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 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 
1 TAKING URGENT ACTION IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
ADJUDICATION 
This book aims to clarify and further develop a legal concept of provisional measures as used by 
international adjudicators dealing with individual complaints about human rights violations. 
Various international adjudicators take action on behalf of individuals facing imminent or ongo-
ing human rights violations. Often the need arises to take action as fast as possible. Such urgent 
action is particularly necessary when the imminent or ongoing violation would cause irreparable 
harm to persons. Examples of irreparable harm are disappearances, torture or executions. 
An urgent action to prevent such irreparable harm generally takes place in the form of a 
message, sent as quickly as possible, to the State concerned, calling upon it to prevent the alleged 
imminent violation. If a United Nations (UN) Special Rapporteur, such as the Special Rapporteur 
on Extra-Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions (hereinafter: Special Rapporteur on Execu-
tions),1 sends such a message, it is usually called an ‘urgent appeal’. On the other hand, if it is 
sent during the course of judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, it is called an interim or provi-
sional measure. Such measure may traditionally be defined as a measure taken (or ‘indicated’)2 by 
an adjudicator and sent to the State concerned in order to safeguard the rights of the petitioner 
pending the final determination of the case. In international law the terms ‘interim measures’ and 
‘provisional measures’ are used interchangeably,3 but the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) speaks of provisional measures (Article 41) and this is the term generally used in this 
book. An exception is made only when discussing the practice of the Inter-American Commission 
on Human Rights because this Commission uses the term ‘precautionary measures’ to distinguish 
its own provisional measures from those of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.4 
                                                 
1  Such Rapporteurs are independent experts appointed by the Chairperson of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights, a body of State representatives. They are appointed as part of the thematic 
proceedings based on the UN Charter. In relation to complaints sent to these Rapporteurs by 
individuals or NGOs reference is often made to more ‘humanitarian’, ‘Charter-based 
proceedings’ in order to distinguish them from the ‘treaty based’ individual complaint 
proceedings, based on specific treaties such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights. 
2  This term is found in Article 41(1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Several 
other adjudicators have copied its use. Generally the term ‘indicate’ is used to refer to the process 
of communicating a provisional measure to the State concerned. The meaning of this term in the 
context of provisional measures has been controversial. In its LaGrand decision (Germany v. 
United States) of 27 June 2001, the International Court of Justice has now clarified its own use of 
the term. See Chapter I on the ICJ’s provisional measures to protect persons. 
3  The 1978 Rules of the International Court of Justice use the term provisional measures (articles 
73-78), but the title of the subsection relating to Article 41 Statute is ‘Interim Protection’: Part III, 
Section D (Incidental Proceedings), Subsection 1. 
4  See Chapter II, section 4 on provisional measures in the Inter-American system. The 
‘precautionary measures’ taken by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights during the 
course of adjudication are simply provisional measures by another name. They do not refer to the 
 General Introduction 
xxx 
The idea of provisional measures is based on a procedure used in national jurisdictions 
where an individual may, pending litigation, request a court to provide for preventive measures, 
injunctions, or other relief. A decision to take such measures does not prejudice the eventual legal 
determination of the conflict. It is relief pendente lite.  
Various international adjudicators have the power to ‘indicate’, ‘take’, ‘issue’ or ‘use’ pro-
visional measures during their proceedings. It can be necessary to use them pending international 
proceedings in order to preserve the respective rights of the parties or to prevent aggravation of 
the dispute. The most prominent international adjudicator making use of provisional measures is 
the ICJ.5 Although individuals cannot appeal to that Court, its procedures are nevertheless rele-
vant for conceptual reasons. Furthermore, some of the ICJ’s case law on provisional measures, 
such as the Hostages case,6 the Genocide Convention case7 and Armed activities on the territory 
of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda),8 has dealt with the issue of irreparable harm to persons,9 an 
issue directly relevant to human rights law. The Court has even indicated provisional measures in 
order to postpone the execution by one State of a national of another State.10 Other adjudicators 
with no specific human rights competence taking provisional measures are the International Tri-
bunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS),11 the European Union’s European Court of Justice (ECJ)12 
and international (arbitral) tribunals in commercial law.13  
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACHR) and European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) and supervisory bodies to human rights treaties,14 such as the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), can indi-
cate provisional measures in order to avert a deterioration of the alleged victim’s position.15 Hu-
man rights courts as well as other supervisory bodies to human rights treaties with an individual 
complaint mechanism are adjudicators determining a legal conflict between an individual and a 
State on the basis of law and rules of procedure.16 They have used provisional measures as part of 
their judicial function.17 
                                                                                                                       
‘precautionary principle’. See Chapter I, section 5.3.3 and Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk), 
discussing the relationship between provisional measures and the precautionary principle. 
5  See Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 
6  ICJ Case concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Order 
of 15 December 1979. 
7  ICJ Case concerning application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), Orders of 
8 April 1993 and 13 September 1993; see further Higgins (1997). 
8  ICJ Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000. 
9  The various reasons for provisional measures given by the ICJ are discussed more closely in 
Chapter I.  
10  ICJ Case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. United States 
of America), Order of 9 April 1998; LaGrand (Germany v. United States), Order of 5 March 
1999 and Judgment of 27 June 2001 and Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. US), 
Order of 5 February 2003 and Judgment of 31 March 2004.  
11  See Article 290 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and Article 25 of Annex VI. 
12  See Articles 242 and 243 EC Treaty. 
13  The case law of the ECJ and of international tribunals in commercial law falls outside the scope 
of this book. 
14  These are often called quasi-judicial bodies. 
15  This research will show that provisional measures can be used also to protect others than the 
petitioner. 
16  By analogy, according to the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) a ‘tribunal’ is a body 
exercising judicial functions, established by law to determine matters within its competence on 
the basis of rules of law and in accordance with proceedings conducted in a prescribed manner, 
see e.g. ECtHR Sramek v. Austria, Judgment of 22 October 1984, §36 and Le Compte, Van 
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The first urgent decisions of human rights adjudicators provide the historical background of 
the practice by human rights adjudicators. The HRC used so called ‘informal provisional meas-
ures’ in the 1970s and 1980s, requesting information on medical treatment in detention or on the 
whereabouts of alleged victims without explicitly invoking its rule on provisional measures, as 
well as a formal provisional measure to halt an expulsion, dating from 1977.18 In the 1970s and 
1980s the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights intervened informally on behalf of 
disappeared persons.19 Since 1988, virtually as of its first case, the Inter-American Court has 
ordered provisional measures to protect against death threats.20 The European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) initially did not often use provisional measures because the Commission (when it 
was still active) normally did so. The earliest known occasion on which the European Commis-
sion on Human Rights used (informal) provisional measures was to prevent the execution of 
Nicolas Sampson in 1958. The European Court did use them to halt the extradition of Soering in 
January 1989.21 
For one of the systems discussed in this book, the Inter-American human rights system, Pro-
fessor Buergenthal, President of the Inter-American Court between 1985 and 198722 has ex-
pressed the importance of provisional measures as follows: 
“It is quite clear that the power of the Court to grant provisional measures has proved to be a 
very useful enforcement tool in the inter-American system. In a region of the world where 
serious violations of human rights are by no means a thing of the past, provisional measures can 
save lives, and they have done so on a number of occasions”.23 
Professor Cançado Trindade, President of the Inter-American Court between 1999 and 2003,24 
has referred to provisional measures as a ‘procedural remedy of crucial importance to the 
protection of the fundamental rights of the human person’.25 
                                                                                                                       
Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 23 June 1981, §55. This reasoning may apply to international 
adjudicators such as the Human Rights Committee as well. See further Chapter XVI (Legal 
status). 
17  While the theoretical issue of what should be the role of the judiciary and what powers it should 
have in a democracy is relevant, its discussion would require a separate study, especially in 
relation to the specific nature of the international system with its additional legitimacy problems. 
This study is based on the premise that the international system of supervision of human rights 
treaties – with all its flaws – is a given for those States that have accepted it. 
18  See Chapters V (Expulsion), VI (Disappearances) and VII (Health in detention). 
19  Interview by the author with Juan Méndez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. See further 
Chapters II (Systems) and VI (Disappearances).  
20  IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, and Godínez Cruz Cases, Orders 
for provisional measures of 15 and 19 January 1988. 
21  ECtHR Soering v. UK Judgment of 7 July 1989. See further Chapter IV (Part 2), discussing the 
early case of Bönisch v. Austria, Judgment of 6 May 1985. 
22  Member of the Court from 1979 to 1991. 
23  Buergenthal (1994), p. 93. 
24  Member of the Court from 1995 to 2006. 
25  Cançado Trindade, preface by the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to 
Provisional Measures Compendium II (2000), p. XVII, §29. See further, e.g., Cançado Trindade 
(2003), pp. 162-168 and Pasqualucci (1993), pp. 803-864, in particular pp. 844-846. 
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2 PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION: CHANGING 
THE TRADITIONAL CONCEPT? 
This book examines the legal concept of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. 
Apart from the conceptual questions raised by these provisional measures, there is their evident 
practical significance. Yet, a systematic analysis of the situations in which they may be relied on 
is currently lacking.26 Such analysis of the nature of the various types of provisional measures is 
of importance to alleged victims,27 to organisations representing them, as well as to the adjudica-
tors themselves. 
The question arises whether the concept of provisional measures has been adapted to fit the 
context of international human rights law or is generally the same as under traditional interna-
tional law. The purposes of provisional measures as used under the UN and the regional human 
rights systems may differ from the traditional purposes of provisional measures as used by the 
ICJ. It is assumed, for instance, that one traditional purpose, preventing irreparable harm, is more 
relevant in human rights cases than are other purposes such as preventing aggravation of the 
dispute or preserving the respective rights of the parties.  
Thus Chapter I examines the concept as applied by two international tribunals with no spe-
cific human rights mandate: the ICJ (and its predecessor) and ITLOS. The subsequent chapters 
analyse the practice with regard to specific aspects of provisional measures (set out in section 4 of 
this introduction) of certain international and regional human rights adjudicators (mentioned in 
section 5). This is done in order to determine whether it is possible to identify a core to the con-
cept of provisional measures that the human rights systems have in common and, if so, what this 
common core entails. Clearly the book does not only deal with the similarities and differences 
between the various systems that are immediately apparent from the treaty texts and Rules of 
Procedure but also discusses common developments, a certain convergence of approaches to-
wards the concept of provisional measures in human rights cases. At the same time the scope of 
application, or outer limits, of provisional measures could vary from system to system. The exi-
gencies of the situation in a specific region or the particular task of an adjudicator in a given 
system may require the use of provisional measures that go beyond the core common to all sys-
tems.  
This book discusses the extent of the convergence or divergences in the approaches of the 
adjudicators. It examines not only the core common to provisional measures in the human rights 
systems, but also the outer limits of such measures. In this respect it may contribute to the ongo-
ing discussion about the proliferation of international adjudicators and the risk of fragmentation of 
international law.  
The outer limits are assumed to be wider in a regional rather than in an international system, 
due to the greater interest in mutual compliance displayed by other States parties and because in a 
regional system the adjudicator is geographically and culturally somewhat closer to the situations 
pending before it. Often a regional adjudicator may be able to apply mechanisms for fact-finding, 
monitoring and conciliation in a more focused way as well.  
To the extent that there is a difference between the concept of provisional measures in hu-
man rights adjudication and in other situations the book discusses whether the concept as used by 
human rights adjudicators could also be relevant to adjudicators with a general competence, not 
limited to human rights issues, when they are dealing with issues involving irreparable harm to 
                                                 
26  The secondary literature on provisional measures in international adjudication that does exist, 
deals mostly with the ICJ. See Chapter I. There are some articles dealing with the practice of 
using provisional measures in some of the human rights systems. See Chapter II. 
27  In practice the term ‘alleged victim’ is used also in the context of potential victims. Obviously, in 
the context of an impending violation, if the provisional measure works as intended, the violation 
does not take place at all or at least is not continued.  
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persons. In this sense this book is part of the discussion about the humanization of international 
law.28 
3 PUBLICATION AND MOTIVATION 
Most human rights adjudicators do not publish or motivate their provisional measures.29 In this 
light the phenomenon that scholars sometimes read more into decisions than may have been 
intended by adjudicators30 applies even more to decisions on provisional measures than to deci-
sions on jurisdiction or merits.31 Even if the adjudicator would publish and motivate them, there is 
obviously little time for contemplation. The urgency of the situation does not allow for exhaustive 
study and discussion. Still, in order to interpret the concept, potential petitioners, States, the adju-
dicator itself in later cases, other adjudicators as well as commentators depend on the information 
made available on the use of provisional measures. Consequently, their interpretations, actions 
and submissions could improve if adjudicators would include reasoning in their decisions on 
provisional measures, as sent to the State and the petitioner. It would also be useful if they would 
make available to the public more information on their use of provisional measures. 
It may be argued that provisional measures in human rights cases do not have to be rea-
soned and the practice of using them does not need to be coherent because they are by definition 
adopted to address a situation of urgency. In that sense they would have a character that would be 
more humanitarian than judicial. Such an argument could explain why provisional measures are 
used in a certain situation vis-à-vis a certain State but not in similar situations vis-à-vis another 
State. The adjudicator may have envisaged something could be achieved exactly in that State but 
not in other States. Apart from the lack of time for elaboration, the wish to maintain maximum 
flexibility may also account for the lack of transparency in the decision-making on provisional 
measures by human rights adjudicators. 
Evidently the above argument is not the approach taken in this book. While the aim of using 
provisional measures is not as such to proclaim the law or have general application, but rather to 
help one or more specific individuals,32 explaining their use and increasing their accessibility is 
likely to make them more persuasive and to enhance their credibility. States and petitioners are 
now often unclear about the types of cases in which they are used. Some flexibility for the adjudi-
cator would indeed remain necessary, but this does not rule out clarification of the use of provi-
sional measures. The aim of flexibility does not justify secrecy and lack of explanation.33 
Sometimes States (including domestic courts) are uncertain about the concept of provisional 
measures. States may invoke arguments applicable not just in the context of provisional measures. 
They may argue that domestic courts are better placed to assess risk of irreparable harm, for 
                                                 
28  See e.g. Van Boven (1982); Simma (1993); Buergenthal (1997); Higgins (1998); Flinterman 
(2000); Kamminga (2001); Seiderman (2001); Meron (2003/2006); Cançado Trindade (2004) and 
Kamminga (2008).  
29  See Chapter II on the human rights systems. 
30  Secretariat staff of the European Commission on Human Rights in Strasbourg (October 1997), 
the HRC in Geneva (October 1998) and the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights in 
Washington D.C. (September/October 2001) have also stressed this. 
31  Thirlway (1994), p. 6 points out with regard to the provisional measures by the ICJ: “Provisional 
measures Orders are prepared under pressure of time and in order to deal with the immediate 
situation”. As a result, he considers that the ‘texts of such Orders should not be put under the 
magnifying glass on the assumption that every word has been weighed’. See also Sztucki (1983), 
p. 278.  
32  See Conclusion Part II (Purpose). 
33  See further Chapter II. 
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instance in expulsion or extradition cases or cases involving indigenous peoples and the environ-
ment. They may also argue that international adjudicators should not interfere in democratic 
decisions, for instance in death penalty cases, or that domestic resources do not allow for certain 
expenditures to be made, for instance in cases involving protection against death threats or access 
to health care. 
Substantiation of the use of provisional measures and making the decisions ordering them 
accessible to the public would help increase their coherence and credibility for everyone in-
volved.34 In the face of a particular threat, information about the use of provisional measures in 
similar cases would provide States and petitioners with some idea about the concept of irreparable 
harm employed by the adjudicator and about the way risks are assessed. It could also be useful to 
know, for instance, the number of times provisional measures are requested by petitioners and the 
number of times they are granted. Knowing in what type of situations adjudicators will intervene 
urgently could be equally useful to NGOs and to State authorities so that they could already an-
ticipate this domestically, making recourse to an international adjudicator unnecessary because 
the situation would already be addressed. This would allow the State to be pro-active in the pro-
tection of human rights. After all, that is what is explicitly required under the respective provi-
sions involving the undertakings of State parties to respect and ensure the rights and provide 
effective remedies and reparations35 and implicitly in the requirement to exhaust domestic reme-
dies.36 Thus, the State would avoid the situation that many similarly situated persons would have 
to resort to international complaint proceedings in urgent cases. 
The relevant information on the practice of the respective systems used for this book is pre-
sented in the subsequent Chapters. The practice of the various human rights adjudicators shows 
that they often do not indicate the criteria for the use of provisional measures, let alone the order 
in which they deal with these criteria, and that their approach is not always coherent. Still, at a 
more abstract level some underlying principles and ideas can be found in the human rights sys-
tems. These have been used to clarify and develop a legal concept of provisional measures in 
human rights cases. These principles and ideas are linked to the existing doctrine on provisional 
measures in general international law.37 Thus, based on more abstract principles that seem to be 
common in the approach of the adjudicators, this book aims to fill gaps in the doctrine.38 
                                                 
34  See further Chapter II on transparency and Chapter XVII on the official responses of States. 
35  See e.g. Article 2 ICCPR, Articles 2 and 6 ICERD, Article 24 CEDAW, Article 2 ICAT, Articles 
1, 13 and 50 ECHR, Articles 1, 2 and 63(1) ACHR and Article 1 ACHRPR. 
36  See e.g. Article 2 OP to the ICCPR, Article 11(3) ICERD, Article 4 OP to the CEDAW, Article 
22(4)(b) ICAT, Article 35(1) ECHR, Article 46(1)(a) ACHR, Articles 50 and 56 ACHRPR and 
Article 6 Protocol African Court. 
37  Several scholars have contributed to the interpretation and development of this doctrine in non 
human rights law. See e.g. Guggenheim (1931 and 1933); Dumbauld (1932); Mendelson (1972-
1973); Oellers-Frahm (1975); Elkind (1981); Sztucki (1983); Collins (1992); Thirlway (1994), 
Merrills (1995); Rosenne (2005) and Brown (2007), pp. 119-151. As noted, within the constraints 
of this book it was not feasible to deal with the extensive case law of arbitral tribunals and the 
European Court of Justice. For an account of the latter see, e.g. De Schutter (2005), pp. 93-130; 
Tridimas (1999); Jacobs (1994), pp. 37-68 and Collins (1992). For an account of the case law of 
arbitral tribunals see e.g. Collins (1992). See Chapter I for a discussion of approach by the PCIJ, 
ICJ and ITLOS. 
38  Given the lack of information available on the practice of the human rights adjudicators with 
regard to provisional measures, in particular their reasoning, the subsequent chapters sometimes 
refer to the arguments of the parties, on the assumption that these played a role in the 
adjudicator’s decision-making. As ICJ Judge Shahabuddeen has observed, it is indeed ‘not proper 
mechanically to impute to the Court the position taken or assumed by counsel, particularly where 
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4 ASPECTS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 
As this book aims to clarify and further develop a legal concept of provisional measures, used by 
international human rights adjudicators, it analyses the choices made by these adjudicators with 
regard to the use of provisional measures. Since the existing records of their decisions to take 
provisional measures, as well as the responses by Addressee States are mostly found in case law, 
it is case law that is used as the main source. This is complemented by some information derived 
from secondary literature, visits of the secretariats/Registries in Washington D.C., San Jose, 
Geneva and Strasbourg39 and, for the HRC, information from the case files in Geneva.40 The 
approach of the various adjudicators is compared, among others as to type of cases in which 
provisional measures are used. Exhaustive discussion is neither possible – most provisional meas-
ures are not published – nor necessary as this book takes a qualitative rather than a quantitative 
approach.  
The cases discussed have been selected because they are informative about a particular as-
pect of provisional measures.41 The book discusses typical cases providing insight into the fea-
tures of provisional measures that the various systems have in common. In addition, it mentions 
similar cases in which other adjudicators indeed confirm the approach taken in these typical cases 
or choose to take a different approach. The book also examines atypical cases (Chapter XI) to 
explore the outer limits of the concept.  
Certain aspects of provisional measures have been selected that seem pertinent both with 
regard to the concept of provisional measures in general and in the context of human rights adju-
dication. These are: the protection required and the relationship with reparation and the (group of) 
beneficiaries; the relevance of admissibility and jurisdiction on the merits, assessment of temporal 
urgency and risk, legal status, the official responses of addressee States and the follow-up by 
adjudicators. The discussion focuses on irreparable harm, an aspect of the concept that may help 
explain the other aspects as well. Thus, the emphasis is on the situations in which human rights 
adjudicators have used provisional measures. Implicitly or explicitly an adjudicator facing a 
request for provisional measures not only determines the applicable purpose of provisional meas-
ures, but also the protection required, the relationship between provisional measures and forms of 
reparation and the group of beneficiaries involved.  
At the same time the adjudicator assesses temporal urgency and risk. Obviously, without the 
competence to use provisional measures it would be a fruitless exercise to consider whether they 
are warranted. In that sense the competence or jurisdiction to use provisional measures is a pre-
requisite rather than a criterion for the use of provisional measures. With regard to the ICJ the 
relevance of admissibility and jurisdiction on the merits has sometimes been considered to be not 
just an aspect, but a prerequisite as well. Some human rights adjudicators have discussed non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies, (non-)admissibility of the claim and the duration of provisional 
measures as well as the role of reservations in cases in which provisional measures were used. 
                                                                                                                       
the Court has not spoken’. ‘On the other hand’, he noted ‘it is equally not right to seek to 
appreciate the positions taken by the Court abstracted from their forensic context’. “As is well 
known, it is frequently the case that recourse to the arguments of counsel is necessary for an 
understanding of what in fact a court was doing”. Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in 
Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991.  
39  Washington D.C., September-October 2001; San José Costa Rica, October-December 2001; 
Geneva, October 1998, April and October 2002; and Strasbourg, October 1997. See also Chapter 
II (Systems). 
40  A reason to pay particular attention to the practice of the HRC lies in the special difficulty of 
obtaining information on the use of and rationale for its provisional measures. Much information 
was derived from the case files rather than from publicly available documents. See Chapter II.  
41  See about purposive sampling Patton (2002), pp. 230-243.  
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While these discussions have some bearing on the concept of provisional measures, it is obvious 
from the practice that admissibility and jurisdiction on the merits are not a prerequisite for the use 
of provisional measures in human rights cases.42 
In addition, the adjudicator considers the legal status of provisional measures, the responses 
of the Addressee State in the past and the best ways to monitor compliance. A separate discussion 
of each of these aspects is important in order to understand the concept of provisional measures in 
human rights adjudication. Yet in practice they obviously must be taken into account simultane-
ously. After all, in the concept of provisional measures procedural and substantive law are inter-
twined.43 
A question that sometimes arises is whether the adjudicator is the appropriate body to deal 
with the situation on an urgent basis.44 If a request for provisional measures is made the adjudica-
tor itself probably cannot avoid taking this policy question into account, at least to some extent. 
Individual petitioners could take it into account in order to find out what would be the most ap-
propriate course of action to avoid irreparable harm and whether this includes resorting to interna-
tional adjudicators. Petitioners could take into account as well the anticipated impact of the adju-
dicator’s use of provisional measures on future cases and the responses of States.45 
In addition to examining the choices by the adjudicators with regard to the use of provi-
sional measures, classical legal research is applied: finding and analysing relevant law with regard 
to provisional measures (case law as well as the applicable standards and rules of procedure), 
comparing the jurisprudence in order to find the underlying rationale for the use of provisional 
measures. This is then put in a conceptual framework interpreting the convergence and diver-
gence of the practice of the various adjudicators with regard to provisional measures. This frame-
work is based, on the one hand, on the factual question whether two or more adjudicators have 
used provisional measures in a given context (e.g. halting executions) and on the other hand on 
the underlying rationale that the provisional measures of the various adjudicators appear to have 
in common. 
5 HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS  
The Human Rights Committee (HRC) is the only adjudicator in a system that is applicable to 
States in various regions of the world.46 Its practice serves as a basis for the discussion of the 
common core of provisional measures. Apart from the HRC the most important UN adjudicator 
whose cases are discussed is the Committee against Torture (CAT). A discussion of the practice 
of CAT as well as that of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) helps clarify the assess-
                                                 
42  See Chapter I (in Part I ‘Setting’) on this aspect of the general concept and Chapter XIV (in Part 
III ‘Consequences’) with regard to human rights adjudication. 
43  The Inter-American Court considers its provisional measures jurisdictional rather than 
procedural. Maybe the point where substantive and procedural law meet in order to prevent 
irreparable harm could be called a ‘jurisdictional guarantee’.  
44  See also Part II on the purpose of provisional measures and the discussion in Chapter I on non-
aggravation of the dispute including the relevance of simultaneous diplomatic activities. 
45  Sometimes NGOs are themselves the petitioner, but not the victims, as in the Inter-American and 
African systems, see Chapter II. 
46  Of the international treaties the ICCPR is the only one comparable to the regional conventions in 
the range of rights involved. The only other international human rights adjudicator with an 
established practice of using provisional measures is the Committee against Torture, but this 
involves a single-issue treaty. As of yet there is no (extensive) practice of using provisional 
measures by the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Committee on 
the Elimination of Discrimination against Women. 
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ment of risk before using provisional measures in non-refoulement cases.47 The ECtHR, more-
over, has recently elaborated on the legal status of provisional measures, making reference to the 
practice of some other adjudicators as well.48 The most important regional system, however, is the 
Inter-American system. This is the only system with a clearly developed practice of dealing with 
urgent cases. The practice of the Inter-American Commission and Court helps clarify the group of 
beneficiaries of provisional measures, the specificity of these measures – ordering to refrain from 
action or instead to take positive action – their purpose as well as their relationship to obligations 
on the merits and reparation.49 
To the extent information is available, a few references are made to the African human 
rights system and its provisional measures.50 As noted, the case law of the ECtHR and the former 
European Commission is mainly relevant with regard to the legal status of provisional measures 
and assessment of risk in non-refoulement cases, although some atypical cases are discussed as 
well (Chapter XI). Finally, a brief reference is made to the approach of the Bosnia Human Rights 
Chamber, established under the Dayton Peace Agreement, particularly in relation to forced evic-
tion and cultural rights. In its application of provisional measures this Chamber interprets the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in a different way than the European Court of 
Human Rights (ECtHR).51 
Apart from an occasional reference to the urgent actions by UN thematic mechanisms, such 
as the Special Rapporteur against Executions and the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights De-
fenders, an examination of other types of urgent actions not constituting provisional measures is 
beyond the scope of this book.52 Thus, the urgent actions by the UN High Commissioner on Hu-
man Rights, by country mechanisms, by the ILO, preventive action (or preventive diplomacy) by 
the UN Secretary-General, urgent actions by the Security Council in individual cases,53 and EU, 
Commonwealth and OSCE actions, most of them more ‘humanitarian’ than adjudicatory, will not 
be discussed. Urgent procedures before national courts, such as summary proceedings and injunc-
tions, have likewise been excluded from this research.54 
For several of the human rights systems, the lack of direct information necessitates an ap-
proach drawing information from the rights claimed, the decisions on the merits and reparations 
in the cases in which the adjudicators took provisional measures. In other words, information on 
                                                 
47  See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
48  See Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
49  See Chapters XII and XIII. 
50  This necessarily is brief given the lack of information on the individual petitions dealt with by the 
Commission supervising the African Convention on Human and People’s Rights (ACHPR). 
51  Within the scope of this book the specific human rights procedures of international governance 
applicable to Kosovo are not discussed.  
52  The independent experts based their activities on international rules, but they often use more 
diplomatic methods than the treaty monitoring bodies to convince States to respect these rules. 
Regularly they request governments to act in a certain way, or abstain from action, ‘for 
humanitarian reasons’. It can be inferred from their yearly reports to the United Nations Human 
Rights Commission that (thematic) Special Rapporteurs and Working Groups often receive more, 
and more positive replies from governments to their urgent appeals than to their normal 
communications. See Van Boven (1994), pp. 72-73 referring to the 1990 and 1992 reports by 
several Charter-based mechanisms. See also, e.g., Decaux (2005), pp. 241-275 and debate, pp. 
277-281; Rodley (2001), pp. 279-283 and Van Boven (1995), pp. 98-105. 
53  For instance in relation to imminent executions of anti-apartheid activists in South Africa.  
54  Obviously provisional measures ordered by international adjudicators find their way back to 
domestic courts, which may implement them through injunctions, etc. See also Chapter XVII 
(Official responses). 
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the rationale of their provisional measures often is construed from the case law, rather than taken 
directly from it.  
6 THE COMMON CORE AND OUTER LIMITS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES: AN 
OUTLINE OF THE BOOK 
While some theoretical works are available on provisional measures in general, writings on the 
theory of provisional measures in human rights cases are scarce. Part I of this book consists of 
two chapters. The first Chapter discusses the concept of provisional measures in traditional inter-
national law, as used in adjudication of conflicts between States. In this respect the current prac-
tice of the ICJ and the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) may already show 
how the traditional concept has evolved. This Chapter distinguishes those situations in which 
provisional measures aim to protect individuals, with a focus on their use to halt executions. 
Subsequently, Chapter II briefly sets out the use of provisional measures by human rights adjudi-
cators in the context of the different human rights treaties. While this book is based on the prem-
ise that the possibility to resort to provisional measures is part of the judicial function,55 this 
Chapter discusses the competence of each adjudicator to use provisional measures, based on the 
relevant treaty text and Rules of Procedure. For each system it also refers to promptness and 
transparency of decision-making. It briefly notes the types of situations in which provisional 
measures are used in each system (Chapter II). Parts II and III are organised by aspect (situations 
in which provisional measures have been used and the concept of irreparable harm; protective 
measures and relationship obligations on the merits and with reparation; beneficiaries; admissibil-
ity and jurisdiction; assessment of temporal urgency and risk; legal status; official responses of 
addressee States and follow-up) in order to find the common core and outer limits of provisional 
measures in human rights adjudication.  
Part II focuses on the situations in which provisional measures are used, culminating in a 
conclusion on the purpose of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. There are situa-
tions that have triggered provisional measures in most of the systems. In other situations only one 
or two adjudicators have, thus far, used provisional measures. An attempt is made to assess the 
relevance of these cases for the practice of the other human rights adjudicators. Chapters III-XI 
discuss the following situations: halting executions, halting corporal punishment, halting expul-
sion or extradition, timely intervention in disappearance cases, timely intervention in detention 
situations involving risks to health, timely intervention to deal with death threats and harassment, 
ensuring procedural rights to protect the right to life and personal integrity, protecting cultural 
rights of indigenous peoples, halting mass expulsion, halting internal displacement or forced 
eviction and other, more incidental, cases that may help establish the outer limits of the concept of 
provisional measures. Chapter XII on protection deals with the substantive obligations of States. 
It is based on the situations discussed in the previous chapters. On the one hand it focuses on the 
specificity of the provisional measures and the question whether action (positive obligations) or 
abstention is required. On the other hand it discusses the relationship between provisional meas-
ures and obligations on the merits as well as forms of reparation. It also deals with the beneficiar-
ies of provisional measures, representation and consultation and the addressees of provisional 
measures. Part II concludes with a substantive discussion of the purpose of provisional measures. 
Part III deals with what could be seen as the consequences of the findings regarding the 
purpose of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. Chapter XIV discusses jurisdiction 
on the merits and admissibility. Chapter XV deals with assessment of temporal urgency and risk 
                                                 
55  See also Chapter XVI (Legal Status). 
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and Chapter XVI with the legal status of provisional measures. Recent case law has drawn inter-
national attention to the latter aspect of the concept.56 
Another question with regard to provisional measures in human rights adjudication is 
whether (and how) they actually work. This is a question of causality that falls outside the scope 
of this research. Nevertheless, the available case law provides some information on the official 
responses of addressee States (discussed in Chapter XVII) and the follow-up by adjudicators 
(Chapter XVIII). Rather than analysing causality as such this book simply discusses this informa-
tion, as this may help clarify the legal concept of provisional measures in human rights cases.  
Exactly because provisional measures in human rights adjudication concern the fate of hu-
man beings at risk, their individual situations and narratives have been the points of departure in 
this book. Still, for the sake of presenting the concept of provisional measures, the stories of the 
people involved have sometimes been split up over different Chapters. Nevertheless, the course of 
some of these stories may be followed throughout the Chapters, discussing various aspects of the 
concept. 
By way of conclusion this book presents the common core of provisional measures in hu-
man rights adjudication and their outer limits and discusses what steps could be taken to improve 
the functioning of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. The latter is based, among 
others, on the best practices found in the various systems. It does this by taking into account, 
where relevant, the following criteria to determine how provisional measures could best assist a 
beneficiary: accessibility, motivation and consistency, responsiveness to the specific situation, 
consultation and follow-up. The criteria of accessibility, motivation and consistency have been 
selected for use in this study as they are thought to make provisional measures more convincing 
vis-à-vis addressee States. Responsiveness to the specific situation and consultation are consid-
ered necessary for the effectiveness of these measures in protecting the individual and follow-up 
by the adjudicators is used as a criterion because it has generally been regarded essential in treaty 
monitoring.57  
 
                                                 
56  See e.g. ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001 and ECtHR (Grand Chamber) 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Judgment of 4 February 2005. This confirmed the first 
section’s Judgment of 6 February 2003 in Mamatkulov v. Turkey, reversing Cruz Varas and 
Others v. Sweden, Judgment of 20 March 1991. 
57  On the general importance of follow-up in human rights cases see e.g. Boerefijn (1999), pp. 101-
112.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
This Part examines the setting of the concept of provisional measures as developed by human 
rights adjudicators. This setting provides the basis for an examination of the purpose of provi-
sional measures (Part II), as well as the impact of the irreparable nature of the harm on the aspects 
of jurisdiction and admissibility, immediacy and risk and legal status (Part III) and the responses 
by States and the follow-up by the adjudicators (Part IV). 
Implicitly or explicitly the use of provisional measures by the human rights adjudicators ap-
pears to have been inspired by the practice of the ICJ. While obviously the humanization of inter-
national law is expressed in the practice of the human rights adjudicators, the practice of the ICJ 
reflects this humanization as well. In order to see to what extent the human rights adjudicators 
have adapted the traditional concept of provisional measures this study takes as a point of depar-
ture the ICJ practice with regard to provisional measures. At the same time it discusses the fact 
that to some extent the ICJ itself has taken into account the special position of the individual as 
well (Chapter I). Among others Chapter I discusses the authority to order provisional measures in 
adjudication of conflicts between States, issues of promptness and transparency of decision-
making and the purpose of provisional measures in general international law. It deals with the 
relation to the merits, the problem of prejudgment, the protective measures required and their 
relation to reparations. Furthermore it addresses the question who are the beneficiaries, the rele-
vance of jurisdiction on the merits, the assessment of urgency, the legal status, the official re-
sponses of addressee States and the follow-up by the ICJ and ITLOS. 
Before examining what the use of provisional measures may have in common in all the sys-
tems, it is necessary to examine how these measures function in each specific system. The par-
ticularities of the systems may help explain differences in the practice developed with regard to 
provisional measures. Chapter II introduces the various human rights adjudicators, putting their 
use of provisional measures in the context of the specific human rights system in which they 
operate. The chapter concludes by more specifically discussing the authority to use provisional 
measures, publication and motivation of these measures and convergence and divergence of case 
law. The latter is an issue relevant to the question of the ‘common core’ and ‘outer limits’ of the 
concept of provisional measures, discussed in Part II and to the legal status of these measures, 
discussed in Part III. 
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 CHAPTER I 
 DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF 
 PROVISIONAL MEASURES BY THE ICJ AND ITLOS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter discusses the development of the traditional concept of provisional measures, as 
used in adjudication of conflicts between States. It focuses on the practice of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) and its predecessor the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ), 
with an occasional reference to the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea (ITLOS). Both 
are international adjudicators not specifically focussing on human rights, one a court of general 
jurisdiction, the other dealing with the law of the sea. As noted in the Introduction to this book, 
the question arises whether the concept of provisional measures has been adapted to fit the 
context of international human rights law or is generally the same as under traditional 
international law. The assumption is that the traditional concept of provisional measures differs 
from that developed by the UN and regional human rights adjudicators because the purpose is 
different. Thus this chapter focuses on the (development of) the traditional purpose of provisional 
measures by the ICJ and ITLOS. 
The chapter first discusses the authority to order provisional measures in adjudication of 
conflicts between States. It also briefly refers to the issues of promptness and transparency of 
decision-making. Subsequently it deals with the purpose of provisional measures in general 
international law. It discusses separately those situations in which provisional measures by the 
ICJ aim to protect individuals. In fact the protection of the individual already played some role in 
the case law of the PCIJ. Nevertheless this chapter focuses on their more recent use to halt 
executions. It then refers to the relation to the merits, prejudgment, the protective measures 
required and their relation to reparations. Furthermore it addresses the beneficiaries, the relevance 
of jurisdiction on the merits, assessment of urgency, legal status, the official responses of 
addressee States and the (relative lack of) follow-up by the ICJ.  
2 THE AUTHORITY TO USE PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
2.1 Introduction 
Article 41 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) provides in its first paragraph:  
“The Court shall have the power to indicate, if it considers that circumstances so require, any 
provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respective rights of either party”.1  
As Merrills has noted, partly because of its brevity Article 41 is one of the most difficult articles 
of the ICJ Statute. It leaves unanswered ‘questions concerning both the basis of interim measures 
                                                 
1 The relevant Rules of Court are Articles 73-78 in section D. (Incidental Proceedings, Subsection 
1. Interim protection), reproduced in 17 ILM 1286 (1978). 
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and the scope and exercise of the power’.2 This chapter first deals with the authority to use 
provisional measures proprio motu, then with the issues of transparency and promptness and the 
authority to delegate the use of provisional measures. 
2.2 Proprio motu use 
Adjudicators normally take provisional measures following a request by a party. Nevertheless, 
several adjudicators can do so proprio motu as well. The term proprio motu seems to be used to 
refer to the situation in which there was no (specific) request by one of the parties to use 
provisional measures, but the adjudicator used them on its own motion. The term ex officio is 
always used together with terms such as ‘authority’ or ‘power’. In other words here the emphasis 
is on the authority of the adjudicator to use provisional measures. This relates to the function of 
the adjudicator. In fact such an adjudicator has the authority ex officio to use provisional measures 
proprio motu.3 Sometimes a reference to provisional measures taken proprio motu seems to 
denote a discretionary power to do so while the reference to provisional measures taken ex officio 
denotes an obligation on the part of the adjudicator. 
In 1932 Dumbauld wrote that in cases already brought before it, in accordance with Article 
40 PCIJ Statute, the PCIJ had the power to indicate provisional measures ex officio. However, if 
the main action had not yet been brought, it could not do so on its own initiative. In passing he 
pointed out that (one of) the parties could request provisional measures already before the main 
action was brought, but without such request the Court could not indicate them in such case.4  
Different from the PCIJ the present Court can only order provisional measures once the 
complaint itself has already been instituted.5 Like the PCIJ, the ICJ may equally indicate 
provisional measures proprio motu ‘at any time’ (Article 75(1) of the Rules of Court). Moreover, 
the substance of the measures may be different from that asked by the parties. Thus far the ICJ 
itself has only once indicated provisional measures proprio motu.6 It has only done so in the 
                                                 
2  Merrills (1995), p. 90. The ICJ has never used provisional measures in the course of advisory 
proceedings. See about this power Sztucki (1983), pp. 136-143. See also Merrills (1995), p. 145 
referring to the Applicability of the obligation to arbitrate under section 21 of the UN 
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Order of 9 March 1988 (holding that in the 
circumstances of the case it was not appropriate for the Court ‘to consider whether or not 
provisional measures may be indicated in proceedings on a request for an advisory opinion’). 
3  Sometimes the term sua sponte is used instead of proprio motu. 
4  Dumbauld (1932), p. 155.  
5  Thirlway (1994), p. 17 notes that different from some other international tribunals, there must be 
an established case before the ICJ. Sztucki (1983), p. 13 refers to Mixed Arbitral Tribunals 
allowing requests for provisional measures before an application is filed. 
6  See ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999. See Merrills (1995), p. 143, 
referring to the Orders until 1995. The Orders decided by the ICJ subsequent to 1995 were 
equally on request of a party, Rosenne (2005), p. 177. In 1975 Oellers-Frahm, pp. 14-16 argued 
that the possibility of ex officio use would remain a dead letter because, according to the author, 
at the stage of provisional measures the Court does not undertake a summary analysis of the 
conflict in light of the need for protection of certain rights. Yet once the Court is (made) aware 
that it is at the stage of provisional measures, it does undertake such a summary analysis. It is 
true, however, that thus far it only dealt with the issue of proprio motu use when the imminence 
of the harm risked would seem to require provisional measures without first organising a hearing. 
In the Bosnia case such use of Article 75(1) of the Court’s Rules was requested unsuccessfully. 
The Court in fact considered that the parties had made specific requests for provisional measures 
and therefore Article 75(1) did not apply. ICJ Application of the Convention on the prevention 
and punishment of the crime of genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and 
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LaGrand case because Germany had brought the case so close to the actual execution date that a 
hearing could not be held.7 It has used its power to modify or ‘tone down’ the provisional 
measures requested by (one of) the Parties.8 After all Article 75(2) of the Rules of the Court 
stipulates that ‘the Court may indicate measures that are in whole or in part other than those 
requested, or that ought to be taken or complied with by the party which has itself made the 
request’. It invoked this Rule in its Order for provisional measures in the Genocide Convention 
case9 and in Cameroon v. Nigeria.10 It has also included new aspects in its Orders for provisional 
measures, which had not been requested by either of the parties. Judge Ajibola confirmed that the 
‘purpose and content of Article 41 of the Statute is not and cannot be restricted only to the 
preservation of the prospective rights of the parties in a matter like the one before the Court’. 
Thus he voted with the majority of the ICJ on the first operative part of the Order for provisional 
measures in Cameroon v. Nigeria, noting that the situation called for an Order proprio motu 
under Article 75 of the Rules of Court. In this context he emphasized the Court’s power to order 
provisional measures in order to prevent the aggravation or extension of the dispute.11 
According to Judge Laing, in his separate opinion to the Order for provisional measures by 
ITLOS in the M/V ‘Saiga’ case (1998), the ICJ has now affirmed that it has the power to order 
provisional measures to prevent aggravation or extension of the dispute even when the parties did 
not request this. He pointed out that there was no doubt that ITLOS had this authority as well.12 
On the other hand, the next year ad hoc Judge Shearer questioned whether ITLOS could prescribe 
provisional measures not requested by the parties. According to him the situation of ITLOS 
differed significantly from that of the ICJ.13 He noted that Article 290(3) of the UN Convention 
on the Law of the Sea stipulates that the ITLOS could only prescribe, modify or revoke 
provisional measures taken under this article ‘at the request of a party to the dispute and after the 
parties have been given an opportunity to be heard’. He considered, therefore, that ‘if article 89, 
                                                                                                                       
Montenegro)), Order of 13 September 1993 (second request). See Wellens (1998), p. 428 
commenting on this approach. 
7  See ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999. Note that it took a different 
approach here from that taken in the Bosnia case. See also Separate Opinion of President 
Schwebel attached to this Order, still questioning the appropriateness of the use of Article 75(1) 
of the Rules in this context.  
8  See e.g. Merrills (1995), p. 144 and Oellers-Frahm (1975), p. 15 (the latter noting that for those 
adjudicators that, unlike the ICJ, are not allowed to order provisional measures different from 
those requested (ultra petita), ex officio authority may be used to change the protective measures 
required). See section 3.7 (Protection). 
9  ICJ Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 13 September 1993 
(second request). See section 3.3.6 (gross human rights violations).  
10  ICJ Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order 
of 15 March 1996, §§41 and 48. See section 3.3.4 (border conflict cases). 
11  ICJ Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order 
of 15 March 1996, Separate Opinion of Judge Ajibola. He referred to Nicaragua v. US, Order of 
10 May 1984, Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986 and the 
Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (Bosnia 
and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 8 April 1993. See section 3 
on the purpose of provisional measures. 
12  ITLOS Separate Opinion Judge Laing, M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2), Order of 11 March 1998. 
13  He noted that in its Order for provisional measures in the M/V ´Saiga´ (No. 2) case ITLOS 
invoked Article 89(5) of the Rules. This stipulates that it may prescribe measures ‘different in 
whole or in part from those requested’ and that it may indicate ‘the parties which are to take or to 
comply with each measure’. This Rule was modelled on Article 75 of the 1978 ICJ Rules of 
Court.  
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paragraph 5, of the Rules of the Tribunal truly purports to give a power to the Tribunal to act 
beyond the bounds of what has been requested (ultra petita)’, the Rule would not be authorised by 
the Convention and would thus be invalid.  
“If, on the other hand, it is properly to be interpreted as meaning only that the Tribunal may, in 
addition to the alternatives of acceding completely to, or rejecting completely, the requested 
measures, prescribe measures that represent a partial grant or modified version of the requested 
measures, then the rule would be within power. I would include among such permitted 
measures, even if not formally requested by the parties, such “traditional” provisional measures 
as non-aggravation of the dispute, and – in the special circumstances of the present case – the 
measure directing the parties to seek agreement with other States and fishing entities engaged in 
fishing for southern bluefin tuna, since this measure is closely related to other measures sought 
by the parties”.14 
Nevertheless in the MOX Plant case (2001) both ITLOS and the Arbitral Tribunal constituted 
pursuant to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea to deal with this case did consider that they 
may prescribe measures different from those requested by the parties. ITLOS simply referred to 
Article 89(5) of its Rules.15 The Arbitral Tribunal equally referred to this article. It also noted that 
any question of procedure not expressly governed by the Convention or the Rules were to be 
decided by the Tribunal after consulting the parties. Since the parties did not comment on this 
issue the Tribunal considered that it was competent to prescribe provisional measures other than 
those sought by a party.16 
                                                 
14  ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases, (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), 27 August 
1999, Separate Opinion of Judge ad hoc Shearer.  
15  ITLOS the MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order for provisional measures of 3 December 
2001, §83. 
16  Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to Article 287, and Article 1 of Annex VII, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the dispute concerning the MOX Plant, 
international movement of radioactive materials, and the protection of the marine environment of 
the Irish Sea, The MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order No. 3, suspension of proceedings on 
jurisdiction and merits and request for further provisional measures, 24 June 2003, §43. The 
Arbitral Tribunal stated ‘its willingness’, during the hearings in June 2003, ‘to consider the 
possibility of prescribing provisional measures if either Party considers that such measures are 
necessary to preserve the respective rights of the Parties or to prevent serious harm to the 
environment’. It did so after it announced its decision to suspend further proceedings in the case 
on the basis of considerations of mutual respect and comity, given possible proceedings before 
the European Court of Justice. Subsequently Ireland indeed submitted a request for further 
provisional measures. See Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to Article 287, and Article 1 of 
Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the dispute concerning 
the MOX Plant, international movement of radioactive materials, and the protection of the marine 
environment of the Irish Sea, The MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order No.3, suspension of 
proceedings on jurisdiction and merits and request for further provisional measures, 24 June 
2003, §§31 and 32. See also ITLOS Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of 
Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Order of 8 October 2003. 
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2.3 Transparency, promptness and delegation 
The Orders of the ICJ are published and include reasoning.17 Obviously provisional measures 
should be taken in a timely fashion.18 Sometimes this necessitates delegation of the authority to 
take provisional measures. Moreover, the discussion on transparency and due process is also 
influenced by considerations of promptness. Article 74 of the ICJ’s Rules stipulates that requests 
for provisional measures shall have priority over all other cases and that the Court shall be 
convened ‘forthwith’ and ‘as a matter of urgency’. Pending the meeting of the Court, its President 
may call upon the parties to take into account the request. Merrills points out that until 1995 the 
period between the request and the Order granting provisional measures varied from eight to 31 
days. For the cases in which the ICJ refused the request the period ranged from 42 to 68 days.19 
More recently it took 27 days in Avena, one day in LaGrand and six days in Breard.20 Notice for 
Orders for provisional measures shall go ‘forthwith’ to the Parties and the Security Council.21 In 
the Lockerbie and Genocide Convention cases the ICJ only dealt with the request for provisional 
measures after it had notified all Parties to the Montreal Convention and the Convention against 
Genocide, respectively, of the filing of the applications.22 Given the urgency involved, sending 
these notifications after the proceedings on provisional measures would seem more appropriate, 
especially in cases involving the fate of human beings.23 
It is the ICJ President who fixes a date for the hearing about the request for provisional 
measures. In some cases (s)he arranges a hearing within a very short period of time. Thirlway 
mentions the Hostages case (ten days) and contrasts this to the Great Belt case (40 days). He 
notes that the President presumably takes into account the degree of urgency as well as other 
material considerations, such as audi alteram partem. The Parties must have the opportunity to 
attend the hearing.24  
As noted, the possibility of delegation was introduced in order to address the need for 
promptness.  
Initially the Presidents of the PCIJ and ICJ had the power to make provisional interim 
orders. In 1927 President Max Huber granted the request for provisional measures in the Sino-
Belgian Treaty case.25 Since the Rules of Court of 1978, Rule 74(4) stipulates that the President 
can only send a telegram requesting the States involved ‘to act in such a way as will enable any 
                                                 
17  Since 1999 the Orders for provisional measures (and the written and oral pleadings) are easily 
accessible on the website of the ICJ (<www.icj-cij.org>). The Court’s judgments and provisional 
measures, as well as the texts of the hearings are made available on the internet in full. The PCIJ 
case law is also made available on this website. ITLOS case law is available at <www.itlos.org>. 
18  About promptness see e.g. Merrills (1995), p. 142. About assessment of temporal and material 
urgency see section 5. 
19  Merrills (1995), p. 142. 
20  See further section 3.3 on the ICJ’s provisional measures to protect persons. 
21  Article 73(2) ICJ Rules of Procedure; Article 94 ITLOS Rule of Procedure; see further Rosenne 
(2005), pp. 153-154. In exceptional cases the Geneva human rights adjudicators might at some 
point decide to do the same, but it remains to be seen whether the Security Council will formally 
deal with the information received. On follow up by the human rights adjudicators see Chapter 
XVIII. 
22  See further Rosenne (2005), p. 166. 
23  See e.g. ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US) and Avena (Mexico v. US). See further Rosenne (2005), 
p. 166. 
24  Thirlway (1994), p. 26.  
25  PCIJ Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 between China and Belgium, Order of 8 
January 1927. See further section 3.3.2. 
 Chapter I 
10 
order the court may make (…) to have its appropriate effects’.26 As Rosenne observes, in all cases 
in which the President sent such a telegram, provisional measures were later used and in those 
cases in which the President did not send telegrams, the ICJ subsequently denied the request for 
provisional measures. The Avena case is an exception: the ICJ used provisional measures to halt 
the execution of several Mexican nationals in the US. The President previously had not sent a 
telegram simply because the execution dates were not imminent.27 Chambers of the ICJ do have 
the power to order provisional measures. In the Frontier Dispute case (1986) between Burkina 
Faso and Mali the Chamber constituted to deal with the dispute indeed did so.28 
Article 29 ICJ Statute stipulates that, (w)ith a view to the speedy dispatch of business’, the 
Court ‘shall form annually a chamber composed of five judges which, at the request of the parties, 
may hear and determine cases by summary procedure’. While this Chamber is formed annually it 
does not appear to be used in the context of requests for provisional measures, possibly also 
because provisional measures are generally requested by one of the parties rather than by both 
parties together. 
In the context of requests for provisional measures it may be necessary to streamline the 
standard proceedings in the interest of promptness, as long as both parties have an opportunity to 
address procedural and substantive concerns upon the Court’s first indication of provisional 
measures. In any case both parties must have equal access to information, also at the provisional 
measures stage. Both parties must have the opportunity to be heard.29 Yet, if the respondent does 
not respond or fails to appear this is not an obstacle to the use of provisional measures.30 In 
general the ICJ has tried to allow the parties full opportunity to present their observations on the 
request for provisional measures.31 ‘The most usual practice’, as Dumbauld put it in 1932 (with 
regard to the PCIJ), ‘is to provide for a hearing if the matter is not too urgent’.32 He referred to the 
statement by Judge Guerrero that ‘time might not always permit a hearing’.33 Nevertheless he 
noted that urgency as a result of the applicant party’s ‘lack of diligence’ in making a timely 
                                                 
26  See also Rules 13 and 32. Initially the power was delegated to the President when Court was not 
sitting (1922 Rules of Court, Article 57); later the power could not be delegated (1931 revision of 
the Rules); subsequently the President could ‘take such measures as may appear to him to be 
necessary in order to enable the Court to give an effective decision’ (1936 Rules of Court, Article 
61(3) and 1946 ICJ Rules of Court); the present Rule provides: “Pending the meeting of the 
Court, the President may call upon the parties to act in such a way as will enable any order the 
Court may make on the request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects” (1978 
ICJ Rules of Court: Article 74(4)). See Wellens (1998), pp. 428-429 on the President’s proactive 
use of this power in the Genocide Convention case. 
27  Rosenne (2005), pp. 169-170. For a recent example see also ICJ Press release of 15 August 2008, 
Proceedings instituted by Georgia against Russia, Urgent Communication to the Parties from the 
President under Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of Court. 
28  ICJ Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order for provisional measures of 10 January 
1986. 
29  See e.g. Merrills (1995), p. 143. 
30  See e.g. ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (UK v. Iceland; Germany v. Iceland, Order of 17 August 
1972; US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Order of 15 
December 1979. 
31  See, however, the discussion by Judge Schwebel on the short notice in the LaGrand case 
(Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999. See also Judge Buergenthal in LaGrand case 
(Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001. 
32  Dumbauld (1932), p. 159.  
33  Ibidem.  
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complaint would be ‘duly discounted’ by the Court.34 The LaGrand case shows that the ICJ has 
taken a different approach when the life of an individual is at stake.35 
In 1995 Merrills noted that States without a national as a member of the Court had generally 
insisted on an ad hoc Judge already at the stage of provisional measures, with the exception of 
Nicaragua in the Nicaragua case.36 This trend has continued since 1995, albeit again with some 
exceptions in particularly urgent cases.37 This is consistent with the ICJ statement in the South-
Eastern Greenland case that the presence of ad hoc Judges would depend on the urgency of the 
case.38 
ITLOS normally sends the information about the requests for provisional measures on the 
same day that a party requests them, generally to the relevant Ministry or Secretary of State and to 
the Embassy (or Consulate) of that State in Germany (where the ITLOS is seated).39 It generally 
takes three weeks for it to Order provisional measures. 
ITLOS has elaborated more than the ICJ on the possibilities of delegation. The Tribunal is 
composed of 21 members with a quorum of eleven members. Like the ICJ, annually it forms a 
chamber of five of its members that may hear and determine disputes by summary procedure.40 
Article 25 of the ITLOS Statute provides that ITLOS and its Seabed Disputes Chamber shall both 
have the power to prescribe provisional measures and that this power is delegated to the Chamber 
of Summary Procedure when the Tribunal is not in session or when there are insufficient 
members to constitute a quorum.41 Like the Chamber of the ICJ, this Chamber is composed of the 
President and the Vice-President, ‘acting ex officio’ and three other members.42 ITLOS may adopt 
provisional measures at the request of any party to the dispute and they shall be subject to its 
review and revision.  
Pursuant to Article 16 of the Statute, ITLOS adopted Rules specifying, among others, its 
approach to urgent cases. The Rules stipulate that in case of urgency the President may convene 
the Tribunal at any time.43 If the Tribunal is not sitting it is the President who shall fix the earliest 
                                                 
34  Ibidem. 
35  ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999. See further section 3.3 (protection of the 
individual). 
36  Merrills (1995), p. 145. 
37  Since 1995 in most cases States that did not have a Judge of their nationality in the Court 
proposed an ad hoc Judge already at the provisional measures stage (Land and Maritime 
Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order of 15 March 1996; 
Legality of the use of force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium/Canada/France/Germany/Italy 
/Netherlands/Portugal), Order of 2 July 1999; Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. 
Belgium), Order of 8 December 2000; Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Congo v. 
Rwanda), Order of 10 July 2002; Certain criminal proceedings in France (Congo v. France), 
Order of 18 July 2003; Case concerning pulp mills on the river Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) 
Orders of 13 July 2006 and 23 January 2007. Yet in Breard (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 April 
1998, Avena et al. (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003 and Armed activities on the territory 
of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000 no ad hoc Judges were appointed at the 
provisional measures stage. 
38  PCIJ Legal status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland, Order for provisional measures of 
3 August 1932, p. 280. See also Dumbauld (1932), p. 157 and Rosenne (2005), p. 137.  
39  See e.g. ITLOS MOX plant case, §3. See also Rosenne (2005), p. 154. 
40  See Article 15 Statute of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, also stipulating that 
two alternative members shall be selected for the purpose of replacing members who are unable 
to participate in a particular proceeding.  
41  See e.g. ITLOS Press Release 100, 6 October 2005.  
42  See Article 28 Rules of the Tribunal. For the ICJ see Article 29 ICJ Statute. 
43  Article 41(6) Rules of the Tribunal, adopted 28 October 1997 (amended 15 March and 21 
September 2001).  
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possible date for a hearing. Pending the meeting of the Tribunal he may ‘call upon the parties to 
act in such a way as will enable any order the Tribunal may make on the request for the 
provisional measures to have its appropriate effects’.44 Within 15 days of the prescription of the 
measures, at the written request of a party, the Tribunal shall review or revise them. It may also 
review or revise them proprio motu.45 
3 THE PURPOSE OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL 
LAW 
3.1 Introduction 
Article 41 ICJ Statute gives the ICJ the power to order provisional measures ‘if it considers that 
circumstances so require’. The power to order such measures is discretionary.46 Nevertheless, 
certain criteria have been applied to assess the appropriateness of their use. In that sense, the 
decision to use them is ‘not purely discretionary’.47 Reference is often made to their use to 
prevent irreparable harm and to the criterion of ‘urgency’.48 Obviously the concepts of irreparable 
harm and urgency are interrelated. They can only be understood in light of the rights claimed and 
the possible form of reparation. This raises issues involving the purpose of provisional measures, 
the risk of prejudgment and the question how urgency must be assessed. These issues are 
discussed in different sections. In order to clarify the criteria of irreparable harm and urgency this 
book distinguishes between the purpose of provisional measures and the assessment of temporal 
and material urgency. Temporal urgency relates to immediacy and material urgency to assessment 
of risk. The other criterion is that of irreparable harm, which adjudicators have found difficult to 
define.49 Moreover, this concept is not always explicitly referred to in each international legal 
conflict.50 
This Chapter not only discusses the purpose of preventing irreparable harm, but also other 
traditional purposes. It then discusses the relationship between provisional measures, the rights 
                                                 
44  Article 90(2) and (4) Rules of the Tribunal.  
45  Article 91 Rules of the Tribunal. 
46  See e.g. Sztucki (1983), p. 111; Merrills (1995), p. 109 and with regard to ITLOS, in M/V ‘Saiga’ 
Judge Laing who has pointed out that ‘the view is well known that the power to order provisional 
measures is in principle discretionary’, §6. He notes that such measures are ‘discretionary and 
equitable’ and that the ‘open-ended’ language of the Convention on the Law of the Sea facilitates 
this by stating: ‘if it considers that the circumstances so require’, §27. M/V ‘Saiga’ (N o. 2), 
Order for provisional measures of 11 March 1998, Separate Opinion Judge Laing. 
47  Elkind (1981), p. 209.  
48  See e.g. Rosenne (2005), pp. 135-148; Elkind (1981), pp. 209-219; Sztucki (1983), pp. 104-122; 
Beirlaen (1979-1980), pp. 97-101 and pp. 256-261; Merrills (1995), pp. 106-113 and Thirlway 
(1994), pp. 8-10 and pp. 25-27. 
49  Also called irreparable damage, injury or prejudice. See further Elkind (1981), p. 216. 
50  See e.g. ITLOS Judge Laing arguing ‘there seems to be no a priori universal requirement of 
substantive urgency’. He believes that the notion of irreparability should not replace the textual 
requirement of the preservation of rights. With regard to a requirement of substantive urgency he 
notes that this ‘has received some tepid encouragement under the twin influences of the 
requirements of procedural urgency and the notion that irreparability, with its connotations of 
gravity, has largely replaced the textual requirement of preservation of rights’. He believes that 
this idea is inaccurate and points out that the Order ‘gives no credence to it’. M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2), 
Order for provisional measures of 11 March 1998, Separate Opinion Judge Laing, §26. 
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claimed and the eventual form of reparation, an issue closely related to that of prejudgment and 
the interests of the respondent State.  
3.2 Adjudication of conflicts between States: the traditional purpose of 
provisional measures 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The ICJ’s provisional measures aim to provide States with an expeditious remedy. At a minimum 
they serve to protect the status quo ante pending international adjudication. Elkind gives a 
broader expression of the function of provisional measures: “No party to a pending action may 
take advantage of a delay in settlement procedures by taking actions which will frustrate those 
procedures. This general norm is the real ‘general principle’”.51 He also notes that this principle 
could be seen as ‘a corollary to the principle nemo judex in sua causa (no one may be judge in his 
own cause) since a defendant who takes an action anticipating the judgment of the court or 
prejudicing the outcome of the dispute is, in effect, deciding in his own favour’.52 This statement 
serves as an example of a broader approach to provisional measures that takes into account the 
fairness of the proceedings.  
The way in which the ICJ uses provisional measures ‘has an important bearing on its ability 
to assist States in managing and resolving their disputes by peaceful means’.53 Upon receipt of a 
request for provisional measures it must examine, to some extent, the substance of the case.54 In 
some of these cases it subsequently finds that it lacks jurisdiction or that the case must be 
discontinued. In these situations the provisional measures phase provides the only opportunity for 
the Court to perform its judicial function. Rosenne has referred to the Southern Bluefin Tuna case 
in which the Annex VII arbitral tribunal had pointed out that revocation of the ITLOS Order for 
provisional measures did ‘not mean that the Parties may disregard the effects of that Order or 
their own decisions made in conformity with it’.55 
                                                 
51  Elkind (1981), p. 30. See in general his discussion of irreparable injury, the maintenance of the 
status quo, protection of the environment and aggravation or extension of the dispute, pp. 209-
233. 
52  Elkind (1981), p. 33 (footnote 53). See also section 3.6 of this Chapter on provisional measures 
and prejudgment.  
53  See Merrills (1995), p. 142.  
54  See further section 4 on the relationship with the rights claimed and section 5 on provisional 
measures and prejudgment. 
55  Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal Southern Bluefin Tuna case, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility of 4 August 2000, §67, referring to ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New 
Zealand v. Japan, Australia v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999. Rosenne (2005), pp. 157-158, 
noted that ‘carefully drafted provisional measures prescribed by ITLOS may have an implication 
for the future actions of the parties and lay the basis for the final solution of the dispute, even 
when the arbitral tribunal does not have jurisdiction over the dispute. There is no reason why this 
notion should not be given a wider application’. Thus ‘carefully crafted provisional measures’ 
may ‘lay the basis for the final solution of the dispute’, even when the adjudicator subsequently 
determines that it has no jurisdiction. In other words, proceedings on provisional measures 
constitute ‘an important element in the general procedures available to States for the pacific 
settlement of their international dispute’. This does not mean that States could start proceedings 
simply in order to obtain provisional measures as some sort of interim judgment. Thus far this 
was a practice mainly before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, before the 
introduction of new Rules of Procedure, see Chapter II of this book. If proceedings started before 
the ICJ are disingenuous, the ICJ is likely to dismiss them or in any case to deny requests for 
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Section 3.1 mentioned the notion of preventing irreparable harm and noted that adjudicators 
have found it difficult to define the concept. The PCIJ initially referred to it. Subsequently, 
however, in 1939 it failed to mention it as a purpose of its provisional measures. In 1951 the ICJ 
did not mention it either, but since 1972 it has generally been accepted to constitute one of the 
main purposes of its provisional measures. This section briefly refers to some of the important 
early cases, starting with the two cases in which the purpose of preventing irreparable harm was 
not mentioned.  
3.2.2 Preservation of rights and prevention of prejudice 
In Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (1939) the PCIJ decided to use provisional 
measures to prevent prejudice to Belgium. The Court referred to Article 41 of the Statute and 
noted that this provision applied the principle ‘universally accepted by international tribunals and 
likewise laid down in many conventions to which Bulgaria has been a party – to the effect that the 
parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in 
regard to the execution of the decision to be given and, in general, not allow any step of any kind 
to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute’.56 What it seems to have had in mind is 
the preservation of rights. The Parties shall not cause prejudice to the execution of the decision to 
be given by the Court. The decision also seems to regard non-aggravation of the dispute as a 
universally accepted principle. Thirlway speculates that this is ‘either a restatement of something 
which in the Permanent Court’s view was inherent in judicial procedures, or as something which 
was implied in Article 41 of the Statute’.57 The Court referred to prejudice to the Applicant 
(Belgium) but there was no indication that this prejudice would have been irreparable.58 In the 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (1951) the ICJ equally referred to the rights that may be ‘subsequently 
adjudged by the Court to belong either to the Applicant or to the Respondent’.59  
In a previous case brought by Belgium (1927) the PCIJ did order provisional measures 
exactly because the violation of certain rights ‘would not be made good simply by the payment of 
an indemnity or by compensation or restitution in some material form’.60 Equally, in the South-
Eastern Greenland case (1932), in which the Court denied a request for provisional measures, it 
pointed out that the object of provisional measures ‘contemplated by the Statute of the Court’ was 
to preserve the respective rights of the Parties insofar as ‘the damage threatening these rights 
would be irreparable in fact or in law’.61 In 1972 the ICJ confirmed this approach in its Order for 
provisional measures in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases. It referred to the purpose of preservation 
of the respective rights of the Parties pending the decision of the Court and pointed out that this 
presupposed that irreparable prejudice should not be caused to rights that are the subject of 
dispute in judicial proceedings. If Iceland would undertake the action planned it would anticipate 
                                                                                                                       
provisional measures. If a request for provisional measures is aimed at preventing irreparable 
harm to persons and there is no prima facie inadmissibility it is suggested in this book that the 
proceedings started are not to be regarded as disingenuous and if such serious cases can be solved 
as a consequence of provisional measures ordered by the Court this should only be welcomed. 
56  PCIJ Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Order of 5 December 
1939, p. 199. 
57  Thirlway (1994), p. 13. 
58  See Elkind (1981), pp. 209-210. See also section 3.6.  
59  ICJ Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, Order of 5 July 1951. 
60  See e.g. PCIJ Sino-Belgian Treaty case, Order of 8 January 1927, p. 7. 
61  PCIJ South-Eastern Greenland case, Order of 3 August 1932, p. 284. 
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the Court’s judgment and prejudice the rights claimed by the UK and Germany. This would 
‘affect the possibility of their full restoration in the event of a judgment in its favour’.62  
3.2.3 Preservation of or return to the status quo/non-anticipation of the 
judgment  
Thirlway refers to the idea of preservation as probably the most essential element of the concept 
of provisional measures, preserving rights that are threatened with irreparable harm.63 This, in 
turn, raises the question of the status quo. In the Hostages case, for instance, the US had argued 
that it obviously was not requesting the Court to maintain the status quo ‘as created by the 
Government of Iran of the past days and weeks’, but rather a return to the status quo ante.64 The 
US referred to Dumbauld’s reference to ‘the last uncontested status prior to the controversy’.65 In 
the Frontier Dispute case the request for provisional measures related to the restoration of the 
status quo ante. The Parties only requested these measures a few years after they referred the 
boundary dispute to the Court.66 They did so in light of subsequent incidents. Thirlway points out 
that non-anticipation is ‘another way of putting the idea of preserving the status quo’. He then 
raises the question what is the status quo and whether it is necessarily the status quo that has to be 
preserved in order to protect the relevant rights.67 He notes that ‘preservation of rights’ means that 
‘it must be shown that there is a right’, that there is a threat to this right that must be prevented 
because it will not be sufficient ‘to wait and recompense the holder of the right afterwards’. This 
obviously implies an ‘anticipation’ to some extent. In this respect he makes a distinction between 
a request to ‘restrain one party from taking some step to change the status quo’ and a request to 
‘require a form of restraint which itself involves a departure from the status quo’.68 Merrills 
considers that ‘there is no reason in principle why actual or impending economic damage should 
not be a sufficient reason for obtaining interim protection’. Clearly the requesting State should 
                                                 
62  ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, Orders of 17 August 1972. About those cases see Thirlway 
(1994), pp. 11-12 who regrets the brevity of the Court’s finding. He refers to the UK’s request in 
which it ‘explained very clearly the economic consequences of exclusion of British vessels from 
the Icelandic fishing grounds, and why those consequences would be irreversible’. He suggests 
that it was this that justified the Court’s Order for provisional measures. “Even if the economic 
consequences had been purely transitory, and therefore capable of redress by monetary 
reparation, the Icelandic action would be just as much an anticipation of the Court’s judgment”. 
In other words, he argues that even if there is no risk of irreparable harm (because redress by 
monetary reparation would be possible) the ICJ could still use provisional measures simply to 
prevent a State from anticipating the Court’s judgment. 
63  Thirlway (1994), p. 3, referring to the French term mesures conservatoires, and pp. 8-10. 
64  ICJ Hostages case (US v. Iran), Oral pleadings of 10 December 1979, p. 33. 
65  Dumbauld (1932), p. 187. Elkind (1981) discusses these statements at pp. 219-220. 
66  ICJ Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986. 
67  In the context of the Passing through the Great Belt (1991) case he notes that it ‘could be said 
that the status quo was the fact of the Great Belt remaining open; but Finland argued in fact that 
the mere continuation of the works was creating a situation in which it would be, as it were, too 
late for Denmark to turn back, and that therefore the status quo was a status quo in which 
Denmark was not planning a bridge, or was at least not proceeding with construction work of a 
bridge’. In reference to the fact that the ICJ found that the interference would not take place ‘until 
after the Court would foreseeably have given judgment on the merits’, he concludes that the 
Court considered that the status quo was that of the Great Belt and not of Denmark’s plans, 
Thirlway (1994), p. 12.  
68  Thirlway (1994), p. 11. 
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show that the harm is irreparable ‘in the sense that it could not be adequately dealt with by a 
subsequent award of compensation’.69 
Recently the ICJ denied requests for provisional measures in two cases instigated by Congo 
in relation to arrest warrants and criminal proceedings in Belgium and France, respectively.70 The 
second case is still pending, but in the first the ICJ eventually found in favour of Congo71 
Nevertheless, pending the proceedings provisional measures were not warranted because the 
situation was not irreversible,. 
3.2.4 Non-aggravation or extension of the dispute 
Non-aggravation or extension of the dispute was already mentioned as a purpose of provisional 
measures in the PCIJ Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria case (1939).72 Yet the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction cases (1972), summing up the purposes of provisional measures, did not mention this 
aspect.73 In the Aegean Sea case (1976) Greece argued that the purpose of preventing aggravation 
or extension of the dispute is a general consideration underlying the right to order provisional 
measures. All actions of the parties that might aggravate or extend the dispute fall under the 
jurisdiction of the Court. This power is not ‘merely another way of phrasing the idea that interim 
measures are intended to avoid prejudice in regard to the execution of the decision later to be 
given’. In other words, ‘these are clearly independent grounds for the Court’s intervention’.74  
According to Elkind the most important function of interim protection is indeed the 
prevention of violence,75 yet in all cases provisional measures must aim at preserving the rights of 
the parties.76 A decade later Merrills wrote that the idea appeared to be firmly established ‘that, in 
addition to the unique features of each situation’, the ICJ ‘should take into account the general 
value of containing disputes.77 On the other hand, Thirlway suggests that the obligation not to 
aggravate or extend an existing dispute ‘might be seen as a parallel’ to the obligation laid down in 
Article 18 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties or to the obligation not to defeat the object 
and purpose of an existing treaty between signature and ratification.78 He notes that ‘you have, as 
it were, a legal kernel of obligation or asserted obligation contained in the original dispute, or in 
the treaty, and you have in parallel to that an obligation or asserted obligation not to enlarge, 
spoil, or defeat the kernel of law’.79 The question remains whether non-aggravation of the dispute 
                                                 
69  Merrills (1995), p. 112. In ICJ Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Order 
of 2 March 1990, the ICJ rejected the argument that Article 41 should be used to protect interests 
as well as rights, see Merrills (1995), p. 143. See further section 3.5 on the relationship with the 
rights claimed. 
70  ICJ Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium), Order of 8 December 2000 and Certain 
criminal proceedings in France (Congo v. France), Order of 17 June 2003. 
71  ICJ Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium), Judgment of 14 February 2002. See on 
this case e.g. Van Alebeek (2006), esp. pp. 333-337 and p. 477. 
72  PCIJ Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Order of 5 December 
1939; see also Dumbauld (1932), pp. 167-168 and Thirlway (1994), p. 7 pointing out that the 
1907 Washington Convention that introduced the Central American Court and the Bryan Treaties 
(US) did not refer to preservation of rights but instead to the purpose of non-aggravation of the 
dispute and of preservation of status quo. 
73  ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, Orders of 17 August 1972. 
74  O’Connell’s arguments on behalf of Greece in the ICJ Aegean Sea case (Greece v. Turkey), 
Order of 11 September 1976, referred to in Elkind (1981), p. 225.  
75  See Elkind (1981), p. 229. 
76  Elkind (1981), p. 228.  
77  Merrills (1995), p. 122.  
78  Thirlway (1994), p. 13. 
79  Thirlway (1994), p. 14. 
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can be a purpose in itself sufficient for the Court to use provisional measures or whether it is part 
of or related to the power to use provisional measures to preserve the rights of the parties. 
In the Nicaragua case the US argued that the use of provisional measures was ‘particularly 
inappropriate at this time’ because it could ‘irreparably prejudice the interests of a number of 
states and seriously interfere with the negotiations’.80 The US considered that the fact that the UN 
Security Council and the OAS were addressing the conflict was another reason to refuse the 
provisional measures requested. Merrills notes that the ICJ did not discuss the relevance of the 
above-mentioned diplomatic activity for the ‘circumstances’ to be taken into account for the use 
of provisional measures. The fact, however, that it did order provisional measures shows that it 
did not consider that this was inappropriate. Merrills suggests that the Court may have agreed 
with Nicaragua’s argument that the fact that the question before it is linked with political 
questions should not force it to decline the ‘essentially judicial task’ before it.81 Subsequently the 
ICJ pointed out, in its judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility, that the UN Charter does not 
confer exclusive responsibility on the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace 
and security. There was no provision in the Charter demarcating between the functions of the 
Security Council and the ICJ. “The Council has functions of a political nature assigned to it, 
whereas the Court exercise purely judicial functions. Both organs can therefore perform their 
separate but complementary functions with respect to the same events”.82 Merrills concludes that 
legal and political processes complement each other and ‘there need be no contradiction between 
the pursuit of diplomatic means of settlement and the ordering of interim protection under Article 
41’. At the same time there may be circumstances in which diplomatic efforts satisfy the Court 
that there is no longer a threat of irreparable harm, that here is no urgency anymore or that 
provisional measures would indeed prejudice ongoing negotiations.83 In the Genocide Convention 
case the ICJ again did not consider the use of provisional measures inappropriate, despite Serbia’s 
argument that the Security Council was already dealing with the case under Chapter VII.84  
On the other hand, in the Lockerbie case, after the Security Council issued Resolution 748 
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, it did not consider the use of provisional measures 
appropriate, although several judges had argued that it could still have used them proprio motu 
with the purpose of preventing the aggravation of the dispute and in order to reduce tension.85 
According to Thirlway’s interpretation of the case law until and including the decision not to use 
provisional measures in the Lockerbie case (1992), either the Court has no independent power to 
use provisional measures only to prevent the aggravation or extension of the dispute or, if it exists 
                                                 
80  ICJ Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Judgment 
on jurisdiction and admissibility, 26 November 1984, §33 and Merrills (1995), p. 127. 
81  Merrills (1995), p. 128. See further Rosenne (2005), pp. 196-201 and Gray (2003). 
82  ICJ Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Judgment 
on jurisdiction and admissibility, 26 November 1984, §95. 
83  Merrills (1995), p. 128. 
84  ICJ Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 8 April 1993, §33. 
85  ICJ Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from 
the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. US and UK), Order of 14 April 1992. See the 
Dissenting Opinions of Judges Bedjaoui, Ranjeva, Ajibola, Weeramantry and ad hoc Judge El-
Kosheri. As Merrills (1995), p. 131 points out, the ICJ could only have used provisional 
measures based on a finding that the Resolution was unconstitutional. ‘Whatever the Court’s 
powers to deal with such questions, it is difficult to see how they could be properly addressed in 
incidental proceedings’. He notes that the ICJ left open the question whether the ICJ could use 
provisional measures if the Security Council is acting in the same manner, but under Chapter VI. 
He refers in agreement to the statement by four individual members that this would indeed be 
possible (pp. 131-132).  
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it ‘should be exercised very sparingly’.86 Subsequently, however, the ICJ has pointed out that, by 
virtue of Article 41, it does have the power to indicate provisional measures ‘with a view to 
preventing the aggravation or extension of the dispute whenever it considers that circumstances so 
require’. It has this power ‘independently of the requests for the indication of provisional 
measures submitted by the parties to preserve specific rights’.87 
In other words, in cases involving armed struggle the ICJ has used provisional measures to 
prevent aggravation of the conflict, but in the Lockerbie case it has not. According to Merrills, the 
fact that the Court refused to use them for that purpose in the latter case ‘must be explained by its 
different assessment of the facts’.88 Moreover, it might also be explained by the idea that the ICJ 
‘should be extremely cautious’ in its decision to use provisional measures proprio motu if a 
dispute was already dealt with under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.89  
In Congo v. Uganda (2000) the ICJ ordered provisional measures and noted that Security 
Council resolutions do not, as such, preclude the ICJ ‘from acting in accordance with its Statute 
and with the Rules of Court’.90 After all the ICJ exercises ‘purely judicial functions’. “Both 
organs can therefore perform their separate but complementary functions with respect to the same 
events”.91 Already in the Frontier Dispute case (1986) the Chamber noted that ‘independently of 
the requests submitted by the Parties for the indication of provisional measures, the Court or, 
accordingly, the Chamber possesses by virtue of Article 41 of the Statute the power to indicate the 
provisional measures with a view of preventing the aggravation or extension of the dispute 
whenever it considers that circumstances so require’.92 The ICJ repeated this statement in 2000 in 
its Order for provisional measures in Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. 
Uganda).93 It now seems to be generally accepted that the need to prevent the aggravation or 
extension of a dispute could be taken into account in deciding whether provisional measures are 
necessary.94  
One situation in which this need is triggered is in cases where there is a risk of armed 
conflict. Yet Judge Buergenthal has pointed out that the ICJ must ‘be deemed to have the requisite 
powers vested in courts generally, powers that in my view find expression in Article 41 of its 
                                                 
86  Thirlway (1994), pp. 14-16. 
87  See e.g. ICJ Certain criminal proceedings in France (Congo v. France), Order of 17 June 2003 
(finding no need to use provisional measures) and Land and maritime boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order of 15 March 1996, §41. See also the 
Court’s statement in Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986, §18.  
88  Merrills (1995), pp. 124-125. He also referred to the Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, in 
Lockerbie (Libya v. US/UK), Order of 14 April 1992. 
89  Merrills (1995), p. 125. See also Wellens (1998), p. 422. In general on provisional measures and 
‘international crisis management’: Rosenne (2005), pp. 218-222 and Gray (2003). 
90  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000, 
§44.  
91  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000, 
§44. See also Cameroon v. Nigeria, Order of 15 March 1996, §36. 
92  ICJ Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986, §18. Merrills 
(1995), p. 123 notes that this remark ‘served to underline the importance of the issue of 
aggravation and extension on the particular facts, as well as to confirm the existence of residual 
powers which might be significant in other cases’. See also the discussion of the proprio motu 
use of provisional measures in section 2 of this Chapter.  
93  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000, 
§44. See also Cameroon v. Nigeria, Order of 15 March 1996, §41. 
94  Judge Laing even argues that ITLOS should not prescribe provisional measures without a 
reference to this purpose because they ‘might otherwise themselves become the source of tension 
between the parties’, ITLOS M/V ‘Saiga’ case (No. 2), Order of 11 March 1998, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Laing, §§31-32. 
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Statute, to ensure that the orderly adjudication of cases pending before it is not aggravated or 
undermined by extrajudicial coercive measures resorted to by one party to the dispute against the 
other’.95 This applies to a broader range of cases than just those involving possible armed conflict. 
It would also mean that a provisional measure could be ordered ‘just’ to prevent aggravation of 
the dispute without also ordering measures to prevent irreparable harm to the rights that are the 
subject of the dispute. 
He notes that in such cases ‘the test would not be whether there is an imminent threat of 
irreparable harm to the subject matter of the dispute, but whether the challenged actions are 
having a serious adverse effect on the ability of the party seeking the provisional measures to 
fully protect its rights in the judicial proceedings’.96 
In any case, even if the ICJ decides not to use provisional measures, for a State the act of 
requesting provisional measures could have a value in itself. Merrills gives the following 
examples: the fact that they allow for the opportunity to generate publicity, that they may allow an 
increase in the pressure on the other States, that they may provoke a debate and even remove the 
requesting State’s fear that it is about to be attacked.97  
3.2.5 Preserving the integrity of the proceedings/preserving the evidence 
Reference has also been made to preserving the integrity of the proceedings and the preservation 
of evidence.98 According to Dumbauld (1932) provisional measures ‘protect rights of the parties, 
not the evidence by which a party expects to establish its rights, unless such evidence is 
indispensable and its loss would mean the loss of a right’.99 The PCIJ President’s Order in the 
Sino-Belgian case did refer to the obligation to provide judicial safeguards for Belgian 
nationals.100 Yet this is a substantive obligation for China that could help protect the individual 
rights of the Belgian nationals rather than just obligations necessary to preserve the procedural 
rights of Belgium in the case before the PCIJ.  
While in the Frontier Dispute case (1986) the ICJ did refer to the risk of destruction of 
evidence that might be material to the dispute, Thirlway considers this a purely procedural 
justification for provisional measures, ‘not of great importance’.101 In this case both Parties 
(Burkina Faso and Mali) had agreed to bring the case before the ICJ and had also agreed on a 
cease-fire. In the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case (1996), 
however, this was not the case. Still the ICJ ordered, among others, that ‘both parties should take 
                                                 
95  ICJ Pulp Mills (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order of 27 January 2007, Declaration of Judge 
Buergenthal, §7. See also Declaration by Judge Koroma to the same order, §4. 
96  Id., Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, §11. See also the discussion in Chapter XIII (Protection) 
with regard to the problem with equality of arms when one of the parties in a legal conflict (the 
petitioner) is executed by the other (the State) pending a case before a human rights adjudicator. 
97  See Merrills (1995), pp. 140-141, referring to the Aegean Sea case and the Lockerbie case in 
relation to the fear of being attacked. For a contrary view, aiming at discouraging States to resort 
to the Court, see the two Concurring Opinions of Judges Dugard and Buergenthal in Congo v. 
Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002. 
98  See e.g. Sztucki (1983), pp. 73-74. 
99  Dumbauld (1932), p. 164. 
100  PCIJ Sino-Belgian Treaty case, Order of 8 January 1927. 
101  ICJ Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986. Thirlway (1994), p. 
16. Yet as Merrills (1995), p. 108 points out, given the armed clashes that have taken place 
following reference of the boundary dispute to the Court, ‘it was plainly important to restore the 
situation on the ground and to facilitate the gathering of evidence if the final judgment was to be 
effective’. See also Chapter XII, section 2.10 for an instance in which the European Commission 
on Human Rights used provisional measures to preserve evidence. 
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all necessary steps to conserve evidence relevant to the present case within the disputed area’ and 
that they ‘should lend any assistance to the fact-finding mission which the Secretary-General of 
the United Nations has proposed to send to the Bakassi Peninsula’.102 
3.2.6 Preventing serious harm to the (marine) environment 
In its provisional measures in the Nuclear Test cases (1973) the ICJ ordered France to halt its 
nuclear tests and referred to claims that ‘the uncertain physical and genetic effects to which 
contamination exposes the people of New Zealand causes them acute apprehension, anxiety and 
concern; and that there could be no possibility that the rights eroded by the holding of further tests 
could be fully restored in the event of a judgment in New Zealand’s favour in these 
proceedings’.103 
The early work of Elkind (1981) already suggested protection of the environment as one of 
the circumstances that might warrant the use of provisional measures.104 He referred to the 
pleadings of New Zealand in the Nuclear test cases about the ‘irreversible contribution which 
such tests make to the pollution of the human environment’. To some extent it seemed, thereby, to 
be ‘asserting some world community interest’.105 He has also pointed out that ‘[e]nvironmental 
damage in most cases involves the unendurable rather than the irreparable’.106 While the 
environmental and world community interests may certainly have played a role in the ICJ’s Order 
to France to halt its nuclear tests, at the time environmental protection, as an interest in itself, was 
not yet generally considered to constitute a reason for the use of provisional measures. Later, in 
Pulp Mills, the ICJ did stress the ‘great significance’ it attached to respect for the environment.107 
It noted the ‘general obligation of States to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction and 
control respect the environment of other States or of areas beyond national control is now part of 
the corpus of international law relating to the environment’.108 It pointed out that the case 
                                                 
102  ICJ Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria case (1996), Order of 15 
March 1996, §49 (Judge Ajibola voted against this part of the Order, considering that while the 
order was formally directed to both Parties, in fact it ‘can only refer to Cameroon’, resulting in 
unequal treatment of the Parties).  
103  ICJ Nuclear Tests case (New Zealand v. France), Order of 22 June 1973, §28. See also section 
3.6 (prejudgment) and 3.7.4 (relation to reparation). In 1994 Wellens referred to the ‘potential 
irreversibility of many forms of environmental damage’ and considered that ‘one would expect a 
more widespread acceptance and provision for mechanisms indicating interim measures of 
protection upon emergence of a dispute, although the need for such a mechanism could in the 
first place be reduced by the application of the precautionary principle to the maximum extent 
possible’, Wellens (1994), p. 25. See also section 5.3 on assessment of material urgency and the 
precautionary principle. 
104  Elkind (1981), pp. 220-224. 
105  Elkind (1981), p. 222. See the Nuclear Test cases, Orders of 22 July 1973 (the six Dissenting 
Opinions related to the issue of jurisdiction rather than to the purpose of provisional measures). 
For Elkind’s evaluation of the concept of irreparable harm see the discussion in section 3.3 of this 
Chapter. 
106  Elkind (1981), p. 224. 
107  ICJ Pulp Mills, Order of 13 July 2006, §72. Yet it denied the request for provisional measures 
because Argentina had not persuaded it that the construction of the mills posed ‘an imminent 
threat of irreparable damage’, §73. See also on lack of imminence, ICJ Pulp Mills, Order of 23 
January 2007, §§42 and 50. 
108  It referred to ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, 8 
July 1996. See further, e.g. Kwiatkowska (1996). See also section 5.3 on assessment of material 
urgency and the precautionary principle. 
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highlighted the importance of the need to ensure environmental protection of shared natural 
resources while allowing for sustainable economic development’.109 
The introduction of Article 290(1) UNCLOS specifically recognized environmental 
protection as one of the aims of provisional measures. The article provides the criterion that the 
provisional measures prescribed by ITLOS must be ‘appropriate under the circumstances to 
preserve the respective rights of the parties to the dispute or to prevent serious harm to the marine 
environment’. This means that there could be two different reasons for provisional measures by 
ITLOS. If it takes measures to prevent such harm to the marine environment and these measures 
have been requested by one of the Parties the two reasons coincide. It explicitly provides the 
tribunal with the authority to take into account a general interest going beyond the rights of the 
Parties to the conflict. This is the interest of the protection of the marine environment. ITLOS 
does not use the criterion of preventing irreparable harm. As is clear from the text, instead it uses 
the more lenient criterion of preventing serious harm. This is also the criterion generally used in 
international environmental law.110 This means that, just like in human rights treaties, States have 
now explicitly assigned to an international adjudicator the task to determine conflicts about the 
interpretation and application of rights and interests that surpass those of the State alone. 
In the MOX Plant case Ireland argued that the commissioning of the plant would itself be ‘a 
near-irreversible step’.111 It would not be possible ‘to return to the position that existed before the 
commissioning of the MOX Plant simply by ceasing to feed plutonium into the system’.112 The 
UK, on the other hand, contended that ‘neither the commissioning of the MOX Plant nor the 
introduction of plutonium into the system’ would be irreversible, ‘although decommissioning 
would present the operator of the plant with technical and financial difficulties, if Ireland were to 
be successful in its claim before the Annex VII arbitral tribunal’.113 ITLOS placed on record the 
assurances given by the UK that there would be no additional marine transports to or from 
Sellafield as a result of the commissioning of the MOX Plant and that there would be no export of 
MOX fuel until October 2002 nor import ‘to the THORP plant of spent nuclear fuel pursuant to 
contracts for conversion to the MOX plant’. In the circumstances, and in the short period before 
the constitution of the Annex VII arbitral tribunal, it did not find that the urgency of the situation 
required the prescription of the provisional measures requested by Ireland. As discussed in section 
3.7 on the substance of provisional measures it instead ordered the parties to cooperate.114 
3.2.7 Preventing irreparable harm 
Dumbauld pointed out in 1932 that it is not necessary for provisional measures to be ‘absolutely 
indispensable’. It is ‘sufficient if they serve as a safeguard against substantial and not easily 
reparable injury’.115 “The degree of necessity required varies with the nature of the measure. The 
more serious the hardship to defendant, the stricter the scrutiny of plaintiff’s wants”.116  
                                                 
109  ICJ Pulp Mills, Order of 13 July 2006, §80. 
110  See also the discussion on the relationship between provisional measures and the precautionary 
principle in section 5.3.3. 
111  ITLOS MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 2001, §70. 
112  Ibid. 
113  ITLOS MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 2001. The discussion on the 
provisional measures in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. 
Japan) Order of 27 August 1999 is also relevant in this respect. 
114  ITLOS MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 2001, §§77-89. 
115  Dumbauld (1932), p. 163. 
116  Ibid. 
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Half a century later Elkind noted that the likelihood of irreparable injury to be caused to 
(one of) the Parties was indeed ‘the most commonly accepted circumstance’ justifying the use of 
provisional measures.117  
Even when the ICJ does not use the phrase ‘irreparable harm’, this seems to underlie its use 
of provisional measures, or in the words of Rosenne, the ICJ will regard a case as urgent only if 
the ‘potential damage would be irreparable’.118 The next section will refer to the Court’s case law 
regarding rights that surpass those of the State alone, in particular to protect the individual. In 
those cases reference is often made exactly to the purpose of preventing irreparable harm. 
3.3 Conflicts between States with regard to the protection of the individual 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The ICJ is not a human rights court and not even an international court of general jurisdiction, 
receiving individual complaints. Yet a State may request it to indicate provisional measures for 
the protection of individuals. This means that the Court can address individual rights in so far as 
they are asserted by a State, through diplomatic protection, but always in function of the 
relationship between the rights of an individual and those of a State.119  
Both under customary international law and in conventions such as the Vienna Convention 
on Consular Relations (1963), States have the fundamental right to protect their subjects abroad, 
if these are injured, or are about to be injured, by acts of another State, in violation of 
international obligations. The State may accord diplomatic protection against an act or omission 
by a foreign State causing injury to its subjects.120 In 1924 the PCIJ already called this ‘an 
elementary principle of international law’.121 The State is entitled to communicate with its 
national who is arrested or charged with a crime in another State, to give him or her assistance 
and to have a representative present at the trial. Moreover, international law has recognised the 
right of States to demand reparation for damage suffered by their nationals abroad. In this respect, 
citizens are still seen as a constituent element of the State itself – and, ideally, the primary reason 
for the State’s existence. On the other hand, the changing nature of international law may even 
change the doctrine of diplomatic protection, exactly where human rights are concerned.122 The 
individual is increasingly gaining prominence in international law, which is particularly relevant 
in connection with dignity rights and the right to life. To some extent this is also reflected in the 
decisions of the ICJ.123 
This section discusses the PCIJ Order in China v. Belgium, and ICJ Orders involving 
consular issues, border conflicts and mass human rights violations.  
                                                 
117  Elkind (1981), p. 210. For Elkind’s evaluation of the concept of irreparable harm see the 
discussion in section 3.3 of this Chapter. For another discussion of the early case law see also 
Beirlaen (1979-1980), pp. 262-270. 
118  Rosenne (2005), p. 135. 
119  On diplomatic protection and attempts of the ILC Special Rapporteur Dugard to emphasize 
human rights aspects, see e.g. his reports A/CN.4/514 (2001), A/CN.4/538 (2004); A/CN.4/546 
(2005) and A/CN.4/567 (2006). See also Vermeer-Künzli (2007) and Pronto (2007). 
120  ALI Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, (1987) par 713, 
Comment c. See more closely on the issue of diplomatic protection and its relation to human 
rights the reports by ILC Rapporteur Dugard and Vermeer-Künzli (2007). 
121  PCIJ Mavrommatis Concessions cases, Judgment of 30 August 1924, p. 12. 
122  See Kamminga (1992). 
123  See also, e.g., Milano (2004), Pinto (2002), Bedjaoui (2000), Higgins (1998), Schwebel (1996b) 
and Goy (1995). 
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3.3.2 Protecting nationals  
In 1927 Belgium claimed that the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation with Belgium, 
which had been denounced by China, was still in force. President Huber of the PCIJ ordered 
provisional measures, noting that, should this claim later be found to be correct, a violation of the 
rights of the Belgian nationals in China ‘could not be made good simply by the payment of an 
indemnity or by compensation or restitution in some other material form’.124 Thus he ordered 
provisional measures, upholding, at least during the proceedings, certain basic rights contained in 
this treaty. These rights included the right of any Belgian who lost his passport or had committed 
an offence ‘to be conducted in safety to the nearest Belgian consulate’ and protection of Belgians 
against insult or violence. They also included their right not to be arrested except through a 
consul, ‘nor to be subjected, as regards the execution of any penalty involving personal violence 
or duress, to any except the regular action of Belgian law’. Finally the provisional measures 
ordered China to ensure the right to a fair trial (legal proceedings) heard by ‘the modern courts’, 
with the right of appeal, ‘in accordance with the regular legal procedure and with the assistance of 
advocates and interpreters chosen by them and duly approved by the said courts’.125 As Higgins 
puts it: 
“[v]arious rights that today we would term human rights were protected by the interim 
measures, exactly because they were the claimed rights by one party under the dispute (...) The 
protection of human rights was the concomitant of the perceived need to protect the rights 
claimed in the dispute under litigation; it was not ancillary to them or separate from them”.126 
3.3.3 Protecting diplomats and other nationals  
In US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (1979) the US had claimed violations of its 
diplomatic and consular rights, as well as the rights of its nationals to ‘life, liberty, protection and 
security’.127  
Early November 1979 a strong-armed group of several hundred people had attacked the US 
embassy and took hostage all the diplomatic and consular personnel, as well as other persons 
present in the premises. Later, they seized US personnel and one US private citizen in other 
places in Tehran and brought them to the embassy as well. Reportedly, the Iranian security 
personnel had simply disappeared from the scene and the government made no attempt to clear 
the embassy premises or to rescue the hostages. They did not even attempt to persuade the 
militants to terminate their actions. Two weeks after the attack thirteen hostages were released, 
but at the time of the request for provisional measures several people were still being held 
hostage: at least 28 persons with the status of ‘member of the diplomatic staff’, at least twenty 
persons recognized as ‘member of the administrative and technical staff’ and two US citizens 
with no diplomatic or consular status.  
The US alleged inhumane treatment of the hostages. In its Order the Court noted the 
assertions by both the militants and the Iranian authorities that the hostages were well treated and 
that special visits had been allowed by religious personalities and representatives of the ICRC. 
                                                 
124  PCIJ Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 Between China and Belgium, Order of 8 
January 1927, p. 7. 
125  Id., p. 8. Subsequently President Huber revoked the Order ‘in its entirety’, upon request of 
Belgium, now that Belgium and China had agreed to a provisional regime of protection, Order of 
15 February 1927. 
126  Higgins (1997), p. 95. 
127  ICJ United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), 15 December 1979, p. 
19. 
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The Court also pointed out that Iran had not refuted the concrete allegations of ill treatment. It 
referred to examples, mentioned in some of the sworn declarations, of hostages who had been 
released in November 1979. Some hostages ‘were paraded, bound and blindfolded before hostile 
and chanting crowds; at least during the initial period of their captivity, hostages were kept bound 
and frequently blindfolded, denied mail or any communication with their government or with 
each other, subjected to interrogation, threatened with weapons’.128 Seventeen days later the Court 
unanimously issued an Order for provisional measures. While the ICJ ordered provisional 
measures on the basis of the diplomatic and consular conventions alone, it did add, that ‘the 
continuance of the situation [which is] the subject of the present request exposes the human 
beings concerned to deprivation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to 
a serious possibility of irreparable harm’.129  
The Hostages case is known mainly for its discussion of state responsibility, including 
responsibility for inaction130 and for the Court’s determination that ‘diplomatic law itself provides 
the necessary means of defence against, in sanction form, illicit activities by members of 
diplomatic or consular missions’.131 At the time the US filed the Application, however, US 
nationals were still being held hostage in Iran, requiring immediate protective action. For this 
reason the US also requested provisional measures under Article 41 of the ICJ Statute and Article 
73 Rules of Court.132 The US had requested, in particular, the immediate release of its nationals 
detained in the embassy and at the Iranian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It had also requested the 
restoration of the embassy premises to the US authorities. Before the Court was able to convene 
to discuss this request the President sent the governments of Iran and the US a telegram 
requesting them ‘to act in such a way as will enable any order the court may make (…) to have its 
appropriate effects’.133  
Subsequently, in its judgment on the merits, the ICJ pointed out:  
“Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical restraint 
in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”.134 
In its order for provisional measures the Court considered that, contrary to Iran’s argument, the 
hostage taking and detention of internationally protected persons was far from ‘secondary and 
marginal’. The Court referred to the UN Secretary General’s statement that it was a ‘grave 
situation’ posing ‘a serious threat to international peace and security’ as well as Security Council 
resolution 457 in which the Council expressed its deep concern about the dangerous level of 
tension between the two States, a tension which ‘could have grave consequences for international 
peace and security’.135 Iran had also put forward that the matter was one of domestic jurisdiction. 
The Court responded that ‘a dispute which concerns diplomatic and consular premises and the 
                                                 
128  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Order of 15 
December 1979, §§17, 18, 22 and 23. 
129  Id. p. 20.  
130  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Order of 15 
December 1979, §§61-67 (due diligence) and 69-79 (acts of state).  
131  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Order of 15 
December 1979, §§83 and 86. 
132  It requested provisional measures on 29 November 1979, the day it filed its Application. 
133  On the basis of Rule 74(4) of the Rules of Court (1978). 
134  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Judgment of 24 
May 1980, §91. 
135  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Order of 15 December 1979, §23. 
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detention of internationally protected persons, and involves the interpretation or application of 
multilateral conventions codifying the international law governing diplomatic and consular 
relations, is one which by its very nature falls within international jurisdiction’.136  
The Court also disposed of Iran’s argument that provisional measures were intended to 
protect the interests of both Parties and could not be granted to one side only. It pointed out that 
the terms of Article 41 of the Statute explicitly refer to ‘the respective rights of either party’ 
(italics by the Court), that ‘the whole concept of an indication for provisional measures, as Article 
73 of the Rules recognizes, implies a request from one of the parties for measures to preserve its 
own rights against action by the other party calculated to prejudice those rights pendente lite’. It 
concluded that a request for provisional measures is ‘by its nature unilateral’.137  
The State did not argue these points during the hearing, as it chose not to appear before the 
Court. Instead, the Court derived these arguments from a letter Iran had sent one day before the 
hearing.138 
After emphasising the fundamental importance of respect for the inviolability of envoys and 
embassies for the conduct of relation between States, in particular the reciprocal obligation to 
assure the personal safety of the diplomats, the US pointed out the danger of irreparable harm. 
“Whereas continuance of the situation the subject of the present request exposes the human 
beings concerned to privation, hardship, anguish and even danger to life and health and thus to a 
serious possibility of irreparable harm”.139 
The Court unanimously found that the situation required the indication of provisional measures in 
order to preserve the rights claimed.140 Firstly, Iran should immediately return to the exclusive 
control of US authorities the premises of the US Embassy, Chancery and Consulates and ensure 
their inviolability and effective protection as required by the treaties in force between the two 
States as well as by customary international law. Secondly, Iran ‘should ensure the immediate 
release, without any exception, of all persons of United States nationality who are or have been 
held in the Embassy of the United States of America or in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Tehran, or have been held as hostages elsewhere, and afford full protection to all such persons, in 
accordance with the treaties in force between the two States, and with general international law’. 
Thirdly, Iran ‘should, as from that moment, afford to all the diplomatic and consular personnel of 
the United States the full protection, privileges immunities to which they are entitled under the 
treaties in force between the two States, and under general international law, including immunity 
from any form of criminal jurisdiction and freedom and facilities to leave the territory of Iran’. 
Finally, it also ordered both parties not to take any action and to ‘ensure that no action is taken 
which may aggravate the tension between the two countries or render the existing dispute more 
difficult of solution’.141  
Thirlway asks in what way the rights asserted by the US would be ‘preserved’ by the 
measures requested: 
                                                 
136  Id., §25. 
137  Id., §29. 
138  According to Oellers-Frahm, in light of the fact that the defendant State often does not appear 
before the Court, it became customary in proceedings for provisional measures for the Court to 
take into consideration any available materials, even without any specific provision to that effect 
in the Rules of Court. Oellers-Frahm (1981), p. 283. See also Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
139  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Order of 15 December 1979, §42.  
140  It referred to the provisions of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes 
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic Agents (1973). 
141  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Order of 15 December 1979, §47. 
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“Setting aside for the moment the rights of individuals concerned, the other rights had already 
been grossly and flagrantly infringed; it was certainly right that the infringement should cease, 
but whether this took place following an order of interim measures or following judgment on 
the merits would not be a question of preservation of the rights, but rather a damage-limitation 
exercise. In neither event would the injury suffered be an irreparable one”.142 
It seems evident, however, that the Court’s main interest was in fact the protection of the 
individuals concerned against further harm. While noting that ‘nothing could be more irreparable 
than the taking of life’, Thirlway questions whether the rights of the US were at stake now that 
some of the persons at risk of being executed were not US citizens.143 He notes that the Court 
‘moved imperceptibly from the international legal rights of the United States to the injury to the 
persons, health and life of the individuals concerned; the Order provides no link between these 
two considerations’.144 
Indeed, in Higgins’ words: ‘[e]schewing formalism, the Court thus made the connection 
between harm to the individuals concerned and obligations owed by Iran to the United States 
under the Vienna Conventions’.145  
3.3.4 Protecting people in border conflict cases: collateral human beings 
In the Frontier Dispute case (1986) the ICJ Chamber pointed out that, in the face of ‘force which 
is irreconcilable with the principle of the peaceful settlement of international disputes’ it had the 
‘power and duty to indicate, if need be, such provisional measures as may conduce to the due 
administration of justice’.146 Moreover, in this case ‘the armed actions in the territory in dispute 
could result in the destruction of evidence material to the Chamber’s eventual decision’.147 Finally 
the facts that had ‘ given rise to the requests of both Parties for the indication of provisional 
measures exposes the persons and property in the disputed area, as well as the interests of both 
States within that area, to serious risk of irreparable damage’.148 Thus the risk of irreparable harm 
to persons and property was sufficient for the use of provisional measures, ‘even though, it must 
be said, that harm could not of itself affect where the frontier line might run or the 
implementation of a judgment on the frontier line’.149  
In Cameroon v. Nigeria (1996) the ICJ noted that it was clear from submissions of both 
Parties ‘that there were military incidents and that they caused suffering, occasioned fatalities – of 
both military and civilian personnel – while causing others to be wounded or unaccounted for, as 
well as causing major material damage’.150 It pointed out that the rights at issue were ‘sovereign 
rights which the Parties claim over territory’ and that these rights also concerned persons.151 It 
noted that especially the killing of persons had already ‘caused irreparable damage to the rights 
that the Parties may have over the Peninsula’ and persons in the disputed area were ‘exposed to 
                                                 
142  Thirlway (1994), p. 8. He pointed out that ‘if the Iranian intruders had not already gained access 
to the secret files in the Embassy vaults, to prevent them doing so would be to forestall an injury 
which would be irreparable’. 
143  Thirlway (1994), p. 8. 
144  Id., p. 9. 
145  Higgins (1997), p. 100. For ICJ DRC v. Uganda, Order of 1 July 2000. See section 3.3.6 of this 
Chapter. 
146  ICJ Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986, §19. 
147  Id., §20. See also section 3.2. 
148  Id., §21. 
149  Higgins (2007), p. 102. 
150  ICJ Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order 
of 15 March 1996, §38.  
151  Id., §39.  
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serious risk of further irreparable damage’. As a consequence the rights of the Parties within that 
area were exposed to such risk. Armed actions ‘could jeopardize the existence of evidence 
relevant to the present case’.152 Judge Oda attached a declaration to the Order, expressing some 
concern about this statement. He noted that the purpose of provisional measures was to preserve 
the rights that were to be considered at the merits stage and which constituted, or were ‘directly 
engaged by, the subject of the application’. “The anticipated or actual breach of the rights to be 
preserved ought to be one which could not be erased by the payment of reparation of 
compensation to be ordered in a later judgment on the merits”. He believed ‘that loss of life in the 
disputed area, distressing as it undoubtedly is, does not constitute the real subject matter of the 
present case’.153 
Judge Koroma, on the other hand, considered that the Court had indeed sufficient reason to 
grant this provisional order ‘on its own accord’, because of ‘the possibility of a further military 
engagement resulting in irreparable damage to the rights of either Party, including further loss of 
human life’.154 Ad hoc Judge Ajibola did not agree with the contents of the provisional measures 
in several respects, but he did confirm that protection and preservation of human life has often 
been an important aspect of provisional measures and he agreed that the Court should indeed 
order provisional measures to the effect that Parties would cease acts of aggression in order to 
alleviate the sufferings and loss of life and property caused by the dispute between two States.155 
As noted, analysing this case Higgins pointed out that ‘[t]he risk of irreparable harm to 
persons’, was ‘enough for provisional measures – even though, it must be said, that harm could 
not of itself affect where the frontier line might run’.156 She argues that this case and Frontier 
Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali) (1986),157 taken together, ‘go beyond the series of cases in 
which provisional measures that protect human life were indicated because the dispute in question 
was exactly about such rights’.158 In other words, even if the dispute before the Court is not 
exactly about the protection of human life or dignity, provisional measures for the protection of 
these rights may still be indicated.159  
                                                 
152  Id., §42.  
153  ICJ Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order 
of 15 March 1996, declaration of Judge Oda.  
154  ICJ Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order 
of 15 March 1996, declaration of Judge Koroma. In a joint declaration Judges Weeramantry, Shi 
and Vereshchetin express concern about one aspect of the courts border, because of the dispute 
about the location of the respected armed forces, while Judge Mbaye was ‘delighted’ by the 
approach taken by the Court.  
155  ICJ Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order 
of 15 March 1996, Separate Opinion of Judge Ajibola (He referred to the Fisheries Jurisdiction 
case and the Hostages case. “Evidently those indications of provisional measures whether simply 
for the preservation of rights, the avoidance of an aggravation or extension of the dispute or an 
act such as might cause irreparable harm or prejudice to the parties have always had an element 
of protection and preservation of human life and/or property”).  
156  Higgins (1998), p. 699. 
157  ICJ Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986 and Land and 
Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order of 15 March 
1996. 
158  Higgins (1997), pp. 107-108. See also Rosenne (2005), pp. 194-196 and Ghandhi (2004). 
159  For a different approach see Yoshiyuki Iwamoto (2002), p. 364. 
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3.3.5 Releasing crew and the protection of the (marine) environment  
As discussed in section 3.2 the ICJ and ITLOS have dealt with requests for provisional measures 
to prevent serious harm to the (marine) environment. This section refers to the authority of ITLOS 
to order the release of crew and its wearing on the authority to order provisional measures. 
In his separate opinion in the M/V ‘Saiga’ case (1998) ITLOS Judge Laing ‘catalogued’ the 
types of cases in which provisional measures have been used in public international law. He 
referred to a wide variety of rights that have been recognized in provisional measures in relation 
to: ‘armed conflicts, threats to peace, injuries to property and persons; human rights violations; 
commercial and consular/diplomatic rights of aliens; environmental protection and maritime 
freedoms’. He considered that ‘perhaps the existing jurisprudence reflects that rights or claims of 
a generally high order have received cognition’. In addition, he argued that Article 290 UNCLOS 
would have to protect ‘non-traditional asserted rights’. However, in the ‘Saiga’ case ‘the rights in 
issue fall within the catalogue set forth above or clearly involve specific entitlements and claims 
under UNCLOS, plus, in one situation, general notions of human rights’.160 The ‘one situation’ 
referred to involved the rights and freedoms of crew members on board vessels that were entered 
by other States.161 
The urgent action to be undertaken by ITLOS may take two different forms. One is the 
‘prescription’ of provisional measures and the other is the delivery of an urgent judgment 
ordering the release of vessels or crews. Article 90 of the ITLOS Rules stipulates: ‘subject to 
article 112, paragraph 1, a request for the prescription of provisional measures has priority over 
all other proceedings before the Tribunal. Article 112(1) of the Rules provides that applications 
for releases of vessels or crews have priority over all other proceedings before the Tribunal. Yet it 
also provides that ‘if the Tribunal is seized of an application for release of a vessel or crew and of 
a request for the prescription of provisional measure, it shall take the necessary measures to 
ensure that both the application and the request are dealt with without delay’. 
The fact that there is an urgent procedure for the release of vessels or crews, together with 
the fact that decisions for such release take the form of a judgment, shows the importance 
attached by ITLOS to the plight of persons in detention. Had it not introduced a specific provision 
on this issue, ITLOS could have used Article 290 UNCLOS, on the prescription of provisional 
measures, to intervene in such cases. The Rules imply that the requests for provisional measures 
have priority over all other proceedings except those involving the release of vessels or crews. At 
the same time they leave some possibility to examine a request for provisional measures prior to a 
request for release of vessels or crews.  
Circumstances triggering a request for provisional measures may be more serious than those 
triggering a request for the release of crew and certainly more serious than those triggering a 
request for the release of vessels only. After all, a request for provisional measures could involve 
threats of irreparable harm to the environment as well as to the inhabitants of an Applicant State, 
for instance if one State claims that a nuclear facility of another State lacks any form of basic 
protection against leakage of waste into adjacent waters. In my view examination of such a 
request for provisional measures to intervene against irreparable harm should have priority over 
examination of a request for the release of crew, unless crew members are in danger of life and 
limb. 
                                                 
160  ITLOS M/V ‘Saiga’ case (No. 2), Order of 11 March 1998, Separate Opinion of Judge Laing, 
§21. 
161  See more closely on the prompt release procedure Tanaka (2004) and Escher (2004). 
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3.3.6 Halting gross human rights violations 
Bosnia brought a case before the ICJ requesting it to order provisional measures to the effect, 
among others, that Yugoslavia and its agents in Bosnia ‘must immediately cease and desist from 
all acts of genocide’ and that Bosnia had the right to seek and receive support in order to defend 
itself, including through obtaining military supplies. The ICJ found that it had prima facie 
jurisdiction to deal with the submission in so far as it was based on the Genocide Convention. It 
avoided the issue of the effect of the UN arms embargo on Bosnia’s right to self-defence by 
considering that it had established the existence of ‘a basis on which its jurisdiction might be 
founded’ and ‘ought not to indicate measures for the protection of any disputed rights other than 
those which might ultimately form the basis of the judgment in the exercise of that 
jurisdiction’.162 It ordered Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) to immediately take all measures 
within its power to prevent commission of the crime of genocide, in particular to ‘ensure any 
military, paramilitary or irregular armed units which may be directed or supported by it, as well 
any organizations and persons which may be subject to its control, direction or influence, do not 
commit any acts of genocide, of conspiracy to commit genocide, of direct and public incitement 
to commit genocide, or of complicity in genocide, whether directed against the Muslim 
population of Bosnia and Herzegovina or against any other national, ethnical, racial or religious 
group’. In addition neither Party should take action that could aggravate or extend the existing 
dispute.163 A few months later Bosnia submitted a further request for provisional measures. 
Instead, the Court reaffirmed its previous provisional measures, ‘which should be immediately 
and effectively implemented’.164 Many years later the Court found Serbia responsible not for 
complicity but for failure to prevent the genocide in Srebrenica. It also noted the State’s failure to 
observe its provisional measures.165  
In Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (2000) the ICJ unanimously ordered 
provisional measures, among others, to the effect that both Parties (Congo and Uganda) ‘must, 
forthwith, take all measures necessary to ensure full respect within the zone of conflict for 
fundamental human rights and for the applicable provisions of humanitarian law’.166 The Court 
noted that it must focus its attention on the rights claimed in the Congo’s application, which 
included the right to respect for the rules of international humanitarian law and for the instruments 
relating to the protection of human rights.167 Five years later, in its judgment in this case, it found 
‘that the DRC put forward no specific evidence demonstrating that after July 2000 Uganda 
committed acts in violation of each of the three provisional measures indicated by the Court’. 
Nevertheless, the Court observed ‘that in the present Judgment it has found that Uganda is 
responsible for acts in violation of international human rights law and international humanitarian 
law carried out by its military forces in the territory of the DRC (…). The evidence shows that 
                                                 
162  ICJ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Order of 8 April 1993, §35. 
163  Id., §52. 
164  ICJ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Order of 13 September 1993. See further on this issue 
section 7 (follow-up), and the Separate Opinions of Judges Lauterpacht, Weeramantry, Ajibola 
and Shahabuddeen. For comment on these Orders see e.g. Toufayan (2005), Gaffikin (1995), 
Wiebalck (1995), Gray (1994), Maison (1994) and Warbrick (1993). 
165  ICJ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Judgment of 26 February 2007. See also later in this 
Chapter, e.g. sections 3.7.4 and 7. 
166  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000.  
167  Id., §40. Congo had requested the Court to order much more detailed provisional measures 
directed only at Uganda. 
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such violations were committed throughout the period when Ugandan troops were present in the 
DRC (..).The Court thus concludes that Uganda did not comply with the Court’s Order on 
provisional measures of 1 July 2000”.168 It further noted that ‘that the provisional measures 
indicated in the Order of 1 July 2000 were addressed to both Parties. The Court’s finding in 
paragraph 264 is without prejudice to the question as to whether the DRC did not also fail to 
comply with the provisional measures indicated by the Court’.169 
The ICJ also expressed its awareness of the ‘complex and tragic situation which had long 
prevailed in the Great Lakes Region’. “There has been much suffering by the local population and 
destabilisation of much of the region”.170 The Court noted that it had to pronounce on the 
violations committed by Ugandan military forces on the territory of the Congo, but it nevertheless 
observed ‘that the actions of the various parties in the complex conflict’ had ‘contributed to the 
immense suffering faced by the Congolese population’. It made the following general remark in 
this respect: “The Court is painfully aware that many atrocities have been committed in the course 
of the conflict. It is incumbent on all those involved in the conflict to support the peace process in 
the DRC and other peace processes in the Great Lakes area, in order to ensure respect for human 
rights in the region”.171  
In August 2008 Georgia submitted a case against Russia to the ICJ under the International 
Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD). Subsequently it requested the 
ICJ to order provisional measures against Russia ‘to protect its citizens against violent 
discriminatory acts by Russian armed forces, acting in concert with separatist militia and foreign 
mercenaries the context of violations of CERD’.172 The next day the President of the Court 
invoked Article 74(4) of the Rules of Court and ‘having considered the gravity of the situation’ 
called upon the parties ‘to act in such a way as will enable any order the Court may take on the 
request for provisional measures to have its appropriate effects’.173 In October 2008 the Court 
ordered provisional measures to the effect that both Parties shall refrain from any act of racial 
discrimination and from sponsoring, defending or supporting such acts; that they shall facilitate 
humanitarian assistance; and that they shall refrain from any action which might prejudice the 
respective rights of the Parties or might aggravate or extend the dispute.174 
                                                 
168  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, §264. 
169  Id., §265. 
170  Referring to the security implications for Uganda and some other neighbouring States the Court 
was aware that ‘the factional conflict’ within the Congo required a ‘comprehensive settlement of 
the conflict of the region’. Yet the Court was to respond to the particular legal dispute brought 
before it. ‘As it interprets and implies the law, it will be mindful of context, but its task cannot go 
beyond that’. ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment 
of 19 December 2005, §26. On the judgment in general see e.g. Gathii (2007) and Savadogo 
(2002). 
171  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, §221. 
172  ICJ Press release of 14 August 2008, ‘Georgia submits a Request for the indication of provisional 
measures’. 
173  ICJ Press release of 15 August 2008, ‘Proceedings instituted by Georgia against Russia Urgent 
Communication to the Parties from the President under Article 74, paragraph 4, of the Rules of 
Court’. 
174  ICJ Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), 15 October 2008 (by a 8-7 vote).  
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3.3.7 Protecting nationals: halting executions 
The safety of its nationals abroad is a vital interest of a State. In the three death penalty cases 
before the ICJ the interests of States coincided with those of the individuals involved. In these 
cases about violations of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) the very lives of 
their citizens were at stake. In the Breard, LaGrand and Avena cases against the US, initiated by 
Paraguay, Germany and Mexico respectively, the ICJ ordered provisional measures to halt the 
execution of an individual.175 Here the interests of the State, namely being able to assist its citizen 
entangled in the laws of a foreign country, overlapped with the interest of the individual 
concerned. 
This section focuses on the Order for provisional measures in the Breard case, as it marks the first 
time the ICJ ordered provisional measures to suspend the execution of an individual.176 The case, 
brought before the Court by Paraguay, concerned the US failure to observe the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) and its failure to remedy past violations of it. Under 
US domestic law, there is no legal recourse available to remedy this violation if a foreign national 
is only informed of his consular rights at the stage of federal proceedings for post-conviction 
relief.  
The application stated that the authorities of Virginia had arrested Paraguayan national 
Breard in 1992 and that he was charged, tried and convicted of culpable homicide and sentenced 
to death in 1993. It stated that all this happened while he was not informed of his right to consular 
access under Article 36 VCCR.177 When Paraguay found out about his case, by its own means, his 
state habeas appeals (before the Courts of the Commonwealth of Virginia) had already been 
concluded and he could no longer raise a VCCR claim, for reasons of procedural default. Yet he 
could not raise his claim any earlier, since he was not informed of his rights, which was also his 
claim.178 For this reason, Paraguay demanded ‘restitution in kind’ in the form of a retrial of its 
national in conformity with the VCCR.  
On 9 April 1998 the ICJ unanimously indicated provisional measures in Breard. It used the 
following sentence: 
“The United States should take all measures at its disposal to ensure that Angel Francisco 
Breard is not executed pending the final decision in these proceedings, and should inform the 
Court of all the measures which it has taken in implementation of this Order”. 
The ICJ ordered provisional measures to ensure that Breard was not executed pending the 
proceedings. It stated that its power to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of its 
Statute presupposed that ‘irreparable prejudice shall not be caused to rights which are the subject 
                                                 
175  ICJ Case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 
April 1998; LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999; Avena and other Mexican 
nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003. On the ICJ and the VCCR see e.g. Künzli 
(2005); Orakhelashvili (2005); Aceves (2004); Ghandhi (2004); Cassel (2002); Jennings (2002); 
Orakhelashvili (2002); Rieter (2002a); Schabas (2002b); Stephens (2002); Yoshiyuki Iwamoto 
(2002); Feria Tinta (2001); Van Boven/Rieter (2000); Addo (1999); Cassel (1999b); Mani (1999) 
and Uribe (1996-97). See also Request for interpretation of the judgment of 31 March 2004 in the 
case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 16 July 2008, 
discussed infra. 
176  On this Order and the US response see more closely ‘Agora’ (AJIL 1998), pp. 666-712 and 
Rieter (1998), pp. 475-494.  
177  ICJ Case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 
April 1998, and Verbatim Record of public sitting, CR 98/7, 7 April 1998. 
178  On the federal proceedings for post-conviction relief in the US see e.g. Bal/Rieter (2001). 
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of a dispute in judicial proceedings’.179 It must, therefore, be concerned ‘to preserve by such 
measures the rights which may subsequently be adjudged by the Court to belong either to the 
Applicant, or to the Respondent’.180 Such measures, it stated, are only justified if there is urgency. 
Breard’s execution was ordered for 14 April 1998 and ‘such an execution would render it 
impossible for the Court to order the relief that Paraguay seeks and thus cause irreparable harm to 
the rights it claims’.181 
The Court pointed out that ‘the function of this Court is to resolve international legal 
disputes between States, inter alia when they arise out of the interpretation or application of 
international conventions, and not to act as a court of criminal appeal’.182 It ruled, furthermore, 
that the measures indicated by the Court for a stay of execution ‘would necessarily be provisional 
in nature and would not in any way prejudge findings the Court might make on the merits’. They 
would preserve the respective rights of both Paraguay and the US. Finally, it indicated that it was 
‘appropriate that the Court, with the co-operation of the Parties, ensure that any decision on the 
merits be reached with all possible expedition’.183  
Judge Oda’s declaration was rather confusing. He believed that the US was released from 
its responsibility for violating the Convention by apologising to Paraguay and giving an assurance 
of non-repetition. He also believed the Court had no prima facie jurisdiction in this case and he 
emphasized that ‘the request for provisional measures should not be used to ensure that the main 
Application continue’. This is puzzling, as exactly this is generally seen as a very good reason for 
using provisional measures. Yet in his view, ‘given the fundamental nature of provisional 
measures, those measures should not have been indicated upon Paraguay’s request’. He voted, 
nevertheless, in favour of the Order, ‘for humanitarian reasons, and in view of the fact that, if the 
execution were to be carried out on 14 April 1998, whatever findings the Court might have 
reached might be without object’.184  
The US, however, disregarded the provisional measures. This included a decision by the US 
Supreme Court not to postpone the execution. By way of its constituent State, the commonwealth 
of Virginia, the US executed Angel Francisco Breard on 14 April 1998.185 While the Paraguayan 
case was not pursued after the execution of Breard, it set the standard for the ICJ. In fact the 
Court’s reasoning in this case was not based on human rights law, but rather more generally on 
international law concepts such as restitutio in integrum. Human rights concerns, however, are 
not alien to these concepts and the provisional measures, if respected, advanced the protection of 
human rights.186 In its subsequent Orders for provisional measures in the LaGrand and Avena 
cases the ICJ confirmed the approach taken in Breard. 
The executions of Breard and, subsequently, of LaGrand raised the question again as to 
whether the Court’s provisional measures were legally binding. This issue was finally 
affirmatively determined in the Court’s judgment in LaGrand (2001)187 Germany had brought this 
case before the ICJ on behalf of the brothers LaGrand, who had been sentenced to death in 
violation of the VCCR. Karl LaGrand had already been executed. Germany requested and the ICJ 
ordered provisional measures on behalf of Walter LaGrand.188 Texas nevertheless executed him. 
In its judgment in LaGrand the Court found that ‘when the sending State is unaware of the 
                                                 
179  ICJ Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 April 1998, §35. 
180  Ibid. 
181  ICJ Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 April 1998, §37. 
182  Id., §38. 
183  Id., §40. 
184  ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, Declaration Judge Oda. 
185  See also section 7 of this Chapter (follow-up). 
186  See also, e.g., Schabas (2002), Orakhelashvili (2002) and Van Boven/Rieter (2000). 
187  ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001. 
188  ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999. 
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detention of its nationals due to the failure of the receiving State to provide the requisite consular 
notification without delay, (...) the sending State has been prevented for all practical purposes 
from exercising its rights under Article 36’.189 Article 36(1) VCCR ‘creates individual rights, 
which, by virtue of Article I of the Optional Protocol, may be invoked in this Court by the 
national State of the detained person. These rights were violated in the present case’.190 It was not 
necessary to show ‘whether the LaGrands would have sought consular assistance from Germany, 
whether Germany would have rendered such assistance, or whether a different verdict would have 
been rendered’. It was ‘sufficient that the Convention conferred these rights, and that Germany 
and the LaGrands [italics ER] were in effect prevented by the breach of the United States from 
exercising them, had they so chosen’.191 The ICJ decided it need not discuss the issue whether the 
individual right to consular notification also was a human right.192 
The US had not given ‘full effect’ to the rights in paragraph 1 and had, thus, violated 
paragraph 2: “Under these circumstances, the procedural default rule had the effect of preventing 
‘full effect [from being] given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this article are 
intended’, and thus violated paragraph 2 of Article 36”.193 The Court found that ‘although United 
States courts could and did examine the professional competence of counsel assigned to the 
indigent LaGrands by reference to United States constitutional standards, the procedural default 
rule prevented them from attaching any legal significance to the fact, inter alia, that the violation 
of the rights set forth in Article 36, paragraph 1, prevented Germany, in a timely fashion, from 
retaining private counsel for them and otherwise assisting in their defence as provided for by the 
Convention’.194 Thus the Court found that while the rule of procedural default ‘as such’ did not 
violate Article 36 VCCR, its specific application in the present case did. 
“The problem arises when the procedural default rule does not allow the detained individual to 
challenge a conviction and sentence by claiming, in reliance on Article 36, paragraph 1, of the 
Convention, that the competent national authorities failed to comply with their obligation to 
provide the requisite consular information ‘without delay’, thus preventing the person from 
seeking and obtaining consular assistance from the sending State”.195 
In the Order for provisional measures in Avena the ICJ had ordered provisional measures to halt 
the execution of three persons.196 The US respected this order. In its Judgment the ICJ again 
found violations of Article 36 VCCR and specified that ‘the appropriate reparation in this case 
                                                 
189  Paragraph 1 (a) VCCR refers to the right of communication and access and paragraph 1 (c) ‘sets 
out the measures consular officers may take in rendering consular assistance to the nationals in 
custody of the receiving State’, ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), judgment of 27 June 2001, 
§74. The ICJ noted that the breach of paragraph 1 (b) ‘had the consequence of depriving 
Germany of the exercise of the rights accorded it under Article 36, paragraph 1 (a) and paragraph 
1 (c) and thus violated the provisions of the Convention’, §73. It did not say that a violation of 
paragraph 1 (b) would always result in the breach of provisions of that Article, but in this case it 
did. The Court referred to paragraph 1 as establishing an 'interrelated régime' designed to 
facilitate implementation of the system of consular protection, §74. 
190  ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §77. 
191  Id., §74. 
192  Id., §78. This was the Court's reply to the further contention of Germany, at the hearings, then the 
right of the individual to be informed without delay and article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna 
Convention was not only in individual rights, but has today assumed ‘the character of a human 
right’.  
193  ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §91. 
194  Ibid. 
195  ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §90. 
196  ICJ Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003. 
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consists in the obligation of the United States of America to provide, by means of its own 
choosing, review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences of the Mexican nationals’ 
mentioned in the judgment.197  
In response the US President issued a Memorandum to the Attorney General determining 
that the US ‘will discharge its international obligations’ under this judgment ‘by having State 
courts give effect to the decision in accordance with general principles of comity in cases filed by 
the 51 Mexican nationals addressed in that decision’.198 Then again, the next day the US withdrew 
from the Optional Protocol to the VCCR, in order to prevent any new claims against it by other 
States in case they would consider that the international obligations of the US based on the VCCR 
were not properly discharged. A State Department spokesman pointed out: ‘we have a system of 
justice that provides people with due process and review of their cases, and it’s not appropriate 
that there should be some international court that comes in and reverses decisions of our national 
courts’.199  
In June 2008 Mexico requested the ICJ to interpret the appropriate reparation referred to in 
its 2004 Avena Judgment because the US apparently understood it only as an obligation of means, 
while Mexico understood it as an obligation of result.200 Mexico noted that since Avena (2004) 
‘[o]nly one state court had provided the required review and consideration’.201 In addition, in 
March 2008 the US Supreme Court, ‘while acknowledging that the Avena judgment constitutes an 
obligation under international law on the part of the United States, ruled that “the means chosen 
by the president of the United States to comply were unavailable under the US constitution” and 
that “neither the Avena Judgment on its own, nor the Judgment in conjunction with the 
President’s memorandum, constituted directly enforceable federal law” precluding Texas from 
“applying state procedural rules that barred all review and consideration of Mr. Medellín’s 
Vienna Convention claim”‘.202 Mexico added that the Supreme Court referred to alternative 
means by which the US could still comply with its obligations, ‘in particular, by the passage of 
legislation by Congress making a “non-self-executing treaty domestically enforceable” or by 
“voluntary compliance by the State of Texas”.203 
                                                 
197  ICJ Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. US), Judgment of 31 March 2004, §153(9). 
198  US President’s Memorandum for the Attorney General on compliance with the decision of the 
ICJ in Avena, 28 February 2005. See also Kirgis (2005). Texas prosecutors, however, questioned 
the President’s authority to ‘force courts’ to reopen cases. A spokesman for the Attorney General 
of Texas was quoted in the New York Times: “The State of Texas believes no international court 
supercedes the laws of Texas or the laws of the United States”. See further Anaya 
Valencia/Jackson/Van de Putte/Ellis (2005); Young (2005); Brook (2004); Murphy (2004); 
Shelton (2004a); Carter (2003); Ray (2003); Babcock (2002). 
199  See ‘U.S. quits foreign inmate accord’, CNN.com, 11 March 2005 (quoting State Department 
spokesman Ereli). See further e.g. Liptak, ‘U.S. says it has withdrawn from world judicial body’, 
New York Times 10 March 2005 (with Professor Koh commenting that this move was 
counterproductive and Professor Spiro that it was a ‘sore-loser kind of move’ and ‘If we can’t 
win, we’re not going to play’). 
200  ICJ Request for interpretation of the judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena 
and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 16 July 2008 (Judges Simma and Parra-
Aranguren, acting under Article 24(1) ICJ Statute, had informed the Court that they would not sit 
in this case). 
201  This was the case of Osvaldo Torres Aguilera. It added that in another case, that of Rafael 
Camargo Ojeda, Arkansas had ‘agreed to reduce’ his death sentence to life imprisonment ‘in 
exchange for his agreement to waive his right to review and reconsideration under the Avena 
judgment’. ICJ Request for interpretation of the judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case 
concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 16 July 2008, §2. 
202  Id., §4. 
203  Ibid. 
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Mexico also requested provisional measures because ‘a Texas court had declined the stay of 
execution requested by counsel for Mr. Medellín in order to allow Congress’ to pass such 
legislation.204 It indicated that ‘the paramount interest in human life is at stake’ and that ‘that 
interest would be irreparably harmed if any of the Mexican nationals whose right to review and 
reconsideration was determined in the Avena judgment were executed without having received 
that review and reconsideration’.205 The ICJ indeed ordered the US to ‘take all measures 
necessary to ensure’ that Medellín and four others ‘are not executed pending judgment on the 
Request for interpretation submitted by the United Mexican States, unless and until these five 
Mexican nationals receive review and reconsideration’ consistent with the Court’s Avena 
judgment of 2004.206 
This is the first time the Court has ordered provisional measures in the context of a request 
for interpretation of an earlier ICJ judgment under Article 60 ICJ Statute. There was no other 
basis for jurisdiction as the US is no longer a party to the Optional Protocol to the VCCR. The 
decision to order these measures was made despite the US argument that there was in fact no 
dispute as to the meaning and scope of the Court’s Avena Judgment, as required by Article 60 ICJ 
Statute. The US argued that the dispute was not about interpretation, as it agreed with Mexico that 
it was facing an obligation of result, but about implementation. The majority of the Court (five 
judges dissented) considered that ‘while it seems both Parties regard paragraph 153(9) of the 
Avena Judgment as an international obligation of result, the Parties nonetheless apparently hold 
different views as to the meaning and scope of that obligation of result, namely whether that 
understanding is shared by all United States federal and state authorities and whether that 
obligation falls upon those authorities’.207 As it considered it could deal with the request for 
interpretation, it was able to order provisional measures.208 
Indeed, the fact that something is a dispute about implementation does not rule out per se 
that it is also a dispute on interpretation. The question is whether or not it matters for the existence 
of a legal dispute that what the State says formally, differs from what it does or fails to do in 
practice or whether that is solely a matter of supervision of implementation. Some human rights 
adjudicators have created follow-up mechanisms such as maintaining a case on the docket 
pending implementation.209 The Inter-American Court, for instance, has pointed out that it is a 
power inherent in its jurisdictional function to supervise compliance with its decisions.210 It 
                                                 
204  ICJ Request for interpretation of the judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena 
and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 16 July 2008, §5. 
205  Id, §19. 
206  Id., §80 (referring specifically to the obligation of review and reconsideration ‘consistent with 
paragraphs 138 to 141’ of the 2004 Judgment). 
207  Id., §55. 
208  Yet five judges dissented, all of them stressing that no executions should take place before review 
and reconsideration, based on the US obligations as expressed in the Avena judgment. They 
argued, however, that Article 60 ICJ Statute could not be a basis upon which to found jurisdiction 
in this case, considering there was no dispute on the interpretation of the Avena judgment. See the 
dissenting opinion of judge Buergenthal (arguing, among others, that the Order ‘adds no 
additional protection’ and that ‘(h)umanitarian considerations which clearly underlie the decision 
cannot override the legal requirements of the Statute of the Court’); the joint dissenting opinion 
of judges Owada, Tomka and Keith and the dissenting opinion of Judge Skotnikov. See further 
section 7 of this Chapter on Follow up. Subsequently, in its judgment of 19 January 2009, the 
Court found it could not accede to Mexico’s request for interpretation. 
209  See Chapter XVIII on Follow up by the human rights adjudicators. 
210  See e.g. IACHR Order on supervision of compliance in the cases Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala 
and Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala and on the request to expand the provisional measures in 
Raxcacó Reyes y otros, 9 May 2008, 1st ‘Considering’ clause.  
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appears that in cases of a continuing or sudden risk of irreparable harm relating to violations that 
have already been established by the ICJ in a judgment,211 Article 60 ICJ Statute could be 
construed as a device for follow-up by the ICJ in order to enhance compliance with its Judgments 
in those cases where there is no longer jurisdiction for the Court to take up a new case regarding 
non-implementation. Yet this could only be so as long as there is some link to a ‘dispute’ between 
the parties regarding the interpretation of their obligations under the judgment. In this context it 
might be argued, at least at the stage of provisional measures, that a State’s arguments involving 
contradictions in the behaviour of the executive of another State (or in the behaviour of the 
various branches) – with regard to its public expressions of legal commitment meant for a 
domestic as opposed to a ‘foreign’ or international audience – do indeed show the existence of a 
‘legal dispute’ on interpretation.212 
3.4 Preventing irreparable harm and the humanization of international law 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The PCIJ and the ICJ have shown to be open to interests beyond those of individual States. They 
may concern peace and security, the rights of other States or organisations, the (marine) 
environment, the ‘collateral damage’ to individuals or minority groups and the rights of 
individuals vis-à-vis the main claim of the Applicant State.  
As Elkind already put it in 1981, ‘desperation defines the boundaries of interim protection’. 
Even though the ICJ deals only with complaints between States, the ‘government of a State must 
cope with the desperation of its people’. He noted that ‘irreparable injury and unendurable 
situations are only the two most acute situations likely to lead to violence’, meaning that the ICJ 
is ‘under a duty to grant interim measures in any dispute where the threat of violence is 
imminent’. He referred to the Hostages case as the one ‘most fraught with desperation’, also 
underlining ‘the nexus between desperation and urgency’.213 Elkind published his work on 
provisional measures in 1981, when the Hostages case was indeed one of the few specifically 
dealing with the plight of individual human beings. Subsequent to the Hostages case the ICJ has 
                                                 
211  In this context the Inter-American Court, which has on occasion also used provisional measures 
following a Judgment on the merits, and even on reparation, has recently decided, instead of 
ordering provisional measures, simply to order compliance with the obligation not to execute 25 
persons based on its previous Judgments. In other words it now clearly distinguishes between 
supervision of its judgments on the merits and reparation and the use (and supervision, expansion 
or termination) of its provisional measures. See e.g. IACHR Order on supervision of compliance 
of the cases Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala and Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala and on the request 
to expand the provisional measures in Raxcacó Reyes y otros, 9 May 2008. 
212  Subsequently the ICJ considered it appropriate to review again whether there exists a dispute and 
whether there was a difference of opinion between the parties, see the discussion in §§21-47. 
From this it concluded that it could not accede to Mexico’s request after all. Yet it did observe 
that ‘considerations of domestic law which have so far hindered the implementation of the 
obligation incumbent upon the United States, cannot relieve it of its obligation’. It noted that a 
‘choice of means was allowed to the United States in the implementation of its obligation and, 
failing success within a reasonable period of time through the means chosen, it must rapidly turn 
to alternative and effective means of attaining that result’. With regard to the execution of 
Medellín in contravention of its provisional measures, it found that the US ‘did not discharge of 
its obligation’ under its Order. It also reiterated that ‘its Avena Judgment remains binding and 
that the United States continues to be under an obligation fully to implement it’. 
213  Elkind (1981), p. 258. 
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dealt with cases involving border conflicts and gross human rights violations.214 Apart from 
provisional measures aimed to help relieve the situations in these cases, the ICJ has now also used 
provisional measures to halt executions of death sentences of the nationals of one State by another 
State. Elkind put it as follows “Not all cases involving interim measures are as desperate, as 
urgent or as critical as the Hostages Case. But interim protection is best understood in conditions 
of desperation, crisis and urgency because these are the conditions with which it must be able to 
cope if it is to fulfil its function”.215  
3.4.2 Humanization 
In DRC v. Rwanda (2006) the ICJ recognized the prohibition of genocide as a peremptory norm 
(ius cogens). As Judge Dugard has noted, norms of ius cogens ‘affirm the high principles of 
international law, which recognize the most important rights of the international order – such as 
the right to be free from aggression, genocide, torture and slavery and the right to self 
determination’.216 He also observed that in its choice of precedent, in Congo v. Uganda (2005), 
the ICJ was influenced by ‘the gravity of the issues raised’, even though it did not make explicit 
that its choice ‘was influenced by the fact that norms of jus cogens were involved in this case’.217 
Judge Simma agreed with the Court’s judgment in Congo v. Uganda, but he considered that 
it should have found that the ‘victims of the attacks at the Ndjili International Airport remained 
legally protected against such maltreatment irrespective of their nationality’. International human 
rights law and humanitarian law applied in this case as well.218 His discussion of this issue affirms 
that the Court has a task in the protection of persons caught up in conflicts between States, 
independent of the intentions of the States bringing a claim on their behalf, acknowledging that 
Uganda’s claim regarding the seventeen victims at the airport may not have been based on a 
‘genuine concern for the fate of the persons concerned’.219 He specifically pointed out ‘that legal 
arguments clarifying that in situations like the one before us no gaps exist in the law that would 
deprive the affected persons of any legal protection, have, unfortunately never been as important 
as at present, in the face of recent deplorable developments’.220 He noted that the events at the 
airport ‘were factually connected to the armed conflict’ and that ‘the application of international 
humanitarian law would be consistent with the understanding of the scope’ of this law as 
                                                 
214  ICJ Nicaragua case, Order of 10 May 1984, Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order 
of 10 January 1986, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 8 
April 1993, Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria), Order of 15 March 1996, Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. 
Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000. 
215  Elkind (1981), p. 258. 
216  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (new application: 2002) (DRC v. Rwanda), 
Judgment on jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the application of 3 February 2006, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Dugard, §10. 
217  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (new application: 2002) (DRC v. Rwanda), 
Judgment on jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the application of 3 February 2006, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Dugard, §11. He pointed out that the ICJ, in Congo v. Uganda, relied 
on the Certain Phosphate Lands case rather than referred to the controversial Monetary Gold 
case. Monetary Gold removed from Rome in 1943 (Italy v. France, UK and US), Judgment of 15 
June 1954 and Certain Phosphate Lands in Nauru (Nauru v. Australia), Judgment of 26 June 
1992 (preliminary objections). 
218  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, §17. 
219  Id., §18. 
220  Id., §19. 
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developed by the ICTY Appeals Chamber.221 He invoked provisions on the prohibition of cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the right to liberty and security of persons and the 
freedom of movement in the ICCPR, the Convention against Torture and the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights. Uganda could have raised these violations before the ICJ.222 
Moreover, the contemporary law of state responsibility confirmed that a State has standing to 
bring a claim regarding human rights violations committed against persons that might not possess 
the nationality of that State.223 Finally, he argued that while Uganda ‘chose the avenue of 
diplomatic protection and failed’, the ICJ should have pointed out the applicability of 
international humanitarian and human rights law and Uganda’s standing in this respect.224 
3.4.3 The concept of irreparable harm 
Elkind believes it is not always helpful to speak of irreparable harm because this criterion may be 
too difficult for the Applicant State to meet when arguing for the use of provisional measures. He 
refers to the Hostages case (1979) and to ‘most cases of environmental injury’, pointing out:  
“Irreparable injury is a reference to a final result and is quite beside the point. In this respect, the 
basis of the complaint is not so much that the injury is irreparable, but that it is unendurable. 
The complainant cannot be expected to put up with it pending the outcome of the dispute. The 
status quo is intolerable”.225  
Agreeing with the ICJ’s refusal to take provisional measures in the Arbitral Award case (1990) 
Judge Evensen wrote separately, pointing out that the risk of irreparable damage should not be a 
condition for the stipulation of interim measures. He noted that neither Article 41 ICJ Statute nor 
Article 73 Rules of Court contained any reference to ‘irreparable damage’ and considered that the 
Court's discretionary powers should not be limited in such manner.226 
In M/V ‘Saiga’ (1997), the first Order for provisional measures by ITLOS, Judge Laing 
referred to Elkind’s suggestion that the applicable phrase should be ‘unendurable’ rather than 
‘irreparable’. He agreed that ‘irreparability arguably does not adequately cover such situations as 
that of the U.S. hostages’ in the Hostages case (1979) and that of the case at hand. In this case the 
applicant State had requested provisional measures to the effect, among others, that the M/V 
‘Saiga’ and her crew would be released. Previously, ITLOS had already ordered their prompt 
release under the ‘prompt release’ proceedings of the Convention on the Law of the Sea.227 
During the public hearing held the next month the applicant specified this request. Subsequently 
                                                 
221  Id., §§21-23. He referred to Article 75 of Protocol I Additional to the 1949 Geneva Conventions 
and Article 3, common to the four Geneva Conventions. Regarding the application of human 
rights law he quoted the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion on the Wall in the occupied Palestinian 
Territory stating that ‘the protection offered by human rights conventions does not cease in case 
of armed conflict’, §30, referring to ICJ Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, §106. 
222  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, Separate Opinion of Judge Simma, §§31-32. 
223  Id., §35, referring to Article 48 of the ILC’s 2001 draft on State Responsibility. 
224  Id., §37. 
225  Elkind (1981), p. 223. See further section 3.3 (protection of the individual). 
226  ICJ Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Order of 2 March 1990 
(dismissed by fourteen votes to one).  
227  The M/V ‘Saiga’ case (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment of 4 December 
1997, §§79 and 86. See Article 292 of the Convention. See about ‘prompt release’ Tanaka (2004) 
and Escher (2004). 
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Guinea released the vessel and its crew. Hence ITLOS noted in its Order that the prescription of a 
provisional measure for their release would no longer serve a purpose. Nevertheless, ‘the rights of 
the Applicant would not fully be preserved if, pending the final decision, the vessel, its Master 
and the other members of the crew, its owners or operators were to be subjected to any judicial or 
administrative measure in connection to the incidents leading to the arrest and detention of the 
vessel and to the subsequent prosecution and conviction of the Master’. It unanimously prescribed 
provisional measures to the effect that Guinea would refrain from such actions.228 In his Separate 
Opinion Judge Laing noted that this case showed that the standard of irreparability was not 
applicable. He referred to the treaty language of ‘the preservation of the respective rights’ and the 
addition, in Article 290(1) UNCLOS of ‘the institution of prevention of “serious” harm to the 
marine environment’. This language ‘strongly reinforces the view that the rather grave standard of 
irreparability is inapt for universal use, at least in many situations under UNCLOS’. He 
considered that ITLOS should indicate very clearly the subsidiary or supplementary nature of the 
standard of irreparable harm if it would decide to use it in the future.229 
Elkind has pointed out ‘that the motivating force behind interim protection is urgency. Its 
purpose is to prevent irreparable injury, terminate unendurable situations, and generally to prevent 
violence by providing an effective alternative to self-help’.230 He specified that provisional 
measures must order the prevention of irreparable injury by maintaining the status quo. On the 
other hand, they could also order to put a halt to an unendurable or intolerable situation, because 
the complaining Party ‘cannot reasonably be expected to endure the status quo pending judicial 
settlement of a dispute’.231 This approach seems useful, also in the context of the ensuing 
discussion of the purpose of the provisional measures in human rights adjudication.232 It comes 
down to maintaining the status quo in the face of threats of irreparable harm as well as returning 
to the status quo ante to deal with an ongoing unendurable situation. Such provisional measures 
aim to prevent (further) human suffering. 
Nevertheless, thus far the ICJ and the human rights adjudicators have only referred to the 
concept of irreparable harm, which appears to cover both of the abovementioned situations. For 
this reason this book refers to the latter concept also in the context of ongoing unendurable 
situations that must be halted.233 
3.5 The relation to the rights claimed and the possible judgment on the 
merits 
In 1932 Dumbauld already pointed out that provisional measures ‘always constitute an 
exceptional remedy’.234 The proceedings for provisional measures are subsidiary to the main 
claim. They simply aim to preserve the rights that are in dispute. As the ICJ has pointed out the 
purpose of the use of provisional measures is ‘to safeguard the rights of each party’. It 
‘presupposes the possibility of irreparable damage being caused to the rights at issue in judicial 
                                                 
228  ITLOS M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) case (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Order of 11 March 
1998, §§41 and 52.  
229  ITLOS M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) case (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Order of 11 March 
1998, Separate Opinion of Judge Laing, §28.  
230  Elkind (1981), p. 229. This qualification, dating from 1981, has not lost its significance. 
231  Elkind (1981), pp. 229-230.  
232  See Part II of this book. 
233  On the distinction between irreparability in law and irreparability in fact, see e.g. Sztucki (1983), 
pp. 108-110. 
234  Dumbauld (1932), p. 184. See also Judge Shahabuddeen in the Passage through the Great Belt 
case (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 19 July 1991, p. 29. 
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proceedings’.235 There is no formal requirement that the Parties before the ICJ or ITLOS specify 
the rights claimed in their request for provisional measures. There should, however, be sufficient 
information for the adjudicators to conclude that there is ‘a prima facie basis’ for the ‘probable 
jurisdiction of the Tribunal on the underlying merits’.236 
Some respondent States have argued that the applicant State should show the likelihood of 
success on the merits.237 In the Hostages case (1979) the ICJ considered that it was the purpose of 
provisional measures to preserve ‘rights which are the subject of dispute in judicial 
proceedings’.238 Thus generally speaking the rights to be protected by provisional measures must 
be linked closely to (or be identical to) the rights claimed in the main case.239 The main dispute in 
the Arbitral Award case (1990) related to the validity of an arbitral decision about maritime 
delimitations. However, Guinea-Bissau’s application for provisional measures included a request 
to direct the Parties to abstain from all actions in the disputed area. The Court rejected this request 
because ‘the alleged rights sought to be made the subject of provisional measures are not the 
subject of the proceedings before the Court on the merits of the case’.240 According to Merrills 
this decision ‘reflects the traditional conception of interim measures as concerned with rights 
rather than interests’.241 After all, Guinea-Bissau would not be able to bring the dispute on 
maritime delimitation before the ICJ because Senegal had made reservations in this respect.  
Thirlway notes that the Genocide Convention case (1993) ‘made clear that even the rights 
claimed in the Application cannot be protected by provisional measures unless they are rights in 
respect of which the Court would have jurisdiction under the title which the Court regards as 
prima facie established’.242 The ICJ pointed out that ‘the Court, having established the existence 
of a basis on which its jurisdiction might be founded, ought not to indicate measures for the 
protection of any disputed rights other than those which might ultimately form the basis of a 
judgment in the exercise of that jurisdiction’.243 At the same time, as discussed in section 3.3.4, 
the ICJ has been prepared to order provisional measures to protect the lives of persons on the 
                                                 
235  ICJ Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986 (Chamber), §13. See 
further e.g. the Passage through the Great Belt case, (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 19 July 
1991, §21 and US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Order 
of 15 December 1979, §36. 
236  Separate Opinion of Judge Laing in the M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2), Order of 11 March 1998, §20, also 
noting that ‘parties will sometimes request measures to protect rights not directly located in the 
Convention but arising under customary international law’ and considering that the ‘difficulty of 
identifying the precise content and even existence of customary rules might further influence a 
tolerant approach of decision-makers to this requirement’. 
237  See further section 3.6 on the issue of prejudgment and section 5.3 on assessment of material 
urgency.  
238  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Order of 15 
December 1979, §36. See also, e.g., Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (UK v. Iceland; Germany v. 
Iceland), Order of 17 August 1972, §21; Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 
10 January 1986, §13 and the Passage through the Great Belt case, Order of 29 July 1991, §16.  
239  See also Wellens (1998), pp. 420-421, p. 424. Generally on this issue Beirlaen (1979-1980), pp. 
270-283. 
240  ICJ Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Order of 2 March 1990, §26 
(Judge ad hoc Thierry dissenting). 
241  Merrills (1995), p. 102. See also Thirlway (1994), p. 17. 
242  Thirlway (1994), p. 35. See also the criticism expressed by Toufayan (2005), Gaffikin (1995); 
Maison (1994) and Wiebalck (1995). 
243  ICJ Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 8 April 1993, §35. 
See section 3.3.  
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basis of existing obligations of the Respondent State, even though these obligations were not the 
direct subject matter of the Application.  
The rights claimed may have already earned clear recognition. In that case the party 
requesting provisional measures should just give some indication of the violation of these rights. 
In the alternative, the Applicant State should make an effort to show that the rights claimed 
indeed exist.244 After all the use of provisional measures would be ‘a pointless exercise in empty 
authority’ if there were ‘no possibility of the claimed rights being substantiated as having an 
existence in law’.245  
By contrast, in other cases States have complained that a request for provisional measures 
was too much a request for an instant decision.246 Moreover, as noted, there have been Orders for 
provisional measures regarding the plight of human beings, not directly linked to the rights in 
dispute. This all indicates that the ICJ takes a sufficiently flexible approach to its competence to 
order provisional measures, taking into account the rights of (groups of) persons, as long as it has 
prima facie jurisdiction vis-à-vis the obligations of the State in this regard.247  
3.6 Provisional measures and prejudgment  
States have sometimes argued that provisional measures were intended to protect the interests of 
both Parties and could not be granted to one Party only.248 On the other hand, in the Hostages 
case (1979) the ICJ pointed out that the terms of Article 41 ICJ Statute explicitly refer to ‘the 
respective rights of either party’ (italics by the Court). ‘[T]he whole concept of an indication for 
provisional measures, as Article 73 of the Rules recognizes, implies a request from one of the 
parties for measures to preserve its own rights against action by the other party calculated to 
prejudice those rights pendente lite’. It concluded that a request for provisional measures is ‘by its 
nature unilateral’.249 This is different for ITLOS because it is authorised, under Article 290 
UNCLOS, to order provisional measures that are appropriate ‘to preserve the respective rights of 
the parties’.250  
Still according to Mendelson ‘the risk of prejudice to one or other of the parties is a real 
one, which cannot be glossed over by the simple incantation of the formula that the grant or 
                                                 
244  See also Goldie (1973-74), p. 501 who notes that in the latter case the State ‘would have a very 
heavy burden of proof to discharge’. 
245  Goldie (1973-74), p. 502. 
246  See also the next section on prejudgment (section 3.6).  
247  See e.g. Questions relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), 
Order of 28 May 2009, §57 “Whereas the power of the Court to indicate provisional measures 
should be exercised only if the Court is satisfied that the rights asserted by a party are at least 
plausible”. The Court added there was no need to establish definitively the existence of the rights 
claimed by Belgium or to consider Belgium’s capacity to assert such rights before the Court’ and 
that this State’s rights ‘begin grounded in a possible interpretation of the Convention against 
torture, therefore appear to be plausible’, §60. Not all members of the Court have been 
comfortable with the Court’s approach to the relation with the merits, see Judge Oda in ICJ Land 
and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order of 15 
March 1996, §2. See also Yoshiyuki Iwamoto (2002). 
248  See also Fitzmaurice (1986), p. 544, arguing that the ICJ should preserve the interests of ‘both 
parties equally’ and Judge Ajibola in his Separate Opinion in Land and maritime boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order of 15 March 1996, under IV (III). 
249  ICJ Hostages case: United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Order of 
15 December 1979, §29. 
250  Judge Laing considers that a general requirement to balance the right of the parties would be 
consistent with the language of Article 290(1), Separate Opinion Judge Laing, ITLOS M/V 
‘Saiga’ (No. 2), Order of 11 March 1998, §23. See also section 3.7 on protection and reparation. 
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refusal of interim measures does not prejudge subsequent decisions in other phases of the 
proceedings’. The ICJ should ‘weigh up the risks to both parties and try to achieve the fairest 
solution’. In this context he noted: “If there is a strong chance of jurisdiction on the merits, the 
risk of prejudice to the rights of the plaintiff will be relatively greater if interim measures are not 
indicated, than the risk of prejudice to the rights of the defendant, if they are. Conversely, if there 
is little prospect of a positive finding on jurisdiction, there will be little prejudice to the plaintiff in 
refusing interim measures, because the Court will probably not be in a position to grant it a 
remedy on the merits at the end of the day, whereas the granting of interim measures may cause 
substantial prejudice to the interests of an unwilling defendant”.251  
In 1932 Dumbauld wrote that the PCIJ’s provisional measures do not constitute a 
provisional judgment. The Applicant ‘can not demand that his legal position be bettered’. He did 
note ‘a seeming exception’ when the relief sought in the principal case is simply aimed at 
forbidding ‘a flagrant wrong or violation of right, rather than an exercise of “judicial jurisdiction” 
to decide a truly doubtful question of law’. In such case, he acknowledges, ‘the only object of the 
final judgment is to forbid the illegal act, definitively and with force of res judicata’. Thus, ‘it 
may well come to pass that the interim order temporarily prohibiting unlawful conduct 
threatening irreparable damage will in fact, though not in law, be equivalent to giving applicant 
the very same thing he hopes to secure by final judgment’.252  
The requirement of non-anticipation by one of the Parties of a decision on the merits means 
that neither of the Parties shall pre-empt the final determination of the case. This is one of the 
traditional reasons for courts to use provisional measures.253 Provisional measures to prevent 
anticipation by one of the parties, in the sense of pre-empting the final determination that could 
otherwise have been made by the adjudicator, may at the same time trigger the different rule that 
the adjudicator itself shall not anticipate the final determination and must ‘avoid any appearance 
of pre-judgment’.254 However, this does not mean that the provisional measures may not give an 
indication of substantive law to the extent this is already clear.  
Thirlway notes that ‘the rights sought to be protected must be, to put it at its lowest, closely 
linked with the rights which are the subject of dispute in the main proceedings’. Hence, ‘to some 
extent an “anticipation” is only to be expected in every case’. The Court has to find the necessary 
degree of anticipation to justify provisional measures. What is important here, according to 
Thirlway, is who took the initiative: ‘it is one thing to restrain one party from taking some step to 
change the status quo, and quite another to require a form of restraint which itself involves a 
departure from the status quo’.255 
If a request for provisional measures is in fact a request for an interim judgment they should 
not be ordered because they could be seen to prejudice the decision on the merits and would be 
incompatible with Article 41.256 In Chorzów Factory (1927) the PCIJ rejected a request by 
Germany as ‘designed to obtain an interim judgment in favour of part of the claim’ rather than a 
request for interim protection proper.257 Thirlway suggests that the ICJ could refer to this decision 
in order to prevent applications for provisional measures that would simply cause ‘short-term 
tactical advantage’ to one of the Parties. Otherwise ‘the fact that neither jurisdiction nor the claim 
itself have to be proved up to anywhere near the hilt for measures to be granted must offer a 
                                                 
251  Mendelson (1972-73), pp. 313-314. 
252  Dumbauld (1932), pp. 163-164. 
253  See e.g. Elkind (1981), p. 210. See also section 3.2 of this chapter on the traditional purposes of 
provisional measures. 
254  See Judge Shahabuddeen in the Passage through the Great Belt case, Order of 29 July 1991.  
255  Thirlway (1994), p. 11. 
256  See e.g. Merrills (1995), p. 104 and Sztucki (1983), pp. 95-96. 
257  PCIJ Factory at Chorzów (German interests in Polish Upper Silesia cases), Order of 21 
November 1927, p. 10. 
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temptation where a case can be made for urgency even if the merits of the claim are shaky or the 
jurisdictional title dubious’.258  
Judge Gros referred to attempts to obtain an ‘interim judgment’ in his dissenting opinion on 
the Order for provisional measures in the Nuclear Test cases (1973). He considered that ‘it would 
indeed, by definition, be contrary to the nature of interlocutory proceedings if they enabled the 
dispute of which they were only an accessory element to be disposed of’.259 Thirlway points out 
that the result of this argument is curious. After all, the measures must relate to the rights claimed. 
“Could the Court refuse to indicate measures requiring the temporary cessation of nuclear tests 
merely because the claim was for a permanent cessation of such tests? Assuming that there was 
sufficient evidence of urgency and the prospect of irreparable damage, the mere coincidence of 
the request for measures with the terms of the claim would be a strange and artificial reason for 
refusal”.260  
He also notes that the ICJ could prevent complacency of the beneficiary once provisional 
measures have been taken, by including in the Order for provisional measures a provision to 
review the measures in light of, among others, the progress of the proceedings on the merits.261 
With regard to the Chorzów Factory case and its reference to ‘an interim judgment in favour of a 
part of the claim’ he explains that this turned on the basis of the German request. Germany ‘was 
not so much asking for protection pendente lite of the rights asserted in the Application, as asking 
for immediate satisfaction of what it regarded as an indisputable part of the claim’.262 
In the Hostages case (1979) Iran had objected that the US was, in fact, requesting a 
judgment on the merits of the case during the interim measures phase. The Court distinguished 
this case from the Chorzów Factory case (1927), where the PCIJ had declined a request for 
provisional measures as being ‘designed to obtain an interim judgment in favour of a part of the 
claim’.263 The ICJ noted that the circumstances in that case were ‘entirely different from those of 
the present one, and the request there sought to obtain from the Court a final judgment on part of 
a claim for a sum of money’. It pointed out as well that a request for provisional measures must in 
fact ‘by its very nature relate to the substance of the case since, as Article 41 expressly states, 
their object is to preserve the respective rights of either party’. In other words, the relationship 
between the rights to be protected at the provisional measures phase and the rights claimed on the 
merits in fact is one of the requirements of Article 41.264 It concluded that ‘in the present case the 
purpose of the United States request appears to be not to obtain a judgment, interim or final, on 
the merits of its claims but to preserve the substance of the rights which it claims pendente lite’.265 
Oellers-Frahm put it as follows: 
                                                 
258  Thirlway (1994), p. 27. 
259  Dissenting Opinion Judge Gros, ICJ Nuclear tests cases (New Zealand v. France/Australia v. 
France), Order of 22 June 1973, p. 123 (Australia) and p. 158 (New Zealand). The ICJ denied the 
request, but Judge Gros proposed additional/different reasons for this denial.  
260  Thirlway (1994), p. 27. 
261  Thirlway (1994), pp. 27-28. He pointed out that the ICJ had in fact done so in the ICJ Fisheries 
Jurisdiction cases (UK v. Iceland; Germany v. Iceland), Order of 17 August 1972. 
262  Thirlway (1994), p. 28.  
263  PCIJ Factory at Chorzów (German interests in Polish Upper Silesia cases), Order of 21 
November 1927, p. 10. 
264  See also section 3.5. 
265  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Order of 15 December 1979, §28. 
 Chapter I 
44 
“That there may even be identity between the objects of those two procedures is self-evident, 
since often the claim on the merits concerns the re-establishment of the status quo ante”.266  
In 1981 Elkind considered that in the Hostages case (1979) ‘it was precisely the status quo 
existing at the time the application and request were filed which was intolerable from the 
standpoint of international law’. This triggered the question of the restoration of the status quo 
ante. The attempt in this case ‘might have constituted an interim judgment’. “If the Court, after 
granting interim measures, later found for Iran on the question of jurisdiction, it could not revoke 
that particular measure. What could it do? Order the hostages returned to Iran? That would have 
been absurd. Yet it was one of the most urgent situations that the Court has ever faced”.267 In fact 
this case already showed that the ICJ takes a more flexible approach regarding the use of 
provisional measures when the urgent situation involves fundamental rights of individuals. 
In the Genocide Convention case (1993) Serbia and Montenegro argued that Bosnia 
Herzegovina was really seeking an interim judgment, but the ICJ pointed out that the rights of 
both Parties ‘to dispute the facts alleged against it, and to submit arguments in respect of the 
merits, must remain unaffected by the Court’s decision’. At the stage of provisional measures it 
could not make definitive findings of fact or imputability, but it merely determined whether the 
circumstances required the use of provisional measures to protect rights under the Genocide 
Convention.268  
In 1991 the ICJ denied a request for provisional measures in the Passage through the Great 
Belt case. It did so for lack of temporal urgency.269 The Respondent State had also argued that the 
Applicant State should be able to ‘substantiate the right it claims to a point where a reasonable 
prospect of success in the main case exists’. The Applicant, on the other hand, argued that the ICJ 
‘may not enter into the merits of a particular case at the stage of deciding whether or not to 
indicate provisional measures’. It denied that its case could be considered as prima facie 
unfounded.270 Clearly the Applicant is not in a position to argue that the Court should not take 
into account the rights claimed, implying that this would prejudge the decision on the merits.271 
Indeed the ICJ noted that it is the purpose of the provisional measures to preserve rights that are 
subject to dispute.272 With regard to the Respondent’s argument that the type of reparation in this 
case could only be satisfied by damages, because ‘restitution in kind would be excessively 
onerous’, it pointed out that it was ‘not at present called upon to determine the character of any 
decision which it might make on the merits’. It did point out, however, that the possibility of a 
judicial finding that the construction of works involving an infringement of a legal right ‘must not 
be continued or must be modified or dismantled’ could and should ‘not be excluded a priori’.273 It 
noted that it was for Denmark to consider the impact a judgment upholding Finland’s claim could 
have on the implementation of the Great Belt project. It was therefore also for Denmark ‘to decide 
                                                 
266  Oellers-Frahm (1981), p. 284.  
267  Elkind (1981), pp. 219-220. 
268  ICJ Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 13 September 1993 
(second request), §44. Only according to Judge Tarassov the Order that Serbia was to ensure that 
forces under its control or influence would refrain from acts of genocide was ‘very close to a pre-
judgment of the merits’. See also Merrills (1995), p. 105, remarking that this does not seem very 
convincing. See on the other hand, Gray (2003), p. 893.  
269  See further section 5.2.  
270  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991, §21.  
271  See also ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, pp. 29-30.  
272  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991, §22.  
273  Id., §31. 
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whether or to what extent it should accordingly delay or modify that project’.274 Merrills pointed 
out:  
“Although the question of possible remedies was a subsidiary point, it provides a striking 
illustration of how questions of interim protection can become bound up with those relating to 
the merits, and of how the Court, while not anticipating its future judgment, may nevertheless 
have to give an issue such as remedies its early attention”.275  
Judge Shahabuddeen has noted that the ICJ is only considering whether the State requesting 
provisional measures has shown any possibility of the existence of the right sought to be 
preserved, not whether it definitively exists. “A finding that such a possibility exists clearly falls 
short of constituting an interim judgment”.276  
When taking provisional measures the ICJ has to consider the circumstances drawn to its 
attention as requiring such measures, but it cannot make definitive findings of fact.277 It 
emphasises that ‘the right of the respondent State to dispute the facts alleged and to submit 
arguments in respect of the merits must remain unaffected by the Court’s decision’.278 In its 
decisions to order provisional measures for a stay of execution of death sentences, for instance, it 
has pointed out that the measures ‘would necessarily be provisional in nature and would not in 
any way prejudge findings the Court might make on the merits’. Such measures would preserve 
the respective rights of the Parties and the Court would ensure, with the cooperation of the parties, 
that any decision on the merits would be reached ‘with all possible expedition’.279  
In its decisions to refuse provisional measures it also points out that ‘the decision given in 
the present proceedings in no way prejudges any question relating to the merits of the case’ and 
leaves unaffected the rights of both States to submit arguments. In Congo v. France (2003), for 
instance, it denied a request for provisional measures to the effect that the proceedings by a 
French investigating judge against a Congolese politician would be suspended immediately. It 
pointed out that this decision ‘in no way prejudges the question of the jurisdiction of the Court to 
deal with the merits of the case or any questions relating to the admissibility of the Application, or 
relating to the merits themselves’. It added the customary remark that the decision ‘leaves 
unaffected the right of the Governments of the Congo and France to submit the arguments in 
respect of those questions’.280  
                                                 
274  Id., §32-33. See further section 3.2 on the traditional purposes of provisional measures. 
275  Merrills (1995), p. 113. 
276  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 30. 
277  See further section 5.3 on assessment of material urgency. 
278  See e.g. ICJ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 
Order of 10 May 1984, §§29-31. 
279  ICJ Breard (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 April 1998, LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 3 
March 1999, §27, Avena et al. (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003. See also Armed 
activities on the territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000, §90.  
280  ICJ Certain criminal proceedings in France (Congo v. France), Order of 17 June 2003, §40. See 
also Arrest warrant of 11 April 2000 (Congo v. Belgium), Order of 8 December 2000, §77. 
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3.7 Protection and reparation 
3.7.1 Introduction 
Clearly the discussion of the protection required by provisional measures is related to the purpose 
of these measures. Often it is a matter of perspective whether provisional measures are seen as 
requiring maintenance of, change of or return to the status quo. They may constitute requests or 
orders to provide information in order to preserve the evidence. The question whether and to what 
extent provisional measures require positive measures is equally a matter of perspective. The 
substance of provisional measures must be regarded as based on a continuum between negative 
and positive measures. Moreover, provisional measures may vary with regard to the level of 
specificity. 
3.7.2 Action and abstention: positive obligations in Orders for provisional 
measures 
International adjudicators have ordered States to abstain from acting as well as to take positive 
action, with varying degrees of detail.281 In order to prevent prejudice to the rights of Belgian 
nationals in China, in 1927 the President of the PCIJ ordered China, among others, to accompany 
any Belgian who may have lost his passport or committed some offence against the law, ‘in safety 
to the nearest Belgian consulate’, to provide ‘effective protection’ of Belgian missionaries and ‘in 
general, protection of Belgians against any insult or violence’. Any legal proceedings against 
Belgians were to be heard by ‘modern courts’, with a right of appeal and with the assistance of 
counsel and interpreters of choice.282 This provisional measure is reasonably detailed and includes 
both obligations to act and to refrain from acting.  
Equally, in the Fisheries cases (1972) the ICJ not only ordered Iceland to refrain from 
certain acts, but it also ordered the Applicant States (the UK and Germany) to ‘ensure’ that 
vessels registered in their State did not take an annual catch of a certain amount and to ‘furnish’ 
both Iceland and the Registry of the ICJ with all the relevant information.283 
In the MOX Plant case (2001) ITLOS used provisional measures aimed precisely at 
preserving the rights arising from the duty to cooperate, referred to as a fundamental principle in 
relation to the prevention of environmental harm.284 Ireland had contended that its rights under 
certain specified conditions would be ‘irrevocably violated’ if the UK would start the operation of 
the MOX power plant at that time. Ireland considered that these operations would have 
irreversible consequences. Eventually, rather than ordering the provisional measures requested by 
Ireland, ITLOS ordered both Parties to exchange further information with regard to the possible 
consequences for the Irish Sea, to monitor risks and devise measures to prevent the radioactive 
pollution that ‘might result from the operation of the Mox plant’.285 It ordered the Parties to 
cooperate and ‘enter into consultations forthwith’ to ‘(a) exchange further information with regard 
to possible consequences for the Irish Sea arising out of the commissioning of the MOX plant; (b) 
monitor risks or the effects of the operation of the MOX plant for the Irish Sea; (c) devise, as 
appropriate, measures to prevent pollution of the marine environment which might result from the 
                                                 
281  See already Dumbauld (1932), p. 167: “Interim measures afford protection not only against acts 
but also against omissions to act which threaten a right”. See also p. 195.  
282  PCIJ Sino-Belgian case, Order of the President of 8 January 1927. 
283  ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction cases (UK v. Iceland; Germany v. Iceland), Order of 17 August 1972. 
284  ITLOS MOX plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 2001, §83. 
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operation of the MOX plant’.286 The duty to cooperate also plays a role in the specific context of 
risk assessment.287 
3.7.3 Specificity of decisions about provisional measures 
As noted, the PCIJ was rather specific in its Order for provisional measures in the Sino-Belgian 
case (1927).288 Yet traditionally the ICJ has not specified the contents of its provisional 
measures.289 In later cases this changed. As discussed, the ICJ (Chamber) decided in the Frontier 
Dispute case (1986) not to order exactly those measures as requested by Burkina Faso. Rather 
than the withdrawal of the Parties’ forces to a specific line it ordered a withdrawal of the forces, 
the terms of which should be determined by agreement between the Parties. Only if such 
agreement would fail the ICJ itself would set the terms of the specific line for withdrawal.290 The 
effect of this approach was ‘conciliatory in the sense that the onus is placed on the parties to 
negotiate a modus vivendi, pending judicial resolution of the dispute’.291 The substance of the 
Order was particularly attuned to the context, in which a regional organisation was actively 
involved in addressing the situation. The Order recognised this involvement and ‘the Chamber’s 
task was essentially one of co-ordinating its application of Article 41 with the parties’ outside 
activities’. By choosing this approach to the substance of provisional measures the ICJ also 
avoided accusations of prejudgment.292 As Merrills points out, the approach of the Chamber in 
this case was ‘clearly a legitimate exercise’ of its powers under Article 41.293  
                                                 
286  Ibid. 
287  See section 5.3 of this Chapter (urgency). 
288  PCIJ Sino-Belgian case, Order of the President of 8 January 1927. 
289  See e.g. PCIJ Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Order of 5 
December 1939, see further Elkind (1981), pp. 97-98. See also ICJ Nuclear tests cases (New 
Zealand v. France and Australia v. France), Order of 22 June 1973, on the Nuclear Tests cases 
see further Elkind, pp. 117-122. 
290  In the Frontier Dispute case (1986) Burkina Faso requested the Chamber to order the withdrawal 
of the Parties to a specific line also proposed on the merits. Mali pointed out that this request 
could not be seen as ‘provisional’ as it would amount to granting the claim on the merits. The ICJ 
responded by distinguishing ‘between withdrawal as a matter of principle and the determination 
of its extent’. In other words it ordered the withdrawal of the forces and determined that the terms 
of this withdrawal should be determined by agreement between the Parties. 
291  Merrills (1995), p. 133. 
292  ICJ Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986. See also Merrills 
(1995), pp. 105-106 and p. 126. See also section 3.6 on provisional measures and prejudgment. 
As Merrills notes, at the time the issue was under consideration ‘within the framework of a 
regional organisation’. Thus ‘this was a constructive way of discharging the Chamber’s function 
while avoiding any accusation of prejudgment’, Merrills (1995), p. 105. This was the 
organisation ANAD, which stands for Accord de non-agression et d’assistance en matière de 
défense. Burkina Faso had also requested the Chamber to order that each Party should refrain 
from any act of territorial administration beyond that same specific line. The Chamber noted that 
it did not consider itself empowered, at the stage of provisional measures, to modify the situation 
that prevailed before the armed actions. Rather it was necessary to avoid prejudging the existence 
of any specific line, ICJ Frontier Dispute case (Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 January 1986, 
11, §29. Instead it ordered that administrative acts in the disputed areas should not modify the 
situation that prevailed before the armed actions. If it would have ordered the provisional 
measures requested by Burkina Faso it would have gone ‘beyond a restoration of the status quo’, 
Merrills (1995), p. 105. 
293  Id., p. 133. 
 Chapter I 
48 
Obviously the discussion on the specificity of provisional measures is closely related to that 
on the authority of adjudicators to order provisional measures proprio motu. Article 75(1) of the 
ICJ Rules of Procedure refers to an action proprio motu if provisional measures are ordered in the 
absence of any request.294 Modification of the contents of the provisional measures requested by 
one of the Parties, including by ordering the preservation of the rights involved ‘by other means 
than those proposed’, or by concluding that ‘rights other than those invoked in the request’, 
required provisional measures, ‘in addition to or instead of those rights’ (footnotes omitted).295 
Such modification of provisional measures was ‘a matter of routine in the Court’s practice’. This 
mainly comes down to condensing and consolidating requests that were originally very detailed, 
granting the measures requested only in particle The Court also routinely adds specific protective 
measures in order to preserve the rights of the Respondent State, as well as measures of general 
restraint directed to both Parties, also in cases in which the requesting Party had only requested 
such measures to be taken vis-à-vis the Respondent. Finally, it may indicate general measures of 
restraint that were not included in the request for provisional measures at all.296  
Regarding the substance of provisional measures, Judge Shahabuddeen has noted that they 
‘should be framed in self-executing terms, in the sense that [they] should contain all the legal 
elements required for [their] interpretation and application’.297 In Cameroon v. Nigeria (1996) 
Judge Ajibola argued that the Court was correct in ordering both Parties to take no action that 
might prejudice rights of the other or that might aggravate or extend the dispute. After all, it was 
the ‘cardinal duty of the Court to preserve peace’. However, he disagreed with the other four 
operative parts of the Order. He considered that the Court should ‘refrain from orders with 
diplomatic or political content or matters concerning mediation or negotiation, since strictly 
speaking there issues are apparently outside the legal assignment of the Court’. Leaving aside the 
relation between ‘strictly speaking’ and ‘apparently’, it is clear that he was concerned that some 
of the operative parts may actually ‘do more harm or damage than good’ and that ‘the Court 
should not issue an order in vain, that is, an order that is difficult or impossible to implement’.298 
The latter criterion is not very convincing. While it is obvious that an Order should be capable of 
being implemented, the Court should not be led by the expectation that the State concerned might 
not be willing to implement such Order. Authoritative Orders of the Court already are important 
simply in order to back up arguments made in domestic courts and other fora. In addition, even 
though that is not their main purpose, they are significant building blocks for the development of 
international law in general. 
Dumbauld has pointed out that provisional measures ‘should go no further than necessary to 
fulfil their purpose’. The adjudicator should choose, from equally effective measures, those that 
‘least harm’ the Addressee State.299 He referred to a range of protective measures relating to the 
preservation of peace, including the establishment of neutralised zones, and concluded that the 
‘Court may use its discretion in indicating any sort of measure which will attain the end desired 
and prove acceptable in practice’.300 
As to substance the Order for provisional measures often is less far reaching than the origi-
nal request by (one of) the Parties and the ICJ often takes into account the rights of the respondent 
                                                 
294  See also section 2 (authority). 
295  Sztucki (1983), p. 158. 
296  Id., p. 159. See also section 3.3.4 (border conflict cases). 
297  ICJ Land and maritime boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order 
of 15 March 1996, declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen. 
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as well.301 At the same time it has pointed out the obligations of the addressee by specifying that 
the Respondent State should transmit the Court’s order to its constituent parts, such as the Gover-
nor of Arizona in LaGrand and report on implementation.302 
The Court’s recommendations in Orders denying provisional measures, for instance by 
stressing the importance of preventing aggravation of the dispute (which is also one of the pur-
poses of provisional measures) is, as Merrills put it, a type of ‘conciliatory function’ related to 
‘the kind of implied power referred to in the Free Zones case’.303 The ICJ has made such recom-
mendations, for instance, in the case of Armed Activities in the territory of the Congo (Congo v. 
Rwanda) (2002).304 Judge Buergenthal disagreed with the expression of the Court’s deep concern 
regarding ‘deplorable human tragedy, loss of life, and enormous suffering’ resulting from the 
continued fighting in East Congo. He also disputed the Court’s emphasis on the obligations of all 
Parties to proceedings before it to act in conformity with their obligations under the UN Charter 
and other rules of international law. The Court had pointed out in particular, the obligations by 
Congo and Rwanda under the Geneva Conventions and the First Additional Protocol.305 It had 
also noted, referring to a range of UN Security Council resolutions, that whether or not States 
accept its jurisdiction, ‘they remain in any event responsible for acts attributable to them that 
violate international law’.306 Buergenthal considered that the ICJ had no jurisdiction to address 
these matters once it had ruled that it lacked prima facie jurisdiction to order provisional meas-
ures: “The Court’s function is to pronounce itself on matters within its jurisdiction and not to 
voice personal sentiments or to make comments, general or specific, which, despite their admit-
tedly ‘feel-good’ qualities, have no legitimate place in this order”.307 He pointed out that the 
Court’s own responsibilities under the UN Charter for the maintenance of peace and security are 
not general, but ‘strictly limited to the exercise of its judicial functions in cases of which it has 
jurisdiction’.308 
Judge Koroma responded to Buergenthal by stating that the Court had ‘rightly and 
judiciously’ expressed its deep concern and rightly emphasized the responsibilities of all 
Parties.309 Judge Dugard pointed out that the Order made no judgment on the conduct of either 
Party, but rightly expressed concern about the human suffering in the region of the Eastern Congo 
as well as called upon States in the region ‘to abide by the rule of law’. The Court’s call applied to 
                                                 
301  See section 3.6 on prejudgment and section 6.1 on the beneficiaries. See also Merrills (1995), p. 
143. 
302  ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999, §28. See also Wellens (1998), pp. 
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304  ICJ Armed Activities in the territory of the Congo (new application: 2002) (Democratic Republic 
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308  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002, Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, §6. 
309  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002 (denying provisional measures), Declaration of 
Judge Koroma, §12. 
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all States in the region and did ‘not in any way prejudge the issue raised in the present 
proceedings’.310  
Judge Buergenthal warned that the Court’s statement ‘might also encourage States to file 
provisional measure requests, knowing that, despite the fact that they would be unable to sustain 
the burden of demonstrating the requisite prima facie jurisdiction, they would obtain from the 
Court some pronouncements that could be interpreted as supporting their claim against the other 
Party’.311 This indeed seems a real possibility, indicating that the Court must stay alert in its 
formulations. Yet it appears that the ICJ considers it may insert recommendations in its Orders 
denying provisional measures. 
A more recent example (2006 and 2007) in which it did so was in its Orders denying 
requests by Argentina for provisional measures Pulp Mills, where the Court reminded the parties 
of their responsibilities under international law and stressed the need for Argentina and Uruguay 
‘to implement in good faith the consultation and co-operation procedures’ provided for in a treaty 
concluded between them in the 1970s. It encouraged both parties ‘to refrain from any actions 
which might render more difficult the resolution of the present dispute’.312 
An earlier case in which the question was brought up whether the Court could insert general 
recommendations to the Parties in its Orders denying the use of provisional measures, was the 
Aegean Sea case (1976).313 In this case Judge Lachs considered that the ICJ should, even when it 
did not indicate provisional measures, have acted proprio motu. It should have stressed the need 
for restraint and have made its own contribution to help ‘pave the way to the friendly resolution of 
a dangerous dispute’.314 In the Arbitral Award case (1990) Judge Evenson drew attention to the 
Parties to ‘make every effort to enter into provisional arrangements’.315 In the Passage through 
the Great Belt case (1991), the ICJ itself, in reference to the PCIJ decision in the Free-Zones case, 
noted that ‘pending a decision of the Court on the merits, any negotiation between the Parties with 
a view to achieving a direct and friendly settlement is to be welcomed’.316 Subsequently this case 
was indeed settled by negotiation and Merrills points out that the Court’s suggestion ‘was well 
justified and may have served a useful purpose’.317  
                                                 
310  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002, Separate Opinion of Judge Dugard, §13. 
311  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002, Declaration of Judge Buergenthal, §9. 
312  ICJ Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order of 13 July 
2006 (denying provisional measures), §82. In its subsequent Order it reiterated ‘its call to the 
Parties’ in respect to both aspects. Order of 23 January 2007 (denying provisional measures), 
§53.  
313  ICJ Aegean Sea case (Greece v. Turkey), Order of 11 September 1976. On the protection required 
in the Court’s provisional measures see also section 3.7. 
314  Judge Lachs suggested that the ICJ ‘could have made its own constructive, albeit indirect, 
contribution, helping to pave the way to the friendly resolution of a dangerous dispute’. It could 
have done so by acting proprio motu, laying ‘greater stress on, in particular the need for restraint 
on the part of both States and the possible consequences of any deterioration or extension of the 
conflict’, even without indicating provisional measures proper. ICJ Aegean Sea case (Greece v. 
Turkey), Order of 11 September 1976, Separate Opinion Judge Lachs, p. 20. Yet Sztucki noted in 
1983 that the Court had been ‘consistently reluctant (South-Eastern Greenland, Right of Passage, 
Aegean Sea) to accept general prevention as the sole object of its interlocutory decisions’, Sztucki 
(1983), p. 78. 
315  ICJ Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Order of 2 March 1990, 
Separate Opinion of Judge Evenson. 
316  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. Denmark), 29 July 1991, §95. Judges 
Tarassov and Broms would have preferred an even more concrete proposal. Judge Broms also 
pointed out that the Parties could take up the suggestion for negotiations without loss of face 
exactly because such negotiations were recommended in the Court’s Order. 
317  Merrills (1995), p. 136. 
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With regard to cases in which it denied provisional measures because it considered them 
inappropriate in the circumstances, the above arguments indeed seem to justify the insertion of 
general recommendations. The same applies in cases where it denies a request for provisional 
measures because of prima facie inadmissibility, without removing the case form its docket 
(General List) altogether. On the other hand, in cases in which the ICJ manifestly has no 
jurisdiction under Article 41 to order provisional measures it could be argued to be inappropriate 
to insert such recommendations. An obvious example would be when an individual person 
requests the ICJ to order provisional measures. To be sure, exactly because of the lack of 
jurisdiction ratione personae the ICJ does not even list such a request in its List of cases. In that 
sense a better example would be an Order by the Court to deny provisional measures for manifest 
lack of jurisdiction combined with a decision to remove the case from the List.318 In such Order it 
would be inappropriate to insert recommendations to the Parties, despite the fact that the Court 
has a role to play under the UN Charter for the maintenance of international peace and security. 
After all, it could only perform this role as part of the case pending before it to settle a contentious 
proceeding. If jurisdiction is so manifestly lacking that the Court removes the case from the List, 
it could be argued it has no jurisdiction either to insert recommendations in its Order denying a 
request for provisional measures. On the other hand, if the case is still on the List this means there 
is still a possibility of jurisdiction on the merits.  
Thus generally speaking the issue goes to the appropriateness of inserting a 
recommendation, not to the power to do so. D’ Aspremont has rightly pointed out that, contrary to 
the operative part of an Order for provisional measures, recommendations ‘have no legal 
consequences’.319 No ‘apparent basis for jurisdiction over the merits’ is needed for the Court to 
make such recommendations ‘as they do not make a final finding of facts or imputability’.320 
Moreover, a reference to the general human rights obligations of States or to their obligations 
under the UN Charter does not interfere with the purpose of preventing damages to the States 
involved. 
According to Rosenne ‘[r]estraint and careful crafting of the judicial pronouncement are 
certainly necessary’ in cases in which the Court decided not to grand judicial measures for lack of 
prima facie jurisdiction. “But the real test for the Court in considering whether to include such 
general statements in any order of provisional measures, in any other judicial pronouncement is 
whether the statement is likely to contribute to the peaceful settlement of the dispute”.321 
3.7.4 Relation to reparation 
As Collins has pointed out, in Chorzów Factory (1927) the PCIJ did not decide that it was 
precluded from ordering provisional measures by ‘the mere fact that the Applicant State seeks the 
same remedy in the interim measures phase as it seeks on the merits’. Instead the Court simply 
decided that Article 41 PCIJ Statute could not serve as a basis for an award of interim damages, 
because this would require ‘some form of determination on the merits’ and not because the 
remedy somehow paralleled the final judgment.322 
Apart from a relationship to the rights claimed, it is also important to examine the possible 
obligations and forms of reparation in the event of a finding of a violation on the merits.323 After 
                                                 
318  That is, if the Court would enter into a discussion on the request at all. It might also simply start 
with removing the case from the List. 
319  D’ Aspremont (2007), p. 190. 
320  Id., p. 192. 
321  Rosenne (2005), p. 221. 
322  Collins (1993), p. 229. See PCIJ Factory at Chorzów (German interests in Polish Upper Silesia 
cases), Order of 21 November 1927. See also Rosenne (2005), p. 190. 
323  In general on judicial remedies, including reparation, see e.g. Gray (1987). 
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all the use of provisional measures could be warranted if the respondent would otherwise pre-
empt any meaningful reparation.324 At the same time the adjudicator must also be able to provide 
the relief requested.325 In that sense the substance of the eventual obligation (cessation, assurances 
of non-repetition) or form of reparation and that of the temporary relief pending the case 
(pendente lite) are closely related.326 In the Sino-Belgian Treaty case (1927) the PCIJ considered 
that the violation of certain rights ‘would not be made good simply by the payment of an 
indemnity or by compensation or restitution in some other material form’.327 In its Order for 
provisional measures in the Nuclear Tests cases (1973) the ICJ referred to claims that ‘the 
uncertain physical and genetic effects to which contamination exposes the people of New Zealand 
causes them acute apprehension, anxiety and concern; and that there could be no possibility that 
the rights eroded by the holding of further tests could be fully restored in the event of a judgment 
in New Zealand’s favour in these proceedings’.328 
Merrills noted that ‘on a narrow view’ prejudice to a State ‘is irreparable only if it cannot be 
adequately compensated for in the final judgment’. The ICJ took such a narrow view in the 
Aegean Sea case (1976). The Court considered that the exclusive right to information on the 
natural resources of the continental shelf ‘might be capable of reparation by appropriate 
means’.329 Merrills emphasised that ‘such an interpretation of the concept of irreparable prejudice, 
if applied generally, would have the effect of restricting the scope for interim protection very 
severely’.330 He noted that the Court took a different approach when it ordered provisional 
measures in the Nicaragua case (1984). This, however, was not surprising given the seriousness 
of the allegations. Nevertheless, the ‘alleged violations of Nicaragua’s sovereignty could have 
been compensated by an award of reparation (which was in fact being sought) and thus in the 
strict sense this did not constitute “irreparable prejudice”’. Merrills presumed that the ICJ used 
provisional measures ‘on the ground that in a case involving allegations of flagrant violations of 
international law the applicant’s rights should be protected whether or not it might eventually 
succeed in its claim for damages’.331  
There is no need for a provision on restitution in kind in each particular Convention. The 
right to restitution in kind is a general rule of international law. As early as 1928, the Permanent 
Court of International Justice established that this form of reparation was to be preferred: 
                                                 
324  Dumbault (1932), p. 165 has referred to ‘irreparable in money’ and situations in which 
‘pecuniary redress’ would be ‘inadequate’, also referring to Guggenheim (1931), p. 12. 
325  See e.g. Goldie (1973-74), p. 504. 
326  See also Wellens (1998), p. 421 (‘the kind of measures requested must be such that they can be 
subsumed by the Court’s judgment’). 
327  PCIJ Sino-Belgian case, Order of the President of 8 January 1927, p. 7. Common law may be 
instructive in order to clarify the relation between irreparable harm and the prospect of 
reparation: harm is considered irreparable when ‘there is no certain pecuniary standard for the 
measure of damages’, for instance when the interest of the Party requesting provisional measures 
is primarily subjective, Elkind (1981), p. 216. 
328  ICJ Nuclear tests case (New Zealand v. France), Order of 22 June 1973, §28. 
329  Merrills (1995), p. 108. See also ICJ Pulp mills on the river Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), 
Order of 13 July 2006, in which the Court found that the circumstances did not require the use of 
provisional measures. Among others, it was ‘not at present convinced’ any violation at issue 
‘would not be capable of being remedied at the merits stage of the proceedings’, §70. See also 
§§72 and 76. 
330  Merrills (1995), p. 108. See also Elkind’s criticism (1981), pp. 211-215 discussed in section 3.4. 
See further section 5.3 on assessment of material urgency. 
331  Merrills (1995), pp. 108-109. See also Sztucki (1983) p. 112, referring to the Hostages case.  
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“The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal act -a principle which seems 
to be established by international practice and in particular by the decisions of arbitral tribunals- 
is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-
establish the situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been 
committed. Restitution in kind, or, if this is not possible, payment of a sum corresponding to the 
value which a restitution in kind would bear”.332 
Article 35 of the International Law Commission’s Articles on State Responsibility confirms that 
the injured State is entitled to the ‘re-establish the situation which existed before the wrongful act 
was committed’.333 
In cases of mass human rights violations the ICJ has sought cessation and guarantees of 
non-repetition, rather than the compensation traditionally requested in diplomatic protection 
cases. In such cases of mass violations compensation would be a particularly inappropriate as the 
sole form of reparation and this would in fact be reflected in the use of provisional measures 
pending the proceedings.334 On the other hand, the Court has shown an awareness of the 
appropriateness of forms of reparation other than compensation also in cases involving fewer 
individuals, brought in the evolving exercise of ‘diplomatic protection’. The US hostages were to 
be released immediately. The Paraguayan, German and Mexican nationals were not to be 
executed before their cases had been submitted to a review taking into account the lack of 
consular assistance. In view of the object of the aforementioned VCCR, namely the protection of 
nationals abroad, it is not surprising that the wronged State expected some form of ‘restitution in 
kind’. By indicating provisional measures, the ICJ acknowledges that if it were to decide 
restitutio in integrum was indeed warranted, this decision would be rendered useless if irreparable 
harm had already been inflicted. Thus the ICJ ordered provisional measures in the cases Breard, 
LaGrand and Avena.335 The execution of Breard and LaGrand, in contravention of these Orders, 
made impossible this restitution in kind. As noted, Paraguay subsequently withdrew its case 
against the US, but Germany persisted. The purpose of Germany’s claim in LaGrand had been to 
‘ensure that German nationals will be provided with adequate consular assistance in the future, 
and thus be protected against the fatal consequences following from breaches of Article 36 in 
circumstances allowing those leading to the death of the brothers LaGrand’.336 After the execution 
of Walter LaGrand Germany focused on its right to satisfaction. It considered that an apology 
alone did not suffice and would be no help in future cases. Instead, it asked the Court to 
pronounce the obligation to provide Germany with assurances of non-repetition. As the first 
reason for its insistence on satisfaction, it referred to the International Law Commission's 
                                                 
332  PCIJ Factory at Chorzów (German interests in Polish Upper Silesia cases), Order of 21 
November 1927, p. 41. 
333  ILC Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, adopted at the 53rd 
session, November 2001, A/56/10, Chapter IV E.2. Article 34 stipulates that restitution is the first 
of the forms of reparation available to an injured State. 
334  Apart from its appropriate emphasis on the continued obligation to punish genocide and 
cooperate fully with the ICTY, the ICJ’s approach in the Genocide Convention case, 27 February 
2007, was surprising in this respect. See e.g. Milanović (2007), pp. 689-691, also referring to the 
case law of the Inter-American and European Court of Human Rights and the Bosnia Human 
Rights Chamber. These adjudicators are introduced in the Chapter II of this book. Gattini (2007), 
p. 712 also noted that a look at the case law of the Inter-American Court ‘could have provided a 
useful source of obligation’. See further Chapter XIII on the approaches of the various 
adjudicators to the relation with reparation.  
335  ICJ Breard (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 April 1998; LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Order of 3 
March 1999 and Avena et al. (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003. 
336  See ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), verbatim record CR 2000/27 of 13 November 2000, p. 
15.  
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statement that satisfaction is a remedy designed especially for those cases in which injury cannot 
be made good by restitution or compensation. As its second reason to request the ICJ to oblige the 
US to render satisfaction, Germany referred to ‘the particularly grave character of the moral 
damage inflicted upon Germany’.337 In short Germany claimed that adequate assurances were 
warranted against repetition. This would mean a guarantee of non-repetition requiring preventive 
action, rather than ‘simple’ verbal assurances. 
Indeed, the ICJ considered that an apology by the US was not sufficient in this case. It also 
considered that an apology would not be sufficient in other cases where ‘foreign nationals have 
not been advised without delay of their rights under Article 36, paragraph 1, of the Vienna 
Convention and have been subjected to prolonged detention or sentenced to severe penalties’.338 
The Court stressed the importance of the information the US had provided on its 
programme to ensure compliance. “If a State, in proceedings before this Court, repeatedly refers 
to substantial activities which it is carrying out in order to achieve compliance with certain 
obligations under a treaty, then this expresses a commitment to follow through with the efforts in 
this regard”.339 
In relation to the other two types of assurances sought by Germany, the Court considered 
that: 
“if the United States, notwithstanding its commitment referred to in paragraph 124 above, 
should fail in its obligation of consular notification to the detriment of German nationals, an 
apology would not suffice in cases where the individuals concerned have been subjected to 
prolonged detention or convicted and sentenced to severe penalties. In the case of such a 
conviction and sentence, it would be incumbent upon the United States to allow the review and 
reconsideration of the conviction and sentence by taking account of the violation of the rights 
set forth in the Convention. This obligation can be carried out in various ways. The choice of 
means must be left to the United States”.340 
Although this was less than Germany requested, in cases involving German nationals who are 
sentenced to severe penalties, the Court did confirm the obligation of the US to review and 
reconsider convictions and sentences in cases where Article 36(1)(b) has been denied despite the 
US assurances.341 Two years later the ICJ specified this by pointing out that the ‘freedom in the 
choice of means for such review and reconsideration is not without qualification’.342 It should be 
effective, take account of the rights in the VCCR and ‘guarantee that the violation and the 
possible prejudice caused by that violation will be fully examined and taken into account’. The 
                                                 
337  See ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), verbatim record CR 2000/27 of 13 November 2000, pp. 
15 and 16. 
338  ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §123.  
339  On the other hand, the Court noted that such question could not provide an assurance that the US 
will never again fail to observe the obligation of notification under Article 36. It also noted that 
no State could give such a guarantee and that Germany did not seek it, but the US had met 
‘Germany's request for a general assurance of non-repetition’. The Court confirmed that it was 
indeed within its authority and jurisdiction to determine the existence of a violation of 
international obligation and, if necessary, to hold that a domestic law has been the cause of this 
violation. It stated that ‘it has not found that a United States law, whether substantive or 
procedural in character, is inherently inconsistent with the obligations undertaken by the United 
States in the Vienna Convention’, ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 
2001, §125. 
340  Ibid. 
341  See e.g. Aceves (2003), Jennings (2002), Orakhelashvili (2002), Palmisano (2002), Tams (2002) 
and Cassel (1999b). 
342  ICJ Avena (Mexico v. US), Judgment of 31 March 2004, §131. 
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‘review and reconsideration should be both of the sentence and of the conviction’ and ‘should 
occur within the overall judicial proceedings relating to the individual defendant concerned’.343 It 
pointed out that ‘the clemency process as currently practiced within the United States criminal 
justice system, does not appear to meet the requirements (…) and is therefore not sufficient in 
itself to serve as an appropriate means of “review and reconsideration” as envisaged by the Court 
in the LaGrand case’.344 As discussed, Mexico requested the ICJ to interpret the Avena judgment 
and in this context it also requested provisional measures to halt the execution of Medellín and 
four others. The Court, by a narrow majority, found that the Parties ‘apparently hold different 
views as to the meaning and scope of th[e] obligation of result [in Avena], namely whether that 
understanding is shared by all United States federal and state authorities and whether that 
obligation falls upon those authorities’.345 Subsequently Texas executed Medellín. Clearly, the 
executions of Breard, LaGrand and Medellín caused irreparable harm not only to the claim, but in 
fact to the persons involved.  
3.8 The beneficiaries of provisional measures and the rights of the 
addressees  
3.8.1 Introduction 
The Court’s recent use of provisional measures aimed to prevent human suffering may be roughly 
divided into cases involving individuals sentenced to death who had been deprived of consular 
protection by their State of nationality on the one hand and cases involving armed ‘territorial’ 
conflicts on the other hand. In the latter type of cases the group of beneficiaries generally is 
considerably larger. Moreover, the Court’s involvement may partially be explained by the ICJ’s 
role, under the UN Charter, in the maintenance of peace. 
Even if the applicant State fails to convince the Court to use provisional measures it may 
still benefit from the Court’s examination of the case, as this may draw public attention to the 
conflict, enable it to publicly make arguments and bring the conflict ‘into sharper legal focus’.346 
In some cases it may strengthen the State’s bargaining position, especially if the adjudicator, 
while denying the request, nevertheless gives some general recommendations. 
3.8.2 Rights by proxy (diplomatic protection) 
Evidently States normally institute proceedings and request provisional measures to protect their 
own rights, although in the majority of cases, in one way or other the interests of the Applicant 
State’s citizens are involved (and subsumed in those of the State).347 In Avena the Court had also 
stressed that it had ‘been addressing the issues of principle (…) from the viewpoint of the general 
application of the Vienna Convention, and there can be no question of an a contrario argument’. 
“In other words, the fact that in this case the court’s ruling has concerned only Mexican nationals 
                                                 
343  Id., §§138 and 141. 
344  Id., §143. See also e.g. Shelton (2004) and Aceves (2003). 
345  ICJ Request for interpretation of the judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena 
and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 16 July 2008, §55. See further section 
3.3.7. 
346  See e.g. Merrills (1995), p. 113. 
347  As Cançado Trindade put it in a dissent to the ICJ’s decision not to order provisional measurs in 
Questions relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 28 
May 2009, the rights invoked by the contending parties ‘have a direct relationship with the 
legitimate expectations of thousands of human beings’, §14. 
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cannot be taken to imply that the conclusions reached by it in the present Judgment do not apply 
to other foreign nationals finding themselves in similar situations in the United States”.348 This 
‘indicates that the Court is more concerned about the international rule of law than about strictly 
contractual relations between two states parties’.349 
In cases involving the lives of persons the approach of the ICJ to the group of beneficiaries 
to be protected by its provisional measures should not be overly strict. The infusion of human 
rights norms in the law on diplomatic protection in fact warrants a flexible approach to the group 
of beneficiaries, rather than a strict interpretation of the ‘nationals’ to be protected.350 The point of 
departure should be the protection required rather than a narrow concept of nationality or an 
otherwise limited approach. In the Hostages case, for instance, the ICJ had ordered Iran to 
immediately release all US nationals, not just those held in the US Embassy or in the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs in Tehran, but also those who ‘have been held as hostages elsewhere’.351 In other 
words it took the scope of the group of beneficiaries to be rather wide to include all US nationals 
being held as hostage anywhere in Iran. 
In the context of the law of the sea ITLOS Judge Laing has also noted ‘potential 
beneficiaries include non-States, often in a commercial context’ and argued that provisional 
measures must protect ‘non-traditional asserted rights’.352 
3.8.3 General interest 
Often the measures requested could also serve the general interest, such as in cases involving 
gross and widespread human rights violations or in cases involving environmental degradation. 
Already in the early cases of the PCIJ there were discussions on the question whether provisional 
measures could be used in ‘proceedings instituted by the requesting State not in defence of its 
own rights but in the ‘public interest’, as a member of the Council of the League’.353 If the State 
has standing to do so, without reference to its ‘own rights’, and the ICJ has jurisdiction to hear its 
particular human rights claim,354 this Court should also be able to Order provisional measures. 
After all this would still preserve the respective rights of either party to ensure protection of the 
human rights standards invoked. The prevention of aggravation of the dispute is but one 
example.355  
3.8.4 Third parties’ rights and obligations 
Applicant States may also refer to the rights and obligations of third parties. In some cases third 
parties have even submitted information separately.356 With regard to the relief sought in the M/V 
                                                 
348  ICJ Avena et al. (Mexico v. US), Judgment of 31 March 2004, §151. See on the confusion created 
in Avena on State rights, diplomatic protection and individual rights Künzli (2005), pp. 55-56 and 
Milano (2004), pp. 124-132. See also Shelton (2004a), p. 561. 
349  Shelton (2004a), p. 565. 
350  See also Judge Simma in ICJ Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Congo v. Rwanda), 
Order of 10 July 2002. Generally on diplomatic protection, see the various reports by ILC 
Rapporteur Dugard; see also Vermeer-Künzli (2007). 
351  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Order of 15 December 1979, §47. 
352  ITLOS M/V ‘Saiga’ (No.2) case, Order of 11 March 1998, Separate Opinion Judge Laing, §21. 
353  Sztucki (1983), pp. 228-229. 
354  See e.g. Milano (2004), p. 114, pp. 118-119. 
355  See section 3.2. 
356  See e.g. the applications for permission to intervene by Australia, Samoa, Solomon Islands, the 
Marshall Islands and the Federal States of Micronesia in the Request for an examination of the 
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‘Saiga’ case ITLOS Judge Laing wrote about third parties that situations involving them had no 
direct bearing on the case but ‘incidents involving non-parties may provide evidence of (…) 
similar facts and conduct, raising the inference that the actions in issue may have occurred’.357 
An applicant State’s interest in the clarification of a legal issue may also be at stake, as was 
the case in the two requests for provisional measures by Bosnia, dealing with the legality of the 
UN arms embargo. As the ICJ considered that the clarification of this issue was meant for 
members of the Security Council rather than for Serbia and Montenegro, it decided not to order 
provisional measures to this effect,358 Bosnia declared its intention to institute legal proceedings 
against one ‘third State’ with permanent membership in the Security Council.359 In November 
1993 it argued that the UK had ‘failed and refused to prevent genocide, had imposed and 
maintained an arms embargo in violation of Article 51 of the UN Charter and had abetted ongoing 
genocide by opposing the efforts of others to have the embargo lifted’. It considered that these 
actions amounted to ‘complicity in genocide’. The next month, however, Bosnia and UK issued a 
joint statement in which Bosnia announced that it would not institute such legal proceedings.360  
3.8.5 Rights of the addressee States 
The Court’s Order for provisional measures in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case (1951) has been 
criticised as arguably ‘contrary to the usual practice’ of the ICJ and the PCIJ, ‘especially because 
the decree created an opportunity for the company to deplete Iran’s oil reserves further’. In that 
sense it ‘patently failed to protect the status quo in an even-handed way’.361 Respondents need to 
be protected as well, but the question is to what length. 
It has been suggested to include in the Order the condition that the requesting State will 
compensate the respondent for (some of the) losses sustained in compliance, should the Court 
subsequently reject the submission on the merits.362 In domestic systems injunctions often include 
such condition. Different from domestic rules and regulations the ICJ Statute and Rules of Court 
do not expressly confer such a power on the ICJ. It has been pointed out that even if such a power 
could be implied it had never been exercised.363 Elkind has considered that one way to protect the 
                                                                                                                       
situation in accordance with paragraph 63 of the Court’s judgment of 20 December 1974 in the 
Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case, Order of 22 September 1995. 
357  M/V ‘Saiga’ (No.2) case, Order of 11 March 1998, Separate Opinion Judge Laing, §24. He 
remarked, however, that the issue played no part in the Order in this case. 
358  ICJ Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Orders of 8 April 1993 and 
13 September 1993. 
359  It referred to the Separate Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, to the Order of 13 September 1993, 
§§98-115. 
360  See ‘editor’s note’, p. 43 International and Comparative Law Quarterly p. 714 (1994). See also 
Toufayan (2005). 
361  ICJ Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (UK v. Iran), Order of 5 July 1951. See Goldie (1974), p. 496. As 
Rosenne (2005), p. 155 put it ‘the fact that important provisional measures were indicated in the 
case and that later the Court held itself to be without jurisdiction over the application has troubled 
both the Court and publicists’. See also Fisheries jurisdiction cases, Orders of 17 August 1972. 
362  Merrills (1995), p. 117 refers to the argument of Denmark in the Passage through the Great Belt 
case. The Court did not order provisional measures and therefore did not deal with this request.  
363  Mendelson (1972-73), pp. 312-313. Collins (1992), pp. 229-231, points out that ‘there can be 
little doubt that a principle of compensation for the unjustified grant of an injunction in private 
litigation is a general principle of law’. Dumbauld (1932), p. 162 considers that the PCIJ had an 
implied power to condition its use of provisional measures this way. Merrills (1995), p. 117 has 
noted that such a ‘provision of security can be thought of as a general principle of law’. In his 
Separate Opinion to ITLOS Land reclamation by Singapore in and around the straits of Johor 
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respondent State is ‘to balance the convenience of the parties in a case involving interim 
protection’. “If compliance with the measures involves a greater hardship than denial of the 
measures, then they should be denied”.364 About the aforementioned conditional relief he 
mentioned that in many domestic jurisdictions courts can order plaintiffs to ‘post security’ against 
any damage the respondent might suffer ‘by virtue of compliance with the Order if the Court later 
decides for respondent at the jurisdiction or the merits phases’. He suggested that the ICJ could 
consider this because the power to do so is ‘functionally inherent’ in the power to order 
provisional measures. At the same time he emphasized that Parties that fail to appear before the 
Court cannot raise matters such as balance of convenience nor can they ask the Court to order the 
Applicant State to post security.365 
The ICJ has not yet decided the issue whether a Party may receive compensation for injuries 
resulting from compliance with provisional measures if the Court later determines it had no 
jurisdiction on the merits or if it finds in favour of the addressee of the provisional measures.366 In 
the Great Belt case (1991) Judge Shahabuddeen recalled that it was not settled whether the 
jurisprudence of the ICJ allowed for ‘compensating a party for any injuries suffered in complying 
with an interim measure should the latter be eventually found to have been unjustified’. He 
pointed out that this made even more significant the exceptional character of provisional 
measures.367 The discussion in the next section on the existence of prima facie jurisdiction on the 
merits is particularly relevant from the perspective of the rights of the addressee State. 
In the Lockerbie and Genocide Convention cases the (Acting) President denied the 
Applicant States’ request to accelerate the proceedings, and did not invoke Article 75(1) of the 
Rules in order to ensure the effectiveness of any provisional measures that might be taken.368 In 
LaGrand, on the other hand, the Court did decide to order provisional measures immediately, as 
the execution of the death sentence against Walter LaGrand was so imminent that a formal 
hearing could not have been planned until after the execution. Judges Schwebel and Buergenthal 
were correct in criticising Germany for not bringing the case and the request for provisional 
measures before the Court sooner.369 This would have allowed the US to adequately prepare its 
response and present it during a hearing. Nevertheless, as the life of a person was involved the 
Court could not have taken a different approach. Moreover, the ICJ was fully aware of the US 
arguments in this respect because this was the second request for provisional measures to halt an 
execution the ICJ had dealt with within a limited period of time. In the previous case the US had 
extensively argued against the use of provisional measures in its written and oral submissions and 
subsequently disrespected the proceedings before the ICJ by executing the Paraguayan national in 
square violation of the Court’s provisional measures.370  
                                                                                                                       
(Malaysia v. Singapore), Order of 8 October 2003, §20 Judge Lucky wrote: “Although there is 
no international precedent that I can find, I think the time has come to consider whether 
applicants for provisional measures, as in some municipal systems, should provide a guarantee in 
their applications that if the measures sought are granted, but discontinued if the substantive 
matter is determined in the respondent’s favour, they will pay damages incurred and costs to the 
respondents”. 
364  Elkind (1981), p. 259. 
365  Elkind (1981), pp. 259-260. See also pp. 238-241 and p. 57. 
366  See section 3.6 on prejudgment. See further section 3.7 on protection and reparation. See also the 
purpose of protecting collateral rights, section 3.3.4. 
367  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991, Separate 
Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 29. 
368  See also Rosenne (2005), pp. 163-164 and Sztucki (1983), pp. 156-157. 
369  ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999, Separate Opinion Judge Schwebel 
and Judgment of 27 June 2001, Dissenting Opinion Judge Buergenthal. 
370  See also Addo (1999), p. 720. 
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When the rights involved are the same for both States it is not difficult to order provisional 
measures that have an equal impact on both Parties. If, on the other hand, the case does not relate 
to a territorial question but to the international responsibility of a Respondent State, it is more 
difficult to fully achieve equal treatment in the text of the provisional measure.371 
It could be argued that in balancing the rights of the Parties in a conflict, a State’s interest in 
the protection of life and limbs of its citizens must outweigh the procedural problems arising 
under the national law of the other State when, for instance, that other State has to retry a foreign 
national in compliance with international law. At the time of its Order to halt the execution of 
Breard and LaGrand, however, the ICJ had not yet reached a decision on this issue. It merely 
indicated provisional measures so that the effectiveness of a possible decision on the merits would 
not be precluded.372 Its judgment in LaGrand (2001) indeed confirmed the importance of 
protection of life and limbs.373 
4 JURISDICTION ON THE MERITS AND THE USE OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
Section 2 noted that while the authority of the adjudicator to use provisional measures is a 
prerequisite, the possibility of jurisdiction on the merits relates to the appropriateness of their 
use.374 
The discussion of the relationship between jurisdiction and provisional measures can be 
divided in two categories: the authority to use such measures in the particular system in the first 
place and their use in relation to the jurisdiction on the merits. The first relates to the implicit or 
explicit legal basis for provisional measures, the authority to use them in inter-state proceedings, 
the authority to use them proprio motu and the delegation of the authority to an individual judge. 
The second already relates to the question whether provisional measures are warranted. It 
involves the concept of prima facie jurisdiction and the use of provisional measures. This section 
                                                 
371  Merrills (1995), p. 117. 
372  This is also observed by Wilson (1998), p. 8: “[The ICJ ruling] didn’t say that Breard should go 
free. It didn’t pass any judgment on the validity of the death sentence imposed in his case. It 
didn’t even say that he should get a new trial. Moreover, it didn’t reach any decision as to the 
ultimate question before the ICJ-that is, what should be done when the Vienna Convention is 
violated. It simply said that Angel Breard should not be executed until the court had a chance to 
hear the full arguments on the application of the Vienna Convention in the context of Breard’s 
case, a legal dispute over which the U.S. government had explicitly agreed that the ICJ had 
jurisdiction”. 
373  ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001. See also Avena (Mexico v. US), 
Judgment of 31 March 2004 and Mexico’s argument in ICJ Request for interpretation of the 
judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico 
v. US), Order of 16 July 2008, §20 (‘any delay in an execution would not be prejudicial to the 
rights of the United States as all of the above-mentioned Mexican nationals would remain 
incarcerated and subject to execution once their right to review and reconsideration has been 
vindicated’.) 
374  Obviously there are also levels of appropriateness. In the context of the practice of ITLOS 
Devine has suggested the following methodology: 1. Is there prima facie jurisdiction? 2. Has 
jurisdiction been excluded by (one of) the parties? 3. Is the exercise of jurisdiction admissible in 
this case? 4. Is it appropriate in this case (criteria of urgency, respective rights and serious harm 
to the marine environment)? 5. What measures should be taken? See Devine (2003), pp. 274-275. 
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deals with the second category: the relevance of the jurisdiction on the merits as established by 
the ICJ.375 
If an individual, a company, or an organisation would request provisional measures, 
however much warranted to prevent irreparable harm, the ICJ obviously would have no authority 
to indicate them because ‘only States may be parties in cases before the Court’ (Article 34(1)). In 
other words the ICJ clearly would have no jurisdiction ratione personae.376 
Yet in the context of provisional measures the ICJ normally does not have to concern itself 
with jurisdiction ratione personae, because almost all States are Party to the ICJ Statute.377 
Generally speaking, however, the ICJ mainly deals with the question whether there is prima 
facie jurisdiction ratione materiae. 
The power of the ICJ to indicate provisional measures is ‘separate and independent from 
jurisdiction over the action in chief’.378 It must be seen independently from the jurisdiction on the 
                                                 
375  Chapter II of this book deals with the competence, procedure, promptness and transparency of the 
human rights adjudication, while Chapter XV deals with the relation between provisional 
measures and jurisdiction on the merits as well as admissibility. 
376  Elkind points out that Article 35 of the ICJ Statute stipulates that ‘the Court shall be open to 
States Parties to the present Statute’. It therefore deals with jurisdiction ratione personae. Read 
together with Article 94 of the UN Charter (providing that all members of the UN are ipso facto 
parties to the ICJ Statute) it identifies ‘over whom the Court has inherent jurisdiction with regard 
to interim measures’, Elkind (1981), p. 259 and p. 177. He further supports this approach by 
reference to domestic systems with some form of interim remedy, in which this remedy has been 
based on jurisdiction ratione personae, Elkind (1981), p. 177. He notes that the consent of a State 
to be brought before the ICJ is usually expressed through Article 36 of the Statute, which is 
primarily concerned with jurisdiction ratione materiae. He notes that interim protection is an 
urgent remedy and the Court ‘cannot be bogged down by complicated questions of Article 36 
jurisdiction at the interim protection stage’, Elkind (1981), p. 259. 
377  This was different in the Genocide Convention case: ICJ Application of the Convention on the 
prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 8 April 1993. In this case the ICJ itself raised the question of 
jurisdiction. Thirlway (1994), p. 34 points out that the Court found it necessary to raise the issue 
ex officio, at the stage of provisional measures. The Respondent (the Republic of Yugoslavia) 
had chosen not to raise it, obviously because it in fact claimed to be a member of the UN, as 
successor of the ‘old’ Yugoslavia, and therefore claimed to be a party to the Statute. The ICJ 
repeated that there should be prima facie jurisdiction and added that this includes jurisdiction 
ratione personae as well as ratione materiae. Resolutions of the Security Council and the General 
Assembly had denied the continuity of Yugoslavia (the Respondent State) and pointed out that it 
should reapply for UN membership. The ICJ noted that it was not necessary, at the phase of 
provisional measures, to determine definitely whether the Respondent was still a party to the ICJ 
statute. It noted that the compromissory clause to a multilateral treaty, such as Article XI of the 
Genocide Convention could be regarded prima facie within its jurisdiction ratione personae. With 
regard to the Applicant State, Bosnia-Herzegovina, it equally concluded that Article XI appeared 
to afford a basis on which its jurisdiction might be founded, see Order of 8 April 1993, §19. It 
rejected another basis for jurisdiction relied on by Bosnia-Herzegovina, namely a treaty dating 
from 1919, because it appeared to be limited to the present territory of Yugoslavia. In other 
words, there was no jurisdiction ratione loci based on this treaty. Neither was there prima facie 
jurisdiction based on the doctrine of forum prorogatum. See further Merrills (1995), pp. 95-100. 
See also Elkind (1981) arguing that the only prerequisite for the use of provisional measures is 
jurisdiction ratione personae, while with regard to jurisdiction ratione materiae the Court should 
only satisfy itself that there is no manifest absence of jurisdiction, p. 177 and p. 192. Doubts on 
jurisdiction on the merits ratione temporis does not necessarily hinder the use of provisional 
measures as orders for such measures are ‘oriented towards the present and the future’, Wellens 
(1998), p. 435. 
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merits exactly because of the aim to ‘provide an expeditious remedy’ and, in the words of 
Merrills, it ‘is therefore well established that the Court can consider whether to order interim 
measures without first resolving contested issues of jurisdiction and, as a corollary, that such 
consideration in no way prejudices its later decision on jurisdictional questions’.379 
In the 1930s Dumbauld pointed out that jurisdiction to grant protection pendente lite did not 
depend on jurisdiction in the main action. A Court could provide such a remedy in advance of 
determination about its jurisdiction.380 He noted that it was ‘sufficient that want of jurisdiction is 
not obvious prima facie’.381 In other words, he argued that it is sufficient that there is no a priori 
lack of jurisdiction.382 
It is important to examine the issue of jurisdiction on the merits at least to a certain extent. 
Eli Lauterpacht has observed that the ICJ could not ‘disregard altogether the question of its 
competence on the merits’ although it did not need to satisfy itself at that stage that it had such 
                                                                                                                       
378  Dumbauld (1932), p. 165. See e.g. ICJ Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case Judgment on preliminary 
objections of 22 July 1952, pp. 102-103. The Court held that it was competent to indicate 
provisional measures if the dispute did not a priori fall ‘completely outside the scope of 
international jurisdiction’. Judges Badawi Pasha and Winiarski dissented. They considered that if 
‘there is no jurisdiction on the merits, there can be no jurisdiction to indicate interim measures of 
protection’ (p. 97). They agreed, however, that the ICJ did not have to finally pronounce on the 
question of jurisdiction before indicating provisional measures, because requests for provisional 
measures ‘might well become pointless’ in such cases. Cheng (1953), p. 271 refers to the 
Czechoslovak-Hungarian Mixed Arbitral Tribunal’s statement that refusing provisional measures 
‘for the sole reason that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is challenged’ would ‘open a very simple 
way for any party wishing to avoid interim measures of protection being taken against him. The 
power of the Tribunal (...) would thus be rendered absolutely futile’. Sztucki (1983), p. 230 also 
quotes from (the French version) of this case: ‘Il suffit que son incompétence ne soit pas 
manifeste, évidente’. About the phrasing in the Anglo-Iranian case Cheng points out, at p. 272, 
that it would have been preferable if the Court would have said that the dispute could not a priori 
be excluded from its (rather than ‘international’) jurisdiction. 
379  Merrills (1995), p. 91. See section 3.6 about the issue of prejudgment. 
380  Dumbauld (1932), p. 165 and p. 186. In the 1920s the President of the PCIJ, who at the time had 
the power to indicate provisional measures, noted that the Court, in its final decision, would 
‘either declare itself to have no jurisdiction or give judgment on the merits’: PCIJ Denunciation 
of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 between China and Belgium, Order of 8 January 1927. 
According to Cheng this means that ‘he was evidently of the opinion that he was competent to 
indicate such measures, even before the question of jurisdiction had been decided, but when 
prima facie the dispute came within, or at least did not fall outside the Court’s jurisdiction’. 
Cheng (1953), p. 272, also referring to PCIJ Administration of the Prince von Pless case, Order 
of 11 May 1933, A/B 54, p. 153 and Polish Agrarian Reform and the German minority case, 29 
July 1933, A/B 58, p. 179. 
381  Dumbauld (1932), p. 165. 
382  According to Sztucki the Sino-Belgian case, the Polish Agrarians and the Pless cases do not 
mean that the Court has the power to order provisional measures unless there is a manifest lack of 
substantive jurisdiction. He argues that these cases have limited value as a precedent in the 
context of jurisdictional issues, Sztucki (1983), pp. 226-227. He points out that at the time (until 
1936) preliminary objections were not filed immediately upon the notification of an application 
and the request for provisional measures, Sztucki (1983), pp. 222-223 and pp. 225-229. 
Moreover, he argues, the President in the Sino-Belgian case used provisional measures ‘on 
personal conviction that the application and request met very high jurisdictional requirements; 
but at the same time felt it necessary to reflect the fact that competence in the matters of interim 
protections and substantive jurisdiction was divided in that case, and that the latter question, if 
necessary, would be decided by the full Court unbound by the decision or conviction of its 
President’ (footnotes omitted), Sztucki (1983), pp. 226-227. 
 Chapter I 
62 
jurisdiction. As a reason for this he noted that ‘Governments ought not to be discouraged from 
undertaking, or continuing to undertake, the obligations of judicial settlement as the result of any 
justifiable apprehension that by accepting them they may become exposed to the embarrassment, 
vexation and loss, possibly following upon interim measures, in cases in which there is no 
reasonable possibility, prima facie ascertained by the Court, of jurisdiction on the merits’.383 
Sztucki points out that there is always a risk that the ICJ, for jurisdictional reasons, will 
deny provisional measures that may otherwise be warranted, while it may eventually uphold 
jurisdiction. On the other hand, the ICJ may also renounce jurisdiction after having indicated 
provisional measures. In that case the Respondent would have been ‘called upon to submit to a 
restraint on his freedom of action in a matter on which the Court really has had nothing to say 
from the very beginning’.384 Yet Sztucki notes that indicating provisional measures before the 
final decision on jurisdiction is nevertheless appropriate because ‘requests for interim protection 
are regarded as a matter of urgency while jurisdictional questions are not’. Exactly because ‘the 
question of jurisdiction is so important in inter-State litigation and therefore requires a scrupulous 
                                                 
383  The claim, he considered, must be based on an instrument that prima facie confers jurisdiction 
upon the Court and that incorporates ‘no reservations obviously excluding its jurisdiction’. ICJ 
Interhandel case (Switzerland v. US), Order of 24 October 1957, Separate Opinion Lauterpacht, 
pp. 118-119. The ICJ had determined that the question of jurisdiction on the merits was to be 
dealt with in the phase of Preliminary Objections. While the majority did not consider the issue of 
jurisdiction to be an obstacle, the Court determined that there was no need for provisional 
measures. Four members (Judges Lauterpacht, Klaestad, Hackworth and Read) disagreed and 
considered that the ICJ had no jurisdiction to take provisional measures in this case. See also the 
Nuclear Test cases, Orders of 22 June 1973, Declaration of Judge Singh pointing out that there 
must be a ‘possible valid base for the Court’s competence’ and that the application must be 
‘prima facie entertainable’. Even at the stage of prima facie examination the ICJ ‘has to examine 
the reservations and declarations’ referred to as the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction. As a result 
the ICJ could either find that ‘there is no possible base’ for the Court’s jurisdiction or ‘a possible 
base exists, but needs further investigation’. In the latter case ‘the Court is inevitably left no 
option but to proceed to the substance of the jurisdiction of the case to complete its process of 
adjudication which, in turn, is time-consuming and therefore comes into conflict with the urgency 
of the matter coupled with the prospect of irreparable damage to the rights of the parties. It is this 
situation which furnishes the “raison d’être” of interim relief’, Australia v. France, pp. 109-110 
and New Zealand v. France, p. 146. In other words he argued that if there is no such prima facie 
jurisdiction provisional measures should not be taken. See also Merrills (1995), pp. 91-92 
pointing out that ‘despite the incidental character of the proceedings, the consent of the 
respondent, and hence the question of substantive jurisdiction, cannot be entirely ignored’, 
exactly because of the ‘exacting consequences’ of provisional measures. After all, their aim is ‘to 
make States act, or more usually refrain from acting, in certain ways for a period of months, or 
possibly years, until the case is finally disposed of’. See further section 3.7 of this Chapter on the 
protective measures required. 
384  Sztucki (1983), pp. 255-256. He points out that this was the case in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. 
case, Judgment of 22 July 1952, p. 114. He acknowledges that the ICJ ‘convalidated the 
indication of interim measures by stating in his judgment on jurisdiction that the order was 
lapsing ex nunc and not ex tunc’. He also refers to the Separate Opinion of Judge Fitzmaurice in 
the Northern Cameroons case regarding this situation, as Sztucki puts it, ‘as perfectly regular’. 
He confirms that this ‘may be so from the point of view of formal logic based on the general 
concept of incidental jurisdiction’ but from the point of view of common sense the situation is 
‘highly undesirable’. 
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and time-consuming examination, the Court is compelled to be less scrupulous with respect to the 
determination of that very question when it considers requests for interim protection’.385 
In the Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (1951) case the ICJ granted provisional measures, but later 
decided it had no jurisdiction.386 According to Elkind, since then ‘many judges and scholars have 
been timid about the Court’s power to indicate interim measures without sufficient assurance that 
the Court actually has jurisdiction to hear the merits of the case’. He notes that ‘no clear theory 
has emerged from either the Court or from scholars’ as to the basis of the Court’s jurisdiction to 
grant provisional measures under Article 41.387 Yet he considers that in conditions of urgency 
even the test of a prima facie chance of success on the merits is too strict. The better rule would 
be ‘that the action must not be manifestly without merit’.388 In other words, he argues for ‘a very 
light standard of proof as to jurisdiction under Article 36 at the interim protection phase’.389 With 
regard to this jurisdiction the Court should go no further than ‘satisfy itself that the absence of 
jurisdiction under Article 36 is not manifest’.390 
In the Nuclear Test cases (1973) the ICJ established the criterion that provisional measures 
may be used if there is no a priori lack of jurisdiction.391 In the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases 
(1972) it pointed out that it need not finally satisfy itself that it had jurisdiction on the merits, but 
ought not to act ‘if the absence on the jurisdiction of the merits is manifest’. It concluded by 
stating that it could take provisional measures as long as it ‘could identify an instrument which 
appeared prima facie, to afford a possible basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be 
founded’.392 This means that the possibility of such jurisdiction is sufficient.393 In the Hostages 
case (1979) the ICJ ‘regarded the so-called ‘positive’ prima facie test as sufficient for the interim 
                                                 
385  Sztucki (1983), pp. 253-254. For a general discussion on the likelihood of jurisdiction on the 
merits and the use of provisional measures, see also Beirlaen (1978-1979), pp. 425-459. 
386  ICJ Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, Order of 5 July 1951. See also Cheng (1953), p. 273 who notes 
that there are differences of opinion ‘as to whether there must be a probability that the Court has 
jurisdiction or whether a mere possibility is sufficient’. “The reason why an international tribunal 
may exercise this power even when its jurisdiction as to the merits is yet uncertain must be 
sought in the fact that the duty of the parties to maintain the status quo already exists 
independently of any judicial intervention”. At the other end of the spectrum it has sometimes 
been asserted that the Court must fully satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction. Elkind (1981), p. 179 
mentions the approach of Judge Forster in the Nuclear Test cases (Australia v. France; New 
Zealand v. France), Orders of 22 June 1973. He also refers to the suggestion of Judge Gros that 
Article 53 ICJ Statute requires the Court to fully satisfy itself that it had jurisdiction when one of 
the parties failed to appear. Vice-President Singh and Judge Morosov accepted this approach in 
the Aegean Sea case, Order of 11 September 1976, p. 17 and p. 22. Elkind points out, however, 
that the Court unanimously applied the prima facie test in the Hostages case, despite the non-
appearance of Iran before the Court. Judges Forster, Gros and Singh all took part in this decision. 
387  Elkind (1981), p. 167. 
388  Elkind (1981), p. 192. See also p. 259: “The best rule is that interlocutory injunctive relief will be 
granted unless the claim is frivolous or vexatious”. At p. 182 he points out that prima facie is a 
slippery concept.  
389  Elkind (1981), p. 207. 
390  Elkind (1981), p. 259. 
391  ICJ Nuclear Test cases (Australia v. France; New Zealand v. France), 22 June 1973, §23. See 
further Cheng (1953), pp. 270-271.  
392  ICJ Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, Order of 22 June 1973, §17. 
393  See Merrills (1995), p. 92, referring to the Nuclear Test cases and pointing out that more recent 
cases confirmed this. See pp. 92-100 for his discussion of the Nicaragua, Arbitral Award, 
Passage through the Great Belt and Genocide Convention cases. See also Collins (1992), pp. 
220-222. 
 Chapter I 
64 
protection stage, namely that there must be an instrument in force between the parties conferring 
jurisdiction upon the Court without reservations concerning the question at issue’.394 
In the Nicaragua case (1984) the ICJ pointed out that it had given the issue of jurisdiction 
over the merits of the case the ‘fullest consideration compatible with the requirements of 
urgency’.395 In the Legality of the use of force cases (1999) the ICJ applied the stricter test of 
existing prima facie evidence rather than the more lenient test of absence of manifest lack of 
jurisdiction or of prima facie not to be excluded.396 Thirlway has noted that it is ‘impossible to 
arrive at a water-tight definition’ of the jurisdiction required and that the general trend seems to 
be towards a very low standard of proof.397 After all, extensive deliberations about the question 
                                                 
394  Oellers-Frahm (1981), p. 283. The ICJ found that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic 
Relations (1961) and the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (1963), as well as Article I of 
the Optional Protocols to both treaties (on the compulsory settlement of disputes), furnished a 
basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court ‘might be founded’. It pointed out that it was 
sufficient at this stage of the proceedings ‘if the provisions invoked by the Applicant appear, 
prima facie, to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded’. ICJ 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran), Order of 15 December 
1979, §§14 and 15. 
395  ICJ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Order of 
10 May 1984, §§24 and 25 (while the ICJ unanimously decided it was competent to use 
provisional measures, while several members later questioned one of the grounds for jurisdiction. 
Judge Schwebel dissented regarding both grounds for jurisdiction). Again, in its decision whether 
or not to take provisional measures the ICJ merely examined whether it had prima facie 
jurisdiction on the merits. It need not finally satisfy itself that it has such jurisdiction, ‘yet it ought 
not to indicate such measures unless the provisions invoked by the applicant appear, prima facie 
to afford a basis on which the jurisdiction of the Court might be founded’. See also Arbitral 
Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal), Order of 2 March 1990; Passage through the 
Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991, §14; Application of the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 8 April 1993; Land and Maritime Boundary between 
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order of 15 March 1996, §31 (In fact the 
declaration made by both Parties under Article 36(2) ICJ Statute, constituted ‘a prima facie basis 
upon which its jurisdiction in the present case might be founded’; Nigeria had also argued that 
provisional measures should not be ordered because the case was inadmissible. The Court 
pointed out that while it did not rule on the question whether it should decide on prima facie 
admissibility before ordering provisional measures, it considered that the case did ‘not appear 
prima facie to be inadmissible’, §33); Certain criminal proceedings in France (Congo v. 
France), Order of 17 June 2003, §20; for older cases see Nuclear Test cases, Orders of 22 June 
1973, §§13 and 17 and US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages 
case), Order of 15 December 1979, §§15, 18 and 20. In some of these cases the judgment on the 
merits also illustrates the approach of the members of the Court towards provisional measures. In 
the ICJ Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, Order of 5 July 1951 the ICJ ordered provisional measures 
while later it found it had no jurisdiction on the merits. 
396  ICJ Legality of the use of force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium and seven other States), 
Order of 2 July 1999. In this case Serbia had requested it to take provisional measures against the 
member States of NATO to halt military action in the Kosovo conflict. The ICJ considered that it 
manifestly lacked jurisdiction to take such measures because, among others, there was no prima 
facie evidence that Article IX of the Genocide Convention constituted a basis of jurisdiction. 
With regard to the cases against Spain and the US (the ninth and tenth cases submitted) it found a 
manifest absence of jurisdiction and these cases were removed from the General List (see §42 
Yugoslavia v. Spain and §34 Yugoslavia v. US). The other eight cases remained on the Court’s 
List of cases. 
397  Thirlway (1994), p. 22.  
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whether an adjudicator has jurisdiction or competence to deal with a given case on the merits 
would conflict with the need for urgent action.398 
In 1991 Judge Shahabuddeen pointed out, in reference to the ‘circumstances’ mentioned in 
Article 41 ICJ Statute, that the question of prima facie jurisdiction in fact does not relate to the 
power to order provisional measures, but rather ‘whether the case is a fit and proper one for 
exercising that power’.399 Commentators have equally noted that ‘one cannot treat the possible 
jurisdiction over the merits as a precondition to the indication of provisional measures without 
confusing the two sorts of jurisdiction’.400 Indeed, the question rather is whether it is appropriate 
for the ICJ to order provisional measures in light of the evidence of likelihood of substantive 
jurisdiction.  
4.1 Decision-making on jurisdictional issues 
Sztucki notes that the ICJ does not decide on provisional measures as a collective body. Rather, 
the judges decide individually. He refers to the 1978 Hague Academy course by Judge Jiménez de 
Aréchaga equally pointing out that each judge decides individually: ‘theories, attempting to 
determine the collective criteria followed on this matter, do not reflect accurately the reality nor 
the way the Court operates at this stage’. He notes that while the judges may discuss the question 
together, a ‘formal and collective decision on the jurisdictional issue is not possible’. Judges will 
vote for or against provisional measures taking into account the views they have formed 
individually on the issue of jurisdiction. They may later change their minds in the light of further 
pleadings. The Court will grant provisional measures only if ‘a majority of judges believes at the 
time that there will be jurisdiction over the merits’.401 
4.2 Removing cases from the Court’s List (docket) to discourage requests 
for provisional measures 
The question has arisen whether cases in which provisional measures were denied should be 
removed from the List only for manifest or also for prima facie lack of jurisdiction. In Congo v. 
Rwanda (2002) the ICJ did not grant Congo’s request for provisional measures finding it lacked 
                                                 
398  See also section 2. 
399  Separate opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen in Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. 
Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991. 
400  Thirlway, among others, has referred to the Court’s ‘distinct statutory jurisdiction’ under Article 
41 to use provisional measures, Thirlway (1994), p. 22. Only incidentally it has been argued that 
jurisdiction on the merits is a prerequisite for the use of provisional measures and that the Court 
cannot take provisional measures before jurisdiction is established. See e.g. Judge Morozov in the 
Aegean Sea case (Greece v. Turkey), Order of 11 September 1976, disagreeing with the argument 
‘that the Court allegedly has a right to consider the request for the indication of interim measures 
of protection before it has considered and settled the question of its jurisdiction’, p. 21 and 
considering that ‘neither the Statute nor the Rules of Court contain any provisions which provide 
that the request for interim measures for protection has any priority over the question of 
jurisdiction’, p. 22. Sztucki (1983), p. 152 points out that four years previously, in the Fisheries 
Jurisdiction cases (UK v. Iceland; Germany v. Iceland), Order of 17 August 1972, Morozov had 
voted in favour of the indication of provisional measures before the Court had ‘settled’ the 
question of its jurisdiction. 
401  Sztucki (1983), p. 257 quoting Jiménez de Aréchaga, ‘International Law in the Past Third of a 
Century’, 159 RCADI 161(1978). 
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prima facie jurisdiction.402 Judge Dugard, who had voted with the majority, considered that the 
Court should have removed the case from the List, as requested by Rwanda.403 He referred to the 
Court’s judgment in LaGrand, finding that its Orders for provisional measures are binding upon 
States. He pointed out: “As a consequence of this decision, provisional measures will assume a 
greater importance than before and there will be a greater incentive on the part of States to request 
such measures”. ‘In these circumstances,’ he argued, the case should have been removed from the 
List for manifest lack of jurisdiction. Dugard referred to the Separate Opinion of Judge Higgins in 
Yugoslavia v. Belgium (1999) explaining cases manifestly lacking jurisdiction as cases in which 
‘it is clear beyond doubt that no jurisdiction exists in a particular case’. In such situation ‘a good 
administration of justice requires that the case be immediately struck off the List’.404 Considering 
that the Court, by failing to find manifest lack of jurisdiction, set a dangerous precedent that could 
result in the Court being ‘inundated with requests for provisional measures’,405 he noted that the 
applicant State was ‘clutching at straws to found jurisdiction’. “It has clutched at eight straws in 
the hope that their cumulative effect might compensate for the failure of each one individually to 
offer a basis for jurisdiction. The Court should show its displeasure for this strategy by striking 
the Application from the list”.406 Yet this approach to jurisdiction appears overly strict. Rather the 
ICJ should seriously consider all possible grounds for jurisdiction, especially in cases of grave 
human suffering. In any case, even when it denies a request for provisional measures it should not 
declare a case manifestly lacking jurisdiction and remove it from the List if there are serious 
jurisdictional issues remaining to be discussed. The aim of discouraging States from submitting 
requests for provisional measures should not interfere with the Court’s task in this respect. In 
Congo v. Rwanda there seem to have been at least two such jurisdictional issues, one based on the 
Genocide Convention and the other based on the Convention on the Elimination of 
                                                 
402  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002. Judge Elaraby dissented, considering that the 
progressive shift that the Court had made in its approach to jurisdiction had not been reflected in 
the Order. Judge Mavungu also dissented. 
403  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002 (Dugard dissenting).  
404  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002, Separate Opinion of Judge Dugard, §5, referring to 
Legality of Use of Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium), Order of 2 June 1999, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Higgins, §29. Dugard suggested that the case ‘should be removed from the List where 
there is no reasonable possibility, based on the facts and circumstances of the unsuccessful 
Application, that the Applicant will at some future date be able to establish the jurisdiction of the 
Court on the instruments invoked for jurisdiction in the Application for provisional measures’. 
405  In his view, six of the instruments relied on by the Congo manifestly did ‘not provide the 
remotest basis for jurisdiction’. Regarding the first remaining ‘possible ground’, the Montreal 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, he pointed 
out that the ‘accumulation of objections to the establishment of jurisdiction’ indicated that it 
‘manifestly’ did not constitute a basis for jurisdiction. He also referred to other factors 
demonstrating that there was ‘no real possibility’ that a reasonable connection between the 
dispute submitted to the Court and Article 14 of the Montreal Convention could be established at 
subsequent stages of the proceedings’, ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Dugard, §10. Regarding the second ‘possible ground’ he questioned whether 
the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was an 
appropriate instrument for the protection of women in armed conflict and noted that it imposed 
no effective procedures for its enforcement, §11. He referred to the never used Article 11 CERD 
as an example of such an effective procedure. He considered that ‘none of the eight instruments 
advanced by the Applicant to found jurisdiction in the present proceedings, viewed separately, 
offers, prima facie, a basis for jurisdiction in the present dispute, either now or in future’. He 
concluded that ‘(t)he absence of jurisdiction is therefore manifest’ and that ‘(t)his conclusion is 
even stronger if one views the eight instruments cumulatively’. 
406  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002, Separate Opinion of Judge Dugard, §12. 
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Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).407 The next heading discusses the validity of the 
reservations to Article IX Genocide Convention (the jurisdictional clause) made by Rwanda.408 
The subsequent heading refers to the possible jurisdictional basis of CEDAW. 
4.3 The development of international law and Article IX Genocide 
Convention as a jurisdictional basis for provisional measures 
Subsequent to the denial of the request for provisional measures in Congo v. Rwanda (2002) the 
Court rendered a judgment on jurisdiction and admissibility in this case. The Dissenting Opinion 
of Judge Koroma and the joint Separate Opinion of Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada 
and Simma confirmed that absence of jurisdiction under the Genocide Convention was not 
manifest. The Separate Opinion argued against a ‘laissez faire’ interpretation of the ICJ’s 1951 
Advisory Opinion on reservations to the Genocide Convention. Instead this 1951 Opinion should 
be read in its particular context, without being allowed to freeze the development of international 
law.409 At the time, the Court ‘had no occasion to address the application of the law of treaties to 
issues of severability in the context of reservations to human rights treaties’.410 Moreover, the 
Court’s present judgment, in Congo v. Rwanda (2006), should not be understood to suggest that a 
reservation to a jurisdictional clause will always be compatible with the object and purpose of a 
Convention.411  
“It is thus not self-evident that a reservation to Article IX could not be regarded as incompatible 
with the object and purpose of the Convention and we believe that this is a matter that the Court 
should revisit for further consideration”.412 
                                                 
407  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002 and Judgment of 3 February 2006. See also 
Kritsiotis (2001); Savadogo (2002); Tatulli (2003) and Mampuya (2004). 
408  See also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
409  They pointed out that the 1951 Opinion must be understood against the background of the 
specific questions put to it by the General Assembly and that the problems that it ‘could already 
envisage in 1951 have turned out to be vastly greater than it could have foreseen’. They also 
noted that the vast majority of States have failed to engage in the task of scrutinizing and 
objecting to reservations, often giving rise to ‘serious concern as to compatibility with the object 
and purpose of the treaty concerned’. ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (new 
application: 2002) (Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment on jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of 
the application of 3 February 2006, Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, 
Owada and Simma, §§10-11. “The Court itself was not in 1951 asked to pronounce on the 
compatibility of particular reservations to the Genocide Convention with its object and purpose 
(…) Since 1951 many other issues relating to reservations have emerged, that equally were not 
and could not have been before the Court at that time”. They mentioned two related questions, 
one regarding the role of UN bodies monitoring human rights treaties in the assessment of the 
compatibility with object and purpose and the other concerning the scope and powers of regional 
human rights courts, §12. See also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction, admissibility and provisional 
measures in human rights adjudication). 
410  Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, §12.  
411  Neither should the Court’s previous Order denying Congo’s request for provisional measures. 
They also explained that the ICJ did not pronounce on the issue in Yugoslavia v. US, since 
Yugoslavia had not introduced any arguments to this effect, Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, §18. 
412  Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma suggested some of the considerations 
the Court had in mind ‘in its findings thus far, that a reservation to Article IX is not incompatible 
with the objects and purposes of the Convention’. Yet they pointed out that the ICJ has an 
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The joint Separate Opinion referred to the ensuing evolution of international law, emphasizing 
that to observe the reality that the Court did not settle all matters relating to reservations in its 
1951 Advisory Opinion ‘is not to attempt to fragment a mythical overarching law on all questions 
of reservations’. After all the 1951 opinion just ‘set out the law as to what it was asked, and no 
more, and did not foreclose legal developments in respect of hitherto uncharted waters in the 
future’.413  
Human rights courts and tribunals had ‘not regarded themselves as precluded by this 
Court’s 1951 Advisory Opinion from doing other than nothing’. This development did not 
constitute a ‘deviation’ from general international law by ‘these various courts and tribunals’.414 
‘Rather, it is to be regarded as developing the law to meet contemporary realities’. The specific 
findings of the Court in 1951 did not prohibit this. “Indeed, it is clear that the practice of the 
International Court itself reflects this trend for tribunals and courts themselves to pronounce on 
compatibility with object and purpose, when the need arises”.415 
In his Dissent Judge Koroma argued that the reservation to Article IX of the Genocide 
Convention was indeed invalid. He considered that it is contrary to the object and purpose of the 
treaty to make reservations to a provision on dispute settlement, if that provision is the raison 
d’être of the treaty.416 He pointed out that ‘States are often remiss in fulfilling their duties of 
objecting to reservations which they consider invalid’. “Moreover, the failure of a State to object 
should not be regarded as determinative in the context of human rights treaties like the Genocide 
Convention that are not based on reciprocity between States but instead serve to protect 
individuals and the international community at large”.417 He referred to the General Comment on 
reservations by the Human Rights Committee interpreting the ICCPR, which was equally relevant 
for the interpretation of the Genocide Convention. Congo’s failure to object to Rwanda’s 
reservation at the time it was made had ‘no bearing on the Court’s ability to consider it’.418 Judge 
Koroma also emphasized that Rwanda, from a moral perspective, should have consented to the 
Court’s jurisdiction.419 
Despite the unimpressive practice of objecting to reservations contrary to the object and 
purpose of human rights treaties, various States have indeed objected against the reservations 
made by certain States to Article IX Genocide Convention.420 The UK, for instance, has 
‘consistently stated’ that it is ‘unable to accept reservations in respect of article IX of the said 
Convention’; it ‘is not the kind of reservation which intending parties to the Convention have the 
right to make’. It also specifically pointed this out vis-à-vis Rwanda, emphasizing that it does not 
                                                                                                                       
important role to play under the Genocide Convention and that Article IX of the Convention not 
only speaks of disputes regarding its interpretation and application, but also regarding the 
‘fulfilment of the Convention’, Joint Separate Opinion, §§26-29. 
413  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (new application: 2002) (Congo v. Rwanda), 
Judgment on jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the application of 3 February 2006, 
Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, §13. 
414  Id., Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, §22. 
415  Id., Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, §23. 
416  Id., Dissenting Opinion Judge Koroma, §11, referring to ILC Report A/CN.4/558/Add.2, §3.1.13, 
14 June 2005. 
417  Id., Dissenting Opinion Judge Koroma, §14. 
418  Id., §15. 
419  Id., §§24-25. 
420  Article IX stipulates: “Disputes between the Contracting Parties relating to the interpretation, 
application or fulfillment of the present Convention, including those relating to the responsibility 
of a State for genocide or for any of the other acts enumerated in article III, shall be submitted to 
the International Court of Justice at the request of any of the parties to the dispute”. 
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accept the reservation.421 The Netherlands went a step further. When it declared the reservations 
made by a range of States to Article IX incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention, it explicitly stated, also referring to Rwanda, that it did ‘not deem any State which 
has made or which will make such reservation a party to the Convention’.422 
4.4 Armed conflict and CEDAW as a jurisdictional basis for provisional 
measures 
The jurisdictional ground of Article 29 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW), invoked in Congo v. Rwanda (2002), did have some merit.423 Indeed, the ICJ 
did not completely dismiss it in its Order for provisional measures. After all it did not remove the 
case from the List. It simply stated that ‘at this stage in the proceedings the Congo has not shown 
that its attempts to enter into negotiations or undertake arbitration proceedings with Rwanda’ 
concerned the application of Article 29 CEDAW and the Congo had not specified either ‘which 
rights protected by that Convention have allegedly been violated by Rwanda and should be the 
object of provisional measures’.424 The latter argument, on the specification of the relevant treaty 
provisions, has rightly been criticized by Judge Higgins. Especially in situations involving human 
beings in conditions of hardship, it is for the Court to specify these rights.425 She noted that it is 
well-established in the case law of international human rights adjudicators that it is not necessary 
for a petitioner ‘to identify which specific provisions of the treaty said to found jurisdiction are 
alleged to be breached’. She considered that ‘a fortiori’ there was ‘no reason’ for the ICJ ‘to 
suggest a more stringent test’ for establishing whether it had prima facie jurisdiction for the use of 
provisional measures. It is not clear why there was no reason ‘a fortiori’. Nevertheless, Higgins 
correctly invokes the practice of the human rights adjudicators and indeed there appears to be no 
reason for the ICJ to take a different approach. As Higgins pointed out: 
“It should rather be for the Court itself, in accordance with the usual practice, to see whether the 
claims made by the Congo and the facts alleged could prima facie constitute violations of any 
particular clause in the Conventions on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against 
Women, the instrument relied on by the Congo as providing the Court with jurisdiction over the 
merits”.426  
                                                 
421  Objections of 26 August 1983. See also Mexico’s objection of 4 June 1990 pointing out that ‘the 
reservation made by the United States Government to article IX of the aforesaid Convention 
should be considered invalid because it is not in keeping with the object and purpose of the 
Convention, nor with the principle governing the interpretation of treaties whereby no State can 
invoke provisions of its domestic law as a reason for not complying with a treaty’. Moreover, 
application of the reservation ‘would give rise to a situation of uncertainty as to the scope of the 
obligations which the United States Government would assume with respect to the Convention’. 
422  Declaration made upon accession to the Convention, 20 June 1966; Objections of 27 December 
1989 to the reservations of the US.  
423  Article 29 CEDAW stipulates: “Any dispute between two or more States concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present Convention which is not settled by negotiation shall, at 
the request of one of them, be submitted to arbitration. If within six months from the date of 
request for arbitration the parties are unable to agree on the organization of the arbitration, any 
one of those parties may refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice by request in 
conformity with the Statute of the Court”. 
424  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002, §79. 
425  ICJ Congo v. Rwanda, Order of 10 July 2002, Declaration of Judge Higgins. 
426  Ibid. 
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While CEDAW may not be the most appropriate instrument for the protection of women in armed 
conflict, this does not mean it cannot create a jurisdictional basis. It is true that the most effective 
procedures for the enforcement of this Convention are found in its recent Optional Protocol, 
which has not yet been ratified by Congo and Rwanda. Yet the supervisory committee to this 
treaty has also dealt with the issue of violence against women in its Concluding Observations and 
in a General Recommendation, interpreting the State obligations under the Convention to prevent 
violence against women.427 The newly developed practice under its Optional Protocol has only 
confirmed this.428  
What made Congo’s argument based on CEDAW less convincing was the apparent lack of 
attempts by it to submit for arbitration a dispute with Rwanda regarding the application of 
CEDAW before bringing it before the ICJ. Yet at the provisional measures stage doubts regarding 
the existence of these attempts should not as such mean that Article 29 CEDAW manifestly does 
not constitute a basis for the Court’s jurisdiction.429 Moreover, as Judge Kooijmans pointed out, 
the position of the Court that Congo should have explicitly referred to CEDAW in its attempts to 
settle the dispute by negotiation is unrealistic, ‘in particular in the case of a multifaceted conflict 
like the present one’.430 He referred to a complaint brought by Congo before the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), as well as to many complaints brought 
before the UN Security Council.431  
“In view of the character and mandate of the international institutions to which these grievances 
were addressed, the complaints could not be expected to itemize on a treaty-by-treaty basis the 
provisions allegedly breached”.432  
The ICJ had no choice, he noted, ‘but to ascertain whether a precondition, explicitly laid down by 
the Contracting States, is met and to decline jurisdiction if it is not’. Nevertheless, the Women’s 
Convention did not ‘set out any specific criteria for the element of “not settled by negotiation”’.433 
This meant that the Court would have had ‘sufficient room’ to interpret this element less 
rigidly.434 
In other words, prima facie CEDAW could serve as a jurisdictional basis, which could even 
have justified the use of provisional measures. In any case, the ICJ only removes a case from the 
List in exceptional cases.435 
                                                 
427  It has also published statements regarding the rights of women in, for instance, Iraq and 
Afghanistan. 
428  CEDAW has made a public inquiry and published a report involving violence against women in 
Mexico, among others discussing murders and disappearances (CEDAW/C/2005/OP.8/ 
MEXICO). It also published a decision on an individual complaint regarding domestic violence: 
A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005. See further Chapter II (Systems) and IX (Threats). 
429  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (new application: 2002) (Congo v. Rwanda), 
Judgment on jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the application of 3 February 2006, 
§91 points out that the evidence had not satisfied the Court that the Congo had ‘in fact sought to 
commence negotiations in respect of the interpretation or application of the Convention’.  
430  ICJ Certain criminal proceedings in France (Congo v. France), 17 June 2003, Declaration of 
Judge Kooijmans, §7. 
431  Id., §5. 
432  Id., §7. 
433  Id., §15. 
434  Id., §15. For a different approach see the Separate Opinion of Judge Dugard, §18. 
435  See also Rosenne (2005), pp. 132-134. 
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4.5 Provisional measures and forum prorogatum 
In the case concerning Certain criminal proceedings in France (2003) Congo ‘proposed to found 
the jurisdiction of the Court upon on a consent thereto yet to be given by France’, under Article 
38(5) Rules of Court. Subsequently France indeed explicitly consented to the jurisdiction of the 
Court in this case.436 With regard to the request for provisional measures the ICJ in this case 
initially followed a different procedure exactly because there was no evidence yet of consent to 
the Court’s jurisdiction. The application was simply sent to France and both States were informed 
that the case would not be entered in the General List and no action would be taken in the 
proceedings until the ICJ was informed of the consent of France. Upon receipt of this consent, 
four months later, the case was entered in the General List and hearings were fixed for that same 
month. Subsequently the ICJ decided not to indicate provisional measures.437 
4.6 ITLOS and prima facie jurisdiction 
Under Article 290 UNCLOS the adjudicator deciding on provisional measures should first 
determine that the adjudicator deciding on the merits ‘has or would have prima facie 
jurisdiction’.438 According to Judge Laing ‘the juridical understanding of “prima facie” is that at 
first sight or impression (on its face), the evidence adduced by the Applicant sufficiently 
establishes the Tribunal’s jurisdiction’. He adds that ‘a prima facie finding has no bearing 
whatsoever on the Tribunal’s final determinations at the merits stage’.439 
A dispute on the admissibility of the claim in the MOX Plant case illustrates some 
difficulties that could arise if different adjudicators may deal with a case.440 The UK had argued 
that the matters of which Ireland complained ‘were governed by regional agreements providing 
for alternative and binding means of resolving disputes’.441 ITLOS, however, considered that the 
dispute settlement procedures under those treaties dealt with ‘disputes concerning the 
                                                 
436  ICJ Certain criminal proceedings in France (Congo v. France), Order of 17 June 2003, §21. See 
also Rosenne (2005), p. 151. 
437  ICJ Certain criminal proceedings in France (Congo v. France), Order of 17 June 2003, §§5-7. 
See Rule 38(5) stipulating “When the applicant State proposes to found the jurisdiction of the 
Court upon a consent thereto yet to be given or manifested by the State against which such 
application is made, the application shall be transmitted to that State. It shall not however be 
entered in the General List, nor any action be taken in the proceedings, unless and until the State 
against which such application is made consents to the Court’s jurisdiction for the purposes of the 
case”. See also Sztucki (1983), p. 221 and Rosenne (2005), p. 120. France also consented to the 
Court’s jurisdiction in Djibouti v. France, ICJ press release 10 August 2006, but there was no 
request for provisional measures, probably because the ICJ had previously denied such requests 
(Congo v. France, Order of 17 June 2003; Congo v. Belgium, Order of 8 December 2000). 
438  In its first Order for provisional measures, in M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) of 11 March 1998 ITLOS 
adopted the formulation of the ICJ that it need not finally satisfy itself that it has jurisdiction on 
the merits ‘and yet it may not prescribe such measures unless the provisions invoked by the 
Applicant appear prima facie to afford the basis on which the jurisdiction of the Tribunal might 
be founded’ (§29). Judge Laing points out that ITLOS could simply have quoted Article 290(1) 
UNCLOS, Separate Opinion Judge Laing, §10. 
439  ITLOS M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2), Order of 11 March 1998, Separate Opinion Judge Laing, §10. 
440  In 1983 Sztucki, p. 222 still noted that ‘the concept of parallel jurisdictions in the same case’ 
appeared to be ‘rather remote from international realities’.  
441  It argued that Ireland could not bring the case before the ‘Annex VII arbitral tribunal’, constituted 
pursuant to Article 287 and Article 1 Annex VII UNCLOS. It referred to the Convention for the 
Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic (the OSPAR Convention) and 
the EC and Euratom Treaty. 
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interpretation or application of those agreements, and not with disputes arising under the 
Convention’.442 ITLOS first satisfied itself that prima facie the Annex VII arbitral tribunal would 
have jurisdiction.443 It then considered whether provisional measures were required pending the 
constitution of this tribunal.444 Subsequently the Arbitral Tribunal agreed with the finding by 
ITLOS that it had jurisdiction prima facie. It noted that both States were Parties to UNCLOS, that 
the Tribunal had been duly constituted, that Ireland had presented its case on the basis of various 
provisions of the Convention, that the dispute concerned the interpretation and application of this 
Convention and that there was ‘nothing which manifestly and in terms excludes the Tribunal’s 
jurisdiction’. Nevertheless it decided to suspend further proceedings on jurisdiction and merits in 
light of certain areas of European Community law ‘as they appear to affect the dispute between 
the Parties before this Tribunal’. It noted that these had become more acute because the European 
Commission was examining the question whether to institute proceedings under Article 226 of the 
EC Treaty.445 The Tribunal suspended the proceedings ‘bearing in mind considerations of mutual 
                                                 
442  It considered that ‘even if the OSPAR Convention, the EC Treaty and the Euratom Treaty contain 
rights or obligations similar to or identical with the rights or obligations set out in the 
Convention, the rights and obligations under those agreements have a separate existence from 
those under the Convention’. ITLOS MOX plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 
2001, §§49 and 50. 
443  ITLOS MOX plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 2001, §§61-62. ITLOS does this 
on the basis of Article 290(5) of UNCLOS, stipulating that it may prescribe, modify or revoke 
provisional measures ‘if it considers that prima facie the tribunal which is to be constituted would 
have jurisdiction’. Given the fact that this function is specifically laid down by treaty and as long 
as ITLOS does not presume to determine anything more than the prima facie jurisdiction of such 
an arbitral tribunal, it does not violate the principle of compétence de la compétence. See 
Dumbauld (1932), p. 186 about a related situation, pointing out that because the power of the 
PCIJ to order provisional measures did not depend upon jurisdiction ‘in the principal action’, 
‘one court may provide a remedy pendente lite in aid of an action of which another court has 
cognizance’. This would be so in order to prevent a denial of justice in a case in which the other 
tribunal (with the jurisdiction on the merits) had no jurisdiction to grant provisional measures, 
provided that the parties were also bound by the obligatory jurisdiction of the PCIJ. An exception 
would apply if ‘an inconsistent intention on the part of the parties was manifested’, pp. 155-156. 
In the MOX Plant case the other Tribunal did not lack jurisdiction to use provisional measures, 
but had not yet been constituted, which made ITLOS the only tribunal to prevent the denial of 
justice referred to by Dumbauld. 
444  It did not prescribe the provisional measures requested by Ireland, because it considered that in 
the short period before the constitution of the arbitral tribunal the urgency of the situation did not 
require these measures. Yet it did prescribe provisional measures of different nature. It referred to 
the duty to cooperate as a fundamental principle in the prevention of pollution of the marine 
environment under both the Convention and general international law. Under Article 290 
UNCLOS it was appropriate to preserve the rights arising from this duty. Thus ITLOS ordered 
the cooperation of the Parties, which were to enter into consultation at once and to exchange 
information, monitor risks and devise preventive measures. ITLOS MOX Plant case (Ireland v. 
UK), Order of 3 December 2001. See in particular §§81, 82 and 89. See also section 3.7 on 
protection. 
445  “In these circumstances there is a real possibility that the European Court of Justice may be 
seized of the question whether the provisions of the Convention on which Ireland relies are 
matters in relation to which competence has been transferred to the European Community and, 
indeed, whether the exclusive jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice, with regard to Ireland 
and the United Kingdom as Member States of the European Community, extends to the 
interpretation and application of the Convention as such and in its entirety”. Arbitral Tribunal 
constituted pursuant to Article 287, and Article 1 of Annex VII, of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea for the dispute concerning the MOX Plant, international 
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respect and comity which should prevail between judicial institutions both of which may be called 
upon to determine rights and obligations as between two States’.446 
4.7 The duration of provisional measures 
Provisional measures end with the final decision of the Court. The ICJ has determined that an 
Order for provisional measures may not continue following the adjudicator’s decision that it has 
no jurisdiction.447 Moreover, proceedings for interpretation and revision of judgments by the ICJ 
are technically regarded as a new case.448 
In his Separate Opinion in the Tuna cases ITLOS Judge Treves pointed out that Article 
290(1) UNCLOS stipulates that provisional measures are meant to apply ‘pending the final 
decision’. He considered that ‘this expression should be read as meaning up to the moment in 
which a judgment on the merits has been rendered’. He noted that in case of measures requested 
under Article 290(5) UNCLOS, providing for the possibility that ITLOS prescribes provisional 
measures pending the institution of an arbitral tribunal for the resolution of a conflict between 
States, the provisional measures could apply until ‘the judgment on the merits by the arbitral 
tribunal’. Of course the competent adjudicator449 may decide to revoke or modify the measures 
before the final decision on the merits.450 
                                                                                                                       
movement of radioactive materials, and the protection of the marine environment of the Irish Sea, 
The MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order No. 3, suspension of proceedings on jurisdiction and 
merits and request for further provisional measures, 24 June 2003, §21. 
446  It observed that both the decisions of the ECJ and its own decision under the Convention would 
be final and binding. Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to Article 287, and Article 1 of 
Annex VII, of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the dispute concerning 
the MOX Plant, international movement of radioactive materials, and the protection of the marine 
environment of the Irish Sea, The MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order No. 3, suspension of 
proceedings on jurisdiction and merits and request for further provisional measures, 24 June 
2003, §§27 and 28. ITLOS Judge Treves had already referred to considerations of comity and 
‘economy of legal activity’ in his Separate Opinion in the MOX Plant case, Order of 3 December 
2001, Separate Opinion Judge Treves, §5. See further on the MOX Plant case Forster (2003) and 
Lavranos (2006). More generally see Treves (1999). 
447  The ICJ has decided that its provisional measures lapse once it determines it has no jurisdiction, 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. case, Judgment of 22 July 1952. See generally on the duration of 
provisional measures Rosenne (2005), pp. 149-158.  
448  Rosenne (2005), pp. 149-150. For an example see ICJ Request for interpretation of the judgment 
of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), 
Order of 16 July 2008.  
449  Under 290(1) or 290(5) UNCLOS. 
450  Separate Opinion of Judge Treves, ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, Order of 27 August 
1999. The issue of duration is also relevant in the context of the related precautionary principle. 
The SPS Agreement provides in Article 5(7) that review of measures taken on the basis of 
precautionary principle shall take place ‘within a reasonable period of time’. The European 
Commission, in its communication on the precautionary principle, has stressed that the temporary 
measures taken when scientific data are inadequate are provisional but that ‘the provisional 
nature is not bound up with a time limit but with the development of scientific knowledge’. 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the 
precautionary principle, 2 February 2000, COM (2000) 1, pp. 12 and 21. It notes on p. 28 that the 
WTO Appellate Body pointed out in the Hormones case that what constitutes ‘a reasonable 
period of time’ to review a precautionary measure was ‘to be established on a case-by-case basis 
and depends on the specific circumstances of each case, including the difficulty of obtaining the 
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The Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal instituted under UNCLOS has pointed out that the Parties 
to the conflict before it must still respect the effects of the Orders of ITLOS prescribing 
provisional measures and ‘their own decisions made in conformity with it’ even after such Orders 
have been revoked. It noted that its Orders and the subsequent developments have had an impact 
on the perspectives and actions of the Parties.451 Rosenne suggests, correctly, that ‘[t]here is no 
reason why this notion should not be given a wider application, in that way making the 
provisional measures proceedings an important element in the general procedures available to 
States for the pacific settlement of their international disputes.452 
5 ASSESSMENT OF URGENCY 
5.1 Introduction 
Provisional measures show that adjudicators believe the matter to be so urgent that measures 
should be taken, although they have not yet been able to evaluate all the evidence and arguments. 
For provisional measures an exhaustive and definitive examination of the evidence is not 
necessary. Waiting too long before taking them defeats their purpose. Still, how are the interests 
of urgency, on one hand, and reliability of information, on the other, balanced off against each 
other? In deciding whether or not to indicate provisional measures, a balance must be struck 
between the two.  
This section sets out discussing the practice of the ICJ involving Parties that are more or 
less equal, at least in comparison to the situation of an individual requesting provisional measures 
against a State. Before the ICJ States may make requests for the use of provisional measures ‘at 
any time during the course of the proceedings’ (Article 73(1) Rules of Court). Obviously, if they 
request provisional measures later in the proceedings rather than at the initial stages, the States in 
question must equally show that the case is urgent. If a request has previously been denied, they 
must also show that the renewed request is based on ‘new facts’ (Article 75(3) Rules of Court). 
In 1991 the ICJ noted that provisional measures are only justified if there is urgency ‘in the 
sense that action prejudicial to the rights of either party is likely to be taken before such final 
decision is given’.453 This brief description could refer to two types of urgency: material and 
temporal. The term ‘likely’ obviously refers to material urgency, but could also refer to the 
immediacy of the risk. The phrase ‘before such final decision is given’ relates to the initially 
indeterminate duration of provisional measures, in the sense that it is not clear when the final 
decision will be given. 
This book distinguishes between criteria for assessment of temporal and material 
urgency.454 The first relates to the immediacy of risk and is discussed in section 5.2. The 
                                                                                                                       
additional information necessary for the review and the characteristics of the provisional SPS 
measure’. 
451  Annex VII Arbitral Tribunal Southern Bluefin Tuna case, Award on Jurisdiction and 
Admissibility of 4 August 2000, §67, referring to ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New 
Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999. 
452  Rosenne (2005), pp. 157-158. 
453  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), 22 July 1991, §23. 
454  The term temporal urgency or urgency in the temporal sense is taken from Judge Treves (ITLOS) 
who distinguishes between the ‘temporal dimension of the requirement of urgency’ and the 
‘qualitative dimension’. See his Separate Opinion in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, Order of 
27 August 1999. See further Rosenne (2005), pp. 135-148, esp. p. 136. 
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discussion of assessment of material urgency also includes the relationship with the preventive 
and precautionary principles.  
5.2 Assessment of temporal urgency  
In the Interhandel case (1957) the ICJ found there was no need to use provisional measures, 
relying upon a statement by the respondent State, made during the hearings on provisional 
measures, that it was not taking action at that time.455 Equally, in another case, upon the Applicant 
State’s request to postpone further consideration of its earlier request for provisional measures, 
the ICJ considered that there was no urgency anymore.456 
In the Passage through the Great Belt case (1991) the ICJ noted provisional measures are 
‘only justified if there is urgency in the sense that action prejudicial to the rights of either party is 
likely to be taken before such final decision is given’.457 Finland had objected to the construction 
of a bridge that could obstruct passage through the Great Belt, but the ICJ did not take the 
provisional measures requested. Instead it ‘placed on record’ Denmark’s assurance that before the 
end of 1994 it would not cause physical obstruction of the East Channel. This meant that although 
Finland could not convince the ICJ to take provisional measures it did obtain ‘a significant benefit 
from its request’.458 Moreover, the ICJ itself decided to accelerate the proceedings.459 It simply 
decided not to use provisional measures because of the abovementioned assurances by Denmark 
and because it expected the conclusion of the case before the end of 1994. Denmark had argued as 
well that, even upon completion of the bridge, there was no risk of irreparable prejudice and 
therefore no urgency. The Court, however, agreed with Finland that it might have a case for 
provisional measures if the passage would be obstructed before the decision on the merits. This 
meant that ‘if the bridge was completed early (contrary to the respondent’s assurances), or the 
decision on the merits were delayed beyond the end of 1994, Finland would be entitled to renew 
its request for interim protection with every prospect of success’.460 
In Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros (1997), when discussing whether there was a ‘peril’ referred to 
the requirement that a state of necessity (for the non-fulfilment of an international agreement) had 
to be ‘grave’ and ‘imminent’. It noted that ‘imminence’ was synonymous with ‘immediacy’ or 
‘proximity’ and went ‘far beyond’ the concept of ‘possibility’. This did not exclude ‘that a “peril” 
in the long term might be held to be “imminent” as soon as it is established, at the relevant point 
                                                 
455  ICJ Interhandel case (Switzerland v. US), 24 October 1957 (about this case see also section 2.3 of 
this chapter on provisional measures and jurisdiction on the merits). See also, e.g. ICJ Pulp mills 
on the river Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order of 13 July 2006 denying the provisional 
measures requested by Argentina, among others, for lack of imminence, §75. The approach of the 
human rights adjudicators generally is equally strict, but exceptions have been developed in 
certain death penalty and expulsion cases where it is unclear how soon after a domestic decision 
execution of the death sentence or expulsion order will take place. In addition, in some death 
penalty cases provisional measures have been used when there was no imminent execution date, 
apparently in order to express moral condemnation. See further Chapter XV (Immediacy and 
risk).  
456  ICJ Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India) 1973, §14. Petrén dissented because 
Pakistan did not withdraw its request.  
457  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), 22 July 1991, §23. 
458  Merrills (1995), p. 112. On 10 September 1992 the case was removed from the Court’s List of 
cases after the parties had settled the dispute. 
459  See ICJ Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), 22 July 1991 and Merrills (1995), 
p. 112.  
460  Merrills (1995), pp. 111-112.  
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in time, that the realisation of that peril, however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain 
and inevitable’.461 
In 2003 Mexico requested the ICJ to take provisional measures on behalf of 52 Mexican na-
tionals on death row in the US. The ICJ ordered provisional measures on behalf of three of them 
for whom an execution date was imminent because domestic remedies had been exhausted. They 
‘were at risk of execution in the following months, or even weeks’. The other Mexican detainees 
had not yet exhausted domestic remedies meaning that their executions were not impending and 
that there was no need yet for provisional measures.462  
Most requests for provisional measures discussed by ITLOS relate to Article 290(5) UN-
CLOS.463 This is a provision dealing with the time period before the arbitral tribunal is installed. 
Eventually it is this tribunal that should determine the case. Once installed, this tribunal itself 
could also use provisional measures. While statements made by ITLOS or individual judges relate 
to this situation specifically, they still provide some information on the assessment of temporal 
urgency in general.  
In the MOX plant case (2001) ITLOS decided not to order the provisional measures exactly 
the way Ireland had requested them. It did not consider that the urgency of the situation required 
this in the short period before the arbitral tribunal would be instituted. It referred specifically to 
the assurances given by the UK during the public hearings to the effect that there would be no 
import or export of fuel to and from the plant until a given date. It also noted that the UK had 
stated its hope to reach agreement on the institution of the arbitral tribunal ‘within a short space of 
time’.464 Instead of ordering the provisional measures requested by Ireland it ordered different 
provisional measures relating to the duty to cooperate.465 In Malaysia v. Singapore (2003) it 
incorporated the assurances of Singapore in the prescription for provisional measures.466 
                                                 
461  ICJ Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, general list 
1992, §54 (no provisional measures because of an agreement between the parties). Yet see ICJ 
Pulp mills on the river Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order of 13 July 2006 denying the 
provisional measures requested by Argentina, among others, for lack of imminence, §75. See also 
Pulp mills on the river Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order of 23 January 2007 (denying the 
provisional measures requested by Uruguay against the blockades by Argentinean citizens), §42.  
462  ICJ Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003, Avena and 
other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Judgment of 31 March 2004), §21. See also e.g. ICJ 
Pulp mills on the river Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order of 13 July 2006 (denying 
provisional measures, among others because ‘the threat of any pollution is not imminent as the 
mills are not expected to be operational before August 2007 (Orion mill) and June 2008 (CMB 
mill), §75.  
463  See ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Order of 
27 August 1999; MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 2001; Land reclamation 
by Singapore in and around the straits of Johor (Malaysia v. Singapore), Order of 8 October 
2003, M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2) case (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Order of 11 March 
1998 did not relate to Article 290(5). 
464  ITLOS MOX plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 2001, §§77-81.  
465  This in itself indicates that it considered that there was some form of temporal urgency. See the 
individual and dissenting opinions for some background on this decision. See also Rosenne 
(2005), pp. 147-148. See further section 3.7 (protection and reparation). 
466  ITLOS Land reclamation by Singapore in and around the straits of Johor (Malaysia v. 
Singapore), Order of 8 October 2003. In an earlier case judge Treves pointed out that the 
requirement of urgency is ‘inherent in the very nature of provisional measures’. He noted that 
Article 290(5) UNCLOS nevertheless explicitly mentions the requirement of urgency, which is 
therefore different from the normal requirement. It is stricter than when provisional measures are 
requested under Article 290(1) UNCLOS, which is the general provision on the competence of 
ITLOS to use provisional measures. This is so because ‘there is no “urgency” under paragraph 5 
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5.3 Assessment of material urgency  
5.3.1 Introduction  
Apart from temporal urgency it is important to determine material urgency or risk of irreparable 
harm. The question arises to what extent evidence of risk and prima facie evidence of such risk 
differ or, more generally speaking, whether and how the evidentiary requirements on the merits 
could shed some light on the assessment of risk of irreparable harm pending the proceedings. The 
term ‘evidentiary requirements’ is used here to refer to the criteria to be met in order to prove a 
case as well as to the standard and burden of proof. These issues are interrelated and normally 
adjudicators do not clearly distinguish between them. Apart from the issue of evidentiary 
requirements there is also the issue of how the adjudicators evaluate this evidence, in other words 
the standard of review.467 Adjudicators have the inherent authority to determine which party 
carries the burden of proof.468 They also determine the related issue of the sources of legal 
presumption469 and point out the duty of cooperation.470 They are free to determine the 
                                                                                                                       
if the measures requested could, without prejudice to the rights to be protected, be granted by the 
arbitral tribunal once constituted’. If there is such urgency pending the constitution of the arbitral 
tribunal, provisional measures may be used. Once constituted this tribunal may modify, revoke or 
affirm the measures taken under Article 290(5) UNCLOS and it may also order new provisional 
measures, ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, Order of 27 August 1999, Separate Opinion of 
Judge Treves.  
467  International adjudicators normally have a fact-finding authority. They may examine the facts 
proprio motu. Depending on the facts found by the adjudicator the claimant and respondent party 
may have to provide more, or less, evidence. Adjudicators may order the parties to provide 
information and documents and submit pleadings. Sometimes they have the power to examine 
witnesses and conduct in situ investigations. They may appoint independent experts and 
determine whether expert witnesses proposed by one of the parties can be heard. Moreover, they 
can take ‘judicial notice’, which means that certain facts do not need further proof. 
468  The traditional approach to the burden of proof is that the party alleging certain facts must prove 
them. See e.g. Kazazi (1996), pp. 232-235 and pp. 369-370. The principle concerned is that of 
actori incumbit probatio/onus probandi actori incumbit. The ‘burdens of proof and of persuasion 
lie on the party that advances a point for adjudication’. They must do so by a preponderance of 
the evidence, Highet (1992), p. 46 and p. 70. Bringing indirect evidence is also allowed as long as 
it leads to reliable and reasonable conclusions. The parties usually have to prove issues of fact 
only, not the law itself. International tribunals are expected to take ‘judicial notice’ of 
international law. The principle concerned is that of iura novit curia.  
469  Kazazi mentions general principles of law as the main source of legal presumptions in 
international procedure. When evaluating the evidence the adjudicator takes into account 
applicable presumptions ‘in favour of the party that carries the burden of proof and not refuted by 
the other party’. The burden may then shift from one party to the other because ‘presumptions 
affect the burden of proof insofar as they create prima facie evidence or proof in favour of the 
party that benefits from them’. He points out that presumptions may shift the burden but do not 
reverse it. Instead they create prima facie evidence in favour of the party claiming certain facts. It 
is possible that the other party cannot bring evidence against the presumption in question and the 
adjudicator rules in favour of the claimant party. This applies in particular when the presumption 
concerns a rule of ius cogens. “In such a case, an irrebuttable legal presumption has conclusive 
probative value and, depending on whether it supports the claim or not, it either relieves the 
proponent from the burden of proof or makes its burden impossible to meet”. Kazazi (1996), pp. 
370-371. 
470  Kazazi argues that the ‘duty of parties to cooperate in good faith in matters of evidence does not 
shift the burden of proof, as it is not the purpose of the rule to relieve the claimant of its 
obligation to prove its claims’. “It is only after the claimant has apparently done its best and all in 
 Chapter I 
78 
admissibility of evidence and are not limited by certain technical rules of evidence that can be 
found in domestic law. Finally, they ‘determine the probative value to be given to each piece of 
evidence available to them’.471 
The issue of material urgency again triggers the question of the relationship between 
provisional measures, the rights claimed and the forms of reparation.472 It is equally related to the 
issue of prejudgment.473 This section also discusses the relevance of the precautionary and 
preventive principles to understanding the concept of provisional measures.  
5.3.2 Material urgency 
Traditionally courts and other adjudicators have had to deal with urgent situations involving risk 
assessment. Assessment of material urgency for the use of provisional measures often implies an 
initial assessment of the main claim.474 If it does not, it is still important to clarify the substantive 
                                                                                                                       
its power to secure evidence, and has actually produced some prima facie evidence in support of 
its case, that the duty of the respondent to produce the evidence exclusively in its possession 
commences”. He also notes that international tribunals do not have specific sanctions at their 
disposal to force a party to produce information and documents, Kazazi (1996), pp. 372-373. The 
duty of cooperation in providing information and documentation or the ‘collaboration of parties’ 
aims to ‘enable the tribunal to base its decision on as much evidence as possible’ and to preserve 
peace ‘through establishing justice and truth’. As a last resort measures such as taking note of a 
State’s failure to provide information or ‘drawing reasonable adverse inferences therefrom’ could 
be used ‘as a deterrent in order to encourage the parties to provide more information and 
documents’. He explains that adjudicators have sometimes drawn such an adverse inference 
against a party withholding evidence, but that mixed claims commissions have resorted to this 
more often than ‘international tribunals dealing solely with the claims of States in their own 
rights’, Kazazi (1996), pp. 373-374 and p. 380. This is not surprising given the fact that 
international tribunals dealing exclusively with the interests of States may assume equality 
between the parties with regard to the magnitude of the consequences of a finding as well as 
equality of arms in the production of evidence. On the other hand, as discussed in section 3.3 on 
the ICJ and the protection of the individual and in Part III of this book, proceedings involving 
individuals as well as States have to take into account the principle of effective protection of the 
individual. See in this respect the comments on the standard of proof used by the ICJ in the 
Genocide Convention case, 26 February 2007, e.g. the dissenting opinion of Vice-President Al-
Khasawneh, §42; Gaeta (2007a), pp. 278-280 and Gaeta (2007b), p. 643; for a different approach 
see Milanović (2006), p. 595 and Gattini (2007), pp. 894-895. See also Chapter XV (Immediacy 
and risk), section 3.2.2 as well as Chapter VI (Disappearances). In its Judgment in Congo v. 
Uganda the ICJ also considered evidence contained in certain UN documents ‘to the extent that 
they are of probative value and corroborated, if necessary by other credible sources’. ICJ Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), judgment of 19 December 2005, §207. 
It referred to a ‘coincidence of reports from credible sources’, ‘persuasive evidence’ in the form 
of UN reports, consistent in the presentation of facts, supporting each other and ‘corroborated by 
other credible sources’. In this respect it referred to the Human Rights Watch Report ‘Ituri: 
covered in blood, ethnically targeted violence in northeastern DR Congo’, July 2003. See ICJ 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 
2005, §209, See section 3 of this Chapter, focusing on this purpose of provisional measures in 
general international law and Part II of this book on the purpose of provisional measures in 
human rights cases.   
471  Kazazi (1996), pp. 374-376. See further on the issues of fact-finding and fact and law e.g. Lillich 
(1992) and Highet (1987), p. 75. 
472  Discussed in section 4. 
473  Discussed in section 5 of this chapter. 
474  See also section 3 of this chapter on the purpose of provisional measures.  
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law invoked, implicitly or explicitly, with the provisional measures.475 Sometimes respondent 
States have referred to the obligation of the party requesting provisional measures to show a 
reasonable prospect of success on the merits.476 Urgency and the gravity of the harm risked are 
interlinked. If the ICJ finds that the potential harm ‘would be irreparable’, this triggers a discus-
sion of the ‘urgency’ criterion.477 In 1932 Dumbauld already considered that delay for the purpose 
of a hearing ‘is not unlimited, and must not be incompatible with the essentially urgent character 
of interim protection’. “In view of the summary nature of the procedure, the rules of evidence 
should be relaxed rather than made more rigid than usual”. In any case, apparently all that was 
required was a ‘prima facie showing of probable right and probable injury’.478  
In the Nuclear Test cases (1973) the ICJ noted that the information did not exclude the pos-
sibility that the deposit on Australia’s territory of radioactive fall-out resulting from the tests 
performed by France could cause irreparable damage.479 Elkind pointed out that in these cases the 
ICJ ‘was willing to accept very slight proof as to the likelihood of irreparable injury’ while in the 
Aegean Sea case (1976) it required a ‘much stricter standard of proof’ of irreparable harm.480  
In his Separate Opinion Judge Elias criticized the Court’s approach in that case because, as 
he put it, it meant that ‘the State which has the ability to pay can under this principle commit 
wrongs against another State with impunity, since it discounts the fact that the injury by itself 
might be sufficient to cause irreparable harm to the national susceptibilities of the offended State’. 
He considered that ‘might’ should no longer be ‘right’ in ‘today’s inter-State relations’.481 While 
the ICJ considered that rights claimed by States might be protected through provisional measures, 
even though they concern the nature and extent of rights rather than their existence, in this case it 
found that circumstances did not require such measures.482  
Elkind criticised the Court’s decision in the Aegean Sea case (1976) and considered that 
Greece had the burden to allege and prove irreparable injury and that ‘demonstrating that the 
interests sought to be protected were subjective or incapable of pecuniary ascertainment should 
have satisfied that onus’. Following this, ‘the burden of coming forward with the evidence to 
negate the claim of irreparable injury shifted to Turkey’. Because Turkey did not appear and did 
not present evidence to the contrary ‘the Court should have held that the case for irreparable 
                                                 
475  See also section 3.5 and 3.7 on the relationship with the rights claimed and the forms of 
reparation. 
476  See also section 3.6 on prejudgment.  
477  See Rosenne (2005), p. 135. 
478  Dumbauld (1932), pp. 160-161. 
479  ICJ Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France), Order of 22 June 1973, §29. Shahabuddeen 
acknowledges that the ICJ did not say that the possible damage might violate some possible right 
of the applicant. However, given the fact that the Court recognised the possibility that the 
Applicant might be able to show irreparable damage it was improbable that it did not assume that 
its rights might be at stake as well. Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order 
of 29 July 1991, Separate Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen, pp. 25-33. See further Goldie (1972-73), 
p. 497, also referring to the PCIJ Sino-Belgian Treaty case, Order of 8 January 1927. 
480  Elkind (1981), p. 223. See, however, ICJ Nuclear Tests follow-up case, Order of 22 September 
1995.  
481  ICJ Aegean Sea case, Order of 11 September 1976, Separate Opinion Judge Elias, p. 31. 
482  According to Thirlway (1994), p. 24 this decision seems to imply that the question whether there 
is a prima facie case on the merits does not arise if the other party has admitted the existence of 
the right to be protected. In reference to the Nuclear test cases, ‘where the very existence of a 
right to redress for damage caused by fall-out from nuclear tests was disputed’, he considered the 
criterion chosen by the ICJ, ‘while appropriate for the facts before it, does not lend itself for 
generalization’. As a ground rule he proposes that ‘if there is any requirement that a prima facie 
case be made out as a condition of provisional measures, this must be so in principle even where 
it is asserted as an extension of a recognized right’. 
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injury was established’. He pointed out that Article 53 did not require the ICJ either ‘to coddle the 
non-appearing respondent to the extent of raising defences proprio motu’.483 
Thus, Elkind considered that the ICJ erred in the Aegean Sea case with regard to the burden 
of proof for the likelihood of irreparable harm. He referred to two findings of law that were 
implicit in the Court’s holding: ‘(a) that the question of what constitutes irreparable injury is 
solely a question of fact and (b) that the burden of proving irreparable injury rests with the 
plaintiff’. However, he noted, the Court only stated that the Turkish explorations ‘might be’ 
capable of reparation, which meant that it also might not be capable of such reparation.484  
According to Sztucki, writing in the early 1980s, the ICJ was not strict about prima facie 
cases. He noted that it could order provisional measures without requiring the Applicant to show a 
prima facie case, while this was normally required under national laws and in the practice of the 
European Court of Justice.485 
In 1991 Denmark argued that Finland’s request for provisional measures in the Passage 
through the Great Belt case was inappropriate because there was ‘not even a prima facie case’ in 
favour of the Finnish claim. It argued that Finland should substantiate the right it claims ‘to a 
point where a reasonable prospect of success in the main case exists’.486 Merrills notes that the 
ICJ ‘was prepared to regard Finland as having satisfied any prima facie test that might be 
necessary, but stopped short of endorsing Denmark's argument that the merits of the principal 
claim are in fact relevant in proceedings relating to interim protection’.487 In his separate opinion 
Judge Shahabuddeen considered that the Applicant State indeed had to show a prima facie case 
‘in the sense of demonstrating a possibility of existence of the specific right’. Given the 
exceptional character of the procedure he argued that it was necessary for the requesting State to 
show some arguable basis for the existence of the right sought to be protected.488  
At the same time it is often the Respondent that raises the question whether the right 
claimed indeed exists. In such situations there is no question of prejudgment. Moreover, a finding 
by the ICJ that there is a possibility of the existence of a right does not, in itself, constitute an 
interim judgment.489 Judge Shahabuddeen pointed out that it ‘is improbable that the Court is 
bound by a mere assertion of rights even where these are manifestly incapable of existing in law’. 
In that sense ‘the Court must be concerned with satisfying itself affirmatively of the possible 
existence of the rights claimed, the required degree of proof being dependent on the character and 
circumstances of the particular case’.490 He did not suggest that the requesting State ‘should 
                                                 
483  Elkind (1981), p. 206. 
484  Elkind (1981), p. 214. 
485  Sztucki (1983), p. 259 (also for early examples of case law by the European Court of Justice). 
486  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 22 July 1991, §21. 
487  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case, Order of 22 July 1991. Merrills (1995), p. 114 points 
out that in the approach suggested by Denmark the strength of the case on the merits should be 
treated as a relevant circumstance. ‘Although superficially attractive, such an approach would 
present many problems and has never been endorsed by the Court’. The ICJ noted that Denmark 
had not challenged the existence of a right of Finland of passage through the Great Belt. Instead 
the dispute was about the nature and extent of the passage. It found that ‘such a disputed right 
may be protected by the indication of provisional measures’ if it ‘considers that circumstances so 
require’, Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 22 July 1991, §22.  
488  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 22 July 1991, Separate 
Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 29. He also referred to Dumbauld’s remark that provisional 
measures always constitute ‘an exceptional remedy’, (1932), p. 184. 
489  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 22 July 1991, Separate 
Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 30. See about prejudgment section 3.6. 
490  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 22 July 1991, Separate 
Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 30. 
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anticipate and meet each and every issue which could arise at the merits’. This would depend on 
the nature and circumstances of the case. He suggested the following standard: “What is 
important is that enough material should be presented to demonstrate the possibility of existence 
of the right sought to be protected”.491 Judge Shahabuddeen argued that it is reasonable to order 
provisional measures only if the Applicant State can show some possibility of success on the 
merits. After all, such measures often have an unequal impact on the parties.492 The ‘need to avoid 
any appearance of prejudgment’ is ‘of special importance in the sensitive field of litigation 
between States’.493 He reiterated that it is only necessary to show ‘the possibility of the existence 
of the right claimed’. According to Merrills this means that ‘the prima facie test could be satisfied 
(at least in theory) without going into the merits of the case in any detail’. He welcomes, however, 
the Court’s reluctance to take this approach because ‘if a prima facie test were to be formally 
required it would probably be impossible to prevent the parties from devoting a significant 
amount of their argument to the merits’. At the same time he acknowledges that, informally, it 
‘would be surprising if a preliminary view of the merits did not in practice influence the Court’s 
approach to requests for interim protection to some degree’.494 
In the Great Belt case (1991) Shahabuddeen referred to the Court’s remark in its Order for 
provisional measures in the Hostages case (1979) that ‘a request for provisional measures must by 
its very nature relate to the substance of the case since, as article 41 expressly states, their object 
is to preserve the respective rights of either party’.495 He discussed the fact that the Court goes 
into the merits of cases at the stage of provisional measures. This means that the Court considers 
that the State requesting provisional measures ‘must satisfy the Court that it has an arguable case 
in favour of the existence of the rights sought to be preserved pending a final decision’.496 In this 
case, however, he agreed with the ICJ that there was no urgency. After all, Denmark showed full 
cooperation and undertook not to complete the disputed bridge before the Court’s decision on the 
merits.  
If the Respondent State provides assurances that it will avoid causing irreparable harm this 
can play a role in the determination that there is no urgency.497 In this context Merrills has pointed 
out that ‘in an appropriate case the fact that the parties, and especially the respondent, are 
demonstrating a co-operative, responsible and law-abiding attitude is a factor which can be and 
has been given weight’. At the same time he stressed that ‘if rights are genuinely threatened, 
something more than vague assurances of goodwill will be necessary before a request is 
refused’.498  
                                                 
491  Id., p. 31. 
492  Merrills (1995), p. 115, notes that this approach would be consistent with the use of the prima 
facie test for jurisdiction to use provisional measures. 
493  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 22 July 1991, Separate 
Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 29. See about prejudgment section 3.6. 
494  Merrills (1995), pp. 115-116. 
495  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Order of 15 
December 1979, §28. See also section 3.5 on the relationship between provisional measures and 
the claim.  
496  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 22 July 1991, Separate 
Opinion Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 33.  
497  See e.g. ICJ Great Belt case, Order of 22 July 1991 and ITLOS MOX Plant case, Order of 3 
December 2001. 
498  Merrills (1995), p. 121. In Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite 
(Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 28 May 2009, the ICJ took note of the assurances given by 
Senegal that it would not allow Mr. Habré to leave its territory before the Court has given its final 
decision, and found that the risk of irreparable prejudice to the rights claimed by Belgium was 
‘not apparent on the date of this Order’, §§71-72 (Judge Cançado Trindade dissenting). 
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Thirlway referred to Judge Shahabuddeen’s Separate Opinion, concluding that the State 
requesting provisional measures ‘is required to establish the possible existence of the rights 
sought to be protected’.499 Judge Shahabuddeen himself referred to a statement by Judge Anzilotti 
who wrote that the Court, for its decision on provisional measures, takes ‘into account the 
possibility of the right claimed (...) and the possibility of the danger to which that right was 
exposed’.500 While this statement was a dissent by a PCIJ Judge, Judge Shahabuddeen considered 
in 1991 that ‘the general pattern of advocacy employed by counsel, and also the reaction of the 
Court on some occasions, as in the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran case, 
would appear to be objectively consistent with Judge Anzilotti’s understanding of the law’ as 
expressed above.501 He noted that the interests of the respondent State required the Court to 
examine whether there was a possibility of the right claimed and a possibility of the danger to 
which that right was exposed. He considered that the requirement of prima facie evidence of the 
possible existence of the right would not be the same as a full examination on the merits. He 
pointed out that the ‘possibility formula’ proposed by Judge Anzilotti was to be preferred over the 
requirement of prima facie evidence because it implied even less risk of prejudgment.  
Nevertheless, in international litigation the distinction between a prima facie test, a test 
whether there is a serious issue to be tried and a test whether there is a possible danger to a 
possible right is not that great.502 In any case the risk of irreparable harm must be shown to some 
extent. Merrills has pointed out that the ICJ may have to consider ‘both the probability of a 
certain event occurring and the consequences which may be expected if it does’.  
“It is worth noting that any future event does not have to be certain, a probability is 
sufficient”.503  
In relation to the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (1999) by ITLOS, Judge Treves noted that it 
seemed reasonable to hold ‘that the prevention of serious harm to the southern bluefin tuna stock 
is the appropriate standard for prescribing measures’. He pointed out that this standard could 
apply to measures for the preservation of the rights of the parties exactly ‘because these rights 
concern the conservation of that very stock’. In that sense he would have preferred that ITLOS 
had mentioned the prevention of serious harm to the stock as the standard for ordering 
provisional measures rather than (only) as the purpose of action to be taken by the parties.504 In 
the context of the provisional measures in the M/V ‘Saiga’ case ITLOS Judge Laing pointed out 
that comparable ICJ jurisprudence did not suggest that there is a ‘prima facie standard by which 
this Tribunal must adjudge the existence and sufficiency of the circumstances and other elements 
which relate to the discretion to prescribe measures’. He considered that there was no persuasive 
doctrine to suggest this either. If jurisprudence about a prima facie standard at the provisional 
measures stage would exist, it ‘would be unreliable, since such circumstances, elements and 
contextual situations are too varied to be submitted to a sole, and probably simplistic, standard’. 
                                                 
499  Thirlway (1994), p. 24. 
500  PCIJ Polish Agrarian Reform and German Minority case, Order of 29 July 1933, Dissenting 
Opinion by Judge Anzilotti, series A/B, No. 58, p. 181.  
501  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 19 July 1991, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, p. 34. 
502  ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 19 July 1991, Separate 
Opinion of Judge Shahabuddeen, pp. 28-36. See also section 3.6 on provisional measures and 
prejudgment. 
503  Merrills (1995), p. 107. 
504  Separate Opinion of Judge Treves, referring to §§70 and 77 of ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna 
cases, Order of 27 August 1999.  
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He noted that this conclusion was confirmed by ‘the discretionary nature of the functions of the 
Tribunal in proceedings on provisional measures’.505  
Indeed, international adjudicators sometimes use the standard of ‘prima facie evidence’, but 
they do not indicate exactly what this means. According to Kazazi the stage of evidence referred 
to as prima facie is ‘an inevitable stage for the distribution of the burden of proof, without which 
there will be no case to require the respondent’s answer’.506 Judge Laing is correct in pointing out 
that to use a single inflexible standard at the stage of provisional measures would do no justice to 
the different contexts. Nevertheless, it does seem that international adjudicators apply some 
standard, and the concept of prima facie evidence for purposes of provisional measures seems 
sufficiently flexible.507 
5.3.3 The preventive and precautionary principles  
Provisional measures by the ICJ (and ITLOS) are often based on the principle of prevention of 
irreparable harm.508 The preventive and precautionary principles are principles that could trigger a 
policy (or judicial) decision to take temporary measures or that relax the evidentiary requirements 
for taking measures to prevent harm.509 If adjudicators apply these principles in their decisions on 
the merits, this approach may equally be reflected in their decisions on provisional measures. 
After all, the standard of risk to be met for provisional measures is anyhow more relaxed than the 
evidentiary standard in the main case. Since provisional measures and the preventive and 
precautionary principles have the common aim of preventing harm, information on the latter 
principles could potentially be useful to clarify the criteria for the use of provisional measures as 
well.  
References to the precautionary principle in international documents on environmental law 
are of more recent date (second half of the 1980s) than references to the preventive principle. The 
latter principle can be traced back to international environmental documents of the 1930s.510 The 
preventive principle is broader than the precautionary.511 References are normally made to the 
preventive principle when a causal relationship can already be established between the act or 
omission and serious or irreparable harm and when the probability of the risk can be established 
either quantitatively or qualitatively. In the latter case it should be possible to indicate, for 
                                                 
505  ITLOS M/V ‘Saiga’ (No. 2), Order of 11 March 1998, Separate Opinion of Judge Laing, §§2-13.  
506  Kazazi (1996), pp. 326-327.  
507  Black’s Law Dictionary, providing definitions on the basis of US law, defines prima facie as 
follows: at first sight; on the first appearance; on the face of it; so far as can be judged from the 
first disclosure; presumably; a fact presumed to be true unless disproved by some evidence to the 
contrary. It defines prima facie evidence, among others, as evidence good and sufficient on its 
face. “Such evidence as, in the judgment of the law, is sufficient to establish a given fact, or the 
group or chain of effects constituting the party’s claim or defence and which if not rebutted or 
contradicted, will remain sufficient”. Black’s Law Dictionary, West Publishing Co., St. Paul, 
Minn., 1990 (6th ed.). 
508  See section 3 of this Chapter, focusing on this purpose of provisional measures in general 
international law. 
509  See for in-depth discussions of various aspects of the precautionary principle e.g. Wibisana 
(2008); Vos/Van Calster (eds.) (2004); Douma (2003); Faure/Vos (eds) (2003); Marr (2003); 
Trouwborst (2002); O’Riordan/Cameron/Jordan (2001) and Freestone/Hey (1996). In literature 
on risk assessment ‘risk’ relates to cause and effect and refers to the probability or likelihood that 
this damage will indeed be caused as well as to the magnitude of this damage. This cannot be 
measured exactly. The term ‘uncertainty’ is used for a situation in which the probability and 
magnitude of the harm cannot be pinpointed. 
510  Sands (2003), p. 267. 
511  Trouwborst (2002), p. 35. 
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instance, whether the risk is negligible, small or high. Depending on the value attached to a 
certain right or interest even scientific evidence of a slight risk could be sufficient to trigger the 
preventive principle and halt the act or remedy the omission. The preventive principle ‘seeks to 
minimise environmental damage as an objective in itself’.512 This means that States may be 
obliged to prevent harm to the environment not only if it involves cross-border harm but also if it 
involves harm to the environment within their own jurisdictions.513 In that respect there is a clear 
correlation between human rights law and the preventive principle in environmental law.514 Sands 
notes that the preventive principle ‘prohibits activity which causes or may cause damage to the 
environment in violation of the standards established under the rules of international law’.515 The 
preventive principle is reflected in State practice, supported by domestic legislation and 
international standards as well as by the emphasis in international legal documents on the need to 
carry out environmental impact assessments and provide access to environmental information.516  
There is no generally accepted definition of the precautionary principle. In fact various 
States, adjudicators and commentators use ‘approach’, ‘principle’, ‘preventive’ and 
‘precautionary’ in different ways. The precautionary principle becomes relevant if there is 
insufficient or conflicting evidence (e.g. conflicting risk assessments) on the causal relationship. It 
could also play a role if the probability of the risk cannot be determined although there is indeed 
scientific evidence about a causal relationship.517 Traditionally the party alleging the risk was 
forced to provide sufficient scientific evidence of such risk, necessitating urgent action. This often 
meant that by the time such evidence was available the harm had already been done. This harm 
could be long lasting or even irreversible. The precautionary principle, first found in the legal 
systems of certain States,518 was introduced exactly to deal with situations of scientific 
uncertainty about risks to the environment or to health. Given the gravity of the harm that could 
otherwise result, certain acts should be halted or certain omissions addressed without the 
obligation to wait for full scientific certainty about the risk.  
One interpretation of the principle has been laid down in the Rio Declaration.519 Principle 
15 stipulates:  
“In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by 
States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, 
lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective 
measures to prevent environmental degradation”. 
Many international and regional instruments, binding and non-binding, have referred to the 
principle.520 It is not yet firmly established as a rule of customary international law although it has 
widely been resorted to by policy makers. Many international legal documents (mainly involving 
environmental law) have referred to it, some of them in binding provisions.521  
                                                 
512  Sands (2003), p. 246.  
513  See Sands (2003), p. 246 (setting it off against Principle 21 of the Rio Declaration, a principle 
flowing from State sovereignty).  
514  See further Chapter XV on Immediacy and risk in human rights adjudication, with specific 
references to the preventive and precautionary approach. 
515  Sands (2003), p. 247. 
516  For references see Sands (2003), p. 247. See also Chapter XIII on beneficiaries and consultation. 
517  See e.g. Trouwborst (2002), pp. 35-44. 
518  E.g. the Vorsorgeprinzip in Germany. 
519  Rio Declaration on environment and Development, June 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. I). 
520  For an overview of such references see Trouwborst (2002).  
521  See the references in Sands (2003). Trouwborst (2002) and Douma (2003) argue that, in 
environmental law, the principle has acquired customary international law status.  
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As Sands puts it in relation to the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992) 
and its statement that lack of full scientific certainty ‘shall not be used’ to prevent action:  
“What remains open is the level at which scientific evidence is sufficient to override arguments 
for postponing measures, or at which measures might even be required as a matter of 
international law”.522 
If precautionary or preventive measures would be required under international law the adjudicator 
could order them. If they are only allowed, the adjudicator could accept them as a justification by 
States for certain acts or omissions. The precautionary principle could be argued to support 
‘shifting the burden’ of proof (even if not formally) so that companies or States planning to carry 
out a certain activity must show that there is no (impermissible) risk to the environment. While in 
some interpretations the damage risked does not need to be ‘serious’ or ‘irreversible’, in other 
interpretations the burden only shifts from the party alleging to the party allegedly causing the 
threat once it has been established that the damage risked would indeed be ‘serious’ or 
‘irreversible’.523  
Thus far the ICJ has not referred to the precautionary principle, even though in the 1995 
French Nuclear Tests cases New Zealand and the intervening States had invoked it.524 In his 
dissent Judge Weeramantry did consider the precautionary principle and the fact that it could shift 
the burden of proof.525 Two years later, in Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros (1997), the ICJ again failed to 
take into account the precautionary principle. This case dealt with Hungary’s argument that the 
suspension of works on a hydroelectric dam (under a bilateral treaty) could be justified because of 
a ‘state of necessity’. It invoked the argument of ecological necessity. According to the ICJ a state 
of necessity could not exist without a ‘peril’. It acknowledged that this word evoked the idea of 
‘risk’ and that this was what distinguished ‘peril’ from material damage. However, ‘the mere 
apprehension of a possible “peril” could not suffice in that respect’.526 On the other hand, as 
Sands points out, the ICJ was examining the legal situation in 1989 when Hungary had suspended 
                                                 
522  Sands (2003), p. 273. 
523  See e.g. the examples given by Sands (2003), pp. 270-272. Sands notes about shifting the burden 
in the latter context that there is ‘growing evidence to suggest that this interpretation is beginning 
to be supported by state practice, even if it still falls short of having sufficient support to allow it 
to be considered a rule of general application’, p. 273 and references therein. 
524  See ICJ Request for an examination of the situation in accordance with paragraph 63 of the 
Court’s judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests case (New Zealand v. France), 
request by New Zealand, §105. 
525  Request for an examination of the situation in accordance with paragraph 63 of the Court’s 
Judgment of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests cases, Order of 22 September 1995, 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, pp. 317-362, in particular pp. 342-344. “New 
Zealand has placed materials before the Court to the best of its ability, but France is in possession 
of the actual information. The principle then springs into operation to give the Court the basic 
rationale for considering New Zealand’s request and not postponing the application of such 
means as are available to the Court to prevent, on a provisional basis, the threatened 
environmental degradation, until such time as the full scientific evidence becomes available in 
refutation of the New Zealand contention”. He considered that New Zealand would have been 
entitled to a consideration of its request for provisional measures. See also the Dissenting 
Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Palmer, pp. 381-421, in particular p. 412. 
526  ICJ Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, §54. This 
case had been brought before the ICJ by common Agreement between the parties. It was included 
in this Agreement that the parties would not request provisional measures.  
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its work on the dam project and at that time ‘the precautionary principle had not yet emerged and 
could not realistically be applied as general international law’.527  
The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) has been more willing to relax 
the evidentiary standard for the party claiming risk to the environment and, implicitly, to apply 
the precautionary principle. It seems to have taken provisional measures on the basis of the 
precautionary principle, or at least the precautionary approach, in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases 
(1999). In this case it noted that the parties should act with ‘prudence and caution’ to prevent 
‘serious harm’.528 It also noted that there was ‘scientific uncertainty’ about the measures to be 
taken.529 While it could not conclusively assess the scientific evidence presented by the parties, 
‘measures should be taken as a matter of urgency to preserve the rights of the parties and to avert 
further deterioration of the southern bluefin tuna stock’.530 It ordered the parties, among others, 
not to conduct experimental fishing programs.531 In their separate opinions Judge Treves and ad 
hoc Judge Shearer explicitly referred to the precautionary approach.532 
While the precautionary principle involves situations of scientific uncertainty it is still 
necessary to provide some evidence of risk before it can be used as a justification for halting 
certain developments.  
A question that has arisen, apart from the status of the principle and its applicability to 
health and other issues outside of environmental law,533 is whether it is mainly a principle to be 
used by policy makers or whether it also serves a function before the courts and other 
adjudicators. Clearly international adjudicators have to deal with it if States use it as a 
justification for an infringement upon the rights claimed by the other party. Yet in my view 
adjudicators may take into account the precautionary approach not just as a justification by States 
for their policy making (including certain acts or omissions) but also as an indication of how to 
approach the evidentiary requirements when dealing with a request for provisional measures.534  
                                                 
527  Sands (2003), p. 275. 
528  See ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Order of 
27 August 1999, §77. 
529  Id., §79. 
530  Id., §80. 
531  For the protective measures required in provisional measures see section 3.7 of this Chapter.  
532  Judge Treves noted in his Separate Opinion that he would have preferred it if the tribunal had 
explicitly stated that in the case at hand ‘the requirement of urgency’ was ‘satisfied only in the 
light of such precautionary approach’, §8; Ad Hoc Judge Shearer noted that the provisional 
measures were ‘rightly based upon considerations deriving from a precautionary approach’, p. 6. 
See about the precautionary principle or approach and the law of the sea Marr (2003). 
533  In the Beef Hormones case the WTO Appellate Body noted that it was not clear whether the 
precautionary principle could already be considered a rule of customary international law. It 
pointed out, however, that it was ‘unnecessary, and probably imprudent’ for it to take a position 
on this question and that ‘the precautionary principle, at least outside the field of international 
environmental law, still awaits authoritative formulation’. WTO Appellate Body, report of 16 
January 1998, WT/DS48/AB/R, §123. The industry has criticised the use of the precautionary 
principle in relation to policy on food safety as creating an impossible burden of proof for food 
products and ingredients, see e.g. Hathcock (2000). 
534  As Treves notes, ‘the precautionary approach can be seen as a logical consequence of the need to 
ensure that, when the arbitral tribunal decides on the merits, the factual situation has not 
changed’. Separate Opinion of Judge Treves, ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand 
v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999, §9. He noted that the Order of the 
Tribunal had hinted at a precautionary approach, in particular in §77 in relation to the future 
conduct of the parties. He regretted that the order did not explicitly state that a precautionary 
approach was also necessary in the Tribunal’s assessment of urgency.  
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6 THE LEGAL STATUS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
It has not always been clear whether the provisional measures by the ICJ were legally binding. 
This was due mainly to the wording of Article 41 ICJ Statute, referring to the power to ‘indicate’ 
provisional measures, which ‘ought’ to be taken. Different from the ICJ Statute the more recent 
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates the power to ‘prescribe’ rather than 
‘indicate’ provisional measures.535 In other words, its provisional measures are clearly legally 
binding.  
The legal controversy on the legal status of provisional measures by the World Court had 
already started with the PCIJ Statute.536 Scholarly views differed as to the question whether the 
provisional measures of the PCIJ and ICJ were legally binding. Dumbauld, for instance, 
considered the provisional measures of the PCIJ not to be legally binding.537 Other authors 
adhered to a functional interpretation and argued that even if the wording of Article 41 was 
ambiguous (e.g. ‘indicate’), the power itself to indicate provisional measures was a necessary 
attribute of the judicial function. Fitzmaurice wrote that ‘(t)he whole logic of the jurisdiction to 
indicate interim measures entails that, when indicated, they are binding – for this jurisdiction is 
based on the absolute necessity, when the circumstances call for it, of being able to preserve, and 
to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties, as determined by the final judgement of the 
Court’.538 Various authors regard the obligation to respect provisional measures a general 
principle of law.539  
                                                 
535  See Article 290 UNCLOS and Article 25 of Annex VI of UNCLOS (Agreement relating to the 
implementation of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 
December 1982, New York, 28 July 1994). 
536  In ICJ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 
Judgment of 27 June 1986 it re-emphasized its Order of 10 May 1984. It noted that it was 
‘incumbent upon each party to take the Court’s indications seriously into account’. “Particularly 
is this so in a situation of armed conflict where no reparation can efface the results of conduct 
which the Court may rule to have been contrary to international law”, §§288-289. In Application 
of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 13 September 1993 (second 
request) the ICJ noted in passing that, unlike its final judgments, its Orders had no ‘binding force’ 
or ‘final effect’ ‘in the decision of any dispute’. It referred to the PCIJ decision in Free Zones of 
Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of 19 August 1929. Nevertheless, it reiterated that 
Yugoslavia must immediately and effectively implement its ‘first order to prevent and cease any 
act of genocide’. But see the Separate Opinions by Judges Weeramantry and Ajibola, discussed 
infra. In a 1996 article Judge Oda wrote that the Court ‘has never taken an overt position in this 
respect but, as a matter of principle, the Court’s “Order” ought to be properly observed’ and ‘(i)f 
the later judgement on the merits is rendered in favour of the applicant State, the respondent State 
may be made responsible for any action taken in defiance of the provisional measures’, Oda 
(1996), p. 555. See also Beirlaen (1984-1985), pp. 739-775 and Rosenne (2005), p. 157 (on the 
Nicaragua case) and p. 179 (on the consequences of disrespect for the Court’s provisional 
measures before LaGrand). 
537  Dumbauld (1932), p. 169. See also p. 173 (in the absence of express wording). 
538  Fitzmaurice (1986), p. 584. See in general on the functional approach Elkind (1981). 
539  See e.g. Collins (1992-III), p. 216. See also the remarks of Pescatore and Oellers-Frahm at the 
colloquium in Bernhardt (ed.) (1994b), pp. 121-122 and pp. 146-147 respectively. For the 
opposite view, see, eg. Herdegen, id., p. 126. Cançado Trindade recently observed a ‘doctrinal 
trend’ to consider provisional measures as ‘equivalent to a true general principle of law, common 
to virtually all national legal systems, and endorsed by the practice of national, arbitral, and 
international tribunals’, ICJ Questions relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite 
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A provisional measure has no force of res iudicata as the decision on the merits still needs 
to be taken. It is, however, a general principle of law that, pending the proceedings before a 
Court, the status quo must be maintained.540 In 1953 Cheng put it as follows: 
“The reason why an international tribunal may exercise this power even when its jurisdiction as 
to the merits is yet uncertain must be sought in the fact that the duty of the parties to maintain 
the status quo already exists independently of any judicial intervention”.541 
In the words of Crockett ‘(a)lthough [provisional measures] are not res iudicata, they do enrich or 
diminish a party’s legal position so that (...) monetary or restitutionary liability for a violation of 
an order indicating interim measures would be entailed. To hold that interim measures have no 
legal effect would be tantamount to rendering them nullities’.542  
In his Separate Opinion in the Genocide Convention case (1993) Judge Weeramanty argued 
that provisional orders are part of the inherent authority of a judicial tribunal, as a general 
principle and for reasons of practical necessity. One of the principles he mentioned in support of 
this view is ‘the wide and universal recognition of the enjoining powers of courts as an inherent 
part of their jurisdiction’.543 Equally, Judge Ajibola pointed out that provisional measures 
influence the outcome of the adjudication and should therefore be considered part of the 
judgment.544 After all ‘an order, like a judgement (and being incidental to it) ought not to be 
ineffective, artificial or illusory. It should be binding and enforceable, otherwise, ab initio, there 
may be a good and reasonable ground to question it being issued at all. The Court, it is submitted, 
should not be seen to act in vain’.545 
In its judgment in LaGrand (2001) the ICJ finally determined that its provisional measures 
were legally binding. It applied a purposive interpretation to deal with the ambiguities of Article 
41 ICJ Statute.546 It followed from the object and purpose of the Statute and from ‘the terms of 
Article 41 when read in their context’, that the power to indicate provisional measures entailed 
‘that such measures should be binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the 
                                                                                                                       
(Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 28 May 2009, dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, 
§13. 
540  See PCIJ Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Order of 5 December 
1939, p. 194. 
541  Cheng (1953), p. 273. 
542  Crocket (1977), p. 384. 
543  ICJ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 13 September 1993, 
Separate Opinion Judge Weeramantry. 
544  ICJ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, 
Provisional Measures (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order 
of 13 September 1993, Separate Opinion Judge Ajibola, §5. 
545  Ibid. See also Ajibola (1996). 
546  It noted that it was faced with two texts (the French and the English), which were not ‘in total 
harmony’. It pointed out that both texts were equally authentic. It then referred to Article 33(4) 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, ‘which in the view of the Court again reflects 
customary international law’. This provision reads: “When a comparison of the authentic texts 
discloses a difference of meaning which the application of Articles 31 and 32 does not remove 
the meaning which best reconciles the texts, having regard to the object and purpose of the treaty, 
shall be adopted”. It then considered the object and purpose of the ICJ Statute together with the 
context of Article 41 Statute: “The context in which Article 41 has to be seen within the Statute is 
to prevent and Court from being hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective 
rights of the parties to a dispute before the Court are not preserved”. ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. 
US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §102. 
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necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of 
the parties as determined by the final judgment of the Court’.547 “The contention that provisional 
measures indicated under Article 41 might not be binding would be contrary to the object and 
purpose of the Article”.548 
The ICJ also referred to the principle ‘universally accepted by the international tribunals 
and likewise laid down in many conventions (...) to the effect that the parties to a case must 
abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of 
the decision to be given, and, in general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken which might 
aggravate or extend the dispute’.549 It noted that it has frequently indicated Orders designed to 
avoid aggravating or extending disputes, which it had ‘indicated with the purpose of being 
implemented’.550  
The Court considered that there are no other sources or interpretations contradicting the 
Court's conclusions as drawn from the terms of Article 41, read in their context and in the light of 
the object and purpose of the Statute. Article 94 UN Charter did not prevent Orders made under 
Article 41 from having a binding character and neither did the preparatory work.551  
Since the Court’s judgment in LaGrand its provisional measures cannot be considered other 
than legally binding.552 Its decision did not seem to depend on the nature of the rights to be 
protected. In other words, the ICJ ‘did not equivocate’ in holding that its provisional measures 
were legally binding, ‘nor did it narrow the application of its holding to death penalty cases, nor 
even danger to life cases’. It attributed ‘legal effect to all its orders for provisional measures, 
irrespective of content and context’.553 In sum, the text of the ICJ Statute includes a reference to 
                                                 
547  ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §102. 
548  Ibid. 
549  It referred to PCIJ Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria, Order of 5 December 1939. 
550  The ICJ refers to several of its Orders, see §103 of LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 
June 2001. 
551  See ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §109. Given the conclusions 
reached in interpreting the text of Article 41 in the light of its object and purpose, the Court did 
not consider it necessary to resort to the preparatory work in order to determine meaning of the 
Article. It did, however, point out that the preparatory work of the Statute did not preclude the 
conclusion that orders under Article 41 are binding. See §§104 and 105-107, discussing the 
travaux. With regard to the US claim that this particular Order was not legally binding because of 
the way it was phrased the ICJ pointed out that in fact this Order ‘was not a mere exhortation’. “It 
had been adopted pursuant to Article 41 of the Statute”. Thus it was legally binding and ‘created 
a legal obligation for the United States’, §110. Jennings (2002), p. 35 considers the Court should 
have paid more attention to the question of Article 94 UN Charter, as manifestly ‘of crucial and 
practical importance’. See further Crocket (1977), p. 376. See in general on the Court’s approach 
to the binding nature of provisional measures in LaGrand; Orakhelashvilli (2002), pp. 116-121, 
pointing out, correctly, that the Court’s approach can be explained by the principle of 
effectiveness, p. 119. 
552  For varying views on the reasoning of the Court, see e.g Weckel (2005); Oellers-Frahm (2001a); 
Jennings (2002), Mennecke and Tams (2002) and Kammerhofer (2003). For a different approach 
see Yoshiyuki Iwamoto (2002), p. 365, somehow arguing that provisional measures should 
nevertheless ‘have no binding force in cases where the criteria for indicating measures have not 
been satisfied, including the situation in which the rights to be protected may not fall within the 
scope of prima facie jurisdiction’. In such case, he considers, ‘an order on provisional measures 
should not be conceived as a proper one’. “If it were, it would pose the risk of creating an’ 
interim judgment’ or a binding decision over a matter which might be irrelevant to the actual 
dispute before the Court”. Naming Breard and LaGrand as possible examples of such cases he 
seems to imply that it is for States to consider whether the criteria have been satisfied.  
553  Harrington (2003), p. 76.  
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provisional measures and the Court’s purposive interpretation of this text has resulted in the 
finding that provisional measures are binding in all cases. 
7 FOLLOWING UP ON OFFICIAL STATE RESPONSES  
The general rate of compliance with the ICJ’s provisional measures is not impressive.554 It is not 
clear to what extent this relates to the fact that it was only in 2001 that the ICJ established the 
obligatory character of its provisional measures, but in the context of the Genocide Convention 
case (1993-2007) this has certainly been suggested.555  
Apart from the responses of other States and other actors as well as the media, the follow-up 
of the ICJ itself is important because it indicates how seriously it takes its own Orders. What may 
also play a role in increasing effectiveness is the transparency of the Court’s decision-making, 
particularly its reasoning. Judge Kooijmans has noted that ‘a court should make clear in its 
reasoning that it is fully aware of the wider context and the complexity of the issues involved’. 
This would help ‘make its legal assessments and conclusions comprehensible and thereby 
acceptable to litigant States whose leaders are no trained lawyers (even though they may be 
assisted by legal professionals), but are the main actors in the process of implementing the 
judgement’.556 This section, however, deals with the Court’s monitoring of the implementation of 
its own provisional measures.  
7.1 ICJ Rules on follow-up 
In 1978 the ICJ formally included a Rule on follow-up in its Rules of Court. Article 78 stipulates 
that the ICJ ‘may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the 
implementation of any provisional measures it has indicated’. The ICJ has generally requested 
such information in its initial Order, but Article 78 does not rule out the use of subsequent Orders, 
indicated proprio motu, to remind States of their obligations under Orders for provisional 
measures. The inclusion of Article 78 does not seem to have been inspired by humanitarian 
considerations, but rather more generally by considerations of effectiveness.557 In the Hostages 
case (1979) the ICJ for the first time noted in an Order for provisional measures that it would 
keep the case continuously under review.558 Later, in the context of Orders to halt the execution of 
a death sentence, it also specifically noted that the addressee States should inform it of the 
measures taken to comply with its Order.559 On the other hand, despite the serious nature of the 
                                                 
554  See e.g. Savadogo (2002), pp. 378-380. On compliance with its judgments see e.g. Paulson 
(2004) and Ajibola (1996) and Schwebel (1996a). For a thorough discussion of compliance with 
the ICJ’s judgments and provisional measures, see in particular Schulte (2004). 
555  ICJ Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 13 September 1993, 
Separate Opinion Judges Weeramantry and Ajibola. See also, e.g., Gaffikin (1995), p. 460 and p. 
468. 
556  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans, §4. See also Cassel (1999b), p. 887. 
557  See Rosenne (2005), p. 178, referring to the two Orders in the Fisheries Jurisdiction cases, 
requesting the Applicant States to provide both the Court and the Respondent with all relevant 
information. 
558  ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Order of 15 
December 1979. 
559  ICJ Breard (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 April 1998, LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 
June 2001; Avena et al. (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003 and ICJ Request for 
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cases in question, in its Orders in the Genocide Convention case (1993) and Congo v. Uganda 
(2000), it did not include a specific requirement for the addressee States to inform it of the 
measures taken in compliance.560  
7.2 ITLOS Rules on follow-up 
ITLOS does include in its Orders for provisional measures a formal obligation to report on 
measures taken in compliance. In Rule 95 of the ITLOS Rules of Procedure each Party ‘shall 
inform the Tribunal as soon as possible as to its compliance (…). In particular, each party shall 
submit an initial report upon the steps it has taken or proposes to take’. In its Orders prescribing 
provisional measures ITLOS includes the date by which the Parties are to submit their initial 
reports. It may also request further information.561 
7.3 Follow-up in death penalty cases 
The US death penalty cases are particularly relevant in the context of a discussion on compliance. 
In the first case the ICJ ordered the US to halt the execution of Paraguayan national Angel Breard. 
The only step undertaken by the US in response was a letter sent by the Secretary of State 
Madeleine Albright to Jim Gilmore, the Governor of Virginia, asking him to halt the execution 
temporarily, because carrying it out at that time ‘could lead some countries to contend incorrectly 
that the US does not take seriously its obligations’.562 At the same time, however, the Clinton 
administration urged the US Supreme Court not to halt the scheduled execution.563 Administration 
lawyers said the sole measure available to the US government for complying with the provisional 
measures was ‘persuasion’, not ‘legal compulsion through the (US) judicial system’.564 Angel 
                                                                                                                       
interpretation of the judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and other 
Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 16 July 2008. See also Frontier Dispute case 
(Burkina Faso v. Mali), Order of 10 July 1986. 
560  ICJ Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 8 April 1993 
(Bosnia had invoked Article78 Rules of Court in both requests for provisional measures, but 
without response by the Court, see Rosenne (2005), p. 178) and Armed activities on the territory 
of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000. See also Land and maritime boundary 
between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Order of 15 March 1996. 
561  See Rosenne (2005), p. 180. 
562  Reuters, 14 April 1998. A reference was also made to the rather unfair justice systems in many 
parts of the world, see Amnesty International (1998), p. 4. 
563  See e.g. Amnesty International (1998), p. 4, describing that the US government told the Supreme 
Court that the assistance of consular officials would not have changed the outcome of the 
proceedings and that for this reason no stay of execution should be granted despite the ICJ’s 
provisional measure. Thus, it seems, the same arguments were used by the US before the US 
Supreme Court (after the provisional measures were indicated), that were rejected by the ICJ. 
The Solicitor General argued, among others, that ‘the ICJ’s Order indicating provisional 
measures should not be accorded comity, not should it be considered binding by the Supreme 
Court’, Aceves (1998), p. 520. See also footnote 17: “David Andrews, the Legal Adviser of the 
Department of State, co-signed the amicus brief on behalf of the United States. Mr Andrews had 
appeared as the U.S. Agent before the ICJ barely a week earlier”. See also Wilson (1998), p. 9: 
“These government lawyers, who had purported to honor the international court’s jurisdiction the 
week before, now argued to the highest domestic court in the United States that the ICJ’s ruling 
was “not binding” and that its order was merely “precatory” in nature-in other words, that the 
ICJ’s ruling was not entitled to any legal deference in the U.S. courts”. 
564  Reuters, 14 April 1998. 
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Francisco Breard was executed, as planned, on 14 April 1998 by the commonwealth of Virginia. 
After his execution Albright apparently said the US ‘did the right thing’.565 
In cases in which provisional measures are requested and ordered, often the arguments of 
the Parties on the merits and those on the provisional measures are linked together. The US 
invoked arguments of federalism, separation of powers and domestic rules of procedure. Its 
Supreme Court had indicated that it must decide questions presented to it ‘on the basis of law’. 
‘The Executive Branch, on the other hand,’ it stated, ‘in exercising its authority over foreign 
relations may, and in this case did, utilize diplomatic discussion with Paraguay. Last night the 
Secretary of State sent a letter to the Governor of Virginia requesting that he stay Breard’s 
execution. If the Governor wishes to wait for the decision of the ICJ, that is his prerogative. But 
nothing in our existing case law allows us to make that choice for him’.566 In effect this means it 
considered that a decision by the ICJ is not ‘law’, the US Supreme Court never makes new law, 
and the issue was solely a matter for ‘diplomatic discussion’. The US Supreme Court’s decision 
marked the end of Breard’s life, since the US government felt it could not do anything apart from 
requesting the Governor of Virginia to postpone the execution and urging the Supreme Court not 
to do that.567 The ICJ’s provisional measures were meant to ensure that the execution would not 
take place during the course of the proceedings before it. By ignoring these and executing Breard, 
the US not only showed disrespect for the ICJ, but also rendered it impossible to award the 
specific remedy claimed by Paraguay, namely restitutio in integrum.568  
The ICJ did not have an opportunity to comment on the US disrespect for its Order to halt 
the execution of Paraguayan citizen Breard, as Paraguay requested a discontinuance of the case 
several months after Breard’s execution.569 In a way the Court’s Order to halt the execution of 
German citizen Walter LaGrand could be seen as a follow-up on the US non-compliance in 
Breard in that the Court pointed out that the responsibility of the Respondent State is engaged by 
the actions of all its composite parts and that the federal authorities must transmit the Order to, in 
this case, the Governor of Arizona, who was in turn obliged to act in compliance with the ICJ’s 
Order.570  
Nevertheless, Walter Lagrand was executed. Different from Paraguay Germany maintained 
the case. Thus, in its judgment in LaGrand the ICJ did have the opportunity to follow-up on its 
Order for provisional measures. It determined that the US had not complied. It did note that this 
measure did not create an obligation of result and agreed that ‘due to the extremely late 
presentation of the request for provisional measures, there was certainly very little time for the 
                                                 
565  Reuters, 16 April 1998. 
566  US Supreme Court, Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998) (14 April 1998). 
567  See also Aceves (1998) p. 523 calling it ‘disquieting’ that the final decision on compliance with 
treaty obligations and provisional measures are entrusted to state rather than federal authorities 
and Wilson (1998), p. 1 wondering why it fell to a state governor ‘to effectively decide the legal 
force of a decision of an international tribunal’. 
568  See further Rieter (1998) as well as the contributions in Agora, American Journal of 
International Law (1998); Aceves (1998); Klabbers (1998) and Wilson (1998). For a different 
approach see Bradley (1998-1999) arguing that the ‘internationalist conception’ of the relation 
between international and US law is inconsistent with the traditionally ‘dualist’ approach and 
unlikely to be to be accepted by US authorities. 
569  ICJ Breard (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 April 1998; Request by Paraguay for a discontinuance 
(2 November 1998); Order of 10 November 1998 to remove the case from the List. As Paraguay 
initially expressed its intention to continue the case after the execution of its national, there has 
been speculation on possible pressure subsequently exerted on this State that could explain its 
request to remove the case from the List. 
570  ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999, §28. 
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United States authorities to act’.571 Nevertheless it observed that ‘the mere transmission of its 
Order to the Governor of Arizona without any comment, particularly without even so much as a 
plea for a temporary stay and an explanation that there is no general agreement on the position of 
the United States that orders of the International Court of Justice on provisional measures are non-
binding, was certainly less than could have been done even in the short time available’.572 It also 
commented on the Solicitor General's letter to the US Supreme Court: 
“The same is true of the United States Solicitor General's categorical statement in his brief letter 
to the United States Supreme Court that ‘an order of the International Court of Justice indicating 
provisional measures is non-binding and does not furnish a basis for judicial relief’”.573  
The ICJ reflected on the decision of the Governor of Arizona as well: 
“It is also noteworthy that the Governor of Arizona, to whom he Court's Order had been 
transmitted, decided not to give effect to it, even though the Arizona Clemency Board has 
recommended a stay of execution for Walter LaGrand”.574 
Finally, it commented on the decision of the Supreme Court which had rejected a separate 
application by Germany for a stay of execution, although ‘it would have been open to the 
Supreme Court, as one of its members urged, to grant a preliminary stay’.575 The ICJ summarised 
the situation as follows: ‘the various competent United States authorities failed to take all the 
steps they could have taken to give effect to the Court's Order’. The Order did not require the US 
to ‘exercise powers it did not have’, but it did impose the obligation to ‘take all measures at its 
disposal to ensure that Walter LaGrand is not executed pending the final decision in these 
proceedings’. It found that the US did not discharge this obligation.576  
In other words, in its judgment in LaGrand the ICJ clearly followed up the non-compliance 
with its Order, by singling out the roles of various US authorities and explain that it had not 
ordered anything out of the ordinary. Yet for several reasons it did not attach additional 
consequences to its finding of non-compliance. It observed that Germany, in its third submission, 
only requested the Court to ‘adjudge and declare’ that the US violated its international legal 
obligation to comply with the Order. It contained no other request regarding that violation. 
“Moreover, the Court points out that the United States was under great time pressure in this case, 
due to the circumstances in which Germany had instituted the proceedings”. It further noted that 
‘at the time when the United States authorities took their decision the question of the binding 
character of orders indicating provisional measures had been extensively discussed in the 
literature, but had not been settled by its jurisprudence. The Court would have taken these factors 
into consideration had Germany's submission included a claim for indemnification’.577 
The US attitude towards the provisional measures by the ICJ displayed in Breard and 
subsequently in LaGrand may be explained by a (latent) hostility towards international law and a 
high level of ignorance by some members of Congress and of some domestic courts as to its 
                                                 
571  ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §111. 
572  Id., §112. 
573  Id., §112. 
574  Id., §113. 
575  Id., §114. 
576  Id., §115. 
577  Id., §116. See also on the LaGrand Judgment: Orakhelashvili (2005); Cassel (2002); Fitzpatrick 
(2002); LaGrand Symposium (2002); Mckie (2002); Mennecke/Tams (2002); Orakhelashvili 
(2002); Rieter (2002); Schiffman (2002); Hirsch Ballin (2001); Oellers-Frahm (2001a). 
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contents and meaning.578 To some extent this situation appeared to be changing. Combined with 
the fact that some actors may gradually have become used to the idea of the ICJ’s provisional 
measures and judgments in LaGrand and Avena, more and more critical voices in the US itself 
resort to arguments based on international and comparative law.579 The US respected the Order 
for provisional measures in Avena (2003).580 In response to the Judgment (2004) in this case the 
President this time gave a clear message to the Attorney General about the need to comply.581  
Yet, as noted, at the same time the US withdrew from the Optional Protocol to the VCCR, 
blocking any future efforts by other States to bring a conflict regarding this treaty to the ICJ for 
resolution.582 In addition, the US Supreme Court has now found that ‘neither the Avena Judgment 
on its own, nor the Judgment in conjunction with the President’s memorandum, constituted 
directly enforceable federal law’ precluding Texas from “applying state procedural rules that 
barred all review and consideration of Mr. Medellín’s Vienna Convention claim”‘.583  
As discussed, the subsequent Order for provisional measures by the ICJ was based on a 
request for interpretation of the Avena judgment. In this context the discussion arose as to whether 
one could speak of a legal dispute on interpretation as required by Article 60 ICJ Statute.584 In its 
provisional measure itself the Court again included the obligation of the State to inform it of the 
implementation measures undertaken.585 In any case, subsequently both the US Supreme Court 
and the State of Texas ignored the ICJ’s Order for provisional measures and Medellin was 
                                                 
578  See e.g. the reaction at the ICJ’s provisional measures by a spokesperson for Jesse Helms 
(chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee) who, as Amnesty International puts it, 
‘appeared to have forgotten that the USA entered into the terms of the Vienna Convention 
voluntarily’. He condemned the Court’s decision in the following words: “It is an appalling 
intrusion by the United Nations into the affairs of the State of Virginia. (…) There is only one 
court that matters here. That’s the Supreme Court. There’s only one law that applies. That’s the 
United States Constitution”. Cited in Amnesty International (1998), p. 4. 
579  The US Supreme Court itself, for instance, has referred to international and comparative law in 
its decision on the death penalty for minors. Yet with regard to the VCCR it confirmed its earlier 
decision in Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, see Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 
(2006). See also Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 and Kirgis (2006). See further Chapter XVII 
(Official responses) and opinion poll conducted by Knowledge Networks, ‘Americans on 
International Courts and their Jurisdiction over the US’, 11 May 2005, 
<www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/may06/Tribunals_May06_rpt.pdf>. 
580  ICJ Avena (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003. The death sentence against Torres was 
commuted to life imprisonment and the other two beneficiaries were not executed either. See e.g. 
Murphy (2004), pp. 581-584 and Shelton (2004a). 
581  See section 3.3.7 of this Chapter.  
582  Most significant in this respect was the aforementioned quote of State Department spokesman 
Ereli: ‘we have a system of justice that provides people with due process and review of their 
cases, and it’s not appropriate that there should be some international court that comes in and 
reverses decisions of our national courts’ in: ‘U.S. quits foreign inmate accord’, CNN.com, 11 
March 2005. This indicates at least a double message on the meaning of US obligations, this one 
meant for an internal rather than international audience. 
583  US Supreme Court Medellín v. Texas, [US] 552 U.S. _ (2008), 128 S. Ct. 1346 (25 March 2008). 
See also section 3.3.7 of this Chapter. 
584  ICJ Request for interpretation of the judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena 
and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 16 July 2008. See further section 3.3.7 of 
this Chapter. 
585  ICJ Request for interpretation of the judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena 
and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 16 July 2008, §80.  
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executed.586 The Court has observed that the US failed to discharge of its obligation under its 
Order. This is not a very strong response, but at least it is combined with the observation that it is 
for the Court and not the parties to determine the Court’s jurisdiction. 
When States have agreed, under international law, to have the ICJ resolve any conflicts they 
may have regarding the interpretation of a treaty, these conflicts are certainly not resolved if 
individual states in a federation choose to ignore its Orders or Judgments and if they do so, the 
State concerned bears full responsibility. 
7.4 Follow-up in the context of armed conflict 
In its judgment in the Nicaragua case (1986) the ICJ specifically discussed the failure of the 
Parties to fully comply with its Order of provisional measures.587 In its judgment in Burkina Faso 
v. Mali (1986) the ICJ Chamber referred to its Order of January 1986 and noted ‘with satisfaction 
that the Heads of State of Burkina Faso and the Republic of Mali have agreed “to withdraw all 
their armed forces from either side of the disputed area and to effect their return to their respective 
territories”’.588 
In the Genocide Convention case (1993) Bosnia requested additional provisional measures 
within four months of the Court’s first Order. Instead, the ICJ reaffirmed that its previous Order 
                                                 
586  US Supreme Court 552 U.S. _ (2008), 128 S. Ct. 1346 (25 March 2008) (5-4 per curiam 
decision). One of the dissenters, Justice Breyer, pointed out that the execution should have been 
stayed, among others because of the ICJ Order; because ‘legislation has been introduced in 
Congress seeking to provide the legislative approval necessary to transform our international 
legal obligations into binding domestic law. See Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H. R. 
6481, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. (2008) (referred to committee, July 14, 2008)’; because ‘prior to 
Medellín, Congress may not have understood the legal need for further legislation of this kind. 
That fact, along with the approaching election, means that more than a few days or weeks are 
likely necessary for Congress to determine whether to enact the proposed Legislation’ and 
because ‘to permit this execution to proceed forthwith places the United States irremediably in 
violation of international law and breaks our treaty promises’. He also pointed out that ‘different 
Members of this Court seem to have very different views of what this case is about. In my view, 
the issue in this suit – what the majority describe as the “beginning premise” – is not whether a 
confession was unlawfully obtained from petitioner’(..). ‘Rather, the question before us is 
whether the United States will carry out its international legal obligation to enforce the decision 
of the ICJ. That decision requires a further hearing to determine whether a conceded violation of 
the Vienna Convention (Texas’ failure to inform petitioner of his rights under the Vienna 
Convention) was or was not harmless’. Obviously, the fact that non-compliance with the Court’s 
judgment may be brought before the UN Security Council is simply one method of enforcement 
that cannot be used as an excuse for domestic courts not to implement international law 
obligations, especially those obligations that should indeed be regarded as self-executing for the 
reasons provided in the dissent by Breyer, in a domestic system in which treaties are in any case 
considered the supreme law of the land. See further on this case the contributions of the Medellín 
symposium (Suffolk Transnational Law Review 2008) such as the pertinent remarks by Paust, pp. 
303-333 on the supremacy clause, self-execution and, in particular the role of the UN Security 
Council.  
587  ICJ Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Judgment 
on the merits of 27 June 1986, §§286-291. See also Reichler (2001). See on Nicaragua’s attempt 
to renew its request for provisional measures Rosenne (2005), pp. 170-172. 
588  ICJ Burkina Faso v. Mali, Judgment of 22 December 1986, §§177-178. 
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‘should be immediately and effectively implemented’.589 In this light its response in its judgment 
on the merits to Serbia’s non-compliance with its provisional measures was rather weak (2007).590  
In its judgment in Congo v. Uganda (2005) it dealt with the issue of non-compliance, but 
only on request by the applicant State. It concluded that Uganda had not complied with its Order 
of July 2000. Congo had requested the Court to declare so, but it had not submitted specific 
evidence in this regard. Yet the Court pointed out that it had just found Uganda responsible for 
acts of killing, torture and other forms of inhuman treatment in violation of international human 
rights and humanitarian law carried out by its military forces against Congolese civilians.591 
Specifically it found violations of the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment in international and African human rights treaties.592 These violations had been 
continued after the Court’s Order for provisional measures.593 The ICJ added that it had in fact 
addressed its provisional measures to both Parties and that its finding on the non-compliance by 
Uganda did not mean that the Congo ‘did not also fail to comply’ with its measures.594  
In a separate opinion Judge Kooijmans considered that the Court should have dismissed 
Congo’s submission on Uganda’s non-compliance, as it had not met the burden of proof. He 
noted that the formulation chosen by the Court seemed ‘to indicate an awareness’ that neither 
Uganda nor the Congo had respected the provisional measures. He considered that it would have 
been ‘judicially sound’ not to have found that Uganda had not complied with its Order on 
provisional measures, although he had ‘no doubt whatsoever that Uganda breached its obligations 
under the Order’. Yet the evidentiary requirements and the purpose of provisional measures to 
protect the ‘legal interests of either party’ caused him to regret the ICJ’s finding that one of the 
Parties had violated the Order for provisional measures.595  
The claims brought by the Congo related to acts that took place after the provisional 
measures were ordered while the counter-claims by Uganda, to the extent they were accepted by 
the Court, did not, making it more difficult for the Court to comment on violations of the 
provisional measures by Congo. The ICJ may have considered that its freedom to deal with 
information not based on the applications of the Parties is more limited at the stage of the merits 
                                                 
589  ICJ Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Order of 13 September 1993 
(second request), §53. See further Toufayan (2005), Gaffikin (1995) and Wiebalck (1995). See 
also Wellens (1998), p. 424 (“This conclusion not only reinforces the view of the Court as to the 
effects to be given to any order indicating provisional measures, but it also exemplifies sound 
judicial reasoning, keeping the balance between the awareness of the limits of the Court’s power 
over effective implementation and the need to closely reassess all the circumstances since the 
making of the previous order”). 
590  Of course this also related to the fact that it did not find Serbia responsible for complicity, but 
only for failure to prevent. In this context it referred to the failure to observe its provisional 
measures as an element in establishing the State’s responsibility for failure to prevent. Yet it 
appeared to attach no other consequences to the State’s failure to observe its provisional 
measures.  
591  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, §345. 
592  Articles 6 (1) and 7 ICCPR; Articles 4 and 5 ACHPR; Article 38 (2) and (3) Convention on the 
Rights of the Child and Articles 1, 2, 3 (3), (4), (5) and (6) of its Optional Protocol on child 
soldiers. See ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 
19 December 2005, §219. 
593  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, §264.  
594  Id., §265. 
595  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, Separate Opinion of Judge Kooijmans §§74-78. 
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than at the stage of provisional measures. Nevertheless, this may not be the case in the context of 
following up on its own Orders for provisional measures. The Court itself appears to be the most 
appropriate body to monitor compliance with its provisional measures. Proprio motu examination 
of publicly available materials is in fact warranted in this context even if the Parties fail in 
bringing such materials to the Court’s attention. In addition, international organisations could take 
a more active approach, assisting the Court in its function of monitoring compliance with its 
provisional measures by invoking the possibility of Article 69(2) Rules of Court. This Article 
stipulates: 
“When a public international organization sees fit to furnish, on its own initiative, information 
relevant to a case before the Court, it shall do so in the form of a Memorial to be filed in the 
Registry before the closure of the written proceedings. The Court shall retain the right to require 
such information to be supplemented, either orally or in writing, in the form of answers to any 
questions which it may see fit to formulate, and also to authorize the parties to comment, either 
orally or in writing, on the information thus furnished”. 
Moreover, in certain cases the Court could implicitly invite such organisations to provide 
pertinent information by notifying them of relevant pending cases.596  
Ad hoc judge Kateka attached a dissenting opinion to the Court’s judgment. He invoked the 
‘clean hands’ theory and considered that the Court’s finding of Uganda’s non-compliance showed 
a ‘lack of concern’ for the actions taken by the Congo to raise this issue against Uganda when it 
itself had committed grave violations of human rights and international humanitarian law.597  
Yet when discussing the protection of human beings even-handedness should not play the 
role suggested by Kateka. Otherwise the actor suffering the consequences of this approach would 
be the individual, who in the present constellation can only be represented by his State. Rightly, 
the Court was not swayed by the ‘clean hands’ argument, which would have left the individual 
without any form of legal protection just because his State did not have clean hands. 
Indeed, if a ‘clean hands’ theory would have a role to play, the Court could easily address it 
in its phrasing of provisional measures, as it did in this case by ordering both Parties to take the 
necessary measures to ensure full respect for fundamental human rights and the applicable 
provisions of humanitarian law. Moreover, the subsequent expression by the Court in its 
Judgment of an awareness that both Parties may have failed to comply with its Order seems 
sufficient to deal with any disingenuousness on the part of the Congo.  
While the ICJ did point out that its Orders on provisional measures under Article 41 had 
binding effect598 and that they ‘created legal obligations which both Parties were required to 
comply with’, it simply found,599 that Uganda did not comply with its Order of 2000. It did not 
attach any specific consequences to this finding.600 As noted, in its judgment in the Genocide 
Convention case (2007) took a similar approach.601 In any future cases of non-compliance it is to 
be hoped that the Court will take an approach that is gradually more robust. 
                                                 
596  See Article 43(2) of the Rules of Court, as amended 29 September 2005. The international 
organisations referred to in Article 69 are organisations of States. 
597  ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 
December 2005, Dissenting Opinion of Judge Kateka, §61. 
598  Referring to LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §109. 
599  It did so by 15 votes to 2 (Judge Kooijmans and Judge ad hoc Kateka dissenting). 
600  Its finding on the obligation to make reparation for the injury caused was made before its finding 
on non-compliance with its provisional measures. 
601  CJ ICJ Application of the Convention on the prevention and punishment of the crime of genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), 26 February 2007. More 
 Chapter I 
98 
8 CONCLUSION 
As Judge Higgins wrote in 1997, ‘the evolving jurisprudence on provisional measures shows a 
growing tendency to recognize the human realities behind disputes of states’.602 Generally speak-
ing the rationale behind the use of provisional measures is to ensure a meaningful outcome of a 
case brought before a court or other adjudicator. More specifically, the traditional purposes of 
provisional measures as used by the ICJ are twofold. The first is the preservation of rights, the 
breach of which is both imminent (or already taking place) and likely to cause irreparable harm to 
the rights claimed. The second, applied only incidentally, is the preservation of proper legal pro-
ceedings. In other words, in the first case there should be a link between the right and remedy 
claimed and the provisional measure and in the second case there should be a link between the 
provisional measure and the purpose of having a fair and accurate procedure.603  
On the other hand the ICJ has occasionally used provisional measures for reasons not neces-
sarily closely related to the rights claimed or to the proceedings. It has taken provisional measures 
in border conflict cases, not only to maintain the status quo in relation to the claim, but also to 
prevent irreparable harm to civilians living in the border area. Their rights were not the (main) 
subject of a State’s request for provisional measures against another State but ‘collateral’ to the 
dispute.604 This would indicate that the ICJ, as an adjudicator not primarily dealing with human 
rights, has developed a certain sensitivity towards the plight of human beings caught up in con-
flicts between States. In any case it shows that in the practice of the ICJ the traditional twofold 
distinction may have been extended to a threefold distinction: to prevent irreparable harm to the 
claim, to the procedure or to individuals not central to the dispute. 
Cançado Trindade has noted that human rights treaties have set limits to State voluntarism, 
creating a ‘new vision of the relations between public power and the human being, which is 
summed up, ultimately, in the recognition that the State exists for the human being, and not vice-
versa’.605 
As Crocket already pointed out in 1977, referring to the Court’s general power to order pro-
visional measures, jurisdiction to do so ‘would appear to be more closely related to the inherent 
power of an international tribunal to determine its own jurisdiction than to the doctrine that juris-
diction is conferred through the consent of the parties’.606 
The ICJ is not a human rights court. It does not even deal with individual complaints. Yet in 
spite of the limitations it is faced with as an adjudicator dealing only with inter-State complaints, 
it does seem to realise the importance of the protection of groups and individuals. Moreover, for 
conceptual reasons its use of provisional measures is relevant to the practice of the human rights 
adjudicators. It may be, for instance, that the unequivocal confirmation of the binding nature of its 
provisional measures in LaGrand will contribute to better compliance by States, not just of its 
own provisional measures,607 but also in the context of provisional measures by other interna-
tional adjudicators. After all the ICJ referred to the inherent function of adjudicators to order 
preservation of the status quo pending the proceedings, invoking the general principle that States 
must not allow any step to be taken that might aggravate the dispute.  
                                                                                                                       
generally on this case, see e.g. Amerasinghe (2008); Ben-Naftali/Sharon (2008); 
Goldstone/Hamilton (2008); Dupuy (2007); Sivakumaran (2007); Sorel (2007) and Weckel 
(2007). 
602  Higgins (1997), p. 108. 
603  This includes hearing both parties on the basis of equality of arms and preserving the evidence. 
604  Higgins (1997), pp. 101-102 and pp. 107-108. 
605  IACHR Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment on reparations of 22 January 1999, Separate Opinion 
Judge Cançado Trindade, §33. 
606  Crocket (1977), p. 379. 
607  Indeed, the US respected the subsequent provisional measures in Avena. 
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The ICJ’s finding in LaGrand that its provisional measures are legally binding is not made 
dependent on the fact that basic rights of the human person were involved, but is simply part of its 
traditional function. The power to indicate binding provisional measures is required by the object 
and purpose of Article 41 ICJ Statute and ‘based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for 
it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final 
judgment of the Court’.608  
At the same time some of the conflicts between States in which the ICJ orders provisional 
measures may indeed concern the rights of individuals and the (human rights) obligations of 
States towards them.609 This only underscores the importance of the inherent powers of adjudica-
tors in this respect. In such cases its provisional measures may either aim to halt measures that 
could result in irreparable harm to a large group of people (armed activities, nuclear tests, etc), or 
aim at the (diplomatic) protection of specific individuals (halt execution of a death sentence; 
release persons held hostage).  
Various aspects of the Court’s orders for provisional measures specifically show its recep-
tiveness to the fate of human beings. In the Chorzów factory (1927) case, concerning a request to 
grant a pecuniary claim at the provisional measures stage, rather than to secure rights basic to the 
human being, the PCIJ was strict and refused to order provisional measures. It considered that the 
request coincided with the claim on the merits and was in fact a request for an interim judgment. 
On the other hand, without breaking with Chorzów factory, the ICJ did take provisional measures 
in the Nuclear Test cases (1973).610 While it did not explain the difference, it is likely, especially 
in light of subsequent cases, that it took into account the enormity of the possible consequences to 
the environment and population of the Applicant States. In the Hostages case (1979) it again 
ordered provisional measures overlapping to a great extent with the main claim. What distin-
guishes these cases from the Chorzów factory case is that they involved the fate of human beings.  
The ICJ equally has relaxed the strict requirement that the Applicant State should not only 
specify the rights invoked in the context of the request for provisional measures, but that these 
should also be related to the main claim. This involves cases, for instance, of armed conflict in 
which the States may not necessarily be as interested in the fate of the people living in the dis-
puted areas as the Court itself. It is particularly relevant in border conflict cases in which the 
Court has added references to so-called ‘collateral’ claims, involving ‘collateral damage’ to peo-
ple. It may even be argued that the Court could introduce proprio motu a reference to the obliga-
tions of States vis-à-vis these people, based on the merest opening in this respect in one of the 
submissions of one of the Parties.611 
In some cases, at the stage of provisional measures, the Court was yet to determine on the 
merits whether a certain act or omission by a State would indeed constitute a violation of the 
rights invoked by the other State (e.g. the Nuclear Test cases). In other cases it was clear that 
certain acts or omissions constituted a violation of the rights invoked, but the dispute related to 
evidence and/or imputability (e.g. Hostages case and DRC v. Uganda). 
The ICJ has also taken into account the basic rights of the individual in its attitude towards 
procedural requirements. In a particularly urgent case it has used provisional measures in advance 
of a hearing on the use of provisional measures: in an Order to halt the imminent execution of an 
individual it was prepared to ‘reward’ the State involved for submitting the claim and request for 
provisional measures strategically late, as the individual facing execution could hardly be pun-
ished for his State being procedurally remiss. Had the claim only involved pecuniary interests, 
rather than the life of an individual, such decision would have been unlikely. 
                                                 
608  ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §102. 
609  See generally e.g. Sohn (1982). 
610  Only two of the judges considered this approach incorrect, as rewarding an attempt to obtain an 
‘interim judgement’. 
611  For a different approach see Yoshiyuki Iwamoto (2002). 
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In some cases States may invoke human rights treaties. Even if they act on the basis of dip-
lomatic protection rather than erga omnes obligations they in fact ask the ICJ to interpret State 
obligations under human rights treaties and, therefore, to take into account the rights of the indi-
viduals concerned. In such cases the assessment of the risk involved and the role of the beneficiar-
ies may differ from the approach normally taken by the ICJ in its use of provisional measures and 
approximate more closely the provisional measures taken by human rights adjudicators.612 At the 
same time, as noted, States may sometimes be involved in legal disputes that have developed into 
military conflict, with their citizens caught in the middle. If the States involved bring the case 
before the Court and request provisional measures, not particularly invoking the rights of the 
individuals, the ICJ nevertheless takes into account the basic rights of the individual. As a result 
the provisional measures ordered may differ from those requested. In general the Court seems to 
be more resourceful in drafting Orders for provisional measures different from those requested 
when the case involves the fate of human beings: it refers to the obligations of both Parties and it 
adds the obligation not to aggravate the dispute, referring to its task in the maintenance of peace 
and security. 
The more recent decisions to take provisional measures in the consular protection/death 
penalty cases, on the one hand, and on mass human rights violations, on the other, are a confirma-
tion of the progressive developments described by Higgins.613 In this sense they constitute exam-
ples of the humanization of international law observed by various authors.614 
Already in 1960, in Honduras v. Nicaragua, the ICJ noted that the reference to ‘judicial de-
cisions’ in Art 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute is not limited to ICJ case law alone. At the time the 
ECtHR was barely in existence and the other international adjudicators were not even established 
yet.615 The subsequent Chapters deal with the judicial decisions by the human rights adjudicators 
in urgent cases since 1960. International human rights law may considerably enhance public 
international law in general and the ICJ extensively referred to it in its Advisory Opinion on the 
Wall in the occupied Palestinian territory (2004). It considered the text and object and purpose of 
human rights treaties, referred to the ‘constant practice’ of the supervisory bodies to these treaties, 
invoking their authoritative case law, General Comments and Concluding Observations.616 
                                                 
612  The most interesting source for comparison would be the practice of the human rights 
adjudicators of using provisional measures in inter-State proceedings, but there is not much 
practice in this regard. Only the ECtHR has had to deal with requests for provisional measures in 
inter-State proceedings. 
613  Higgins (1997). For discussion of subsequent developments see e.g. Rieter (1998); Addo (1999); 
Feria Tinta (2001); Rieter (2002); Schabas (2002b); Orakhelashvili (2002); Shelton (2004a); 
Ghandhi (2004); Milano (2005); Dugard (2007); Higgins (2007); Pronto (2007); Bedi (2007). For 
an approach considering the Court’s new reasoning ‘artificial’ see Jennings (2002) and 
Yoshiyuko Iwamoto (2002).  
614  See e.g. Buergenthal/Sohn (1973); Van Boven (1982); Simma (1993); Buergenthal (1997); 
Higgins (1998); Meron (2000); Flinterman (2000); Kamminga (2001); Seiderman (2001); 
Cançado Trindade (2004); Meron (2006). 
615  ICJ Arbitration Judgment of the King of Spain of 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 18 
November 1960, pp. 204-217. See also the Separate Opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade in the 
judgment on preliminary objections in IACHR Constantine et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 1 
September 2001, §34. 
616  ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, 9 July 2004, §§107-114 and 136. 
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Cançado Trindade has pointed out that human rights law enables the law of treaties to 
evolve and to regulate legal relations between and within States and that by affirming contempo-
rary legal principles human rights law in fact enriches and legitimises general international law.617 
Indeed, the practice of the ICJ indicates, albeit tentatively, that adjudicators not exclusively 
dealing with human rights may develop sensitivity for the plight of human beings caught up in 
conflicts between States, with its consequential effects on the concept of provisional measures.618 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
617  IACHR Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment on reparations of 22 January 1999, Separate Opinion 
Judge Cançado Trindade §§27-28. He also considered that the emphasis on positivism and on 
States as the main subjects of international law is simply a product of the time, rather than 
‘eternal and immutable truths’. In fact, given the growing importance of human rights, the 
‘almost mechanical application’ of so-called truths, such as the autonomous will of the State, has 
become inappropriate. IACHR Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment on reparations of 22 January 1999, 
Separate Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §§28-29. 
618  As a Judge at the ICJ Cançado Trindade subsequently observed that ‘we are living the infancy’ of 
the ICJ’s jurisprudential development relating to provisional measures. He noted that the Court 
had not yet pronounced on the autonomy of its Orders for provisional measures, nor on the legal 
consequences of non-compliance, nor on issues of state responsibility in this respect. Questions 
relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 28 May 2009, 
dissenting opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §97. 
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 CHAPTER II 
THE USE OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN THE CON-
TEXT OF THE  VARIOUS  HUMAN  RIGHTS SYSTEMS 
 
 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This Chapter introduces the human rights adjudicators referred to in this book: the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC), the Committee against Torture (CAT), the Inter-American Commission 
(CIDH)1 and Court of Human Rights (IACHR), the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights (ACHPR), the European Commission and Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the Bos-
nia Human Rights Chamber. The other two UN Committees, the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination (CERD) and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) are only mentioned briefly, lacking extensive practice with regard to the use 
of provisional measures. The same applies for the recently established African Court of Human 
and Peoples’ Rights.  
The Chapter sets out the rules on provisional measures in the context of the respective indi-
vidual complaint systems. For each system it briefly sums up the situations in which provisional 
measures have been used, their context (institutional setting and the right of individual com-
plaint), the power of the adjudicator to use provisional measures and the promptness with which it 
uses them and, finally, the sources about provisional measures used for this book (under the head-
ing ‘transparency or the lack thereof’).2  
The Chapter concludes with a brief discussion of the authority to use provisional measures, 
the importance of motivating them and the general issue of convergence and divergence.3 As to 
the latter, the overview presented in this Chapter serves to highlight commonalities as well as 
differences between the systems. This contextual information may help explain why the respec-
tive practices of the adjudicators, discussed in the subsequent chapters, converge or diverge.  
2 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE  
2.1 Introduction 
The HRC, supervising compliance with the ICCPR, has mostly used provisional measures to halt 
execution of the death penalty. In addition it has used provisional measures to inquire about the 
health situation of detainees, to halt expulsions and corporal punishment, to find a missing person 
and to ensure access to counsel. Moreover, it has used them in cases involving indigenous culture 
(e.g. when a company is allowed to log trees in a traditional grazing area), in a family life case, in 
                                                 
1 The Spanish acronym CIDH is used: Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, so as to 
distinguish it from IACHR. In this book IACHR stands for Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights. 
2 Because of variations in the availability of information the discussion on procedure and 
promptness is more extensive with regard to some systems than with regard to others. 
3 The subsequent Chapters more extensively discuss the practice of the adjudicators. While this 
Chapter, for instance, deals with the competence of the various adjudicators to use provisional 
measures, Chapter XIV deals with the relevance of jurisdiction on the merits for the use of provi-
sional measures and Chapter XVI deals with the legal status of these measures. 
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a case involving death threats and in a freedom of expression case (to halt the destruction of a 
painting). 
This section discusses the institutional setting of the provisional measures as used by the 
HRC and the right of individual petition, the power to order provisional measures, the promptness 
of the adjudicator in deciding on the use of provisional measures and the availability of informa-
tion on the use of these measures. 
2.2 The right of individual complaint: the HRC and the OP to the ICCPR  
The ICCPR entered into force in 1976 and has 160 States parties.4 The HRC, consisting of 18 
independent experts, supervises to what extent the States parties respect the ICCPR. The first 
Optional Protocol (OP) to the ICCPR lays down the right of individual complaint. It does not 
explicitly refer to the power to take provisional measures, but in 1977 the HRC included this 
possibility in its Rules of Procedure.5  
In order to clarify the Committee’s use of provisional measures it is sometimes helpful to 
consult not just its case law on the merits and inadmissibility, but also other sources of informa-
tion on its interpretation of rights. The Committee’s activities under the reporting procedure are 
one of three sources of information on its interpretation of rights. As part of the reporting proce-
dure (under Article 40 ICCPR) States parties must periodically send in reports explaining how 
their legislation and practice answer to the obligations they assumed under the treaty. In a discus-
sion that takes place in public a delegation of the State answers questions posed by Committee 
members. The HRC then publishes its official comments on the State report as Concluding Ob-
servations.6 The second source of information is the publication by the HRC of General Com-
ments on specific rights or issues.7 In order to clarify the concept of provisional measures the 
third source of information is obviously the most important: the decisions of the HRC on individ-
ual complaints. 
Bringing a case (an individual complaint) before the Committee is only possible if the State 
against which the complaint is directed has pre-committed itself to the individual complaint pro-
cedure under the first Optional Protocol (OP) to the ICCPR. Under this Protocol, 110 States have 
recognised the right of persons under their jurisdiction to submit individual complaints to the 
Committee.8  
                                                 
4 Treaty concluded in 1966, entered into force 1976, 160 States Parties according to the data provi-
ded by the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (last updated 20 July 2007): 
<http://untreaty.un.org> (accessed 29 November 2007). 
5 It did so as Rule 86. In August 2004 its Rules of Procedure were renumbered. Now Rule 92 is the 
Rule on provisional measures. Still, most of the quotes are from cases published prior to that date 
and they refer to Rule 86.This list provides an overview of the most relevant Rules: 
 Provisional measures     Rule 86 (old) ÆRule 92 (new) 
 Transmission to State/request for information   Rule 91 (old) ÆRule 97 (new) 
 Designation of Special Rapporteurs   Rule 89 (old) ÆRule 95 (new) 
 Confidentiality     Rule 96 (old) ÆRule 102 (new) 
6 Where relevant this book also refers to these Concluding Observations. See generally Boerefijn 
(1999a). 
7 Where relevant reference is made to these General Comments throughout this book. 
8 Treaty concluded in 1966, entered into force 1976, 110 States Parties according to the data 
provided by the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights (last updated 11 October 2007): 
<http://untreaty.un.org> (accessed 29 November 2007). On exhaustion see Article 5 OP. As 
Harrington puts it, States have granted the right of individual petition to over a billion people in 
the world, Harrington (2003), p. 64. 
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The petitioners must claim to be a victim of a provision of the ICCPR. Individuals claiming 
such a violation before the HRC can do this only after they have exhausted domestic remedies. In 
other words, they must first try and get redress before the courts of the State against which they 
are bringing a claim. This way, this State has the opportunity to resolve and remedy the situation 
before it ends up at the international level. Only when they have exhausted domestic remedies or 
when no effective remedies are available, victims of human rights violations may resort to the 
Committee to find redress.9 Victims initiate such a complaint by writing a letter to the Commit-
tee's Secretariat in Geneva. When the letter contains insufficient information, the Secretariat 
specifies to the petitioner (usually called ‘author’ and sometimes ‘applicant’) the additional in-
formation necessary for the registration of the complaint.10 Petitioners do not need to travel to 
Geneva as the procedure is conducted entirely in writing. Both the petitioner and the respondent 
State have the opportunity to respond to each other's submissions. It is an adversary procedure 
based on equality of arms. The parties must comply with certain procedural requirements. The 
Committee has denied many claims as prima facie unsubstantiated. It has denied other claims 
because the alleged facts occurred before the ICCPR entered into force for the State in question. It 
also declares a complaint inadmissible if it is not based on any provision of the Covenant or is 
even contrary to the Covenant or if it includes insulting language to the State concerned. 
For many individuals the Committee is the first (quasi-) judicial body dealing with their 
complaint about violations of Covenant provisions, because these were never properly addressed 
before domestic courts. In other cases domestic courts may have been uncertain about the proper 
interpretation of certain provisions. In such situations the Committee can provide the necessary 
clarifications.  
The State parties against which complaints have been lodged vary considerably. Examples 
are Canada, Argentina, the Netherlands, Zambia, and Georgia. The subject matter varies as well. 
The Committee has ruled about issues ranging from disappearances to the right to equality. Many 
cases have dealt with the right to a fair trial or detention issues. The first cases under the OP, in 
the late 1970s and early 1980s, were almost all directed against Uruguay.11 
2.3 The power and promptness of the HRC to take provisional measures 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the power to use provisional measures, the need to delegate this power, the 
promptness of the intervention with regard to certain issue areas, possible explanations for 
tardiness, the manner in which the Addressee State is contacted, other relevant Rules of Procedure 
and the possibility to take provisional measures proprio motu. 
                                                 
9 More generally on ICCPR law and the proceedings under the OP see e.g. Barkhuysen/Van 
Emmerik/Rieter (2008); Nowak (2005); Joseph/Schultz/Castan (2004); Vandenhole (2004); 
Conte/Davidson/Burchill (2004); Carlson/Gisvold (2003); Bayefsky (2002); Young (2002); 
Bayefsky (2001); De Zayas (2001); pp. 67-121; Scheinin (2001), pp. 129-145; Bayefsky (2000); 
Evatt (1998), pp. 86-115; Ghandhi (1998); Schmidt (1998), pp. 13-18; O’-Flaherty (1996); 
McGoldrick (1994); Zwart (1994); and Schmidt (1992), pp. 645-659.  
10 This book uses the term petitioner. 
11 Other Latin American countries such as Argentina, Chile or Paraguay ratified the OP much later, 
namely in 1986, 1992 and 1995 respectively. 
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2.3.2 The power of the HRC to use provisional measures 
While the text of the OP itself does not include a reference to the use of provisional measures, the 
HRC has developed a practice of using them. Under Article 39(2) ICCPR the HRC shall establish 
its own rules of procedure. In March 1977 the HRC discussed these, including the introduction of 
a rule on provisional measures.12 The issue that came up most often was the question whether the 
HRC had indeed the power to take provisional measures and, if so, whether it could delegate this 
power to subsidiary organs.13 It drafted the following Rule, then Rule 86, now Rule 92:  
“The Committee may, prior to forwarding its Views on the communication to the State party 
concerned, inform that State of its Views as to whether interim measures may be desirable to 
avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation. In doing so, the Committee shall 
inform the State party concerned that such expression of its Views on interim measures does not 
imply a determination on the merits of the communication”. 
2.3.3 Promptness and delegation 
The Committee is only in session three times a year. In 1977, during the drafting process of the 
Rule on provisional measures, Committee member Espersen (Denmark) already referred to the 
delays involved in the Committee’s procedures and mentioned the issue of the death penalty as an 
example. He emphasised the need to avoid irreparable harm to the petitioner. These delays ‘made 
it quite possible that the execution of a sentence by a State, especially the execution of the death 
penalty, would make the whole case obsolete’. The Rule should be such that ‘the Committee or a 
subsidiary group should be able to reach a quick decision on interim measures’.14 Several mem-
bers of the HRC indeed considered that there should be an arrangement to deal with provisional 
measures in between sessions.15 Cold War politics, however, initially prevented the inclusion of a 
rule allowing delegation of the competence to take provisional measures to a Rapporteur or 
Working Group.16 Nevertheless, the text of the Rule did not exclude the possibility of a subsidiary 
                                                 
12 In February and March 1977 the Secretary General had submitted ‘preliminary draft provisional 
rules of procedure’. These included the following rule on provisional measures: “The Committee, 
or the Group referred to under rule 88 below after consultation with the Chairman of the 
Committee, may at any time request the State party concerned to take interim measures in order 
to avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation. In doing so, the Committee or 
the Group shall inform the State concerned that such a request does not imply a determination as 
to the admissibility or the substantive validity of the communication”. Preliminary draft 
provisional rules of procedure submitted by the Secretary-General, CCPR/C/L.2 and Add. 1 and 
2, 28 February, 2 and 4 March 1977; draft Rule 86 was initially issued in CCPR/C/L.2/Add. 2 on 
4 March 1977. See Yearbook of the Human Rights Committee 1977-1978, Vol. II, 1986. It was 
partly inspired by the Rules of Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination. During its thirteenth and seventeenth meeting, chaired by Mavrommatis 
(Cyprus), the members of the Committee discussed this proposal. 
13 Summary records of the meetings of the first session, thirteenth meeting, 29 March 1977 and 
seventeenth meeting, 31 March 1977, Yearbook of the HRC 1977-1978, Vol. I, CCPR/1 pp. 44-
46 and 54. 
14 Ibidem. 
15 See Sir Vincent Evans (UK); Uribe Vargas (Colombia); Prado Vallejo (Ecuador); Espersen 
(Denmark); Opsahl (Norway) and Tomuschat (Federal Republic of Germany). 
16 Several members, predominantly of Eastern European States, did not want to delegate the power 
to use provisional measures: Graefrath (former German Democratic Republic); Koulishev 
(Bulgaria); Movchan (USSR). See summary records of the meetings of the first session, 13th 
meeting, 29 March 1977 and 17th meeting, 31 March 1977, Yearbook of the HRC 1977-1978, 
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body contacting the State on urgent matters. The summary records indicate that the Committee 
preferred to leave open this question for the time being.17 
In response to the increasing number of petitions by persons on death row the HRC finally 
introduced a Special Rapporteur in 1987. This Rapporteur could then take provisional measures 
(at least those involving death penalty cases) in between sessions.18 After all, execution dates are 
not centred on HRC sessions. 
Thus, after about ten years the HRC finally determined the unfinished discussion about the 
delegation of the power to issue provisional measures. As Tomuschat puts it: 
“The death row cases made it abundantly clear that the original line of construing the Protocol, 
which led to the deletion, in Rule 86, of any reference to subsidiary bodies of the Committee, 
                                                                                                                       
Vol. I, CCPR/1, pp. 44-46 and 54. Ganji (Iran) considered that any group the HRC would 
establish would keep it informed of any views communicated to States. If the full Committee 
disagreed with those views, it could always adopt its own position. “Such instances were likely to 
be rare, however, since rule 86 provided that views on interim measures should be formulated 
after consultation with the Chairman of the Committee. It might be useful, nevertheless, to add a 
sentence in rule 86 stipulating that the views communicated to States concerning interim 
measures should be brought to the attention of the Committee at its first meeting after the 
transmission of the views in question”. Note that the eventual formulation does not refer to 
consultation with the Chairman.  
17 The Annual Report 1977 to the General Assembly, describing the adoption of the Rules of 
Procedure at the Committee’s first session, presents the rule on provisional measures as providing 
that only the Committee but not a subsidiary body may inform a State party of its views whether 
such measures may be desirable. A/32/44, §56. The next Annual Report to the General Assembly 
refers to a decision the HRC did take to improve promptness in deciding on urgent cases. It notes 
that it ‘was suggested’ that the Committee’s application of Rule 86 ‘should not be subject to the 
prior inclusion of the communications in the lists of communications’. These lists were prepared 
by the Secretariat for the Committee’s convenience. The persons who suggested this were 
considering the urgency factor and wished to avoid the hurdle of this formal procedure: ‘(t)hus 
the Committee would be in a position to apply rule 86 at an early stage in urgent cases’ A/32/44, 
§175. While the Report does not explain whether all members agreed with this suggestion, it did 
not refer to any disagreement either. This could be interpreted as an acknowledgment of the 
possibility to use provisional measures at least prior to the admissibility declaration. See Chapter 
III on the relevance of admissibility and jurisdiction on the merits. 
18 A/43/40, 28 September 1988, §656, in: Official Records of the Human Rights Committee 1987-
1988, Vol. II, CCPR/7/Add. 1. The first 31 sessions the HRC used provisional measures only 
during sessions. It did so more than 20 times. Its speed ranged from twelve days to almost six 
months. The first time the HRC used provisional measures was on 21 July 1986, on behalf of Earl 
Pratt, 210/1986. This was the only time it did so that year. For budgetary reasons there was no 
proper meeting in the fall of 1986. This may account for the fact that the second time the HRC 
took provisional measures to halt an execution was seven months later. On the other hand, the 
Working Group of the HRC did convene between 8 and 10 December 1986 in order to deal with 
‘urgent cases’. Apparently this did not result in the use of provisional measures. It was in 1987 
that it was suddenly faced with many death penalty complaints. Seven months after its first 
provisional measure on this issue it used a provisional measure again, this time on behalf of Ivan 
Morgan, 225/1987, 24 March 1987. That same year it used twenty other such provisional 
measures. Lloyd Reece v. Jamaica (247/1987), (disc. 1993); Reid v. Jamaica, 20 July 1990; A.A. 
v. Jamaica, 30 October 1989; Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991; W.W. v. Jamaica, 26 October 
1990; Carlton Linton v. Jamaica 22 October 1992; Michael and Desmond McLean v. Jamaica, 
11 April 1991 and Campbell v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992. On 12 November alone it used 
provisional measures in eight different cases, all in order to halt an execution. On this day it 
decided to appoint one of its members as a Special Rapporteur on Death Penalty Cases. 
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was incompatible with the object and purpose of Rule 86 to enable the Committee swiftly and 
effectively to address any situation where irreparable harm is looming”.19 
Possibly to satisfy those members of the Committee who were wary of delegating this power to a 
Rapporteur, the HRC decided to appoint Mr. Mavrommatis (Cyprus), known for his diplomatic 
approach, to this post. He was not very active in his use of provisional measures.20 In fact, the 
pre-session Working Group took most of the provisional measures.21 It is not clear why he did not 
take provisional measures more often, since it was in fact his task to deal with the urgent cases 
when the HRC was not in session.  
As of spring 1989 the Committee replaced the Special Rapporteur on Death Penalty cases 
with a Special Rapporteur on New Communications in order to deal with its increasing caseload. 
Her task was not only to deal with urgent cases in between sessions but also to authorize registra-
tion of all new cases and transmit them to States.22  
2.3.4 Explaining promptness and tardiness 
2.3.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
To examine the Committee’s promptness in taking provisional measures the first provisional 
measure decision in a given case, in relation to the date of initial submission, was taken as a point 
                                                 
19 Tomuschat (1995), p. 628. 
20 Presumably Mavrommatis started in his new function at the end of the Committee’s session, in 
December 1987. Only five cases are known in which he used provisional measures. In two of 
these, almost three months passed before he used them but in one case he took provisional 
measures within a day. Possibly the Secretariat sent telegrams on his behalf in other cases as 
well, but if this is the case the HRC failed to mention it in the final decision. 
21 This involved more than 20 cases. 
22 In its Annual Report 1989 the Committee does not yet mention the Special Rapporteur’s role with 
regard to provisional measures. A/44/40, §620 and Annex IX. While in another section the 
Report refers to the HRC’s requests not to carry out death sentences, it does not specify whether 
the full Committee, a Working Group, the old Special Rapporteur on Death Penalty Cases or the 
Special Rapporteur on New Communications decided on the provisional measures. In July 1991 
the Committee adopted revised terms of reference for the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on 
New Communications. This included (b) ‘to issue rule 86 requests, whether coupled with a 
request under rule 91 or not’ and (c) ‘to inform the Committee at each session on action taken 
under rules 86 and 91’. The Special Rapporteur now takes the decision to transmit a complaint to 
the State party and to request provisional measures. Annex X, Mandate of the Special Rapporteur 
on New Communications, revised terms of reference adopted at the 1087th meeting, 24 July 1991, 
A/46/40, 10 October 1991, in: Official Records of the Human Rights Committee 1990/1991, Vol. 
II, CCPR/10/Add. 1. In 1987 the HRC requested the State not to carry out the death sentence 
before it had had an opportunity to consider further the question of admissibility. As of spring 
1988 it used a different formulation, by requesting the State not to carry out the death sentence 
while it was considering the communication. This allowed for a longer duration of the provisional 
measure. This way the Committee would not need to renew the use of provisional measures after 
the case was declared admissible. Instead, it could just reiterate them in situations where a State 
seemed to move towards non-compliance. Even during sessions it is the Special Rapporteur on 
New Communications rather than the full Committee who decides on the use of provisional 
measures. Information obtained at the HRC Secretariat in Geneva, September 2003. 
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of reference.23 After 1993 the HRC saw an increase in the use of provisional measures.24 The 
actions of the subsequent Special Rapporteurs on New Communications have shown that, on 
occasion, it was possible to intervene within days. Yet it was only over time and with the intro-
duction of modern communication methods that a practice developed of prompt intervention.25 
Since the Rapporteurs became accustomed to the use of e-mail, the HRC often used provisional 
measures within a day26 or even on the same day,27 depending also on resources and alertness at 
the Secretariat.28  
                                                 
23 While it is possible that the petitioner initially did not request provisional measures, but did so at 
a later date, not mentioned in the View, in the large majority of cases he requests this as part of 
his initial communication. Of course in some of these cases the HRC repeats its provisional 
measures. It must be noted that the promptness of the provisional measure may often depend 
more on the situation at the Secretariat in Geneva than on the attitude of the Rapporteur. 
24 In 1998 the number of provisional measures decreased. This may be related to the withdrawal of 
Jamaica from the Optional Protocol. Jamaica withdrew on 23 October 1997. This became 
effective on 23 January 1998. On 22 January 1998 the Rapporteur still took provisional measures 
in HRC Howell v. Jamaica (2003). The last example of such a decision sent to Trinidad and 
Tobago dates from 15 January 1999. See Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 28 March 
1992. Trinidad and Tobago initially withdrew and re-entered with reservations on 26 May 1998. 
This would have become effective on 26 August 1998, but the HRC decided to declare 
admissible a complaint following that date. This decision, of 5 November 1999, related to a case 
submitted on 7 December 1998 and transmitted to the State with a provisional measure on 15 
January 1999 (see 845/1998). Trinidad and Tobago denounced the Optional Protocol once more 
on 27 June 2000 (now without re-entering). This became effective on 27 September 2000. Some 
cases submitted before that date may still be pending and, upon final determination, may disclose 
information about the use of provisional measures.  
25 Promptness only improved substantially as of 1995. The majority of provisional measures were 
then issued within days. 
26 See e.g. HRC Michael Robinson v. Jamaica, 29 March 2000, initial submission of 9 December 
1996, Rule 86/91 of 10 December 1996. In Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999, the Secretary to 
the Governor General of Jamaica even commented to counsel on the ‘commendable dispatch’ of 
the Committee’s request for a stay (letter by counsel of 20 November 1997). Counsel had 
submitted the request for provisional measures on 12 November 1997 and the Rapporteur 
transmitted the case under Rule 86/91 on 13 November 1997 (on file with the author).  
27 See e.g. HRC Mansaraj et al.; Gborie et al. and Sesay et al. v. Sierra Leone, 16 July 2001. Initial 
submission of 12 and 13 October 1998; Rule 86 equally on 12 and 13 October 1998; the 18 
petitioners had all been sentenced to death on 12 October 1998. There was no right of appeal. See 
section 5 on the State party’s attitude. 
28 Apart from the lack of resources at the Secretariat and the difficulty to obtain a response from the 
Rapporteur (initially because of more primitive means of communication) the lack of promptness 
in the use of provisional measures in the first years might also be explained by the decision of the 
Rapporteur only to intervene in the face of an actual execution date rather than upon receipt of 
the complaint. In the autumn of 1995 the HRC ‘declared that the competence of the Special 
Rapporteur to issue, and if necessary to withdraw, provisional measures would continue up until 
the moment the Working Group on Communications took up the question of admissibility. When 
the Committee was not in session that competence would be exercised by the Chairman until the 
Working Group on Communications considered the substance of the case, in consultation, where 
necessary, with the Special Rapporteur’, A/51/40, Vol. I, 1996, §381. It seems that in such cases 
the Chairman takes over the Rapporteur’s task, while the Rapporteur deals with similar new 
cases. Subsequently the HRC did not provide any information that would indicate changes in the 
practice of taking provisional measures as a result of this decision. Rapporteur Scheinin reports 
that there would be at most two days a year in which he could not check his e-mail. Moreover, 
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In a presentation before CAT, Special Rapporteur Scheinin gave some information about 
the practical procedure before the HRC: 
“Language problems, which could be very real, were resolved by the Secretariat; the Special 
Rapporteur needed to know only the essential elements of each case, which was set out for him 
by the Secretariat in a language at his command. A member of the Human Rights Committee 
could theoretically continue to serve as a special rapporteur for the duration of his term of 
office. In practice, the matter was reviewed every two years when the bureau of the Committee 
was convened, where upon, the Special Rapporteurs for New Communications and for Follow 
Up on Views were appointed”.29 
Scheinin noted that the Special Rapporteur of the HRC responsible for provisional measures 
intervenes at a much earlier stage than the pre-sessional working group reviewing draft decisions 
on admissibility. He intervened ‘at the moment when it became necessary to decide to register a 
communication, and it was generally then that a request addressed to the State party under rule 86 
might be appropriate’.30 
2.3.4.2 DEATH PENALTY CASES 
In some cases the HRC seems to have skipped several sessions before it used provisional meas-
ures. Any time it takes more than four months to use them it means not only that the Rapporteur 
did not deal with the case but also that the HRC itself skipped an earlier opportunity to deal with 
it.31 This may indicate the role of the Secretariat in suggesting cases for discussion. In any case, 
apart from exceptional circumstances, the Secretariat only approaches the Special Rapporteur and 
not the full Committee, even during sessions.32  
Tardiness of the full Committee or the Special Rapporteur in adopting provisional measures 
may relate to late receipt of information by the petitioner, to the question whether the Rapporteur 
can be reached quickly (e.g. through e-mail or by mobile phone) and to the question whether the 
Rapporteur reacts quickly.33 It may also relate to shifts within the Secretariat in Geneva or to 
holiday periods at the Secretariat.34 If the State only received the Note Verbale with the request 
for the provisional measures the day before the planned execution or on the day itself, this may 
also play some role in cases of non-compliance, at least to the extent that the State may use the 
late receipt as an excuse for having executed the petitioner in defiance of the Committee’s provi-
sional measures.35 Nevertheless, the HRC has determined that the State breaches its obligations 
                                                                                                                       
the Secretariat could also get hold of him through mobile phone. Interview with Martin Scheinin, 
Geneva, April 2003.  
29 CAT Summary Records, 27th session, 13 November 2001, CAT/C/SR.487, 10 March 2003, §19. 
30 Id., §17. 
31 See e.g. HRC A. H. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 October 1990 (more than eight months between 
submission and the use of provisional measures). 
32 Information obtained at the Secretariat in Geneva, September 2003.  
33 At least one Special Rapporteur preferred to receive the complete file rather than the case 
summaries before he would make decisions. This may have resulted in delay.  
34 An example of the latter is 732/1997. Measures were taken within 18 days, while most 
provisional measures used during the period Pocar was Rapporteur were taken within days. In 
this case, however, the Christmas holiday took place subsequent to the submission and previous 
to the provisional measure.  
35 See HRC Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002. Yet the main reason for 
disregarding the provisional measure in that case seems to be the fact that the deadline set by the 
JCPC was approaching, beyond which domestic law would forbid execution. In this case the 
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under the OP when it executes an alleged victim knowing that a case has been brought before the 
Committee, even if the Committee has not yet itself contacted the State with provisional meas-
ures.36  
In two Belarus cases the HRC was particularly tardy in requesting provisional measures. In 
fact it requested them only after the executions. In the one case it took provisional measures nine 
and a half months after the initial submission, while the execution had taken place at least three 
months earlier.37 In the other case the interval between initial submission and the provisional 
measure was eleven months. Seven months previously Belarus had executed the petitioner. The 
Committee referred to the lack of promptness in its use of provisional measures in the following, 
rather oblique, terms: 
“The Committee notes with regret that, by the time it was in a position to submit its Rule 86 
request, the death sentence had already been carried out. The Committee understands and will 
ensure that cases susceptible of being subject of Rule 86 requests will be processed with the 
expedition necessary to enable its requests to be complied with”.38 
It is not clear what caused the extreme tardiness, but unavailability of resources at the Secretariat, 
in particular in relation to complaints in languages other than English, French or Spanish, may 
have played a role.39 
2.3.4.3 DETENTION AND DISAPPEARANCE CASES 
The above discussion of prompt intervention involved death penalty cases. Obviously this 
promptness is also relevant in expulsion,40 detention and disappearance cases as well as in those 
                                                                                                                       
Secretariat handed the Rapporteur’s combined Rule 86/91 request to the Permanent Mission of 
Trinidad and Tobago in Geneva at 4.05 p.m. Geneva time on 13 July 1994. This was 10.05 a.m. 
Trinidad and Tobago time. According to the Permanent Mission this request was transmitted by 
facsimile to the Port-of-Spain authorities between 4.30 and 4.45 p.m. that day, Geneva time. In 
Trinidad and Tobago it was between 10.30 and 10.45 a.m. Mr. Ashby’s counsel continued the 
efforts to obtain a stay of execution throughout the night of 13 to 14 July 1994, both before the 
Court of Appeal in Trinidad and Tobago and before the JCPC in London. The JCPC issued an 
order to stay the execution shortly after 11.30 a.m. (London time) on 14 July. It appeared, 
however, that by that time Mr. Ashby had already been executed. It was 6.30 a.m. in Trinidad and 
Tobago when the JCPC issued its order. The Court of Appeal was also in session at the time of 
the execution, deliberating on whether it would order a stay of execution. 
36 See e.g. HRC Piandiong et al. v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000; Mansaraj et al. v. Sierra 
Leone, 16 July 2001 and Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002. See further 
Chapters XVI (Legal status) and XVII (Official responses). 
37 HRC Anton Bondarenko and Natalia Schedko (submitted by the latter on behalf of her deceased 
son and herself) v. Belarus, 3 April 2003. 
38 HRC Igor Lyashkovich and Mariya Staselovich (submitted by the latter on behalf of her deceased 
son and herself) v. Belarus, 3 April 2003 §1.3. See also Anton Bondarenko and Natalia Schedko 
(submitted by the latter on behalf of her deceased son and herself) v. Belarus, 3 April 2003, §1.3.  
39 About this case see also Chapter XVII (Official responses) and Chapter XVIII (Follow-up by the 
adjudicators). 
40 In one early case (1978), in which there was no Special Rapporteur yet, the HRC seized the 
earliest opportunity to take provisional measures to halt an expulsion. This was around a month 
after initial submission. HRC O.E. v. S., 25 January 1978. In this case the petitioner had 
submitted a complaint on behalf of his son on 30 December 1977. The HRC used provisional 
measures on 25 January 1978, meaning that it took action within a month. In some cases 
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involving indigenous culture. The discussion of prompt intervention and the use of provisional 
measures in detention cases relates to lack of medical treatment, whereabouts and access to coun-
sel. In this type of cases the HRC has also used so-called ‘informal’ provisional measures, re-
questing information on the treatment and whereabouts under the rule on the transmission of 
cases and requests for clarification, rather than formally under the Rule on provisional measures.41  
                                                                                                                       
involving alleged threats to life and security in the receiving State the HRC did not use 
provisional measures. One such case was HRC P. L.-B. v. Canada, 556/1993, discontinued 17 
April 1996 (request for urgent measures of 4 October 1993, initial submission of 5 October 1993, 
information about his deportation on 7 October 1993 and Rule 91 of 18 January 1994, letter State 
of 19 July 1994: the petitioner was not deported but he disappeared; on file with the author). In 
this case it did not use them partly because the timeframe between submission and the date of 
deportation appeared too short and the Secretariat was unable to contact the Rapporteur in time. 
Counsel for the petitioner had informed the HRC that he had ‘just learned a few minutes ago’ that 
his client’s removal from Canada would most likely take place in the evening of 7 October 1993. 
The HRC received this fax on this date. It was sent two days previously and refers to a 
submission of 4 October 1993. By the time it registered the case it had already received reports 
that the petitioner had been deported. Hence it only referred to Rule 91. Transmission under Rule 
91 of 18 January 1994. In 2003 a petitioner was extradited subsequent to the initial submission of 
his case. In this case the HRC had not used provisional measures. Both the initial submission and 
the extradition took place on the same day, meaning that only a ‘same day Rule 86’ could have 
been effective. Technically this case involved a deportation, but with the same risk as extradition 
because a death sentence had already been pronounced against the petitioner in the receiving 
State. While the petitioner had requested provisional measures, the time-period for contacting the 
Rapporteur or another member of the HRC apparently was too short. HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 
August 2003. See Chapter V (Expulsion) for a discussion of the Committee’s View in this case. It 
appears from the case file that the Secretariat attempted to contact two different members of the 
Committee on the day the case was submitted. As noted, the petitioner was deported on the same 
day. The reason Rule 86 was not used may lie in the difficulty of reaching the Special Rapporteur 
in the timeframe of hours rather than days. The Special Rapporteur transmitted the case to the 
State party more than a year later, on 20 August 1999.  
41 The issues of lack of medical treatment in detention and unclear whereabouts of detained persons 
were among the early cases dealt with by the Committee, when the examination of individual 
complaints by international adjudicators was still new and more sensitive than it is now. This 
may account for the fact that it initially did not formally invoke its Rule on provisional measures 
in these cases. See the discussion in Chapter VI (Locating and protecting disappeared persons) 
and Chapter VII (detention). The case Juan E. Zelaya Blanco and Myriam Zelaya Dunaway (on 
behalf of Roberto Zelaya who later joined) v. Nicaragua, 20 July 1994, indicates that the practice 
of using informal rather than formal provisional measures, once developed in a given context 
(e.g. detention) continued to be used into the 1990s. Initially the petitioners (the brother and sister 
of Mr. Zelaya) wrote to the Secretary General of the UN in July 1988, among others referring to 
death threats made against their detained brother by a lieutenant. Five days later they received 
information that this lieutenant had been transferred following an investigation. While they 
observed that he was still in active military service and could continue to put other people at risk, 
the Committee could indeed conclude that the immediate threat against the alleged victim no 
longer existed. Letters of 22 and 26 July and 2 September 1988 (on file with the author). The 
official initial submission was sent two months later, in September 1988. The focus of the 
complaint was on the health of the alleged victim and in particular on the risk of prolonged 
experimentation with cortisones. The Working Group dealt with the case at the earliest 
opportunity, since there was not yet a Special Rapporteur on New Communications who could 
deal with cases in between sessions. Special Rapporteur Mavrommatis had only been appointed 
to deal with death penalty cases. At this time there was no longer a need to intervene in relation 
to the death threat, although it is not clear whether the HRC would have enquired about this 
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The urgency of some of the situations was not met with the requisite promptness. In Setelich 
it took the HRC four months to decide on the petitioner’s first request to use provisional meas-
ures. Although it did not use provisional measures but inquired about the alleged victim’s health 
instead, it would have been useful had it been able to move in a more timely fashion. Yet it must 
be borne in mind that this is an early case, brought before the HRC during the period before it had 
assigned one of its members with the task of dealing with communications in between sessions.42 
Since the installation by the HRC of a Special Rapporteur dealing first with death penalty cases 
only and later with all new communications, the promptness has gradually increased.43 
Prompt intervention is also particularly important in disappearance cases. Different from the 
UN Working Group on Enforced Disappearances (WGED), the HRC has no specific guidelines 
on prompt intervention in disappearance cases. The WGED directly transmits cases that occurred 
within the three months preceding receipt of the information by the Group to the Minister of 
Foreign Affairs ‘by the most direct and rapid means’.44  
                                                                                                                       
otherwise. On the issue of death threats and the use of provisional measures see Chapter IX. 
While decision-making by the Working Group was prompt, in the circumstances, its 
implementation by the Secretariat was not. Between the Committee’s decision to enquire about 
the alleged victim’s health situation and access to medication and the transmittal of this decision 
to the State party there was an interval of more than three weeks. Rule 91 decision of 24 October 
1988, CCPR/C/WG/34/D/328/1988, 8 November 1988 and Note Verbale of 17 November 1988 
(on file with the author). The HRC requested, among others, information on the current state of 
health of Mr. Zelaya. In particular it requested the State to forward copies of his medical reports 
and to indicate the medication he was receiving. Zelaya was detained until March 1990. After his 
release he went to the US. The HRC declared the case admissible after he had already been 
released. See also Dave Marais v. Madagascar, 24 March 1984 in which the HRC used informal 
provisional measures to ensure access to counsel, two years after initial submission. In Muteba v. 
Zaire, 24 July 1984 a request for information about such access, together with requests about the 
state of health of the alleged victim, was sent within eight days. Informal provisional measures 
were sent on the same date as those in the case of HRC Manera Lluberas v. Uruguay, 6 April 
1984. The decision to use provisional measures in A. et al. v. Angola, 810/1998, discontinued 1 
August 2000 (initial submission of 13 February 1998; provisional measures of 10 March 1998) to 
provide access to counsel and court, was taken within a month of receipt of initial submission. 
42 In Altesor v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982 the HRC was able to act within three weeks because it was 
in session at the time. Still, in some cases harm to a detainee’s health could clearly become 
irreparable in three weeks time. In HRC Lafuente Penarrieta et al. v. Bolivia, 2 November 1987, 
it is not clear why the HRC did not request informal provisional measures in 1984, upon receipt 
of initial submission, or during or following the time the alleged victims were on a hunger strike, 
but rather in 1985. 
43 At least seven times before the introduction of a Special Rapporteur the HRC did not intervene 
during the upcoming session but instead skipped one or more sessions. Nine times it did indeed 
intervene at the upcoming session. Once this was even within eight days of the initial submission. 
See Muteba v. Zaire (124/1982). 
44 Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, Revised methods of work of the 
Working Group, adopted 14 November 2001. The UN Working Group, not a treaty body, but one 
of the thematic mechanisms, has specifically delegated its power to the Chairperson, who can 
authorise the urgent appeals. If a person disappeared more than three months but less than a year 
previous to receipt of the information by the Secretariat the Chairperson may authorise 
transmission of the case in between sessions. In such cases there should be some connection with 
a case that did occur within the three-month period and the method of transmission is by letter. 
See <www.ohchr.org>. In this respect there does not appear to be extensive cross-fertilization 
between the adjudicator and the Working Group. See also Chapter VI on the practice of 
adjudicators with regard to using provisional measures in disappearance cases. 
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The case of Ana Rosario Celis Laureano v. Peru (1996) involved the urgent intervention of 
the UN Working Group on Disappearances as well as that of the HRC.45  
In Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay (1983)46 the petitioner had submitted the case on be-
half of her daughter and herself five years after her daughter was last seen. The HRC requested 
the State to confirm that Elena Quinteros, whose whereabouts had been unknown since 1976, was 
in detention. It requested the State to make known the place of detention.47 Because five years had 
passed since her disappearance it is not surprising that the HRC did not use provisional measures. 
The likelihood that a disappeared person has died increases with every month the disappearance 
persists. The Committee’s request to be informed of her whereabouts seems to be more a matter 
of principle and a necessary stage in acquiring information for a final determination than it is an 
attempt to informally intervene pending the proceedings in order to prevent irreparable harm.48  
                                                 
45 HRC Laureano Atachahua (on behalf of his granddaughter Ana Rosario Celis Laureano) v. 
Peru, 25 March 1996. The victim, who was a minor, had disappeared in August 1992. Her 
grandfather submitted his complaint to the HRC more than two months later, in October 1992. By 
then the UN Working Group had already registered her case. The HRC determined that it was not 
prevented from dealing with this case because, in light of the difference in the mandates of the 
Working Group and itself, the case could not be seen as dealing with the ‘same matter’. In 
November 1992 the Peruvian Government informed the UN Working Group that the Prosecutor’s 
Office in Huacho was investigating the case and that the Government had requested information 
from two Ministries: those of Defence and the Interior. The Prosecutor’s Office had not yet found 
Ms. Laureano nor identified those responsible for her disappearance. More than half a year leter, 
the HRC Special Rapporteur transmitted the case to the State party. By that time the UN Working 
Group had already appealed to the State twice. It is not clear whether the Rapporteur enquired 
about her health and whereabouts since the Committee’s View does not provide information 
about the substance of the transmission. In its admissibility decision, in July 1994, the HRC only 
requested detailed information on the investigations carried out by the authorities. Given the lack 
of response by the State the likelihood of finding her alive after November 1992 seemed limited. 
The State party responded on 10 June 1993 drawing on information provided by its Ministry of 
Defence. “On 8 September 1992, the commander of the military base in Ambar inquired with the 
judge about the status of the case; on 11 September 1992, the judge confirmed that the girl had 
been abducted one month earlier, and that the judicial authorities seized of the matter attributed 
responsibility for the event to members of the military. On 21 September 1992, the Attorney-
General of the Second Prosecutor’s Office (Fiscal de la Segunda Fiscalía de la Nación) reported 
on the action taken by the Office until then; he issued a list of eight police and military offices 
and concluded that Ms. Laureano was not detained in any of these offices”. HRC Laureano 
Atachahua (on behalf of his granddaughter Ana Rosario Celis Laureano) v. Peru, 25 March 
1996, §4.1. Although the submission was two months after the disappearance and the Working 
Group on Disappearances had already been involved for a month, the HRC could have reacted 
immediately upon receipt of the submission instead of several months later. Beyond this report of 
21 September 1992, the State does not seem to have investigated the matter. This also appears 
from the information provided by the UN Working Group, which had not been updated beyond 
November 1992. See also Chapter XI on the attitudes of addressee States and the follow-up by 
the adjudicators. See also Mojica v. Dominican Republic, 15 July 1994. 
46 HRC Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983. 
47 HRC Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983, com. no. 107/1981, CCPR/C/OP/2, at 138 
(Rule 91 of 14 October 1983). 
48 See also HRC Thevaraja Sarma (submitted by his father S. Jegatheeswara Sarma) v. Sri Lanka, 
16 July 2003. In this case the victim had been abducted in June 1990. The State party ratified the 
OP in October 1997 and the initial submission was of October 1999. See also Alfredo and Samuel 
Sanjuán Arévalo (submitted by their mother Elcida Arévalo Perez) v. Colombia, 3 November 
1989, CCPR/C/37/D/181/1984, 22 November 1989 (no informal provisional measures, probably 
because the disappearance took place more than two years before initial submission). 
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Before the HRC introduced the Special Rapporteur on New Communications it intervened 
informally several times, requesting information on the whereabouts of an alleged victim.49 In In 
Tshishimbi v. Zaire (1996) the Special Rapporteur took formal provisional measures to discover 
the whereabouts of the alleged victim and prevent irreparable harm.50 Subsequently the Commit-
tee expressed particular concern about the absence of cooperation in relation to the provisional 
measure by the Rapporteur.51 Nevertheless, the full Committee did not itself use formal provi-
sional measures to follow-up on those of the Special Rapporteur. Instead, it reiterated the Rule 91 
(current Rule 97) request ‘to provide detailed information on the whereabouts of Mr. Tshishimbi 
and to indicate whether he was covered by the terms of the amnesty announced by the State 
party’s new Government in the summer of 1994’. After all, nothing had been heard from him for 
two years, making it less likely that he was still alive. The use of provisional measures is particu-
larly warranted in the context of recent disappearances or in the face of other indications that the 
alleged victim may still be alive.52 A relevant example is El Megreisi v. Libya (1994).53 The 
petitioner had submitted a case on behalf of his brother almost two years after his disappearance. 
The HRC only requested information on his whereabouts and health seven months after initial 
submission.54 Subsequently the El-Megreisi family learned that the petitioner’s brother was still 
alive in April 1992, when he was suddenly allowed a visit by his wife. During this visit he could 
not comment on his conditions of detention. It was then that the HRC requested information on 
his health and whereabouts.55  
2.3.4.4 CASES INVOLVING THREATS TO INDIGENOUS CULTURE 
The HRC has not been particularly prompt in its intervention on behalf of indigenous culture. The 
time between initial submission and the use of provisional measures varied from two and a half 
months (Länsman II)56 to almost three and a half years (Lubicon Lake Band).57 Waiting such a 
period before taking them considerably diminishes their practical use. When it did use provisional 
measures in the latter case it did so in light of the seriousness of the claim that the Lubicon Lake 
Band was on the verge of extinction.58 In that light it would have been helpful if it had made the 
assessment earlier in the proceedings. It must be remembered, however, that this was the first 
                                                 
49 Promptness varied from a few days to four months. 
50 In this case there was an interval of one month between the initial submission and the provisional 
measure. 
51 HRC Tshishimbi v. Zaire, 25 March 1996. 
52 See also Chapter VI (Locating and protecting disappeared persons). 
53 HRC Mohammed Bashir El-Megreisi (submitted by his brother Youssef El-Megreisi) v. Libya, 23 
March 1994.  
54 It is not clear from the decision on the merits why it did not make this request immediately upon 
receipt of the complaint. Possibly it assumed that the disappearance was not sufficiently recent 
and therefore did not warrant provisional measures. It is also possible that the Rapporteur simply 
did not deal with the case sooner or that the Rapporteur preferred the use of informal provisional 
measures under Rule 91 (old) in this case. The View only refers to Rule 91, not to Rule 86, but it 
is also possible that Rule 86 was used nevertheless.  
55  Five months later the petitioner stated that at that time his brother was detained in a military 
camp in Tripoli of which the name and location were unknown. The next month, in its admissibi-
lity decision, the HRC repeated its request to the State about the current whereabouts, state of 
health and conditions of detention. 
56 HRC Länsman v. Finland (Länsman II), 30 October 1996. 
57 HRC Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990. 
58 See also Chapter X (Culture). 
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time the HRC formally used provisional measures in a case not involving the death penalty, 
expulsion or extradition. Moreover, there was no Rapporteur yet dealing with new 
communications in between sessions, which meant that the case was a recurring topic only during 
official sessions.  
2.3.4.5 URGENCY AFTER REGISTRATION OF THE PETITION 
In 2003 Special Rapporteur Scheinin acknowledged that the Secretariat does not inform him 
about new developments after he has authorised registration of a case. To his knowledge, no 
Rapporteur assigned to prepare a specific case for determination on the merits has intervened to 
alert the HRC about such developments that might warrant the use of provisional measures. 
Provisional measures taken after registration follow up on earlier provisional measures, rather 
than deal with new situations. He agreed that it would be useful to arrange for a procedure to deal 
with those urgent issues coming up following registration. As an example he referred to risks to a 
detainee on the verge of turning blind.59 
2.3.5 Contacting the addressee State with provisional measures 
Especially if the treaty body only informs the agent of the State in Geneva (Permanent Mission) 
of the provisional measure, it is important to allow for time to transmit this information from 
there, by way of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to the relevant (prison) authorities, often through 
the Ministry of Justice as well.60  
Within the United Nations it is diplomatic practice to address the diplomatic missions repre-
senting States, based in Geneva, rather than the governments directly. In urgent cases, however, 
this is not very practicable. By the time the provisional measure reaches the relevant authorities, 
irreparable harm may already have occurred. Hence, even in some of the early cases the HRC 
                                                 
59 Interview by author with Special Rapporteur Scheinin, Geneva, April 2003. Thus far it does not 
appear that a formal decision has been made to arrange for such a procedure. Indeed HRC Polay 
Campos (submitted by his wife Espinoza de Polay) v. Peru, 6 November 1997 appears to be a 
rare exception in which the case rapporteur eventually suggests the use of provisional measures. 
On 5 March 1993 Ms. Espinoza de Polay submitted the case on behalf of her husband who was 
detained in Peru. She sent her submission from France. Only when the Committee declared this 
case admissible, three years after the initial submission, it requested the State to ensure medical 
treatment. While three Rapporteurs theoretically could have intervened (the initial submission in 
Polay Campos v. Peru was in March 1993, just before the session ending the Rapporteurship of 
Lallah and starting that of Chanet. Pocar started his Rapporteurship as of spring 1995), the 
practice at the Secretariat seems to have been such that the Rapporteur authorizing registration 
and transmission of the new case to the State may be informed about urgent matters at the same 
time. More importantly, the Special Rapporteur on New Communications does not receive 
information about subsequent developments that could put at risk the health of the petitioner, 
while the member of the Committee who is responsible for drafting the decision on the merits 
does not have the task of intervening urgently. Eventually, in Polay Campos the HRC did urge 
the State to provide medical treatment, but it only did so when it declared the case admissible. It 
is evident that it did not act with the same sense of urgency as it tends to do when it uses formal 
provisional measures. It eventually intervened upon a suggestion by Committee member Prado 
Vallejo who became the case Rapporteur. Letter of Prado Vallejo to the Geneva Secretariat, 2 
July 1996 (on file with the author).  
60 The issuance of a provisional measure may also be useful information to submit in domestic 
court.  
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already sent a telegram directly to the Minister of Foreign Affairs as well as to the Deputy Prime 
Minister.61  
In other cases the HRC also sent the provisional measure to the Advocate General of the 
State. It may address him as follows: ‘please find enclosed the text of the urgent note verbale 
which we delivered to the Permanent Mission today’.62 In cases against Jamaica it developed the 
practice to address the Minister of Foreign Affairs and External Trade directly and send a copy to 
the Permanent Mission of Jamaica in Geneva. According to Special Rapporteur Scheinin, how-
ever, there is no consistent practice on whether the Secretariat contacts only the Permanent Mis-
sion or whether it contacts the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, other government ministries, prison 
wardens etc. as well.63 
Jamaica’s attitude towards the manner in which it was informed of provisional measures in 
the early years becomes apparent in Reece v. Jamaica (disc. 1993).64 Jamaica pointed out it 
wished to receive all the information together with the request for provisional measures. Its re-
sponse serves as a reminder of the importance of providing full information with any decision to 
use provisional measures and, preferably, some motivation.65 It also serves as a historical back-
ground showing that initially the means of communication were rather inefficient.66  
                                                 
61 HRC O.W. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988, and Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v. Jamaica, 6 April 1989. 
62 HRC Ramcharan Bickaroo v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997, Rule 86/91 decision of 5 
October 1993 (on file with the author). 
63 Interview by the author with Special Rapporteur Scheinin, Geneva, April 2003.  
64 HRC Lloyd Reece v. Jamaica, 247/1987, discontinued upon receipt of the petitioner’s 
instructions to withdraw, 28 April 1993; initial submission of 18 June 1987; Rule 86/91 of 25 
November 1987 of 12 November 1987 (separate unpublished HRC decision, on file with the 
author). His death sentence was commuted on 6 June 1995. See also the follow-up case Lloyd 
Reece v. Jamaica, 14 July 2003.  
65 See further section 8.3 of this Chapter on publication and motivation. The HRC decided to take 
provisional measures on 12 November, but this decision was only transmitted to the State on 25 
November 1987. It pointed out that a person under sentence of death had submitted the 
complaint. At the same time it noted that further factual information from the petitioner was 
necessary before the HRC could consider the question of admissibility. It relied on the State’s 
willingness to cooperate with the HRC ‘at this early stage in the consideration of the subject-
matter’. Apparently, however, the State only received this decision thirteen days after the HRC 
had decided on it. On 8 December 1987 an official Note Verbale confirmed the message in the 
telegram. It was only with this Note Verbale that the Secretariat also transmitted the text of the 
complaint itself. Decision under Rule 86/91, 12 November 1987, CCPR/C/31/D/247/1987, 
transmitted on 25 November 1987 (by telegram) and Note Verbale by UN Secretariat to Jamaican 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs with a copy to the Permanent Mission, 8 December 1987 (on file with 
the author). In other words, there was an interval between the Committee’s decision to take 
provisional measures and the Secretariat’s action to inform the State, first by telegram and later 
by transmittal of the Note Verbale. A month later the Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Trade and Industry responded to the telegram. While the Note Verbale referred to a telegram, the 
response referred to a telex. It may be assumed that the UN Centre for Human Rights sent its 
telegrams through its own telex system before it changed to using the fax. It noted that the 
telegram included the text of the Committee’s decision to take provisional measures, which 
mentioned that a copy of the petitioner’s communication would be transmitted separately. The 
State acknowledged that, under the Rules of Procedure, the HRC was only required to ensure that 
the text of a complaint is sent to the State party before it made a declaration on admissibility. It 
nevertheless felt that the HRC should make such communications available to the Government 
‘at the earliest possible opportunity, or at any rate, contemporaneously with the first request by 
the Committee for action by the State Party under the Protocol and its Rules’. It gave as an 
example the Committee’s request under Rule 86. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs felt ‘that from 
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The case of the late Rockliff Ross v. Guyana (disc. 1997)67 shows the lengths to which the 
Secretariat of the HRC sometimes has to go in trying to get the message to the relevant authori-
ties. Even though the pains taken were to no avail, the case serves as an interesting example 
showing the sequence of events in contacting the State party. Aguilar Urbina, the Chairperson of 
the HRC, had authorised both the registration of the case and the use of provisional measures. 
These were to be sent directly to the State party, more precisely to the Presidency and the Office 
of the Attorney General, because there was no Permanent Mission of Guyana in Geneva and the 
Permanent Mission in New York would only start its daily business after the execution. A mem-
ber of the Geneva Secretariat dictated the contents of the Note Verbale with the provisional meas-
ure to an assistant of the Superintendent of the State Prison. The Superintendent himself could not 
be reached anymore, being ‘out in the yard’. Earlier the Superintendent of the prison had said he 
could not interfere with the process and emphasised he was carrying out an executive order. 
Rockliff Ross was executed as planned.68 
                                                                                                                       
that stage the relevant State Party should at least be seized of the nature of the complaint that has 
been made against it’. “Indeed, although Rule 86 has no express provisions on this question, it 
appears to proceed on the assumption that the State Party would already have been seized of the 
communication and hence of the complaint by the time a request for its action under that Rule has 
been made”. Letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Trade and Industry of Jamaica to the 
Director of the United Nations Centre for Human Rights, 24 December 1987, reference number 
50/151/1 regarding Lloyd Reece (247/1987) (on file with the author). From the Secretariat’s reply 
to the Jamaican Ministry of Foreign Affairs it becomes apparent that Jamaica had made the same 
observation with regard to twelve other cases. These were 237/1987, 246/1987, 248/1987, 
249/1987, 250/1987, 251/1987, 252/1987, 253/1987, 254/1987, 255/1987, 256/1987 and 
257/1987.The Secretariat agreed with the State’s argument that the text of a communication 
should be transmitted simultaneously with the relevant decision. 
66 “Nevertheless, given the special nature of the cases in question, the Committee requested the 
Secretariat, as an exception to the normal practice, to transmit the text of the decisions first by 
telegram, to be followed by a retransmittal of the decisions as soon as possible, under cover of 
Notes Verbales, enclosing at that time copies of the communications themselves. This, the 
Secretariat has tried to do as expeditiously as possible”. It also suggested a solution for this 
problem: “Should the Ministry of Foreign Affairs consider it helpful, the Secretariat would be 
quite willing to consider the possibility of effecting transmittal of the Committee’s decisions 
together with copies of the communications by telefax (if further cases of this nature do arise). 
For this purpose, the Secretariat would be grateful for learning the telefax number of the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs”. Note Verbale by the UN Secretariat (Centre for Human Rights) to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jamaica of 15 January 1988 concerning 237/1987, 240/1987 and 
246/1987 to 257/1987 (on file with the author). 
67 HRC (The late) Rockliff Ross v. Guyana, discontinued 10 December 1997, 703/1996 (on file with 
the author). 
68 At approximately 11:30 a.m. Chairperson Aguilar Urbina had authorised the provisional 
measures. Mr. Schmidt of the UN Secretariat would contact the Superintendent of the Prison. At 
12:15 p.m. the Secretariat transmitted the Note Verbale of Aguilar to the Presidency by fax. 
Seven successive attempts to send this to the Attorney General failed. At 12:30 p.m. Schmidt was 
on the phone with the Superintendent of the prison, who said he could not interfere with the 
process and emphasised he was carrying out an executive order. Schmidt suggested him at least 
to check with the President’s or the Attorney General’s Office, which the Superintendent 
promised to do. Subsequent attempts (between 12:30 – 14:15 p.m.) to contact the Office of the 
Attorney General by phone and to reach the Presidency and the Chief Justice failed as well. 
Between 12:35 and 12:45 p.m. Schmidt dictated the contents of the Note Verbale with the 
provisional measure to an assistant of the Superintendent of the State Prison. The Superintendent 
himself could not be reached anymore, being ‘out in the yard’. The request to have him paged or 
call back remained without result. The assistant promised to deliver the handwritten transcript to 
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Sometimes a long time-span does not mean that the HRC did nothing. It may have taken ac-
tion informally. A.A.T. v. Hungary (disc. 1994) serves as an example.69 In this deportation case it 
took the HRC ten months to decide affirmatively on the use of provisional measures.70 Yet this 
case hints at the importance of informal interventions. The Geneva Secretariat emphasised to the 
petitioner that if the authorities would decide to expel or extradite him to Iraq he should not hesi-
tate to contact the Committee. Upon inquiry in Hungary the Committee found that there was 
indeed a valid court order for the expulsion of the petitioner and that a date had been set. Appar-
ently, informal interventions on behalf of the HRC resulted in a stay of this domestic court order. 
Nevertheless, once it appeared that the expulsion was still imminent, the Special Rapporteur did 
transmit the case to the State party and requested it to halt deportation. Obviously, for this type of 
informal intervention there should be knowledge about the domestic situation and personal access 
to State decision-makers by a member of the HRC or its Secretariat. 
2.3.6 Related Rules of Procedure 
Next to the Rule on provisional measures itself (now Rule 92, previously Rule 86) there are some 
other Rules of Procedure with particular relevance to provisional measures: the Rule on the 
transmittal of a complaint to the State party and the possible enquiry of the Committee on specific 
points needing clarification by the State or the petitioner (now Rule 97, previously Rule 91), the 
Rule on the designation of special rapporteurs (now Rule 95, previously Rule 89), and the Rule on 
confidentiality (now Rule 102, previously Rule 96). Generally the Committee’s provisional meas-
ures71 are simply included at the end of a Note Verbale directed to the respondent government. 
This Note Verbale normally transmits the complaint to the State concerned and provides it with 
the communication number of the case.72 The HRC sometimes uses provisional measures as part 
                                                                                                                       
the Superintendent in the yard. At 14:15 p.m. the HRC received a reply from the Attorney 
General’s Office, but none from the Superintendent’s Office. The London-based NGO Interights 
sent Mr. Schmidt a fax on 6 June 1996 informing him that the execution took place at 8:00 a.m. 
Guyana time. Initial submission 2 June 1996 (received 3 June); telephone call by counsel at 11:00 
a.m. Geneva time on 4 June; submission under Rule 86 on 4 June at 11:30 a.m. Geneva time: 
client scheduled for execution same day 8:00 a.m. (2:00 p.m. Geneva time), from file notes of 4 
June 1996 and telephone chart (on file with the author) in: Rockliff Ross v. Guyana, discontinued 
10 December 1997, 703/1996.  
69 HRC A.A.T. v. Hungary, 543/1993 (disc. 1994); initial submission of 10 August 1992; Rule 
86/91 of 2 June 1993. 
70 The petitioner had requested provisional measures in August 1992 but the Rapporteur only used 
provisional measures in June 1993. 
71 In its Views and Annual Reports the HRC itself tends to use the term ‘interim measures’. As 
noted in the Introduction for the sake of consistency this book normally uses the term provisional 
measures. 
72 Note Verbale is the term generally used to refer to official letters sent to the State involved, 
usually to the State’s diplomatic representative at the UN in Geneva. This representative is 
expected to channel such letters to his government (usually the Ministry of Foreign Affairs). 
Often it also requests certain information from the State. The HRC usually includes its 
provisional measures in this ‘transmission’ to the State. In July 1991 the Committee adopted 
revised terms of reference for the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on New Communications. 
This included ‘to issue rule 86 requests, whether coupled with a request under rule 91 or not’ and 
‘to inform the Committee at each session on action taken under rules 86 and 91’. Annex X, 
Mandate of the Special Rapporteur on New Communications, revised terms of reference adopted 
at the 1087th meeting, 24 July 1991, A/46/40, 10 October 1991, in: Official Records of the 
Human Rights Committee 1990/1991, Vol. II, CCPR/10/Add. 1. 
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of its decision on admissibility rather than together with its earlier decision to transmit the case to 
the State. Sometimes it does both. 
The Rule on confidentiality clarifies the level of access to information. Since 1997 the 
Committee has formally excluded provisional measures from its confidentiality rules. It declared 
decisions relating to provisional measures to be public information, not hampered by confidential-
ity limitations. Its paragraph 5 provides: 
“Subject to paragraph 4, the Committee's decisions on inadmissibility, merits and 
discontinuance shall be made public. The decisions of the Committee or the Special Rapporteur 
designated pursuant to rule 95 paragraph 3, under rule 92 of this rule shall be made public. No 
advance copies of any Committee decision shall be issued”. 
Paragraph 6 stipulates: 
 
“The Secretariat is responsible for the distribution of the Committee's final decisions. It shall 
not be responsible for the reproduction and the distribution of submissions concerning 
communications”. 
A limited interpretation of paragraph 6, making the Secretariat only responsible for the 
distribution of the HRC’s final decisions, would make it difficult to envisage the implementation 
of the obligation to make public decisions on provisional measures.  
2.3.7 Proprio motu use of provisional measures 
Often petitioners submit hand-written complaints, without assistance of a lawyer, sometimes from 
death row. They may invoke any particular article of the Covenant. However, the HRC can derive 
the applicable rights from the facts of the case even if the petitioner did not specifically claim 
them. It is customary for the HRC, or rather initially its Secretariat, to indicate proprio motu 
under which articles issues seem to arise. For instance, based on the initial petition the HRC has 
inquired about the health of the petitioner’s detained relatives while the petitioner apparently did 
not specifically request this.73 On the basis of the facts mentioned in the complaint it also seems 
to have requested information on the whereabouts of a petitioner’s relative.74 In other words it 
took an informal provisional measure proprio motu.75  
Equally, if the complaint refers to the imposition of corporal punishment on the alleged vic-
tim, but the specific claims do not relate to it, the HRC can include an Article 7 claim proprio 
motu and use provisional measures to prevent the execution of the punishment. In the first two 
corporal punishment cases it is likely that members of the Committee noticed only at a rather late 
stage of the proceedings that the petitioner had been sentenced to corporal punishment. Then they 
raised the issue proprio motu. They could also have used provisional measures, but at this late 
                                                 
73 See e.g. HRC Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay, 15 August 1979. In Martinez Machado v. 
Uruguay, 4 November 1993, however, it did not inquire about the alleged victim’s state of health, 
despite the great concern expressed by the petitioner. In Almirati Nieto (submitted by Almirati 
Garcia) v. Uruguay, 25 July 1983 it did not intervene proprio motu either, probably because of 
the lack of specificity about the urgency of the concern. See further Chapter VII (Detention).  
74 HRC Martinez Machado v. Uruguay, 4 November 1993. 
75 On this flexible approach, not applying non ultra petita in a strict manner, or not regarding as non 
ultra petita this type of assistance to the lay petitioner in formulating his claim, as long as it is 
based on the facts in the petition, is based on the protective function of the adjudicator and on the 
particular context. See further Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction). About informal provisional measures 
see Chapters VI (Disappearances) and VII (Detention). 
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stage the Committee may no longer have taken into account the possibility of taking provisional 
measures because the decision to take such measures is normally made during the initial stages of 
the proceedings. Now that the HRC has clearly found violations in the context of specific claims 
about corporal punishment it is likely that any mention of this punishment in a petition will trig-
ger action by the Secretariat contacting the Special Rapporteur about the use of provisional meas-
ures in cases in which the punishment has not yet been executed.76  
The Committee has also used provisional measures upon request, but on the basis of a dif-
ferent right than that claimed by the petitioner. It introduced this proprio motu. This was the case 
in the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (1990) involving cultural survival. In this case the petitioner 
claimed a violation of Article 1 ICCPR and requested provisional measures. Before deciding on 
the request for provisional measures the HRC first introduced Article 27 ICCPR proprio motu as 
an alternative to the Article 1 ICCPR claim, which it held inadmissible. Then it took the provi-
sional measures, requested, but on the basis of the claim it had introduced proprio motu.77  
                                                 
76 See further Chapter IV (Corporal punishment). In a case published the year before Sooklal 
(2001), the case Osbourne v. Jamaica (2000), it appears from the files in Geneva, but not from 
the View itself, that the Committee did use provisional measures. It did so on 23 June 1997. The 
petitioner had submitted his complaint that same month, on 12 June 1997. It was in this case that 
the HRC pointed out, for the first time, that imposition of corporal punishment in itself already 
constituted a violation of Article 7, even without the execution of this punishment. While the 
Committee published Matthews v. Trinidad and Tobago, the first case dealing with corporal 
punishment, in March 1998, more than two months after it used its provisional measure to 
prevent flogging in Osbourne v. Jamaica, it is unlikely that it already used provisional measures 
in Matthews. The complaint was of 11 October 1993 and the Committee declared it admissible, 
also with regard to the corporal punishment issue, two years later. Indeed the file does not refer to 
the use of provisional measures. 
77 HRC Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990 
(destruction of the natural habitat and Article 27). See also Chapters X (Culture) and XIV 
(Jurisdiction and admissibility). In situations claiming ongoing violations the HRC has 
sometimes taken into account new developments. In Bakhtiyari family v. Australia (2003) the 
Rapporteur adjusted his provisional measures in light of procedural developments. See HRC 
Bakhtiyari family v. Australia, 29 October 2003, §2.1: “On 27 March 2002, the Committee, 
acting through its Special Rapporteur for New Communications, pursuant to Rule 86 of the 
Committee's Rules of Procedure, requested the State party to refrain from deporting Mrs 
Bakhtiyari and her children, until the Committee had had the opportunity to consider their claims 
under the Covenant, in the event of a negative decision by the Minister for Immigration on their 
request in October 2001 to exercise his discretion to allow them to remain in Australia. Following 
the Minister's adverse decision and advice that Mrs Bakhtiyari and her children had applied to the 
High Court of Australia, this request to refrain from deportation was adjusted by the Special 
Rapporteur on New Communications, on 13 May 2002, to be conditional on an adverse decision 
on the application by the High Court”. Later the Committee observed that certain claims under 
Articles 17 and 23 ‘deriving from a separation of the family unit’ had been withdrawn after the 
father had been placed with his family. However, ‘the most recent information suggests that the 
State party is moving to remove Ms. Bakhtiyari and her children while proceedings in relation to 
Mr Bakhtiyari are in process’. HRC Bakhtiyari family v. Australia, 29 October 2003, §8.5. Thus, 
proprio motu it regarded these claims as still relevant and considered them sufficiently 
substantiated for purposes of admissibility. 
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2.3.8 Withdrawing provisional measures 
Generally human rights adjudicators take provisional measures for a limited period and, based on 
the facts, they may decide to extend them or not to renew them at all after this period has lapsed. 
In some cases a specific decision was made to withdraw provisional measures.  
In the Jouni Länsman v. Finland II, involving Sami culture, the Rapporteur had used provi-
sional measures in August 1995, but had immediately invited the State to inform him in case it 
did not agree with such measures, which the State promptly did. In November 1996 the Rappor-
teur set aside his provisional measures, apparently accepting the State’s arguments. Later the case 
was declared admissible.78 When a case is declared inadmissible the provisional measures are 
generally assumed to be set aside, unless a statement to the contrary is made.79 Yet in another case 
involving the Sami Sara et al. v. Finland, the provisional measures were first maintained upon 
admissibility, but when the case was subsequently declared inadmissible, the Committee specifi-
cally noted that the provisional measures were set aside as well. 
With regard to a discontinued extradition case, E.G. v. Canada (unpublished, but discontin-
ued in 1997),80 it appears from the file that the State party was keen on withdrawal of the provi-
sional measures and the Rapporteur indeed decided that there was no need to maintain them. He 
had made this decision ‘after careful consideration and upon reflection’ and ‘on the basis of the 
assurances obtained by the Canadian Government from United States authorities, to the effect that 
the death penalty will not be sought against and imposed on’ the petitioner. As the Rapporteur 
normally points out in his decision to take provisional measures, he noted here as well that the 
withdrawal did not imply that the HRC had reached a decision on admissibility.81 In the letter sent 
by the Secretariat to counsel it was noted that the Rapporteur was ‘satisfied that the Government 
of Canada has obtained the appropriate assurances from the United States authorities, both at the 
Federal and at the State level’.82 In May 1997 the petitioner withdrew his communication before 
the HRC. ‘The answers provided by Canada in response to the communication have helped to 
clarify his legal situation and he feels that the assurances are now sufficient that the death penalty 
will not be imposed’.83  
                                                 
78 See the discussion in Chapter X (Protecting (indigenous) cultural and religious rights). 
79 The latter is further discussed in Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
80 E.G. v. Canada, 738/1997, disc. 17 November 1997, initial submission 5 January 1997, received 
7 January 1997 with newspaper clipping of the Orlando sentinel of 18 September 1996, Rule 
86/91 of 17 January 1997; withdrawal of Rule 86 (on file with the author). 
81 Note verbale by the Special Rapporteur to the Permanent Mission of Canada in E.G. v. Canada 
(738/1997), 28 April 1997 (on file with the author).  
82 Letter by the Secretariat to the petitioner’s counsel, 28 April 1997 (on file with the author). The 
fact that in federal systems it is also important to take into account implementation at the level of 
the constituent State is something not only the human rights adjudicators, but also the ICJ has had 
to face. See e.g. its provisional measures to halt executions in LaGrand and Avena. See Chapter I. 
83 Letter by counsel to the HRC, 26 May 1997; In November 1997 the HRC decided to discontinue 
examination of the case, letter by the Secretariat to counsel informing about the decision, taken at 
the 61st session, to discontinue the case, 17 November 1997 (on file with the author). 
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2.4 Decisions of the HRC to take provisional measures: transparency or the 
lack thereof? 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The fact that the proceedings are conducted entirely in writing obviously means that the HRC 
does not conduct public hearings on the use of provisional measures. The request for provisional 
measures is usually included in the last paragraph of a Note Verbale sent to the State party. This 
request is not motivated84 and Notes Verbales are not published.85 In its Annual Report to the 
General Assembly it provides some general information on the use of provisional measures.86 
However, the main information about its use of provisional measures must be derived from its 
case law. This section refers to the different sources and shows that the Committee has not been 
very transparent in its use of provisional measures.  
2.4.2 Secondary literature and visit of the Geneva Secretariat 
There is no literature systematically analysing the HRC’s use of provisional measures. Some 
general literature on the HRC has referred to provisional measures.87 Only a handful of authors 
have more extensively dealt with the issue.88 In addition some information was obtained at the 
Committee’s secretariat in Geneva.89 
                                                 
84  There may be a recent change in this respect, judging from HRC Dissanayake, Mudiyanselage 
Sumanaweera Banda v. Sri Lanka, 22 July 2008, where the Committee notes in its decision on 
the merits that the petitioner had requested provisional measures to the effect that he be granted 
respite from the execution of the sentence of hard labour, but that in March 2005 the Special 
Rapporteur denied this request ‘on the ground that working in a print shop did not appear to come 
within the terms of article 8, paragraph 3(b)’, §1.2. 
85 This section deals with the available information on the Committee’s provisional measures. Only 
in the early years it sometimes separately published a provisional measure. 
86 See the paragraph in the Report on the Committee’s consideration of communications under the 
Optional Protocol. Incidentally the HRC also mentions provisional measures in its Concluding 
Observations on certain States Parties’ reports. 
87 Literature discussing the HRC’s procedure in general only briefly refers to provisional measures. 
See, e.g. Bayefsky (2002), pp. 64 and p. 165; De Zayas (2001), pp. 79-81; O’Flaherty (1996) p. 
28; Zwart (1994), pp. 14-16; McGoldrick (1994), pp. 131-132, p. 202; Zwaak (1991), p. 82. 
Discussion is more extensive in Joseph/Schultz/Castan (2004), pp. 25-28; Barkhuysen/Van 
Emmerik/Rieter (2002), pp. 84-89 and (2008), pp. 106-112; Ghandhi (1998), pp. 57-65 and p. 
425; the following articles have also referred to the HRC’s use of provisional measures: 
Pasqualucci (2005); Schmidt (1998); Kamminga (1996) and Van Boven (1994). As apparent 
from the title, Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts, Bernhardt (ed.) (1994) does 
not deal with the HRC’s provisional measures but only with measures indicated by courts.  
88 Harrington (2003), pp. 55-87 and Tomuschat (1995), pp. 624-634. See also Malinverni (2005), 
pp. 63-75; Schabas (2005), pp. 77-90; Naldi (2004), pp. 445-454 (on legal status); Van 
Boven/Flinterman/Rieter (1999), pp. 908-909 and Rieter (1999), pp. 1136-1145 (both on Dutch 
compliance with provisional measures by CAT). 
89 The author visited the Geneva Secretariat on 12-22 October 1998; 29 March-5 April 2003 and 
24-30 August 2003. She wishes to thank HRC members Martin Scheinin, Sir Nigel Rodley (April 
2003), Fausto Pocar and Cecilia Medina Quiroga (October 1998) as well as various (former) staff 
members dealing predominantly with the HRC, but also with CAT, including Marcus Schmidt, 
Paul Oertly, Antonie Cardon, Carla Edelenbosch and Jacob Möller. In October 1998 only the 
files recently closed (and some pending files) were available, not those already archived. Some 
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2.4.3 Drafting history Rule 86 (current Rule 92) 
The drafting history of Rule 86 provides some information on the Committee’s approach towards 
the concept of provisional measures in the first years of its existence. In this respect the HRC 
discussed three issues: its authority to use provisional measures; urgency and delegation of the 
authority to use provisional measures to subsidiary organs;90 and the relationship of provisional 
measures with the admissibility and merits of a case pending before it.91 
2.4.4 Separate publication of decisions on provisional measures 
While the HRC normally does not publish its Notes Verbale, including the references to Rule 86, 
in the early stages it took separate decisions to issue provisional measures and published some of 
them.92 This provides additional information on how the HRC has approached the issue, at least in 
the early years. In 1978 it made public a provisional measure to halt a deportation.93 In 1986, 
moreover, on two separate occasions it made public a specific provisional measure to halt an 
execution.94 These provisional measures are separate decisions instead of a sentence in an unpub-
lished Note Verbale to the government concerned. It is clear from these decisions that the request 
for information (then under Rule 91) and the use of provisional measures are closely interrelated. 
In the first death penalty case, X v. S (1986), the HRC considered that it had insufficient informa-
tion to deal with the admissibility of the case. It requested the State party to clarify certain matters 
involving the right of appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London 
and the issue of statutory time limits. Apart from this it requested the State party not to carry out 
the death sentence against the petitioner before the HRC had had the opportunity to consider 
further the question of admissibility. The Committee indicated that this further consideration 
would take place during its next session.95 It later joined the case with another.96 The final deci-
                                                                                                                       
files, moreover, were missing. In one week in March/April and one in August 2003 it was made 
possible to consult several archived files (some of them relating to files that had been pending in 
October 1998). The author is grateful for the decision of March 2003 by a meeting of members of 
the HRC and HRC staff granting her access to these archived files with regard to decisions about 
the use of provisional measures. This decision was based on what was then Rule 96(5) of the 
Rules of Procedure (currently Rule 102(6)). Within the limited time period available a selection 
was made on the basis of death penalty cases from the time period in which the HRC did not 
mention its use of provisional measures in its decisions on the merits and inadmissibility, other 
cases in which questions arose about the use of provisional measures, recently discontinued cases 
(of which the communication numbers were available) and cases the author was alerted to in 
October 1998 that could not be properly consulted then. It must be noted that case files do not 
always provide information about the use of provisional measures either: until about 1995 there 
was no formal exchange between Secretariat and Special Rapporteur about these measures. There 
would just be a phone call and, normally, a note in the file about the decision taken. 
90 See later in this Chapter. 
91 See Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
92 The reason that it did so in the early stages may have been that, different from subsequently, 
these were decisions by the full Committee.  
93 HRC O.E. v. S., 25 January 1978 and 26 July 1978, com. no. 22/1977, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 5 and 6. 
See further Chapter V on halting refoulement. 
94 HRC X v. S (210/1986 of 21 July 1986) and X v. S (252/1987 of 13 November 1987), both 
published in Selected Decisions vol. II, under the heading ‘interlocutory decisions’, 
CCPR/C/OP/2. 
95 HRC X v. S, 210/1986. Since 210/1986 was one of the cases in Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica it is 
now clear that the State in X v. S was Jamaica. It is not clear why the HRC initially chose to keep 
the State anonymous. Possibly, it did so because it was publishing the decision on provisional 
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sion in both cases is Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica (1989).97 The second time it separately pub-
lished a provisional measure in a death penalty case was in a case that was also called X v. S 
(1987).98 This case is different in the sense that here the HRC requested the information from the 
petitioner and not from the State. This request for information and the provisional measures re-
quest to the government are nevertheless interrelated.99 Similarly, there have been separate publi-
cations in relation to early detention cases in which the HRC requested information about the 
health and/or whereabouts of the alleged victims.100  
Unlike the Committee did initially, when it decided for provisional measures in full session, 
the Rapporteurs, first the one on Death Penalty Cases and later the one on New Communications, 
do not draft formal transmission and provisional measures decisions. Clearly they do not provide 
a motivation why provisional measures would be necessary. In the weeks preceding a session the 
Working Group on Communications could also decide on provisional measures. It does not moti-
vate its provisional measures either.  
2.4.5 Information in the Annual Reports 
The HRC gives some cursory information on its use of provisional measures in its Annual Re-
ports. It mentioned that during its 29th and 30th sessions (22 March-27 July 1987) it had used them 
to halt executions vis-à-vis two States parties.101 It also mentioned a mysterious situation in which 
it invoked provisional measures ‘in a case concerning a group of persons, in respect of whom the 
State party was requested to take steps to avoid irreparable damage’.102  
In its Annual Report of 1988 the HRC clarified an issue brought up when the Rule was 
drafted. The Committee finally determined what to do with urgent situations arising in between 
sessions.103  
In its 1989 Annual Report it also pointed out that some petitioners sentenced to death and 
awaiting execution ‘claimed to be innocent of the crimes of which they were convicted and fur-
ther allege that they were denied a fair hearing’. The Committee used provisional measures ‘in 
view of the urgency of the communications’. Again, the report indicated that during that period 
there were only two addressee States.104  
                                                                                                                       
measures when it had not yet decided on the merits and it believed the State would be more 
willing to cooperate if the Committee did not yet identify it. 
96 See 225/1987. 
97 HRC Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v. Jamaica, 6 April 1989. 
98 See 252/1987. 
99 As yet there is no inadmissibility decision or final View available on this interlocutory decision X 
v. S. It is most likely that the case was discontinued. 
100 See Chapter VII (Detention). In the third volume of the Selected Decisions of the HRC the table 
of contents refers to ‘interlocutory decisions’, with the subheading ‘decisions transmitting a 
communication to the State party (rule 91) and requesting interim measures of protection (rule 
86)’. In fact under this heading two inadmissibility decisions simply refer to provisional measures 
in death penalty cases. O.W. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988 (inadm.), 227/1987 and N.A.J. v. Jamaica, 
26 July 1990 (inadm.), 246/1987, CCPR/C/OP/3, pp. 11-16. 
101 A/42/40, §404, in: Yearbook of the Human Rights Committee 1987, Vol. II, CCPR/6/Add. 1.  
102 A/42/40, §405, in: Yearbook of the Human Rights Committee 1987, Vol. II, CCPR/6/Add. 1, 
referring to the 30th session. This may be the case of Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon 
Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990, CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984, 28 March 1990 because in 1986 
the HRC used provisional measures in that case, see Chapter X on protecting cultural survival. 
103 See under ‘timing and procedure’, section 2.3 of this Chapter. 
104 A/44/40, 29 September 1989, §634, in: Official Records of the Human Rights Committee 
1988/1989, Vol. II, CCPR/8/Add. 1. 
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Apart from some information on the HRC’s practice of issuing provisional measures, in-
cluding information about the delegation of the authority to issue them to a Special Rapporteur,105 
the Annual Reports also provide the names of the Special Rapporteurs during the period in ques-
tion.106 
2.4.6 Information in the Committee’s Views and inadmissibility decisions 
The fact that there is no complete record of its provisional measures, let alone of the substance of 
these measures, does not mean that the HRC did not use them. Closer investigation of its case law 
uncovers many of these measures. Whether or not provisional measures were used in individual 
cases must normally be ascertained from references made in the Committee’s decisions on the 
merits (Views) and its inadmissibility decisions.107 Apart from such references, the HRC rarely 
discusses provisional measures. At times it does not even mention in its Views that it has used 
them.108 
                                                 
105 A/52/40, Vol. I, 1997, §467 (Pocar transmitted 46 new communications under Rule 91 and an 
unspecified number of Rule 86 decisions); A/53/40, 1998, §433 (Pocar transmitted 57 new 
communications under Rule 91, while ‘in other cases’ he used Rule 86); A/54/40, 1999, §398 
(Kretzmer transmitted 44 new communications under Rule 91 and used Rule 86 in 10 cases). 
A/55/40, Vol. II, 2000, §§14 and 546 (Kretzmer transmitted 66 communications and used 
provisional measures 11 times); A/56/40, Vol. I, 2001, §15 (Kretzmer transmitted 32 
communications and used provisional measures twice. Scheinin transmitted 31 communications, 
four times he also used Rule 86; in §99 the Committee mentions that during the period covered 
by this Annual Report, the Special Rapporteurs transmitted 60 new communications (not 63) and 
issued provisional measures in 7 cases (not 6)). 
106 As noted, the Annual Reports only provide general information. See e.g. A/46/40, 1991, §§669 
and 692 (this report does not mention how many communications were transmitted to the State, 
let alone how many provisional measures); A/47/40, 1992, §617 (Lallah transmitted 30 new 
communications under Rule 91); A/48/40, 1993, §772 (Chanet transmitted 35 new 
communications under Rule 91); A/49/40, Vol. I, 1994, §386 (Chanet transmitted 26 
communications under Rule 91); A/50/40, Vol. I, 1995, §492 (Chanet and Pocar transmitted 38 
new communications); A/51/40, Vol. I, 1996, §378 (Pocar transmitted 62 new communications 
under Rule 91).  
107 The Committee’s Views and inadmissibility decisions are found in the Annexes to the HRC’s 
Annual Report to the General Assembly. Admissibility decisions, on the other hand, are not made 
public, not even after publication of the Committee’s decision on the merits. One exception is 
Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, public admissibility decision of 2 November 1999. It is 
therefore not possible to refer systematically to useful information included in these decisions. In 
this book incidentally references are made based on information from the files in Geneva.  
108 Sometimes the HRC appears to have used provisional measures only as part of the admissibility 
decision. This seemed to be the case in HRC Bernhard Lubuto v. Zambia (1995), meaning it took 
the HRC three and a half years before it used its provisional measures. Bernhard Lubuto v. 
Jamaica, 31 October 1995. In §4.4 of the View, the Committee notes that it declared the 
communication admissible on 30 June 1994 and it also notes that it had requested the State party, 
under Rule 86, not to carry out the death sentence against the petitioner pending the case. The 
initial submission was of 1 January 1990. From the references to Rule 86 in this paragraph one 
would almost conclude that it only used the provisional measure as part of the admissibility 
decision. Nevertheless, the file shows provisional measures were used already on 23 February 
1990. The case file, however, shows provisional measures were used within two months. In other 
words, the assumption based on the View is incorrect and can be explained by the Committee’s 
failure to provide the exact information in this decision. Equally, in George Graham and Arthur 
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2.4.7 Dividing decisions in time-periods depending on the availability of in-
formation 
Depending on the information they provide, the decisions of the Committee may be divided in 
several categories. The first category covers the period between August 1977 and April 1991. 
These older Views and inadmissibility decisions mention all decisions of the Committee in rela-
tion to the case, including decisions to take provisional measures.109 In other words, the format of 
the cases is such that information on their use can be identified in the View or decision itself.  
Apart from the interlocutory decisions mentioned above, on provisional measures separately 
published, for this period this research examined the Committee’s use of provisional measures in 
twenty inadmissibility decisions and three Views dealing with the death penalty,110 all in the early 
period from 1988 to April 1991. There was also one case dealing with deportation,111 one dealing 
with the protection of indigenous culture112 and several informal provisional measures (under 
Rule 91) dealing with the health of detainees.113  
During the period from April 1991 to March 1996 the format of the decisions changed. The 
HRC did no longer provide the information on the use of provisional measures in the text of the 
Views itself. In his 1995 article Tomuschat qualifies this change in format as ‘deplorable’. He 
points out that ‘the measure in which requests under Article 86 are made and heeded or disregarded 
by States is an important feature of any proceeding’.114 Fortunately, in this period it is often still 
possible to find out whether provisional measures were taken in a certain case because the HRC 
mentions this on the cover page of the View in question.115 Research with regard to this period 
uncovered provisional measures in a large number of inadmissibility decisions and Views.116 
In the period from July 1996 to August 1998 the Committee again changed the format of its 
Views, but this did not improve matters. As a general rule, the Committee did not mention prior 
                                                                                                                       
Morrison v. Jamaica, 25 March 1996 the HRC did not immediately use provisional measures, 
but seemingly only several years after the initial submission, after one of the petitioners had died 
during a prison incident. In fact the file shows that it did not use them at the admissibility stage in 
October 1994, but earlier, in October 1992. The initial submission was of 18 March 1991; Rule 
86/91 was of 25 October 1992.  
109 They can be found under ‘Documentation References’ on the cover page, with a reference to the 
document number. 
110 In this period the HRC published 206 Views and inadmissibility decisions. Between 1988 (when 
it started to use provisional measures in death penalty cases) and April 1991 it published 89 of 
these 206 cases. 
111 HRC O.E. v. S (22/1977). 
112 HRC Ominayak v. Canada, 26 March 1990.  
113 See Chapter VII. 
114 Tomuschat (1995), p. 629. 
115 As of July 1994 the Committee’s Views inform the reader (on the cover page) that the 
provisional measure ‘is not issued in document form’. This means that they no longer include the 
(internal) document number of the decision of provisional measures on the cover page of the 
View. The date of the transmittal of the provisional measure to the State Party is still mentioned.  
116 In total, in the approximately 200 Views and inadmissibility decisions published during this 
period, the HRC referred to provisional measures more than 60 times. It did so mainly, but not 
exclusively, in death penalty cases. Sometimes the HRC describes the transmittal of the 
communication under (former) Rule 91, but fails to mention its use of provisional measures in 
this respect. The use of these measures may still be mentioned on the cover page or in the text of 
the decision. In relation to the admissibility decision, the HRC may mention its renewed request 
for interim protection under Rule 86, although the cover page does not mention the Rule 86 of 
that date. See e.g., Michael Sawyers and Michael and Desmond McClean v. Jamaica, 11 April 
1991.  
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decisions on the cover page anymore and did not refer to them in the decision itself either.117 This 
means that it is not clear from the case law whether it used provisional measures during this pe-
riod and, if so, in which cases. Although from the situations involved one could assume the HRC 
had used them, this could only be confirmed through information collected at the Secretariat of the 
Committee in October 1998, April and August 2003.118 This period covers more than 100 inadmis-
sibility decisions and Views, none of them referring to provisional measures while, in fact, the HRC 
had indeed used provisional measures in at least 50 cases. Since 1997 the Rule on publicity and 
confidentiality stipulates that decisions to use provisional measures ‘shall be made public’. In this 
light one might have expected the Committee, in addition to mentioning the use of provisional 
measures in its Views, to publish these measures separately as well or otherwise to summarise 
them in its Annual Reports. Surprisingly, however, this new rule initially did not even trigger a 
restoration of the old format of the Committee’s Views, at least mentioning in which cases provi-
sional measures had been used. 
It took two years, until the October 1998 session, before the HRC mentioned its use of pro-
visional measures on the cover page again. These cover pages, however, were published neither on 
the treaty body database of the High Commissioner on Human Rights nor in the Committee’s An-
nual Report.119 Between October 1998 and March 2002 the HRC published 147 inadmissibility deci-
sions and Views. In more than 20 of these cases the HRC used provisional measures.120 The forego-
ing means that the information about the use of provisional measures during the six-year period from 
July 1996 until March 2002 has been particularly inaccessible. The HRC remedied this lack of 
transparency in March 2002 when it started to refer again to its provisional measures in a way that is 
accessible to the public, in other words, on publicly available cover pages and/or in the text of the 
Views themselves.121  
                                                 
117 It concerned the period from 16 July 1996 to 19 August 1998.  
118 The author visited the secretariat in Geneva in October 1998. At the time only the files recently 
closed (and some pending files) were available, not those already archived. Some files, moreover, 
were missing. In one week in March/April and one in August 2003 it was made possible to 
consult several archived files (some of them relating to files that had been pending in October 
1998). The author is grateful for the decision of March 2003 by a meeting of members of the 
HRC and HRC staff granting her access to these archived files with regard to decisions about the 
use of provisional measures. This decision was based on what was then Rule 96(5) of the Rules 
of Procedure (currently Rule 102(6)). Within the limited time period available a selection was 
made on the basis of death penalty cases from the time period in which the HRC did not mention 
its use of provisional measures in its decisions on the merits and inadmissibility, other cases in 
which questions arose about the use of provisional measures, recently discontinued cases (of 
which the communication numbers were available) and cases the author was alerted to in October 
1998 that could not be properly consulted then. It must be noted that case files do not always 
provide information about the use of provisional measures either: until about 1995 there was no 
formal exchange between Secretariat and Special Rapporteur about these measures. There would 
just be a phone call and, normally, a note in the file about the decision taken. 
119 Category IV in the table of cases (from 19 August 1998 to March 2002). It seems that, mistakenly, 
these cover pages had not been included in the decisions as made public. Consultation of the 
internal search system in Geneva (‘ODS search’) in April 2003, by entering communication 
numbers of cases in which Rule 86 was expected to have been used, uncovered only twelve cases 
mentioning Rule 86 on the (internal) cover page. There are, however, several other cases in 
which provisional measures were used during this period. Only a search of the case files 
uncovered this. There was even one case (614/1995) in which the internal cover pages did in fact 
mention previous decisions, including under Rule 91, but failed to mention that the Rapporteur 
had used Rule 86 as well. 
120 Again, this number it not necessarily exhaustive. 
121 Category V in the table of cases (as of March 2002).  
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It must be kept in mind that this division is based on the type of information available. It 
only indicates the format in which the HRC has presented its decisions, but is not meant to indi-
cate possible trends in its use of provisional measures.122 
2.4.8 The relevance of discontinued cases 
Provisional measures have not just been used in cases that were subsequently published (in Views 
and inadmissibility decisions), but also in cases that were later discontinued. If death penalty 
cases are discontinued this is usually because counsel had no other intention than to halt the exe-
cution. Following the stay a new avenue for appeal may have been opened or, as is often the case, 
the Secretariat was unable to contact the petitioners or their counsel. In death penalty cases this 
may equally indicate that the death sentence has been commuted so that counsel lost interest in 
the case. In expulsion cases, however, the fact that the alleged victim cannot be reached, clearly 
does not mean that the case has been solved. He may have been forcibly returned. In cases in 
which counsel is unable to contact his clients (usually after deportation, sometimes after prison 
transfers) the HRC has sometimes tried to find them through the Office of the UN High Commis-
sioner for Refugees. Usually, however, the search remains ineffective. This means that once a 
petitioner has been removed from the territory of the addressee State, this often marks the end of 
the individual complaint proceeding against that State. In relation to the death penalty and expul-
sion there are many discontinued cases, such as the above.  
By September 1997 the HRC reported a total number of 115 discontinued or withdrawn 
cases.123 As the communication numbers of these cases are not known it is not possible to check 
in which of them the HRC used provisional measures. It is only since the fall of 1998 that the 
HRC mentions the communication numbers of those cases it decided to discontinue.124 This was 
the result of the new rule concerning confidentiality and it meant, among others, that all final 
decisions would be made public, including decisions to discontinue a case. Still, the HRC does 
not indicate whether provisional measures were used in these cases. Thus, it is only possible to 
refer to these cases incidentally.125 This chapter refers to known cases in which the HRC used 
provisional measures, as well as those in which counsel requested the use of provisional measures 
to no avail.126  
                                                 
122 The drop in provisional measures under Category IV as compared to Category III, for instance, 
seems to relate more to the denunciation of the OP by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago, 
dramatically diminishing the number of provisional measures than to the difference in source. 
123 A/52/40, §456. 
124 A/53/40. 
125 See e.g. HRC A.A.T. v. Hungary (543/1993) for an example of a case in which provisional 
measures were used but that was later discontinued because it had been solved (on file with the 
author). In some cases counsel asked for discontinuance after, for instance, the promise that 
permanent residence visas would be granted, or after the victim’s release and changes in the law.  
126 See e.g. HRC A.B. v. Canada (622/1995); J.P.A.F. v. Canada (620/1995); P.L.-B. v. Canada 
(556/1993) and J.C.A. v. Costa Rica (725/1996) and X. v. Australia (776/1997), for examples of 
discontinued cases in which counsel’s request for provisional measures had been denied. In some 
cases it is not clear whether provisional measures were used. O. v. France (715/1996), for 
instance, concerned an impending deportation to Spain but it is not clear whether they were used. 
In one case, R. v. Canada (652/1995), the petitioner did not request provisional measures and the 
HRC did not grant them, but there was a discussion about serious hardship. It was possible to 
examine the case files of eight discontinued cases mentioned in the Committee’s reports to the 
General Assembly relating to sessions 53-56. In fact provisional measures were not applied in 
these cases. See e.g. HRC Coloma v. Russia (607/1995); Schier v. New Zealand (892/1999); Lee-
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2.4.9 No information on pending cases  
On the basis of the available material it is possible to draw tentative conclusions about the situa-
tions the HRC has dealt with and the protective measures required by its (informal) decisions on 
provisional measures. No comprehensive information is available on the direction the present 
Committee is taking, by way of its Rapporteur. This is so, exactly because it is necessary to await 
the publication of the cases on the merits. It is only occasionally that information becomes avail-
able in advance of publication of the decision on the merits.  
In some cases involving executions in violation of its provisional measures the HRC has 
made public official statements.127 In other cases counsel or others may have informed the 
press.128  
                                                                                                                       
Alexander v. Australia (723/1996); Huat v. Australia (681/1996); Nielson v. Australia 
(545/1993); Espinosa v. Ecuador (551/1993). One of the cases mentioned as discontinued was in 
fact concluded with a View. In Gutierrez Vivanco v. Peru (678/1996) the HRC found a violation 
of Article 14. Provisional measures played no role. There were two cases that related to 
deportation. In one of them the petitioner did not request provisional measures and the HRC did 
not grant them, but there was a discussion about serious hardship, see Richardson v. Canada 
(652/1995). In the other the petitioner did request Rule 86 but the HRC did not grant it. The case 
was discontinued following the petitioner’s expulsion, see A.B. v. Canada (622/1995). Four other 
case files relating to these sessions were not available. According to Secretariat staff at least two 
of these four cases were not applicable: HRC Agatanova v. Latvia (764/1997) and Kravchenko v. 
Latvia (713/1996). While the latter case related to deportation, the petitioner’s wife had already 
been deported before he submitted the case. In Williams v. New Zealand (773/1997) the 
petitioner had requested the HRC to use provisional measures to request the State to make 
available kidney dialysis so as to prevent irreparable harm. The HRC did not do so and eventually 
the case was discontinued. See Chapter XII (Other situations). The fourth case, O. v. France 
(715/1996) concerned an impending deportation to Spain. It is not clear whether provisional 
measures were used. It was also possible to examine some other files of discontinued cases, some 
of earlier periods, on the assumption that they might relate to deportation or death penalty cases. 
Two of these cases appeared to be inapplicable. HRC Nunes v. Jamaica, (745/1997) and Sahli v. 
France (629/1995). Five of them did involve the use of provisional measures to halt an execution. 
See e.g. HRC Frank McKnight v. Jamaica (729/1996), Rule 86 of 4 December 1996; case 
discontinued on 29 July 2003. In H.M. v. Jamaica, (595/1994) the HRC used provisional 
measures on 8 November 1994. In April 1995 the petitioner withdrew the case following 
reclassification of his sentence from capital to non-capital on 20 March 1995. His counsel pointed 
out that their client’s sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment. They withdrew the case 
because their objective for requesting the Committee’s recommendations had been fulfilled. 
Letter of 18 April 1995. Hence, at its 54th session the HRC decided to discontinue the case, letter 
of 3 August 1995. See also E.P. v. Trinidad and Tobago (636/1995), Rule 86 of 27 June 1995, 
discontinued 29 July 2003 (on file with the author). In Rockliff Ross v. Guyana, 703/1996, the 
State executed the petitioner despite provisional measures. See also Reece v. Jamaica, 247/1987, 
both discussed Chapter III (Executions). In several cases the HRC failed or refused to use 
provisional measures to halt a deportation. See e.g. HRC P.L.-B v. Canada (556/1993); J.P.A.F. 
v. Canada (620/1995); A.B. v. Canada (622/1995); J. v. Canada (685/1996) and J.C.A. v. Costa 
Rica (725/1996). In total, this book refers to nine discontinued cases in which the HRC used 
provisional measures. As noted, five of them dealt with halting executions. One dealt with halting 
the execution of a detention order. HRC V. v. Spain, 495/1992. Three cases dealt with halting 
expulsion or extradition. HRC O.E. v. S., 22 /1977; A.A.T. v. Hungary, 543/1993 and E.G. v. 
Canada, 738/1997. One case, finally, dealt with providing access to counsel and court. HRC A. et 
al. v. Angola, 810/1998. 
127 See public statements following the execution of Ashby, HRC Summary Record of the 1352nd 
meeting: Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1994; Dante Piandiong et al. v. the Philippines, 19 
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Until the HRC decides to publish its provisional measures separately for those who wish to 
consult them, to issue press releases in some of these cases or at least an overview of its provi-
sional measures in its Annual Report, the information on the use of provisional measures will 
become available only upon publication of its final Views and inadmissibility decisions.129 
In my view, after publication of the final Views, the previous admissibility decision should 
be made available as well. If it is advisable to ‘anonymise’ the (alleged) victim, initials could be 
used instead of the full names. Moreover, the Committee should always discuss the procedure 
under a separate heading and include references to the provisional measures taken. It would be 
preferable if it also provided a short explanation of the purpose of the provisional measure. In any 
case a specification should be included in the note verbale sent to the State. In my opinion this 
would enhance the authoritativeness of the provisional measure. 
2.4.10 Construing the purpose of provisional measures from the Committee’s 
case law 
The lack of consistent references to and explanations for the use of provisional measures necessi-
tates an approach drawing conclusions from the factual situations, the rights claimed and the 
eventual decisions on the merits and reparation. In this light, it is necessary not only to present the 
conclusions, together with references to the sources, but to present as well the construction of this 
source material. This is so precisely because the findings are construed and cannot be found as 
such in the text of the decisions.  
If sufficient case law is available on certain issues, for instance on the death penalty, it is 
not necessary to present the issue on a case-by-case basis. If there are only a limited number of 
(diverse) cases available on an issue, however, such approach is indeed warranted. In some cases 
the context provided in the relevant Views themselves is insufficient and additional information is 
                                                                                                                       
October 2000. See also Mansaraj et al.; Gborie et al. and Sesay et al. v. Sierra Leone, 16 July 
2001 and Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002. See further press release, 
‘Human Rights Committee deplores the execution of six individuals in Uzbekistan’, 24 July 
2003. The petitioners who were executed were Muzaffar Mirzaev (case 1170/2003), Shukrat 
Andasbaev (case 1166/2003), Ulugbek Ashov (case 1165/2003), Ilkhon Babadzhanov and 
Maksud Ismailov (case 1162/2003), and Azamat Uteev (case 1150/2003). In addition see Barno 
Saidova v. Tajikistan, 8 July 2004. In other cases NGOs sometimes make available information. 
While the case of Ahani was still pending, sources other than the HRC had already made 
available information about the provisional measures and the fact that Canada nevertheless 
deported him. Amnesty International urgent action of 17 May 2002 and Amnesty International 
Annual Report 2003, p. 67. Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, 
CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002, 15 June 2004. See the discussion of this case in Chapter V 
(Expulsion). The Asian Human Rights Commission made public information about the use of 
provisional measures to the effect that Sri Lanka would protect Michael Anthony Fernando and 
his family against threats. See e.g. the urgent appeals on its website, <www.ahrchk.net> 
(consulted on 5 August 2004). See further about this case Chapter IX (Threats).  
128 An example is a newspaper article referring to a ‘Geneva based United Nations human rights 
panel’, which agreed to examine the Bakhtiyari family’s case on 28 March 2002 and had 
recommended Australia not to deport the children until it had been able to determine the case. 
Richard C. Paddock, ‘A family apart in Australia’, Los Angeles Times, 10 April 2002, 
reproduced at <www.carad-wa.org> (consulted 9 April 2003). The HRC published its decision on 
the merits in 2003: Bakhtiyari v. Australia, 29 October 2003. See further in Chapter V on halting 
expulsion and Chapter VII on detention situations involving risks to health and safety.  
129 In September 2002 the Special Rapporteur reported he had used more than 20 provisional 
measures, many of them involving conditions of detention (health care) and expulsion. Interview 
of author with Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin, Maastricht 20 September 2002. 
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derived from other sources such as NGO reports and Concluding Observations by the HRC in 
relation to State reports under Article 40 ICCPR. 
3 CAT, CEDAW AND CERD  
3.1 Introduction 
In light of their adjudicatory function, in light of the object and purpose of the treaties and the 
individual petition system, the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD), 
supervising the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion (ICERD),130 and the Committee against Torture (CAT) supervising the Convention against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (ICAT),131 have in-
cluded in their Rules of Procedure the possibility of taking provisional measures.  
For the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women 
(CEDAW),132 the possibility of individual complaint was only recently introduced, by way of an 
Optional Protocol. This Protocol includes an explicit article on provisional measures. The same 
applies to the even more recent UN Convention against Disappearances, which has not yet en-
tered into force. It explicitly provides for the possibility (and obligation) to take urgent action. 
CAT has an established practice with regard to provisional measures while CERD has never 
used them and the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) 
has only just started its practice. Dealing with complaints under the most recent individual com-
plaint mechanism, CEDAW has used provisional measures in 2003, requesting the State to take 
protective measures to prevent irreparable harm to the petitioner because of domestic violence.133 
CAT takes almost all its provisional measures under Article 3 (non-refoulement).134 Yet 
there is one case in which it took them in order to protect family members and witnesses against 
threats and another case in which it did so in the context of the State’s obligation to act against 
impunity.135 As the majority of its case law deals with the question whether or not there would be 
a real risk of torture in the receiving or requesting State, most of its case law will be dealt with in 
Chapter XV about provisional measures and assessment of risk.  
While CERD has never used provisional measures as of yet there are situations in which it 
could feasibly use them in the future.136 Article 2(1)(a) CERD stipulates that States refrain from 
                                                 
130 ICERD was concluded in 1965 and entered into force in 1969. It has 173 States parties (as of 18 
July 2007). 
131 ICAT was concluded in 1984 and entered into force in 1987. It has 145 States parties (as of 2 
October 2007).  
132 CEDAW was concluded in 1979 and entered into force in 1981. There are 185 States parties (as 
of 20 July 2007).  
133 CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005. See further Chapter IX (Threats). 
134 Between 1993 and 2003 CAT took provisional measures in more than 80 cases involving non-
refoulement. See Chapter V (Non-refoulement) and Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk).  
135 CAT B.M’.B v. Tunisia (inadm.), 5 May 1994 and Suleymane Guengueng et al. v. Senegal 
(involving former Chadian dictator Habré), Press release Human Rights Watch, 23 April 2001, 
‘United Nations asks Senegal to hold Ex-Chad Dictator’, <www.hrw.org/justice/habre> (accessed 
22 June 2005); confirmed formally in Note Verbale CAT to HRW of 27 April 2001, 
<http://www.hrw.org/french/themes/habre-legal.htm> (accessed 22 June 2005). 
136 Until 2000 the number of cases decided by CERD was extremely small. See Van Boven (2000a) 
and Van Boven (2001a), also referring to the ‘modest number of communications received and 
considered’. Before 2000 the Committee published decisions (views and inadmissibility 
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racial discrimination and ensure that public authorities and institutions refrain from such dis-
crimination. Article 3 obliges States to prevent racial segregation and apartheid and Article 4 to 
take immediate and positive measures against incitement of racial hatred. Article 5 lays down the 
security of the person including the protection from violence or bodily harm (Article 5(b)),137 the 
right to vote (Article 5(c)) and social, economic and cultural rights such as the right to housing, 
health care and education (Article 5(e)). This right is of particular importance when children are 
involved.138 Article 6 refers to the undertaking to ensure effective protection and remedies includ-
ing reparation and satisfaction. 
If CERD would decide to take provisional measures this would likely be in the context of 
widespread and systematic discrimination or in an extreme individual case.139 In this respect there 
may be similarities with its practice to take preventive measures including early warning and 
urgent procedures with regard to situations requiring its immediate attention outside of the regular 
process of commenting on State reports.140 When it initiated this practice in 1993 it referred to the 
conclusion by the fourth meeting of the chairpersons that the human rights treaty bodies had an 
important role to play not only in responding to human rights violations but also in seeking to 
prevent them. Each treaty body should consider whether procedural innovations would be re-
quired to enable it to take all possible measures within its competence in order to prevent human 
rights violations and monitor more closely emergency situations.141 
It is perhaps not surprising that the treaty body dealing with the smallest number of individ-
ual petitions was the first and, thus far, only body to institute a formal process for urgent situa-
tions. The HRC did decide, in April 1991 that it could request periodic emergency reports, but has 
                                                                                                                       
decisions) in nine cases. Between 2000 and August 2007 another 29 cases were concluded with 
an inadmissibility decision or decision on the merits (based on UN statistical survey of 15 August 
2007). 
137 See Chapter IX (Threats) on the use of provisional measures by other adjudicators to protect 
against such threats. 
138 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
139 See Chapter XI discussing provisional measures in the Inter-American system to prevent mass 
expulsion and by the Bosnia Chamber to halt forced eviction. As noted in Chapter I (ICJ), in 
October 2008 the ICJ ordered provisional measures to the effect that both Parties shall refrain 
from any act of racial discrimination and from sponsoring, defending or supporting such acts; that 
they shall facilitate humanitarian assistance; and that they shall refrain from any action which 
might prejudice the respective rights of the Parties or might aggravate or extend the dispute. ICJ 
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, 
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), 15 October 2008 (by a 8-7 vote).  
140 This became part of its regular agenda in 1994. See its working paper on this issue, A/48/18, 
Annex III. The General Assembly has supported this approach, see e.g. General Assembly 
resolution 48/90, 20 December 1993, A/RES/48/90, 16 February 1994: “Encourages the 
Committee to continue to exert its efforts to enhance its contributions in the area of prevention of 
racial discrimination, including early warning and urgent procedures”. The distinction between 
early warning measures and urgent procedures is not always clear in practice, but the former 
would be aimed at addressing existing problems in order to prevent escalation while the latter 
would respond to ‘problems requiring immediate attention to prevent or limit the scale or number 
of serious violations of the Convention’. See e.g. the Annual Report of CERD to the General 
Assembly, 22 September 1995, A/50/18, §§20-24. See e.g. Van Boven (1998), pp. 165-182. 
141 Fourth meeting of Chairpersons of the human rights treaty bodies, 42nd session, A/47/628, §44.  
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not often used this method.142 The other treaty bodies have, on occasion, asked for special re-
ports.143 
This section discusses the right of individual petition and the power of CERD, CAT and 
CEDAW to order provisional measures, the promptness of CAT in deciding on the use of provi-
sional measures and the availability of information on the use of these measures.144 
3.2 The right of individual complaint and CERD, CAT and CEDAW 
CERD consists of eighteen, CAT of ten and CEDAW of twenty-three independent experts. Like 
the decisions of the HRC, the decisions of the other UN supervisory bodies dealing with individ-
ual complaints must be seen in their wider context, including the tasks of these bodies under the 
reporting procedure.145 Similar to the HRC they publish Concluding Observations on State reports 
as well as General Comments on specific issues.146  
CAT’s Rapporteur for follow-up to State party reports and gender issues has pointed out 
that the follow-up procedure has been established to ensure compliance with Article 2 ICAT. 
Matters for which CAT requested measures in the context of its follow-up procedure should meet 
three criteria: ‘they must be urgent, protective and achievable within one year’.147 These refer-
ences, especially to urgency and to the criterion of protective measures, are relevant as well in the 
context of provisional measures. Also relevant is the response by the Chairperson of CAT to a 
remark by the representative of China. The Chairperson noted:  
                                                 
142 See A/50/40, §§36 and 39. For examples see Boerefijn (1999a), pp. 255-283 (on reporting under 
exceptional circumstances). 
143 The International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) notes that the UN Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (a committee not currently dealing with individual 
petitions) ‘is the quickest at examining situations, which are not dealt with by state party reports’. 
These ‘consist in sending letters to the relevant governments, expressing the concern of the 
Committee in relation to the information gathered and asking for factual information in 
response’. The FIDH adds that these examinations are ‘carried out outside any well-defined 
procedure’. In this respect the Committee seems to prefer ‘to justify its reaction within the 
framework of its follow-up to earlier recommendations’ although urgency is indeed ‘one of the 
factors in sending letters of concern’. International Federation for Human Rights, Progress report 
on implementation of FIDH program (2000-2001), treaty monitoring bodies: mechanisms to be 
supported, report 322/2, December 2002, p. 20.  
144 On 4 April 2008 the UN Working Group on the Optional Protocol adopted by consensus a draft 
for an Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
and sent it for consideration to the Human Rights Council. This draft also includes an Article 5 
on interim measures, which refers to the discretion of the supervisory committee to ‘transmit to 
the State Party concerned for its urgent consideration a request that the State Party take such 
interim measures as may be necessary in exceptional circumstances to avoid possible irreparable 
damage to the victim or victims of the alleged violations’. 
145 See e.g. Flinterman (2003), pp. 621-624; Bayefsky (2002); Bayefsky (2001); Ingelse (2001); 
Alston/Crawford (2000); Bayefsky (2002); O’ Flaherty (1996). 
146 CERD and CEDAW have regularly issued General Comments. CAT, thus far, has only published 
a General Comment on Article 3 ICAT (non-refoulement) and one on Article 2 on 
Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, see further Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
147 See CAT Summary Record of the 662nd Meeting, 19 May 2005, CAT/C/SR.662, 2 June 2005, §5 
(Ms. Gaer, US, Rapporteur for follow-up to State party reports and gender issues). 
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“It was standard practice to raise questions about individual cases during the dialogue with 
States parties, most of which had not been reluctant to reply. However, as a rule, such cases 
were not mentioned in the conclusions and recommendations”.148 
Article 22 ICAT lays down the right of individual complaint against States that have specifically 
recognised CAT’s competence in this regard.149 The same applies to Article 14 ICERD.150 The 
individual complaint procedure under the Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention entered 
into force on in December 2000.151 CEDAW’s first decision on the merits concerned protection 
against domestic violence.152 In this case it also used provisional measures. The proceedings of 
CERD, CAT and CEDAW do not significantly differ from those of the HRC.153  
3.3 Power and promptness of CAT and CEDAW to take provisional 
measures and the possibilities of the new Committee against 
Disappearances 
3.3.1 Introduction 
As noted, CERD was the first UN treaty body introducing provisional measures in its Rules of 
Procedure. Rule 94(3) is phrased as follows: 
“In the course of its consideration, the Committee may inform the State party of its views on the 
desirability, because of urgency, of taking interim measures to avoid possible irreparable 
damage to the person or persons who claim to be victim(s) of the alleged violation. In doing so, 
the Committee shall inform the State party concerned that such expression of its views on 
interim measures does not prejudge either its final opinion on the merits of the communication 
or its eventual suggestions and recommendation”. 
                                                 
148 See CAT Summary Record of the 662nd Meeting, 19 May 2005, CAT/C/SR.662, 2 June 2005, 
§32. 
149 Of the States parties to the ICAT 61 have also recognised the right of individual petition, 17 of 
them since 2000. Japan, the UK and the US have only recognised the inter-State procedure that 
has never been used as of yet. See UN statistical survey, updated 23 November 2007 
untreaty.un.org (accessed 11 July 2005). About the treaty itself and the process leading up to its 
conclusion and ratification see Burgers/Danelius (1988) and Boulesbaa (1999). About the 
individual complaint procedure and case law see Doerfel (2005); Gorlick (1999); pp. 479-495, 
esp. pp. 484-492; Ingelse (2001); Gorlick (2000), pp. 117-177, esp. pp. 150-164. 
150 Since 2000, the number of States parties to the ICERD that recognised the competence of CERD 
to receive and consider communications under Article 14 ICERD increased from 31 to 51. See 
UN statistical survey, 15 August 2007. 
151 The right of individual complaint under the OP to the CEDAW has been recognised by 89 States. 
See UN statistical survey, 8 November 2007. 
152 CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005. See also Boerefijn (2005a), pp. 470-480. 
153 See section 2 of this Chapter on the HRC. See also Chapter XIV on admissibility and jurisdiction. 
CAT often refers to the ‘complainant’, CEDAW to the ‘author’ and CERD to the ‘petitioner’. 
Generally about the proceedings see Complaint Procedures, Fact Sheet No. 7/Rev.1 and The 
United Nations Human Rights Treaty System: An introduction to the core human rights treaties 
and the treaty bodies, Fact sheet no. 30, June 2005; Hannum (2004); Bayefsky (2002); 
Barkhuysen/Van Emmerik/Rieter (2008); Amnesty International Handbook to combat racial 
discrimination (2001); Tanaka/Nagamine (2001); O’Flaherty (1996); Zwaak (1991). 
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While CERD has never invoked it as of yet, the Rule did serve as a source of inspiration when the 
HRC was drafting its Rules of Procedure.154 
Rule 108 of CAT’s Rules of Procedure stipulates: 
“1. At any time after the receipt of a complaint, the Committee, a working group, or the Rappor-
teur(s) for new complaints and interim measures may transmit to the State party concerned, for 
its urgent consideration, a request that it take such interim measures as the Committee considers 
necessary to avoid irreparable damage to the victim or victims of alleged violations. 
2. Where the Committee, the Working Group, or Rapporteur(s) request(s) interim measures un-
der this rule, the request shall not imply a determination of the admissibility or the merits of the 
complaint. The State party shall be so informed upon transmittal. 
3. Where a request for interim measures is made by the Working Group or Rapporteur(s) under 
the present rule, the Working Group or Rapporteur(s) should inform the Committee members of 
the nature of the request and the complaint to which the request relates at the next regular ses-
sion of the Committee. 
4. The Secretary-General shall maintain a list of such requests for interim measures. 
5. The Rapporteur for new complaints and interim measures shall also monitor compliance with 
the Committee’s requests for interim measures”. 
As noted, the OP to the Women’s Convention explicitly refers to the power to take provisional 
measures. Its Article 5 stipulates: 
“1. At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits 
has been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent con-
sideration a request that the State Party take such interim measures as may be necessary to avoid 
possible irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged violation.  
2. Where the Committee exercises its discretion under paragraph 1 of the present article, this 
does not imply a determination on admissibility or on the merits of the communication”.155 
Article 31 International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced 
Disappearance156 provides for an optional individual complaint procedure. Its section 4 stipulates:  
                                                 
154 See section 2.4 of this Chapter. 
155 Rule 63 Rules of Procedure CEDAW-Committee (A/56/38, Annex 1): “1. At any time after the 
receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits has been reached, the 
Committee may transmit to the State party concerned, for its urgent consideration, a request that 
it take such interim measures as the Committee considers necessary to avoid irreparable damage 
to the victim or victims of the alleged violation. 2. A working group or rapporteur may also 
request the State party concerned to take such interim measures as the working group or 
rapporteur considers necessary to avoid irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged 
violation. 3. When a request for interim measures is made by a working group or rapporteur 
under the present rule, the working group or rapporteur shall forthwith thereafter inform the 
Committee members of the nature of the request and the communication to which the request 
relates. 4. Where the Committee, a working group or a rapporteur requests interim measures 
under this rule, the request shall state that it does not imply a determination of the merits of the 
communication”. CEDAW’s Working Group on Communications under the OP to the CEDAW 
has recommended deletion of the words ‘or rapporteur’ in this rule, leaving it for the working 
group to deal with requests for provisional measures, see its Report of its ninth session, 26 
February 2007, in: Sessional/Annual Report of Committee CEDAW/C/2007/111/WGCOP/L.1, 
§8(g). 
156 Adopted 20 December 2006, not yet entered into force (by December 2008: 71 signatories and 
one ratification (Albania)). 
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“4. At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits 
has been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent 
consideration a request that the State Party will take such interim measures as may be necessary 
to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victims of the alleged violation. Where the 
Committee exercises its discretion, this does not imply a determination on admissibility or on 
the merits of the communication”. 
Yet in urgent cases the Committee may address even States parties that have not recognized the 
individual complaint procedure under Article 31. The innovative Article 30 introduces the 
possibility for the Committee to intervene upon a request ‘by relatives of the disappeared person 
or their legal representatives, their counsel or any person authorized by them, as well as by any 
other person having a legitimate interest’ that ‘a disappeared person should be sought and found’. 
In fact when it considers that a range of procedural requirements is met, it ‘shall request the State 
Party concerned to provide it with information on the situation of the persons sought, within a 
time limit set by the Committee’.157 
3.3.2 Promptness and delegation 
In 2002 CAT introduced its new Rules of Procedure, creating the Special Rapporteur on New 
Complaints and Interim Measures to enhance consistency and speed. Following a proposal by 
Committee member Mavrommatis Rule 108 refers to ‘Rapporteur(s)’ rather than to ‘Rapporteur’. 
Mavrommatis had pointed out that ‘in view of the urgency of requests for interim measures the 
Committee should envisage having an alternate to such a rapporteur, who would be able to deal 
immediately with a case in the absence of the Rapporteur for New Complaints’.158  
Previously the Secretariat transmitted each new communication to the Chairman, ‘who con-
sulted the other members of the Committee about it’.159  
“In appointing the rapporteur for a given communication, language considerations were taken 
into account, since the rapporteur often had to examine the dossier in depth. The procedure was 
therefore pragmatic rather than systematic, but was perhaps less effective than that of the 
Human Rights Committee”.160 
Most information about the promptness of CAT’s provisional measures is available over the 
period 1993-2003 and is unlikely to reflect the increased promptness suggested by the 2002 deci-
sion to assign one member of CAT with the task to deal with provisional measures. In the period 
under review it generally took the Committee a few weeks to decide on provisional measures. 
There are some instances in which it was able to take them on the day on which it received the 
petition.161 There are also cases in which it took them half a year after the petitioner requested 
                                                 
157 On the procedural requirements see Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
158 CAT Summary Records 28th session, 6 May 2002, CAT/C/SR.513, 15 May 2002, §92. 
159 Summary Records 27th session, 13 November 2001, CAT/C/SR.487, 10 March 2003, §20 (Burns, 
Canada). 
160 Ibidem. 
161 See CAT Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994 (petition and provisional measure 18 
November 1993) and P.S.S. v. Canada, 13 November 1998 (petition and provisional measure 5 
May 1997). 
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them.162 In one case it took provisional measures within a day, but the petitioner was deported on 
that same day. The State argued that it had received the Note Verbale too late.163  
Initially CAT used provisional measures almost automatically in any Article 3 case. Later a 
Special Rapporteur was introduced. As provisional measures are considered to be ‘fairly intru-
sive’ the Rapporteur would ask the secretariat to make a quick assessment on the substance of the 
complaint and whether there was prima facie evidence of risk. This resulted in the use of provi-
sional measures in a lower percentage of cases.164  
In 2005 the representative of Sweden pointed out that when CAT requested provisional 
measures ‘it would be helpful if the request was forwarded at a reasonable time, in other words 
before 6 p.m. on a Friday evening’.165 The Rapporteur on interim measures pointed out that 
‘while he always tried to observe the 24 hour rule, it was sometimes necessary to ask the State 
party for further information’.166 This seems to indicate that, since the institution of a Rapporteur, 
an attempt is made to take provisional measures within a day of receipt of a request to that end.  
The Rules of Procedure by the CEDAW foresee delegation of the authority to take provi-
sional measures to a working group or rapporteur, but the Working Group on Communications 
has suggested the deletion of the reference to ‘or rapporteur’.167 On 20 October 2003 the used 
provisional measures for the first time.168  
                                                 
162 See e.g. X, Y and Z v. Sweden, 6 May 1998 (provisional measures on behalf of Z on 22 
November 1996; initial submission 27 June 1996). 
163 CAT J.A.G.V. v. Sweden, 11 November 2003 (provisional measure and expulsion of 23 July 
2002); see also Z.T. v. Australia, 19 November 2003 in which the petition dated from 4 January 
2000 and the provisional measure was sent on 26 January 2000, on which day the State expelled 
the petitioner. 
164 About 60 to 70 % according to an estimate made at the secretariat in Geneva in October 2003. 
Yet see Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk), section 3.2.4 under the heading ‘assessment of risk by 
CAT. 
165 See Summary Record of the 662nd Meeting, 19 May 2005, CAT/C/SR.662, 2 June 2005, §24 
(Ms. Sundberg, representative Sweden). 
166 See Summary Record of the 662nd Meeting, 19 May 2005, CAT/C/SR.662, 2 June 2005, §36 (Mr. 
Mavrommatis, Rapporteur on interim measures). See also Chapter XV on immediacy and risk. 
167 See Rule 63. Yet its Working Group on Communications under the Optional Protocol has 
suggested the deletion of the words ‘or rapporteur’, see its Report of its ninth session, 26 
February 2007, in: Sessional/Annual Report of Committee CEDAW/C/2007/111/WGCOP/L.1, 
§8(g). 
168 See CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005 (the petitioner sent a request on 10 October; 
2003; 10 days later provisional measures were used; a corrigendum was sent on 17 November 
2003 and a follow-up on 13 July 2004). Based on information provided by Prof. Flinterman, 
member of the Working Group, Maastricht 10 June 2005, Beate Schöpp-Schilling, Chairperson 
of the Working Group on individual petitions, used these provisional measures upon consultation 
with other members of the Working Group. At the time CEDAW was the only UN treaty body 
based in New York rather than Geneva. When the Optional Protocol introducing the right of 
individual complaint entered into force, members of its staff visited Geneva for two weeks to 
inform themselves about the practices of the other treaty bodies. Obviously this included the 
practices with regard to provisional measures. There were weekly contacts (e-mail and phone) for 
purposes of coordination. The person with overall responsibility for the individual petition 
procedures in Geneva was previously active for CEDAW in New York, which may also be 
helpful for the integration of working methods. In 2008 the Committee transferred to Geneva. 
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3.3.3 Proprio motu 
The text of the CAT’s Rule on provisional measures does not exclude their proprio motu use and 
as most complaints involve Article 3 (non-refoulement) it would be very rigid, and disagree with 
the purpose of the Rule, to insist on an explicit invocation by the petitioner in such cases where 
the petitioner already mentions a date of expulsion and argues before CAT that such expulsion 
would violate the principle of non-refoulement.169 The text of the OP to the Women’s Convention 
does not preclude proprio motu use of provisional measures either and neither does the text of 
CEDAW’s Rules of Procedure. 
3.3.4 Withdrawing provisional measures 
As noted, generally human rights adjudicators take provisional measures for a limited period and, 
based on the facts, they may decide to extend them or not to renew them at all after this period has 
lapsed. Moreover, in practice the HRC, the Inter-American Commission and Court and the 
ECtHR have been known to lift provisional measures upon receipt of pertinent information on 
changed circumstances or lack of urgency or risk.170 Nevertheless, since 2002 the CAT’s Rule on 
provisional measures (Rule 108) explicitly invites the State to protest against the use of 
provisional measures: 
“6.The State party may inform the Committee that the reasons for the interim measures have 
lapsed or present arguments why the request for interim measures should be lifted. 
7.The Rapporteur, the Committee or the Working Group may withdraw the request for interim 
measures”.171 
A reason for the inclusion of this rule may be the letters received by a few states threatening 
withdrawal from the individual complaint system. These States had done so at a strategic moment 
in time, just after the withdrawals by Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago from the OP to the 
ICCPR. This may have been why CAT formally introduced this ‘mini procedure’ in which the 
State is informed of the possibility to request a withdrawal of the provisional measures.  
In 2003 some members of the secretariat expressed the fear that this new rule would be used 
by States as a tool for taking provisional measures less seriously.172 Indeed, discomfort about the 
                                                 
169 CAT has also declared petitions admissible in which the petitioner, not assisted by counsel, does 
not specifically invoke Article 3 ICAT but indicates a fear of torture upon expulsion. In such 
cases it has also used provisional measures. See e.g. CAT V.L. v. Switzerland, 20 November 2006 
(provisional measures 14 January 2005). 
170 See e.g. Chapter XV on immediacy and risk. 
171 Former Rules 108(9) and 110(3) of CAT’s Rules of Procedure did not contain such invitation. 
Rule 108(9) was as follows: “In the course of the consideration of the question of the 
admissibility of a communication, the Committee, or a working group or a special rapporteur 
designated under rule 106, paragraph 3, may request the States parties to take steps to avoid 
possible irreparable damage to the person or persons who claim to be victim(s) of the alleged 
violation. Such a request addressed to the State party does not imply that any decision has been 
reached on the question of the admissibility of the communication”. Former Rule 110(3) 
stipulated: “In the course of its considerations, the Committee may inform the State party of its 
views on the desirability, because of urgency, of taking interim measures to avoid possible 
irreparable damage to the person or persons who claim to be victim(s) of the alleged violation. In 
doing so, the Committee shall inform the State party concerned that such expression of its views 
on interim measures does not prejudge its final views on the merits of the communication”. See 
Rules of Procedure 1984 as amended during the 13th session, A/50/44 Annex 4. 
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new rule also appears from the statements by members of the Committee itself. During the draft-
ing process of the mandate of the Rapporteur on New Complaints and Interim Measures Commit-
tee member Mariño (Spain) had argued that it would ‘be more prudent to authorise the Rapporteur 
to act in conjunction with the plenary or the Bureau or, at the very least, in consultation with the 
Chairman’ when deciding to withdraw provisional measures. ‘Given that a person’s life could be 
at stake’ the Rapporteur should not be empowered to act alone on this matter. While he did not 
wish to ‘cast doubts on the sound judgment of the Rapporteur’, he did wish to ‘make sure that 
appropriate safeguards were in place’.173 González Poblete (Chile) responded that ‘the most im-
portant task was to establish uniform criteria and uniform jurisprudence’. To achieve this ‘the 
Rapporteur would report to the Committee on his or her decisions and Committee would indicate 
what corrective action needed to be taken in the future, if required’.174 The full Committee did not 
adopt the suggestion by Mariño about the need for consultation before provisional measures 
would be withdrawn. 
The reference in each ‘request’ for provisional measures by the Special Rapporteur to the 
fact that this ‘request could be reviewed in the light of observations provided by the State party on 
the admissibility or on the merits’ would indeed appear to trigger more requests for withdrawal. 
Yet the new Special Rapporteur certainly did not automatically heed to States’ requests for such 
withdrawals. In April 2002 the Special Rapporteur denied a request by Germany to withdraw the 
Committee’s provisional measures.175 Germany had taken this course of action while it was the 
first time provisional measures had ever been requested against it.  
Another example of CAT not immediately heeding to a State’s request for a withdrawal of 
provisional measures is one taken in December 2003 in which a reference to the possibility of 
withdrawal had been added: “The Rapporteur indicated that this request could be reviewed in the 
light of new arguments presented by the State party”. CAT also noted that the State party acceded 
to this request.176 In February 2004 ‘the State party challenged the admissibility of the communi-
cation and requested the Committee to withdraw its request for interim measures, pursuant to 
Rule 108, paragraph 7, of the Committee's rules of procedure’. The View notes that the petitioner 
objected to the State party's motion for withdrawal of the provisional measures, but it does not 
specify what was the Committee’s response. It only notes that the Secretariat informed the State 
party that admissibility and merits would be examined separately.177 Subsequently it found the 
                                                                                                                       
172 Yet it was also suggested that the Committee would not mention any withdrawals in its Views 
because then it would look like CAT made a mistake if it had to withdraw and it could discourage 
petitioners. In fact it appears that the Committee has referred to withdrawals and State’s requests 
for withdrawals and to the extent that it has not, such lack of transparency would not enhance the 
Committee’s credibility. 
173 CAT Summary Records, 28th session, 16 May 2002, CAT/C/SR.527, 29 May 2002, §25. 
174 CAT Summary Records, 28th session, 16 May 2002, CAT/C/SR.527, 29 May 2002, §26. 
175 In November 2002 the State party had submitted its observations on the admissibility of the 
complaint ‘together with a motion asking the Committee to withdraw its request for interim 
measures, pursuant to Rule 108, paragraph 7, of the Committees rules of procedure’. Counsel 
asked the Committee to maintain its provisional measures ‘until a final decision on the complaint 
has been taken’. ‘On 4 April 2002, the Committee, through its Rapporteur on new 
communications and interim measures, decided not to withdraw its request for interim measures’. 
See §1.3. Eventually in this case it did not find a violation of Article 3 ICAT. The petitioner had 
‘failed to establish a foreseeable, real and personal risk of being tortured if he were to be returned 
to Turkey’. CAT did welcome the ‘State party's readiness to monitor the complainant's situation 
following his return to Turkey’ and requested it to ‘keep the Committee informed about said 
situation’. CAT M.A.K. v. Germany, 12 May 2004, §13.9. 
176 CAT R.T. v. Switzerland, 24 November 2005 (inadm.), §1.2. 
177 Id., §1.3. 
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claim manifestly unfounded and declared the case inadmissible. In light of cases such as these it 
would seem that informing States of the possibility to request withdrawal of provisional measures 
is simply a gesture to placate them. 
3.4 Decisions of CAT and CEDAW to take provisional measures: 
transparency or the lack thereof?  
Like the HRC, CEDAW and CAT do not publish their provisional measures separately.178 The 
request is usually included in the last paragraph of a Note Verbale to the State party.  
Unless one of the parties decides to make public the information on the use of provisional 
measures pending the case information will only be available upon publication of the decision on 
the merits.179 References to the use of provisional measures in their decisions usually are not very 
                                                 
178 Rule 74 Rules of Procedure CEDAW (Confidentiality of communications) provides: 
 “1. Communications submitted under the Optional Protocol shall be examined by the Committee, 
working group or rapporteur in closed meetings. 2. All working documents prepared by the 
Secretariat for the Committee, working group or rapporteur, including summaries of 
communications prepared prior to registration and the list of summaries of communications, shall 
be confidential unless the Committee decides otherwise. 3. The Committee, working group or 
rapporteur shall not make public any communication, submissions or information relating to a 
communication prior to the date on which its views are issued. 4. The author or authors of a 
communication or the individuals who are alleged to be the victim or victims of a violation of the 
rights set forth in the Convention may request that the names and identifying details of the 
alleged victim or victims (or any of them) not be published. 5. If the Committee, working group 
or rapporteur so decides, the name or names and identifying details of the author or authors of a 
communication or the individuals who are alleged to be the victim or victims of a violation of 
rights set forth in the Convention shall not be made public by the Committee, the author or the 
State party concerned. 6. The Committee, working group or rapporteur may request the author of 
a communication or the State party concerned to keep confidential the whole or part of any 
submission or information relating to the proceedings. 7. Subject to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the 
present rule, nothing in this rule shall affect the right of the author or authors or the State party 
concerned to make public any submission or information bearing on the proceedings. 8. Subject 
to paragraphs 5 and 6 of the present rule, the Committee’s decisions on admissibility, merits and 
discontinuance shall be made public. 9. The Secretariat shall be responsible for the distribution of 
the Committee’s final decisions to the author or authors and the State party concerned. 10. The 
Committee shall include in its annual report under article 21 of the Convention a summary of the 
communications examined and, where appropriate, a summary of the explanations and statements 
of the States parties concerned, and of its own suggestions and recommendations. 11. Unless the 
Committee decides otherwise, information furnished by the parties in follow-up to the 
Committee’s views and recommendations under paragraphs 4 and 5 of article 7 of the Optional 
Protocol shall not be confidential. Unless the Committee decides otherwise, decisions of the 
Committee with regard to follow-up activities shall not be confidential”. The Rules of Procedure 
of CAT do not specifically refer to confidentiality pending the individual complaint proceedings. 
179 For an example of information about provisional measures by CAT made available pending the 
proceedings, see CAT Suleymane Guengueng et al. v. Senegal (involving former Chadian 
dictator Habré), Press release Human Rights Watch, 23 April 2001, ‘United Nations asks Senegal 
to hold Ex-Chad Dictator’, <www.hrw.org/justice/habre> (accessed 22 June 2005); confirmed 
formally in Note Verbale CAT to HRW of 27 April 2001, <http://www.hrw.org/french/themes/ 
habre-legal.htm> (accessed 22 June 2005) About this case see Chapter XII (Other cases). 
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extensive. In the secondary literature reference is made to provisional measures only in passing.180 
CEDAW published its decision on the merits in A.T. v. Hungary in January 2005. It did devote a 
separate section to the provisional measures it had taken in accordance with Article 5(1) of the 
Optional Protocol.181 In addition, different from the HRC, CAT does seem to refer more consis-
tently to situations in which it refused to take provisional measures. 
In May 2001 the CAT had a discussion about its use of provisional measures. This discus-
sion may have been triggered by critical comments of certain States. Committee member Camara 
(Senegal), who presented a background paper, pointed out that the Rules of Procedure ‘did not 
specify the kind of interim measures to be taken in order to prevent irreparable damage resulting 
from a violation of the Convention’.  
“He had therefore reviewed the Committee’s practice, which was often based on individual 
decisions by the rapporteurs for the communications concerned, in an attempt to identify a 
general rule”.182  
The background paper itself is not available, but apparently it listed the circumstances in which 
Rapporteurs in individual cases had recommended the use of provisional measures, as well as the 
conditions in which they did not.183 Camara noted that when a State had accepted the right of 
individual petition, ‘it accepted that an external body might take decisions it would not like’.184 
“There was no point in having a Convention if the Committee was always supposed to condone 
the action of States. An effort should be made to improve communications with States, since 
they appeared willing to accept interim measures whenever an explanation of the reasons for 
them was provided”.185 
Initially CAT planned to draft a General Comment ‘on interim measures requested by the 
Committee under article 22 of the Convention’.186 Apparently it later decided against drafting 
such a Comment.187 In November 2001 the Committee had a meeting with the Special Rapporteur 
                                                 
180 O’Flaherty (1996), pp. 162-163 briefly mentions the possibility of provisional measures. See 
more specifically Barkhuysen/Van Emmerik/Rieter (2008), pp. 106-112 and Ingelse (2001), p. 
179, p. 180, p. 188. See also the references in Chapter XV on assessment of risk. The author 
visited the Geneva Secretariat on 12-22 October 1998; 29 March-5 April 2003 and 24-30 August 
2003. She would like to thank various staff members dealing predominantly with the HRC, but 
also with CAT, including Marcus Schmidt, Paul Oertly, Antonie Cardon, Carla Edelenbos and 
Carmen Rueda Castañon. 
181 CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005, §§4.1-4.8. As to other requests by petitioners for 
provisional measures, see the information that the five member Working Group on 
Communications under the Optional Protocol turned down a request for provisional measures 
(unspecified), see its Report of its ninth session, 26 February 2007, in: Sessional/Annual Report 
of Committee CEDAW/C/2007/111/WGCOP/L.1, §4. 
182 CAT Summary Record, 26th session, 15 May 2001, CAT/C/SR.479/Add.1, 25 May 2001, §5. 
183 See further Chapter XV on assessment of risk. 
184 CAT Summary Record, 26th session, 15 May 2001, CAT/C/SR.479/Add.1, 25 May 2001, §5. 
185 Summary Record, 26th session, 15 May 2001, CAT/C/SR.479/Add.1, 25 May 2001, §27. See 
further Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
186 The Summary Records refer to document CAT/C/XXVI/Misc.11, which is not publicly available. 
187 Committee member Gaer (US) criticised the background paper. She ‘suggested that it was 
unnecessary to identify countries or cases by name when citing the Committee’s jurisprudence’. 
She also questioned the references to the General Comments of another supervisory body and 
pointed out that the text ‘should be carefully revised to ensure that it was gender-neutral’. 
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for New Communications of the HRC to hear about that Committee’s practice with regard to 
provisional measures. HRC Special Rapporteur Scheinin discussed the authority of the HRC, the 
range of cases in which it used provisional measures and other related issues. CAT member El 
Masry (Egypt) asked Scheinin whether the same Rapporteur was responsible for registering a 
petition and for the procedure with regard to provisional measures and whether ‘he received 
guidelines’ from the HRC. Scheinin confirmed that the same Rapporteur dealt with both issues, 
about which there were no written guidelines.  
“[T]he rapporteurs applied the criteria set out in the Optional Protocol and the Committee’s 
jurisprudence, which was often very extensive, although in certain cases the rapporteur had to 
innovate”.188  
Scheinin pointed out that having a Special Rapporteur to take such measures ‘had the dual 
advantage of ensuring consistency’ and ‘of proceeding rapidly in urgent cases’. 
“Another practical advantage of the institution of Special Rapporteur for New Communications 
was that there was no need to justify the requests for interim measures of protection. The 
Special Rapporteur had full latitude in making such requests and, where necessary, withdrawing 
them”.189 
It is not clear why the institution of a Special Rapporteur diminishes the need to justify 
provisional measures. Given the reference to ‘full latitude’ the reason for wishing not to justify 
provisional measures may lie in the need for ultimate flexibility. It is also possible that in this 
context the term ‘justify’ specifically relates to ‘justify oneself’ or ‘answer to’ the State, rather 
than to ‘motivate’, ‘provide reasoning’ or ‘substantiate’. After all, motivation or substantiation are 
requirements inherent to authoritative adjudication, while international adjudicators, being 
independent, do not have to ‘answer to’ a State. Some form of substantiation of their provisional 
measures should be possible without losing too much flexibility. Nevertheless, Burns, the 
Chairman of CAT, and Mavrommatis, who subsequently became its Special Rapporteur on New 
Complaints and Interim Measures, seemed to agree with Scheinin. Burns pointed out that the 
CAT ‘could only endorse the reasons given – consistency and speed – to explain the usefulness of 
having a special rapporteur’ and that ‘he himself never gave explanations when addressing 
requests for interim measures to States parties’.190 According to Mavrommatis: 
“[I]t would be desirable to avoid making such requests too systematically to States parties 
because some of them would be likely, especially for the sake of shortening the proceedings, to 
denounce the Optional Protocol, as had happened in the past. Ways had to be found to reconcile 
that imperative with the need to avoid having to justify the request for interim measures”.191  
Rather than substantiating its provisional measures in order to enhance their authority and persua-
siveness, Mavrommatis’ advice would be to limit the number of provisional measures. When he 
refers to ‘the need to avoid having to justify the requests for interim measures’ he must mean 
                                                                                                                       
Summary Records, 26th session, 15 May 2001, CAT/C/SR.479/Add.1, 25 May 2000, §8 (see also 
§26). 
188 Summary Record, 27th session, 30 November 2001, CAT/C/SR.487, 10 March 2003, §§21-22. 
189 Id., §4. 
190 Id., §7. 
191 Id., §8. 
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something else than the conviction that the adjudicator does not have to ‘answer to’ the State. It 
may be that he simply fears additional resources would be necessary if they were to do so.192 
A few years later Mavrommatis noted, as the Special Rapporteur for New Communications 
and Interim Measures, that ‘(a)lthough some States had requested the Committee to establish 
guidelines on criteria for requesting interim measures, the Committee considered that guidelines 
could be restrictive’. Instead he emphasized that CAT did not take provisional measures auto-
matically in non-refoulement cases.193 
4 THE INTER-AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
4.1 Introduction 
The situation in which precautionary and provisional measures have been used in the Americas 
most often is for the protection of witnesses, human rights defenders and others against threats. 
Other measures related to halting the execution of a death sentence, locating and protecting disap-
peared persons, halting a deportation and protecting the health and dignity of detainees. The 
precautionary and provisional measures of the Inter-American Commission and Court show the 
seriousness of the situation in which these adjudicators must operate, in particular in countries 
such as Colombia and Guatemala.  
In the Inter-American system precautionary and provisional measures have been used as 
well to protect indigenous culture, judicial independence or even freedom of speech. There have 
also been cases involving arbitrary detention, mass expulsion and the psychological well-being of 
minors whose biological parents had disappeared. Often the provisional and precautionary meas-
ures, particularly those involving protection against threats, aim at protecting a large number of 
beneficiaries and they are sometimes maintained over a long period of time. In most cases the 
President of the Court first used urgent measures, which were later ratified by the full Court.  
This section explains the obligations of members of the OAS under the American Conven-
tion on Human Rights and the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of Man. It also 
describes the right of individual complaint and the different roles of the Commission and Court in 
the Inter-American system, the power of the Commission and Court to order provisional measures 
and their promptness in doing so and, finally, the transparency of the information they make 
available on the use of provisional measures. 
                                                 
192 See further section 8.3 of this Chapter. Scheinin pointed out that the withdrawal by some 
Caribbean States from the OP to the ICCPR was not due to the Committee’s practice with regard 
to provisional measures, but had arisen ‘from a complex situation in which the States involved 
had also been subject to the jurisdiction of the Privy Council in London’, Summary Record, 27th 
session, 30 November 2001, CAT/C/SR.487, 10 March 2003, §13. It seems that certain critical 
States have simply exploited CAT’s fear for similar withdrawals from the individual petition 
system under the ICAT, a system not facing this complex situation. See further Chapter XVII on 
the official responses of Addressee States.  
193 “If there was no prima facie case for the threat of torture, the complaint was refused. Interim 
measures would be refused if the Committee considered that persons were attempting to use the 
procedure to prolong their stay in a certain country. Each case was considered very carefully, and 
as much information as possible was requested from all parties. A new procedure had been 
introduced whereby, if there was no prima facie case, the State party concerned was informed 
that the case might be reviewed at a later date pending receipt of further information”. Summary 
Records, 34th session, 19 May 2005, CAT/C/SR.662, 2 June 2005, §4 (Mavrommatis). See 
further Chapter XIII on reparations and XV on immediacy and risk. 
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4.2 Right of individual complaint and the Inter-American Commission and 
Court 
4.2.1 Introduction 
Of the 35 countries of the Americas, 34 countries are active members of the Organisation of 
American States (OAS).194 The Inter-American Human Rights system has two supervisory or-
gans, the Commission and the Court. The OAS created the Commission in 1959, long before the 
Court came into existence. The Court was introduced in 1969 by the American Convention on 
Human Rights (ACHR). In 1969 the General Assembly agreed on the text of the ACHR.195 At 
present 21 of the 24 State Parties have recognised the contentious jurisdiction of the Court.196 
This includes important countries such as Brazil and Mexico (both federal States), Colombia, 
Peru, Argentina and Chile and non-Latin American countries such as Suriname and Haiti.  
Different from the complaint system under the ICCPR and the ECHR the petitioner does not 
need to be the actual victim. Article 44 of the American Convention provides:  
“Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognised in one or 
more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party”. 
Before the entry into force of the ACHR, in 1978, the member States of the OAS already had 
human rights obligations under the OAS Charter and the American Declaration on the Rights and 
Duties of Man. Equally, those OAS members that have not ratified the Convention, or have rati-
fied it without recognising the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with individual complaints, still 
have obligations under the American Declaration. 
At present, ten OAS members have not ratified the American Convention: six Caribbean Is-
lands, Guyana, Belize, The United States and Canada. This list of non-members now includes 
Trinidad and Tobago as well. Trinidad used to be a State party to the ACHR but it denounced the 
Convention.197  
4.2.2 Inter-American Commission 
As noted, the establishment of the Commission pre-dates the entry into force of the ACHR. It is 
an organ of the OAS under the OAS Charter (Article 53). The Commission is composed of seven 
members elected in their individual capacity by the General Assembly of the OAS. The General 
Assembly is the supreme organ of the OAS that, among others, has the power to decide the gen-
                                                 
194 The participation of the government of the 35th country, Cuba, has been suspended since 1962: 
Resolution VI in: “Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, serving as 
Organ of Consultation in application of the Inter-American Treaty for Reciprocal Assistance, 
Punta del Este, Uruguay, January 22-31, 1962, Meeting Documents,” Organization of American 
States, OEA/Ser.F/II.8, doc. 68, pp. 17-19. According to the Commission the State itself is still a 
party to OAS Charter and, thus, has obligations under the American Declaration. See, e.g., its 
Report on Cuba, Chapter IV, Annual Report 2001. See in general about the OAS and human 
rights: Gómez (1998), pp. 173-197. See also Taillant/Picolotti (1998), pp. 117-134. 
195 It entered into force on 18 July 1978. 
196 As of 24 December 2007. On 26 May 1998 (effective a year later), Trinidad and Tobago 
denounced the ACHR. Before that time there were 22 States that had recognized the competence 
of the Court and 26 State parties. Dominica, Grenada and Jamaica have ratified the ACHR, but 
not the competence of the Court. 
197 Denunciation of 26 May 1998, which became effective on 26 May 1999. The Court may still deal 
with cases initiated before this. 
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eral action and policy of the OAS and determine the structure and function of its organs (Article 
54a OAS Charter). Article 106 of the OAS Charter provides that the principal function of the 
Inter-American Commission ‘shall be to promote the observance and protection of human rights 
and to serve as a consultative organ of the Organization in these matters’. This article also an-
nounces the creation of an Inter-American Convention on human rights that shall determine ‘the 
structure, competence, and procedure of this Commission, as well as those of other organs re-
sponsible for these matters’.198  
Roughly, the monitoring function of the Commission can be divided in a reporting task, an 
adjudicatory task and the task to represent the petitioners in the cases it decides to send to the 
Court. As part of its reporting task, its delegations visit countries. Afterwards, the Commission 
prepares country reports. This is especially important in dealing with gross and systematic viola-
tions.199 Furthermore, the Commission adjudicates individual complaints. It may do so based 
either on the Declaration or on the ACHR. According to Article 20 of the Statute of the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights, approved by the General Assembly of the OAS in 
October 1979, the Commission monitors compliance with the American Declaration of the Rights 
and Duties of Man for those States that have not yet ratified the ACHR.200 The Declaration al-
ready dates from 1948. The Ninth International Conference of American States, the same Confer-
ence that created the OAS, approved it several months before the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights.  
The Inter-American Commission’s competence to take action and examine individual com-
plaints with respect to member States of the OAS that are not party to the ACHR is based on the 
OAS Charter and on the practice the Commission has established. The General Assembly’s adop-
tion of the Statute of the Commission has confirmed this practice.201 
In addition the ACHR has assigned the Commission with a clear function monitoring the 
rights contained in it. Under this Convention the Commission may examine cases brought under 
Article 44 ACHR and may subsequently decide to bring a case before the Court, if the State in-
volved has recognised the competence of the Court. States parties to the Convention that have not 
                                                 
198 Charter of the Organisation of the American States, as amended by the “Protocol of Buenos 
Aires”, signed on February 27, 1967, at the Third Special Inter-American Conference; by the 
“Protocol of Cartagena the Indias”, approved on December 5, 1985, at the Fourteenth Special 
Session of the General Assembly; by the “Protocol of Washington”, approved on December 14, 
1992, at the Sixteenth Special Session of the General Assembly; and by the “Protocol of 
Managua”, adopted on June 10, 1993, at the Nineteenth Special Session of the General 
Assembly.  
199 See generally Medina Quiroga (1988). 
200 This Article stipulates that the Commission has the following specific powers in relation to those 
member States of the OAS not parties to the ACHR: “a. to pay particular attention to the 
observance of the human rights referred to in Articles I, II, III, IV, XVIII, XXV and XXVI of the 
American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man; b. to examine communications submitted 
to it and any other available communication, to address the government of any member state not 
a Party to the Convention for information deemed pertinent by this Commission, and to make 
recommendations to it, when it finds this appropriate, in order to bring about more effective 
observance of fundamental human rights; and, c. to verify, as a prior condition to the exercise of 
the powers granted under subparagraph b. above, whether the domestic legal procedures and 
remedies of each member state not a Party to the Convention have been duly applied and 
exhausted”.  
201 See the Inter-American Commission’s Annual Reports. See generally Buergenthal (1982), pp. 
231-245 and Buergenthal (1975), pp. 828-836. About a similar argument with regard to the UN 
Charter and the Universal Declaration see e.g. Sohn (1982), pp. 1-64. See further Chapter XVI 
(Legal Status). 
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recognised the competence of the Court still have obligations under the Convention, as monitored 
by the Commission.  
The Commission takes admissibility decisions and decisions on the merits. In urgent cases, 
it may take a decision to request a State to take precautionary measures or (in cases where the 
State involved has recognised the competence of the Court) request the Court to order provisional 
measures. 
Article 51 ACHR stipulates that if the matter discussed in the Commission’s report, setting 
forth the facts and stating its conclusions (under Article 50 ACHR), has not been settled or sub-
mitted to the Court, the Commission makes pertinent recommendations and prescribes a period 
within which the State is to take remedial measures.202 Upon expiry of such period the Commis-
sion shall decide (by an absolute majority of its members) whether the State has taken adequate 
measures and whether to publish its report.  
Initially the Commission deals with all individual complaints.203 The Commission or a State 
Party may bring a case before the Court, but the petitioner may not. In the past the Commission 
brought cases before the Court only sparingly, but during the last decade the number has in-
creased. With its new Rules (2001/2003) a significant change is introduced in how the Commis-
sion will deal with cases against States that have recognised the contentious jurisdiction of the 
Inter-American Court. While for a long period most cases were not sent to the Court, by now 
most of them are.204 Article 43 of the Rules, dealing with the report on the merits and Article 44, 
dealing with referral of the case to the Court, establish that the petitioner has one month to present 
a position as to whether the case should be submitted to the Court. Article 44 specifically lays 
down that the Commission ‘shall’ refer the case to the Court when it considers that the State has 
not complied with the recommendations of its report on the merits.205 This leads exception only 
                                                 
202 Following the examination of the evidence, the Commission prepares a report stating the facts 
and conclusions regarding the case (Article 46 (2)). It then transmits the report with its 
recommendations (Article 47 (1)). When the matter has not been settled within three months from 
the date of the transmittal of the report to the state, the Commission may submit it to the Court or, 
in the alternative, the Commission may set forth its opinion and conclusions, including its 
pertinent recommendations. It then prescribes a period within which the government in question 
must take the measures that are incumbent upon it to remedy the situation examined (Article 47). 
Upon expiry of the prescribed period the Commission decides by the vote of an absolute majority 
of its members whether the State has taken suitable measures and whether to publish its report 
(Article 48).  
203 Article 61 ACHR, See §2.2. 
204 About the case law of the Commission see the Commission’s website (<www.cidh.org>), with 
the Annual Reports, the cases published by the Commission (since 1974), press releases (since 
1993), information on Rapporteurships, etc. and see the Inter-American Human Rights Digest, 
Repertorio de Jurisprudencia by Grossman/Goldman/Martin/Rodríguez-Pinzón (only in Spanish): 
<http://www.wcl.american.edu/humright/hracademy/iadigest.cfm> and database for Inter-
American Commission reports (session reports 1960-1969), Annual Reports (1970-1998) and 
Special Reports (1962-2001) at: <http://www.wcl.american.edu/pub/humright/digest/Inter-
American/index.html>. See further Wilson (2001), Index of individual case reports of the Inter-
American Commission (1994-1999), pp. 353-647. 
205 The Court and several commentators had criticised the fact that the Commission used to send 
only some cases to the Court. Some members of the Commission’s staff, however, considered 
that sending all cases to the Court would delude from the standing of the Commission. Interview 
with Christina Cerna, Washington D.C., 18 October 2001. See in general about the procedure 
before the Commission and/or the Court: Medina Quiroga/Nash Rojas (2007); Pasqualucci 
(2003); Gomez (2001), pp. 111-126; Faúndez Ledesma (1999); Buergenthal/Cassel (1998), pp. 
539-571; Krsticevic (1998), pp. 413-448; Farer (1998), pp. 515-536; Gomez (1998a), pp. 213-
240; Harris/Livingstone (1998); Cançado Trindade (1998a), pp. 133-149 and (1998b), pp. 1-27 
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when an absolute majority of the members of the Commission decides not to refer the case. As 
only the State and the Commission can act before the Court, the Commission’s role changes from 
that of an ‘adjudicator’ to that of a ‘litigator’. It turns into the representative of the petitioner. In 
an attempt to remedy the (appearance of) conflict in this regard it has established the practice, 
during the Court hearings, to include the petitioner in its team and to take on the more generally 
formulated role to act to defend the Inter-American system. The Commission and the petitioner 
may in fact have different positions and bring different arguments.  
To sum up, the Commission can take on different roles to promote the observance and pro-
tection of human rights (Article 111 OAS Charter): a conciliatory, an informal advisory and an 
adjudicatory role.206 In addition it has the completely different task of representing the petitioners 
before the Court in cases it had previously adjudicated itself.  
4.2.3 The Inter-American Court 
The Inter-American Court has distinguished itself in its proactive use of provisional measures to 
prevent irreparable harm to persons.207 It consists of seven judges ‘elected in an individual capac-
ity from among jurists of the highest moral authority and of recognised competence in the field of 
human rights, who posses the qualifications required for the exercise of the highest judicial func-
tions in conformity with the law of the state of which they are nationals or of the State that pro-
poses them as candidates’.208 The OAS General Assembly elects them from a panel of candidates 
proposed by the States Parties to the Convention.209 
The Court applies and interprets the ACHR. To do this, it has both an adjudicatory jurisdic-
tion and the competence to issue Advisory Opinions, for instance on the interpretation of certain 
articles.210 As part of its adjudicatory role it takes decisions on provisional measures, preliminary 
objections, merits and reparations.211 Since the political organs of the OAS do not play a role in 
follow-up it also tries, together with the Commission, to supervise and monitor the compliance of 
States with its Judgments and provisional measures. The flexibility of the Commission and Court 
in this respect may help achieve effective protection of persons against human rights violations.212 
The Court can only examine those individual complaints that the Commission has previ-
ously examined.213 In other words, the Commission deals with all individual complaints first. 
                                                                                                                       
and (1998c), pp. 573-604; Dulitzky (1998), pp. 363-390; Nikken (1996), pp. 25-44; Pinto (1998), 
pp. 169-184; Vivanco (1998), pp. 51-72; Davidson (1997); Fix-Zamudio (1996), pp. 19-32; Nieto 
Ravia (1996), pp. 397-418; Nieto Navia (1994), pp. 369-418 and Fix-Zamudio (1989), pp. 8-64.  
206 The informal advisory role is not related to the Inter-American Court’s function, later introduced 
in the ACHR, to issue Advisory Opinions upon request.  
207 It has equally distinguished itself on two interrelated levels, firstly through its analysis of human 
rights obligations both in its Advisory Opinions and in contentious cases. Worth mentioning are 
the 1988 landmark cases of Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment of 29 July 1988 and Godínez Cruz, 
Judgment of 20 January 1989, both against Honduras. The Court established State responsibility 
for disappearances, which were violations of the right to personal freedom, personal integrity as 
well as the right to life. Ever since it has emphasised the obligation to prevent, to investigate and 
punish human rights violations. Secondly it has distinguished itself in its Judgments on remedies 
and reparations, see also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
208 Article 52 ACHR. See also, e.g. Faúndez Ledesma (1998), pp. 185-210; Picado (1996), pp. 19-
32; Pasqualucci (1996a), pp. 877-899; Pasqualucci (1995), pp. 794-806; Gros Espiell (1988), pp. 
456-466. 
209 Article 53 ACHR. 
210 See e.g. Buergenthal (1985), pp. 1-27. 
211 If necessary, it also issues Interpretations of Judgments on the Merits or on Reparations. 
212 See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
213 Article 61 ACHR.  
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Only the Commission or a State Party may bring a case before the Court. In the past the Commis-
sion did so only sparingly,214 yet during the last decade the number of cases brought before the 
Court has increased. The Commission’s new Rules of Procedure have laid down that it shall refer 
a case to the Court when it considers that the State has not complied with its decision on the 
merits. In the last decade, within the confines of the Convention text, the Court is increasingly 
giving the petitioners (and victims) the possibility to directly contact the Court in cases pending 
before it.215 As of June 2001, when the Court’s new Rules of Procedure became applicable, the 
petitioner is able to present arguments and claims independently, once the Commission (or the 
State) has brought a case before the Court.216 
4.3 Power and promptness of the Inter-American Commission and Court 
4.3.1 Introduction 
Article 63(2) deals with provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons: 
“In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to 
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in the matters it 
has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the 
request of the Commission”. 
It appears from the last sentence that the Commission may request the Court to act with respect to 
a case not yet submitted to the Court.217 Obviously the Commission cannot do this in relation to 
                                                 
214 See e.g. Buergenthal (2005), p. 15. 
215 See in general about the case law and proceedings before the Commission and Court: Shelton 
(2004b), pp. 127-141; Pasqualucci (2003); Faúndez Ledesma (1999); Buergenthal/Cassel (1998), 
pp. 539-571; Cançado Trindade (1998a), pp. 133-149; Pinto (1998), pp. 169-184; Davidson 
(1997) and Volio Jiménez (1996), pp. 287-298. 
216 Rules of Procedure December 2000, with amendments that entered into force January 2003. 
About procedural changes see Pasqualucci (2003), pp. 18-25; Gomez (2001), pp. 111-126; 
Cançado Trindade (1998), pp. 1-27; Gomez (1998a), pp. 213-240; Krsticevic (1998), pp. 413-
448; Méndez/Cox (1998); Nikken (1996), pp. 25-44; Vivanco (1998), pp. 51-72 and Padilla 
(1995). See e.g. the Court’s refusal to order an extension of its provisional measures in the 
Raxcacó Reyes et al. case (Gatemala), on behalf of Mr Valenzuela Ávila, 20 April 2006, because 
his case was unrelated to the Raxcacó Reyes et al. case and the pending provisional measures, 
and involved a case still pending before the Commission, meaning that it was the Commission 
that could request the Court to order provisional measures involving that matter, but not the 
petitioner. See further Chapter XIII (Protection), the section on beneficiaries. For the case law of 
the Court see the Court’s website <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/> as well as 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/iachr.html> (basic documents, case law, Annual Reports, 
Press Releases). See also the Inter-American Human Rights Digest, Repertorio de Jurisprudencia 
by Grossman/Goldman/Martin/Rodríguez-Pinzón (only in Spanish): <http://www.wcl.american. 
edu/humright/hracademy/iadigest.cfm>; the contributions on the Inter-American system by 
Medina Quiroga, Martín and Rodríguez Pinzón in the Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights; 
Buergenthal/Shelton (1995). 
217 The Statute of the Commission provides in Article 19 (c) that the Commission shall have the 
power ‘to request the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to take such provisional measures 
as it considers appropriate in serious and urgent cases which have not yet been submitted to it for 
consideration, whenever this becomes necessary to prevent irreparable injury to persons’, Statute 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, approved by Resolution N1 447 taken by 
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States that have not ratified the ACHR or States that have ratified the Convention but have not 
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.218  
The Commission usually takes its own precautionary measures before it applies to the Court 
to take provisional measures. Its authority to do so is based on its function of adjudicating peti-
tions under the OAS Charter as well as under the ACHR.219 It formally laid down this possibility 
in its Regulations of 1980 and it can be found in Article 25 of the Commission’s new Rules, 
which entered into force on 1 May 2001. This Article provides: 
“1. In serious and urgent cases, and whenever necessary according to the information available, 
the Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a party, request that the State 
concerned adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
2. If the Commission is not in session, the President, or, in his or her absence one of the Vice-
Presidents, shall consult with the other members, through the Executive Secretariat, on the ap-
plication of the provision in the previous paragraph. If it is not possible to consult within a rea-
sonable period of time under the circumstances, the President, or, where appropriate, one of the 
Vice-Presidents shall take the decision on behalf of the Commission and shall so inform its 
members. 
3. The Commission may request information from the interested parties on any matter related to 
the adoption and observance of the precautionary measures. 
4.The granting of such measures and their adoption by the State shall not constitute a 
prejudgment on the merits of a case”.220 
                                                                                                                       
the General Assembly of the OAS at its ninth regular session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, October 
1997. 
218 The last sentence (‘a case not yet submitted’) could also be interpreted to imply that the 
Commission may only request provisional measures if it will later bring the case before the Court 
on the merits as well. On the other hand, the inclusion of the word ‘yet’ may also simply 
distinguish between cases already pending before the Court and those still pending before the 
Commission, without implying anything more than an assumption that, at a later stage, the latter 
will be submitted to the Court as well. In any case, the word does not justify lifting a provisional 
measure when the Commission has not yet submitted a case to the Court within a certain time 
frame. 
219 About their legal status see Chapter XVI. 
220 Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, approved by the 
Commission at its 109th special session held from December 4 to 8, 2000. Entry into force on 1 
May 2001 according to Article 78. The Spanish and English texts are equally authentic. Its 
previous Rules, then called Regulations, dealt with precautionary measures in Article 29: “The 
Commission may, at its own initiative, or at the request of a party, take any action it considers 
necessary for the discharge of its functions. In urgent cases, when it becomes necessary to avoid 
irreparable damage to persons, the Commission may request that provisional measures be taken 
to avoid irreparable damage in cases where the denounced facts are true. If the Commission is not 
in session, the Chairman, or in his absence, one of the Vice-Chairmen, shall consult with the 
other members, through the Secretariat, on implementation of the provisions of Paragraphs 1 and 
2 above. If it is not possible to consult within a reasonable time, the Chairman shall take the 
decision on behalf of the Commission and shall so inform its members immediately. The request 
for such measures and their adoption shall not prejudice the final decision”. Regulations of the 
Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, Approved by the Commission at its 660th 
Meeting, 49th Session, held on 8 April, 1980, and modified at its 64th Session, 840th Meeting, held 
on 7 March, 1985, at its 70th Session, 938th Meeting, held on 29 June, 1987, and at its 90th 
Session, 1282nd Meeting, held on 21 September, 1995. The text of this regulation about its 
precautionary measures used the term ‘provisional measures’. Article 25 of the new Rules does 
not reproduce the first paragraph of Article 29 of the old Regulations because that paragraph was 
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The reason for the increase in precautionary and provisional measures in the last decade is not 
that they were not necessary in the past. In the 1970s and 1980s few States in the hemisphere even 
had elected governments and evidence of gross human rights violations in that period is abundant. 
The changes seem to lie in the institutional development of the tool.  
Commissioner Juan Mendez refers to two advantages of taking precautionary measures first 
and going to the Court for provisional measures only later. Firstly, if the Commission does not go 
to the Court directly, it has more ammunition. The other advantage is that the Commission, 
through the Executive Secretariat, can do it directly from Washington D.C. It can be done in one 
hour, while when the Commission applies to the Court it has to prepare a statement and so does 
the Court. When the Court is not in session the Secretariat of the Court contacts the President. 
Even though the Court’s Secretariat will usually act on it swiftly, it still takes another couple of 
steps. Mendez notes that if the matter is very urgent the Commission probably requests the Court 
to take provisional measures and takes its own precautionary measures at the same time, without 
waiting for the Court’s reaction. According to him the benefit of the system is that it is so flexible 
that you can adapt it to the degree of emergency.221  
In the last decade the Commission’s practice in using the tool of precautionary measures has 
become more elaborate. There are a few different layers of decision-making providing some extra 
flexibility. NGOs are aware that under its Rules of Procedure and practice, the Commission has to 
make a ‘case’ of any petition received, including of an originally free-standing petition for pre-
cautionary measures. Often, however, they file a petition and at the same time they file separately 
for precautionary measures. This is to emphasise the urgency of the case, possibly for fear that the 
Executive Secretariat will take less seriously such request when it is filed as part of a petition.222 
For instance, when a case deals with the displacement of communities, petitioners may say that 
this is going to happen any time soon, it may even happen tomorrow. In such cases the President 
of the Commission may take precautionary measures without first consulting the rest of the 
Commission.  
Another approach is not to act on the urgent petition for precautionary measures but to act 
immediately on the formal petition by giving it a number and passing it on to the government. 
Even though in that case the Commission itself does not say it is taking a precautionary measure, 
because of the fact that it is passing the petition on to the government so quickly and because the 
petitioners’ request for urgent measures is included, the State knows that it is a matter to which 
they have to pay attention.  
The third possibility is to inform the State that it has received a request for precautionary 
measures and to request it to give its version of the situation so that the Commission can decide 
whether or not to act on the request. Several times States have solved the problem at that stage. 
For instance, they have released persons in detention. This way, this third possibility is an inter-
mediate step that is not a formal decision but it may work nevertheless.  
The fourth possibility is indeed taking a precautionary measure asking a State to act in a 
certain way or to refrain from acting and giving it several weeks or months to comply.  
The fifth possibility the Commission has when it is faced with urgent situations, is to go di-
rectly to the Court and request it to take provisional measures. Governments tend to fear the 
Court’s provisional measures more that the Commission’s precautionary measures.223  
                                                                                                                       
not specific to the issue of precautionary measures. The addition ‘under the circumstances’ 
following ‘within a reasonable period of time’ in Article 25(2) is already implicit in ‘reasonable’ 
and seems redundant 
221 Interview by author with Commissioner Juan Mendez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. 
222 Id. 
223 Commissioner Juan Mendez mentioned these five layers of decision-making during an interview 
by the author in Washington D.C., on 17 October 2001.  
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The first case in which the Commission went straight to the Court to request a provisional 
measure was the case Bustíos Rojas. Upon request of the petitioners (Americas Watch), the 
Commission went to the Court without first using its own precautionary measures.224  
States may want to avoid placing the Commission in a position where it has to go to the 
Court. Generally they fear having to attend the Court’s hearings, where they have to account for 
their acts or omissions in public. If they comply with the Commission’s precautionary measures, 
or even anticipate them, they may be able to avoid the attention of the press as well. 
As part of its considerations the Court often specifically refers to the fact that the State 
failed to respond to the Commission’s precautionary measures as one of the indications of ur-
gency warranting an Order by the Court.225 Yet strong views have also been expressed arguing 
against the Commission’s use of precautionary measures before going to the Court to request 
provisional measures: ‘(t)he Commission’s insistence in its practice with regard to prior precau-
tionary measures may, in some case, have negative consequences for the potential victims and 
create one more obstacle for them. In certain cases, it can constitute a denial of justice at the 
international level’.226 
In the Matter of Children Deprived of Liberty in the "Complexo do Tatuapé" of FEBEM re-
garding Brazil the Commission had continued using its own precautionary measures for a long 
time while repeatedly receiving reports of beneficiaries killed.227  
4.3.2 The Commission’s Rules of Procedure (2000/2003) 
In 2000 the Commission substantially amended its Rules of Procedure.228 The new Rules on the 
Commission’s admissibility decisions and the criteria for sending a case to the Court are impor-
tant in the context of its precautionary measures. 
The possibility to take precautionary measures is useful not only in relation to States that 
have not recognised the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, but also to those that have. It gives 
the Commission more flexibility. Of course this is the case only inasmuch as the Commission 
does not fail to resort to the Court when the case is ready or when the exigencies of the situation 
so require. With the present Rules of Procedure this risk is considerably diminished.  
4.3.3 The Court’s competence 
First and foremost Article 63(2) ACHR establishes the Court’s competence. The Statute of the 
Court does not further elaborate on its competence to take provisional measures.229  
                                                 
224 See the urgent measures ordered by the Court’s President in Bustíos Rojas, 5 June 1990, as 
confirmed by the full Court in its Order for provisional measures of 8 August 1990. 
225 See, e.g., IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order for provisional measures, 
14 June 1998, James et al. cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 25 October 2001 
and Order for provisional measures, 26 November 2001. 
226 See Cançado Trindade’s individual opinion in IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the 
"Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo regarding Brazil, Order 
of 30 September 2006, §30, referring to his Separate Opinion in the Matter of Mery Naranjo et 
al., §§5-11 and in the Matter of Gloria Giralt de García-Prieto et al., §§7-13. 
227 See IACHR Matter of Children Deprived of Liberty in the "Complexo do Tatuapé" of FEBEM , 
Order of 17 November 2005, Separate Concurring Opinion of judge Cançado Trindade criticizing 
this. 
228 The Statute, as approved by the General Assembly provides that the ‘Commission shall prepare 
and adopt its own Regulations, in accordance with the present Statute’. Indeed, the Commission 
previously called its Rules of Procedure ‘Regulations’. It amended the Rules slightly in 2003. 
These Rules, as amended, entered into force in January 2004.  
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As is clear from Article 25 of the Rules, the President of the Court may use so-called ‘ur-
gent measures’ when the Court is not in session. The President basically grants ‘provisional 
measures’ provisionally so that any provisional measures later decided by the full Court may still 
have their intended function. Later, usually following a public hearing in the matter, the full Court 
ratifies these in an Order for provisional measures. Thus far, there are no known instances where 
the full Court decided not to ratify the President’s urgent measures other than for reasons that the 
situation meanwhile had been solved already. The Court lifts its provisional measures when they 
are no longer necessary. 
4.3.4 Delegation and consultation 
Different from the Rules of Procedure of the HRC and CAT, the Rules of the Inter-American 
Commission specifically refer to consultation within the Commission about the use of provisional 
measures.230 Article 6 of the Rules provides that the Commission shall have as its board of offi-
cers a President, a first Vice-President and a second Vice-President. If consultation on the use of 
precautionary measures has not been possible within a reasonable period of time, the President or 
one of the Vice-Presidents shall take the decision on behalf of the Commission. Since 2001 the 
                                                                                                                       
229 Statute of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, adopted by the General Assembly of the 
OAS at its Ninth Regular Session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, October 1979 (Resolution 4.4.8). 
Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure, dating from 2000 (with paragraphs 3 and 6 added in 2003), 
provides: “1. At any stage of the proceedings involving cases of extreme gravity and urgency, 
and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the Court may, at the request of a 
party or on its own motion, order such provisional measures as it deems pertinent, pursuant to 
Article 63(2) of the Convention. 2. With respect to matters not yet submitted to it, the Court may 
act at the request of the Commission. 3. In contentious cases already submitted to the Court, the 
victims or alleged victims, their next of kin, or their duly accredited representatives, may present 
a request for provisional measures directly to the Court. 4. The request may be made to the 
President, to any judge of the Court, or to the Secretariat, by any means of communication. In 
every case, the recipient of the request shall immediately bring it to the President's attention. 5.If 
the Court is not sitting, the President, in consultation with the Permanent Commission and, if 
possible, with the other judges, shall call upon the government concerned to adopt such urgent 
measures as may be necessary to ensure the effectiveness of any provisional measures that may 
be ordered by the Court at its next session. 6. The beneficiaries of urgent measures or provisional 
measures ordered by the President may address their comments on the report made by the State 
directly to the Court. The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights shall present 
observations to the State’s report and to the observations of the beneficiaries or their 
representatives. 7. The Court, or its President if the Court is not sitting, may convoke the parties 
to a public hearing on provisional measures. 8. In its Annual Report to the General Assembly, the 
Court shall include a statement concerning the provisional measures ordered during the period 
covered by the report. If those measures have not been duly implemented, the Court shall make 
such recommendations as it deems appropriate”. Rules of Procedure of the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights, approved by the Court at its 49th Regular Session held from 16 to 25 November 
2000, entered into force on 1 June 2001, amended November/December 2003 (including the 
addition of §§3 and 6), entered into force 1 January 2004. The Permanent Commission referred to 
in Rule 25 (5) is composed of ‘the President, the Vice-President and any other judges the 
President deems it appropriate to appoint, according to the needs of the Court’. See Article 6 (1) 
Rules. 
230 As noted, Rule 63(3) of CEDAW’s Rules of Procedure stipulates that when a Working Group or 
Rapporteur has decided to take provisional measures they ‘shall forthwith thereafter inform the 
Committee members of the nature of the request and the communication to which request 
relates’.  
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Vice-Presidents can now take this decision as well. As becomes clear from Article 25(2) the other 
members of the Commission must be informed when the President or either Vice-President has 
requested a State to adopt precautionary measures. Apart from a special provision on precaution-
ary measures (Article 25), the Rules of Procedure also include specific references to serious or 
urgent cases in Articles 29 and 30. Article 29, on the initial processing of individual petitions, lays 
down in paragraph 2 that the Executive Secretary shall immediately notify the Commission in 
serious or urgent cases. Article 50 of the Rules stipulates that this provision, just like the Rule on 
precautionary measures, also applies to the procedure of petitions with regard to OAS member 
States not a party to the ACHR.231  
Article 30, on the admissibility procedure, provides in paragraph 4: ‘In serious or urgent 
cases, or when it is believed that the life or personal integrity of a person is in real or imminent 
danger, the Commission shall request the promptest reply from the State, using for this purpose 
the means it considers most expeditious’. The Commission may refer here to the means of com-
munication (telephone, fax, etc.) of precautionary measures, as well as to other measures such as 
an informal request during a country visit or simply giving priority to examining that case. 
While responsiveness sometimes depends slightly on the efficiency of the individual staff 
members, the CIDH generally is capable of responding quickly and in a manner that is focused on 
the situation.232  
The CIDH was the first international body to speak out on the situation of the ‘unlawful 
combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay. Subsequently various UN special mechanisms and treaty bodies 
have dealt with their situation, yet the CIDH remains the only international adjudicator with 
competence to deal with complaints against the US. Indeed it has shown its ‘capacity to respond 
quickly and effectively to urgent concerns raised by counter-terrorism measures, when domestic 
mechanisms of protection may be absent or ineffective’.233 
Whereas in its adjudicatory role the Court deals only with States that have recognised its 
contentious jurisdiction, the Commission deals with all members of the OAS. This is relevant in 
relation to the Commission’s competence to take precautionary measures. It can take them both 
with regard to States that have ratified the ACHR and with regard to those that have not. As dis-
cussed in the previous section member States of the OAS who have not ratified the ACHR must 
still answer to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.  
With respect to State parties to the Convention, the Commission’s competence is based on 
the ACHR. The Statute provides in Article 19 that the Commission has several special powers 
with respect to the States parties to the American Convention on Human Rights. One of these is 
                                                 
231 With regard to the initial processing of petitions Article 34(2) of the old Regulations had 
provided that ‘in serious or urgent cases or when it is believed that the life, personal integrity or 
health of a person is in imminent danger, the Commission shall request the promptest reply from 
the government, using for this purpose the means it considers most expeditious’. 
232 In the context of disappearances it was the Inter-American Commission that was the first to use 
provisional measures, in the 1970s and 1980s. In any case it had authorised the Executive 
Secretary to intervene in some urgent cases in its name. Generally this happened when someone 
had claimed that a person had disappeared after an arrest. Such intervention normally consisted of 
writing a letter, sometimes sending a telegram. At other times it was a telephone-call to the 
relevant State’s Ambassador to the OAS, based in Washington D.C. and sometimes even a long 
distance call to the Foreign Ministry or to some other contact in the State. The Commission used 
these methods to express an interest in the fate and whereabouts of the recently disappeared 
person. It seems that the Executive Secretary did this quite often but the practice was also very 
discretionary. It may well be that many urgent complaints just received the regular case 
treatment. Interview of author with Juan Méndez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. In the 
1980s he was working as a practitioner at the NGO Human Rights Watch. 
233 Tittemore (2006), p. 401. 
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‘to request the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to take such provisional measures as it 
considers appropriate in serious and urgent cases which have not yet been submitted to it for 
consideration, whenever this becomes necessary to prevent irreparable injury to persons’.  
The Commission can only ask the Court to take provisional measures when the State con-
cerned has recognised the Court’s jurisdiction, but it may use precautionary measures with regard 
to all member States of the OAS.234  
The terminology used by the Commission in relation to its precautionary measures differs. 
The Commission sometimes says it ‘issued’ precautionary measures and sometimes it says it 
decided to ‘take’ them. Often it simply states it requested a government to take the necessary 
steps to prevent irreparable harm to persons. Generally, petitioners request the Commission to 
‘take’ or ‘issue’ precautionary measures, while the Commission, in turn, asks the State to ‘take’ or 
‘adopt’ precautionary measures. In other words both the Commission’s decision itself to take 
precautionary measures and the protective measures required are called ‘precautionary measures’. 
The Commission holds periodic meetings determining whether precautionary measures must be 
maintained or not. When it does not maintain them, it often also notes that it ‘filed’ the case, 
meaning lifted or archived it. 
4.3.5 Promptness 
Since the Inter-American Court is not permanently in session it is usually the President who takes 
action in urgent cases in the periods between the sessions. The first time the Court became in-
volved in the issue of provisional measures to prevent the execution of a death sentence was when 
the President of the Court ordered urgent measures in the cases of James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia 
and Bethel in May 1998. Judge Salgado-Pesantes, who was President of the Court at the time, 
ordered Trinidad and Tobago to take all necessary measures to preserve the lives of these six 
persons ‘so that the Court may examine the pertinence of the provisional measures requested by 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights’. The President sometimes refers to his consul-
tation with the other members of the Court.235 In any case, the Rules of Procedure provide that the 
President consults with the Permanent Council before he orders urgent measures. The full Court 
has confirmed such Orders and has sometimes noted that the President had used them ‘in confor-
mity with the provisions of the Convention and the Rules of Procedure and the information pre-
sented in the matter’.236 It has also noted that it was ‘convenient to hear the arguments of the State 
and the Commission with regard to this matter in a public hearing’.237  
Trinidad’ first six reports, responding to the Court’s Orders and to those of the President, 
argued that Trinidad could not stay an execution until the Warrant of Execution had been issued 
and read.238 The Commission pointed out that the fact that there were only five to seven days 
between the reading of a Warrant of Execution and the execution itself ‘would impede the Court’s 
                                                 
234 See further Chapter XVI (Legal status).  
235 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 29 June 1998; James et al. 
case, Order of the President for urgent measures, 13 July 1998; James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and 
Bethel cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 22 July 1998 and Order of the President 
for urgent measures, 25 October 2001 all refer to consultation; the President’s Orders of 11 May 
and 19 June 1999, on the other hand, do not refer to consultation. 
236 IACHR James et al. cases, Orders for provisional measures, 14 June and 29 August 1998, 25 
May and 25 September 1999 and 26 November 2001. 
237 IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order for provisional measures, 14 June 
1998 (‘convenient’ is the literal translation used in the official English text of the original 
‘conveniente’, but it is likely that the Court meant something like ‘suitable’). 
238 See IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 29 August 1998. 
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ability to issue effective provisional measures’.239 Trinidad’s professed impossibility to stay an 
execution in advance of the reading of the Execution Warrant, combined with the fact that there is 
only a limited period of time (e.g. five to seven days) between this reading and the intended exe-
cution, indeed makes it very difficult for the Court to order provisional measures in a timely 
manner. The death row prisoner must first contact the NGO or lawyer dealing with his case who, 
in turn, must contact the Commission, which in turn approaches the secretariat of the Court. The 
Court’s staff then communicates with the President who orders urgent measures. These must 
arrive in time to halt the execution.240 As noted, in cases that are themselves already pending 
before the Court the petitioners may now directly approach the Court without having to go 
through the Commission. 
The Inter-American Court does not normally provide information on the time span between 
the Commission’s receipt of urgent information on an execution and its resort to the Court. Yet 
some cases have shown that the Commission is able to respond very swiftly.241 The State is gen-
erally late in informing a prisoner of his execution date. Sometimes the Commission leaves the 
Court little time to deal with an urgent case.242 In other instances, it is the Court that waits until 
the day before the execution with its order for provisional measures.243  
4.3.6 Proprio motu 
The Inter-American Commission can take precautionary measures proprio motu.244 An example 
is the La Tablada case, which did not arise from any individual submission. The petitioner just 
                                                 
239 IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 29 August 1998. 
240 See also under the heading ‘timing’ in this paragraph. 
241 On 25 June 1998 Mr. Thomas had been informed that he would be hanged in five days. The next 
day the petitioners informed the Commission about this. On the same day the Commission 
unsuccessfully appealed to the Court to include him as a beneficiary in the James et al. 
provisional measures. James et al. cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 29 June 
1998. Another example is when on 17 June 1999 the Commission informed the Court that on that 
same date the State had read a warrant of execution to one of the beneficiaries of the Court’s 
provisional measures, Mr. Briggs, and that this execution would be carried out in five days. 
James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 16 August 2000. 
242 There have also been times when the Commission was not that swift and did not leave the Court 
much reaction time. One of them also concerns the case of Mr. Briggs. In February and May 
1999 Trinidad requested the Court to ‘confirm’ that he was not a beneficiary any more. On that 
same day the Secretariat requested the Commission to submit an urgent report on the situation of 
Mr. Briggs within 24 hours. The Commission requested an extension of four days, which 
included the weekend. The President granted this extension. James et al. case, Order for 
provisional measures, 25 May 1999. On the day the Commission presented its report the Court 
ordered the provisional measures to be maintained. In his Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado 
Trindade referred to the little time that was available to the Court to decide on this Order: ‘the 
few hours that the Court disposed of’ (in fact, the Spanish text says ‘de que dispuso la Corte’, 
referring to the little time the Court had, rather than the time it ‘disposed of’) ‘the merciless 
pressure of time’ and the Commission’s document ‘submitted to the Court a couple of hours ago’. 
243 On 29 June 1998 the President of the Court ordered urgent measures on behalf of Mr. Thomas. 
His execution was scheduled early the next morning, which meant that these measures were 
barely in time. James et al. cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 29 June 1998. The 
Commission requested the Court to include Mr. Hilaire as a beneficiary, four days before his 
scheduled execution. The President ordered urgent measures on his behalf three days later, again 
only on the day before his scheduled execution. James et al. cases, Order of the President for 
urgent measures, 13 July 1998. 
244 See Article 25(1) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure (‘on its own initiative’). 
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asked for a provisional measure.245 Yet the Commission seldom uses such precautionary measures 
proprio motu. It already deals with a great number of cases and it also considers it is in a better 
position when it can say that there was a specific request to take action, even if it is only a tele-
phone call. In theory, however, the Commission could act upon its own initiative if something 
comes to its attention, for instance based on public knowledge.246  
Since the introduction of the Office of the OAS Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expres-
sion the Commission has been more pro-active in the use of precautionary measures to protect 
journalists and it has even informed specific journalists of the possibility of requesting the Com-
mission’s precautionary measures.247 While this is not the same as proprio motu use of provi-
sional measures, it clearly is approaching the potential beneficiary proprio motu. 
The Commission can also go to the Court and ask for provisional measures on its own ini-
tiative. An example of where the Commission acted without a request is the Chipoco case. Yet the 
Court observed that this was a matter still pending before the Commission, which had ‘not sub-
mitted information to the Court sufficient to support the adoption of such measures, which re-
quires the Commission to have gathered preliminary evidence to support a presumption of the 
truth of the allegations and of a situation whose grave seriousness and urgency could cause irrepa-
rable harm to persons’.248 
As to the Court, if a case is still pending before the Commission it cannot order provisional 
measures proprio motu. It can only order them upon request by the Commission. Once a case is 
pending before the Court the Rules of Procedure have given the petitioner a more independent 
role. Not only the Commission, but also the petitioner can request provisional measures. At this 
stage the Court can also order them proprio motu.249 Thus, the monopoly of the Commission with 
regard to triggering the Court’s decision whether or not to order provisional measures only ap-
plies to those cases that are not yet pending before the Court. In such cases the petitioner depends 
                                                 
245 See also Chapter VII (Detention situations) and Chapter XIII (Protection). 
246 Interview of author with Juan Mendez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. 
247 See e.g. CIDH Annual Report 2006, 3 March 2007, Volume II, Report of the Office of the 
Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, p. 1, §§7-8 and p. 9, §18. 
248 IACHR Chipoco (Peru), Order of 27 January 1993 (refusing request for provisional measures). 
Previously the President had already decided not to order urgent measures, Order of President of 
14 December 1992. On evidentiary requirements see Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
249 See Article 63(2) ACHR and 25(3) of the Court’s Rules of Procedure. In its Annual Report 2005, 
p. 76, the Court included charts indicating that provisional measures were requested 96 times 
(including requests for extensions) and rejected three times; in six cases the Court used them 
proprio motu (see also section 4.3 of Chapter XIII (Protection) on the importance of ascertaining 
the wishes of the beneficiaries in this respect), nine were on request of the victim, 80 on request 
of the Commission and one based on an agreement by the petitioners, the State and the 
Commission. 75 % of the provisional measures relates to cases pending before the Commission 
and 25 % to cases pending before the Court. The Court’s Annual Report 2007 referred to a total 
of 118 requests for provisional measures. It noted that in 10 cases the measures requested were 
rejected and that 32 belonged to requests to expand provisional measures already adopted. It also 
pointed out that 26 % of the provisional measures requested were related to contentious cases 
processed before the Court, while 74 % related to proceedings still pending before the 
Commission. The great majority (93) of the provisional measures were requested by the Inter-
American Commission. Again the Court mentioned that it ordered six provisional measures on its 
own motion (meaning that it did not use them proprio motu since the publi8cation of its Annual 
Report 2005); again it mentioned that one was requested by common agreement by the 
Commission, the alleged victims and the State and 18 were requested by the alleged victims or 
their representatives, indicating that the number of such requests doubled since 2005. See Annual 
Report 2007, p. 76. 
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on the Commission’s decision that its own precautionary measures are insufficient and that, pur-
suant to the last sentence of Article 63(2), the Court’s provisional measures are warranted.  
At the end of 2001 the Secretary of the Inter-American Court decided to assign the task to 
prepare provisional measures to one staff member. The question arises whether this is a desirable 
approach. After all, provisional measures constitute an integral part of the case. For a decision 
whether or not to take them it is necessary to examine all information available. Such a division 
of labour would mean a duplication of work. Nevertheless, this approach has been suggested with 
regard to the ECtHR as well and it could have benefits.250 According to Garry instituting a sepa-
rate body with expertise in analysing requests for provisional measures ‘might also be beneficial 
to the individual applicants for whom a thoroughly knowledgeable and expeditious review of the 
request is often a matter of life or death’.251 Expertise on provisional measures is necessary, but 
these measures should not be dealt with in a manner divorced from the main case. 
During an on-site visit in Peru the Inter-American Commission had received information 
about harassment to which Mr. Mezarina was subjected, allegedly by members of the Peruvian 
army. There had been an attack on his life in November 1998. Unknown persons had fired at him 
twice when he was leaving his home. In February 1999 the Commission granted precautionary 
measures on his behalf and on behalf of his family. In light of the Commission’s reference to its 
country visit, it may be that it more or less decided this precautionary measure on a proprio motu 
basis. In March 1999 Peru informed the Commission that it had adopted specific measures. Sub-
sequently, ‘the parties’ continued presenting information on the issue.252 The reference to ‘the 
parties’ may either mean that there indeed had been a petitioner from the start (which probably 
means that the Commission did not use its power to take precautionary measures proprio motu) or 
that later an NGO came forward to represent the beneficiary.253  
4.4 Decisions by the Inter-American Commission and Court to take 
provisional measures: transparency or the lack thereof?  
4.4.1 Introduction 
Different from the UN adjudicators the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American 
Court (especially the latter), have been more forthcoming in providing information about their use 
of provisional measures.254 Secondary literature has addressed the issue as well.255 
                                                 
250 See e.g. Buquicchio-de Boer (1998), p. 236. 
251 Garry (2001), p. 402.  
252 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III C.1, §49. 
253 In the alternative the beneficiary himself remained in touch with the Commission and was 
referred to as a party. 
254 As set out in this section they have published more information on their use of provisional meas-
ures than the UN committees. The author visited the Secretariat of the Inter-American Commis-
sion, Washington, D.C. (18 September-22 October 2001). She would like to thank members of 
the Commission Robert Goldman, Juan Mendez and Claudio Grossman; staff members Brian Tit-
temore, Veronica Gomez, Elisabeth Abi-Mershed, Ignacio Alvarez, Ariel Dulitzky and Christina 
Cerna; as well as Rick Wilson (Washington College of Law), Viviana Krsticevic (CEJIL), the 
Guatemala Human Rights Commission, Diego Rodríguez (Washington College of Law) and 
Claudia Martín (Washington College of Law). She also would like to thank Judge Thomas Buer-
genthal (The Hague, 19 July 2001) and Douglas Cassel (then Northwestern University School of 
Law, Chicago, 7 September 2001). She visited the Secretariat of the Inter-American Court, San 
José, Costa Rica (23 October-10 December 2001). She would like to thank President Cançado 
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4.4.2 The Commission 
Official information on the Commission’s early use of precautionary measures is lacking.256 
Apparently, during the 1970s the Commission’s President would sometimes – very informally – 
contact a State if the Commission felt a person was at risk. He did so simply for humanitarian 
reasons and did not specifically refer to the State’s obligations under the OAS Charter or the 
ACHR.257 In 2001 one of the members of the Commission recalled that in the 1970s and 1980s, 
when he himself brought cases before the Commission as a petitioner, the Commission developed 
a practice of urgent intervention in the context of the disappearances.258  
Between 1979 and 1989 the Commission focused primarily on other activities, such as pre-
paring Country Reports, rather than on individual petitions. Yet as part of its other activities the 
Commission has intervened in urgent situations as well.  
Since 1989, when the Court issued its first Judgments, not only the Court, but also the 
Commission has dealt more intensively with individual complaints. This may mean that it has 
used precautionary measures more often since then, although references to precautionary meas-
ures prior to 1996 are only found incidentally.259  
It is only since its Annual Report 1996, published in March 1997, that the Commission in-
cludes a specific section on its use of precautionary measures. In this Annual Report the Commis-
                                                                                                                       
Trindade and staff members Pablo Saavedra-Alessandri, Emilia Segares-Rodríguez, Paula Liza-
no, Olger González-Espinoza, María Auxiliadora Solano, Lilly Ching; former under-Secretary of 
the Court Victor Rodriguez, Charles Moyer (Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, formerly 
Secretary of the Court and Commission); and Alejandra Nuño (CEJIL Costa Rica). She also at-
tended the public hearings on provisional measures in the Centro Pro case against Mexico, where 
the murder of human rights lawyer Digna Ochoa was discussed (after the withdrawal of provisio-
nal measures), and the hearings on reparations in the Bamaca case against Guatemala (a case in 
which witnesses were in need of protection against threats also after the judgment on the merits 
was published). 
255 See e.g. Medina Quiroga/Nash Rojas (2007), pp. 70-71 (precautionary measures) and pp. 93-94 
(provisional measures); Bonifaz Tweddle (2006), pp. 55-97; Pasqualucci (2005), pp. 1-49; 
Cançado Trindade (2005), pp. 145-163; Shelton (2005b), pp. 165-176; Pasqualucci (2003), pp. 
219-325; Cançado Trindade (2003), pp. 162-168; González-Espinoza (2002); Padilla (1998), pp. 
1189-1196; Buergenthal (1994), pp. 69-94; Aguiar-Aranguren (1994), pp. 19-37. 
256 In general the Commission’s early decisions on admissibility and merits are difficult to access. 
See Wilson (American University), in his introduction to the 1994 version of an index to the 
Inter-American Commission’s case law, at the University of Minnesota search database 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/commission.htm>. See also Gilman (1998), pp. 261-290. 
257 Interviews by author with Christina Cerna, Washington D.C., 18 October 2001 and Charles 
Moyer, San José, Costa Rica, 20 November 2001. 
258 Interview by author with Commissioner Juan Méndez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. In the 
1980s he was working as a practitioner at Human Rights Watch. 
259 The 1997 case docket of CEJIL, the main NGO bringing cases before the Inter-American 
Commission and Court, gives some information on the cases it has dealt with prior to 1998. This 
case docket is simply a reference document used within CEJIL. It was not intended for 
publication and it does not claim to be complete. It mentions 153 cases. In 36 of these it 
requested the Commission to take precautionary measures. It is not clear whether the 
Commission always followed this request. In seven of these cases CEJIL also requested the 
Commission to seek provisional measures from the Court. It requested the Commission to take 
precautionary measures in eight cases involving Colombia and in ten cases involving Guatemala. 
The other countries were Mexico (five), El Salvador and Dominican Republic (three times each), 
Honduras and Bolivia (twice each) and Peru, Brazil and Guyana (once each). CEJIL case docket 
1997, on file with the author. 
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sion presented its precautionary measures in the order in which it received requests for such 
measures by petitioners.260 In later Annual Reports the Commission presents the precautionary 
measures per State in chronological order.261 Its presentation generally includes the name of the 
person(s) on whose behalf the Commission used precautionary measures and usually a very brief 
summary of facts. Furthermore, the Commission mentions the rights of the persons exposed to 
grave and imminent danger, the number it has assigned to the case (if any) as well as the name of 
the State involved and the date on which the Commission decided on the precautionary meas-
ures.262  
The quality of the information given in the Annual Reports on the Commission’s use of 
precautionary measures seems to depend on the desk officer at the Executive Secretariat, working 
on a specific country. This is particularly relevant in light of the question to what extent the An-
nual Report provides an explanation for the use of precautionary measures in the cases it de-
scribes. It is possible that for budgetary reasons the Commission has chosen not to coordinate the 
information it presents.263 
As the Commission does not formally reject petitioners’ requests for precautionary meas-
ures, there is no documentation available on its decision not to take them.264 This means that its 
conditions for taking precautionary measures must be derived from the information it provides on 
those situations where it did take them.  
Before 2000 the Commission already published both its Admissibility and its Inadmissibil-
ity Reports, with ‘the essential purpose of establishing clear and objective criteria for the process-
                                                 
260 See CIDH Annual Report 1996, Chapter II, §4. 
261 See e.g. CIDH Annual Report 1997, Chapter III, §2(a). 
262 As of Spring 2008 the Commission also provides a functioning link on its website through which 
the sections of its Annual Reports discussing precautionary measures may be accessed directly. 
263 In 2002, for instance, the Commission received 4.1 % of the total OAS budget. Speech by Dr. 
Juan Méndez, President of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights at the inauguration 
of the 114th regular session of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights, 25 February 
2002, <www.cidh.org/discursos>. Méndez noted that the Commission’s overall budget for that 
financial year was $ 3.1 million USD and that it spent approximately two-thirds on staff salaries 
and benefits. He pointed out that ‘[t]he remainder barely covers the costs of preparing and 
holding two regular sessions and one special session publishing an annual report, covering 
performance contract fees, and paying for supplies and similar items’. “As a result on-site visits, 
dealings with the Inter-American Court, and the Commission’s other activities in promoting and 
protecting human rights have to be financed with voluntary contributions from member states and 
assistance from observer nations”. The Court’s Annual Report 2005, published in 2006, referred 
to the Commission’s budget at constituting 4.29 % of the OAS budget. The Commission has 
since included a link to ‘Financial resources’ on its website, which presents a graph for the OAS 
2006 adjusted budget indicating 4.6 % of the budget distributed to the Commission ($ 3,728.3). 
See <http://www.cidh.org/financiro.eng.htm> (consulted 10 August 2008). 
264 Cançado Trindade has pointed out that ‘the decisions of the Commission and the Court 
concerning both precautionary and provisional measures, respectively, should always be 
motivated, as a guarantee of respect for the adversary principle – which is a general principle of 
law – so that the petitioners have certainty that the matter they submitted has been duly and 
carefully considered by the international instance, and so that the meaning of the decision taken 
by the latter is clear’. This applied also to the Commission’s decision to deny a request for 
precautionary measures: ‘this decision should be duly justified’. IACHR Matter of the persons 
imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo 
(Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, Separate Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §30, referring 
to his Separate Opinions attached to Mery Naranjo et al. (Colombia), Order of 22 September 
2006, §§5–11 and Gloria Giralt de García Prieto et al. (El Salvador), Order of 26 September 
2006, §§7-13. 
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ing of individual petitions both for the states and for the representatives of the victims of human 
rights violations’.265 Nevertheless, there sometimes is a lack of transparency, both with regard to 
the decision-making on which cases to speed up and send to the Court and with regard to the use 
of precautionary measures.266 
In order to address the problem of the lack of transparency of the procedure in 2000 the 
Commission introduced a provision in its Rules of Procedure. Article 44(2) reads as follows: 
“The Commission shall give fundamental consideration to obtaining justice in a particular case, 
based, among others, on the following factors: (a) the position of the petitioner; (b) the nature 
and seriousness of the violation; (c) the need to develop or clarify the case law of the system; 
(d) the future effect of the decision within the legal systems of the Member States; and, (e) the 
quality of the evidence available”. 
The petitioner and the representative of the State attend the hearings before the Inter-American 
Commission. The Commission does publicize that it has had a hearing as well as some of its 
contents. Both parties are free to publicize their visions on the matter but the meetings themselves 
are not open for the public and the press.  
In some of its admissibility decisions the Inter-American Commission refers to its use of 
precautionary measures and sometimes it provides information on State replies, etc. Since 1996 it 
includes a short section on its use of precautionary measures in its Annual Report. This has al-
ready improved the transparency of the Commission’s use of this tool. The information provided, 
however, is not very consistent and does not generally analyze the replies of States. It is possible 
that the Commission fears that more detail on State replies would diminish the effectiveness of its 
precautionary measures because State parties could use non-compliance by other States as an 
excuse for their own non-compliance. It may also be possible to explain the inconsistency in 
reporting by the chronic lack of resources under which the Commission’s Secretariat is forced to 
operate.  
Obviously, the Secretariats of the various adjudicators have an important role to play in the 
day to day proceedings and drafting of documents, including the preparation of decisions on 
provisional measures. After all the petitions and State responses arrive at these Secretariats and 
the adjudicators can only function effectively when their members are assisted by the staff work-
ing at these Secretariats.267 The Inter-American Commission has expressed itself publicly about 
this and related issues, partly to address speculations in domestic press. In 2005 it published a 
Resolution in which it distanced itself from public statements made by one of its members both 
involving the status of its precautionary measures and with regard to its decision-making on these 
measures. Commissioner Gutiérrez had publicly indicated to a Mexican newspaper that the rele-
vant province in Mexico ‘had no obligation to comply with precautionary measures’, because 
                                                 
265 CIDH Annual Report 1997, Chapter III, §§5-6. 
266 In the past, when there was no policy to send cases to the Court, the lack of transparency with 
regard to decision-making on when to send a case to the Court was even greater. On the one hand 
the need for transparency and motivation required the Commission to give reasons in its Annual 
Report for not having sent a case to the Inter-American Court. On the other hand, some members 
of the Commission and its staff perceived a risk that doing this might undermine the integrity and 
effectiveness of the Commission’s final decisions, for instance when the Commission did not 
deem a case strong enough to present to the Court. Nevertheless, in my view providing no 
information and explanation why a case was not sent to the Court might actually enhance the risk 
of speculation, which could also undermine effectiveness. 
267 This observation could equally be made with regard to permanent international courts as well as 
domestic courts. 
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they were ‘only observations issued from the Secretariat, not from the Commission’.268 The re-
mark had caused alarm among the petitioners and others in Mexico. The beneficiary of the pre-
cautionary measures reportedly decided to leave the province in question because of the state-
ments. Gutiérrez had also attacked the Executive Secretary as having ‘usurped’ the Commission’s 
functions, being the person who ‘decides to admit and process all the files in relation to questions 
on the merits and precautionary measures’.269 Moreover, while he was in Colombia, in November 
2004, he had stated that precautionary measures were not binding. The remarks by the Commis-
sioner were particularly problematic in light of the serious situations in Colombia, involving death 
threats, and the fact that this State had never protested that the Commission’s precautionary 
measures would not be legally binding. Finally, he had publicly commented on statements of the 
Inter-American Commission with regard to his State of nationality (Venezuela). 
In the Resolution the Commission noted that the various opportunities it had given Gutiér-
rez to comply with his juridical and ethical obligations had been to no avail. It pointed out that it 
had ‘the legal and moral obligation to report on this situation to the member States, the organs of 
the OAS and civil society, and to respond publicly to the notions put forth by Commissioner 
Freddy Gutiérrez Trejo’.270 The Commission reaffirmed the international obligation of member 
States to comply with its precautionary measures.271 The Resolution also reiterated the ethical and 
legal commitment of members of the Commission to refrain from participating in the discussion 
of a matter if they are nationals of the State concerned.272 With regard to its decision-making it 
noted that the precautionary measures had in fact been adopted with the majority vote of its mem-
bers and that when the Commission was not in session such vote would take place through con-
ference calls or by electronic means, in accordance with Article 17(5) of its Rules of Procedure.273  
In July 2007 the Commission referred the same Commissioner once more. It stated that he 
had repeatedly abused his position as a Rapporteur in order to attack the institutional integrity of 
the Commission. It also stated that he had made false statements regarding matters and cases 
pending and had made numerous public statements even with regard to cases pending involving 
his own country. The other members of the Commission decided to replace him in the functions 
and responsibilities that were assigned to him as a Rapporteur.274  
In July 2008 the Commission adapted and expanded Article 15 of its Rules of Procedure re-
garding Rapporteurships and Working Groups, which originally consisted of two paragraphs only. 
Among others the article now includes parameters for the designation of Rapporteirships and 
membership in Working Groups and it includes the explicit option to replace a special rapporteur 
‘for reasonable cause’ by an absolute majority. 
For its discussion of precautionary measures this chapter predominantly draws on the in-
formation provided in the Commission’s Annual Reports since 1996. In 1996 the Commission 
                                                 
268 CIDH Resolution 1/05, 8 March 2005. 
269 Ibidem. 
270 CIDH Resolution 1/05, 8 March 2005. 
271 See further Chapter XVI on legal status. 
272 See more generally about the independence and impartiality of members of the Commission and 
the Court e.g. Faúndez Ledesma (1998), pp. 185-210.  
273 CIDH Resolution 1/05, 8 March 2005, by all members of the Commission other than Gutiérrez. 
The latter’s comment was attached to the Resolution. 
274 CIDH Resolution 3/07, 17 July 2007. 
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took less than thirty precautionary measures.275 In the next five years it took fifty or more precau-
tionary measures each year.276  
Two approaches of the Commission (and its staff) are particularly helpful with regard to 
transparency: the fact that it now publishes statistics about its precautionary measures in its An-
nual Reports and the fact that it sometimes publishes press releases specifically about compliance 
with its own precautionary measures and with the Court’s provisional measures.277 Recently it has 
even made available video and audio of hearings involving a State’s compliance with its precau-
tionary measures.278 It has also made a separate link to ‘precautionary measures’ on the main page 
of its website, providing information even on recent precautionary measures that have not yet 
been included in an Annual Report.279 
4.4.3 The Court 
Despite the lack of any meaningful budget the Court has been able to make its decision-making 
on the use of provisional measures more transparent than any other human rights adjudicator.280 
                                                 
275 Annual Report 1996. These were Brazil (4), Colombia (4), Dominican Republic (3), Ecuador (1), 
El Salvador (1), Guatemala (8), Honduras (2), Mexico (5) and US (1).  
276 In its Annual Report 2006, published in March 2007, the CIDH included a table referring to 57 
precautionary measures in 1997; 54 in 1998; 52 both in 1999 and in 2000; 50 in 2001; 91 in 
2002; 56 in 2003, 37 in 2004; 33 in 2005 and 37 in 2006.  
277 See e.g. CIDH, Press Release, ‘IACHR Expresses concern over the situation of Yvon Neptune’, 
19/05, 6 May 2005; ‘Inter-American Commission on human Rights expresses its concern over 
the situation in the Urso Branco prison in Brazil’, 13/04, 19 March 2004; ‘Executive Secretary of 
the IACHR concerned over the death threats against Human Rights Defenders in Haiti’, 28/01, 9 
November 2001; ‘Inter-American Commission on Human Rights requests precautionary 
measures to protect Claudy Gassant, the judge investigating the murder of reporter Jean 
Dominique’, 13/01, 6 July 2001 and Press release (urging the OAS to call off the execution of 
federal death row inmate Garza), 11/01, 15 June 2001; all at: <www.cidh.org>. Furthermore it is 
interesting to note that, in the press releases on precautionary measures, the Commission has 
introduced a practice of attaching background information (less than half a page) on its mandate 
and composition, evidently intended to inform the media. See e.g. press release ‘IACHR calls 
upon the United States to postpone execution of juvenile offender Alexander Williams’, 7/02, 19 
February 2002. See also Chapters XVII (Official State responses) and XVIII (Follow up). 
278 See e.g. CIDH Video and Audio of the hearing on Precautionary Measures for the Detainees at 
the Guantánamo Bay Naval Base, held on October 28, 2008, during the Commission’s 133rd 
period of sessions, link provided in CIDH press release 02/09, ‘IACHR welcomes order to close 
Guantanamo detention center’, 27 January 2009, at <http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/ 
2009/02-09eng.htm> (consulted 27 January 2009). 
279 See e.g. <http://www.cidh.org/medidas/2009.eng.htm> (consulted 27 Jnauary 2009). 
280 In 2005 the Court received less than two percent of the OAS budget. Following the presentation 
by the President of the Court of the 1999 Annual Report on the work of the Court to the 
Committee on Juridical and Political Affairs of the Permanent Council of the OAS, Annual 
Report of the Inter-American Court 2000, III.6, sixteen delegations congratulated the Court for 
the excellent work performed during 1999 and hoped that the OAS would continue to support the 
Court. “In this respect, they expressed themselves in favor of reintegrating at least US$ 
100,000.00 of the US$ 150,500.00 cut form the Court’s budget for 2000 by the OAS Program-
Budget Committee, so that the Court could conduct at least three sessions in 2000 and translate 
and publish its annual report for that year. Likewise, they expressed the hope that the Court’s 
budget would be increased as of 2001, as it has been frozen since 1998”. On 12 October 2000 the 
OAS General Assembly approved the Court’s budget for the year 2001in a total of US$ 
1,284,700. In other words the Court must work with a little over a million US dollars, Annual 
Report Inter-American Court 2000, Chapter VII. See also the General Secretariat’s Report on the 
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From the start the Inter-American Court has published its provisional measures separately, first in 
its Annual Reports, later also in its ‘Series E’ on provisional measures.281 The same applies to the 
President’s decision to take urgent measures in advance of any Court decision.  
The Court hearings on provisional measures are public and contribute significantly to the 
persuasiveness of its Orders for provisional measures. Moreover, since September 2001 its provi-
sional measures are also accessible directly on the website of the Court.282 They are motivated, 
references are made to public hearings held on requests for provisional measures and they regu-
larly include concurring opinions.283 The Court also issues press releases specifically referring to 
its provisional measures and both the Commission and the Court provide overviews of their pro-
visional measures in their Annual Reports.284  
Yet given the relevance of the Court’s provisional measures for other systems as well as for 
the English speaking petitioners and States of the American system it would be substantially 
increase the accessibility of the information if good translations were regularly provided.285  
                                                                                                                       
budget execution of the regular fund 2001 as presented to the Committee on Administrative and 
Budgetary Affairs, 18 September 2001(MAN/AS/150/01), p. 6, <www.oas.org/consejo/CAAP/ 
documentos.htm>. The latter Report speaks of a total OAS budget of 76 million US dollars, 
which means that the Court received 1.7 % in 2001. In a table published in its 2005 Annual 
Report, published in 2006, the IACHR refers to 1,82 % of the OAS Annual Budget that is 
reserved for the Court. Both in 2005 and 2006 the budget was US$ 1,391,300. The budget set by 
the OAS clearly did not take account of the increased case load of the Court. The budget for 2007 
was somewhat larger: 1,656,300 and for 2008 it was 1,756,300 (IACHR Annual Report 2007, p. 
6). In a speech of 27 November 2006 President Sergio García Ramírez referred to the 26.3 
percent increase in the Court’s regular budget and the increase in the funds from external 
donations, Annual Report 2007, p. 55. 
281 This includes introductions by the President of the Inter-American Court: Fix-Zamudio (1996), 
pp. V-IX; Cançado Trindade (2000), pp. VII-XVIII; Cançado Trindade (2001), pp. V-XX. See 
also the separate publication on the Court’s website (often only in Spanish; in cases involving 
Brazil often only in Portuguese). 
282 See <http://www.corteidh.or.cr>. The website of the University of Minnesota Human Rights 
Library is an accessible alternative, though not up-to-date: <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/ 
iachr/iachr.html>. 
283 On dissenting and separate opinions before the Inter-American Court generally see Gros Espiell 
(1988), pp. 456-466. 
284 They both provide statistics as well. See e.g. IACHR Annual Report 2005, with 25 tables, pp. 65-
81, including tables relating to provisional measures, such as the number of public hearings held 
on provisional measures, p. 79. In addition, in 2007 the Court introduced the practice of making 
available on its website the official pleadings of several cases. Again the Court is the first human 
rights adjudicator doing so in a manner comparable to that of the ICJ. 
285 The translation into English of provisional measures that were originally written in Spanish has 
sometimes been unclear or inaccurate. Moreover, quotations in these provisional measures from 
earlier decisions on the merits or reparations (and even from provisions of the treaty) often 
appeared to have been translated anew, rather than copied from the original translation or official 
text. In spite of a chronic lack of resources some oversight on the accuracy and consistency of 
translations would be useful. A fully functioning search system of the case law, including the 
provisional measures, would be the next step. 
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5 THE AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
5.1 Introduction 
An African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights was installed in 2006 with an explicit mandate 
to order provisional measures. In July 2008 the African Union (AU) adopted a Protocol aimed at 
the merger of this Court with the Court of Justice. The new African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights also has the power to order provisional measures. Lacking Court practice this book only 
refers to the practice of the Commission, whose mandate to use provisional measures is based on 
its Rules of Procedure. 
The African Commission, monitoring compliance with the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR), has used provisional measures to halt executions; to protect against 
threats and ensure security; to intervene in a detention situation and ensure medical treatment; to 
halt deportation; to protect indigenous culture; to allow the return of a person to his home country 
and to allow the return of a body for burial; to intervene on behalf of journalists detained without 
charge and to release detainees or bring them before a court. 
This section discusses the institutional setting of the provisional measures as used in the Af-
rican system and the right of individual petition, the power to order provisional measures, the 
promptness in deciding on the use of provisional measures and the availability of information on 
the use of these measures. 
5.2 The right of individual complaint before the African Commission and 
Court 
In 1981 the Organisation African Unity, the predecessor of the AU,286 adopted the African Char-
ter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR). This Charter entered into force in 1986. It has 53 
States parties (all AU member States). The African Commission, monitoring compliance with its 
provisions, consists of 11 members. Its Secretariat was inaugurated in June 1989 and is based in 
Banjul (The Gambia), yet its sessions are often held in other States in Africa.287 Its function is 
both promotional (Article 45(1)) and protective (Article 45(2)). Under its protective mandate it 
must ‘ensure’ the protection of human and peoples’ rights. In this context it examines State Re-
ports and individual communications.288 The African Commission has also instituted Special 
Rapporteurs on prisons and prison conditions; on women’s rights; on freedom of expression; on 
human rights defenders; on extra-judicial, summary or arbitrary executions; on refugees, asylum 
seekers and internally displaced persons in Africa. Some of these Rapporteurs also apply an ur-
gent action procedure. These urgent actions may relate to persons that have not submitted any 
                                                 
286 Constitutive Act of the African Union, Lomé, Togo, 11 July 2000 (based on the Sirte Declaration 
of the Organisation of African Unity’s Assembly of Heads of State and Government, Fourth 
Extraordinary Summit, Libya, 9 September 1999). The Constitutive Act entered into force 26 
May 2001. The headquarters of the AU are in Addis Ababa (Ethiopia). See generally about 
Africa and human rights Heyns (2004); Zeleza/McConnaughay (2004); Lloyd/Murray (2004), pp. 
165-187; Bekker (2004), pp. 293-299; Naldi (1999); Welch (1995); specifically on the African 
Union and human rights: Murray (2004) and Udombana (2002), pp. 1177-1261. About the role of 
the African Union’s predecessor, the OAU, see e.g. Naldi (2002), pp. 1-35. 
287 See Ouguergouz (2003), pp. 505-507. 
288 Formally its mandate is to examine State communications and ‘other communications’. 
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complaint before the Commission.289 The interrelation between the Commission’s provisional 
measures and the urgent actions by its Special Rapporteurs has not yet been formally clarified. 
The ACHPR also includes a provision on early warning in emergency situations. Under Ar-
ticle 58(3) the Commission should refer cases of emergency to the Chairman of the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government. As Ankumah observes, this Assembly had ‘a reputation of fail-
ing to condemn human rights abuses by African governments’. She speculates about what Idi 
Amin would have done with a complaint about violations in Uganda in the late 1970s, when he 
was the Chairman of the Assembly.290 
As noted, part of the Commission’s mandate is ‘protective’ (Article 45(2)). Under this man-
date it must ‘ensure’ the protection of human and peoples’ rights. The main procedure discussed 
in the Charter is the inter-State complaint procedure, which has rarely been used (Articles 47-
54).291 On the basis of the phrase ‘communications other than those of States parties’ in Article 55 
ACHPR the Commission has accepted individual complaints. It accepts complaints by individuals 
and by NGOs and it does not apply a victim requirement. In this respect the practice developed by 
the Commission is similar to that of the Inter-American Commission, although for the latter the 
absence of victim requirement is apparent from Article 44 ACHR. 
The procedure is otherwise similar to that of the other adjudicators.292 In the Ogoni case 
(2002) the African Commission made clear that the ‘uniqueness of the African situation and the 
special qualities of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights imposes upon the African 
Commission an important task. International law and human rights must be responsive to African 
circumstances’.293  
In 1998 the Heads of State and Government of the OAU (now AU) adopted the Protocol to 
the African Charter establishing an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. It has been 
installed in Arusha, Tanzania and the new judges were sworn in on 2 July 2006. The African 
Commission or States that have ratified the Protocol can bring cases before the Court (Article 5). 
In addition the Court can provide Advisory Opinions.294 Direct access to the Court is possible for 
individuals and NGOs when the State against which they complain has made a declaration to this 
effect accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under Article 5(3) Protocol.295 As 
                                                 
289 About the Rapporteurs see e.g. Evans/Murray (2002), pp. 280-304; Harrington (2001), pp. 247-
267 and Murray (2000), pp. 22-24. 
290 Ankumah (1996), p. 40. See also Murray (2000), pp. 24-25. 
291 See ACHPR Congo v. Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, com. nr. 227/99, 15th Annual Activity 
report 1001-2. 
292 See e.g. ACHPR, Information Sheet No. 2 Guidelines of the submission of communications (10 
pp.) and No. 3 Communication Procedure (10 pp.). See in general about the case law and 
proceedings before the Commission Heyns & Killander (2006), pp. 509-543; Murray (2004), pp. 
193-204; Flinterman/Ankumah (2004), pp. 171-188; Heyns/Viljoen (2004), pp. 129-143; 
Mugwanya (2003); Ouguergouz (2003); Udombana (2003a), pp. 1-37; Evans/Murray (2002); 
Pityana (2002), pp. 219-245; Naldi (2001), pp. 109-118; Nmehielle (2001); Odinkalu (2001), pp. 
225-246; Umozurike (2001), pp. 707-712; De Wet (2001), pp. 713-729; Murray (2000); 
Heyns/Viljoen (1999), pp. 421-445; Umozurike (1997) and Ankumah (1996). 
293 “Clearly, collective rights, environmental rights, and economic and social rights are essential 
elements of human rights in Africa. The African Commission will apply any of the diverse rights 
contained in the African Charter. It welcomes this opportunity to make clear that there is no right 
in the African Charter that cannot be made effective”. ACHPR The Social and Economic Rights 
Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (Ogoni case), October 
2001, §68. 
294 See e.g. Van der Mei (2005b), pp. 27-46. 
295 “The Court may entitle relevant Non Governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status 
before the Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with 
article 34 (6) of this Protocol”. As of 15 October 2007, 24 States had ratified the Protocol on the 
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noted, in July 2008 the AU adopted a Protocol aimed at the merger of this Court with the Court of 
Justice.296 The Protocol on the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights will remain in force 
for a transitional period. The new Protocol does not make provision for direct access to the Court 
by individuals or NGOs either. Once more they can only bring petitions to the Human Rights 
Section of the new Court against States that have made a specific declaration to this effect. In 
addition to State parties and the African Commission the African Committee of Experts on the 
Rights and Welfare of the Child, African Intergovernmental Organizations accredited to the Un-
ion or its organs and African National Human Rights Institutions can also bring petitions (Article 
30 of the 2008 Protocol). 
As there is not practice so far, the interrelationship between the African Commission and ei-
ther African Court is not yet clear.297  
5.3 Power and promptness in the African system 
The African Charter does not contain a specific article on provisional measures, but Rule 111 of 
the Commission’s Rules of Procedure stipulates:  
“1. Before making its final views know to the Assembly on the communication [sic], the Com-
mission may inform the State party concerned of its views on the appropriateness of taking pro-
visional measures to avoid irreparable damage being caused to the victim of the alleged viola-
tion. In so doing, the Commission shall inform the State party that the expression on its views 
on the adoption of those provisional measures does not imply a decision on the substance of the 
communication.  
2. The Commission, or when it is not in session, the Chairman, in consultation with other mem-
bers of the Commission, may indicate to the parties any interim measure, the adoption of which 
seems desirable in the interest of the parties or the proper conduct of the proceedings before it.  
3. In case urgency when the Commission is not in session, the Chairman in consultation with 
other members of the Commission, may take any necessary action on behalf of the Commission. 
As soon as the Commission is again in session, the Chairman shall report to it on any action 
taken”.298 
                                                                                                                       
African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights. See the official website of the African Union: 
<www.africa-union.org>. This source does not indicate which of those States specifically 
recognised the competence of the Court to receive cases under Article 5(3) Protocol. Some States 
that have ratified the Protocol had not previously explicitly recognized an individual complaint 
mechanism, such as the individual complaints procedure under the ICCPR (e.g. Rwanda, Burundi 
and the Comoros).  
296 The Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights was adopted at the 
11th African Union (AU) Summit of July 2008. It merges the 1998 Protocol on the African Court 
of Human and Peoples’ Rights and the 2003 Protocol of the African Court of Justice (ratified by 
15 AU States). 
297 On the creation of the 1998 Protocol and the potential of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (given the text of the Protocol), see e.g. Padilla (2005), pp. 185-194; Van der Mei 
(2005), pp. 113-129; Ouguergouz (2003), pp. 681-683; Pityana (2003), pp. 110-129; Harrington 
(2002), pp. 305-334; Udombana (2000), pp. 1-5 and Krisch (1998), pp. 713-726. On the 
announced institution of a Court of the African Union see e.g. Viljoen/Baimu (2004), pp. 241-
267. 
298 ACHPR Rules of Procedure of 6 October 1995 (<www.achpr.org>). Previously this was Rule 
109, Rules of Procedure, 1 February 1988, see Murray/Evans (2001), p. 161. 
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Article 27(2) of the Protocol to the African Charter establishing the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights (1998) stipulates: 
“In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to 
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems necessary”. 
The words ‘shall adopt’ indicate the importance attached to provisional measures while ‘such 
provisional measures as it deems necessary’ refers to the discretion of the Court. It is not yet clear 
how the complementarity between the Commission and the Court would work out with regard to 
provisional measures. In the text of the 1998 Protocol there is no arrangement similar to that in 
Article 63(2) ACHR whereby the Commission requests the Court’s provisional measures in cases 
that can be brought before the Court but at that time are still pending before the Commission.299 
Article 35 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights 
(2008) stipulates: 
“1. The Court shall have the power, on its own motion or on application by the parties, to indi-
cate, if it considers that circumstances so require any provisional measures which ought to be 
taken to preserve the respective rights of the parties. 
2. Pending the final decision, notice of the provisional measures shall forthwith be given to the 
parties and the Chairperson of the Commission, who shall inform the Assembly”. 
It is assumed that the change in phrasing from ‘cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when 
necessary to avoid irreparable harm to persons’, in the 1998 Protocol, to ‘if it considers that cir-
cumstances so require any provisional measures which ought to be taken to preserve the respec-
tive rights of the parties’, in the 2008 Protocol, aims at a broader range of situations than just 
those to prevent irreparable harm to persons, because the provision applies to both the Human 
Rights Section and to the General Affairs Section. 
The text of Article 27(2) of the 1998 Protocol does not rule out the proprio motu use of pro-
visional measures by the African Court and neither does the text of Article 111 of the Commis-
sion’s Rules of Procedure for provisional measures by the Commission. The text of Article 35 of 
the 2008 Protocol explicitly refers to proprio motu use.  
The available primary sources provide insufficient information on the promptness of the 
Commission’s interventions.300 In light of the lack of resources and other problems at the Com-
mission’s secretariat, it may be assumed that promptness in a given case depends also on the 
resourcefulness of individual Commissioners.301 
                                                 
299 See Articles 2 and 8 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
300 See section 5.4. Some decisions do provide information relevant as to promptness, see e.g. 
ACHPR B. v. Kenya, November/December 2004 (inadm.), 2004 AHRLR 67. In this case the 
request was received on 21 October 2003. The Secretariat prepared a draft appeal to the State (in 
a case involving judicial independence) and sent it to the chairperson of the Commission on 24 
October. The latter replied by e-mail on 28 October, determining that an appeal letter should not 
be sent until the Commission had examined the matter during the next session in November. In 
March 2004 the petitioner withdrew the complaint, considering that the State was now addressing 
the situation. 
301 While discussing the practice of Special Rapporteurs in the context of the African Commission, 
Harrington (2001), pp. 247-267 lists several criteria, such as expertise, resources, willingness to 
devote time and the independence of the Commissioner. These criteria may also play a role in the 
Commission’s use of provisional measures. The 2005 Guidelines excluding senior civil servants 
and diplomatic representatives from Commission membership, BC/OLC/66/Vol. XVIII will be 
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5.4 Decisions to use provisional measures: transparency or the lack thereof? 
As part of human rights adjudication in the African system provisional measures could help pre-
vent irreparable harm, but thus far they have received little attention.302 Initially it was difficult 
even to access the decisions on the merits by the African Commission in individual cases, also 
because the drafters of the Charter had not intended to create easy access.303 Yet the Commission 
has now made available on its website its Annual Activity Reports including its decisions in 
individual cases.304 Moreover, in July 2004 the Centre for Human Rights of the University of 
Pretoria published the first volume of African Human Rights Law Reports and it has continued 
these publications since.305  
The Commission does not publish information on its use of provisional measures, let alone 
the texts themselves of the communications sent to the States under Rule 111.306 It has published 
few press releases, especially in comparison to the Inter-American Commission, and the press 
releases it did publish, did not relate to provisional measures. Recently the Special Rapporteur on 
human rights defenders in Africa has published a range of press releases that sometimes refer to 
ongoing threats and therefore aim at prevention. These may also be indicative of how communi-
cations under Rule 111 are formulated.307 Yet this is only the case to the extent that these press 
releases were prepared by the Secretariat and not by the Rapporteur herself. The Annual Activity 
Reports or the publication of the University of Pretoria, with the relevant case law, sometimes do 
                                                                                                                       
helpful to ensure independence, see Heyns/Killander (2006), pp. 524-525. See also Udombana 
(2003b), pp. 485-488, discussing the lengthy proceedings before the African Commission and the 
‘absolute necessity’ of the power of a human rights tribunal to order provisional measures, p. 
488. 
302 For a discussion see e.g. Flauss (2005a), pp. 231-239; Ouguergouz (2003), pp. 741-742; 
Udombana (2003b), pp. 479-532 (discussing various systems, but paying due attention to the 
African system); Naldi (2002), pp. 1-9, Nmehielle (2001), pp. 232-236 (and pp. 299-301 about 
the Court); for references see e.g. Murray (2000a), p. 20 (footnote 99) and Ankumah (1996), p. 
41 (the rule on provisional measures is an ‘effort to give meaning to the provisions guaranteed by 
the Charter’). 
303 Article 59(3) ACHPR stipulates that the Assembly formally adopts the Commission’s annual 
Activity Reports, which include its decisions in individual cases: Article 59(1) “All measures 
taken within the provisions of the present Chapter shall remain confidential until such a time as 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall otherwise decide. (2) The report on the 
activities of the Commission shall be published by its Chairman after it has been considered by 
the Assembly of Heads of State and Government”. 
304 See <www.achpr.org>. About openness/ confidentiality and resource limitations see e.g. Murray 
(2000b), pp. 169-173 and pp. 160-161. See also Ouguergouz (2003), pp. 680-681. 
305 The 2004 publication included 97 findings of the African Commission before 31 December 2000. 
See African Human Rights Law Reports, <www.chr.up.ac.za> (African Human Rights Centre, 
University of Pretoria). The African Human Rights Centre has since published subsequent 
African Human Rights Law Reports. Previously the Institute for Human Rights and 
Development, a pan-African NGO, also published a compilation of the Commission’s decisions 
between 1994 and 1999. Very useful is also the website of the University of Minnesota’s African 
Human Rights Resource Center, which lists the case law of the African Commission 
alphabetically: <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/africa/comcases/allcases.html>. Another useful 
internet source is <http://www.chr.up.ac.za/hr_docs/themes/theme02.html>. See further the 
documents in Heyns (2005) and Murray/Evans (2001). 
306 On the lack of transparency see also Julia Harrington (2001), pp. 247-267. 
307 See ACHPR Special Rapporteur on human rights defenders in Africa, Adv. Reine Alapini-
Gansou, on specific cases of harassment, detention, assassination. E.g. Press release on the 
harassment of Mr. Jean-Paul Noël Abdi, Djibouti, 16 March 2007. 
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not refer to (informal) provisional measures while they may have been taken, because the official 
publication of the decision on the merits or inadmissibility does not always refer to procedural 
decisions.308 Yet some additional information about the use of provisional measures by the Afri-
can Commission can be found in press releases by NGOs.309 
6 THE EUROPEAN HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM 
6.1 Introduction 
Most provisional measures by the (former) European Commission and by the European Court 
involve halting expulsion and extradition (Articles 2 and 3 ECHR). There are also a few provi-
sional measures involving direct violation of Articles 3 and 4 by the addressee State (halting 
executions or intervening in detention situations and intervening in the conditions of 51 asylum 
seekers in tents in the burning sun, without sanitation in no-man’s land between Spain and Mo-
rocco). Incidentally the Commission or Court have also used provisional measures in situations 
varying from ensuring access to court, halting the destruction of an embryo in an IVF case and 
preserving evidence.  
This section discusses the institutional setting of the provisional measures as used in the 
European system and the right of individual petition, the power to order provisional measures, the 
promptness of the adjudicator in deciding on the use of provisional measures and the availability 
of information on the use of these measures. 
6.2 The right of individual complaint  
The European human rights system is the oldest regional system. It has been instituted under 
auspices of the Council of Europe. This organisation was inaugurated in 1949. Presently it has 47 
                                                 
308 In earlier, unofficial, versions of the decisions references were sometimes made to provisional 
measures. This appears to have been the case e.g. in Vera and Orton Chirwa v. Malawi, 1995, §3: 
“After international protest, the sentences were commuted to life imprisonment. The Chirwas 
were held in almost complete solitary confinement, given extremely poor food, inadequate 
medical care, shackled for long periods of time within their cells and prevented from seeing each 
other for years”. See also Degli (on behalf of Corporal N. Bikagni) et al. v. Togo, published in 
abbreviated undated version, 7th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 315 (ACHPR 
1994). See e.g. <http://dcregistry.com/users/ACHPR/index3.html> (consulted 20 October 2007) 
for the initial decision of March 1995, §14 (“On 19 September 1994, the Commission, under 
Rule 109, called on the government of Togo to take the necessary measures to prevent irreparable 
prejudice to Corporal Bikagni”.). Thus, in some cases, given the subject matter, (informal) 
provisional measures may have been used. 
309 See e.g. Minority Rights Group, Statement on the human rights situation of Endorois of Kenya 
36th session of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights (23 November-7 
December 2004) and press release, 24 January 2005, <www.minorityrights.org> (accessed on 25 
July 2005). In this submission it drew attention to the provisional measures that the Commission 
had granted during its 35th session on 1 June 2004, urging the government of Kenya ‘to take 
immediate steps to ensure that no further issuance of mining concessions or transfers of parts to 
the land occurred prior to the case being concluded’ in order to prevent irreparable damage to the 
traditional lands of the Endorois community around the Lake Bogoria region, through 
government sanctioned mining operations. See further Chapter X (cultural rights). 
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members.310 The Council of Europe has introduced almost 200 treaties, the most important of 
which is the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The Convention was concluded in 
1950 and entered into force in 1953. The permanent European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) 
consists of 47 judges, a number equal to the number of Contracting States (Article 20 ECHR). The 
Court is divided in Chambers of seven judges. The Grand Chamber (seventeen judges) handles 
important cases referred to it by the Chamber to which a case was initially brought or through a 
system of internal appeal.311  
The Court only deals with civil and political rights, which have been interpreted to include 
positive obligations as well.312 The range of rights covered is more limited than that of the Inter-
American and, especially, the African human rights system, but its individual complaint system is 
being used to the full. The ECHR ‘represents a very distinct form of international instrument and 
– in many respects – its substance and process of application are more akin to those of national 
constitutions than to those of ‘typical’ international treaties’.313 
Protocol 11 to the ECHR entered into force in 1998 and introduced a complete overhaul of 
the European human rights system, predominantly in order to address the ever increasing case-
load of the Court. In the original system a European Commission on Human Rights, set up in 
1954 and comparable to the Inter-American and African Commissions, initially dealt with cases. 
It declared them (in)admissible and published reports on the merits (so-called Article 31 reports). 
The Commission and the State concerned could decide to take the case to the European Court of 
Human Rights, in existence since 1959. If not, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe would finally decide on the question whether there had been a violation or not. Sometimes 
it would take a decision different from that of the Commission. This old system is still relevant 
because the European Commission often used provisional measures. In this respect it set the stage 
for the practice of the current permanent Court.  
With the entry into force of the 11th Protocol the Commission was abolished.314 The Court 
became permanent and its jurisdiction became compulsory for all States parties to the Conven-
tion. The Committee of Ministers now only monitors compliance with the Court’s judgments, a 
                                                 
310 To understand the broader context of provisional measures taken in the human rights system of 
the Council of Europe two other regional organisations in Europe must be mentioned that 
sometimes deal with human rights issues: the Organization for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE), a 55 member security organisation (including non-European States), including 
its High Commissioner on National Minorities, the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human 
Rights, the High Commissioner on Freedom of the Media and the Conflict Prevention Centre of 
the Secretariat of the OSCE, on the one hand, and the European Union on the other hand. 
311 Given the excessive workload of the Court, in 2004 Protocol 14 was accepted to streamline 
proceedings. It will enter into force upon ratification by Russia.  
312 See e.g. Mowbray (2004); Van der Velde (2002); Vlemminx (2002); Lawson (1995) and Forder 
(1992). See further Chapter XIII on the protective measures required. In addition to the rights in 
the Covenant the following Protocols are in force: Protocol 1 (property, education and elections), 
Protocol 4 (no imprisonment for debt, freedom of movement; no expulsion of citizens, no 
collective expulsion of aliens), Protocol 6 (abolition of the death penalty, war time exception 
possible), Protocol 7 (appeal in criminal cases; procedural safeguards expulsion aliens; 
compensation for wrongful conviction; no double jeopardy; equality between spouses), Protocol 
12 (general prohibition of discrimination) and Protocol 13 (abolition of the death penalty without 
exceptions). The Council of Europe also introduced the European Social Charter and its Protocols 
(including a collective complaint system). 
313 ECtHR Concurring Opinion Judge Garlicki, §4, ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Öcalan v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 12 May 2005. 
314 While the new Court started functioning in November 1998, the Commission continued to exist 
until the end of October 1999 in order to deal with those cases it had previously declared 
admissible. 
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role more suitable for a political body.315 While the new Court took over the functions of the 
Commission, it seems that it does not always have the opportunity to fulfil all of the fact-finding 
and conciliatory functions previously fulfilled by the Commission.316 
Article 34 ECHR (right of petition) stipulates protection for the alleged victims in unhin-
dered submission of complaints and participation in the proceedings. Moreover, anyone partici-
pating in the proceedings (as petitioners, counsel, witnesses, experts, advisers, etc.) enjoys immu-
nity from legal process in respect of acts before the Court, as well as freedom to correspond with 
the Court and freedom to travel in order to attend hearings in Strasbourg.317 
Different from the Inter-American and African system there is a so-called ‘victim require-
ment’, meaning that for the complaint to be declared admissible the petitioner must in fact allege 
to be the victim of the violations complained of. This means that the role of NGOs is less promi-
nent than in the other two regional systems.318  
As noted, one of the main purposes of Protocol 11 was to be able to deal with the steadily 
increasing caseload, which by 1997 amounted to 4,750. At present, however, the Court is strug-
gling to keep up with an even more staggering stream of applications.319 To address the problem 
of overburdening various proposals have been made, including the introduction of a certiorari 
system similar to that used by the U.S. Supreme Court. Yet a pick-and-choose approach would 
not do justice to the petitioner’s right to redress about violations of the ECHR.  
If a certiorari system would be introduced, the Court should still address all claims involv-
ing risks of irreparable harm to persons. Introduction of a certiorari system that does not take into 
account urgent cases would constitute an irreparable blow to the protective function of the Court. 
At the same time when such a system would still address all urgent claims, clarity about the types 
of cases suitable for the use of provisional measures would then be even more warranted, lest 
some petitioners would try and infuse an urgent element in a claim that might otherwise be de-
nied. 
                                                 
315 On follow-up see Chapter XVIII. In general about the supervisory mechanism applied at the time 
and the proposed changes see Klerk (1995). 
316 In 1999 the Office of the Commissioner for Human Rights was established. This Commissioner 
does not only have a role in the sphere of promoting and facilitating, but is also mandated to 
identify problems, visit member States and publish reports. 
317 European Agreement relating to Persons Participating in Proceedings of the European Court of 
Human Rights (ETS no. 161), adopted 1996, entered into force 1999, 35 State parties as of 3 
September 2007. 
318 Different from the system under the OP to the ICCPR, companies and other non-governmental 
entities may petition the ECtHR as long as they claim to be victims of a violation against 
themselves.Obviously NGOs may represent or assist the alleged victims and submit amicus 
curiae briefs. See further on the role of NGOs Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on the 
beneficiaries of provisional measures. More generally on the law and procedure before the 
ECtHR (and the old Commission) see e.g. Practice Direction on Institution of Proceedings, 1 
November 2003, supplementing Rules 45 and 47 of the Rules of Court, see <www.echr.coe.int>, 
under ‘Basic texts’, ‘Practice Directions’; Mowbray (2007); Leach (2007); Ovey/White (2006); 
Van Dijk/Van Hoof/Van Rijn/Zwaak (2006); Van de Lanotte/Haeck (2005); Barkhuysen/Van 
Emmerik/Rieter (2002/2008); Clements/Mole/Simmons (1999); Van der Velde (1997); 
Harris/Boyle/Warbrick (1995); Gomien/Harris/Zwaak (1997); Schokkenbroek (1996); Klerk 
(1995); Cohen-Jonathan (1994), pp. 97-111; Zwart (1994); Lawson/deBlois (1994); Zwaak 
(1991) and Ergec/Velu (1990), pp. 818-991.  
319 In 2006 the Court had delivered 1560 judgments and struck out or declared inadmissible 28,160; 
89,887 cases were pending, see ECtHR Annual Report 2006, May 2007, p. 115. 
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6.3 Power and promptness in the European system 
6.3.1 Introduction 
When the ECHR was drafted in the late 1940s and early 1950s no provision was made for the 
possibility to take provisional measures.320 The International Juridical Section of the European 
Movement had included a provision on such measures in its draft convention of 12 July 1949, but 
if discussion took place on the issue this is not reflected in the travaux préparatoires. The pro-
posed Article 35 was similar to Article 41 ICJ Statute.321  
It was not long after the Convention entered into force, in 1953, that it became clear that if 
the rights in the Convention were to have practical meaning and if the Convention-bodies were to 
truly perform their task, these bodies should have the possibility to indicate to the Parties that 
provisional measures are warranted in a given case.  
As early as 1957, the Commission sent an urgent request to the Government of the United 
Kingdom not to execute Nicolaos Sampson until the Commission had been fully informed of the 
circumstances of the case. The Commission stated it had decided to make this request in order to 
prevent “any irreparable act”.322 This could be called an informal provisional measure, not based 
on a specific Rule on provisional measures. Yet in two less serious cases, decided in 1958 and 
1963, the Commission refused to take provisional measures, considering that the Convention did 
not give it the competence to order them.323  
In 1964 it again took informal provisional measures, this time to halt an extradition.324 In 
fact since then an informal practice developed in which the Commission requested – and obtained 
– the cooperation of Governments in urgent cases involving extradition or expulsion.  
In 1970 the Acting President of the Commission once more requested a State not to execute 
persons, in this case any of the 34 suspects in a criminal case in Greece, during the proceedings 
before the Commission.325 The executions did not take place.326 In 1974 the Commission decided 
                                                 
320 The Convention was signed in Rome, 4 November 1950. 
321 See Nørgaard (1994), pp. 278-297 and references therein. 
322 See EComHR Application of the ECHR to the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. United Kingdom), 
Article 31 report of the Commission, No. 176/56, 26 September 1958, p. 34. This request was 
respected, see further Chapter III (Executions). 
323 EComHR X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 22 March 1958 (“Whereas the Convention does 
not contain any such obligations binding upon the High Contracting Parties as invoked by the 
Applicant; whereas, moreover, the Convention does not contain any provision giving the 
Commission competence to order provisional measures; whereas it therefore appears that the 
application is in this respect incompatible with the provisions of the Convention; whereas it 
should, in pursuance of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention, accordingly be rejected”.) and 
X. and Y. v. Belgium, 18 December 1963 (‘whereas the fact that the Commission is dealing with a 
case does not have suspensive effect and the Commission is not empowered to order protective 
measures (see the decision on the admissibility of Application No. 297/57, Volume II, p. 213); 
whereas, far from obliging national courts to wait for the Commission to complete its work 
before they complete theirs, the Convention, in principle, provides for the opposite solution 
(Article 26) and assigns a mainly subsidiary role to the collective guarantee machinery set up by 
it’). 
324 EComHR X v. Austria and Yugoslavia, 30 June 1964 (inadm.); provisional measure on 14 
February 1964. See also S.B. v. FRG, 19 December 1969 (struck off), provisional measure on 7 
January 1965 and 24 April 1965. 
325 See Partial Decision of the Commission as to the admissibility of the application, The Second 
Greek case, application No. 4448/70, Denmark, Norway and Sweden v. Greece, report of the 
Commission on the present state of the proceedings, adopted on 5 October 1970, p. 11. Both 
cases and both requests for provisional measures were brought before the Commission by States, 
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to make official its theretofore informal practice of using provisional measures by including a 
provision on provisional measures in its Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure.327 The Court did so in 
1982. Almost all provisional measures taken before the entry into force of Protocol 11 were the 
Commission’s. The old Court did not often deal with provisional measures. Yet its Rules of Pro-
cedure did include a rule on provisional measures: Rule 36, which entered into force in January 
1983. The President could take provisional measures at the request of one of the parties, the Com-
mission, the petitioner or ‘any other person concerned’, or proprio motu. Nevertheless, most cases 
in which provisional measures were used were either solved at the admissibility stage and struck 
out, or declared inadmissible so that the provisional measure did not apply any longer. Moreover, 
of those cases in which the Commission did make a decision on the merits, not all were later 
determined by the Court.328  
Presently the Court’s procedure on provisional measures is called ‘Rule 39 procedure’. Rule 
39 stipulates: 
“The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any other 
person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it 
considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the 
proceedings before it”.329 
On the basis of the wording of the Rule on provisional measures, one may conclude that many 
circumstances could give rise to a request for provisional measures. As will be seen in the subse-
quent chapters, however, the Commission and Court have interpreted this provision rather strictly. 
They have been taken mostly in cases of imminent expulsion or extradition involving prima facie 
evidence of a real risk of torture, inhuman treatment or life threatening situation in the receiving 
State.330 The President of the Section may consult the other members of the seven judge panel 
constituted for the case in order to decide on the use of provisional measures.331 It has been 
                                                                                                                       
under the state complaint procedure (Article 24 ECHR (pre-Protocol 11), rather than by 
individuals under the individual complaint procedure (Article 25 ECHR pre-Protocol 11).  
326 See also Chapter XVIII (Official responses). EComHR Amerktane v. UK (1973) was only 
submitted to the Commission after the UK authorities had already sent the alleged victim from 
Gibraltar to Morocco. The petitioners claimed he had subsequently been tortured and sentenced 
to death. The Commission decided to give priority to the case, possibly because he was still 
facing execution at the time of submission. No information is available about whether it 
informally inquired with the UK government about the situation of Amerktane in Morocco, 
including possible diplomatic interventions on his behalf by the government to prevent his 
execution. In fact he was executed in January 1973. The case was subsequently settled with his 
widow. Amekrane v. UK, 11 October 1973 (adm.). 
327 Article 36 ECHR (pre-Protocol 11) stating that the Commission shall draw up its own rules of 
procedure. It did so on 13 December 1974. In its 1993 Rules of Procedure, Rule 36 was phrased 
as follows: “The Commission, or when it is not in session, the President may indicate to the 
parties any interim measure the adoption of which seems desirable in the interest of the parties or 
the proper conduct of the proceedings before it”. Revised version as adopted by the Commission 
on 12 February and 6 May 1993 and entered into force on 28 June 1993. 
328 The old Court did take provisional measures in Soering v. UK, Vijayanathan & Pusparajah v. 
France, Chahal v. UK and Ahmed v. Austria. See Chapter V (Non-refoulement). 
329 “2. Notice of these measures shall be given to the Committee of Ministers. 3. The Chamber may 
request information from the parties on any matter connected with the implementation of any 
interim measure it has indicated”. 
330 Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. 
331 See Garry (2001), p. 401, referring to an interview with Judge Pellonpää, Section IV, 16 June 
2000. 
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pointed out by one of the judges of the permanent Court, in reference to the Öcalan case, that the 
efficiency of decision-making on the use of provisional measures would have been influenced 
negatively if the judges had not been available on a permanent basis.332 
When provisional measures were used, the former Commission often decided to give the 
case precedence as well, according to Rule 33: 
“The Commission shall deal with applications in the order in which they really become ready 
for examination. It may, however, decide to give precedence to a particular application”. 
Precedence or priority, however, was not only given simultaneously with provisional measures to 
prevent irreparable harm, but also in other cases, such as where priority treatment of a case could 
ensure that petitioners with terminal illnesses could still be informed of the decision on the 
merits.333 Under Rule 41 the current permanent Court can give priority to urgent cases too.334 It 
has the policy to do so in cases in which it also decided to order provisional measures, but it does 
give priority in other cases as well.335 
6.3.2 Inter-State cases 
As noted, the UN adjudicators have never dealt with complaints brought by States against other 
States. Regionally, thus far, only the European system has dealt with a few significant inter-State 
cases.336 In two of the very early inter-State cases the European Commission used provisional 
measures to halt the execution of death sentences.337 
                                                 
332 See Thomassen (2008), p. 931. Wilhelmina Thomassen was a member of the Court between 1998 
and 2004. 
333 See e.g. EComHR B. v. France, 12 July 1991 (adm.) (priority decision 19 April 1991). This case 
subsequently came before the ECtHR on 18 October 1991 as X v. France, undated priority 
decision; petitioner died 2 February 1992; judgment of 31 March 1992. See also, e.g., EComHR 
R.M. v. UK, 14 April 1994 (inadm.), priority decision of 21 October 1993. 
334 See e.g. ECtHR Pretty v. UK, 29 April 2002. 
335 Judge Myjer provides a non-exhaustive list that is applied by the Court with some measure of 
flexibility. The Court considers that ‘cases should be considered as urgent and granted priority 
under Rule 41’, if: “a. the existing situation which the applicant complains about poses a risk to 
his life or health; b. there exist other circumstances connected with the applicant’s person, 
warranting special urgency in dealing with the application; c. the case concerns particularly 
serious violations of human rights that might require a fact-finding mission; d. Rule 39 was 
applied in the case”. Other situations referred to include those concerning systemic or endemic 
problems or cases considered as appropriate for being dealt with as a pilot case, cases where the 
applicant ‘is in a precarious situation by reason of his or her age or state of health’ or ‘is in 
detention and there is a prima facie indication attending to the right to liberty and security of a 
person’. See Myjer (2007), p. 1074. 
336 Recently see the ECtHR’s provisional measures in Georgia v. Russia. ECtHR Press release 
issued by the Registrar, ‘European Court of Human Rights grants request for interim measures’, 
12 August 2008. Both the African and Inter-American Commission have now dealt with an inter-
State case as well, but in these cases no provisional measures were used. See ACHPR Congo v. 
Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, com. nr. 227/99, 15th Annual Activity report 1001-2 and CIDH 
Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, 8 March 2007 (inadm.). 
337 See the aforementioned Application of the ECHR to the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. United 
Kingdom), Article 31 report of the Commission, No. 176/56, 26 September 1958, p. 34 (to halt 
the execution of Sampson in Cyprus) and Partial Decision of the Commission as to the 
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6.3.3 Delegation and promptness 
In the old system of a non-permanent Commission and Court, the decision-making procedure for 
when the request for provisional measures arrived at the Commission’s Secretariat, the slightly 
differed depending on whether the Commission was or was not in session at the time. If the 
Commission was in session, one of its members was instantly appointed as a rapporteur. He 
would examine the case – a further enquiry might be made by telephone or fax – and present a 
proposal to the Commission. If the case was ‘particularly urgent’, he could do this at any time 
during the session.338 When the Commission was not in session, the Commission’s President or 
Acting President (the President of either Chamber) dealt with the request.339 At the Secretariat, 
the ‘lawyer best qualified to deal with it’ – given his or her language or legal system – obtained 
relevant information from the petitioner or his or her lawyer (on the basis of a questionnaire to be 
filled in by the petitioner or otherwise by completing a check-list on the basis of the available 
information)340 and, among others, made a brief summary of the case and gave a provisional 
opinion as to the merits of the request.341 This was then discussed with the Secretariat’s senior 
lawyer responsible for all provisional measures. Following this, the senior lawyer, or someone 
standing in for her, would immediately contact the President or Acting President by telephone. 
Relevant documents might be sent by fax. As soon as the Commission was again in session, any 
action undertaken was brought to its attention.342 
Once the decision to apply Rule 36 was made, the Government concerned was contacted 
immediately, usually by fax, but sometimes also by telephone. When provisional measures were 
used the respondent Government was usually notified of the petition at the same time and invited 
to comment on its admissibility and merits. Rule 46 laid down that: 
‘In any case of urgency, the Secretary of the Commission, may, without prejudice to the taking 
of any other procedural steps, inform a High Contracting party concerned in an application, by 
any available means, of the introduction of the application and of a summary of its objects’. 
The Secretary did not send this ‘communication’ to the respondent government, however, when a 
Commission session was imminent, so that the matter could be discussed by the Commission as a 
whole.343 In that case the President or Acting President did not ‘communicate’ the case, but he did 
already take the provisional measure. 
The promptness of the Commission’s earliest – informal – provisional measures varied from 
more than four months to the same day. Its promptness subsequently varied as well from around 
eight months to the same day. 
                                                                                                                       
admissibility of the application, The Second Greek case (Denmark, Norway and Sweden v. 
Greece), 5 October 1970, §11 (to halt the execution of Karageorgas). 
338 EComHR Directive concerning the implementation of interim measures pursuant to rule 36 of the 
Commission’s Rules of procedure, January 1997, p. 3, point III, §2. 
339 The President or Acting President could not take a decision on provisional measures where this 
concerned their own state of citizenship: Directive concerning the implementation of interim 
measures pursuant to rule 36 of the Commission’s Rules of procedure, January 1997, p. 1, point I, 
§1. 
340 EComHR Directive concerning the implementation of interim measures pursuant to rule 36 of the 
Commission’s Rules of procedure, January 1997, p. 2, point II§2. 
341 Id., p. 1, point I §1. 
342 See Rule 34(3) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. 
343 EComHR Directive concerning the implementation of interim measures pursuant to rule 36 of the 
Commission’s Rules of procedure, January 1997, p. 3, point II §3 sub (b). 
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Soering v. UK (1989) was the first case in which the Court faced a situation in which it it-
self was called upon to take provisional measures.344 In this case the Commission had used provi-
sional measures. Subsequently, after the case had been brought before the Court, the President 
decided to use provisional measures as well. Yet, there was a period of time in which the peti-
tioner was without the protection of provisional measures. This was not problematic in this par-
ticular case because the UK, in a good faith application of the Convention, decided not to extra-
dite Soering. Nevertheless, the Court decided to amend its Rules of Procedure so that, unless the 
President of the Court would decide differently, the Commission’s provisional measures would 
remain applicable when the case was sent to the Court.  
Different from the Inter-American system, the former European system did not specifically 
take into account situations considered urgent by the Commission that were not yet pending be-
fore the Court. 
Buquicchio-de Boer has noted that the Commission often received requests for provisional 
measures by fax on Friday afternoons ‘just hours before an expulsion’. Some Member States 
carried out deportations on weekends.345 The permanent Court has a greater chance to deal 
promptly with requests. Nevertheless, petitioners are informed that requests for provisional meas-
ures should be sent during working hours (8am-6pm Monday through Friday), this should not be 
done outside of working hours ‘unless this is absolutely unavoidable’. In addition, petitioners are 
recommended to already submit their urgent request in advance of the final domestic decision, so 
as to enable the Court to act as quickly as possible in case a person will be removed soon after the 
final domestic decision has been given.346 
The European Commission would put on hold its normal planning and examine the request 
as soon as possible. When not in session the President would decide ‘in collaboration with a 
senior member of the Commission’s legal Secretariat’.347  
Since the entry into force of Protocol 11 petitioners address their requests to the Registry of 
the Court and the underlying cases are immediately assigned to a Section. The President of the 
Section in question will decide on the request for provisional measures. Some Presidents consult 
with other members of their Section. Judge Pellonpää, for instance, would bring the case before 
the Section for a vote, if he had any doubts and if time permitted him to do so. Often Presidents 
will at least consult ‘a judge familiar with the country at issue (who will give a recommendation 
on acceptance or refusal of the application with supporting reasons) and its law in addition to 
analysing documentation provided in the application’.348  
In this respect the approach of the HRC is rather different. If the Special Rapporteur has the 
nationality of the State against which the complaint is made the Secretariat contacts the Chairper-
son or another member of the Committee to decide on the use of provisional measures.349 It seems 
that the emphasis of the ECtHR is on acquiring as much information as possible, on the assump-
tion that the national judge would indeed be able to provide inside information. The emphasis of 
the HRC, on the other hand, is on independence and impartiality.  
At times the European Court and its staff have to take a range of actions in order to ensure 
that the relevant government is informed of the use provisional measures. In the Shamayev case 
(2005), the petitioners were removed from their cells and the request for provisional measures on 
behalf of eleven of them in order to prevent their extradition to Russia was received by the Court 
                                                 
344 ECtHR Soering v. UK, Judgment of 7 July 1989. 
345 Buquicchio-de Boer (1998), pp. 229-236. 
346 ECtHR Practice Direction, Requests for interim measures, 5 March 2003. See further Chapter 
XV (Immediacy and risk). See also Chapter XVI (Legal status), and XVII (Official responses) on 
the tendency by some States to make sure petitioners are unable to send a request to the Court.  
347 Buquicchio-de Boer (1998), pp. 233-234. 
348 Garry (2001), p. 414, referring to an interview of 16 June 2000.  
349 See e.g. HRC Länsman III v. Finland, 17 March 2005. 
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around 4 PM. At 6 PM the government of Georgia was informed, through its permanent represen-
tative in Strasbourg, that the Court had ordered provisional measures. The names of the persons 
concerned were dictated to the representative of the permanent representation by phone. Given 
technical problems and failed attempts by the staff to have them resolved, the decision of the 
Court was formally repeated to the vice-president of justice of Georgia only at 7:45 PM, which 
could only be confirmed by telecopy at 7:57 PM. Meanwhile, at 7:10 PM the petitioners were 
extradited.350 
6.3.4 Proprio motu  
Sometimes petitioners who are not represented by a lawyer are less likely to request provisional 
measures, but they might, nevertheless, ask for the adjudicator’s intervention. This was already 
the case with the former European Commission, which regarded this as a request for such meas-
ures as well.351  
On occasion the Court has even addressed itself to the petitioner under Rule 39, requesting a 
halt to a hunger strike. It does so proprio motu, often in response to a request by the petitioner 
about improvements in detention conditions, a prison transfer etc.352 
Rule 39 stipulates that the relevant Chamber of the ECtHR, or its President, may take provi-
sional measures on its own initiative or on the request of the petitioner. They may also do so on 
the request of ‘any other person concerned’. In this respect the possibilities for NGOs are wider 
than is generally the case in the European system. Moreover, apart from NGOs, individuals such 
as witnesses to the human rights violation complained of may approach the ECtHR when they 
receive threats, requesting provisional measures on their behalf, also if they are not themselves 
parties to the case.353 
6.4 Decisions to use provisional measures: transparency or the lack thereof? 
Most handbooks on the ECHR only refer to provisional measures in passing.354 A few articles 
have paid specific attention to the practice of the former European Commission on Human Rights 
and/or the current Court with regard to provisional measures.355 A few articles also refer to statis-
                                                 
350 ECtHR Chamaïev et autres c. Géorgie et Russie, 12 April 2005, §§474-475. 
351 See: EComHR Directive concerning the implementation of interim measures pursuant to rule 36 
of the Commission’s Rules of procedure, January 1997 (“(w)here the applicant requests the 
Commission, expressly or in substance”) and Nørgaard (1994), pp. 280-281. See also EComHR 
Ennslin, Baader and Raspe v. FRG, 8 July 1978 (inadm.), discussed in Chapter XII (Other 
situations), section 2.10 (preserving evidence). 
352 Following the example of the Commission, in 1983 the old Court introduced a reference to 
addressing the petitioner in its Rule 36. The present Court may do so as well. See also Chapter 
XIII (Protection), section 4 (beneficiaries). 
353 See also Pasqualucci (2005), p. 36. See Chapter IX on the use of provisional measures to protect 
against death threats and harassment. 
354 Recent handbooks devote more attention to the issue, see e.g. Barkhuysen/Van Emmerik/Rieter 
(2008), pp. 48-53; Van Dijk/Van Hoof/Van Rijn/Zwaak (2006), pp. 110-119; Leach (2005), pp. 
38-42; VandeLanotte/Haeck (2005), pp. 435-486 and Barkhuysen/Van Emmerik/Rieter (2002), 
pp. 39-44. 
355 Haeck/Burbano Herrera/Zwaak (2008), pp. 41-63; Rieter (2007); Rieter (2006), pp. 736-739; De 
Salvia (2005), pp. 177-194; Rieter (2005a), pp. 25-44; Rieter (2005b), pp. 320-324; Rieter 
(2004), pp. 73-87; Rieter (2003a), pp. 1074-1076; Rieter (2003b), pp. 23-27; 
Spielmann/Spielmann (2000), pp. 1346-1358; Buquicchio-de Boer (1998); pp. 229-236, 
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tics provided by the ECtHR following the entry into force of Protocol 11.356 The Registry of the 
Court itself has indicated that in 2007 the Court had received ‘approximately 1,060 requests for 
interim measures and granted 252 of them’.357  
The available information on the use of provisional measures by the European Commission 
is haphazard at most.358 Specific information about decision-making with regard to provisional 
measures often is only made available when a State did not respect them.359 
Following the entry into force of Protocol 11 and Rule 39 the Court’s Registry adapted its 
practice by automatically registering requests for provisional measures rather than only after the 
decision is made to accept or reject a request. According to Garry ‘[a]utomatic registration has the 
                                                                                                                       
Nørgaard (1994), pp. 278-297; Bernhardt (1994a), pp. 95-114; Giardina (1993), pp. 791-802; 
MacDonald (1992), pp. 703-740; Nørgaard/Krüger (1988), pp. 109-117; Zwart (1985a), pp. 562-
571; Rogge (1977), pp. 1569-1570; Eissen (1969), pp. 252-256. 
356 See Haeck/Burbano Herrera (2003), pp. 625-676 and Garry (2001), pp. 399-432. There are 
various articles and case notes specifically discussing Cruz Varas v. Sweden (1991) and 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005 (Grand Chamber), see also Chapter XVI on 
the legal status of provisional measures. 
357 ECtHR Press release issued by the Registrar, ‘Inappropriate use of interim measures procedure’, 
21 December 2007. 
358 See e.g. Nørgaard/Krüger (1988), pp. 109-117; EComHR Cruz Varas v. Sweden, Report of 7 
June 1990 and Buquicchio-de Boer (1998), pp. 229-236.  
359 A case in point is EComHR Lynas v. Switzerland, 6 October 1976 (inadm.). In this case the 
petitioner claimed that the Swiss authorities, in deciding on his extradition to the United States, 
exposed his life to danger since CIA agents were after him. On the morning of 22 December 
1975 the Secretary of the Commission learnt of the application (sent 18 December) and 
immediately submitted the petitioner’s request ‘for an immediate approach to the Swiss 
Government’ to the President of the Commission. At 10.45 the Secretary informed the Swiss 
Government that the application had been lodged. At 12.10 the President of the Commission was 
contacted. He immediately made an order for provisional measures and decided that the petition 
should be given precedence. The Federal Justice Division of the Swiss Government was notified 
by telephone at 12.15. The representative of the Justice Division informed the Secretary that the 
petitioner had just been taken to a plane, which had not yet taken off; he stated that the Federal 
Councillor in charge of the Justice and Police Department would be immediately informed of the 
order made by the President of the Commission. The notification of the order was confirmed the 
same day (22 December 1975) by a letter from the Secretary. The Commission was subsequently 
informed that the petitioner had been extradited to the US on 22 December 1975. Another 
example is EComHR Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 7 June 1991, §§65-70. The President of the 
European Commission decided to apply Rule 36 on 6 October 1989, 9 AM. Ten minutes later the 
agent of the Swedish Government was informed by telephone. At noon the Commission 
confirmed this by telefax. In the meantime the Secretariat of the competent Ministry had been 
informed (at 9.20 AM). At 12.45 PM the matter was presented to the competent Minister. 
“However, according to information given by the Government, the Minister could not take any 
action since the matter had already been decided by the Government and was pending before 
another authority”. In the meantime the petitioner had requested the National Immigration Board 
to stay the enforcement of the expulsion. “At that time the Board was aware of the present 
application to the Commission and of the Commission’s indication under Rule 36”. At 4.40 PM 
Mr. Cruz Varas was deported to Chile. His wife and son went into hiding in Sweden. That same 
year Sweden also ignored a provisional measure on behalf of a petitioner who was subsequently 
deported to Jordan. The agent of the Government had been informed by phone at 4.10 pm. The 
decision was confirmed by fax on 5.38. Two days later Sweden nevertheless expelled the 
petitioner. Provisional measure of 19 October 1989 in: Mansi v. Sweden, 9 March 1990 (struck 
out) and 7 December 1989 (adm.) 
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effect of making applications available to the public from the very beginning’.360 Indeed such 
registration would be a prerequisite for making such information available. Nevertheless, this 
effect seems overstated given the fact that members of the public would have to travel to Stras-
bourg and indicate which specific case file they would like to consult.  
In general, since the entry into force of Protocol 11, memorials and other documents filed 
with the Court’s Registry in principle are accessible to the public (Article 40(2) ECHR).361 As 
noted, potential petitioners and other interested persons have to travel to Strasbourg and should 
indicate beforehand exactly which documents they need. General requests to look, for instance, at 
files on cases against one particular State are not granted. This applies equally to requests to 
consult all files in a given period involving requests for provisional measures by petitioners, or to 
all decisions to grant such request by the Court.362 In most cases no hearings are held, but if they 
are held, they are public. Thus far, however, there is no public information on cases in which the 
Court held such a hearing at the stage of provisional measures. 
A brief reference to the use of provisional measures may be found in decisions on the merits 
and inadmissibility decisions. Decisions not to grant provisional measures generally are not men-
tioned at all. Case law is available on the internet through the HUDOC search database.363 Older 
cases are available to a certain extent, but if necessary, one may make a copy of a particular case 
from the bound volumes of unpublished cases at the Court’s library in Strasbourg. The informa-
tion on many cases of the former Commission that were struck from the roll can only be consulted 
in bound volumes at the Registry in Strasbourg.364 
Decisions to take provisional measures are not published separately and do not include an 
explanation. Some cases are pending for a long time. This means that a new practice may develop 
with regard to provisional measures with which most practitioners, governments and scholars are 
unfamiliar because most information on the use of provisional measures is only published in 
judgments on the merits and inadmissibility decisions. The Information Notes prepared by the 
Court do have an entry on the use of Rule 39 from which some information can be derived on the 
use of provisional measures in ongoing cases.  
For attorneys that take asylum cases only occasionally and for others interested in the de-
velopments, information with regard to provisional measures simply is not very accessible. Even 
for seasoned asylum attorneys who keep each other informed about the Court’s use of provisional 
measures, it would be useful if the Court itself made available this information as most attorneys 
are not yet in touch with all asylum attorneys in all member States of the Council of Europe. 
A helpful development was the publication, in 2003, of a Practice Direction on provisional 
measures by the President of the Court.365 Moreover, there have been a few cases in which the 
                                                 
360 Garry (2001), p. 414. 
361 For exceptions see Rules 33(3) en 99(4). 
362 “You must give the details of each case you wish to consult. It is not possible to deal with general 
requests, for example to consult the files of all cases against a particular State or all the files 
relating to a particular subject”. See: Consultation of files, 7 November 2002, 
<www.echr.coe.int/eng/General.htm> (consulted 22 July 2004). 
363 See <www.echr.coe.int>. 
364 The author visited the Secretariat of the European Commission on Human Rights, Strasbourg 
(13-17 October 1997). She would like to thank Maud Bucchiccio-de Boer, Nico Mol, Agnes van 
Steijn, Marie-Therèse Schoepfer, Wolfgang Peukert, Michèle De Salvia, Caroline Ravaux, 
Wolfgang Larcher, Wolfgang Strasser and Leo Zwaak. She also would like to thank Ties Prakken 
(counsel in the Öcalan case, Maastricht, interview of 18 March 1999) and the late Henry 
Schermers (Leyden, interview of 3 March 1998) as well as Yvonne Klerk, Stijn Franken, Jouke 
Osinga, René Bruin and Mark Jansen who have been helpful in providing information. 
365 ECtHR Practice Direction on Interim Measures, 5 March 2003. See <www.echr.coe.int> ‘Basic 
texts’, ‘Practice Directions’. 
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Court issued a press release about the (non)-use of provisional measures, but these are excep-
tional.366  
In addition, the cause of transparency was served in two provisional measures directed 
against the Netherlands involving expulsion to Somalia in 2004, in which the Court gave some 
explanation of its use of provisional measures.367 It added an explanatory remark to the State in 
order to stem an increasing number of individual complaints by persons similarly situated.  
“The President had regard to the current situation in northern Somalia and in particular to the 
absence of an effective public authority capable of providing protection to the applicant, who 
submits that he belongs to a minority and that he has no family or clan ties in northern Somalia. 
The President further noted that there was no guarantee that the applicant would be admitted to 
northern Somalia”.368 
In the second case it added the following explanation for its use of provisional measures: it had 
used them ‘in the light of the information currently available concerning the situation of internally 
displaced persons in Puntland’. The measures would apply until the Court had studied the new 
Dutch country report on Somalia, on the basis of which the Dutch executive decides on asylum 
petitions. Depending on the information in this Report the Court would then decide to hold a fact-
finding hearing in Strasbourg, hearing experts with personal knowledge about Somalia.369 Subse-
quently the Court was faced with a flood of cases against the UK involving the situation in Sri 
Lanka. Here the Court issued a press release providing some reasoning referring to the general 
situation of risk.370 
                                                 
366 See the first provisional measure in the case Öcalan, press release 4 March 1999 (access to his 
Turkish counsel) and ECtHR (Section 2) Shamayev and 12 others v. Georgia and Russia, 
36378/02, Rieter (2003b). See also ECtHR press release 337 of 30 June 2004 in which the Court 
referred to a decision of the previous day not to grant the request by lawyers of Saddam Hussein 
to order the UK not to transfer him to the Iraqi interim government without prior receipt of a 
declaration that the death penalty would not be imposed. See 
<www.echr.coe.int/eng/General.htm>. 
367 See Rieter (2005a), pp. 25-44. This concerned cases against the Netherlands to prevent expulsion 
of persons to Somalia. See also Rieter (2006), pp. 736-739. 
368 See President ECtHR, Note Verbale with provisional measure, 3 May 2004, in case 15243/04, 
published in the Dutch journal JV 226 (Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht). Asylum counsel in 
the Netherlands make a scan of the Notes Verbales they receive with information about 
provisional measures directed to the State and make these available at ‘Vluchtweb’ 
<www.vluchtweb.nl>, a subscription-based website maintained by the Dutch NGO 
Vluchtelingenwerk (Dutch Council for Refugees). Some information is also freely available at 
the website of the Vereniging Asieladvocaten en -juristen Nederland, <www.vajn.org> 
(organization of Dutch asylum lawyers). Moreover, one attorney has made available examples of 
procedures before the ECtHR, listing several procedures initiated by various attorneys and 
posting the text of some Notes Verbales with provisional measures, see 
<http://www.collet.nu/ehrm.htm>. 
369 Ibid. In the context of these cases members of the Strasbourg staff wrote a brief advisory for 
Dutch attorneys. See Kempees/Mol/Van Steijn (2004), pp. 299-300. On provisional measures in 
non-refoulement cases see Chapter V. On the group of beneficiaries see section 4 of Chapter XIII 
(Protection). 
370 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §§21-22. In this case the Court’s request fell on deaf ears. The 
UK refused to halt the deportation of Tamils to Sri Lanka as a general measure and the Court was 
forced to order provisional measures 342 times. See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4.4.2. 
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In order to strengthen the provisional measures decisions it sends to States, it appears that 
the ECtHR has, at least since 2006, added references to the fact that ignoring provisional meas-
ures could constitute a violation of Article 34 ECHR.371 
At the end of 2007 the Registrar of the ECtHR also published a Press Release warning peti-
tioners not to submit inappropriate requests for provisional measures.372 
7 THE BOSNIA HUMAN RIGHTS CHAMBER 
7.1 Introduction  
The Bosnia Human Rights Chamber was introduced in the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Dayton Peace Agreement) in 1995, as part of a transitional 
justice approach.373 It has ordered provisional measures to halt executions, find a disappeared 
person, ensure medical examination in detention and improve health conditions in a refugee 
camp, but most of its provisional measures relate to halting forced evictions. It has also used them 
to halt exhumation of the body of the petitioner’s deceased wife from a Muslim cemetery, to 
protect religious sites, to secure ballots, to suspend constructions, to safeguard documentary 
evidence and in the context of legislation. 
This section discusses the institutional setting of the provisional measures as they were used 
by the Bosnia Chamber and the right of individual petition, the power to order provisional meas-
ures, its promptness in deciding on the use of provisional measures and the availability of infor-
mation on the use of these measures. 
7.2 The right of individual complaint 
In 1995 the State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (State of BiH) had not yet ratified the ECHR. Annex 
6 to the Dayton Peace Agreement instituted the Human Rights Commission encompassing the 
Office of the Ombudsperson and the Human Rights Chamber. The Chamber was a temporary 
hybrid tribunal for the settlement of disputes about human rights during the first post-war period 
in the former Yugoslavia. Other relevant initiatives, part of the Dayton Agreement, are the Consti-
tutional Court of BiH, the Commission for Real Property Claims (under Annex 7) and the om-
budspersons of the Federation of BiH and Republica Srpska. 
                                                 
371 See e.g. ECtHR Ben Khemais v. Italy, 24 February 2009, §18; C.B.Z. v. Italy, 24 March 2009, 
§13; O. v. Italy, 24 March 2009, §16 as well as several other judgments against Italy published on 
24 March 2009. On the violation of Article 34 see the discussion of the case Mamatkulov in 
Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
372 ECtHR Press release issued by the Registrar, ‘Inappropriate use of interim measures procedure’, 
21 December 2007. 
373 General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, signed and entered into 
force Paris 14 December 1995, agreed between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
Republic of Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (the "Parties”). See in general, for 
instance: Küttler (2003), pp. 47-68; Gomien (2001), pp. 763-770; Nowak (2001), pp. 778-780; 
O’Flaherty (2001), pp. 749-762; Nowak (2000a), pp. 141-208; Nowak (1999a), pp. 285-289; 
Nowak (1999b), pp. 95-106; Benedek (1999); Gomien (1999), pp. 107-120; Haller (1999), pp. 
25-29; Hicks (1999), pp. 127-148; Kälin (1999), pp. 59-66; Leuprecht (1999), pp. 15-18; Neussl 
(1999), pp. 290-302; O’Flaherty (1999), pp. 6-13; Pajic (1998), pp. 1-12 and Nowak (1997), pp. 
174-178. 
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Several international organisations and institutions played a role in the post-conflict period, 
including the operation of the Chamber. The Office of the High Representative was created under 
the Dayton Peace Agreement. The High Representative is at the same time the EU’s Special 
Representative.374 Other existing organisations, such as the OSCE, the Council of Europe, the 
NATO and the United Nations Mission in BiH (including the International Police Task Force) 
also play (or have played) a role in the transition process (and economy) in Bosnia.375 
The facts complained of should fall within the jurisdiction of the parties to the Annex: the 
State of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) with its constituent parts: the Federation of BiH and the 
Republica Srpska.  
The Chamber could consider allegations of violations of the ECHR and its Protocols,376 as 
well as allegations about discrimination under several other international treaties, including the 
ICCPR (and its two Protocols), ICESCR, ICAT, ICERD and CEDAW, the Geneva Conventions 
I-IV and Protocols I and II, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness and the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities.  
The Bosnia Chamber was a hybrid tribunal because it consisted of both international and 
domestic members applying international norms directly in the national system. Eight of the 
fourteen members of the Chamber were international members, appointed by the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe. Four members were appointed by the Federation of BiH and 
two by the Republica Srpska. Michèle Picard (France) was the President. The staff of the Secre-
tariat numbered around 45 in 2002.377 Approximately ten of them were international staff.  
The Chamber could also be called an adjudicator sui generis. It was instituted on the basis 
of an international treaty, at the same time it is considered an institution of the State of BiH, but is 
not its Constitutional Court: “One must, therefore, assume that it is an institution sui generis with 
a predominantly international element”.378 
The Rules of Procedure have largely been inspired by those of the ECtHR and the former 
Commission, but ‘the procedure is less formalistic and contains important differences’.379 There 
are also separate Rules dealing with particular institutions, for instance, about the relations with 
the Ombudsperson. The Ombudsperson could submit cases to the Chamber, but petitioners could 
also directly resort to it without going through the Ombudsperson first.380  
In April 2002 the State of BiH became a member of the Council of Europe and ratified the 
ECHR. In a Press Release of June 2003 Amnesty International emphasized the importance of the 
Bosnia Chamber. It noted that the ‘unique mandate of the Chamber has enabled it to consider 
issues relating to human rights violations specific to the context of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where 
discrimination in the enjoyment of many human rights has been widespread and access to justice 
minimal’. It added: “The continuing and rising number of applications being submitted to the 
Chamber indicates that for people in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Chamber is acting as a last and 
possibly only avenue of justice”.381 
                                                 
374 See the website of the High Representative: <http://www.ohr.int/>. 
375 See e.g. Alefsen (1999), pp. 149-154 and Hicks (1999), pp. 127-148.  
376 See e.g. Pajic (1999), pp. 33-44 and Mol (1998), pp. 27-69. 
377 Bosnia Chamber Annual Report 2002, p. 8. 
378 Nowak (1997), p. 176. 
379 Ibid. 
380 See Title IV. On the relation with the ombudsperson, see e.g. Gelmamez, (1999), pp. 277-329. 
See also Haller (1999), pp. 25-32. For the website of the current Office of the Ombudsperson see 
<www.ohro.ba>. In general about the procedure and case law of the Chamber see Küttler (2003); 
Dakin (2002); Nowak (2001), pp. 771-793; Nowak (2000a), pp. 182-190; Berg (1999); Neussl 
(1999), pp. 290-302; Aybay (1997), pp. 529-558 and Nowak (1997), pp. 174-178. 
381 Amnesty International, Press Release, Bosnia-Herzegovina: Abolition of Human Rights Chamber 
leaves citizens unprotected, 11 June 2003. 
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Despite these and similar arguments put forward in favour of extending the Chamber’s 
mandate, it was decided not to do so. The mandate of the Chamber expired on 31 December 2003. 
Those cases received by the Bosnia Chamber on or before that date were dealt with by a Human 
Rights Commission within the Constitutional Court of BiH in 2004. The Constitutional Court is 
meant to deal with all human rights cases received after that date. 
7.3 The power and promptness of the Bosnia Human Chamber 
7.3.1 Introduction 
Article X (1) of Annex 6 to the Dayton Peace Agreement provides (in relevant part): 
“The Chamber shall have the power to order provisional measures, to appoint experts, and to 
compel the production of witnesses and evidence”. 
Article VIII, 2(f) on the jurisdiction of the Chamber stipulates: 
“Applications which entail requests for provisional measures shall be reviewed as a matter of 
priority in order to determine (1) whether they should be accepted and, if so (2) whether high 
priority for the scheduling of proceedings on the provisional measures request is warranted”.382 
This means that the authority to take provisional measures was granted in the treaty itself. Rule 36 
of the Chamber’s own Rules of Procedure then specifies: 
“1. Applications entailing requests for provisional measures shall be reviewed as a matter of 
priority. The Chamber, or when it is not in session, the President, shall determine in particular 
whether such applications should be accepted and, if so, whether high priority for the schedul-
ing of proceedings on the provisional measures requested is warranted. 
2. The Chamber or, when it is not in session, the President, shall decide whether, in the interest 
of the parties or the proper conduct of proceedings, any provisional measures should be ordered 
under Article X para. 1 of the Agreement. 
3. The Chamber or, when it is not in session, the President, shall bring any such order to the no-
tice of the party concerned by any available means with a view to ensuring its effective imple-
mentation in accordance with the Agreement. 
4. Where the President has ordered any provisional measures she or he shall report her or his 
action to the Chamber under para. 3 of Rule 33”.383 
Article XI, 1(b) of Annex 6 also refers to provisional measures. At first sight this is a strange 
provision, because it grants the Chamber the power ‘to include an order for provisional measures 
                                                 
382 See also Article XI (Decisions): “1. Following the conclusion of the proceedings, the Chamber 
shall promptly issue a decision, which shall address: (a) Whether the facts found indicate a 
breach by the Party concerned of its obligations under this Agreement; and if so (b) what steps 
shall be taken by the Party to remedy such breach, including orders to cease and desist, monetary 
relief (including pecuniary and non-pecuniary injuries), and provisional measures”. And Article 
XII (Rules and Regulations) “The Chamber shall promulgate such rules and regulations, 
consistent with this Agreement, as may be necessary to carry out its functions, including 
provisions for preliminary hearings, expedited decisions on provisional measures, decisions by 
panels of the Chamber, and review of decisions made by any such panels”. 
383 Rule 36 Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Chamber, Sarajevo, adopted on 13 December 
1996. 
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in its final decision on the merits of a case’. Chapter XIII discusses the relationship between the 
protective measures required pending the proceedings and as a form of reparation, but in order to 
indicate a relationship between concepts it is generally useful to distinguish them first. The 
Chamber seems to have found a way to interpret this provision: “This power might be used to 
regulate the position of the parties before the decision becomes final and binding, or pending the 
full implementation of the decision”.384 Indeed, pending implementation it may often be useful to 
follow up on the situation of the victims in order to make sure that nothing happens that could 
prevent further implementation.385 
7.3.2 Delegation 
Pursuant to the reference in the Dayton Peace Agreement about priority treatment of requests for 
provisional measures the Chamber gives precedence to such requests.386 With the reference to the 
situation when the Chamber is not in session this system also made included a reference to dele-
gation of the authority to take provisional measures from the Chamber to its President, in order to 
ensure prompt and effective protection. Rule 33, on action by the Chamber in specific cases, 
specifies in section 3 that the Vice-President may also ‘take any necessary action on behalf of the 
Chamber’, if the President is ‘prevented from carrying out his duties’. The Vice-Presidents of the 
two Panels were the next in line to take such action and, in case they were not available, a judge 
with seniority.387 Whoever took the decision to take provisional measures in between sessions 
shall inform the full Chamber during the next session.  
In urgent cases the Chamber could order provisional measures within one or two days.388 A 
Handbook drafted by the former Registrar of the Chamber notes: 
“In order to enable the secretariat to act quickly on such a request, the applicant’s submissions 
must be as complete as possible. They may initially be sent by facsimile. It is highly advisable 
not to leave the intervention request to the last minute, as the secretariat has no duty officers 
processing a request during a weekend or a public holiday”.389 
Another provision that takes into account promptness is Rule 48, providing that ‘in any case of 
urgency, the Registrar may, without prejudice to the taking of any other procedural steps, inform 
the respondent Party in an application, by any available means, of the introduction of the applica-
tion and of a summary of its subject-matter’. 
If the Chamber orders provisional measures, it normally immediately transmits the applica-
tion itself to the respondent Party for ‘factual or legal observations to be submitted by that party 
as a matter of urgency’.390 
                                                 
384 See Bosnia Chamber Annual Report 2000 (under the heading ‘provisional measures’). 
385 The Inter-American Court only considers a case closed once the State has fully implemented it. 
Before such time it may maintain provisional measures, for instance to protect witnesses. See 
further Chapter XIV discussing jurisdiction and Chapter XVIII on follow-up. 
386 See also Rule 35. 
387 See e.g. Rules 9, 10 and 4, Bosnia Chamber Annual Report 1999 and Berg Handbook (1999), p. 
9. 
388 Response by Peter Kempees, Registrar of the Chamber, 8 March 2001, by e-mail (on file with the 
author).  
389 Berg Handbook (1999), p. 9. 
390 See Berg Handbook (1999), p. 10, referring to ‘President’s Standing Order no. 1’. 
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7.3.3 Proprio motu use and withdrawal of provisional measures 
Rule 36 itself does not refer to the authority to take provisional measures proprio motu, but Rule 
33(1) states that the Chamber may, proprio motu or at the request of a party, take any action 
which it considers expedient or necessary for the proper performance of its duties under the 
Agreement.391 
Rule 36(5) stipulates that the Chamber shall withdraw an order for provisional measures 
whenever it is ‘no longer justified’. It is the Chamber as a whole that decides so, ‘by formal deci-
sion’. In deciding whether or not to maintain provisional measures information provided by other 
international organisations plays a role, for instance from OSCE officers, officers of the UN 
International Police Taskforce or the Human Rights Field Operation of the Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights.392  
7.3.4 Continuity 
To put the Chamber’s provisional measures in context it is useful to know that, under Rule 16 of 
the Rules of Procedure, the Ombudsperson may also take such measures.393 
As noted, upon expiry of the Chamber’s mandate, on 31 December 2003, a Human Rights 
Commission within the Constitutional Court of BiH dealt with those cases received by the Bosnia 
Chamber on or before that date.394 It could not accept new applications, but in ongoing cases that 
require provisional measures this Commission, or its President may take provisional measures.395 
                                                 
391 The Berg Handbook (1999), p. 10 simply notes that Rule 36 may also be applied on the 
Chamber’s own motion. It then adds that an ‘injunction could also be issued against an 
applicant’. It does not give examples in which the Chamber had done so. It is not clear whether 
the Chamber formally decided that it could do so, or whether the author of the handbook, legal 
secretary of the ECtHR and legal officer of the former European Commission, has assumed this 
based on the fact that the Chamber has taken over many rules and practices of the Strasbourg 
bodies. In a footnote the Handbook refers to the practice of the former European Commission to 
recommend petitioners to stop their hunger strike. See further on this issue Chapter XIII, section 
4 on the beneficiaries of provisional measures. 
392 Berg Handbook (1999), p. 10. OSCE officers also play a role in monitoring compliance with 
Chamber decisions, including Orders for provisional measures, see e.g. Annual Reports 1999 and 
2000 of the Bosnia Chamber, in its overview of cooperation with international institutions in BiH 
and Periodic Report of the Human Rights Field Operation in the former Yugoslavia of the Office 
of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, April 1998, §§27-29. 
393 See e.g. the Ombudsperson’s Annual Reports, under ‘Interim measures’. Between May 1997 and 
the end of January 1998, for instance, she took provisional measures 59 times. On the 
ombudsperson see also Raguz (1999), pp. 121-124. 
394 As of July 2005 the website of this Commission <http://www.hrc.ba/commission> only refers to 
three members. It refers to two other persons from BiH that must be appointed, while 2(1) of its 
Rules of Procedure refers to ‘the two international members’. 
395 See Rule 34 Rules of Procedure Human Rights Commission within the Constitutional Court of 
BiH, adopted January 2004: “(1) Applications entailing requests for provisional measures shall be 
reviewed as a matter of priority. The Commission, or when it is not in session, the President, shall 
determine in particular whether such applications should be accepted and, if so, whether high 
priority for the scheduling of proceedings on the provisional measures requested is warranted. 
(2)The Commission or, when it is not in session, the President, shall decide whether, in the 
interest of the parties or the proper conduct of proceedings, any provisional measures should be 
ordered under Article X paragraph 1 of the Agreement. (3)The Commission or, when it is not in 
session, the President, shall bring any such order to the notice of the Party concerned by any 
available means with a view to ensuring its effective implementation in accordance with the 
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The Constitutional Court of BiH consists of six citizens of the State of BiH (four selected by the 
Federation of BiH and two by Republica Srpska) and three international judges appointed by the 
President of the ECtHR. It started its work in 1997.396 
7.4 Decisions to use provisional measures: transparency or the lack thereof?  
Like all other human rights adjudicators, apart from the Inter-American Court, the Bosnia 
Chamber did not publish its provisional measures separately. References to these measures are 
instead found in the decisions on inadmissibility and merits.397 These decisions refer to all 
requests for provisional measures, also those it did not grant, making it possible to examine the 
type of cases in which it does not consider them warranted. Another useful approach by the 
Chamber was its specific, though brief, discussion of its use of these measures in its Annual 
                                                                                                                       
Agreement. (4) Where When [sic] the President has ordered any provisional measures he or she 
shall report her his or heris [sic] action to the Commission under paragraph 3 of Rule 31. (5) 
Whenever an order for provisional measures is no longer justified, the Commission shall, by a 
formal decision, withdraw it”. See also Rule 33 (on priority) and 31(1) (on action in specific 
cases). 
396 See Rule 78 Rules of Procedure Constitutional Court BiH: (1) The Chamber may, until the 
adoption of a final decision, upon a request of a party, issue any interim measure it deems 
necessary in the interest of the parties or the correct conductance of the proceedings before the 
Court. (2) Exceptionally, the President of the Court may, if it is not possible to convene a session 
of the Chamber, issue an interim measure such as is referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article. (3) 
The plenary Court may, on its own motion, issue an interim measure such as is referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article. (4) A decision on an interim measure such as is referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article shall be submitted immediately to the adopter of the challenged act 
and to the parties to the proceedings. (5) The Chamber or President of the Court, if they find it 
appropriate, may also decide to forward a decision on a measure such as is referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article to other authorities. (6) The Chamber or the President of the Court 
shall submit a decision on an interim measure referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article to the 
plenary Court for information. (7) A decision on an interim measure such as is referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article shall have legal effect, until the plenary Court decides otherwise. (8) 
The Chamber or the President of the Court may request information from the parties on every 
issue relating to an interim measure. (9) In the event that an interim measure is no longer 
justified, the Chamber or the President of the Court shall annul it. (10) Proceedings for the 
adoption of an interim measure shall be urgent. See also Rule 10 (1) The Chamber shall consist 
of the President of the Court and two Vice-Presidents from among the judges elected by the 
competent legislative authorities of the Entities. The President of the Court shall preside over the 
Chamber. (2) The Chamber shall decide by a majority of votes of the members of the Chamber 
on the joining or separation of cases and on requests for the adoption of interim measures. The 
Chamber shall adopt a proposal for a decision on admissibility which shall be submitted to the 
Grand Chamber or the plenary Court for verification. (3) The Chamber shall submit a decision on 
an interim measure to the plenary Court for information.  
397 Different from the HRC, it is the practice of the Chamber to mention any Orders (and requests for 
such Orders) in the final decision (Peter Kempees, 12 March 2001, by e-mail (on file with the 
author). The bound volumes of these decisions are not widely available outside of BiH, but the 
cases can be accessed on the internet. The Chamber shares its site with that of the human rights 
commission within the constitutional court of BiH. The site includes a search database with all 
the decisions of the former Human Rights Chamber see: <http://www.hrc.ba/> (last accessed 10 
January 2008).This database includes all decisions until July 2003, as well as decisions on 
admissibility and merits until May 2005. 
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Reports.398 In the secondary literature only Berg, the legal secretary of the ECtHR and former 
Registrar of the Human Rights Chamber, devotes some more specific comments to ‘intervention 
in urgent matters’.399  
8 CONCLUSION 
8.1 The authority to use provisional measures  
8.1.1 Introduction 
The Inter-American Court is able to order provisional measures based on the explicit text of the 
treaty. The same applies to CEDAW and the new African Court, as well as to the former Bosnia 
Chamber. The Inter-American Commission, African Commission, European Commission and 
Court, HRC, CAT and CERD have included in their Rules of Procedure the possibility to use 
provisional measures. Indeed, even if the text of the treaty is not explicit about the authority to use 
provisional measures in the context of individual complaints, in practice this authority is deemed 
part of the function of the adjudicator assigned to deal with individual complaints under a given 
human rights treaty. Apart from CERD, all human rights adjudicators regularly use provisional 
measures. Just with regard to the inter-State complaint proceedings in the human rights treaties, 
which have not often been used in any case, the practice of using provisional measures is very 
limited.400  
It is submitted that human rights adjudicators have the implied power to use provisional 
measures.401 After all human rights adjudication has the function of determining, on the basis of a 
legal procedure, the obligations of States in a legal conflict with an individual or individuals 
involving human rights. This function is particularly pressing in the face of threats of irreparable 
harm to persons.402 Provisional measures are necessary in order to prevent such harm pending the 
proceedings.  
If the human rights treaty also includes inter-State proceedings it should be possible to use 
provisional measures in these proceedings as well. After all, even the ICJ – the obvious inter-State 
adjudicator – has used provisional measures in the face of irreparable harm to persons.403 
                                                 
398 See especially its Annual Reports 2000, 1999 and 1998 (on average devoting half a page on the 
issue). These Reports are accessible at the website of the human rights commission within the 
constitutional court of BiH: <http://www.hrc.ba/> (last accessed 10 January 2008). 
399 Berg (1999), pp. 8-11. See further Küttler (2003), pp. 70-72; Nowak (2001), p. 777; Gelmamez 
(1999), pp. 309-310 and Aybay (1997), p. 545. The author would like to thank Jacob Möller 
(judge in the Bosnia Chamber, Geneva 1998), Therese Nelson and Peter Kempees (staff of the 
Chamber) for the information they provided. 
400 See Chapter III (Executions) with two early examples from the European system. 
401 In this respect Pasqualucci (2005), distinguishes between the inherent authority of courts and the 
implied power of quasi-judicial bodies. In this book, however, the argument is made that all 
human rights adjudicators (courts and so-called ‘quasi-judicial bodies’) have the implied power 
to take provisional measures to properly perform their function of addressing individual 
complaints. Chapter XVI on the legal status of provisional measures further elaborates on this.  
402 For a discussion of the purpose of provisional measures in human rights cases (in relation to 
irreparable harm) see conclusion Part II.  
403 See Chapter I on the ICJ and provisional measures to protect individuals. 
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8.1.2 Proprio motu use 
The HRC often receives information on the basis of which it concludes that the petitioner is ask-
ing for provisional measures. An example is a hand-written note with the text: ‘I am going to be 
executed on 5 March’, without a specific request for provisional measures. On the other hand it is 
not clear whether the HRC could use provisional measures based on information from sources 
other than the petitioner. Different from the HRC the rules on provisional measures by the Inter-
American Commission and Court and the European Court of Human Rights specifically provide 
for the possibility of proprio motu use of provisional measures.  
In a human rights approach the authority to use provisional measures should indeed include 
the authority to use them proprio motu. Especially in cases in which potential beneficiaries are 
unable to contact the adjudicator directly, the adjudicator should be able, in light of the purpose of 
provisional measures, to intervene on its own motion on the basis of other credible information.  
8.1.3 Delegation 
If a court or other adjudicator only convenes periodically it becomes necessary to delegate the 
authority to use provisional measures to one member of the court or adjudicatory body. Without 
this option the usefulness of provisional measures is seriously reduced because they are tardy or 
even used only after the irreparable harm has already been done.404 In other words, without the 
possibility to delegate the power to use provisional measures these measures will be deprived of 
their protective function.  
Once the HRC started to receive a substantial number of urgent petitions (relating to im-
pending executions) it decided to delegate its authority to use provisional measures to one of its 
members, who as the Special Rapporteur on New Communications could then deal with these in 
between sessions. The Committee against Torture waited somewhat longer with taking a similar 
decision, but has now assigned a Special Rapporteur to deal with these cases as well. In some 
systems the provisional measures taken in between sessions have a different status and name, for 
instance ‘urgent measures’. The President of the Inter-American Court, upon consultation with 
other members of the Court, only takes ‘urgent measures’ and calls for a meeting of the full 
Court. It is the Court that uses the provisional measures proper. While such approach is interest-
ing, it is not necessary as long as the member to whom the authority has been delegated indeed 
reports about the use of all provisional measures. Following this, the adjudicator should ratify, 
expand upon or lift the provisional measure. An obligation to consult other members of the Court 
or Committee in advance could be useful as well, but this should not be required at the cost of 
expedience. 
8.2 Publication and motivation of provisional measures 
In the context of the ICJ’s provisional measures it has been argued that, generally speaking, inter-
national adjudicators should hold public hearings on the use of provisional measures.405 Such 
hearings may indeed help enhance the persuasive force of provisional measures and play a role in 
follow-up, because they would offer a formalized forum for dialogue between the parties on this 
issue. Nevertheless, they are not always practicable and their absence does not significantly di-
minish the authority of provisional measures that are substantiated and publicly accessible. In 
                                                 
404 See also Pasqualucci (2005), p. 36. 
405 See the individual opinion of judge Buergenthal in LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 
June 2001. See also Addo (1999), pp. 713-732 and Cassel (2002), p. 886. 
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practice, however, only the Orders of the Inter-American Court are published and motivated.406 In 
the other systems the use of provisional measures is simply mentioned in the decision on the 
merits or inadmissibility. The unpublished letters to the parties informing them of decisions about 
provisional measures normally do not clarify the criteria for their use either.  
Most adjudicators do not formally reject requests by petitioners to take provisional or pre-
cautionary measures. Thus, it is not possible to systematically trace failed attempts to convince 
them to take such measures. Systematic references to refusals to use provisional measures are 
only found in the decisions by the Inter-American Court, the Bosnia Chamber and, to some ex-
tent, the Committee against Torture.407 This lack of references by the other adjudicators is unfor-
tunate because cases in which the petitioners failed to convince the adjudicators to take provi-
sional measures could give particular insight into their approach to the concept.  
Many provisional measures in the European system have been taken in cases that were not 
published. These cases can only be examined in Strasbourg. This book makes reference mainly to 
those cases that are easily verifiable. An exception is made for the practice of the HRC because 
for several years it failed to mention its use of provisional measures in its final decision alto-
gether. Without reference to information derived from the case files the practice discussed would 
not be representative. Because eventually an opportunity was offered to examine case-files in 
Geneva on the Committee’s practice with regard to provisional measures it was decided to make 
them more widely available in this book.408  
It is remarkable that information about the use of urgent appeals by Special Rapporteurs un-
der the non-legal proceedings is more systematically made available, at the latest in their Annual 
Reports. Often Special Rapporteurs also make use of press releases. The international and re-
gional adjudicators, on the other hand, do not regularly issue press releases and they do not con-
sistently make available information on the particular protective measures required. It could be 
argued that adjudicators should have even more reason than theme Rapporteurs to motivate and 
publish their decisions on provisional measures.  
This book emphasises the importance of motivation and accessibility of an adjudicator’s 
provisional measures, increasing the authority of the measures used and providing insight in the 
approach of the adjudicators to the concept.409 This transparency and accessibility is all the more 
important because, as is argued in Chapter XVI, provisional measures are legally binding.410 This 
provides more concrete tools to domestic courts as well.411  
It might be said that providing a motivation for the use of provisional measures would al-
ready anticipate the final determination of the case. Yet in that case it would be the use itself of 
the measures rather than the motivation that would anticipate the decision on the merits. Motiva-
tion only serves to clarify the basis for using provisional measures and to make visible the most 
important criteria applied by the adjudicator. If this already indicates a certain direction the adju-
                                                 
406 See Rieter (2005a), p. 42. The Inter-American Court is also the only human rights adjudicator 
that convenes hearings specifically to deal with requests for provisional measures. 
407 The HRC did not keep record of these requests, meaning that statistical data are not available 
either. In its Information Notes the ECtHR occasionally also refers to cases in which it refused to 
take provisional measures.  
408 This book indicates which information is on file with the author. 
409 Rieter (2005a), p. 40. See also Rieter (2003), p. 24. 
410 On the importance of motivation in response to the increased status of these measures in the 
European system in particular, Rieter (2005a), pp. 41-42. 
411 For an example see Rieter (2005a), pp. 29-32. The need for motivation of provisional measures in 
the European system was confirmed in Haeck/VanDeLanotte (2005), pp. 468-469, in which it 
was noted that the binding nature of provisional measures as well as the need to enable domestic 
courts to act in the face of failure by the executive both argue in favour of motivating provisional 
measures. See also Rieter (2006), pp. 736-739. 
 The Use of Provisional Measures in the Context of the Various Human Rights Systems 
191 
dicator may take, this is very likely to happen as well if he omits making explicit such a motiva-
tion. Adjudicators like the ICJ, with a more general mandate, not only involving human rights, 
have also motivated their orders for provisional measures. The motivation and publication of the 
Orders of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is commendable and States have never 
complained that this anticipated the eventual decision. In human rights cases involving the risk of 
irreparable harm to persons the rule of non-anticipation by the adjudicator of the decision on the 
merits simply means that provisional measures should not dictate the direction of the ultimate 
determination of the main conflict. This approach is based on the threat of irreparable harm to 
persons on the one hand and the difference in availability of evidence and time for evaluation of 
this evidence at different stages of the proceedings. The assessment of the evidence for the pur-
pose of provisional measures should not prejudice the eventual decision. It should be clear, for 
instance, that the final decision is based on an evaluation of all the available evidence and argu-
ments on the basis of the principle audi alteram partem.412 After all adjudicators should make 
available the information to both parties and allow them the opportunity to respond. In fact this 
principle should apply already pending the proceedings to any follow-up decision with regard to 
the provisional measures initially taken.  
On the other hand, because provisional measures cannot go further in the required protec-
tion than an eventual decision on reparations would, they already give an indication on substan-
tive law. This is all the more reason for the adjudicator to motivate its decisions to use provisional 
measures. If the rationale of provisional measures is explained these measures become more 
persuasive. Moreover, both the State and the petitioner may be able to provide a more focused 
response. The provisional measure would be substantiated by referring to the authority to use it, 
the purpose of preventing irreparable harm to persons413 and the applicable articles as well as by 
noting that the decision is made in light of the urgency of the situation and based on prima facie 
evidence of an imminent risk of irreparable harm. The adjudicator could also refer to previous 
decisions on the legal status of provisional measures, indicate the follow-up information required 
as well as the relevant time limits.414 For adjudicators that do not yet motivate their use of provi-
sional measures substantiation in this form would not imply an inordinate increase of the work-
load of the adjudicator and its staff. It would only require one extra page in a Note Verbale or 
order to the government (sent for information to the petitioners) that could partially be standard-
ised.415 
Accessibility, transparency, coherence and consistency in the use of provisional measures 
should be increased, among others by making public the decisions and by including reasoning. 
One of the aims of the research is in fact to assist in this process by collecting, systematizing and 
analysing the relevant information. 
8.3 Convergence or divergence? 
The introduction to this chapter noted that the overview was aimed to serve to highlight common-
alities as well as differences between the systems. As to the commonalities, the systems are facing 
                                                 
412 The principle audi alteram partem/audiatur et altera pars (both parties are to be heard in the 
course of a judicial procedure), may be considered a general principle of law. Cheng (1953) has 
pointed out that the principle translates into practice ‘the fundamental requirement of equality 
between the parties in judicial proceedings’, p. 291.  
413 This is further discussed in the Conclusion to Part II. 
414 For a discussion of the official responses by addressee States, the legal status of provisional 
measures and follow-up see the subsequent Chapters.  
415 The Inter-American Court uses such a standardised model, adding the relevant information for 
the case at issue.  
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common problems and issues, which may sometimes result in converging interpretations, occa-
sionally consciously (often referred to as ‘dialogue’ or ‘cross-fertilization’), at other times more 
indirectly.416 As to the possible divergences in the approaches of the adjudicators with regard to 
provisional measures these are mainly due to the differences between the systems.417 These diver-
gences are explored to clarify the use of provisional measures that are situated, as discussed in 
Chapter XII, on a continuum beyond the common core, but still within the outer limits of the 
concept.418  
In other words, the differences and commonalities in the systems may help to explain why 
the respective practices of the adjudicators converge or diverge with regard to the use of provi-
sional measures. Awareness of convergence and divergence may in turn enhance the understand-
ing of the common core and outer limits of the current concept of provisional measures in human 
rights adjudication.419 The question also arises whether (regional) context could fully determine 
the outer limits of the concept of provisional measures in human rights cases or whether there are 
outer limits beyond which adjudicators cannot go in any system without depriving the concept of 
independent meaning.420 
To the extent information is available, the subsequent chapters examine the divergences and 
convergences in the approaches of the human rights adjudicators towards provisional measures 
with regard to the aspects mentioned in the Introduction to this book (the protection required, the 
relationship with reparation and the (group of) beneficiaries; the relevance of admissibility and 
jurisdiction on the merits, the assessment of temporal urgency and risk, the legal status, the offi-
cial responses of addressee States and the follow-up).  
Are the international and regional adjudicators moving towards a more uniform approach to 
the concept of provisional measures? This study aims to identify what, if any, is the underlying 
                                                 
416 See e.g. Weiser (2004), pp. 116-117 (and references therein): “[T]he human rights domain is 
especially conducive to international and transnational influences because of the numerous 
‘genealogical’ links between national, regional and international human rights standards”. See 
further Slaughter (2003), pp. 191-219; Slaughter (2000), pp. 1103-1124; Slaughter (1994), pp. 
99-135. In general on comparing various human rights systems, see e.g. Buergenthal (2005); 
Cançado Trindade (2004); Udombana (2003b), pp. 479-532; Jayawickrama (2002); Fix-Zamudio 
(2000), pp. 507-533; Ramcharan (2000), pp. 324-326; Helfer (1999), pp. 285-379; Pool/Mayhew 
(1999), also referring to the domestic case law made accessible through the NGO Interights; 
Carozza (1998), pp. 1217-1237 (discussing uses and misuse of comparative law in international 
human rights, taking the ECtHR as an example); Dulitzky (1997), pp. 33-74; Helfer/Slaughter 
(1997), pp. 273-391; Sohn (1996), pp. 33-56; Ni Aolain (1995), pp. 101-142; Merrills (1993); 
Partsch (1989), pp. 1-9 and Cançado Trindade (1987).  
417 As ITLOS pointed out in its Order for provisional measures in the Mox Plant case, ‘the 
application of international law rules on interpretation of treaties to identical or similar provisions 
of different treaties may not yield the same results, having regard to, inter alia, differences in the 
respective contexts, objects and purposes, subsequent practice of parties and travaux 
préparatoires’. ITLOS the MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order for provisional measures of 3 
December 2001, §51. 
418 In this respect regional systems may set the stage and move forward at a greater pace, possibly to 
be followed by international adjudicators. See e.g. Van Boven (1995), p. 23: ‘in devising regional 
(or sub-regional) systems for the promotion and protection of human rights, the following three 
criteria should duly be taken into account so as to give the regional approach a value additional to 
the universal approach: (1) its pioneering or innovative character, (ii) the introduction of a higher 
level of protection, (iii) the fulfilment of clearly established needs of a particular region (or sub-
region)’. 
419 It is assumed that the concept is dynamic rather than frozen in time. 
420 The latter refers to the ability of the phrase to be used in communication resulting in some form 
of common understanding. 
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interpretative approach as to the nature of provisional measures that the human rights adjudicators 
have in common. As the adjudicators generally do not make explicit the rationale for using provi-
sional measures, an attempt is made to derive it from their judgments on the merits and admissi-
bility. The conclusions drawn with regard to a possible underlying interpretative approach are 
supported by the fact that this book also examines whether more than one system has used provi-
sional measures in a given circumstance. 
As noted in the Introduction, when the underlying approaches of all adjudicators, as well as 
the specific practice of at least two of them converge, this study speaks of a common core.  
It is assumed that if the adjudicators indeed move towards a more uniform approach this 
will make the provisional measures more persuasive to domestic courts, the executive and the 
legislator. In addition it presumably is more ‘costly’ for a State’s international image to ignore 
such provisional measures because of their enhanced legitimacy.  
States dealing with supervisory mechanisms under various human rights treaties have some-
times emphasized the importance of coordination. This does not just apply to coordination be-
tween the UN treaty bodies,421 but also between regional and international human rights adjudica-
tors, as well as human rights and general international adjudicators, such as the ICJ.422 For in-
stance, States have sometimes referred to the case law of the ECtHR implying that CAT or the 
HRC should follow its example. Even States that are not themselves subject to the jurisdiction of 
the ECtHR have sometimes argued that the UN bodies should take the same approach as that 
Court.423 The Dutch government has tried to justify ignoring a provisional measure by CAT, 
among others, by pointing to the different case law of the ECtHR.424 The case law of the two 
petition mechanisms ‘differed in terms of the extent to which the burden of proof lay with the 
State party’. There was a ‘clear need’ for the international and the European body ‘to reach some 
measure of agreement on their interpretation of the rules, since it was essential for asylum-seekers 
and European Governments to know the exact limits of the protection provided by international 
law’.425 
As an example of an international law concept on which the approaches of the various adju-
dicators may differ, this research on provisional measures aims to contribute to the ongoing dis-
cussion on the proliferation of international adjudicators and the ‘fragmentation’ of international 
                                                 
421 On this see e.g. Rasmussen, member of CAT, who has argued for additional meeting time. He 
pointed out that the lack of contact with the UN Special Rapporteur against torture and other UN 
bodies ‘was attributable to time constraints, not to the fact that the Committee did not find such 
cooperation beneficial’. Summary Records, 34th session, 19 May 2005, CAT/C/SR.662, 2 June 
2005, §63. 
422 Specifically on the relation between human rights case law and general international law, see e.g. 
Borgen (2005); Toufayan (2005); Caflisch/Cançado Trindade (2004), pp. 5-62; Oellers-Frahm 
(2001b), pp. 67-104; Cohen-Jonathan (1999), pp. 767-789; Simma (1995), pp. 153-235; Cançado 
Trindade (1987) and Sohn (1982), pp. 1-64. See also Kamminga’s Final Report on the Impact of 
International Human Rights Law on General International Law, presented on behalf of the 
Committee of Human Rights Law and Practice of the International Law Association (ILA), July 
2008, made available on SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150664> (consulted 5 August 2008); 
on the role of international and regional adjudicators, including issues such as subsidiarity, 
judicial activism and restraint, see e.g. Carozza (2003), pp. 38-79; Benvenisti (1999), pp. 843-
854; Mahoney (1990), pp. 57-88 and Schachter (1983), pp. 813-821. 
423 See e.g. the remarks by Canada in the context of proceedings before the HRC, CAT and Inter-
American Commission (see Chapter XVII (Official responses)). 
424 See further Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
425 Statement by Mr. Dumoré (Netherlands), Summary Record of the Committee against Torture, 
24th meeting, 11 May 2000, CAT/C/SR.426, 13 February 2001, §4, see also Chapter XV on 
assessment of risk and XVII (Official responses).  
 Chapter II 
194 
law, or in any case the importance of coherence in the application of international law.426 Already 
in 1971 the ICJ stated: ‘an international instrument has to be interpreted and applied within the 
framework of the entire legal system prevailing at the time of its interpretation’.427  
Article 31(3)(c) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is particularly relevant 
as an expression of the aim of increasing coherence in the law applied to different subject matters. 
It reflects the principle of systemic integration, referring to ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’ as an element that must be taken into account with 
the context when interpreting a treaty provision. A presumption exists of consistency of the text to 
be interpreted with general international law, unless this would undermine the object and purpose 
of the particular system.428  
International human rights law may to some extent be seen as a ‘regime’. Krasner has ex-
plained ‘regime’ as ‘a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international rela-
tions’.429 Indeed, human rights adjudicators, alleged victims, NGOs and States appear to have 
assumed, even if implicitly, the principle of effective protection to prevent irreparable harm to 
persons as a fundamental norm around which the human rights system is built. At the same time, 
in light of the principle of systemic integration, this special ‘regime’ does not, and should not 
weaken general international law. 
As the purpose of this regime is the protection of human rights, any resort to ‘external’ gen-
eral rules, also applicable outside of the regime, is legitimate in any case as long as this is condu-
cive to their protection. Insofar as general international law is truly in the process of humaniza-
tion,430 resort to international law rules that harm the effective protection of human rights is be-
coming increasingly less likely. From a systematic perspective it is important for the human rights 
adjudicators as well to pursue consistency and coherence in the application of general concepts 
and principles of international law. The Conclusion to this book will return to the issue of consis-
tency and coherence for those instances in which this situation does occur and the object and 
purpose of the human rights system would in fact be undermined by applying the interpretation 
advanced by general international adjudicators such as the ICJ.431  
                                                 
426 See e.g. ILC, Report of the Study Group, Finalized by Martti Koskenniemi, Fragmentation of 
international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law, 
A/CN.4/L.682, 13 April 2006; Conclusions of the ILC Study Group, Fragmentation of 
international law: difficulties arising from the diversification and expansion of international law, 
A/CN/.4/L.702, 18 July 2006; Wellens/Huesa-Vinaixa (2006); Simma (2004), pp. 845-847; 
Pauwelyn (2003); Slaughter (2003), pp. 191-219; Higgins (2003), pp. 21-51; Charney (2002), pp. 
369-380; Dupuy (2002); Koskenniemi/Leino (2002), pp. 553-579; Reed (2002), pp. 219-237; 
Buergenthal (2001), pp. 267-275; Sands (2001), pp. 527-558; Hafner (2000); speech of ICJ 
President Guillaume to the UN General Assembly, 27 October 2000; the various contributions in 
NYU Symposium Issue ‘The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing Together the 
Puzzle’, (1999), pp. 679-933; Helfer/Slaughter (1997), pp. 273-391; Charney (1999a); 
Heyns/Killander (2006), pp. 540-543; Wellens (1994), pp. 3-37; Partsch (1989), pp. 1-9. 
427 ICJ Advisory Opinion Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa 
in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 21 June 
1971, §53. 
428 See Sands (1999), p. 104. The rule invoked must both be relevant and applicable between the 
parties. The latter means that it must be legally binding (based on customary law, treaty or 
general principle). For an explicit reference to Article 31(3)(c) see e.g. ICJ Oil Platforms (Iran v. 
US), 6 November 2003, §41. See further e.g. McLachlan (2005), pp. 279-320; Higgins (2003), 
pp. 1-20; Pauwelyn (2003); Conforti (2007), pp. 6-18. 
429 Krasner (1983), p. 2. 
430 See also Chapter I, section 3.4. 
431 See the suggestion by Sands (1999), p. 104. 
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The African Commission is explicitly authorized to ‘draw inspiration from’ rules of interna-
tional law other than those found as such in the ACHPR or to take those ‘into consideration’ (see 
Articles 60 and 61 ACHPR). The African Court even ‘shall apply’ the provisions of the ACHPR 
as well as ‘other instruments ratified by the States concerned’ (Article 7 Protocol).432 The older 
instruments, in particular the ECHR, are not explicit in this respect, but nevertheless cross-
fertilization does appear to take place. In some cases even the ECtHR has explicitly referred to the 
case law of other adjudicators.433 
Obviously it is more difficult to find a common understanding of legal concepts and achieve 
convergence in interpretation with regard to a large number of States from different regions of the 
world. Yet if all adjudicators have a similar interpretative approach to certain phenomena and 
legal texts, this would validate that interpretation for the time being.434 Cross-fertilization can 
make an interpretation more convincing and more coherent from the perspective of the develop-
ment of a body of international case law.  
The practice that has been developed by human rights adjudicators in the application of the 
human rights treaties subsequent to their entry into force is relevant when a given treaty is applied 
domestically, as well as when other international adjudicators invoke the provisions of that treaty. 
International adjudicators may do so either directly, as the ICJ has done,435 or in order to inform 
the meaning of the particular treaty they supervise. In both cases they consider the subsequent 
practice of the relevant treaty bodies as well.436  
The drafters of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) did not take into ac-
count the fact that many modern treaties, such as those aimed at the protection of human rights, 
have introduced expert bodies interpreting the meaning of the treaty provisions, often even 
through adjudication of complaints by individuals against States parties.437 Nevertheless, even the 
text of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which 
establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’, does not preclude a dynamic 
interpretation involving subsequent developments. After all, it may be assumed that States parties 
ratified human rights treaties, including the supervisory mechanisms, in good faith, meaning that 
the human rights adjudicators established by these treaties have genuinely been assigned the task 
of monitoring compliance with and therefore interpret the provisions of the treaty.438 Thus the 
practice developed by the human rights adjudicators could be said to establish the agreement of 
the parties regarding their interpretation, exactly because these adjudicators were created under 
                                                 
432 See also Ouguergouz (2003), p. 735. 
433 See e.g. ECtHR Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1988 (on disappearances); Issa v. Turkey, 16 November 
2004 (on extraterritorial application); and, specifically on provisional measures: Mamatkulov and 
Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005 (Grand Chamber). On the latter judgment see also Chapter 
XVI (Legal status). For overviews of references by domestic (and international) adjudicators to 
international case law, see e.g. Final and Interim Reports of the Committee on International 
Human Rights Law and Practice of the International Law Association (ILA) on the impact of 
findings of the United Nations human rights treaty bodies, 2004 and 2002. 
434 As noted, it is assumed that the concept of provisional measures is dynamic rather than frozen in 
time. 
435 See e.g. ICJ Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian 
territory, Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, §§107-113. 
436 See e.g. Report of the Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice of the 
International Law Association, at the Berlin Conference (2004), pp. 629-630; McCorquodale 
(2004), pp. 477-504; Herdegen (2004), p. 125; Simma (1995), p. 234. 
437 See also Report of the Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice of the 
International Law Association, at the Berlin Conference (2004), p. 629. 
438 See also Helfer/Slaughter (2005), pp. 3-58. 
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the treaty in order to interpret it.439 In light of the object and purpose of the human rights treaty, 
which is not traditionally inter-State, as well as of the individual complaint mechanism included 
in the treaty, one may conclude that there is no need for the consent of each State party with each 
and every finding by these adjudicators.440 They have agreed to, and signed up for, a ‘process’ of 
treaty interpretation by an expert body functioning as an adjudicator in the context of the individ-
ual complaint procedure.441 
In 1948 ICJ Judge Alvarez already noted ‘that an institution, once established, acquires a 
life of its own, independent of the elements which have given birth to it, and it must develop, not 
in accordance with the views of those who created it, but in accordance with the requirements of 
international life’.442 Two years later he pointed out that, because of the ‘exigencies of modern 
life’, there is a rapid elaboration of new rules of law, ‘effected by means which are different from 
those of former times’. “The common view that international law must be created solely by States 
is, therefore, not valid to-day – nor indeed has it ever been”.443  
                                                 
439 See also Report of the Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice of the 
International Law Association (ILA), at the Berlin Conference (2004), p. 629 and the HRC 
agreeing with this approach in its draft General Comment 33 (2nd revised version, 18 August 
2008), §18 (arguing this in relation to the ‘general body of jurisprudence’ generated by the HRC 
and referring to the Berlin Conference report). This position is no longer reflected, though, in the 
advance unedited version of its General Comment 33, CCPR/C/GC/33, 5 November 2008. See 
further ILA Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice Final Report on the 
Impact of International Human Rights Law on General International Law, July 2008, §3.2, also 
noting that ‘(a)lthough the International Court of Justice has not formally endorsed such an 
approach implicitly it has adopted this course of action, e.g. in its advisory opinion on The Wall 
in which it closely follows the findings of the UN human rights treaty bodies’. Of course States 
will sometimes argue that adjudicators overstepped their mark and tried to create rather than 
interpret the law, which is still an argument that strikes a chord with many. This is a discussion 
that cannot be avoided. It means in any case that adjudicators must motivate their findings, with a 
thorough and coherent legal analysis. See also Mahoney (1990), pp. 57-88, arguing, in the 
context of the practice of the ECtHR, that judicial activism and judicial self-restraint are two 
sides of the same coin. 
440 In his discussion of Article 31 VCLT Sorel (2006), pp. 1289-1334, extensively deals with the 
teleological and dynamic/evolutive interpretation by various adjudicators (e.g. ICJ, ICTY, ECJ, 
ECtHR) and notes that Article 31 has left behind traditional voluntarism. An argument has also 
been made that States may be understood to have acquiesced in the role of the supervisory bodies 
as interpreting the law to such effect that it comes to constitute subsequent practice. See Report of 
the Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice of the International Law 
Association, at the Berlin Conference (2004), p. 629. This may be different only when there is 
considerable protest by a range of States parties. After all, different from the traditional system of 
issuing objections to treaty reservations by other States, in this context States would indeed have 
a self-interest in voicing their disagreement with the interpretation by an international 
adjudicator, as this may have an impact on their own obligations under the treaty in question. 
This study does not address the question what is the level and range of such protest and what are 
its consequences. 
441 On the law as a process approach in general see Higgins (1994), pp. 1-16, esp. p. 8. See further 
Hey (2003).  
442 ICJ Conditions of admission of a State to membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the 
Charter), Advisory Opinion of 28 May 1958, Individual Opinion Judge Alvarez, p. 68. 
443 ICJ Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion of 3 March 1950, Dissenting Opinion Judge M. Alvarez, p. 13. He also pointed 
out that ‘(i)t would be meaningless to speak of solidarity, interdependence, co-operation, the 
general interest, human happiness, etc., if States could continue to exercise all their rights freely 
and without restriction’ , p. 14. Next to the institutions he referred to in 1948, he now noted that a 
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Apart from the relevance of the subsequent practice developed by the adjudicators to the in-
terpretation of treaty provisions, ‘judicial decisions’ also constitute ‘subsidiary means for the 
determination of international law’ (Art 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute). These may be domestic or interna-
tional judicial decisions. The phrase ‘judicial decisions’ is used, rather than ‘court decisions’. This 
potentially includes the decisions made in individual cases by treaty monitoring bodies or WTO 
Panels and Appellate Body. The argument is often made that such decisions are ‘quasi-judicial’, 
but even if that is the case, what could be argued to be most relevant is the range of States whose 
obligations are covered by the interpretation, rather than the exact legal status of the findings.444 
In other words, a decision of a domestic court, which may be binding on one particular State, 
certainly has less legal authority vis-à-vis other States, than the interpretation by a treaty monitor-
ing body. Nevertheless, the findings by domestic courts and other domestic adjudicators may be 
used as subsidiary means for the determination of international law. In this vein the decisions of 
treaty bodies on individual complaints against States could equally, and more suitably, serve as 
subsidiary means for the determination of this law. 
A joint Separate Opinion attached to the ICJ Judgment in Congo v. Rwanda (2006) made 
some important remarks about the case law of the human rights adjudicators.445 It pointed out, 
among others, that ‘the treaty bodies set up under certain United Nations conventions may well be 
central to the whole efficacy of those instruments’.446 It also drew attention to new trends discern-
able from the practice of human rights adjudicators, which ‘have not followed ‘the laissez faire’ 
approach to reservations attributed to the International Court’s Advisory Opinion of 1951’.447 
Significantly, it pointed out:  
“The practice of such bodies is not to be viewed as ‘making an exception’ to the law as 
determined in 1951 by the International Court; we take the view that it is rather a development 
to cover what the Court was never asked at that time, and to address new issues that have arisen 
subsequently”.448  
                                                                                                                       
treaty itself acquires a life of its own. “Consequently, in interpreting it we must have regard to the 
exigencies of contemporary life, rather than to the intentions of those who framed it”. ICJ 
Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United Nations, 
Advisory Opinion of 3 March 1950, Dissenting Opinion Judge M. Alvarez, p. 18. In other words, 
the ‘interpretation of treaties must not remain immutable’. Ibid. 
444 On the legal status of provisional measures see Chapter XVI. 
445 On the case law by the various human rights systems regarding Jurisdiction, admissibility and 
provisional measures in human rights adjudication see Chapter XIV. 
446 ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (new application: 2002) (DRC v. Rwanda), 
Judgment on jurisdiction of the Court and admissibility of the application of 3 February 2006, 
Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, §21. 
447 They referred to the practice of the European Court of Human Rights, the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee supervising the ICCPR, with its General 
Comment 24. 
448 Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, §16. 
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 CONCLUSION 
Part I provides the basis on which the development of the concept of provisional measures in 
human rights adjudication is examined. 
For conceptual reasons the ICJ’s use of provisional measures is relevant to the practice of 
the human rights adjudicators. The practice of the ICJ is discussed in Chapter I. The chapter 
found that the practice of the ICJ with regard to provisional measures shows that adjudicators not 
exclusively dealing with human rights may develop sensitivity for the plight of human beings 
caught up in conflicts between States. This has also helped develop the concept of provisional 
measures. In cases involving the fate of human beings the ICJ has ordered provisional measures 
overlapping to a great extent with the main claim. In other cases, but for the same reason, it has 
also relaxed the strict requirement that the Applicant State should not only specify the rights 
invoked in the context of the request for provisional measures, but that these should be related to 
the main claim as well. The ICJ has further taken into account the basic rights of the individual in 
its attitude towards procedural requirements for the use of provisional measures. Finally, when the 
case involves the fate of human beings the Court seems to be more resourceful in drafting Orders 
for provisional measures different from those requested: it refers to the obligations of both Parties 
and it adds the obligation not to aggravate the dispute, referring to its task in the maintenance of 
peace and security. 
From the practice of the ICJ three purposes of provisional measures may be perceived to 
prevent irreparable harm, namely to the claim, to the procedure or to individuals not central to the 
dispute. The question arises whether this is the case as well in the practice of the human rights 
adjudicators. This question is addressed in Part II.  
The ICJ’s finding in LaGrand that its provisional measures were legally binding is not made 
dependent on the fact that basic rights of the human person were involved, but is simply part of its 
traditional function. The power to indicate provisional measures was required by the object and 
purpose of Article 41 ICJ Statute and ‘based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for it, 
to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final judg-
ment of the Court’.1 The question arises whether the binding nature of provisional measures in 
human rights adjudication is dependent on the purpose of the specific provisional measures or 
equally applies across the board, even though the particularly serious nature of the harm to be 
prevented in some cases may have played a role in the finding provisional measures legally bind-
ing. This question is dealt with in Part III.  
Finally the practices developed by the human rights adjudicators with regard to provisional 
measures and discussed in the subsequent Parts in turn are relevant to the ICJ. After all the refer-
ence to ‘judicial decisions’ in Article 38(1)(d) of the ICJ Statute is not limited to ICJ case law 
alone. 
Chapter II of Part I discussed the use of provisional measures by the human rights adjudica-
tors in the context of the right to individual complaint. Human rights adjudicators have the inher-
ent authority to use provisional measures. If the human rights treaty also includes inter-State 
proceedings it should be possible to use provisional measures in these proceedings as well. As 
appears already from the practice before the ICJ, States may also institute proceedings (partly) 
involving human rights violations. Pending these proceedings the ICJ has also granted provisional 
                                                 
1 ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §102. 
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measures. The authority to use provisional measures includes the authority to use them proprio 
motu. Especially in cases in which potential beneficiaries are unable to contact the adjudicator 
directly, the adjudicator should be able to intervene on its own motion on the basis of other credi-
ble information. The inherent authority to order provisional measures, based on the principle of 
effective protection, also implies the possibility of delegation. Without the possibility to delegate 
the power to use provisional measures to one member of the court or adjudicatory body these 
measures will be deprived of their protective function. After all, various adjudicators only con-
vene periodically. Generally speaking over time the human rights adjudicators have improved the 
promptness with which they decide on provisional measures. They have done so indeed partly by 
introducing a mechanism of delegation and partly because of an improvement in rapid communi-
cation methods.  
This book emphasises the importance of motivation and accessibility of an adjudicator’s 
provisional measures. In most systems the transparency of decision-making on provisional meas-
ures is insufficient. The availability of information is not very balanced over the different bodies. 
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights publishes its decisions on provisional measures 
separately and these decisions are motivated. The other systems, however, offer virtually no 
explanations on the use of provisional measures. Their use is simply mentioned in the decision on 
the merits or inadmissibility. The unpublished letters to the parties informing them of decisions 
about provisional measures normally do not clarify the criteria for their use either. In addition, 
most adjudicators do not formally reject requests by petitioners to take provisional measures. 
Thus it is not possible to systematically trace failed attempts to convince them to take such meas-
ures. Systematic references to refusals to use provisional measures are only found in the decisions 
by the Inter-American Court, the Bosnia Chamber and, to some extent, the Committee against 
Torture. The lack of references by the other adjudicators is unfortunate because cases in which the 
petitioners failed to convince the adjudicators to take provisional measures could give particular 
insight into their approach to the concept. Accessibility, transparency, coherence and consistency 
in the use of provisional measures should be increased, among others by making public the deci-
sions and by including reasoning. One of the aims of this research is to assist in this process by 
collecting, systematizing and analysing the relevant information.  
The current lack of transparency in the practice of most adjudicators made an impact on the 
methodology used in this book. Given the breadth of systems and subject matters discussed, and 
as most provisional measures are not published, exhaustive discussion of the practice with regard 
to all subject matters dealt with by all the adjudicators when using provisional measures is not 
possible. It is not necessary either since this book takes an illustrative rather than an exhaustive 
approach. The cases discussed are selected because they are informative about a particular aspect 
of provisional measures. Typical cases are discussed providing insight into the features of provi-
sional measures that the various systems have in common. Similar cases are also mentioned in 
which other adjudicators confirmed the approach taken in these typical cases or in which they 
chose to take a different approach. The book also examines atypical cases (Chapter XI) in order to 
explore the outer limits of the concept. It makes reference mainly to those cases that are easily 
verifiable. An exception is made for the practice of the HRC because for several years it failed to 
mention its use of provisional measures in its final decision altogether. Without reference to 
information derived from the case files the practice discussed would not be representative. Be-
cause eventually an opportunity was offered to examine case files in Geneva on the Committee’s 
practice with regard to provisional measures it was decided to make the information retrieved 
more widely available in this book. 
In the context of requests by petitioners for provisional measures the systems are facing 
common problems and issues, which may sometimes result in converging interpretations, occa-
sionally consciously (often referred to as ‘dialogue’ or ‘cross-fertilization’), at other times more 
indirectly. Are the international and regional adjudicators moving towards a more uniform ap-
proach to the concept of provisional measures? This study aims to identify what, if any, is the 
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underlying interpretative approach as to the nature of provisional measures that the human rights 
adjudicators have in common. This is particularly relevant for the assessment of the provisional 
measures used by an adjudicator while its constituent treaty does not explicitly mention this pos-
sibility. As the adjudicators generally do not make explicit the rationale for using provisional 
measures, an attempt is made to derive it from their judgments on the merits and admissibility. 
The conclusions drawn with regard to a possible underlying interpretative approach are supported 
by the fact that this book also examines whether more than one system has used provisional 
measures in a given circumstance. As noted in the Introduction, when the underlying approaches 
of all adjudicators, as well as the specific practice of at least two of them converge, this study 
speaks of a common core.  
Awareness of convergence and divergence may enhance the understanding of the common 
core and outer limits of the current concept of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. 
As to the possible divergences in the approaches of the adjudicators with regard to provisional 
measures these are mainly due to the differences between the systems. These divergences are 
explored to clarify the use of provisional measures that are situated, as discussed in Chapter XII, 
on a continuum beyond the common core, but still within the outer limits of the concept. The 
question also arises whether (regional) context could fully determine the outer limits of the con-
cept of provisional measures in human rights cases or whether there are outer limits beyond which 
adjudicators cannot go in any system without depriving the concept of independent meaning. 
It may be more difficult to find a common understanding of legal concepts and achieve 
convergence in interpretation with regard to a large number of States from different regions of the 
world. Yet if all adjudicators have a similar interpretative approach to certain phenomena and 
legal texts, this would validate that interpretation for the time being.2 Cross-fertilization can make 
an interpretation more convincing and more coherent from the perspective of the development of 
a body of international case law. It is assumed that if the adjudicators indeed move towards a 
more uniform approach this will make the provisional measures more persuasive to domestic 
courts, the executive and the legislator. In addition it presumably is more ‘costly’ for a State’s 
image to ignore such provisional measures because of their enhanced legitimacy.  
Article 31(3)(c) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is particularly relevant 
as an expression of the aim of increasing coherence in the law applied to different subject matters. 
It reflects the principle of systemic integration, referring to ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’ as an element that must be taken into account with 
the context when interpreting a treaty provision. A presumption exists of consistency of the text to 
be interpreted with general international law, unless this would undermine the object and purpose 
of the system. 
The practice that has been developed by human rights adjudicators in the application of the 
human rights treaties subsequent to their entry into force is relevant when a given treaty is applied 
domestically, as well as when other international adjudicators refer to the provisions of that treaty. 
International adjudicators may do so either directly, as the ICJ has done in its Wall opinion, or in 
order to inform the meaning of the particular treaty they supervise. In both cases they consider the 
subsequent practice of the relevant treaty bodies as well. This is so either as law applicable in the 
relations between the parties or as the authoritative interpretation of a treaty provision that is 
conceptually similar, which interpretation could therefore serve as a source of inspiration or even 
indicate underlying general principles of law or interpretation.  
In addition, apart from the relevance of the subsequent practice developed by the adjudica-
tors to the interpretation of treaty provisions, ‘judicial decisions’ also constitute ‘subsidiary means 
for the determination of international law’ (Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute). These may be domestic 
                                                 
2 As noted, it is assumed that the concept of provisional measures is dynamic rather than frozen in 
time. 
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or international judicial decisions. The term ‘judicial decisions’ is used, rather than ‘court deci-
sions’. Judicial decisions potentially include the decisions made in individual cases by treaty 
monitoring bodies or WTO Panels. The argument is often made that such decisions are ‘quasi-
judicial’, but even if that is the case, what could be argued to be most relevant is the range of 
States whose obligations are covered by the interpretation, rather than the exact legal status of the 
findings. In other words, a decision of a domestic court, which may be binding on one particular 
State, certainly has less legal authority vis-à-vis other States, than the interpretation by a treaty 
monitoring body. Nevertheless, the findings by domestic courts and other domestic adjudicators 
may be used as subsidiary means for the determination of international law. In this vein the deci-
sions of treaty bodies on individual complaints against States could equally, and more suitably, 
serve as subsidiary means for the determination of this law. 
The subsequent Parts discuss the practice of the human rights adjudicators with regard to 
their use of provisional measures. Further dialogue about the concept within, as well as between 
the various systems, will undoubtedly enhance the quality and persuasiveness of provisional 
measures by human rights adjudicators. Meanwhile, for this research ‘information-rich’ cases 
have been selected in order to gain insight into the concept of provisional measures in human 
rights adjudication. Some of them relate to situations in which (almost) all human rights adjudica-
tors have used provisional measures, others concern unusual situations.  
By abstracting from individual cases and systems the subsequent chapters examine patterns 
with regard to the various aspects mentioned in the introduction and, if possible, point out best 
practices. As noted in the Introduction to this book, the latter are based on the following criteria: 
accessibility, motivation and consistency, responsiveness to the specific situation, consultation 
and follow-up. These criteria are selected as they are considered either to make provisional meas-
ures more convincing to the addressee State or to be necessary for the effectiveness of these 
measures in protecting the individual.  
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 INTRODUCTION 
Provisional measures in international human rights adjudication have been referred to as ‘a 
practical and necessary device for preventing irreversible harm to either party’s case such as the 
destruction of crucial evidence pertaining to the facts or danger to an individual applicant’s health 
and well-being (…). They are also important for ensuring that the proceedings of the case are 
properly handled’.1 As Cançado Trindade, judge at the Inter-American Court, has pointed out, in 
human rights law excessive formalism is unwarranted. In the past such formalism has sometimes 
given the impression that procedure was an end in itself, rather than a means to achieve justice, 
while in fact provisional measures are judicial guarantees of a preventive character. The concept 
is evolutive. The transposition of preventive measures from national to international law did not 
appear to have changed the object of provisional measures, at least not in interstate relations. Yet 
the most recent transposition from inter-State relations to international human rights law has 
indeed changed the purpose of provisional measures.2 
Part I, discussing the practice of the ICJ and ITLOS (Chapter I) and introducing the human 
rights systems dealt with in this book (Chapter II), provided the setting for a discussion of the 
purpose of provisional measures as used by the human rights adjudicators. 
The question arises whether the purpose of provisional measures used in the human rights 
systems differs from the purpose of such measures as applied by the ICJ and ITLOS. 
The ICJ has ordered provisional measures also when there would be no irreparable harm to 
the claim but instead to rights ‘collateral’ to the claim. It may be assumed that adjudicators 
specifically dealing with human rights may equally take provisional measures in such 
circumstances. Like the ICJ, the human rights adjudicators have generally invoked the traditional 
concept of ‘irreparable’ rather than ‘intolerable’ or ‘unendurable’ harm.3 As this Part will show, 
preventing irreparable harm is in fact the main purpose of the provisional measures by human 
rights adjudicators, while it is just one of the purposes of provisional measures in general 
international law.4 
There is less clarity, however, about the types of situations that would result in such harm. 
Adjudicators have used provisional measures in a wide variety of situations, generally without 
specifying their approach to the concept of irreparable harm. One question that arises, for 
instance, is whether they use provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to a wide range of 
human rights (referred to in this book as irreparable harm to the claim), or to prevent irreparable 
                                                 
1 Garry (2001), p. 404.  
2 The Inter-American Court now uses this argument, which was introduced by Cançado Trindade, 
in its Orders for provisional measures, see e.g. Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, Order 
of 24 November 2000, 12th Considering Clause, following the previous Order of the President in 
the same case, 9 October 2000, ninth Considering Clause and referring to the Order of the 
President in the Constitutional Court case (Peru), 7 April 2000, §§10-11. 
3 Elkind has pointed out with regard to the provisional measures by the ICJ, that these measures are 
necessary when the injury is ‘unendurable’ or ‘intolerable,’ rather than ‘irreparable’. The 
petitioner ‘cannot be expected to put up with it pending the outcome of the dispute’. Elkind 
(1981), p. 223. See further Chapter I (ICJ). Elkind’s terminology has not been adopted, but in fact 
it seems incorporated in the concept of irreparable harm as used by the adjudicators. 
4 See further Chapter I of this book. 
 Introduction  
206 
harm to a smaller range of human rights intimately related to basic conditions of life in dignity 
(referred to in this book as irreparable harm to persons). 
Most constituent documents or Rules of Procedure for different adjudicators have specified 
irreparable harm simply as harm to the victim of the alleged violation.5 The criterion for the Inter-
American Court specifically is to prevent irreparable harm to persons.6 This is also the relevant 
criterion for the Inter-American Commission.7 The Protocol to the African Charter, instituting an 
African Court, applies a similar reference.8  
The Rules of Procedure of the ECtHR (and the former Commission), on the other hand, do 
not refer to irreparable harm at all. Instead the Rule on provisional measures is formulated 
broadly: ‘any interim measure, the adoption of which seems desirable in the interest of the parties 
or the proper conduct of the proceedings before it’. Rule 111 of the Rules of Procedure of the 
African Commission has it both ways. In the first paragraph it refers to avoiding ‘irreparable 
damage being caused to the victim’ and in the second to ‘any interim measures, the adoption of 
which seems desirable in the interest of the parties or the proper conduct of the proceedings 
before it’.  
While Annex 6 of the Dayton Peace Agreement specifically includes an entry on 
provisional measures, it gives no indication of their purpose and the text of the Rule on 
provisional measures in the Chamber’s Rules of Procedure is taken from the Rules of Procedure 
of the ECtHR. This means that the text does not specify the type of situations in which the Bosnia 
Chamber is expected to take provisional measures. 
On the basis of the wording of the Rules on provisional measures of the ECtHR and the 
European Commission one may conclude that many circumstances could give rise to their use of 
provisional measures. In practice, however, both adjudicators have interpreted this provision 
rather strictly. They have taken provisional measures mostly in cases of imminent expulsion or 
extradition involving prima facie evidence of a real risk of torture, inhuman treatment or life 
                                                 
5 For the HRC the Rule on provisional measures speaks of avoiding ‘irreparable damage to the 
victim of the alleged violation’ (Rule 92/Rule 86 old). Both Rule 108(1) of CAT’s Rules of 
Procedure and Article 5 of the Optional Protocol to the Women’s Convention speak of avoiding 
irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged violations. CERD does so as well, only 
more circumspectly. Rule 94(3) of CERD’s Rules of Procedure refers to avoiding ‘possible 
irreparable damage to the person or persons who claim to be victim(s) of the alleged violation’. 
The African Commission also speaks of avoiding irreparable damage ‘to the victim of the alleged 
violation’ (Rule 111 Rules of Procedure). 
6 Article 63(2) ACHR. 
7 “In serious and urgent cases, and whenever necessary according to the information available, the 
Commission may, on its own initiative or at the request of a Party, request that the state 
concerned adopt precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons”. The 
significance of the comma, followed by the word ‘and’ is unclear. It may be that the Commission 
can order precautionary measures both in ‘serious and urgent cases’ and ‘whenever necessary 
according to the information available’. In any case, the precautionary measures still aim at the 
prevention of irreparable harm to persons. It is not clear how ‘urgent cases’ are clarified by the 
addition of ‘and whenever necessary according to the information available’ and by the addition 
of ‘serious’ nor is it clear whether the Commission intends to extend or restrict the possibility to 
take precautionary measures. See Rule 25. 
8 Article 27(2) OP to the ACHPR: “In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary 
to avoid irreparable harm to persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems 
necessary”. Article 35 of the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights (2008) does not include this reference, probably because the power to order provisional 
measures is broader because the provision applies to both the Human Rights Section and to the 
General Affairs Section. 
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threatening situation in the receiving State.9 Yet it turns out that, based on the same text, the 
Bosnia Chamber has in addition used provisional measures to halt forced eviction.10 
Chapter II, introducing the human rights systems, pointed out that the Inter-American Court 
is the only adjudicator that publishes its provisional measures as well as motivates them. In 
addition, even though the Inter-American Commission does not publish its precautionary 
measures themselves, it does publish in its Annual Report a yearly overview of its practice in 
using thesemeasures. Moreover, in its decisions on the merits it adds a brief explanation of its use 
of precautionary measures. It appears, furthermore, that like the Inter-American Court in its 
Orders, the Commission does motivate, to some extent, the measures themselves in its Notes 
Verbales to the Addressee States. Generally the Commission points out in its letter to the 
petitioner informing it about the precautionary measures taken vis-à-vis the State that it considers 
necessary the adoption of concrete measures, with an urgent character, in order to protect the life 
and personal integrity of certain people, often mentioned by name. Sometimes it refers to a 
particular group of people. Such letter also notes that the precautionary measure is without 
prejudice to other actions deemed pertinent by the government.11 The Commission considers that 
all concrete measures ‘need be’ or ‘must be’12 adopted urgently13 in order to protect the personal 
integrity and the life of the persons mentioned.14 
The other human rights adjudicators neither publish nor motivate their provisional 
measures. In a few situations the HRC has provided information about its approach towards 
provisional measures, but generally this must be derived from the context as apparent from its 
decisions on the merits. The object and purpose of a treaty, the essence of a right and the 
prevention of irreparable harm are issues that are closely related. Hence when discussing the 
HRC’s practice with regard to the use of provisional measures it is helpful to refer to its General 
Comments dealing with the issue of reservations, states of emergency and the meaning of Article 
2 ICCPR (general legal obligations). These may help determine which actions or omissions it 
would consider to cause irreparable harm. The HRC emphasises, for instance, that limitations of 
rights may in no case ‘be applied or invoked in a manner that would impair the essence of a 
Covenant right’.15 In its General Comment on Article 4 ICCPR (states of emergency) it affirmed 
that Articles 6 (right to life) and 7 (prohibition of torture and cruel treatment) are non-derogable. 
It pointed out that the inclusion in the Covenant of these rights as rights that could not be 
derogated from even during emergency situations was recognition of the peremptory nature of 
these rights.16 In other words, the Committee qualifies these rights as rules of ius cogens. This 
statement may also reflect its awareness of the irreparable nature of violations of these rights.  
                                                 
9 Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. 
10 See Chapter XI on halting mass expulsion and forced eviction. 
11 Information derived from viewing several such letters at the Offices of the NGO CEJIL in 
Washington, DC (October 2001) and San Jose, Costa Rica (December 2001). Most cases involve 
a request to the government to protect certain people against threats to their life or physical 
integrity.  
12 The Commission uses phrases like: ‘que deben adoptarse’ or ‘considera necesaria’. 
13 The phrase used is ‘con carácter urgente’. 
14 In such cases the Commission also seeks that the government takes timely measures for the 
immediate investigation of the denounced acts so as to identify and punish those responsible. See 
further Chapter XIII (Protection and reparation).  
15 See HRC General Comment No. 24 on reservations, 4 November 1994; General Comment No. 
29 on states of emergency, 24 July 2001 and General Comment No. 31, ‘The nature of the 
general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant’ (on Article 2), 29 March 
2004.  
16 HRC General Comment 29 on Article 4 (states of emergency), 31 August 2001, §11. 
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The following statement gives some indication as to the Committee’s approach to the 
purpose of provisional measures. 
“Flouting of the Rule, especially by irreversible measures such as the execution of the alleged 
victim or his/her deportation from the country undermines the protection of Covenant rights 
through the Optional Protocol”.17 
The statement emphasises the importance of provisional measures for the prevention of actions of 
an irreversible nature. It is not clear whether the use of the word 'especially' means that the 
Committee could also use provisional measures in contexts not constituting irreversibility. It is 
clear, however, that flouting its provisional measures would always undermine the protection, 
through the Optional Protocol, of Covenant rights and especially in cases in which the provisional 
measures were intended to halt irreversible measures.  
Beyond such specific statements, information about the purpose of the provisional measures 
by the relevant adjudicators and the precise protection required must be derived from the claims, 
the findings on the merits18 and the recommendations for reparation.19  
The HRC has pointed out that provisional measures are essential to the Committee’s role 
under the OP.20 Its general reference to the obligation of States not to frustrate its consideration of 
a case21 may be seen as an obligation not to harm the procedure, but it does not indicate whether 
this obligation eventually relates to harm to the person or the claim. The reference, on the other 
hand, to the obligation not to prevent the HRC from expressing its Views22 may be seen as an 
obligation not to cause irreparable harm to the claim.  
In Mamatkulov (2005) the ECtHR pointed out: “Even before the provisions regulating the 
question of interim measures came into force, the Commission had not hesitated to ask respondent 
Governments for a stay of execution of measures liable to make the application pending before it 
devoid of purpose”.23 This statement from the European system equally seems to refer to 
preventing irreparable harm to the claim. 
Part II examines whether in practice the irreparable harm to be prevented is harm to the 
claim or to persons. Even if irreparable harm to the victim of the alleged violation (the criterion 
for the international adjudicators and the African Commission) is understood as irreparable harm 
to persons (the criterion for the Inter-American Commission and Court and the African Court), 
this in itself does not clarify the types of situations in which the adjudicators would use 
provisional measures to prevent such harm. Part II discusses those situations in which most 
human rights adjudicators have used provisional measures on the one hand and those that are 
specific mainly to one system on the other. It analyses known instances of provisional measures 
in a variety of situations, examining what type of urgent action the adjudicator has undertaken 
and, if there is no explicit reference to provisional measures, whether this action may nevertheless 
amount to such measures. Occasionally, it also refers to situations in which provisional measures 
would have been feasible or in which petitioners unsuccessfully requested them.24  
                                                 
17 HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000, 
§5.4. 
18 See further section 3 in the Chapters III-XI. 
19 See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
20 See e.g. HRC Dante Piandiong et al., 19 October 2000, §5.4. 
21 Id., §5.2. 
22 Id., §5.1. 
23 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, §106. 
24 Clearly, decisions by the adjudicators not to use provisional measures could help clarify their 
approach towards the concept of these measures, in particular their outer limits. Public 
information about such decisions, however, is rare. 
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All chapters pay attention to the relationship between provisional measures and the merits 
of the relevant cases. After all, the question arises whether provisional measures should be taken 
in cases in which a finding of a violation is unlikely. This does not relate to evidentiary 
requirements alone, an issue discussed in Chapter XV on assessment of risk, but also to 
substantive issues. If the adjudicators would never find on the merits that States have obligations 
under these articles, the purpose of provisional measures could not be preventing irreparable harm 
to the claim. Their purpose would only be the protection of the right of individual petition as such.  
The argument in this book rests on the assumption that provisional measures are taken to 
prevent a violation from taking place or to stop a continuing violation. Thus, for cases in which 
provisional measures have been requested, it is important to establish what type of obligations the 
adjudicators have found on the merits, in order to see whether an order to take provisional 
measures pending the proceedings may be justified by the case law on the merits. The question 
must be addressed whether there is an apparent right and whether its violation would result in 
irreparable harm.  
Another assumption in this book is that provisional measures are aimed at ensuring that if 
the adjudicator would subsequently find that a given act or omission would constitute a violation, 
the most adequate form of reparation could still be implemented.  
The term ‘irreparable’ appears to be the generic term applied in the context of provisional 
measures. Yet it is argued that a distinction must be made between irreversible harm to the claim 
(or procedure), on the one hand and irreparable harm to the person(s) involved on the other. The 
subsequent chapters will clarify this distinction. The destruction of a painting, for instance, is 
discussed as irreversible harm to the claim of the artist not to have it destroyed.25 The destruction 
of evidence is discussed as an example of irreversible harm to the procedure.26 Part II argues that 
in certain cases irreversible harm to the claim in fact would constitute irreparable harm to persons 
as well.27 Moreover, in some cases irreversible harm to the procedure would equally constitute 
irreparable harm to persons, albeit to persons other than the petitioner.28 This book will argue that 
the use of provisional measures to prevent acts that are reversible is beyond the outer limits of the 
concept of provisional measure, while their use to prevent acts that are not only irreversible, but 
also irreparable is more likely to fall within the core common to the practice of all human rights 
adjudicators. Violations of rights causing irreparable harm must be prevented since a return to the 
status quo ante is impossible after the irreversible has taken place (irreversibility), while the 
nature of the harm implies that such violations can never be repaired by financial compensation 
(irreparability).  
In order to establish the common core and outer limits of the concept of provisional 
measures currently applied by human rights adjudicators Part II discusses a selection of cases in 
which the human rights adjudicators have referred to the use of provisional measures.  
Separate chapters are devoted to those situations in which the use of provisional measures 
by human rights adjudicators seems widespread, or in which their use is at least more than 
incidental, as long as more than one adjudicator has used them in that situation. Examples of 
situations in which only one system has used them are all discussed together in one chapter. Yet 
apart from the practice of the adjudicators with regard to the actual use of provisional measures, 
their practice with regard to the case law on the merits is deemed relevant as well, in order to 
establish the underlying rationale that the use of provisional measures may have in common. 
In order to clarify the development of the concept, the selection of cases discussed covers 
the range of human rights claims in the context of which provisional measures are known to have 
been used or refused. Examples that could have particular relevance to an international context of 
                                                 
25 See Chapter XII, section 2.11. 
26 See Chapter XII, section 2.10.  
27 See Chapters III-XI. 
28 See Chapter IX on protecting against death threats and harassment. 
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counterterrorism measures are referred to as well. Moreover, cases were selected involving 
individual as well as collective beneficiaries of provisional measures and State obligations to act 
as well as to abstain from acting. 
Part II starts with Chapter III on provisional measures to halt executions, Chapter IV on 
provisional measures to halt corporal punishment and Chapter V on provisional measures to halt 
expulsion or extradition in non-refoulement cases. They show that such measures have been used 
by all relevant adjudicators, not just in the post 2001 counter-terrorism era but already from the 
inception of the individual complaint proceedings. Chapters VI (Locating and protecting 
disappeared persons) and VII (Intervening timely in detention situations involving risks to health 
and dignity) discuss provisional measures to protect the life and personal integrity of persons in 
(secret) detention. Again, from the start human rights adjudicators have used provisional 
measures is such circumstances, but their current relevance is evident as well. A less obvious type 
of provisional measures, incidentally used by some adjudicators, involves respect for procedural 
rights such as due process in detention. Chapter VIII discusses this practice and shows that in fact 
these measures have only been used in cases ultimately aimed at the protection of life and 
personal integrity.  
While Chapters III to VIII all involve the protection of persons that already are under the 
physical control of government authorities (in some form of detention), Chapter IX deals with the 
protection of persons that generally are not (yet) detained but whose lives and personal integrity 
are at risk because of their views, activities or belonging to a particular group. It discusses the 
practice, firmly established in the Inter-American system, of ordering provisional measures to 
protect against death threats and harassment. It notes that more recently most other adjudicators 
have begun to use such provisional measures as well, the ECtHR being the last. This Chapter 
argues that in the European system this type of provisional measure is indeed warranted as well. 
Death threats do not just take place outside of the Council of Europe. Certain of the member 
States of this organisation also fail to protect persons against death threats and harassment. Some 
governments refer to the ‘war on terror’ in order to justify labelling human rights defenders, 
journalists and others as ‘enemies of the State’. This makes these people vulnerable to threats and 
attacks against their lives and physical integrity.  
Chapters X and XI discuss provisional measures of a different type. They are different 
because they partly involve collective rights and because strictly speaking they do not relate to the 
right to life and personal integrity. Chapter X deals with the practice, established in some systems, 
of ordering provisional measures for the protection of (indigenous) cultural and religious rights. 
Chapter XI discusses the (limited) practice, developed in the Americas and by the Bosnia 
Chamber, to halt mass or arbitrary expulsion and forced eviction.  
Chapter XII deals with the continuum between common core and outer limits of the concept 
of provisional measures by discussing examples of situations in which only one human rights 
adjudicator has used provisional measures as well as some examples of cases in which 
adjudicators have explicitly refused to use them.  
The last chapter of Part II discusses the relation between the substance of the provisional 
measures on the one hand (e.g. act or abstention) and the measures or forms of reparation that 
could possibly be ordered upon an eventual finding of a violation (Chapter XIII) on the other 
hand. This chapter also discusses some issues with regard to the beneficiaries of provisional 
measures.29  
Based on common elements relevant to the concept of provisional measures in human rights 
cases, the Conclusion to be found at the end of this Part presents a theoretical framework for the 
purpose of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. It clarifies the meaning of 
                                                 
29 It also briefly refers to the addressees of provisional measures. The official responses of 
addressee States are discussed in Chapter XVII. 
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irreparable harm to the claim, persons or the procedure and indicates which of them is crucial to 
the use of provisional measures in human rights adjudication.  
While the conclusions to the individual chapters already take the first step in this respect, 
the Conclusion to Part II argues more closely what types of provisional measures belong to the 
common core, what types may be situated somewhere beyond the common core but still within 
the outer limits and what currently constitute the outer limits of the concept.  
It combines theoretical with practical criteria. While the argument is based on what seems 
to be a common underlying rationale for the use of provisional measures in human rights 
adjudication, this book qualifies as belonging to the common core those types of provisional 
measures that not only share the underlying common rationale but are also actually used by more 
than one adjudicator. 
Thus, with regard to the purpose of provisional measures the Conclusion to Part II indeed 
presents the current common core of the concept as well as its outer limits, applying the criteria of 
irreversible and irreparable harm.  
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 CHAPTER III 
 HALTING EXECUTIONS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The international and regional human rights adjudicators dealing with a range of human rights 
have all used provisional measures to halt executions.1 Even the ICJ, which does not have a spe-
cific human rights function, has made use of provisional measures to halt executions.2 This chap-
ter discusses the practice of the human rights adjudicators in this regard. The issue of prejudgment 
discussed in Chapter I (ICJ) is also relevant in the practice of the human rights adjudicators. 
Provisional measures to halt an execution serve as an example. Thus this chapter deals with the 
issue of prejudgment as well. The subsequent chapters on provisional measures used in specific 
situations will not return to this issue as no new aspects are highlighted in the case law regarding 
those situations. 
The question arises whether provisional measures should be taken in cases in which a find-
ing of a violation is unlikely. This does not relate to evidentiary requirements alone,3 but also to 
substantive issues. As noted in the introduction to Part II, the argument in this book rests on the 
assumption that there is a link between provisional measures and the possible decision on the 
merits. In this approach the first question to be dealt with is whether certain conduct would consti-
tute a violation of any of the treaty provisions invoked or at least whether the rights invoked are 
capable of being interpreted such that a violation could be concluded. If not, this book argues that 
the use of provisional measures would be inappropriate.  
The next question, which is addressed in Chapter XIII, is whether a violation of the rights 
invoked would result in the impossibility of an appropriate form of reparation. In other words, 
could such violations constitute irreparable harm? If answered in the affirmative this would war-
rant the use of provisional measures in order to prevent or halt these violations.4 
Most of the practice discussed in section 2 is based on provisional measures only mentioned 
in the decisions on the merits, but not published separately. One reason for discussing decisions 
on the merits to help explain the use of provisional measures (section 3) thus is the fact that these 
decisions constitute the only information publicly available. This chapter concludes by discussing 
available information on the relationship between provisional measures and the decision on the 
merits. 
                                                 
1 Even for the specialized treaty bodies (CAT, CEDAW, CERD) an intervention would be feasible 
in the context of a death sentence based on statements extracted under torture or based on a 
discriminatory trial.  
2 ICJ Case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 
April 1998 (Breard case); LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 27 June 2001; Avena and other 
Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003 and Interpretation Avena, Order of 
16 July 2008, as discussed in Chapter I. 
3 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
4 See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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2 PRACTICE 
2.1 Introduction 
Provisional measures to halt executions have been used in all three regional human rights 
systems, as well as by the HRC.5 The European Commission was the first to use them, as 
discussed under the next heading. The African Commission6 and the Bosnia Chamber have used 
provisional measures to halt executions as well.7 The HRC and the Inter-American Commission 
and Court, finally, have used provisional measures to halt the execution of a great number of 
persons. While briefly referring to the European system first, this section takes as a point of 
reference the practices of the HRC and the Inter-American Commission and Court. 
2.2 ECHR 
The first known example of a provisional measure to halt an execution dates from 1957. The 
European Commission on Human Rights sent an urgent request to the Government of the United 
Kingdom not to execute Nicholaos Sampson, a twenty-two year old journalist from Cyprus, until 
it had been fully informed of the circumstances of the case.8 Under the provisions of the Emer-
gency Regulations the Nicosia Special Court had sentenced him to death for carrying firearms.9 
                                                 
5 The other specialized UN conventions (ICAT, CEDAW and ICERD) do not deal specifically 
with the death penalty. 
6 See e.g. ACHPR (African Commission) Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Akamu and 
Others) v. Nigeria, provisional measure of 22 October 1991; Constitutional Rights Project (in 
respect of Lekwot and 6 others) v. Nigeria, provisional measure of 16 February 1993; 
International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa Jr. and 
Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, provisional measure somewhere between 2 and 9 
November 1995 (secret execution 10 November 1995); Avocats sans Frontières (on behalf of 
Bwampamye) v. Burundi, provisional measure of 13 December 1999; Interights et al. (on behalf 
of Mariette Bosch) v. Botswana, provisional measures of 27 March 2001 (execution on 31 March 
2001) and Interights (on behalf of Husaini et al.) v. Nigeria, provisional measures of 6 and 8 
February 2002 (also sent to the African Union). 
7 See Bosnia Chamber Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH, provisional measure of 16 December 1996; 
Nail Rizvanović v. Fed.BiH, provisional measure of 2 September 1997 and Borislav Herak v. 
Fed. BiH, provisional measure of 10 November 1997. 
8 See also Chapter II (Systems). 
9 Earlier he had been found not guilty of the murder of a police sergeant. The previous year the 
Government of Greece had lodged a complaint against the UK in connection with Cyprus. In the 
beginning of July the Commission received an urgent letter by Greece pointing out that 
Sampson’s execution appeared imminent. Letter by the Agent of the Greek Government, 1st July 
1957, also mentioning that this case has ‘deeply stirred the population of the island, which is 
apparently very anxious and disturbed about the fate of the young journalist’. EComHR 
Application of the ECHR to the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. UK), 26 September 1958 (Article 31 
report), p. 33. It was on that day that the Sub-Commission intervened. During the hearings, in 
July 1957, President of the Commission drew the attention to this decision. “In addition, the Sub-
commission received on 1st July 1957 an urgent letter from the Agent of the Greek Government 
regarding the case of Nicolas Sampson. This letter gave rise to the Sub-commission’s decision of 
the same day, a Decision which has already been communicated to you. The Sub-Commission 
desired to be thoroughly informed of the facts of the case”. EComHR Application of the ECHR to 
the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. UK), 26 September 1958 (Article 31 report), p. 37. 
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The Commission stated it decided to make this request in order to prevent ‘any irreparable act’.10 
The UK did not carry out the execution. 
The next time the European Commission intervened to halt an execution was equally in an 
inter-State case but this time it was to halt an execution by Greece itself. In 1970, during the 
Greek Colonels’ regime, the Acting President of the Commission requested the State not to exe-
cute any of the 34 suspects in a criminal case during the proceedings before the Commission.11 
The executions did not take place. 
The Convention organs did not have to intervene in death penalty cases anymore until the 
Court was faced with the case of Öcalan v. Turkey. In 1999 it ordered Turkey not to execute 
Öcalan during the proceedings before it.12 At the time this State was the only original member of 
the Council of Europe that still retained the death penalty. It abolished it in 2002.  
2.3 Inter-American Commission and Court 
At least since the early 1990s the Inter-American Commission makes use of precautionary meas-
ures to halt executions.13 An example is its first precautionary measure on behalf of Shaka 
Sankofa, at the time still called Gary Graham.14 This is one of the many cases before the Commis-
                                                 
10 See EComHR Application of the ECHR to the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. UK), 26 September 
1958 (Article 31 report), p. 34 (the death sentence should not be carried out until the Sub-
commission had been fully informed as to the facts of the case and had had the opportunity to 
present its observations). The European Commission did not have a Rule on provisional measures 
at the time. See generally Chapter XVII on official responses. See also Eissen (1969), p. 254 and 
p. 258. The death sentenceof Nikolaos (or Nikos) Sampson was commuted to a life sentence, to 
be served in the UK. Later he received amnesty and when Cyprus gained formal independence 
from the UK in 1960, he returned. In 1974 he was installed as President of Cyprus by a coup 
d'état staged by Greek-Cypriot nationalists and remained so for eight days, until the Turkish 
invasion of Northern Cyprus. He was sentenced to a prison term, which for medical reasons he 
was allowed to serve in France (Encyclopedia Brittannica 2001). He did not serve this sentence 
and upon return to Cyprus in 1990 he was briefly detained. In March 1992 he brought a case 
before the European Commission for a violation of Article 5 ECHR: Sampson v. Cyprus, 9 May 
1994 (inadm.). 
11 On 8 April 1970 the public Prosecutor requested the death penalty for Karageorgas. The 
European Commission used informal provisional measures on 11 April, requesting Greece to 
suspend the execution of the death sentences against the thirty-four accused persons. On 12 April 
the domestic court sentenced Karageorgas to life imprisonment. See Partial Decision of the 
Commission as to the admissibility of the application, The Second Greek case (Denmark, Norway 
and Sweden v. Greece), 5 October 1970, §11. Both cases and both requests for provisional 
measures were brought before the Commission by States, under the State complaint procedure 
(former Article 24 ECHR), rather than by individuals under the individual complaint procedure 
(former Article 25 ECHR). 
12 ECtHR Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005 (second provisional measure of 30 
November 1999 in order to stay the execution (first provisional measure: access to his Turkish 
counsel, see press release 4 March 1999). 
13 As discussed in Chapter II the Inter-American Commission’s provisional measures are called 
‘precautionary measures’. 
14 CIDH Gary T. Graham, now known as Shaka Sankofa v. US, 15 June 2000 (adm.). The initial 
petition was of 26 April 1993 by the International Human Rights Law Clinic at the Washington 
College of Law, American University. The state of Texas had first scheduled him to be executed 
on 29 April 1993. On 27 April 1993 the Commission sent a note to the Governor of Texas 
requesting a stay. His execution was subsequently stayed ‘as a consequence of various domestic 
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sion involving the US death penalty. It was a case involving juvenile death penalty and a credible 
claim of innocence. In October 1993 the Commission took precautionary measures noting that the 
beneficiary was 17 years old at the time of the offence for which he was sentenced to death, that 
his case ‘dealt with the most important right, the right to life, and a mistake on the part of the 
authorities could result in irreparable harm’.15  
In October 2004 the US Supreme Court decided that the Constitution did not allow the exe-
cution of offenders who were below the age of 18 when their crimes were committed.16 Until that 
time the Inter-American Commission had continued to take precautionary measures to halt the 
execution of juvenile offenders. In February 2002, for instance, it did so on behalf of Alexander 
Williams whose execution by the State of Georgia was scheduled for the next day. It alleged that 
the execution of a person who was below the age of eighteen when he committed the offence 
would violate his right to life under Article I of the American Declaration. Moreover, it would 
also violate fundamental norms of customary law.17 
Another case involving the US relates to the federal death penalty. In Garza the Inter-
American Commission took precautionary measures and in its admissibility decision (2001) it 
held that the failure of an OAS Member State ‘to take steps to preserve a condemned man’s life 
while his case was being reviewed by the Commission was inconsistent with the state’s basic 
human rights obligations’.18 It also took precautionary measures on behalf of Victor Saldaño, an 
Argentine citizen sentenced to death in Texas. His Hispanic background had been taken into 
account in determining ‘future dangerousness’.19 Despite the fact that the US generally does not 
respect the Commission’s precautionary measures, many individuals and NGOs in the US con-
                                                                                                                       
legal proceedings’. His first new execution date had been set for 3 June 1993. On 1 June the 
Commission again requested the Governor to stay his execution. The Commission formally 
opened his case on 3 August 1993 and transmitted the pertinent parts of the petition to the State. 
On the same day it requested the Governor of Texas once more to suspend the execution. During 
a hearing on 4 October the petitioners requested the Commission to take precautionary measures 
pursuant to Article 29(2) of its Regulations. This may lead to the conclusion that the petitioners 
(and the Commission itself) considered the notes the Commission sent before only as informal 
precautionary measures. 
15 CIDH Gary T. Graham, now known as Shaka Sankofa v. US, 15 June 2000 (adm.), §15. He was 
executed on 22 June 2000. 
16 US Supreme Court, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). This ruling affected 72 juvenile 
offenders in 12 US states. Between 1985 and 2003 Texas executed 13 juvenile offenders, 
Virginia 3 and Oklahoma 2. South Carolina, Florida, Georgia and Missouri each executed one 
person who was below 18 at the time of the offence. 
17 Several days after it received the initial petition, on 6 December 2000, the Commission issued 
precautionary measures for the first time in order to investigate his claim. It reiterated these on 15 
February 2002 and again on 19 February, the day before the scheduled execution. 
18 CIDH Juan Raúl Garza v. US, 4 April 2001 (adm.). 
19 On 5 June 2000 the US Supreme Court revoked his death sentence and returned his case to the 
Texas Court of Criminal Appeals. By letter of 10 November 2000 the US informed the 
Commission that it had received information from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals about a 
public hearing that would be held on 30 December 2000, later postponed until 8 February 2001, 
Annual Report 2000, §50. This Court has since affirmed his death sentence finding that, among 
others, the confession of error by the prosecutor in his case, in admitting expert testimony at the 
sentencing face that race or ethnicity was a factor in determining future dangerousness, did not 
permit it on remand to consider the admissibility of that testimony as the defendant should have 
objected against the use of this expert testimony at trial, Saldaño v. State, 70 S.W. 3d 873 (Tex. 
Crim. App. 2002) (13 March 2002).  
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tinue to resort to it.20 It is the only international adjudicator that examines complaints against the 
US.21 
The Commission has dealt with many death penalty cases, mainly from the United States 
and Trinidad and Tobago, but also with regard to Guatemala, Jamaica, Grenada and the Bahamas. 
Of the Caribbean States, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago are the most notable. The Commission 
has requested a stay of execution in many cases ‘so that it could investigate thoroughly the 
charges made in connection with the case and the presumed violation’ of their fundamental 
rights.22 It has also formulated the rationale for the use of the precautionary measures by stating 
that executing petitioners before the Commission has been able to examine their claims would 
cause irreparable harm.23 
Apart from Guatemala and Barbados, and initially Trinidad and Tobago, none of the death 
penalty States in the Americas have recognised the jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court. In 
1998 the Court ordered provisional measures for the first time in order to halt executions on be-
half of several persons from Trinidad and Tobago, whose cases were pending before the Commis-
sion.24 Trinidad had recognised the Court’s jurisdiction in 1991 and withdrew its recognition in 
May 1998.25 The Court has since dealt with one situation involving Barbados26 and two involving 
Guatemala, currently the only State in Latin America imposing the death penalty.27 
                                                 
20 See Chapter II on the obligations of OAS States under the American Declaration. See also 
Chapter XVII on the official responses of addressee States. 
21 The US has not ratified the OP recognising the right of individual complaint under the ICCPR. It 
has not ratified the ACHR either. The Inter-American Commission deals with complaints against 
the US on the bases of the US obligations under the OAS Charter, including the American 
Declaration. See further Chapter II (Systems) and XVI (Legal status). 
22 For CIDH Annual Report 1997 see e.g. Neville Lewis, Case 11.825, 20 November 1997; Leroy 
Lamey, Case 11.826, 20 November 1997; Peter Blaine, Case 11.827, 19 November 1997. 
23 See e.g. CIDH Denton Aitkin v. Jamaica (2 May 2000) and Dave Sewell (4 December 2000), 
Annual Report 2000, §§38-39. 
24 It had previously taken precautionary measures on their behalf but these proved unsuccessful. 
The provisional measures can be found as the James et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago cases. In 2002 
the Court issued its Judgment in Hilaire, Constantine et al. and Benjamin et al. Not all 
beneficiaries protected under the James et al. Order for provisional measures are included in this 
Judgment of 21 June 2002. This book discusses this Judgment to the extent it may clarify the 
purpose of provisional measures. See section 4 of this Chapter. See further Chapter XIV 
(Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
25 See Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
26 IACHR Case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados, Judgment of 20 November 2007 (ordering, among 
others, a commutation of the death sentence of the victim that was still facing the death penalty, 
in order to guarantee the non-repetition of the violations of the rights addressed in the judgment, 
§127). See the previous Orders for provisional measures of 25 November 2004 and 14 June 2005. 
In the judgment the Court referred to these measures as follows: “The Court had ordered the State 
to adopt provisional measures on behalf of all four victims for the purpose of preserving their 
“lives and physical integrity […] so as not to hinder the processing of their cases before the Inter-
American system” (supra, paras. 31-33). Since their cases have now reached this Tribunal, which 
has already analyzed violations of the American Convention by Barbados to their detriment in 
accordance with its contentious jurisdiction, the Court considers that the purpose of the 
provisional measures has been met. In light of the above, and further considering that Mr. Atkins 
passed away in 2005, that Messrs. Boyce and Joseph’s death sentences have been commuted to 
life in prison, and that the Court has ordered the State to formally commute the death sentence of 
Mr. Huggins, this Court hereby lifts the provisional measures ordered on behalf of all of the 
victims. Accordingly, the Tribunal considers that the State’s obligations within the framework of 
these procedural measures are superseded by those that are ordered in the present Judgment as of 
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In its Orders for provisional measures the Court generally refers to Article 1(1) ACHR, stat-
ing that this article ‘imposes on States Parties the obligation to respect the rights and freedoms set 
out in that treaty and to ensure to all persons subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise 
of the said rights and freedoms’.28 Moreover, ‘as the Court has repeatedly held, it is the responsi-
bility of the State to adopt measures to protect all persons subject to its jurisdiction’29 and ‘this 
duty is particularly compelling in the case of persons currently the subject of a proceeding before 
the supervisory organs of the American Convention’.30 
In Orders involving death penalty cases it also considers that ‘if the State were to execute 
the alleged victims, this would lead to an irreparable situation, as well as constitute conduct in-
compatible with the object and purpose of the Convention’.31 
In his Concurring Opinion to the Court’s Order to halt executions in James et al. Cançado 
Trindade elaborated on the ‘eminently preventive dimension’ of the Court’s provisional measures. 
He pointed out that the constitutive elements of provisional measures (extreme gravity and ur-
gency on the one hand and the prevention of irreparable harm to persons on the other) to date 
were ‘present and persistent’ in this case. These elements ‘transform the provisional measures of 
protection into a true jurisdictional guarantee of preventive character’.32 
In light of the constitutive elements of provisional measures and their legal nature Cançado 
disagreed with ‘the doctrinal trend which beholds in the provisional measures ordered by the 
Inter-American Court at the request of the Commission measures of an exceptional order, to be 
restrictively interpreted by virtue of their innovating character’.33 He considers this doctrinal trend 
to be static and conservative.34 It is difficult to see how provisional measures could still have an 
innovative character, as he claims, in such an approach. He may mean that scholars normally tend 
to take a cautious approach to the use of provisional measures, cherishing their exceptional char-
acter exactly because the protection required in those measures is indeed innovative. In that light, 
his statement indicates his belief that such measures should, contrary to this trend, nevertheless be 
ordered more often and in new types of situations as well. 
2.4 HRC 
The great majority of provisional measures by the HRC deals with the death penalty. More than 
160 cases were examined in which the HRC used provisional measures in the context of this 
                                                                                                                       
the date of its notification”. IACHR Case of Boyce et al. v. Barbados, Judgment of 20 November 
2007, §129. 
27 Guatemala accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction on 9 March 1987. 
28 See e.g. IACHR Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, Order of 25 November 2004. 
29 See e.g. IACHR Raxcacó et al. v. Guatemala, Order of 30 August 2004, 5th ‘Considering’ clause 
and Sarayaku Indigenous Community v. Ecuador, Order of 6 July 2004, 4th ‘Considering’ clause. 
30 IACHR Raxcacó et al. v. Guatemala, Order of 30 August 2004, 5th ‘Considering’ clause; Gómez 
Paquiyauri v. Ecuador, Order of 7 May 2004, 6th ‘Considering’ clause; and Urso Branco Prison 
v. Brasil, Order of 22 April 2004, 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
31 See IACHR James et al., Order of 26 November 2001, 12th ‘Considering’ clause; Raxcacó et al., 
30 August 2004, 9th ‘Considering’ clause; Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, 25 November 2004, 9th 
‘Considering’ clause. 
32 See e.g. IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 25 May 1999. 
33 See IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 25 May 1999, Concurring Opinion Cançado Trindade, 
§10. 
34 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 25 May 1999, Concurring Opinion Cançado Trindade, §11. 
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penalty.35 Most of them were taken since spring 1993.36 While in death penalty cases this 
international adjudicator has virtually always used them, this research is based on the premise that 
the decision to do so is, or should be, related to its case law on the merits.37 The petitions in death 
penalty cases in which provisional measures were taken generally invoked the right to a fair trial. 
The HRC has been extensive in its case law on fair trial and the right to life. Section 4 on the 
relationship between provisional measures and the merits, first refers to more general remarks on 
this link and then focuses on the most important claims made in death penalty cases before the 
HRC, in order to clarify the function of provisional measures to halt executions.  
3 RELATION BETWEEN PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO HALT EXPULSION OR 
EXTAN EXECUTION AND THE EXPECTED DECISION ON THE MERITS  
3.1 Introduction 
What is the relation between a prima facie claim and the use of provisional measures? Do human 
rights adjudicators use provisional measures in all cases involving petitioners facing the death 
penalty or is the decision to use them based on the existence of an apparent right?  
The first step in addressing this question is to make explicit the rights invoked for the use of 
provisional measures to halt an execution. 
Article 6(1) ICCPR recognises the inherent right to life of every human being. No one shall 
be arbitrarily deprived of his life. Article 6(2) stipulates that in ‘those countries which have not 
abolished the death penalty’ this sentence may only be imposed under strict conditions in confor-
mity with the provisions of the ICCPR and only for the most serious crimes. Article 6(4) lays 
down the right of all persons sentenced to death to seek pardon or commutation. It establishes that 
amnesty, pardon, or commutation may be granted in all cases. In conjunction with 14(5) it pro-
vides that no execution should take place pending appeal or other recourse procedure, nor pending 
pardon or commutation proceedings. Article 6(5) forbids the death penalty for persons who were 
                                                 
35 This section discusses the Committee’s decisions in death penalty cases over the period July 1986 
to July 2003. Occasionally, references are made to case law decided after this period. In almost 
all cases referred to the HRC used provisional measures pending the proceedings. There are some 
death penalty cases, however, in which it did not use provisional measures because the State had 
already commuted the sentence. See Chapter II on the accessibility of information on provisional 
measures. The HRC may equally have used provisional measures in cases that have not yet been 
concluded. In all but one case it seems to have used provisional measures in order to halt an 
execution. The exception was a request to halt the imposition itself of the sentence rather than 
just its execution: Victor Domukovsky, Zaza Tsiklauri, Petre Gelbakhiani and Irakli Dokvadze v. 
Georgia, 6 April 1998 (provisional measures of 10 March 1995 and 5 July 1996). 
36 There is no great difference in the frequency with which the HRC used provisional measures 
previous to and following the institution of the Special Rapporteur on Death Penalty Cases. 
Subsequently, with the institution of the Special Rapporteur on New Communications, frequency 
initially diminished, but later increased. Apart from factors such as an increase in the number of 
petitions, this may also depend on the personal attitude of the Rapporteur in question. While the 
introduction of a Special Rapporteur on Death Penalty cases opened a possibility to deal with 
urgent cases in between sessions, the Rapporteur did not make use of this possibility as often as 
he could have. On the other hand, pending sessions the HRC took provisional measures quite 
often during the period this Rapporteur was in function. See also Chapter II. 
37 Equally, there should be such a link with the reparation eventually recommended, see Chapter 
XIII (Protection). 
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below the age of 18 when the crime occurred for which they stand trial or are convicted. Article 
6(6) emphasises that nothing in the article shall be invoked to delay or prevent the abolition of 
capital punishment. A contemporary interpretation of the prohibition of cruel treatment and the 
right to life is evidenced in both the Second Optional Protocol (Second OP) abolishing the death 
penalty and decisions by national and international courts.38 The last 15 years an increasing num-
ber of States have abolished the death penalty, 67 of which have ratified the Second OP.39 Ja-
maica has been the State that the HRC has dealt with most often to halt an execution. It has also 
dealt with Trinidad and Tobago, Barbados, Guyana, St. Vincent and the Grenadines (the Ameri-
cas), Zambia and Sierra Leone (Africa), South Korea and The Philippines (Asia), Belarus, Russia, 
Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan (Europe and Central Asia).40 
In the regional systems provisional measures have also been used to halt executions. The 
African system is not very elaborate on the right to life. Article 4 ACHPR simply stipulates that 
human beings are inviolable and that every human being ‘shall be entitled to respect for his life 
and the integrity of his person’. “No one may be arbitrarily deprived of his right”. Fourteen Afri-
can States have abolished the death penalty for all crimes, nineteen States are not actively apply-
ing the death penalty and 21 others retain and apply this penalty.41 
Article 2(1) ECHR lays down that every one’s life shall be protected by law. “No one shall 
be deprived of his life intentionally save in the execution of a sentence of a court following his 
conviction of a crime for which this penalty is provided by law”. Subsequently the Member States 
of the Council of Europe adopted Protocol No. 6 on the abolition of the death penalty in peace 
time (1983).42 This development was completed with its adoption of Protocol No. 13 on the aboli-
tion of the death penalty in all circumstances (2002).43 The Commission and Court have only 
dealt with three States: UK, Greece and Turkey. Presently, all Member States of the Council of 
Europe, except Russia, have abolished the death penalty.44 Abolition has become a condition of 
membership of the Council of Europe.45 
Of the Members of the Organisation of American States (OAS) that still apply the death 
penalty only Guatemala and Barbados have also recognised the competence of the Inter-American 
Court. Until May 1999 this applied to Trinidad and Tobago as well.46 Article 4 ACHR provides 
                                                 
38 See e.g. the abolition of the death penalty by the South African Constitutional Court: S v 
Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC). Generally on the death penalty in 
international law see e.g. Schabas (2002a); Schabas (1996) and Hood (2002). 
39 Ratification status as of 3 September 2008. According to Amnesty International by 2007 137 
countries in the world had abolished the death penalty in law or practice, Amnesty International 
report 2008. 
40 In general about international developments see the reports of the UN Special Rapporteur on 
Summary and arbitrary executions, also referring to the Rapporteur’s urgent appeals to halt 
executions. Trinidad & Tobago and Jamaica have now withdrawn from the individual complaint 
proceedings under the First OP. See e.g. Chapters XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility) and XVII 
(Official responses). 
41 See Chenwi’s book (2007) on the abolition of the death penalty in Africa, referring to 13 
abolitions in law and practice, p. 25 (and referring to 7 African countries having ratified the 2nd 
OP to the ICCPR), pp. 51-52. In addition Rwanda abolished the death penalty in July 2007. 
42 Council of Europe Treaty Series 114; concluded 28 April 1983; entry into force 1 March 1985 
(ratified by all member States of the Council of Europe except Russia, which has signed but not 
yet ratified).  
43 Council of Europe Treaty Series 187; concluded 3 May 2002; entry into force 1 July 2003 (40 
ratifications as of 7 September 2008). 
44 Ukraine ratified Protocol No. 6 in 2000 and since also ratified Protocol 13. The membership of 
retentionist Belarus is pending since 1993.  
45 Council of Europe Resolution 1044 (1994). 
46 This State denounced the ACHR on 26 May 1998. This became effective on 26 May 1999. 
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that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life. This Convention, which was signed in 1969, 
stipulates that States that have abolished the death penalty shall not re-establish it (Article 4(3) 
ACHR). Countries that have not abolished the death penalty may only impose this penalty for the 
most serious crimes, in accordance with a law establishing such punishment, enacted prior to the 
commission of the crime. They may only impose this penalty, moreover, pursuant to a final 
judgment. States shall not extend their death penalty law to ‘crimes to which it does not presently 
apply’. They shall in no case inflict capital punishment for political offences or related common 
crimes (Article 4(4)). They shall not impose this punishment upon persons who were below the 
age of eighteen or more than seventy years of age at the time the crime was committed, nor to 
pregnant women (Article 4 (5)). Finally, this article provides that every person condemned to 
death shall have the right to apply for amnesty, pardon or commutation of sentence. States shall 
not impose capital punishment ‘while such a petition is pending a decision by the competent 
authority’ (Article 4 (6)). In 1990 a separate Protocol on the abolition of the death penalty was 
adopted.47 
The American Declaration is less elaborate on the right to life than the ACHR. Article I 
provides: “Every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person”. The 
Commission and the Court have considered that the Declaration must be interpreted in light of the 
Convention.48 They have specified the obligations of States with regard to Article 1 of the Decla-
ration and Article 4 ACHR. While States in the Americas generally have an abolitionist tradition, 
this applies mainly to the Latin-American States.49 Many common law countries in the Americas, 
with the notable exception of Canada, have not abolished the death penalty. The United States 
(US) and several Caribbean States still actively apply it.  
Apart from the right to life the international and regional treaties also include a prohibition 
of torture and cruel or degrading treatment or punishment. This has also been relevant in the 
context of death penalty cases.50 Article 7 ICCPR stipulates that no one shall be subjected to 
torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. The text of Article 3 ECHR is 
similar, but without reference to ‘cruel’. Article 5 ACHPR provides that ‘every individual shall 
have the right to the respect of the dignity inherent in a human being’ and that ‘all forms of ex-
ploitation and degradation of man particularly slavery, slave trade, torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading punishment and treatment shall be prohibited’. Article 5 ACHR, finally, stipulates in 
paragraph 1: “Every person has the right to have his physical, mental and moral integrity re-
spected”. Paragraph 2 specifically prohibits torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment 
or treatment.  
As noted, none of the human rights adjudicators, apart from the Inter-American Court (and 
to some extent the Inter-American Commission), have published or motivated their provisional 
measures. After mentioning a few cases by the Inter-American Court this section attempts to 
derive information from the decisions on the merits in death penalty cases about the types of 
death penalty situations in which the adjudicators use provisional measures. The focus is on the 
practice of the HRC, but in the context of the right to life references are also made to the approach 
of the ECtHR and the Bosnia Chamber. It specifically examines whether the practice of the HRC 
makes sense in light of its general approach towards the purpose of its provisional measures. 
                                                 
47 OAS Treaties Series No. 73, adopted 8 June 1990. As of September 2008 there were 9 
ratifications, <www.cidh.org>. 
48 See also Chapter II (Systems). 
49 The only Latin-American country still applying it is Guatemala.  
50 Specifically about the death penalty as cruel punishment, see e.g. Nowak (2000b) and Schabas 
(1996). 
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After all it has made some explicit statements about this purpose in some cases involving non-
compliance with its provisional measures.51 
3.2 Prejudgment 
If in a request by petitioners for provisional measures the facts complained of relate to other 
aspects of the main case, not directly constituting a situation of urgency, the adjudicator will 
declare (this part of) the request for provisional measures inadmissible. The Inter-American Court 
has emphasized that it may not examine ‘any arguments other than those which are directly and 
strictly related to situations of extreme gravity and urgency which require the adoption of protec-
tion measures to avoid irreparable damage to persons. Any other arguments or facts may only be 
examined and determined by the Court when considering the merits of contentious cases brought 
before the Court’.52 
This means that if it is ‘not possible to assess the facts at issue without giving an opinion on 
the merits of the case’ using provisional measures ‘implies revising the conformity of the facts 
denounced by the alleged victims to the American Convention’. “The opinion on the merits of a 
case submitted to the Court must be issued in the judgment rendered in that case rather than in a 
decision regarding the adoption of provisional measures. In fact, the latter may imply a prior 
judgment via an interlocutory proceeding, determining some of the facts submitted to the consid-
eration of the Court and their consequences”.53 
Yet the situation is different when the irreparable harm is related to the main claim. The In-
ter-American Commission and Court have made some statements regarding provisional measures 
to halt executions that may clarify the issue of prejudgment and provisional measures.  
In death penalty cases the Inter-American Commission requested stays of execution ‘to give 
it time to fully examine the allegations made in the petition, on the grounds that, executing (…) 
before the Commission could investigate the case would cause irreparable harm’.54 It bases its 
request ‘on the fact that, should the State execute the victim before the Commission had an oppor-
tunity to examine the case, any eventual decision would be rendered moot in terms of the efficacy 
of potential remedies’.55 It referred to remedies such as a recommendation of commutation of 
sentence and pointed out that such mootness would cause the victim irreparable harm.56  
                                                 
51 About the legal status of provisional measures see Chapter XVI and about the follow-up by the 
adjudicators see Chapter XVIII. 
52 IACHR Matter of Adrián Meléndez-Quijano et al. (El Salvador), Order of 26 November 2007, 9th 
‘Considering’ clause, referring to various cases including Matter of Luisiana Ríos et al. 
(Venezuela), Order of 3 July 2007, 9th ‘Considering’ clause. 
53 IACHR Matter of Adrián Meléndez-Quijano et al. (El Salvador), Order of 26 November 2007, 
10th ‘Considering’ clause, referring to Matter of Castañeda-Gutman (Mexico), Order of 25 
November 2005, 6th ‘Considering’ clause and Matter of Luisiana Ríos et al. (Venezuela), Order 
of 3 July 2007, 11th ‘Considering’ clause. In Meléndez-Quijano the previous provisional 
measures to protect the beneficiaries were reiterated, but the Court found inadmissible the 
petitioners’ request ‘for the provisional suspension of “all the administrative and judicial 
proceedings started against Adrián Meléndez-Quijano”’. 
54 E.g. CIDH Annual Report 2000, §47. 
55 Ibid. 
56 See e.g. CIDH 6 January 1999, Wayne Matthews, Case 12.076; 21 January 1999, Alfred 
Frederick and Natasha De Leon, Cases 12.082 and 12.093; 4 March 1999, Vijay Mungroo and 
Phillip Cholatal, Cases 12.11 and 12.112; 12 April 1999, Naresh Boodram and Joey Ramiah, 
Case 12.129; 28 April 1999, Nigel Mark, Case 12.137; 1 May 1999, Wilberforce Bernard and 
Steve Mungroo, Cases 12.140 and 12.141; 8 May 1999, Peter Benjamin and Krishendath 
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In the operational part of its Order the Court often orders the State to take all necessary 
measures to preserve the life (and physical integrity) of the beneficiaries ‘so as not to hinder the 
processing of their cases before the Inter-American system’.57 In his first Order for urgent meas-
ures the President of the Inter-American Court pointed out:  
“It is imperative to note that this does not imply a declaration on the merits of the request, but 
simply acknowledges the possibility of such a decision, which leads to the conclusion that the 
stay of the executions of the petitioners is necessary to guarantee the integrity of the Inter-
American system for the protection of human rights”.58  
This also refers to the procedural considerations aimed at safeguarding the Inter-American human 
rights system as a whole. Both the Inter-American Court and its President have noted the 
relationship between the merits and the provisional measures, often in connection with the remark 
that the cases included in the Commission’s request have not yet been submitted to the Court. The 
Court noted, for instance, that for that reason its consideration of ‘the issues at hand’ is: 
“based not upon the merits of said Cases but upon the State’s procedural obligations as a Party 
to the American Convention. Therefore, the Court cannot, in a provisional measure, consider 
the merits of any arguments pertaining to issues other than those which relate strictly to the 
extreme gravity and urgency and the necessity to avoid irreparable damage to persons. Such 
other issues are properly brought before the Court only through contentious cases or requests for 
advisory opinions”.59  
At other times the President simply stated that since the case had not been submitted to the Court, 
‘the adoption of urgent measures does not imply a decision on the merits of the existing contro-
versy by the petitioners and the State’.60 In the first example the Court noted that its consideration 
of the issues was not based on the merits of the cases but on the State’s procedural obligations 
under the ACHR. In the second example a decision on the merits is not implied by the adoption of 
urgent measures. In other words, their adoption does not result, implicitly, in a determination on 
the merits. In both cases the result is that ‘the Court will study the request of the Commission in 
light of the existence of a situation of extreme gravity and urgency and the necessity to avoid 
irreparable damage to persons, elements to be taken into account in conformity with Article 63(2) 
of the Convention’.61  
                                                                                                                       
Seepersad, Cases 12.148 and 12.149; 11 May 1999, Calvin Dial and Andrew Dottin, Case 
12.145; 20 May 1999, Anthony Johnson and Allan Phillip, Cases 11.718 and 12.115; 21 May 
1999, Narine Sooklal, Case 12.152; 25 May 1999, Amir Mowlah, Case 12.153; 3 June 1999, 
Mervyn Parris and Francis Mansingh, Cases 12.156 and 12.157. 
57 See e.g. IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 14 June 1998, 29 August 
1998, 25 May 1999 and 26 November 2001. 
58 IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order of the President for urgent 
measures, 27 May 1998. 
59 IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 29 August 1998. See also, Order for 
provisional measures, 26 November 2001. 
60 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 29 June 1998. See also 
those of 27 May 1998, 13 July 1998 and 25 October 2001. 
61 IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 26 November 2001. 
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The President of the Inter-American Court has pointed out that by adopting urgent meas-
ures, this Presidency is ensuring that the Court may carry out effectively its conventional man-
date’.62 The full Court simply considered: 
“That the cases included in the request for amplification have not been submitted to the Court 
and the consideration of the issues at hand is, consequently, based upon the State’s procedural 
obligations under the Convention in relation to the processing of the Provisional Measures of 
protection and therefore does not imply a prejudgment on the merits. As a result, the Court will 
study the request of the Commission in light of the existence of a situation of extreme gravity 
and urgency and the necessity to avoid irreparable damage to persons, elements to be taken into 
account in conformity with Article 63(2) of the Convention”.63 
Indeed, the Inter-American Court has considered that the cases in which it took provisional meas-
ures were ‘not before the Court’. It noted that the purpose of provisional measures in international 
human rights law was ‘to protect fundamental human rights by seeking to avoid irreparable dam-
age to persons’. Their adoption ‘does not imply a decision on the merits of the controversy be-
tween the petitioners and the State’. “Upon ordering such measures, this Tribunal is ensuring only 
that it may faithfully exercise its mandate pursuant to the Convention in cases of extreme gravity 
and urgency”.64 
While the Inter-American Court explains that its consideration is ‘based upon the State’s 
procedural obligations under the Convention in relation to the processing of the Provisional 
Measures of protection and therefore does not imply a prejudgment on the merits’, it does refer to 
the Commission’s statement that the claims pending before it ‘if proven, tend to establish viola-
tions of the American Convention’.65 
Since the President’s first Order for urgent measures to halt executions, the Court and its 
President have pointed out that the execution of the death penalty in the cases of the alleged vic-
tims ‘would necessarily affect the Court’s consideration of the Commission’s request by render-
ing moot the object of any eventual decision in their favor’.66 Thus, there is a relationship be-
tween the merits of the case (and possible reparation)67 and the prevention of irreparable harm 
intended with the Court’s provisional measures.  
The relationship between the merits of the case and the prevention of irreparable harm is 
also relevant because provisional measures may be used to prevent a State from anticipating the 
Court’s Judgment and pre-empting it. Some consideration of substantive law is relevant in this 
                                                 
62 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 25 October 2001. 
63 IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 26 November 2001. 
64 See e.g. IACHR Raxcacó et al., Order of 30 August 2004 (11th ‘Considering’ clause); Carlos 
Nieto et al., Order of 9 July 2004 (10th ‘Considering’ clause); and Sarayaku Indigenous 
Community, Order of 6 July 2004 (2nd ‘Considering’ clause) and Boyce and Joseph, Order of 25 
November 2004 (10th ‘Considering’ clause). 
65 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 26 November 2001. See 
also James et al. case, Order of the President for urgent measures, 11 May 1999. That same 
month, on the other hand, the Court had also pointed out that when it considers requests for 
provisional measures in cases still pending before the Commission its ‘consideration of the issues 
at hand’ is ‘based upon the State’s procedural obligations as a Party to the American Convention, 
rather than on the merits of each Case’. Thus, the elements the Court takes into account when it 
studies the Commission’s request are ‘the existence of a situation of extreme gravity and urgency 
and the necessity to avoid irreparable damage to persons’. See e.g. James et al. case, Order of 25 
May 1999. 
66 See IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order of the President for urgent 
measures, 27 May 1998 and further Orders.  
67 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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respect. At the same time the Inter-American Court itself is expected not to predetermine its 
decision on the merits by ordering provisional measures. Traditionally, courts have tried to bal-
ance those two conflicting rules (non-anticipation and no predetermination), in light of the impor-
tance of balancing the interests of the parties in a conflict pending before them. Yet the situation 
is different for adjudicators dealing with human rights issues, exactly because the parties are not 
two States but the State on the one hand and an individual or group of individuals on the other. 
This makes the situation inherently unequal, increasing the task of the adjudicator. In this respect 
the statements of the Inter-American Court are sufficiently general in nature to be relevant as well 
to the situation of the other human rights adjudicators. 
3.3 The published Orders of the Inter-American Court to halt executions 
In its Orders for provisional measures the Inter-American Court specifically refers to the rights 
claimed. An examination of the various Orders in the James et al. case shows that the omission, 
in some cases, of a reference to the protection of physical integrity in addition to the protection of 
life is not necessarily based on a specific decision on the part of the Court and its President.68  
With regard to five new beneficiaries in the James et al. case the Court noted that they all 
complained about the mandatory nature of the death penalty.69 Other complaints included failure 
to supply full disclosure to the defence, delay in bringing the person involved to trial (3x), im-
proper treatment in detention (5x), conditions of detention (2x), statements taken by coercion 
(3x), failure to advise right to an attorney, inadequacy of counsel and no trial by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal. The Court pointed out that if the State would execute the 
petitioners ‘it would create an irremediable situation’. It ‘would be incompatible with the object 
and purpose of the Convention’.70 In the reports Trinidad initially supplied to comply with the 
Court’s Order it pointed out that it had followed due process in all the cases in which the Court 
had now ordered provisional measures.71  
With regard to those beneficiaries involved in the Court’s Judgment in Hilaire etc. (2002) it 
is possible to illustrate a relationship with the merits. First of all, all cases included in the Judg-
ment dealt with the mandatory death penalty. The Commission also claimed other violations.72 In 
two cases it claimed a violation of Article 5(6) for failure to take efforts for the reform and ‘social 
re-adaptation’ of the petitioner as an essential aim of his punishment. This request is interesting 
                                                 
68 See for instance IACHR James et al. case, Order for provisional measures, 27 May 1999 and 
Order of President for urgent measures, 19 June 1999 and Order of 25 October 2001 in which the 
Court ordered the State to take all necessary measures to preserve the lives of the beneficiaries 
without mentioning their physical integrity. See the Orders of 25 September 1999, 16 August 
2000 and 24 November 2000 for examples where physical integrity is explicitly mentioned. In 
this light not too much meaning must be attached either to the change from the phrase ‘physical 
integrity’ to that of ‘personal integrity’ used in the Court’s Order of November 2001 and in most 
Orders involving other situations. It seems reasonable to assume that the Inter-American Court 
intended to include the protection of physical integrity in all its Orders to halt executions. 
69 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 25 October 2001; Order 
for provisional measures, 26 November 2001. In one case the Commission had already declared 
admissible the claims of the petitioner: Case of Balkissoon Roodal, 10 October 2001 (adm.). 
70 IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 26 November 2001. The majority of 
beneficiaries was later included in the cases Hilaire, Constantine et al. and Benjamin et al. 
71 IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 29 August 1998. 
72 E.g. a violation of the right to respect for the physical, mental and moral integrity, as laid down in 
Article 5(1), the right not to be subjected to cruel, inhumane or degrading punishment or 
treatment in violation of Article 5(2). 
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because it means that the Commission, at least in certain circumstances, takes the approach that 
the death penalty as such or, alternatively, the death row phenomenon, or certain aggravated 
forms of this phenomenon would run counter to the essential aims of punishment laid down in 
human rights treaties. Earlier, British lawyers had suggested this approach in cases before the 
HRC.  
In June 2002 the Court issued its Judgment. It found that the State had violated the right to 
life of all 32 petitioners (Articles 4(1) and 4(2)) in conjunction with Article 1(1). It also found a 
violation of Article 2 ACHR (obligation to adopt the necessary legislative or other measures). 
Trinidad had violated, moreover, their right to humane treatment (Articles 5(1) and 5(2)). Finally, 
it found 32 violations of the right of every person condemned to death to apply for amnesty, 
pardon or commutation of sentence, laid down in Article 4(6). With regard to 30 of them, the 
Court found a violation of the right to trial within a reasonable time (Articles 7(5) and 8(1)) and 
with regard to eleven of them a violation of the right to judicial protection (Articles 8 and 25). On 
top of all these violations the Court found that Trinidad arbitrarily deprived Joey Ramiah of his 
right to life in violation of Article 4 ACHR by executing him pending the proceedings.73 Subse-
quently the provisional measures were maintained on behalf of those petitioners still under sen-
tence of death.74 
In Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados (2004) the Inter-American Court pointed out that ‘in this 
case the measures mandated are designed to allow the organs of the Inter-American system of 
human rights protection to evaluate the possible existence of a violation of Articles 2, 4, 5 and 8 
of the American Convention’.75 In 2007 the Court found the State in violation of various provi-
sions of the ACHR.76 It ordered, among others, that the State must commute the death sentence of 
Michael McDonald Huggins and adopt the necessary measures to ensure that the death penalty is 
not imposed in a way that violates the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the ACHR and, in par-
ticular, that it not be imposed by means of a compulsory judgment; it must also take legislative or 
other measures to eliminate the effect of a provision in its Constitution that makes it impossible to 
contest ‘existing laws’; and, the State’s obligations arising from the Court’s provisional measures 
in this case should be replaced by the obligations specified in the judgment.77  
Already in 1983 the Inter-American Court had pointed out that States that still applied the 
death penalty were not to extend it to situations to which it did not previously apply. Its unani-
mous advice was ‘that the Convention imposes an absolute prohibition on the extension of death 
penalty and that, consequently, the State Party cannot apply the death penalty to crimes for which 
such a penalty was not previously provided for under its domestic law’. The Court also found, 
unanimously, ‘that a reservation restricted by its own wording to Article 4(4) of the Convention 
does not allow the Government of a State Party to extend by subsequent legislation the applica-
                                                 
73 See IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, 21 June 2002. 
74 See e.g. IACHR James et al., Order of 28 February 2005. See further on maintaining provisional 
measures e.g. Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
75 IACHR Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, Order of 25 November 2004, 7th ‘Considering’ clause. 
See also 1st ‘Having seen’ clause: the provisional measures are taken so as not to hinder the 
processing of their cases before the Inter-American system. 
76 IACHR Boyce et al. (Barbados), Judgment on Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, 20 November 2007 (finding that Barbados had violated the Articles 4(1) and 4(2) ACHR 
(Right to Life), in relation to Article 1(1) (obligation to respect rights); it had also violated Article 
2 (Domestic Legal Effect), in relation to Articles 1(1), 4(1), 4(2) and 25(1) (Judicial Protection); 
and Articles 5(1) and 5(2) ACHR (Right to Humane Treatment) in relation to Article 1(1), all to 
the detriment of Lennox Ricardo Boyce, Jeffrey Joseph, Frederick Benjamin Atkins and Michael 
McDonald Huggins). 
77 IACHR Boyce et al. (Barbados), Judgment on Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations and 
Costs, 20 November 2007. 
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tion of the death penalty to crimes for which this penalty was not previously provided’.78 In Rax-
cacó Reyes v. Guatemala (2005) the Court found a violation of the prohibition to extend the death 
penalty to situations to which it did not previously apply (Article 4(2)).79 It also found that this 
State’s domestic legislation, punishing by death any type of kidnapping, violated the principle in 
Article 4(2) that the death penalty should be limited to the worst crimes only.80  
3.4 Unpublished provisional measures to halt executions 
3.4.1 Introduction 
In order to clarify the relationship with the merits in the unpublished provisional measures by the 
HRC (and most other human rights adjudicators), it is all the more important to know what the 
claims were in cases in which provisional measures were taken. An examination of known cases 
in which the HRC took provisional measures in death penalty cases shows that apart from the 
right to life itself (Article 6), the rights most regularly claimed by detainees on death row are the 
right to a fair trial (Article 14), the security of person and pre-trial rights (Article 9), the prohibi-
tion of torture or cruel treatment (Article 7) and the right to humane treatment in detention (Arti-
cle 10). 
The subsequent sections deal with various components of the case law on the death penalty. 
The focus is on the approach of the HRC, but where relevant references are made to other adjudi-
cators. Section 3.4.2 deals with the right to life as such and refers to the case law of the ECtHR 
and Bosnia Chamber. Section 3.4.3 discusses rights relating to the person sentenced to death: 
juvenile death penalty and mandatory death penalty. Section 3.4.4 involves rights relating to the 
death penalty proceedings and, finally, section 3.4.5 deals with the significance of the death row 
phenomenon, including its impact on individual petitioners.  
                                                 
78 See IACHR Restrictions to the death penalty, Advisory Opinion OC-3/83, 8 September 1983. 
Before its provisional measures in James et al. and its Judgment in Hilaire, Constantine and 
Benjamin et al., the Inter-American Court only dealt with the issue of the death penalty as part of 
its advisory function. In this Advisory Opinion the Commission had requested the Court’s 
Advisory Opinion in light of three cases pending before it in which Guatemala has executed 
persons on the basis of trials before Courts of Special Jurisdiction. On the basis of its reservation 
to Article 4(4) ACHR Guatemala had justified its extension of the death penalty to crimes for 
which this penalty was not previously provided under its domestic law. Article 4(4) stipulates: 
“In no case shall capital punishment be inflicted for political offences or related common 
crimes”. In reference to the Court’s Advisory Opinion the Commission subsequently found 
Guatemala in violation of Article 4 ACHR. Resolution 15/84 of the Commission against 
Guatemala (cases 8094, 9083 and 9080), 3 October 1984, Informe Anual 1984-1985. Only the 
Commission could deal with these cases as a contentious matter, because Guatemala just 
accepted the Court’s contentious jurisdiction in March 1987. 
79 IACHR Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala, 15 September 2005, §§57-66. 
80 IACHR Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala, 15 September 2005, §§67-72. See also Hilaire, 
Constantine et al., Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, 21 June 2002, §§106-108. See further 
on the case of Case of Raxcacó Reyes et al. (Guatemala), the Court’s Order of 21 November 2007 
deciding, among others, to lift the provisional measures adopted by the Court in favor of Pablo 
Arturo Ruiz Almengor, but to reiterate to the State that it must maintain the necessary measures 
to project the life of Bernardino Rodríguez Lara so as not to obstruct the processing of his case 
before the inter-American system for the protection of human rights; and to remind the State that, 
in its judgment Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala, 15 September 2005, as a measure of non-repetition 
it had ordered the State abstain from applying the death penalty and executing those convicted of 
the crime of kidnapping or abduction. 
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3.4.2 The right to life as such 
The adjudicators have to deal with treaty texts on the right to life that were drafted when the death 
penalty was still common in many States. Thus, these texts often refer to States in which the death 
penalty is still applied, simply posing limitations to their use. The question arises whether 
provisional measures have been taken also in cases in which a violation was later found on the 
basis of a more dynamic interpretation of the provisions on the right to life or only in such cases 
in which there would likely be a violation even on the basis of a restrictive interpretation. 
3.4.2.1 ECTHR 
In the Soering case (1989) the ECtHR established that capital punishment under certain condi-
tions was still permitted by Article 2(1) ECHR.81 It acknowledged that subsequent practice could 
remove a textual limit on the scope for dynamic or evolutive interpretation of Article 3 ECHR. In 
the circumstances of the case it found that the extradition of Soering to the US would violate 
Article 3 because of the death row phenomenon in the state of Virginia.82 In this case both the 
Commission and the ECtHR used provisional measures. The decisions on the merits do not fur-
ther clarify whether they would equally use such measures in other cases involving the death 
penalty. 
Only very recently the ECtHR slightly adapted its approach to the right to life as such. In 
Öcalan v. Turkey (2005) the Grand Chamber agreed with the First Section of the ECtHR, which 
decided in 2003 that both the concepts of inhuman and degrading treatment and the legal position 
with regard to the death penalty had ‘undergone a considerable evolution’ since the entry into 
force of the Convention and indeed since its Soering judgment.  
“The de facto abolition noted in that case in respect of twenty-two contracting States in 1989 
has developed into a de jure abolition in forty-three of the forty-four Contracting States and a 
moratorium in the remaining State which has not yet abolished the penalty, namely Russia”. 
All States have signed and all but three have ratified Protocol No. 6. The practice is ‘further 
reflected’ in the policy of the Council of Europe creating a death penalty free zone by requiring 
abolition as a condition of membership. 
“Such a marked development could now be taken as signalling the agreement of the Contracting 
States to abrogate, or at the very least to modify, the second sentence of Article 2 §1, 
particularly when regard is had to the fact that all Contracting States have now signed Protocol 
No. 6 and that it has been ratified by forty-one States. It may be questioned whether it is 
necessary to await ratification of Protocol No. 6 by the three remaining States before concluding 
that the death penalty exception in Article 2 has been significantly modified. Against such a 
consistent background, it can be said that capital punishment in peacetime has come to be 
regarded as an unacceptable … form of punishment which is no longer permissible under 
Article 2”.83 
Yet it subsequently retracted somewhat from this statement by replaying its argument that by 
opening for signature Protocol No. 13 (on the abolition of the death penalty in all circumstances) 
                                                 
81 ECtHR Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgement of 7 July 1989. 
82 See later in this Chapter under the heading ‘death row phenomenon’. On provisional measures to 
halt extradition see Chapter V. 
83 ECtHR Grand Chamber Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, §163, quoting Öcalan v. 
Turkey (First Section), 12 March 2003, §§189-196.  
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the Contracting States had ‘chosen the additional method of amendment of the text of the 
Convention in pursuit of their policy of abolition’. It did acknowledge that ‘this final step toward 
complete abolition of the death penalty’ could also ‘be seen as confirmation of the abolitionist 
trend in the practice of the Contracting States’. Thus, Protocol 13 ‘does not necessarily run 
counter to the view that Article 2 has been amended in so far as it permits the death penalty in 
times of peace’.84 Taken together this statement seems to lean towards construing Article 2 as no 
longer permitting the death penalty. Nevertheless, the Grand Chamber subsequently agreed with 
the Chamber that there was no need to reach ‘any firm conclusion’ on this issue because ‘even if 
Article 2 were to be construed as still permitting the death penalty’ it would in any case be 
contrary to the Convention ‘to implement a death sentence following an unfair trial’.85 It agreed 
with the Chamber’s reasoning that the implementation of the death penalty following an unfair 
trial would not be permissible.86 The Chamber had pointed out that Article 2 ‘ranks as one of the 
most fundamental provisions of the Convention’. 
“Even if the death penalty were still permissible under Article 2, the Court considers that an 
arbitrary deprivation of life pursuant to capital punishment is prohibited”. 
The Chamber determined that Öcalan had not had a fair trial so that his execution would have 
resulted in a violation of Article 2. This conclusion ‘must inform’ the Court’s opinion when it 
considers whether the imposition of the death penalty had resulted in a violation of Article 3 
ECHR. The Court found such a violation because Öcalan had spent several years facing execution 
on the basis of an unfair trial. 
“In the Court’s view, to impose a death sentence on a person after an unfair trial is to subject 
that person wrongfully to the fear the he will be executed. The fear and uncertainty as to the 
future generated by a sentence of death, in circumstances where there exists a real possibility 
that the sentence will be enforced, must give rise to a significant degree of human anguish. Such 
anguish cannot be dissociated from the unfairness of the proceedings underlying the sentence 
which, given that human life is at stake, becomes unlawful under the Convention”.87 
In Öcalan the ECtHR indicated that the execution of the petitioner would constitute a violation of 
Article 2 because his trial had been unfair. The Inter-American Court has equally considered that, 
as long as the execution itself is not carried out, the imposition of the death penalty without due 
process does not result in a violation of the right to life.88 Like the ECtHR this Court has held that 
                                                 
84 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, §164. 
85 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, §165. The Grand 
Chamber continues its approach in Soering with regard to the traditional method of amendment 
and the interpretation of Article 3 ECHR. It considers that ‘the fact that there are still a large 
number of States who have yet to sign or ratify Protocol No. 13’ may presently prevent it ‘from 
finding that it is the established practice of the Contracting States to regard the implementation of 
the death penalty as inhuman and degrading treatment’ contrary to Article 3. It believes that this 
may be so because the rights in Article 3 are non-derogable, ‘even in times of war’. 
86 The Court imposing the penalty must be independent and impartial and ‘the most rigorous 
standards of fairness’ must be observed ‘in the criminal proceedings both at first instance and on 
appeal’. Grand Chamber, Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, §166, quoting Öcalan v. 
Turkey (First Section), 12 March 2003, §§201-204. The Court referred to the irreversible nature 
of an execution, ECOSOC Resolution 1984/50, the decisions of the HRC, the Inter-American 
Court judgment Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago and that 
Court’s Advisory Opinion on consular assistance. 
87 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, §164.  
88 See IACHR Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, 20 June 2005, §103. 
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having suffered adverse conditions of detention and having been sentenced to death after a trial in 
violation of the principle of due process constituted a violation of the right to respect for each 
person’s physical, mental and moral integrity and the prohibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment (Article 5 (1)(2)).89 
Thus, the Court did not find a violation of Article 2 for the imposition of the death penalty 
following an unfair trial, but only indicated that the execution of the petitioner would constitute 
such violation. Its alternative argument based on Article 3 is somewhat strained because there 
would be anguish in any case, independent of the fairness of the proceedings. Moreover, the first 
sentence seems to imply that a person can also rightfully be subjected to the fear of execution, 
while the Chamber previously emphasized that capital punishment in peace time has come to be 
regarded as unacceptable. While the Court was unwilling to explicitly construe Article 2 as ex-
cluding the death penalty, replicating the conundrum created in Soering with the ‘traditional 
method of amendment’ approach,90 it would have been more convincing for it to have found a 
violation of Article 2 for imposition of the death penalty after an unfair trial rather than a violation 
of Article 3. The Court’s approach perpetuates an unclear situation with regard to provisional 
measures that could arise particularly in non-refoulement cases. The question arises whether it 
would use provisional measures in cases in which imposition of the death penalty would be likely, 
but execution may not necessarily follow because the death penalty is not applied actively at the 
time of the decision on provisional measures. The ECtHR, for instance, refused to take provi-
sional measures to halt the transfer of Saddam Hussein to the Iraqi Interim Government, which 
did not actively apply the death penalty at the time. After he was handed over the Interim Gov-
ernment re-instated the penalty. While this may be predominantly an issue of assessment of risk, 
the Court’s complicated reasoning, regarding Articles 2 and 3 may in itself have repercussions for 
the use of provisional measures. 
The interpretation by the ECtHR of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR in the Soering and Öcalan 
judgments is not entirely convincing. The Court’s acknowledgment, in Soering, that subsequent 
practice could remove a textual limit on the scope for dynamic or evolutive interpretation of 
Article 3 is indeed consonant with the longstanding view that the ECHR is a living instrument. 
Nevertheless, the Court used Protocol No. 6 (on the abolition of the death penalty in peace time) 
not to show a practice and conviction on the part of the member States of the Council of Europe, 
but to establish that the Contracting Parties intended the normal method of amendment of the text 
in order to introduce a new obligation to abolish the death penalty. Protocol 6, however, was 
adopted to lay down and secure, and certainly not to limit, the interpretation of Article 2 ECHR. 
Reflecting the contemporary standards of justice in Europe, the Protocol takes into account the 
subsequent practice and codification. In his Concurring Opinion Judge De Meyer considered that 
the death penalty is not consistent with the present state of European civilisation. ‘Extraditing 
somebody in such circumstances’, he said, ‘would be repugnant to European standards of justice, 
and contrary to the public order of Europe’.91 It is unfortunate that in Öcalan the Court stuck with 
its traditional inter-state ‘treaty amendment’ approach. Its members seem to have in mind images 
of politicians conspiring together to indicate to the Court that it should not meddle. While there 
may be some truth to such images in other contexts, including with regard to human rights issues, 
given the general attitude within the Council of Europe vis-à-vis the death penalty, the approach 
of judge Garlicki in his Concurring Opinion appears more realistic. He points out that ‘it can no 
longer be disputed that – on the European level – there is a consensus as to the inhuman nature of 
the death penalty’.  
                                                 
89 IACHR Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, 20 June 2005, §§114-120. 
90 Or as Garlicki calls it, ‘a doctrine of pre-emption’, ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Öcalan v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 12 May 2005, Concurring Opinion Judge Garlicki, §5. 
91 ECtHR Soering v. United Kingdom, Judgement of 7 July 1989, Concurring Opinion Judge De 
Meyer. 
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“Therefore, the fact that governments and politicians are preparing a formal amendment to the 
Convention may be understood more as a signal that capital punishment should no longer exist 
than as a decision pre-empting the Court from acting on its own initiative”.92 
In fact the Court is not acting on its own initiative, but simply interpreting the provisions invoked. 
Yet in its interpretation it should not box itself into a corner, away from its normal ‘living 
instrument’ approach. This living instrument approach is particularly warranted in the context of 
the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment. After all the Court considers Articles 2 and 
3 to be the most fundamental rights in the Convention. Garlicki correctly points out that the Court 
‘seems to be convinced that there is no room for the death penalty even within the original text of 
the Convention [b]ut at the same time, it has chosen not to express that position in a universally 
binding manner’. He considers the Court ‘could and should have gone further in this case’.93 The 
ECHR ‘represents a very distinct form of international instrument and – in many respects – its 
substance and process of application are more akin to those of national constitutions than to those 
of ‘typical’ international treaties’.94 
“[A]s long as the member States have not clearly rejected a particular judicial interpretation of 
the Convention’, it is ‘legitimate to assume’ that ‘the Court has the power to determine the 
actual meaning of words and phrases which were inserted into the text of the Convention more 
than fifty years ago’. “In any event, and this seems to be the situation with regard to the death 
penalty, the Court may so proceed when its interpretation remains in harmony with the values 
and standards that have been endorsed by the member States”.95 
While the Court could have gone further on the merits, it did use provisional measures, which 
indicates that they have been taken also in cases in which a violation later could have been found 
on the basis of a more dynamic interpretation of the provisions on the right to life. 
3.4.2.2 BOSNIA AND PROTOCOL NO. 6 TO THE ECHR (ABOLITION IN PEACE 
TIME) 
The Bosnia Chamber has specifically interpreted Protocol No. 6 to the ECHR on the abolition of 
the death penalty in peace time. The petitioner had submitted that his execution would violate his 
human rights as guaranteed by Annex 6 of the Peace Agreement. The respondent Party had 
argued that the execution would be covered by Article 2 of Protocol No. 6 and would not involve 
any violation of the petitioner’s rights. The Chamber used provisional measures in 1996 and 
1997. On the merits it pointed out that Article 1 of the Protocol prohibited both the imposition and 
the execution of the death penalty. This prohibition is absolute and subject only to the exception 
in Article 2. The obligations under the Protocol became effective in December 1995 when the 
General Framework Agreement entered into force. The Chamber then proceeded with its 
interpretation of Article 2 of the Protocol. It noted that, as an exception to the rule, it should be 
‘narrowly interpreted’. After all the right to life was one of the most fundamental provisions in the 
ECHR.96 It considered that before the exception could apply ‘there must be specific provision in 
                                                 
92 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, Concurring Opinion 
Judge Garlicki, §5. 
93 Id., §2. 
94 Id., §4. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Bosnia Chamber Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH, 5 September 1997 (merits), §29. See also 
Herak v. Fed. BiHH, 12 June 1998, §§ 50-51. 
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domestic law authorising the use of the death penalty in respect of defined acts committed in time 
of war or of imminent threat of war’. 
“The law must define with adequate precision the acts in respect of which the death penalty may 
be applied, the circumstances in which it may be applied, and the concepts of ‘time of war or 
imminent threat of war’. Article 2 requires that before it can apply the legislature should have 
considered and defined the circumstances in which, exceptionally in the context of a legal 
system where the death penalty has been abolished, such penalty may nevertheless be applied in 
respect of acts committed in time of war or imminent threat thereof”.97 
The provisions on the basis of which the petitioner was sentenced to death were not restricted to 
‘time of war or imminent threat of war’. Neither did they have the necessary precision.98 
Moreover, the obligation in the Constitution to secure the rights and obligations in the 
international agreements listed in Annex I made the death penalty provisions inapplicable as a 
matter of national law, because of the Second OP to the ICCPR.99 The Second OP imposed ‘an 
absolute prohibition, without the possibility of any reservation or exception, on the imposition or 
carrying out of the death penalty in time of peace’. Since Bosnia was not in a state of war 
anymore, executing the petitioner would be contrary to the Second OP.100 The domestic law 
authorising execution of the death penalty in peace time was inconsistent with the Constitution 
because of the Constitution’s general obligation to ‘secure the highest level of internationally 
recognised human rights’. According to the Bosnia Chamber the obligation to secure the other 
human rights agreements (including the Second OP to ICCPR) without discrimination included 
‘both an obligation to secure the rights in question to all persons and an obligation to do so 
without discrimination’.101  
“Where one of the human rights agreements referred to imposes a clear, precise and absolute 
prohibition on a particular course of action, the only way in which the obligation to secure the 
right in question to all persons without discrimination can be carried out is by giving effect to 
the prohibition”.102 
                                                 
97 Bosnia Chamber Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH, 5 September 1997 (merits), §32. See also 
Herak v. Fed. BiH, 12 June 1998, §49.  
98 Bosnia Chamber Herak v. Fed. BiHH, 12 June 1998, §§ 50-51. 
99 Id., 12 June 1998, §§52-56, referring to Articles I, II(4) and II(1) of the Constitution (as set out in 
Annex 4 to the General Framework Agreement). In the earlier case Damjanović the Chamber’s 
formulation was less precise, triggering a concurring opinion by Nowak and Möller. They 
pointed out that under the Constitution the right not to be executed ‘is an absolute right and all 
organs of the State of BH and its entities have the constitutional obligation to secure this right’. 
Referring to Article II(4) of the Constitution they explained that the Constitutional obligation to 
secure the right not to be executed had to be distinguished from the international obligations 
under Annex 6 and the jurisdiction of the Chamber to consider complaints about violations of the 
Second OP to the ICCPR only in case of alleged or apparent discrimination. 
100 Bosnia Chamber Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH, 5 September 1997 (merits), §36 and Herak v. 
Fed. BiHH, 12 June 1998, §54. 
101 Bosnia Chamber Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH, 5 September 1997 (merits), §37 and Herak v. 
Fed. BiH, 12 June 1998, §56. 
102 Bosnia Chamber Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH, 5 September 1997 (merits), §37 and Herak v. 
Fed. BiH, 12 June 1998, §56.  
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3.4.2.3 HRC AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE AS SUCH 
The HRC has struggled with issues similar to those of the ECtHR. In the extradition cases Kindler 
v. Canada and Ng v. Canada (1993) it had to decide on the right to life and the relationship be-
tween Articles 6(1) and (2) as well as on the relevance of the death row phenomenon in the con-
text of Article 7. It has, thus far, interpreted Article 6 ICCPR rather than the Second Optional 
Protocol (1987), abolishing the death penalty (Second OP).103 
In fact the HRC took the same approach of reading Article 7 in light of Article 6(2). It con-
cluded that ‘capital punishment as such, within the parameters of Article 6, paragraph 2, does not 
per se violate Article 7’.104 Moreover, it referred to its previous jurisprudence on the death row 
phenomenon and interpreted the ECtHR decision on the death row phenomenon, Soering v. UK, 
restrictively, by emphasizing this Court’s analysis of the specific situation of Soering over its 
discussion of the death row phenomenon in general. It then distinguished Kindler's situation from 
Soering's by stating that the facts of the case differed as to age, mental state and conditions on 
death row, which in Kindler's case was in Pennsylvania, and in Soering's case in Virginia. It also 
noted that in Soering there was a simultaneous request for extradition by a State where the death 
penalty would not be imposed.105 In Ng v. Canada the Committee reasoned along the same lines 
as in Kindler (1993). The dissenters, similarly, followed their reasoning in that case. The Commit-
tee stated that it was aware that ‘by definition, every execution of a sentence of death may be 
considered to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 7 of the Cove-
nant’. At the same time it noted that Article 6(2) permitted the imposition of capital punishment. 
It also pointed out, however, that any method of execution must be designed in such a way as to 
avoid conflict with Article 7. The petitioner had provided ‘detailed information that execution by 
gas asphyxiation may cause prolonged suffering and agony and does not result in death as swiftly 
as possible, as asphyxiation by cyanide gas may take over 10 minutes’. The HRC pointed out that 
the State had had the opportunity to refute these allegations, but had failed to do so.106 It consid-
ered that Canada could reasonably have foreseen that the petitioner, if sentenced to death, would 
be executed in a way that amounts to a violation of Article 7, because execution by gas asphyxia-
tion did not meet the test of ‘least possible physical and mental suffering’.107 Consequently Can-
ada had failed to comply with its obligations under the Covenant by extraditing Ng without hav-
ing sought assurances that he would not be executed.108  
                                                 
103 Adopted 15 December 1987, entered into force 11 July 1991, G.A. Res. 44/128, 44 UN GAOR 
Supp. (No. 49) at 206, A/44/49 (1989). The reason for this is the fact that the extradition cases 
dealing with this issue were all against Canada. While this State has abolished the death penalty it 
is not yet a party to the OP2. Australia is a party, but in A.R.J. v. Australia the HRC concluded 
that there was no real risk of the death penalty. This meant it did not need to discuss the Second 
OP. From the View it is not clear whether it may have used provisional measures, with this 
Protocol in mind but the files show that the HRC indeed did so in light of the Second OP (on file 
with the author).  
104 HRC Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993. 
105 Id. Note that the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, for instance, has interpreted Soering much less 
restrictively. Section 3.4.5 of this Chapter discusses the issue of the death row phenomenon. 
106 HRC Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §16.3. “Rather, the State party has confined itself to 
arguing that in the absence of a norm of international law which expressly prohibits asphyxiation 
by cyanide gas, ‘it would be interfering to an unwarranted degree with the internal laws and 
practices of the United States to refuse to extradite a fugitive to face the possible imposition of 
the death penalty by cyanide gas asphyxiation’”. 
107 HRC Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §16.4. 
108 Five members of the HRC would have found a violation of Article 7 on different grounds. Pocar 
and Lallah considered that because they would find a violation of Article 6, they would 
necessarily find a violation of Article 7 as well. Aguilar Urbina pointed out that the death penalty 
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In Judge v. Canada (2003) the HRC reversed Kindler. It recognised that it should ensure 
consistency and coherence of its jurisprudence but noted that ‘there may be exceptional situations 
in which a review of the scope of application of the rights protected in the Covenant is required’. 
As examples it mentioned situations ‘where an alleged violation involves that most fundamental 
of rights – the right to life – and in particular if there have been notable factual and legal devel-
opments and changes in international opinion in respect of the issue raised’. The Kindler decision 
dated from ten years prior. It noted that ‘since that time there has been a broadening international 
consensus in favour of abolition of the death penalty, and in states which have retained the death 
penalty, a broadening consensus not to carry it out’.  
Paragraphs 2 to 6 ‘have the dual function of creating an exception to the right to life in re-
spect of the death penalty and laying down limits on the scope of that exception’. The HRC ac-
knowledged that by interpreting paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6 in this way abolitionist and reten-
tionist States parties were treated differently. This was ‘an inevitable consequence of the wording 
of the provision itself’. It also pointed out that many delegates participating in the drafting process 
already saw the death penalty as an ‘anomaly’ or a ‘necessary evil’. The Committee noted that it 
would appear logical to interpret the rule in Article 6(1) ‘in a wide sense’ and to interpret Article 
6(2) narrowly.109 
Given the fact that the HRC overturned its previous case law it is not surprising that some 
members attached an individual opinion.110 Lallah underscored the importance of the decision and 
                                                                                                                       
as such constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of that article and not 
only in case of gas asphyxiation. In any case he considered that the application of the death 
penalty was subsumed by the violation of Article 6. See §11 of Ng v. Canada. Chanet considered 
that the HRC had engaged in ‘questionable discussion’ when it assessed the suffering caused by 
cyanide gas and took ‘into consideration the duration of the agony’. She wondered whether it 
would find no violation if the agony lasted nine minutes, now it has deemed unacceptable an 
agony lasting more than ten minutes. She noted that a strict interpretation of Article 6 could have 
prevented this debate. Wennergren, finally, quoted one of the dissenting justices of the US 
Supreme Court in a 1992 case denying an individual a stay of execution by gas asphyxiation in 
California. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote: “The barbaric use of cyanide gas in the Holocaust, 
the development of cyanide agents as chemical weapons, our contemporary understanding of 
execution by lethal gas, and the development of less cruel methods of execution all demonstrate 
that execution by cyanide gas is unnecessarily cruel”. Wennergren considered that this 
summarised ‘in a very convincing way’ why the use of this method amounts to a violation of 
Article 7. He also explained that he did not consider execution by lethal injection acceptable 
either ‘from a point of view of humanity’ but at least this did ‘not stand out as an unnecessarily 
cruel and inhumane method of execution, as does gas asphyxiation’. On the other hand, two other 
members of the HRC would not have found a violation of Article 7 at all. Herndl emphatically 
disagreed with the HRC’s finding of a violation of Article 7 because of the execution method. He 
criticised the fact that the HRC gave only one reason to substantiate its finding of a violation, 
namely that the execution method did not meet the test of the ‘least possible physical and mental 
suffering’. He considered it futile to attempt to establish categories of execution methods, 
because it was ‘futile to attempt to quantify the pain and suffering of any human being subjected 
to capital punishment’. This was so, as long as ‘such methods were not manifestly arbitrary and 
grossly contrary to the moral values of a democratic society, and as long as such methods are 
based on a uniformly applicable legislation adopted by democratic processes’. Ando equally 
disagreed with the finding of a violation of Article 7. The only thing he was certain of was that 
the article ‘prohibits any method of execution which is intended for prolonging suffering of the 
executed or causing unnecessary pain to him or her’. 
109 HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003, §10.5. 
110 Committee member Solari Yrigoyen, for instance, provided an alternative text. He would have 
preferred an approach in which the Committee had found a violation of Article 14(5) because of 
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added three observations. He recalled that while it was ‘encouraging’ to note a ‘broadening inter-
national consensus in favour of the abolition of the death penalty’, it was ‘appropriate to recall 
that, even at the time when the Committee was considering its views in Kindler some 10 years 
ago, the Committee was quite divided’ in relation to Article 6. He pointed out that no less than 
five members of the Committee dissented in that case ‘precisely on the nature, operation and 
interpretation of Article 6(1) of the Covenant’. To illustrate this he appended their individual 
opinions in Kindler (1993) to his separate opinion in Judge (2003).111 While Judge was deported 
to the US before the HRC could take provisional measures, this case clarifies that such measures 
vis-à-vis non-death penalty States should always be used in refoulement cases involving a real 
risk of imposition of the death penalty. 
3.4.3 The right to life and the person of the petitioner 
This section focus on two issues pertaining to the person of the petitioner: the death penalty for 
minors and the mandatory death penalty. The first issue is that of the death penalty for minors. 
The Inter-American Commission has found that not only had a norm of customary international 
law emerged prohibiting juvenile death penalty, but that this norm was of ‘a sufficiently indelible 
                                                                                                                       
the automatic review of the petitioner’s death sentence in absentia. This would result in a 
violation of Article 6. His approach may originate from a wish not to overrule previous case law. 
Chanet clearly subscribed to the Committee’s new approach, which she had advocated more than 
ten years previously in Kindler, but considered that the Committee should not have given an 
opinion in this case about Article 14(5). She considered that while the HRC could ‘declare itself 
competent to assess the degree of risk to life (death sentence) or to physical integrity (torture), it 
is less obvious that it can base an opinion that a violation has occurred in a State party to the 
Covenant on a third State’s failure to observe a provision of the Covenant’. The HRC had 
examined this claim and declared it inadmissible for failure to substantiate. In other words, 
Chanet considered that the HRC should not have examined this claim for admissibility ratione 
materiae in the first place. She argued that now that the HRC directly addressed the fundamental 
question of the compatibility with Article 6 of extradition without assurances, the issue of the 
irregularity of the procedure followed in the third State became irrelevant because an abolitionist 
State cannot expel or extradite a petitioner to a State where he could be executed. About 
deportation and extradition in the face of risks of an unfair procedure in the receiving or 
requesting State (the third State) Chanet noted that while the HRC ‘can ascertain that a State 
party has not taken any undue risks, and may perhaps give an opinion on the precautions taken by 
the State party to that end, it can never really be sure whether a third State has violated the rights 
guaranteed by the Covenant if that State is not a party to the procedure’. She mentioned some of 
the other problems involved: what if the third State is not a party to the ICCPR or the OP? ‘Does 
the obligation of a State party to the Covenant in its relations with third States cover all the rights 
in the Covenant or only some of them? Could a State party to the Covenant enter a reservation to 
exclude implementation of the Covenant from its bilateral relations with another State?’. 
111 HRC Judge v. Austria (2003). He also observed that other provisions of the ICCPR may be 
relevant in interpreting Article 6(1). He noted in particular Articles 5(2) and 26. Finally, he 
observed that the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Burns was encouraging, although he 
wondered about its remark that assurances against the death penalty must be obtained ‘subject to 
exceptions’. He was not sure whether it was possible conceptually to envisage such exceptions, 
‘given the autonomy of Article 6(1) and the possible impact of Article 5(2) and also Article 26 
which governs the legislative, executive and judicial behaviour of States parties’. “That, however, 
is a bridge to be crossed by the Committee in an appropriate case”. The dissents by Ando and 
Solari Yrigoyen did not relate to the interpretation of Article 6(1). All members participating in 
the decision agreed with this interpretation. Pursuant to Rule 85 Wedgwood (US) did not 
participate in the adoption of the View. 
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nature’ to constitute a norm of ius cogens.112 Imposition of the death penalty for crimes commit-
ted below the age of 18 constitutes a violation of the right to life under Article I of the American 
Declaration. Execution of a person in such circumstances would be ‘a further grave and irrepara-
ble violation’ of the right to life.113  
The HRC has also found a violation of Article 7 in a case of a minor on death row. In John-
son v. Jamaica (1998) the petitioner’s age was not a factor in finding a death row phenomenon in 
violation of Article 7, but the imposition of the death sentence itself was void ab initio – and as 
such in violation of Article 7 – because of the violation of Article 6(5) forbidding the death pen-
alty for persons under 18 at the time of the crime.114 
The other issue that has arisen is whether the mandatory death penalty is prohibited or not. 
The Inter-American Commission115 and Court have considered it is indeed prohibited.116 The 
Court, for instance, found a violation of Article 4(1) ACHR because domestic legislation pre-
vented courts from establishing the degree of culpability of a convicted person and compelled the 
                                                 
112 Apart from the fact that the rejection by States of the juvenile death penalty was virtually 
uniform, it referred to the non-derogable nature of the relevant treaty provisions and pointed out 
that ‘the acceptance of this norm crosses political and ideological boundaries and efforts to 
detract from this standard have been vigorously condemned’. CIDH Domingues v. US, 22 
October 2002, §85. When discussing on the merits whether the American Declaration prohibits 
the execution of persons convicted of a crime committed when they were below the age of 18 the 
Inter-American Commission has interpreted its provisions ‘in the context of pertinent 
developments in customary international law and the norms of jus cogens’. It has taken into 
account ‘evidence of relevant state practice as disclosed by various sources, including recitals in 
treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice of 
the United Nations and other international governmental organisations, and the domestic 
legislation and judicial decisions of states’. CIDH Domingues v. US, 22 October 2002, §54. See 
further e.g. Shaka Sankofa (Gary Graham) v. US, 29 December 2003 and Patterson v. US, 7 
March 2005. For an earlier approach by the Commission see Roach and Pinkerton v. US, 22 
September 1987. 
113 See e.g. CIDH Domingues v. US, 22 October 2002, §§87 and 112. 
114 HRC Clive Johnson v. Jamaica, 20 October 1998. See also Alfredo Baroy v. the Philippines, 31 
October 2003 (inadm.). In this case the HRC used provisional measures both to halt the 
petitioner’s execution and to speedily determine his age and treat him as a minor in the meantime. 
Subsequent to this provisional measure a domestic court reduced his sentence, ‘for reasons other 
than alleged minority’, to reclusion perpetua. Thus, the HRC considered that the issues with 
regard to alleged violations of Article 6 had become moot. Nevertheless it observed that 
‘sentencing a person to death and placing him or her on death row in circumstances where his or 
her minority has not been finally determined raises serious issues under articles 10 and 14, as 
well as potentially under article 7, of the Covenant’. It noted, however, that at the time of its 
consideration of the case domestic remedies had not been exhausted. 
115 See e.g. CIDH Lamey, Mykoo, Montique & Daley v. Jamaica, 4 April 2001 (the mandatory death 
penalty, excluding consideration of the individual circumstances of each offender and offence 
results in arbitrary deprivation of life in violation of Article 4 (1) ACHR; this also precludes ‘any 
effective review by a higher court as to the propriety of a sentence of death in the circumstances 
of a particular case’, which cannot be reconciled with the fundamental principles of due process 
under Articles 4 and 8; moreover, it ‘deprives an individual of the most fundamental rights 
without considering whether this exceptional form of punishment is appropriate in the 
circumstances of the individual’s case’, which is contrary to the essential respect for the dignity 
of the individual, underlying Article 5) and CIDH Thomas v. Jamaica, 3 December 2001.  
116 IACHR Hilaire, Constantine et al., Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, 21 June 2002, §105 
and IACHR Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala, 15 September 2005. 
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indiscriminate imposition of the death penalty.117 The international adjudicator has taken a similar 
approach. In fact both the Inter-American Commission and Court have referred to the HRC’s case 
law in this respect, while it, in turn, seems to have been inspired by the Inter-American case law. 
In all cases involving the mandatory death penalty the HRC also used provisional measures, even 
when it had not yet interpreted Article 6 as prohibiting such penalty. In Thompson v. St. Vincent 
& the Grenadines (2000)118 it found the mandatory death penalty, as applied in this State, in 
violation of Article 6(1), since it was ‘based solely upon the category of crime for which the 
offender is found guilty, without regard to the defendant’s personal circumstances or the circum-
stances of the particular offence’.119 In Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago (2002)120 the Committee 
confirmed the decision in Thompson by establishing that mandatory capital punishment for cer-
tain categories of crime may indeed constitute a violation of Article 6(1).121 Counsel had argued, 
following the decision of the Inter-American Commission in Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago 
(1999),122 that the mandatory death sentence constituted a violation of Articles 6(1), 7 and 26 
ICCPR. This decision seems to have followed US Supreme Court decisions declaring the manda-
tory death sentence to be unconstitutional.123 The HRC has considered that ‘such a system of 
mandatory capital punishment would deprive the author of the most fundamental of rights, the 
right to life, without considering whether this exceptional form of punishment is appropriate in 
the circumstances of his or her case’. Discretionary measures by the executive, such as the right to 
                                                 
117 IACHR Hilaire, Constantine et al., Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, 21 June 2002, §103. 
118 HRC Mr. Eversley Thompson v. St. Vincent & the Grenadines, 18 October 2000. 
119 Lord Colville dissented. He considered that the HRC was diverting from its earlier Views. He 
believed that the majority had founded its opinion on civil law rather than common law and 
disagreed with the view that there could be full compliance with Article 6(4) and still a violation 
of Article 6(1). Kretzmer wrote the second dissent, co-signed by Amor, Yalden and Zakhia. Note 
that, apart from Lord Colville himself, one of the other dissenters, Yalden, indeed came from a 
common law country (Canada), while some of the others may have been influenced by common 
law thinking. At the same time Bhagwati (India), Evatt (Australia) and Henkin (US) who were in 
the majority, all are from common law countries as well. Moreover, it is the US Supreme Court 
that initiated the jurisprudence on the mandatory death penalty. For an earlier case in which the 
HRC found a violation of Article 6(2) rather than 6(1) see: Lubuto v. Zambia, 31 October 1995.  
120 HRC Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002. 
121 In HRC Xavier Evans v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2003, the death sentence was 
commuted several years before the petitioner submitted his case to the HRC. This means that 
Rule 86 was not used. Because of this commutation the HRC determined that the application of 
mandatory capital punishment in this case did not give rise to a claim under the OP. 
122 See CIDH Hilaire v. Trinidad & Tobago, 21 April 1999 (Report 66/99) as referred to in IACHR 
Hilaire, Constantine et al., Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, 21 June 2002, §23. The 
Commission brought the case before the Court on 23 May 1999, arguing that the mandatory 
death penalty violated Articles 1(1), 4(1), 5(1), 5(2), 5(6) and 8(1) ACHR. In its subsequent 
submissions of Constantine et al. and Benjamin et al. it omitted the reference to Article 5(6) on 
social re-adaptation etc.). 
123 See e.g. US Supreme Court, Woodson v. North Carolina 428 U.S. 280 (1976), arguing that 
respect for human dignity, underlying the relevant provision in the constitution, required 
‘consideration of aspects of the character of the individual offender and the circumstances of the 
particular offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of imposing the ultimate punishment of 
death’. The statute in question ‘impermissibly treats all persons convicted of a designated offense 
not as uniquely individual human beings, but as members of a faceless, undifferentiated mass to 
be subjected to the blind infliction of the death penalty’, pp. 303-305). 
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seek pardon or commutation, while obligatory under the ICCPR, were insufficient to secure ade-
quate protection of the right to life.124 
In Carpo et al. v. the Philippines (2003) the HRC raised the issue of the mandatory death 
penalty proprio motu. The Rapporteur may intuitively take provisional measures in a case in 
which, based on the facts, the HRC later invokes a claim proprio motu.125 Wedgwood and Ando 
did not agree with the Committee’s choice to deal with the claim proprio motu nor with the 
Committee’s approach towards the mandatory death penalty.126 On the other hand, they did agree 
with the use of provisional measures in this case. In subsequent cases the HRC raised the issue of 
the mandatory death penalty again.127 In Pagdayawon Rolando v. the Philippines (2004), for 
instance, the Committee first used provisional measures and later found a violation of Article 
6(1).128 The UN Special Rapporteur on arbitrary executions has confirmed this approach by the 
HRC, Inter-American Commission and Court and several domestic courts. “Making such a pen-
alty mandatory – thereby eliminating the discretion of the court – makes it impossible to take into 
account mitigating or extenuating circumstances and eliminates any individual determination of 
an appropriate sentence in a particular case”. “The adoption of such a black and white approach is 
entirely inappropriate where the life of an accused is at stake. Once the sentence has been carried 
out it is irreversible”.129  
                                                 
124 HRC Thompson v. St. Vincent and the Grenadines, 18 October 2000 and Kennedy v. Trinidad 
and Tobago, 26 March 2002. See also Jaime Carpo et al. v. Philippines, 28 March 2003 (Ando 
and Wedgwood dissenting). In this case Amor and Yalden were in fact with the majority and did 
neither join Ando’s dissent nor that of Wedgwood. The other three dissenters in the earlier two 
cases are no longer members of the HRC. 
125 HRC Jaime Carpo et al. v. Philippines, 28 March 2003 (Ando and Wedgwood dissenting). 
126 Wedgwood pointed out that the initial communication by the petitioners was ‘well after 
publication of the Committee’s earlier opinions on the question of mandatory death penalties’. 
They had had the advice of professional legal counsel who had decided not to raise such a claim. 
However, it is in fact normal practice of the HRC to take up issues proprio motu and the 
argument that counsel should have known about the HRC’s earlier decisions on the mandatory 
death penalty also works the other way around, because it should have come as no surprise to the 
State either that the HRC would bring up this issue based on its earlier Views. Nevertheless, 
Wedgwood correctly points out that the HRC could have referred the issue of mandatory 
sentencing to the State party for comment. In other words, the case law is clear on the principle of 
mandatory death penalty and the HRC could easily bring it up as part of its practice to raise 
issues proprio motu, deriving from the facts of the case, without violating procedural equality. It 
could, however, have requested the State party to provide it with a copy of the opinion of the trial 
court in order to determine whether the facts of the case indeed amounted to mandatory 
sentencing.  
127 It noted from the domestic judgments that the death penalty was imposed automatically and 
found a violation of Article 6(1) ICCPR. Only Committee member Ando objected, referring to 
his individual opinion in Carpo. The Committee’s Special Rapporteur had used provisional 
measures in Rayos as well. HRC Ramil Rayos v. the Philippines, 27 July 2004. While Scheinin, 
Chanet and Lallah fully agreed with the Committee’s finding that the petitioner’s mandatory 
death penalty was an arbitrary deprivation of life, they considered that the HRC should have 
followed its interpretation in Judge v. Canada. It should have found that the State equally 
violated Article 6 by re-introducing capital punishment in 1993 after abolishing it in 1987. They 
pointed out that the distinction between abolition and a moratorium was decisive in this respect. 
128 HRC Pagdayawon Rolando v. the Philippines, 3 November 2004 (Wedgwood and Ando 
dissenting). 
129 See e.g. Press release of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary 
executions, ‘Expert on arbitrary executions calls on Singapore government not to carry out 
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3.4.4 The right to life and the fairness of the proceedings  
The provision that a death sentence may be imposed only in accordance with the law and not 
contrary to the provisions of the ICCPR implies that ‘the procedural guarantees therein prescribed 
must be preserved, including the right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the presump-
tion of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defence, and the right to review by a higher 
tribunal’.130 Consequently, if no further appeal is available, the imposition of a death sentence 
‘upon the conclusion of a trial in which the provisions of the Covenant have not been respected’ 
constitutes not only a violation of Article 14 (fair trial) but a violation of the right to life (Article 
6) as well. Thus, the HRC has pointed out that if the final death sentence was passed without due 
respect for the requirements of Article 14 it must hold that there has also been a violation of Arti-
cle 6.131 These requirements include ‘the right to a fair hearing by an independent tribunal, the 
presumption of innocence, the minimum guarantees for the defence, and the right to review of 
conviction and sentence by a higher tribunal’.132 
In its General Comment on the right to a fair trial, the Committee pointed out that the rights 
specifically enumerated in Article 14 ICCPR are ‘minimum’ guarantees. Their observance does 
not always ensure the fairness of a hearing. The right to a fair trial is broader than the sum of the 
individual guarantees, and depends on the entire conduct of the trial.133 
Thus, the HRC considers that any violation of the right to a fair trial in a death penalty case 
automatically results in a violation of the right to life as well. Chapter XIII (Protection) shows that 
this relationship with the right to life is reflected also in the remedy the HRC considers warranted 
if it finds a violation. This is relevant as well for the use of provisional measures.  
Death penalty cases in which the adjudicators have taken provisional measures relate to a 
range of claims. This section first discusses specific issues regarding the fairness of the proceed-
ings dealt with by the regional adjudicators: trial in public and the prohibition of forced confes-
sions, the right to consular notification, freedom from ex post facto laws, the independence and 
impartiality of the judiciary, rights of amnesty, pardon or commutation and the prohibition to 
execute persons pending judicial or administrative proceedings. It then specifically refers to the 
most important claims in death penalty case in which the HRC has taken provisional measures: 
right to counsel, adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence, right to appeal and effective 
                                                                                                                       
mandatory death sentence’, 15 November 2005. The appeal by Rapporteur Alston was made on 
behalf of Nguyen Tuong Van, awaiting execution for attempting to traffic almost 400 grams of 
pure heroin. He pointed out that while the Singapore Court of Appeal had considered several 
cases decided by the JCPC ‘it failed to examine the most important case of all’, which was Boyce 
and Joseph v. the Queen (2004), pointing out that “No international human rights tribunal 
anywhere in the world has ever found a mandatory death penalty regime compatible with 
international human rights norms”. 
130 HRC General Comment 6, 30 April 1982, §7. 
131 See, e.g., HRC Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 July 1990 (Wennergren dissenting); 
Carlton Reid v. Jamaica, 20 July 1990 (Wennergren dissenting); Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 
1991; Trevor Collins v. Jamaica, 25 March 1993; Garfield Peart and Andrew Peart v. Jamaica, 
19 July 1995; George Graham and Arthur Morrison v. Jamaica, 25 March 1996; Clifford 
McLawrence v. Jamaica, 18 July 1997; Abdool Saleem Yasseen and Noel Thomas v. Republic of 
Guyana, 30 March 1998; Silbert Daley v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998; Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 
3 November 1998; Conroy Levy v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998; Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 
23 March 1999 and Azer Garyverdy Ogly Aliev v. Ukraine, 7 August 2003.  
132 HRC General Comment 6, 30 April 1982, §7. 
133 HRC General Comment 13, 13 April 1982, §5. The HRC has since replaced this General 
Comment with its General Comment 32, 23 August 2007, see §31. For specific references to 
necessary aspects for the right to fair trial in cases involving the death penalty see §§10, 17, 38, 
51. 
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representation on appeal, fair trial aspects of detention and delay and undue delay and the lack of 
a written judgment by domestic courts.  
3.4.4.1 TRIAL IN PUBLIC AND THE PROHIBITION OF FORCED CONFESSIONS 
While the African Charter does not specifically mention the right to public trials, the African 
Commission, drawing guidance from international human rights law and practice, has found that 
Article 7 does not allow in camera trials.134  
The rule that no one shall be compelled to testify against himself or to confess guilt (Article 
14(3)(g) ICCPR) is closely related to Article 7 on the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment. 
The HRC has noted that Article 14(3)(g) ‘must be understood in terms of the absence of any 
direct or indirect physical or psychological pressure from the investigating authorities on the 
accused, with a view to obtaining a confession of guilt. A fortiori, it is unacceptable to treat an 
accused person in a manner contrary to Article 7 of the Covenant in order to extract a confes-
sion’.135 Hence the HRC has found that for the purpose of guaranteeing a fair trial Article 14(3)(g) 
also implies the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment.136 
3.4.4.2 THE RIGHT TO CONSULAR NOTIFICATION 
An example of a claim dealt with in the Inter-American system involves the right of consular 
notification. In 1999 the Inter-American Court issued an Advisory Opinion dealing with the 
human rights obligations of the members of the OAS who were also States Parties to the Vienna 
Convention of Consular Relations. The Court considered that executing a foreign national who 
had not been notified of his or her right to contact his consulate, and had not been able to remedy 
this violation once informed of this right was an arbitrary deprivation of life.137 The Inter-
American Commission has used precautionary measures several times to halt executions of 
persons who had not been informed of their right of consular notification.138  
                                                 
134 ACHPR Civil Liberties Organisation et al. v. Nigeria, April/May 2001, §§35-39. 
135 See e.g. HRC Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991; Glenford Campbell v. Jamaica, 30 March 
1992, and Albert Berry v. Jamaica, 7 April 1994. 
136 See e.g. HRC Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991 and General Comment 32, on Article 14, 23 
August 2007, §§6, 41 and 60. See also ACHPR Malawi African Association et al. v. Mauritania, 
May 2000, §95 and Civil Liberties Organisation et al. v. Nigeria, April/May 2001, §40. 
137 IACHR The right to information on Consular assistance in the framework of guarantees of the 
due process of law, Advisory Opinion OC-16/99, 1 October 1999. See also the ICJ LaGrand 
judgment of 27 June 2001, discussed in Chapter I.  
138 See e.g. CIDH Humberto Leal García v. US, 30 January 2007, §47; Rubén Ramírez Cárdenas v. 
US, 30 January 2007, §48; Heriberto Chi Aceituno v. US, 28 September 2007, §50 (see also 
CIDH press release 35/08, 8 August 2008 condemning his execution) and José Ernesto Medellín 
v. US, 6 December 2006 and 3 January 2007. See also decision on the merits, 24 July 2008 
(determining ‘that the State violated Articles I, XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration of 
the Rights and Duties of Man against Mr. Medellín, with respect to the criminal conviction that 
led to his death sentence. Among other aspects, the IACHR determined that as a result of the 
State’s failure to fulfill its obligation, under Article 36.1 of the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations, to inform Mr. Medellín of his right to consular notification and assistance, the criminal 
process against him did not meet the minimum standards of due process and a fair trial required 
under Articles XVIII and XXVI of the American Declaration. The Commission concluded that if 
 Halting Executions 
241 
3.4.4.3 FREEDOM FROM EX POST FACTO LAWS  
The Inter-American Court has also dealt with freedom from ex post facto laws. In Fermín 
Ramírez v. Guatemala (2005) it pointed out that the procedural guarantees delimiting the State’s 
power to prosecute and punish individuals in a democratic society are particularly important in 
the context of the death penalty.139 In order to establish his dangerousness, the sentencing tribunal 
had changed the legal qualification of the crime and introduced (and held as established) new 
facts and circumstances that the petitioner had not been charged with.140 The Inter-American 
Court added that the introduction of the criterion of future dangerousness in the domestic 
legislation was incompatible with the freedom from ex post facto laws in Article 9 ACHR.141 
3.4.4.4 INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY OF THE JUDICIARY 
One very important claim relates to the independence and impartiality of the judiciary. In Öcalan 
the ECtHR found that the petitioner had not been tried by an independent and impartial tribunal 
within the meaning of Article 6(1) ECHR, which was not in conformity ‘with the strict standards 
of fairness required in cases involving capital sentence’.142 He had to ‘suffer the consequences of 
the imposition of that sentence for nearly three years’. The imposition of the death penalty ‘fol-
lowing an unfair trial by a Court who’s independence and impartiality were open to doubt 
amounted to inhuman treatment in violation of Article 3’.143 
Although it had already found that the execution of the petitioner would violate Protocol 
No. 6 the Bosnia Chamber considered whether the execution would be in conformity with Article 
2 ECHR.144 It pointed out that the procedural guarantees in death penalty cases must be ‘of the 
                                                                                                                       
the State executed Mr. Medellín based on those proceedings, it would commit an irreparable 
violation of his fundamental right to life, protected by Article I of the American Declaration. The 
IACHR thus recommended, among other things, that the State vacate the death penalty imposed 
on Mr. Medellín and hold a new trial in accordance with the protections prescribed under the 
American Declaration-equality, due process, and a fair trial, including the right to competent 
legal representation’, see press release 33/08 of 6 August 2008, condemning his execution). See 
also the ICJ’s provisional measures in the Avena interpretation case, Chapter I. 
139 IACHR Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, 20 June 2005, §78. 
140 Id., §§65-80. It referred to the principle of coherence or correlation between the charge and the 
sentence, meaning that the sentence should be based only on the facts and circumstances in the 
original charges. It referred to ECtHR Pelissier and Sassi v. France, 25 March 1999, §§51-54 
(observing that Article 6 (3)(a) ECHR gives the defendant the right ‘to be informed no only of the 
cause of the accusation, that is to say the acts he is alleged to have committed and on which the 
accusation is based, but also the legal characterization given to those acts’). 
141 IACHR Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, 20 June 2005, §§87-98. The Court also found a violation 
of a the minimum guarantee of prior notification of the charges (Article 8 (2)(b)) and of adequate 
time and means for the preparation of the defence (Article 8 (2)(c)). 
142 ECtHR Grand Chamber Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, §174. 
143 ECtHR Grand Chamber Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, §§174 (but see partly 
Dissenting Opinion Wildhaber, Costa, Caflisch, Türmen, Garlicki and Borrego Borrego arguing 
that the domestic court had been independent and impartial; see also the partly Dissenting 
Opinion by Costa, Caflisch, Türmen and Borrego Borrego arguing that even if the domestic court 
had not been independent and impartial this would not have constituted a breach of Article 3). 
144 Bosnia Chamber Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH, 5 September 1997 (merits). See, however, the 
concurring opinion of Nowak and Möller pointing out that it was irrelevant whether the 
imposition of the death penalty before December 1995 was in accordance with the law at that 
time and whether the sentence was imposed by an independent and impartial court after a fair 
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highest order’.145 A strict approach must be taken to the requirements of independence and impar-
tiality of judges. It pointed out that members of the District Military Court that convicted the 
petitioner were not legally protected against removal. Such protection ‘must normally be consid-
ered an essential requirement of independence’. In this case the relevant court ‘lack a sufficient 
appearance of independence’ and could therefore not be regarded as a ‘court’ for the purposes of 
Article 2(1) ECHR.146 The African Commission has also emphasized the importance of an inde-
pendent and impartial judiciary.147 In the Saro-Wiwa case it found that the special tribunals in 
Nigeria violated Article 7(1)(d) African Charter ‘because their composition is at the discretion of 
the executive branch’.148 In violation of this article, tribunals composed of persons belonging 
largely to the executive branch of government create the ‘appearance, if not actual, lack of impar-
tiality’, simply by their composition and ‘(r)egardless of the character of the individual members 
of such tribunals’.149 It has also found that the composition alone of the Special Courts in Sudan 
violated Article 7 (1)(d) by creating ‘the impression, if not the reality, of lack of impartiality’. The 
government had the duty to provide the structures necessary for the exercise of this right. “By 
providing for courts whose impartiality is not guaranteed, it has violated article 26”. The Com-
mission added that the State had violated both articles as well by dismissing more than 100 
‘judges who were opposed to the formation of special courts and military tribunals’ “To deprive 
courts of the personnel qualified to ensure that they operate impartially thus denies the right to 
individuals to have their case heard by such bodies”.150 
                                                                                                                       
trial or not because after the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement execution of a death 
penalty would constitute ‘a violation of the constitutional obligation to secure the absolute right 
not to be executed’, as contained in Article 1 Second OP, listed in Annex I of the Constitution. 
145 Bosnia Chamber Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH, 5 September 1997 (merits), §38. 
146 Id., §§40-42. See also Herak v. Fed. BiH, 12 June 1998.  
147 See also Chapter XII, section 2.9, discussing provisional measures to protect independence of the 
judiciary. 
148 ACHPR International PEN et al. (on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa) v. Nigeria, 31 October 1998, 
§86. 
149 ACHPR Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lakwot and 6 others) v. Nigeria, 
October 1994, §§13-14. See also Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Akamu et al.) v. 
Nigeria, undated/8th Annual Activity Report/1995, §12. It also found a violation in a case against 
Mauritania. “Withdrawing criminal procedure from the competence of the Court established 
within the judicial order and conferring it to an extension of the executive necessarily 
compromises the impartiality of the Court, to which the African Charter refers. Independent of 
the quality of the persons sitting in such jurisdictions, their very existence constitutes a violation 
of the principles of impartiality and independence of the judiciary and, thereby, of article 
7(1)(d)”. Moreover, by establishing a section within the special domestic tribunal, responsible for 
matters relating to state security, Mauritania was ‘reneging on its duty to guarantee the 
independence of the Court’ in violation of Article 26 ACHPR. ACHPR Malawi African 
Association et al. v. Mauritania, 11 May 2000, §§98-100. 
150 ACHPR Amnesty International et al. v. Sudan, November 1999, §§68-69. In an unedited version 
of a decision against Malawi (that cannot be found as such in the official version) the 
Commission considered that under Article 7(1)(a) and (c) ACHPR individuals have a right to be 
tried by a court that is not only impartial, but also competent. This ‘follows from the other articles 
and the spirit of the Charter’ “To fail to ensure that judges have legal training and that rules of 
evidence are applied illustrates that the government has neglected its duty to provide courts that 
are of sufficient competence to satisfy Article 26 of the Charter”. Achutan (on behalf of Aleke 
Banda) and Amnesty International (on behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa) v. Malawi, 
October/November 1994, at <dcregistry.com/users/ACHPR/index2.html>. 
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3.4.4.5 RIGHTS OF AMNESTY, PARDON OR COMMUTATION AND THE PROHIBITI-
ON TO EXECUTE PERSONS PENDING JUDICIAL OR ADMINISTRATIVE PRO-
CEEDINGS 
There have also been claims about the procedural rights involving requests for amnesty, pardon or 
commutation. The HRC seems to take a more restrictive approach than the Inter-American Court. 
In Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala (2005) the Inter-American Court found a violation of Article 
4(6) because an appropriate possibility for requesting clemency was lacking. It pointed out that 
clemency formed part of the international corpus iuris.151 In Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago 
(2002) the HRC decided that the right to seek commutation was not governed by the procedural 
guarantees of Article 14 and that it was within the discretion of States to spell out the modalities 
of the exercise of this right.152 
Yet, no execution should take place pending appeal or other recourse procedure, nor pend-
ing pardon or commutation proceedings (Article 6(4) jo. 14(5) ICCPR). A similar provision can 
be found in Article 4(6) ACHR. This is directly related to the purpose of the provisional meas-
ures: halting executions pending the proceedings before the HRC. As one member of the Commit-
tee put it, its Rule on provisional measures ‘had in fact been designed to guarantee’ that those 
sentenced to death should be able to exhaust all remedies.153 
3.4.4.6 RIGHT TO COUNSEL 
The extensive case law of the HRC, in cases in which it previously used provisional measures, 
indicates the types of situations in which provisional measures are likely to be invoked in the 
future as well. One situation obviously is that involving complaints regarding the right to counsel.  
The HRC has determined it is ‘imperative’ or ‘axiomatic’ that ‘legal assistance be available 
at all stages of the proceedings in capital cases’.154 This includes any preliminary hearings and the 
relevant appeals as well.155 Equally, the absence of an assigned counsel during summing up con-
stitutes ineffective assistance of counsel in violation of this article.156 The HRC has equally noted 
                                                 
151 IACHR Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, 20 June 2005, §§104-110.  
152 HRC Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002. 
153 HRC Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1994, 
CCPR/C/SR/1352, 31 July 1996, §21 (Bruni Celli; Venezuela). 
154 See e.g. HRC Frank Robinson v. Jamaica, 30 March 1989 (provisional measures were not 
applied in this case since his death sentence was already commuted before he petitioned the 
HRC). See further E.B. v. Jamaica, 26 October 1990, §5.4. See also W.W. v. Jamaica, 26 
October 1990; Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 July 1990; Carlton Reid v. Jamaica, 20 
July 1990; Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991; Raphael Henry v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; 
Glenford Campbell v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992; Trevor Collins v. Jamaica, 25 March 1993; 
Robinson LaVende v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997; Abdool Saleem Yasseen and Noel 
Thomas v. Republic of Guyana, 30 March 1998; Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 30 November 
1998 and Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999. 
155 See e.g. HRC Osbourne Wright and Eric Harvey v. Jamaica, 27 October 1995 and Clarence 
Marshall v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998 (a violation of Article 14(3)(d) because the court 
commenced and proceeded through a whole day of the preliminary hearing without informing the 
petitioner of his right to legal representation). 
156 HRC Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999. The Committee recalled that the State 
party should ensure that counsel, once assigned, provide effective representation of the accused. 
It considered that ‘it should have been apparent to the trial judge that counsel was not providing 
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that the denial of legal aid constitutes a violation of Article 14(1) jo. 2(3).157 Still, ‘the mere ab-
sence of the defence counsel at some limited time during the proceedings does not in itself consti-
tute a violation of the Covenant’. It ‘must be assessed on a case-by-case basis whether counsel’s 
absence was incompatible with the interests of justice’.158 It is axiomatic in capital cases that the 
accused be represented not only for the trial but also for the preliminary inquiry.159 In a case 
against Ukraine the HRC considered a violation of Article 14(1) that the petitioner had no counsel 
during the first five months of detention. During this period he had been interrogated by police 
officers and the capital crime of which he was accused was being reconstructed without his par-
ticipation. In the same case it also found a violation of Article 14(3)(d) because the Supreme 
Court heard his case in his absence and in the absence of his counsel.160 Indeed, Article 14(3)(d) 
also stipulates the right to be tried in one’s presence. In one case against Georgia the HRC noted 
that it was uncontested that the petitioners were forced to be absent during long periods of the 
trial, that one of the petitioners was not represented for part of the trial and that two others were 
represented by lawyers whose services they had refused. They were not allowed to conduct their 
own defence or to be represented by lawyers of their choice.161 The HRC has also pronounced 
itself on the availability of information to the defendant. In a 1997 case against Jamaica the peti-
tioner did not have the documents of a statement in which someone else confessed to the murder 
for which the petitioner had been sentenced to death. The Committee noted that the State party 
had not explained why this alleged statement was never made available to him or to his counsel. It 
found that the failure to provide him with legal aid had denied him the opportunity to have inquir-
ies made about the matter and to pursue such domestic legal remedies as may have been available 
to him.162 
Regional adjudicators have also dealt with this issue. In Öcalan, for instance, the ECtHR 
found a violation of the rights of the defence because the petitioner had no access to a lawyer 
while in police custody, he ‘was unable to communicate with his lawyers out of the hearing of 
officials, restrictions had been imposed on the number and length of his lawyers’ visits to him, he 
                                                                                                                       
effective representation of the accused’. This should have been apparent ‘at the latest when he 
noticed that counsel was absent when he started his summing-up’. 
157 HRC Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002. 
158 HRC Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998. 
159 HRC Steve Shaw v. Jamaica, 2 April 1998. See also Clive Johnson v. Jamaica, 20 October 1998. 
In this case the State party had not contested that the petitioner was not represented during the 
preliminary hearing but had merely stated that there was no indication that he had requested a 
lawyer. The Committee considered that “when the author appeared at the preliminary hearing 
without a legal representative, it would have been incumbent upon the investigating magistrate to 
inform the author of his right to have legal representation and to ensure legal representation for 
the author, if he so wished”. See further Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999. In this 
case the HRC noted from the trial transcript that the petitioner’s representative was absent during 
the deposition of two prosecution witnesses at the preliminary hearing and that the magistrate 
continued the hearing of the witnesses and only adjourned when the petitioner indicated that he 
did not wish to cross-examine the witnesses himself. After two adjournments where the lawyer 
again did not turn up, the judge appointed new counsel for the petitioner, but this counsel 
declined to cross-examine the witnesses. The Committee found a violation of Article 14(3)(d). 
“In the present case, the Committee is of the opinion that the magistrate, when aware of the 
absence of the author’s defence counsel, should not have proceeded with the deposition of the 
witnesses without allowing the author an opportunity to ensure the presence of his counsel”. 
160 HRC Azer Garyverdy ogly Aliev v. Ukraine, 7 August 2003. 
161 It found a violation of Article 14(3)(d) in respect of all four petitioners. HRC Victor P. 
Domukovsky, Zaza Tsiklauri, Petre Gelbakhiani and Irakli Dokvadze v. Georgia, 6 April 1998. 
162 This amounted to a violation of Article 14(3)(d) in conjunction with Article 2(3) ICCPR. HRC 
Maurice Thomas v. Jamaica, 3 November 1997. 
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was unable to consult the case-file until an advanced stage of the proceedings and his lawyers did 
not have sufficient time to consult the file properly’.163 
The African Commission has noted that ‘especially in serious cases, which carry the death 
penalty, the accused should be represented by a lawyer of his choice’. “The purpose of this provi-
sion is to ensure that the accused has confidence in his legal counsel. Failure to provide for this 
may expose the accused to a situation where he will not be able to give full instructions to his 
counsel for lack of confidence”.164 Assigning of military counsel to accused persons, against their 
objections, ‘and especially in a criminal proceeding which carries the ultimate punishment’ vio-
lates Article 7(1)(c) ACHPR.165 Giving sentencing tribunals the power to veto the choice of coun-
sel of defendants is ‘an unacceptable infringement’ of the right to freely choose one’s counsel. 
“There should be an objective system of licensing advocates, so that qualified advocates cannot 
be barred from appearing in particular cases. It is essential that the national bar be an independent 
body which regulates legal practitioners, and that the tribunals themselves not adopt this role, 
which will infringe on the right to defence”.166 The African Commission added that it was desir-
able for indigent defendants that they were represented ‘at state expense’, but ‘even in such cases, 
the accused should be able to choose from a list the preferred independent counsel “not acting 
under the instructions of government but responsible only to the accused’”.167 
3.4.4.7 ADEQUATE TIME AND FACILITIES TO PREPARE A DEFENCE 
The HRC explains the right to have adequate time and facilities for the preparation of the defence 
as an important element of the guarantee of a fair trial and a corollary or ‘emanation’ of the 
principle of equality of arms. Particularly in capital cases it is axiomatic that sufficient time must 
be granted to the accused and counsel and this requirement applies to all stages of the judicial 
proceedings.168At the same time ‘the State party cannot be held accountable for lack of 
preparation or alleged errors made by defence lawyers unless it has denied the author and his 
counsel time to prepare the defence or it should have been manifest to the court that the lawyers’ 
conduct was incompatible with the interests of justice’.169 In the absence of information or 
objection from the State party the HRC found a violation of Article 14(2) in Saidov v. Tajikistan 
                                                 
163 This constituted violations of Article 6(1), together with Article 6 (3)(b)(c). See ECHR (Grand 
Chamber), Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 May 2005, §173. 
164 ACHPR Civil Liberties Organisation et al. v. Nigeria, April/May 2001, §28. 
165 Id., §31. 
166 ACHPR Amnesty International et al. v. Sudan, November 1999, §64. See also Constitutional 
Rights Project v. Nigeria, 26th ordinary session, 13th Annual Activity Report, §12. 
167 ACHPR Civil Liberties Organisation et al. v. Nigeria, April/May 2001, §29. The Commission 
referred to early case law of the HRC involving Uruguay and to its own Resolution on the Right 
to Recourse and Fair Trial (1992). See also ACHPR Malawi African Association et al. v. 
Mauritania, May 2000, §96 (no access or restricted access to counsel and insufficient time to 
prepare for the defence in violation of Article 7(1)(c)) and idem, §97 (Article 7(c)(1) requires 
charges in language defendants understand). 
168 HRC Clifton Wright v. Jamaica, 27 July 1992; Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991; Aston Little 
v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; Leaford Smith v. Jamaica, 31 March 1993 and Alrick Thomas v. 
Jamaica, 31 March 1992. 
169 See e.g. HRC Errol Smith and Oval Stewart v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999. It has discussed Article 14 
(3)(b) and (e) in other situations as well. See e.g. Yasseen and Thomas v. Guyana, 30 March 
1998. 
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(2004). ‘Due to the extensive and adverse pre-trial coverage by state-directed media’ the 
petitioner’s right to be presumed innocent had been violated.170 
3.4.4.8 RIGHT TO APPEAL AND EFFECTIVE REPRESENTATION ON APPEAL 
In some States the issue of the availability of legal aid for constitutional motions is of crucial 
importance.171 The ICCPR does not require States to provide for several instances of appeal, but if 
domestic law provides for further instances Article 14(5) requires that the convicted person in-
deed has access to each of them.172 In death penalty cases the availability of legal representation is 
a prerequisite for a fair hearing. This also applies to hearings on constitutional issues, especially 
as these are often quite complicated. When the HRC refers to the requirements of a fair hearing in 
such cases, it does not argue that Article 14(3)(d) is directly applicable, but it states that in death 
penalty cases the requirements found in Article 14(3)(d) must be read into Article 14(1).173 
The right to a fair trial extends to the right to review by a higher tribunal according to law 
(Article 14(5) ICCPR). The Committee takes ‘according to law’ in Article 14(5) to mean that 
when domestic law provides for more than one instance of appeal in criminal cases, the convicted 
person must indeed have effective access to each of these instances of appeal.174 Of course it is a 
prerequisite for Article 14(1) that the petitioner is informed about the date of the appeal hearing 
before it takes place.175 The most important factor the HRC has examined in relation to the right 
to effective representation during appeal is whether counsel had abandoned (grounds for) the 
appeal. It has found violations of Article 14(3)(d) and (5) when counsel had abandoned all 
grounds of appeal and when the court had not ascertained whether this was in accordance with the 
wishes of the client.176 
                                                 
170 HRC Gaibullodzhon Ilyasovich Saidov (submitted by his wife Barno Saidova) v. Tajikistan, 8 
July 2004. 
171 See the discussion of exhaustion of domestic remedies and the use of provisional measures, 
Chapter XIV, section 2.2.2. 
172 See, e.g., HRC Anthony Currie v. Jamaica, 29 March 1994; Lloyd Grant v. Jamaica, 31 March 
1994; Patrick Taylor v. Jamaica, 18 July 1997; Desmond Taylor v. Jamaica, 2 April 1998 
(Ando, Bhagwati, Buergenthal and Kretzmer dissenting) and Steve Shaw v. Jamaica, 2 April 
1998 (Ando, Bhagwati, Buergenthal and Kretzmer dissenting). See also Clive Johnson v. 
Jamaica, 20 October 1998 (in this case the Committee considered that, in light of its other 
findings it was not necessary to address counsel’s claim that the absence of legal aid for the 
purpose of filing a constitutional motion in itself constituted a violation of the Covenant). 
173 The HRC has also found a violation of Article 14(3)(d) because of the denial of legal aid ‘which 
contributed to the further delay in the author’s application for leave to appeal to the Privy 
Council’. Maurice Thomas v. Jamaica, 3 November 1997. See further Raphael Henry v. 
Jamaica, 1 November 1991 and Robinson LaVende v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997. 
The Inter-American Commission has made a similar argument, invoking Articles 8(1) and 25 
ACHR, see e.g. CIDH Lamey, Mykoo, Montique and Dalton v. Jamaica, 4 April 2001, (fifth 
recommendation); Joseph Thomas v. Jamaica, 3 December 2001 (fourth recommendation); 
Denton Aitken v. Jamaica, 21 October 2002 (fifth recommendation) and Sewell v. Jamaica, 27 
December 2003 (fourth recommendation). 
174 HRC Raphael Henry v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991. 
175 HRC Alrick Thomas v. Jamaica, 31 March 1992. 
176 HRC Carlton Reid v. Jamaica, 20 July 1990; Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991; Trevor 
Collins v. Jamaica, 25 March 1993; Tony Jones v. Jamaica, 6 April 1998. See also e.g. George 
Graham and Arthur Morrison v. Jamaica, 25 March 1996; Rickly Burrell v. Jamaica, 18 July 
1996; McCordie Morrison v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998, and Errol Smith and Oval Stewart v. 
Jamaica, 8 April 1999. On this issue see also Spronken (2001), pp. 447-449. 
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The African Commission has pointed out about the right of appeal that Article 7(1)(a) 
ACHPR is clearly violated by the ‘foreclosure of any avenue of appeal to competent national 
organs in a criminal case attracting punishment as severe as the death penalty’.177 “For an appeal 
to be effective, the appellate jurisdiction must, objectively and impartially, consider both the 
elements of fact and of law that are brought before it”.178 All provisions of Article 7(1) are ‘mutu-
ally dependent, and where the right to be heard is infringed, other violations may occur, such as 
detentions being rendered arbitrary’. “Especially sensitive is the definition of ‘competent’, which 
encompasses facets such as the expertise of the judges and the inherent justice of the laws under 
which they operate”.179 In 2000 the African Commission found Sierra Leone in violation of due 
process (Article 7(1) (a) ACHPR) for executing 24 soldiers without having granted them the right 
of appeal.180 Moreover, it found a violation of the right to life (Article 4), stressing this right ‘is 
the fulcrum of all other rights. It is the fountain through which other rights flow, and any violation 
of this right without due process amounts to arbitrary deprivation of life’.181 
3.4.4.9 UNDUE DELAY 
There is a clear link between the right to be brought promptly before a judicial officer (Article 
9(3) ICCPR) and the right to habeas corpus (Article 9(4)). This link often shows itself in the issue 
of access to legal representation.182 Moreover, the right of persons charged with a criminal of-
fence to be informed promptly and in detail of the charges against them (Article 14 (3)(a)) is 
closely related to, but more precise than, Article 9(2). Article 9(2) stipulates that anyone who is 
arrested shall be informed, at the time of arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and shall be promptly 
informed of any charges against him. However, as long as Article 9(3) is indeed complied with, a 
violation of Article 9(2) does not necessarily imply a violation of Article 14(3)(a).183 In other 
words, as long as the authorities have complied with Article 9(3), Article 14(3)(a) does not re-
quire them to provide the details of the nature and cause of the charge immediately upon arrest.184 
                                                 
177 ACHPR Civil Liberties Organisation et al. v. Nigeria, April/May 2001, §35. See also 
Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Lakwot and 6 others) v. Nigeria, 1995, §11 and 
Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Akamu et al.) v. Nigeria, undated/8th annual activity 
report 1995, §11. 
178 ACHPR Malawi African Association et al. v. Mauritania, 11 May 2000, §94. 
179 ACHPR Amnesty International et al. v. Sudan, November 1999, §61. 
180 They were executed on 19 October 1998, some of them in violation of provisional measures by 
the HRC, see e.g. Chapter XVII (Official responses). The Sierra Leonean NGO Forum of 
Conscience brought the case before the African Commission five days after the executions took 
place. 
181 ACHPR Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone, October/November 2000, §19. As noted, the 
initial submission in this case was five days after the execution, which explains why no 
provisional measures were used. 
182 HRC Stephens v. Jamaica, 18 October 1995. The HRC found a violation of Article 9(3) because 
of a delay of eight days, but it did not find a violation of Article 9(4) because there was no 
evidence that the petitioner or his legal representative had requested a prompt decision on the 
lawfulness of his detention. The availability of counsel seems crucial, since in other cases in 
which it found violations of Article 9(3) the HRC mentioned the denial of access to legal 
representation as an aggravating factor. In such cases it did find a violation of the right to habeas 
corpus (Article 9(4)). See also Glenford Campbell v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992; Albert Berry v. 
Jamaica, 7 April 1994 and Clifford McLawrence v. Jamaica, 18 July 1997. 
183 HRC Clifford McLawrence v. Jamaica, 18 July 1997, see especially §5.9. 
184 Id. In this case, however, the Committee had found a violation of Article 9(3) when it stated that 
a delay of one week in a capital case could not be deemed compatible with that paragraph and 
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The General Comment on the right to liberty and security of persons (Article 9) stipulates 
that ‘pre-trial detention should be an exception and as short as possible’.185 The Committee has 
found that, in the absence of a satisfactory explanation by the State party, a delay ranging from 23 
months to more than three years in bringing the petitioner to trial, during which he is kept in pre-
trial detention, constituted not only a violation of Article 14(3)(c) but also of the entitlement to 
trial within reasonable time or release (Article 9(3)).186 The HRC may also find a violation of 
Article 9(3) but not of 14(3)(c). If the HRC only recommends commutation in the context of a 
violation of Article 14, this choice is significant as provisional measures used in cases involving a 
claim of a violation of Article 9 alone do not seem to be related to the right to reparation.187 It has 
concluded that a delay of almost four years between the judgment of the Court of Appeal and the 
beginning of the retrial, a period during which the petitioner was kept in detention, cannot be 
deemed compatible with the provisions of Articles 9(3) and 14(3)(c), ‘in the absence of any ex-
planations from the State party justifying the delay’.188 In other cases it declared the claim inad-
                                                                                                                       
neither could the pre-trial detention of more than 16 months. The Committee had indeed found a 
violation of Article 9(2) when it stated that it must rely on the petitioner’s statement that he was 
only apprised of the charges for his arrest when he was first taken to the preliminary hearing 
almost three weeks after the arrest. It noted that the duty to inform the accused under Article 
14(3)(a) is ‘more precise’ than that for arrested persons under Article 9(2). Given the fact that in 
this case the Committee had concluded that the State had not complied with Article 9(3) its 
reasoning in declaring no violation of Article 14(3)(a) is puzzling. 
185 HRC General Comment No. 8 on the right to liberty and security of persons (Article 9), 30 June 
1982. 
186 See e.g. HRC Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999; Steve Shaw v. Jamaica, 2 April 
1998; Beresford Whyte v. Jamaica, 27 July; Anthony Finn v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998; Clive Smart 
v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 July 1998; Zephiniah Hamilton v. Jamaica, 23 July 1999; Desmond 
Taylor v. Jamaica, 2 April 1998; E. Henry and E. Douglas v. Jamaica, 25 July 1996 and Oral 
Hendricks v. Guyana, 22 October 2002. 
187 See further Chapter XIII (Protection). In the following two cases provisional measures were used, 
but the claim was not based on Article 9 ICCPR alone. Andrew Perkins v. Jamaica, 30 July 1998, 
the petitioner was only brought to trial after one year and nine months, and remanded in custody 
for that period. The HRC found a violation of Article 9(3) but deemed that, in the circumstances, 
there was no need to address the question of whether the delay also constitutes a violation of 
Article 14(3)(c). See also Everton Morrison v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998. The delay of 1,5 year 
between arrest and trial was only a ‘matter of concern’ but did not amount to a violation of 
Article 9(3) ‘since he was detained on a murder charge’ nor of Article 14(3)(c) ‘because the 
preliminary enquiry took place during that period’. Medina Quiroga dissented on this issue 
arguing that ‘if a delay is a matter of concern the Committee cannot conclude that there is no 
violation unless the State has given an explanation about the reasons for the delay’. She pointed 
out that the Committee itself had taken this position when it decided on the admissibility of the 
claim and invited the State ‘to provide more precise information as to the investigations carried 
out during the period between the arrest and the preliminary enquiry and to inform the Committee 
of the exact dates of the preliminary hearings’. As the State simply responded to this request by 
repeating its earlier statement, she concluded that the Committee should have found a violation of 
Article 9(3). 
188 HRC Leroy Shalto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 4 April 1995. See also Sahadeo v. Guyana, 1 
November 2001. In another case it found that the delay of one year and nine months between the 
Court of Appeal judgment that a re-trial should take place and the beginning of the re-trial could 
not be attributed solely to the State party and thus did not disclose a violation of the Covenant. 
Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999. In the absence of any circumstances justifying it, 
the HRC did consider that a delay of one year and eleven months between trial and appeal 
constituted a violation of Article 14(3)(c) and (5). Samuel Thomas v. Jamaica, 31 March 1999; 
see also Clifford McLawrence v. Jamaica, 18 July 1997 (delay of two years and seven months; in 
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missible noting that it was clear that such delays in the appeal proceedings were essentially attrib-
utable to the petitioner.189  
About the relevance of the economic situation as a justification for undue delay the HRC 
has pointed out that ‘the rights set forth in the Covenant constitute minimum standards which all 
States parties have agreed to observe’.190 
3.4.4.10 THE LACK OF A WRITTEN JUDGMENT BY DOMESTIC COURTS 
Some claims based on Article 14(3)(c) and 14(5) ICCPR have related specifically to the lack of 
written judgment by domestic courts.191 This has been relevant in many cases involving Jamaica. 
In Clement Francis v. Jamaica (1995)192 the HRC found that the ‘inordinate delay in issuing a 
note of oral judgment’ entailed a violation of Article 14 paragraphs 3(c) and 5, ‘although it ap-
pears that the delay did not ultimately prejudice the author’s appeal to the Judicial Committee of 
the Privy Council’. 
The lack of written judgment on appeal results in a denial of the possibility to effectively 
appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London. The JCPC allegedly 
routinely dismisses petitions that are not accompanied by the written judgment of the lower court. 
The Jamaican Constitution provides for appeals from a decision of the Jamaican Court of Appeal 
to the JCPC. Thus, the failure of the Court of Appeal to issue a written judgment resulted in a 
violation of Article 14(5).193 Equally, the HRC has determined that the dismissal of an application 
for leave to appeal, ‘without reasons given and in the absence of a written judgment’ constitutes a 
violation of Article 14(5).194 When the Court of Appeal does not produce a written judgment the 
petitioner is prevented from effectively petitioning the JCPC for special leave to appeal.195  
                                                                                                                       
this case it even observed that in the absence of any State party justification it would make such a 
finding in similar circumstances in other cases. This was a clear warning to the State party for 
future cases); Silbert Daley v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998 (delay of two years and seven months); 
Errol Smith and Oval Stewart v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999 (delay of two years and one month) and 
Errol Johnson v. Jamaica, 22 March 1996 (delay of four years and three months). 
189 HRC Clive Smart v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 July 1998. The Committee referred to the contents 
of an addendum in the Court of Appeal judgement that stated: “It was clear to us all that the 
appellant was attempting by this manoeuvre to beat the Pratt and Morgan deadline as best he 
could”. Sometimes it has noted that delays were not entirely attributable to the State party, as the 
petitioners themselves had requested adjournments. See e.g. Abdool Saleem Yasseen and Noel 
Thomas v. Republic of Guyana, 30 March 1998 and Lennon Stephens v. Jamaica, 18 October 
1995. 
190 HRC Bernhard Lubuto v. Zambia, 31 October 1995. It acknowledged the difficult economic 
situation of the State party, but considered that the period of eight years between the arrest and 
the final decision of the Supreme Court, dismissing his appeal, was incompatible with the 
requirements of Article 14(3)(c). 
191 See also Chapter XIV on the relationship with admissibility and jurisdiction. 
192 HRC Clement Francis v. Jamaica, 25 July 1995. See also Aston Little v. Jamaica, 1 November 
1991, finding a violation of Article 14(5). 
193 HRC Raphael Henry v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991. 
194 HRC George Winston Reid v. Jamaica, 8 July 1994. 
195 HRC Raphael Henry v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991. See also Victor Francis v. Jamaica, 24 
March 1993. In Anthony Currie v. Jamaica, 29 March 1994 the petitioner pointed out fifteen 
years had passed since he was originally charged with murder and almost thirteen years since the 
Court of Appeal orally dismissed his appeal. No written judgment had been issued as yet. 
Challenging Jamaica’s statement that the JCPC had examined his case, he stated that the Privy 
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3.4.5 The death row phenomenon 
There are at least four levels at which the death row phenomenon may come into play. The first 
level consists of being sentenced to death and waiting to be executed at a predetermined point in 
time in a predetermined, often routinised and ‘medicalised’ manner. The second level consists of 
the length of the wait (days/5 years/18 years/32 years?).196 The third level relates to the circum-
stances of the wait, such as a separate death row and a rigid regime.197 The final level consists of 
individual circumstances such as age, mental history. If step one triggers the death row phenome-
non, the other steps (the length of the wait, the circumstances on a specific death row and personal 
factors) simply show types of aggravation. The question arises whether the HRC would use provi-
sional measures in any or all of these situations. 
While in the more recent Öcalan case the ECtHR took provisional measures to halt an exe-
cution, in Soering v. UK it did so to halt extradition to a death penalty State.198 On the merits it 
found that the UK would violate Article 3 ECHR rather than Article 2 on the right to life (since, 
as noted, the majority had a strictly textual interpretation of the latter article). Its argument for 
finding a violation of Article 3 was based on the risk of exposure to a so called ‘death row phe-
nomenon’.199 This issue may become relevant as well in the context of a person not awaiting 
extradition, but already on death row, awaiting execution. As established in the Court's case law, 
ill treatment must attain a minimum level of severity if it is to fall within the scope of Article 3.200 
The ECHR concluded that the circumstances relating to a death sentence could give rise to an 
issue under Article 3. It gave as examples the manner in which the sentence is imposed or exe-
cuted, the personal circumstances of the condemned person and disproportionality to the gravity 
of the crime committed, as well as the conditions of detention while awaiting execution.  
“Present day attitudes in the Contracting States to capital punishment are relevant for the 
assessment whether the acceptable threshold of suffering or degradation has been exceeded”. 
The Court concluded that extradition of Soering would result in a violation of Article 3. 
“Having regard to the very long period of time spent on death row in such extreme conditions, 
with the ever present and mounting anguish of awaiting execution of the death penalty, and to 
the personal circumstances of the applicant, especially his age and mental state at the time of the 
offence, the applicant’s extradition to the US would expose him to real risk of treatment going 
beyond the threshold set by art. 3. A further consideration of relevance is that in the particular 
                                                                                                                       
Council merely denied him leave to appeal, because he was unable to meet the requirements of its 
rules of procedure.; see also Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991; Lenford Hamilton v. Jamaica, 
21 March 1994 and Trevor Collins v. Jamaica, 25 March 1993. 
196 In the case S v. Makwanyane and Mchunu of the Constitutional Court of South Africa, 1995 (2) 
SACR 1 (CC), Justice Kentridge, for instance, has said: ‘the mental agony of the criminal, in its 
alternation of fear, hope and despair must be present even when the time between sentence and 
execution is measured in months or weeks rather than years’. 
197 In Missouri persons sentenced to death are incarcerated together with other long-term prisoners, 
rather than on a separate death row, see: Lombardi, Sluder & Wallace (1997), pp. 2-11. If it 
would be the physical circumstance of a separate death row alone that would trigger the death 
row phenomenon, Missouri would not produce it. 
198 On provisional measures to halt refoulement see Chapter V. 
199 The following discussion is partly based on Rieter (2002b). See on the death row phenomenon, 
e.g. Schmidt (2000); Schabas (1996) and Schabas (1994). 
200 ECtHR Ireland v. United Kingdom, Judgment of 13 Dec. 1977; Tyrer v. United Kingdom, 
Judgment of 25 April 1978 (the Court, referring to the convention as a ‘living instrument’ 
declared birching minors to be contrary to article 3 of the Convention).  
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instance the legitimate purpose of extradition could be achieved by another means which would 
not involve suffering of such exceptional intensity or duration”. 
It noted, moreover: 
“However well-intentioned and even potentially beneficial is the provision of the complex of 
post-sentence procedures in Virginia, the consequence is that the condemned prisoner has to 
endure for many years the conditions on death row and the anguish and mounting tension of 
living in the ever-present shadow of death”. 
The strength of the wording used by the Court indicates the importance that must be accorded to 
this anguish and mounting tension. It seems Soering’s youth and his mental state at the time are 
only taken into account as contributory factors.201 They are not necessary to establish that the 
death row phenomenon violates Article 3.202 Thus, in this interpretation any situation that could 
expose a person to the death row phenomenon would constitute a violation of Article 3. 
In Reyes v. Guatemala (2005) the Inter-American Court found the conditions of detention 
of a person sentenced to death to violate his right to physical, psychological and moral integrity. 
In reference to testimony by a psychologist that the detainee was suffering from post traumatic 
stress and psychosomatic illnesses caused by his situation, awaiting his execution, the Court 
found a violation of the prohibition of cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment contrary to Article 
5(2) ACHR.203  
Unlike the ECtHR and the Inter-American Court the HRC, as the only international adjudi-
cator, has not accepted that the so called death row phenomenon violates the prohibition of cruel 
treatment under the ICCPR. The HRC usually declares inadmissible claims relating to the death 
row phenomenon, without even discussing them on the merits.204 The remoteness of a favourable 
decision on the merits would make doubtful the use of provisional measures involving only a 
claim about this phenomenon.  
Thus, different from domestic and regional courts,205 the HRC has thus far maintained that 
detention for a specific period of time does not amount to a violation of Article 7 and 10(1) ‘in the 
                                                 
201 See also Shea (1992) (convincingly arguing that the death row phenomenon, rather than the 
specific facts in the case, was the main criterion in the Soering judgment); for a different 
approach see: Lillich (1991); see also Quigley/Shank (1989). 
202 As subsequent cases on removal to a death penalty State often were struck out or declared 
inadmissible, they do not clarify the position of the Strasbourg organs, see e.g. Venezia v. Italy, 
21 October 1996 (struck out as domestic court had forbidden the extradition); Aylor-Davis v. 
France, 20 January 1994 (inadm.), (inadmissible for lack of real risk of exposure to death 
penalty, thanks to recipient State party’s credible assurances against the death penalty) In such 
cases involving possible removal to a death penalty State, the Commission always used 
provisional measures to prevent the removal while the case was pending. However, this does not 
need to be linked to the prevention of irreparable harm in the context of the death row 
phenomenon: all States involved have now ratified Protocol 6, meaning that the provisional 
measure could have been to prevent irreparable harm to the right to life of the petitioner. The fact 
that the Court used provisional measures to prevent Turkey from executing Öcalan may be more 
significant, as Turkey had not ratified Protocol 6 at the time. See Grand Chamber Öcalan v. 
Turkey, 12 May 2005. 
203 IACHR Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala, 15 September 2005, §§94-102. 
204 Part of this discussion is derived from Rieter (2002b). See further Nowak (2000b) and Schmidt 
(2000). 
205 Such as the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council and the Zimbabwe Supreme Court. 
 Chapter III 
252 
absence of some further compelling circumstances’.206 The Committee has been unwilling to 
consider detention conditions in relation to the death row phenomenon. These complaints, it 
considered, must be addressed separately.207 
The HRC has often found violations of Articles 7 and/or 10 for beatings, threats and general 
conditions on death row.208 The Committee has not yet found a circumstance that is so compelling 
                                                 
206 See e.g. HRC Errol Johnson v. Jamaica, 22 March 1996. See further Ramcharan Bickaroo v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997 (almost 16 years); Ramcharan Bickaroo v. Trinidad and 
Tobago, 29 October 1997 and Robinson LaVende v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997 (in 
an individual opinion Bhagwati, Chanet, Prado Vallejo and Yalden criticised the majority’s lack 
of flexibility; this joint individual opinion covered the cases of Bickaroo and LaVende; Gaitan de 
Pombo also approved the individual opinion but did not sign it; see also Henkin in Simpson v. 
Jamaica, 31 October 2000, attaching an individual opinion noting that, like several of his 
colleagues, he continued to be troubled by the Committee’s formulation of the relevant principles 
with regard to the death row phenomenon; nevertheless, he concurred in the Committee’s 
conclusion that the circumstances of the petitioner’s case did not constitute a violation of Article 
7, ‘according to the jurisprudence of the Committee as formulated in previous cases’ because he 
did not consider the present case ‘an appropriate vehicle for re-examining and reformulating’ the 
principles involved). In the extradition case Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994 Committee member 
Ban (Hungary) emphasised that the decisive factor for the death row phenomenon should be 
psychological rather than physical. “Although I accept the notion that physical conditions play an 
important role when assessing the overall situation of prison inmates on death row, my conviction 
is that the decisive factor is rather psychological than physical; a long period spent awaiting 
execution or the granting of pardon or clemency necessarily entails a permanent stress, an ever 
increasing fear which gradually fills the mind of the sentenced individual, and which, by the very 
nature of this situation, amounts -depending on the length of time spent on death row- to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment, in spite of every measure taken to improve the physical 
conditions of the confinement”. He disagreed with the Committee’s holding that the petitioner 
had adduced no evidence showing, for instance, that there would be unreasonable delays 
imputable to Pennsylvania. He referred to counsel’s submission that ‘nobody had been executed 
in Pennsylvania for more than twenty years, and there are individuals awaiting execution on 
death row for as much as fifteen years’. Wennergren pointed out that Pennsylvania had not 
executed anyone in more than twenty years. Prisoners sentenced to death are segregated from 
other prisoners. The fact that they are awaiting execution for so many years can be explained by 
the fact that Pennsylvania does not consider it appropriate to proceed with executions, rather than 
because those on death row avail themselves of all types of judicial appellate remedies. If this 
State ‘considers it necessary, for policy reasons, to have resort to the death penalty as such but 
not necessary and not even opportune to carry out capital sentences, a condemned person’s 
confinement to death row should, in my opinion, last for as short a period as possible, with 
commutation of the death sentence to life imprisonment taking place as early as possible’. “A 
stay for a prolonged and indefinite period of time on death row, in conditions of particular 
isolation and under threat of execution which might by unforeseeable changes in policy become 
real, is not, in my opinion, compatible with the requirements of article 7, because of the 
unreasonable mental stress that this implies”. 
207 See e.g. HRC Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999. 
208 See e.g. HRC McTaggart v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998 (severe beatings, belongings burnt 
including letters from his lawyers, a trial transcript and a copy of his petition to the Privy 
Council); Michael Freemantle v. Jamaica, 24 March 2000; Carlton Linton v. Jamaica, 22 
October 1992 (physical abuse, a mock execution set up by prison wardens and denial of adequate 
medical care); Irvine Reynolds v. Jamaica, 3 April 1997; Everton Morrison v. Jamaica, 27 July 
1998; Willard Collins v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; Tony Jones v. Jamaica, 6 April 1998; 
Randolph Barrett and Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992; Michael Robinson v. Jamaica, 
29 March 2000 (excessive force) and Victor Domukovsky, Zaza Tsiklauri, Petre Gelbakhiani and 
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that, in combination with the length of time spent on death row, it would result in inhuman or 
degrading treatment. In most cases if it pronounces on inhuman treatment, the Committee gener-
ally finds a separate violation of the Covenant. The fact that this inhuman treatment took place on 
death row seems to have no specific significance for the Committee. 
Short of finding a death row phenomenon, the HRC sometimes did find violations in cases 
of ill treatment that are specific to persons on death row. It found, for instance, that waiting al-
most 20 hours before informing prisoners of a stay of execution and removing them from the 
death cell was a violation of Article 7.209 It also found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) in a case 
where the petitioner was repeatedly taunted and threatened about his impending execution, in 
graphic detail.210 
Possibly the HRC did find a death row phenomenon in some very specific cases. In Francis 
v. Jamaica (1995)211 it found a violation of Articles 7 and 10(1). 
“Whereas the psychological tension created by prolonged detention on death row may affect 
persons in different degrees, the evidence before the Committee in this case, including the 
author’s confused and incoherent correspondence with the Committee, indicates that his mental 
health seriously deteriorated during incarceration on death row. Taking into consideration the 
author’s description of the prison conditions, including his allegations about regular beatings 
inflicted upon him by warders, as well as the ridicule and strain to which he was subjected 
during the five days he spent in the death cell awaiting execution in February 1988, which the 
State party has not effectively contested, the Committee concludes that these circumstances 
reveal a violation of Jamaica’s obligations under Articles 7 and 10, paragraph 1, of the 
Covenant”.212 
The petitioner was entitled to an ‘effective remedy, including appropriate medical treatment, 
compensation and consideration for an early release’.  
Another case in which the Committee mentioned the psychological impact of death row is 
Williams v. Jamaica (1997).213 It found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) because the material 
before it indicated that the petitioner’s mental condition seriously deteriorated during his incar-
ceration on death row. He did not receive any, or at least inadequate, medical treatment for his 
mental condition.214 At the time of the decision the petitioner had been removed from death row, 
                                                                                                                       
Irakli Dokvadze v. Georgia, 6 April 1998 (a finding of torture for severe beatings, physical and 
moral pressure including concussion and broken bones, wounding and burning, scarring, torture 
and threats to family). See also Chapter VI on ongoing detention situations and Chapter IX on 
death threats and harassment. 
209 HRC Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v. Jamaica, 6 April 1989. 
210 HRC Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 15 July 1994. 
211 HRC Clement Francis v. Jamaica, 25 July 1995 (no provisional measures because the death 
sentence had already been commuted; provisional measures were used on behalf of other 
petitioners in earlier case, C.F. v. Jamaica, 28 July 1992 (inadm.).  
212 HRC Clement Francis v. Jamaica, 25 July 1995. 
213 HRC Nathaniel Williams v. Jamaica, 4 November 1997 (classified as non-capital in 1992; the 
petitioner was re-sentenced to serve a further ten years at the General Penitentiary before 
becoming eligible for parole). 
214 Counsel had indicated that the petitioner had already displayed signs of mental disturbance at the 
time of the trial in December 1988. He also referred to correspondence from inmates on death 
row stating that the petitioner had severe mental problems and was unable to write himself. He 
referred to a report of a psychiatric examination in March 1992 observing that the petitioner ‘had 
four sticks of wooden matches occluding his left external auditory conduct (ear) which he 
explained was to shut out the ‘voices’ which he constantly heard discussing him’. This doctor 
diagnosed Williams as ‘suffering from schizophrenia of a paranoid type, unspecified personality 
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but he was still suffering this mental condition. The Committee noted that in this case the requi-
site remedy for the violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) included, in particular, an entitlement to 
appropriate medical treatment. 
In both cases the Committee took into account the psychological impact of detention on 
death row on the convicted prisoner. Still, it did not literally call this impact a ‘death row phe-
nomenon’. It simply condemned the lack of adequate medical treatment and called for appropriate 
medical treatment. The difference in remedy between the two cases can be explained by the fact 
that in Francis the Committee had also found a violation of Article 14(3)(c) and (5) in relation to 
the ‘inordinate delay in issuing a note of oral judgment in his case’. 
Thus, at present the HRC does not consider that a State is in violation of the Covenant if it 
executes a petitioner after a long period on death row. Its comments imply that it should strive to 
prevent executions. At the same time it recommends commutation or release only if it finds a 
specific violation of Article 14. It has not found that a violation of other articles, such as Articles 
7 and 10, also resulted in a violation of Article 6, and that, therefore, a death sentence must be 
commuted.215 Nor did it find, between 1991 and 1998, that violation of articles other than Article 
14, should result in a commutation even if not a violation of Article 6. Paradoxically, this reason-
ing leads to the conclusion that declaring that the death row phenomenon does not violate Article 
7 is the only method used by the Committee itself to reduce recourse to the death penalty in cases 
where it did not find a violation of Article 14. Of course, the Committee does act to reduce re-
course to the death penalty in cases of unfair trial. Clearly, if a State executes a prisoner in an 
expedited manner, without remedying an unfair trial, this will violate the Covenant. The real 
dilemma for the HRC is not the legal implication of a decision that the death row phenomenon 
would violate Article 7, but the actual implication that the State would decide to execute a pris-
oner before he has had a chance to communicate to the HRC about such a violation. Such situa-
tion would only leave the HRC the option of deciding in its Concluding Observations to the State 
party’s report under Article 40 ICCPR, that a prisoner had been executed in violation of the right 
of petition. If the HRC found a violation of Article 14, it would be particularly unsatisfactory if 
the HRC only had the possibility to refer to this as part of its Concluding Observations to the 
State party’s report. It might very well be the case, moreover, that this way the Committee will 
never know of these cases. 
In cases in which a prisoner would be able, after all, to petition the HRC if it would have set 
a clear deadline for the stay on death row, this fact could ‘provide’ the State party with the argu-
ment that it was respecting this deadline in executing the prisoner in disregard of provisional 
measures indicated by the Committee. In my view, these factual implications are the real di-
lemma. It did not matter what the HRC did, as the JCPC decision in Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney 
General (1993) had already triggered the aforementioned negative effect. More recently, this 
domestic court has tried to remedy this effect by clearly establishing that States could not execute 
prisoners in violation of the right to fair trial arguing this is necessary in order to limit the length 
of time on death row so as not to violate the prohibition of cruel treatment. The HRC could take a 
similar approach. Nevertheless, as long as there is no indication that it may be ready to change its 
case law in this respect, the Rapporteur should not use provisional measures in cases only claim-
ing a death row phenomenon, because on the merits the Committee would not find a violation. 
                                                                                                                       
disorder and anxiety and depression, in keeping with the circumstances of his incarceration. He 
recommended that the author should benefit from regular psychotropic medication’. Counsel 
visited the petitioner on death row on 18 December 1992. He noted that Williams did not 
understand the questions he put to him and a senior prison officer as well as other inmates on 
death row told counsel that the petitioner was ill. His repeated requests for authorisation of a 
further medical examination had been unsuccessful. 
215 See further Chapter XIII (Protection), discussing the relationship between provisional measures 
and reparation. 
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This way the provisional measures would serve no function, within the individual complaint 
system, other than to postpone the inevitable.  
The ECtHR has taken an approach that is different from that of the majority of the HRC. 
The European Court stated about the long period of time on death row: ‘just as some lapse of time 
between sentence and execution is inevitable if appeal safeguards are to be provided to the con-
demned person, so it is equally part of human nature that the person will cling to life by exploiting 
those safeguards to the full’.216 
An element of delay between the lawful imposition of a death sentence and the exhaustion 
of available remedies is inherent in the review of a death sentence. Therefore even prolonged 
periods of detention under a severe custodial regime on death row cannot generally be considered 
to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely availing 
himself of appellate remedies.217  
Committee member Chanet noted in dissent: ‘I consider that the author can not be expected 
to hurry up in making appeals so he can be executed more rapidly’.  
The HRC does attach importance to the question of what caused the delay. It considers that 
‘prolonged periods of detention under a severe custodial regime on death row cannot generally be 
considered to constitute cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment if the convicted person is merely 
availing himself of appellate remedies’.218 
That a convicted person makes use of a constitutional right for review of his case does not 
make his stay on death row less cruel. The fact that the prisoner clings to his life is only natural 
and cannot be used to argue that the time-period spent in expectation of his execution does not 
subject him to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment. The prisoner’s only choice is between 
death and death row. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The three regional systems, the HRC and the Bosnia Chamber have all used provisional measures 
to halt executions. Especially the HRC and the Inter-American Commission and Court have used 
such measures very often.  
All adjudicators have stressed that their use of provisional measures does not imply a deci-
sion on the merits. The Inter-American Court has acknowledged the relationship between the 
merits of the case and the provisional measures used pending the case. It must be ensured that the 
State does not anticipate the case by taking action pre-empting that which is requested on the 
merits. At the same time the adjudicator may not prejudge the case at the stage of provisional 
measures. What this means in practice is that, as the Inter-American Court has put it, it ‘cannot, in 
a provisional measure, consider the merits of any arguments pertaining to issues other than those 
which relate strictly to the extreme gravity and urgency and the necessity to avoid irreparable 
damage to persons’.219 
                                                 
216 The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, like the European Court, considered the likely effect of the 
delay to be the proper test, and not the cause of the delay. When the sentence was death, the 
cause of the delay was immaterial, because the dehumanising character of the delay was 
unaltered. Per curiam it was decided ‘(i)t was highly artificial and unrealistic to discount the 
mental agony and torment experienced on death row on the basis that the condemned prisoner 
could have shortened his suffering by not making maximum use of the judicial process available. 
The cause is irrelevant for it fails to lessen the degree of suffering of the condemned person’. In 
approval, the Supreme Court an Indian case and the ECtHR Soering case. 
217 HRC Randolph Barrett and Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 6 April 1992. 
218 See HRC Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992. 
219 IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 29 August 1998. 
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This chapter focussed on the unpublished provisional measures by the HRC, dealing with 
various components of the case law on the death penalty. Among others it dealt with the right to 
life as such, also referring to the case law of the ECtHR and Bosnia Chamber. The chapter ob-
served that the ECtHR did use provisional measures in cases in which it subsequently could have 
gone further on the merits. In other words they have been taken also in cases in which a violation 
later was not, but could have been found on the basis of a more dynamic interpretation of the 
provisions on the right to life. The Bosnia Chamber’s use of provisional measures to halt an exe-
cution fits clearly in its case law on the merits. The case law by the HRC on the right to life as 
such has only recently been clarified. Judge v. Canada (2003) shows that vis-à-vis non-death 
penalty States such measures should always be used in refoulement cases involving a real risk of 
imposition of the death penalty, also when there are no specific concerns regarding the fairness of 
the proceedings or the person to be sentenced to death in the requesting State. Yet before this 
clarification the HRC had already used provisional measures in such cases. 
Next to the right to life as such this chapter also discussed rights relating specifically to the 
person sentenced to death. Both the Inter-American Commission and Court and the HRC have 
found that the death penalty for minors and the mandatory death penalty are forbidden. This 
makes it obvious that provisional measures should be used pending proceedings involving such 
claims. It then examined case law referring to several aspects affecting the fairness of death pen-
alty proceedings. The most important claims in death penalty cases in which the HRC has taken 
provisional measures involve the right to counsel, adequate time and facilities to prepare a de-
fence, right to appeal and effective representation on appeal, fair trial aspects of detention, undue 
delay and the lack of a written judgment by domestic courts. The chapter indicated the varying 
prospect of success with such claims. Finally, this chapter dealt with the significance of the death 
row phenomenon, including its impact on individual petitioners and discussed the limited pros-
pect of success on the merits. In this respect the question arises why the HRC decided to take 
provisional measures virtually automatically in all death penalty cases to halt executions. In view 
of the fact that in many cases it may then have to declare, on the basis of its previous case law, 
that there was no violation, one may wonder whether the object of the provisional measure was 
simply to postpone the suffering until after the expected finding. This would be an unsatisfactory 
approach to the concept of provisional measures. If the HRC (in majority) does not consider a 
certain situation to be in violation of the Covenant and the claim only relates to this issue while 
there is no indication that it will change its case law, the Rapporteur should not use provisional 
measures. The main example is the death row phenomenon claim. While there would be good 
reasons for the Committee to change its case law and find a violation of Article 7 ICCPR in at 
least some circumstances, as long as there are no indications that it might do so, the Rapporteur 
should not use provisional measures in relation to such claims. 
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 CHAPTER IV 
 HALTING CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Thus far only the HRC and the Inter-American Commission have used provisional measures to 
halt corporal punishment. It is argued that the other human rights adjudicators would also order 
such provisional measures if faced with a complaint regarding the impending execution of a 
sentence (or disciplinary measure) of corporal punishment. After all, the prohibition of corporal 
punishment is widespread and based on the existing case law on the merits.1 
On the one hand, provisional measures to halt the execution of corporal punishment are 
similar to those to halt the execution of a death sentence. In both cases these measures appeal to 
the State to refrain, pending the proceedings, from carrying out a practice that, as Rodley has put 
it, applies rather than violates national law.2 On the other hand, in the relation of these measures 
to the merits provisional measures to halt the execution of corporal punishment differ from those 
halting the execution of a death sentence. As becomes clear in section 3 of this chapter, with 
regard to corporal punishment the case law on the merits is rather more straightforward and un-
controversial, while the previous chapter showed that the case law on the merits regarding the 
situations in which the death penalty is prohibited is more complicated and therefore the choice to 
use provisional measures is too. 
2 THE PRACTICE OF THE ADJUDICATORS TO TAKE PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
TO HALT CORPORAL PUNISHMENT 
In June 1997, in Osbourne v. Jamaica (2000), the HRC ordered Jamaica to halt the execution of a 
sentence of 10 strokes of the tamarind switch.3 Counsel had argued that the use of this switch was 
an inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment and that the actual procedure employed 
for flogging and whipping ‘appears to be largely at the discretion of the implementing prison 
authorities’.4 This also emphasized the risk of abuse of power.5 In response, Jamaica invoked the 
                                                 
1 See section 3. 
2 Rodley (1999), p. 309. 
3 HRC Osbourne v. Jamaica, 15 March 2000. This is also the first case published by the HRC that 
deals specifically with the issue of corporal punishment. The legislation described the tamarind 
switch as ‘three lengths of twigs of the tamarind tree, each forty-four to forty-eight inches long 
and not more than one-quarter of one inch in diameter, trimmed smoothly so that there shall be 
no protrusion of knots or joints and bound together with cotton twine’, Article 244(A)(3)(a) The 
Prison (Amendment) Rules, 7 April 1965, No 115, reproduced at <http://www.corpun.com/ 
japrr1.htm> (consulted 26 April 2007). 
4 In both Trinidad and Tobago and Jamaica flogging has taken place with the so-called cat-o-nine 
tails. In Jamaica the Prison (Amendment) Rules, no. 105 of 1965 explain this instrument as 
follows: ‘a rope whip consisting of a round wooden handle twenty inches long, and one to one 
and on-half inches in diameter with nine thongs of cotton cord and not more than three sixteenths 
of an inch in diameter and knotted at the end or whipped at the end with cotton twine’. In Jamaica 
the prison director could choose whether the disciplinary punishment would consist of flogging 
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permissibility of the sentence under domestic law as a justification for a violation of the ICCPR. 
The HRC, however, pointed out on the merits that ‘the constitutionality of the sentence is not 
sufficient to secure compliance also with the Covenant’.6 The second time the HRC used provi-
sional measures to stop a State from carrying out a sentence of corporal punishment (six strokes 
of the tamarind switch) was in 1998 in the case of Higginson v. Jamaica (2002).7 
The Inter-American Commission has also used precautionary measures at least once in or-
der to halt the execution of a flogging sentence, in a case against the Bahamas. It did so in Febru-
ary 2003 immediately upon confirmation from the petitioner that his sentence had not yet been 
                                                                                                                       
or whipping. Flogging would be inflicted with the cat-o-nine tails on the back of the prisoner 
between the shoulders and the waist. Whipping would be inflicted with a tamarind switch on the 
prisoner’s buttocks. 
5 He invoked the affidavit of a former detainee who had already suffered the execution of a 
sentence of corporal punishment. E.P. had been sentenced to four years hard labour and six 
strokes of the tamarind switch. He was scheduled for release on 1 March 1997 after he had been 
granted a remission of his sentence for good behaviour. In his affidavit he stated that on the day 
before his release more than twelve correctional officers took him from his cell to another section 
of the prison. He protested when he realised that they were going to carry out the sentence of 
flogging. As a result, one of the officers hit him in the stomach. He stated that ‘an unnecessary 
number of prison warders (25) were present at the time of the whipping and that this added to his 
humiliation’, Osbourne v. Jamaica, 15 March 2000, §3.3. “He was then seized, blindfolded and 
ordered to remove clothing from the lower part of his body. When this was done, he was forced 
to lean forward across a barrel and one of the warders placed his penis in a slot in the barrel. He 
was then strapped in that position and struck across the buttocks with an instrument that he was 
unable to see”. Affidavit as discussed in Osbourne v. Jamaica, 15 March 2000, §3.3. He also 
noted that the doctor was the only outsider present and that this doctor did not examine him after 
the whipping. Affidavit as discussed in Osbourne v. Jamaica, 15 March 2000, §3.3. The 
Amnesty International report ‘Jamaica; a summary of concerns: a briefing for the Human Rights 
Committee’, October 1997, AI Index: AMR 38/07/97 referred on p. 15 to petitions filed with the 
HRC by Errol Pryce and George Osbourne, which were still pending at the time. The petition of 
Errol Pryce included an affidavit describing the circumstances of his whipping. He was the first 
person whipped by court order in over 20 years. Amnesty International describes the same 
circumstances as mentioned in the affidavit by E.P. to which the HRC refers in its View in 
Osbourne v. Jamaica. The only additional information it provides is that the person whipping 
Errol Pryce was wearing a hood covering his face and a long gown concealing his body. 
Newspaper articles have also referred to this case, e.g. ‘Court of appeal to decide on flogging’, B. 
Gayle, staff reporter, The Gleaner, 28 April 1998 and ‘Jamaican court abolishes flogging’, 
Reuters, CNN, 18 December 1998. In 2004 the HRC published its Views in this case, finding a 
violation of Article 7: Errol Pryce v. Jamaica, 15 March 2004. 
6 HRC Osbourne v. Jamaica, 15 March 2000, §9.1. It was its firm opinion that the imposition of 
corporal punishment constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading punishment in violation of Article 
7 ICCPR, even if it had not been carried out. Under Article 2(3)(a) ICCPR Jamaica was ‘under an 
obligation to provide Mr. Osbourne with an effective remedy, and should compensate him for the 
violation. The State party is also under an obligation to refrain from carrying out the sentence of 
whipping upon Mr. Osbourne. The State party should ensure that similar violations do not occur 
in the future by repealing the legislative provisions that allow for corporal punishment’. 
7 HRC Higginson v. Jamaica, 28 March 2002. Higginson submitted his complaint in January 1997. 
He had been sentenced to several years of imprisonment with hard labour as well as six strokes of 
the tamarind switch. In this case the petitioner was not represented by counsel in the proceedings 
before the HRC. The Rapporteur used provisional measures a year later. Jamaica’s denunciation 
of the OP did not play a role yet as it became effective only on 23 January 1998. 
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carried out. The State acknowledged receipt of this request, noting that it had been ‘referred to the 
relevant authorities for their attention’.8  
3 RELATION BETWEEN PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO HALT CORPORAL 
PUNISHMENT AND THE EXPECTED DECISION ON THE MERITS  
As to punishments for disciplinary offences, Article 31 UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Treatment of Prisoners points out that corporal punishment ‘shall be completely prohibited’.9 The 
aversion against corporal punishment is apparent as well in UN Rules dealing with juveniles in 
detention.10 Moreover, the punishment is prohibited in international humanitarian law.11 Doctri-
nally it is not surprising that the HRC used provisional measures to halt corporal punishment. 
Already in its General Comment on Article7 ICCPR (1992) it had pointed out that the prohibition 
of cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment must extend to corporal punishment.12 
                                                 
8 CIDH Prince Pinder v. Bahamas, 12 October 2005 (adm.), §11. The petition was based on the 
American Declaration. The Commission repeated its request almost two months later, but 
received no response other than an acknowledgment of receipt, §13 (precautionary measures of 4 
February, acknowledgment of receipt of 8 April 2003; reiteration of precautionary measure on 30 
May 2003; acknowledgment of receipt 30 June 2003). No information is provided in the 2003 
Annual Report’s overview of precautionary measures. See also decision on the merits of 15 
October 2007. 
9 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, Adopted by the First United Nations 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, held at Geneva in 1955, 
and approved by the Economic and Social Council by its resolution 663 C (XXIV) of 31 July 
1957 and 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977. On the language used see Rodley (1999), p. 316. 
10 See e.g. United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty, G.A. res. 
45/113, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A), p. 205, A/45/49 (1990); United Nations 
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (The Riyadh Guidelines), G.A. res. 
45/112, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A), p. 201, A/45/49 (1990) and Standard Minimum 
Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (“The Beijing Rules”), G.A. res. 40/33, annex 40 
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 53), p. 207, A/40/53 (1985). The Commentary to the latter notes: “The 
provision against corporal punishment is in line with article 7 of the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights and the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Being 
Subjected to Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, as well 
as the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or 
Punishment and the draft convention on the rights of the child”. 
11 See e.g. Rodley (1999), pp. 314-316. 
12 See e.g. HRC General Comment 20, 4 March 1992, §5. Like the HRC, CAT has equally shown a 
special interest in the abolition of corporal punishment. Such punishment ‘could constitute in 
itself a violation in terms of the Convention’. CAT Concluding Observations on Jordan, A/50/44, 
1 May 1995, §169. See also, e.g., its Concluding Observations on Namibia, A/52/44, 6 May 
1997, §150. In addition, the Committee on the Rights of the Child, supervising the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child, has confirmed ‘the obligation of all States parties to move quickly to 
prohibit and eliminate all corporal punishment and all other cruel or degrading forms of 
punishment of children’. Committee on the Rights of the Child General Comment No. 8 (2006) 
on “The right to protection from corporal punishment and other cruel or degrading forms of 
punishment (Articles 19; 28(2); and 37)”, CRC/C/GC/8, 2 March 2007, §2. UN Charter-based 
bodies have confirmed this approach: Commission on Human Rights, Res. 1997/38, 
E/CN.4/1997/150, April 1997 and Res. 2000/43, E/CN.4/Res. 2000/43, 20 April 2000: “Corporal 
punishment, including of children, can amount to cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or 
even to torture”. The consecutive Special Rapporteurs on Torture (Kooijmans, Rodley, Van 
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The individual cases in which the HRC dealt with corporal punishment all relate to Jamaica 
and Trinidad and Tobago.13 In the latter State the punishment is still possible.14 No one but the 
court and the President can repeal a prisoner’s flogging sentence. Flogging is also used as a means 
of prison discipline.15 The case of Errol Pryce v. Jamaica (2004) had been submitted in May 
1997, subsequent to the carrying out of corporal punishment on the petitioner in February of that 
year.16 While the HRC only published its Views in 2004, this case had triggered considerable 
interest in 1997 and may have drawn the attention of the HRC to the possibility of using provi-
sional measures to halt corporal punishment.17 
                                                                                                                       
Boven, Nowak) have taken the view that corporal punishment is inconsistent with the prohibition 
of torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment enshrined in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See e.g. Rapporteur Van Boven’s interim report to the 
General Assembly A/57/173, 2 July 2002, §48, confirming the approach of the other Rapporteurs. 
The urgent action sent by Rapporteur Nowak to the Bahamas on behalf of a person sentenced to 
eight lashes with a ‘cat-of-nine-tails’, on 10 October 2006, confirms this view, 
A/HRC/4/33/Add.1., 20 March 2007, p. 16. 
13 In most Caribbean States corporal punishment is a remainder of slavery times and was used 
mainly until the Second World War. For information on other sentences of flogging, next to that 
of Osbourne, see Amnesty International’s Annual Reports 1995, 1996 and 1998. See also 
Amnesty’s report ‘Jamaica: A summary of concerns, A briefing for the Human Rights 
Committee, October 1997, AI Index: AMR 38/07/97. In later Annual Reports, following 1998, 
Amnesty International does not further discuss corporal punishment in Jamaica (the Jamaica 
Court of Appeal declared corporal punishment unconstitutional in December 1998).  
14 Amnesty International’s Annual Report 1994 refers to the case of an eleven-year-old boy who 
was sentenced to twenty strokes with a leather belt for possession of cocaine. He had no 
opportunity to appeal the sentence as it was carried out immediately. Its Annual Report 1995 
mentions that subsequently there was a court hearing in this case in which the boy sought redress 
and compensation. See further Annual Reports 1996, 1997 and 1998. See also Amnesty 
International, Trinidad and Tobago: woman sentenced to corporal punishment, March 1996, AI 
Index: AMR 49/07/96. In its Annual Report 1999 it pointed out that at least three people may 
have been whipped in 1998. They had been sentenced that same year. It noted that the Court of 
Appeal reportedly described as ‘monstrous’ the fact that in August one person received fifteen 
lashes while the appeal of his conviction and sentence was still pending. 
15 Flogging is mainly carried out at the maximum-security prison of Carrera Island, which has a 
special ‘whipping room’. “The naked prisoner is placed face down on an adjustable bench and 
handcuffed. He never knows who delivers the blows – the officer is masked or the prisoner’s face 
is turned. Many people are present during a flogging, including the prison doctor, the infirmary 
officer, the prison superintendent, and several other senior officials. The doctor is responsible for 
examining the prisoner’s heart rate, blood pressure, respiratory rate and other signs both before 
and after the flogging. S/he can suspend the flogging or whipping if s/he considers that the 
prisoner is physically unfit to withstand the punishment”. Amnesty International, Trinidad and 
Tobago: woman sentenced to corporal punishment, March 1996, AI Index: AMR 49/07/96, p. 2. 
16 HRC Errol Pryce v. Jamaica, 15 March 2004 (finding a violation of Article 7). Amnesty 
International had earlier reported on this case: Amnesty International report ‘Jamaica; a summary 
of concerns: a briefing for the Human Rights Committee’, October 1997, AI Index: AMR 
38/07/97. The Special Rapporteur on Torture had equally referred to it: E/CN.4/1999/61, §§399-
403. 
17 See further HRC Higginson v. Jamaica, 28 March 2002. Again it pointed out that it was its 
‘consistent opinion’ that corporal punishment violates Article 7, ‘irrespective of the nature of the 
crime that is to be punished or the permissibility of corporal punishment under domestic law’. In 
its Concluding Observations, under the reporting procedure (Article 40), it has also addressed the 
issue: see e.g. its Concluding Observations in relation to Sudan CCPR/C/79/Add. 85, 5 
November 1997: “Flogging, amputation and stoning, which are recognised as penalties for 
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In Matthews v. Trinidad and Tobago (1998)18 the petitioner had claimed violations of Art. 
10(1) ICCPR because of the conditions of detention, in particular the sanitary conditions. In pass-
ing, he mentioned that he had been sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and 20 strokes with a 
birch. While he did not claim a violation with respect to corporal punishment, the Committee 
raised the issue proprio motu, recalling its General Comment on Article 7 ICCPR. In its admissi-
bility decision it requested Trinidad and Tobago to inform it whether the punishment had already 
been carried out.19 The HRC may have used provisional measures in this case, but given the fact 
that it only raised the issue proprio motu when discussing admissibility it is unlikely that it did 
so.20  
The Committee could also have concluded already in this case that the imposition of the 
punishment in itself was a violation of Article 7. It could have pointed out in the decision on the 
merits that the State party was under an obligation not to carry out the sentence of 20 strokes with 
a birch, as it indeed did in the later case of Sooklal v. Trinidad and Tobago (2001).21 In that case 
the petitioner was serving a prison sentence and was sentenced to twelve strokes with the birch. 
His complaint related to Articles 9(3) and 14(3)(c) but the Committee pointed out, again proprio 
motu, that the facts of the case also raised an issue under Article 7 ICCPR. It referred to its deci-
sion in the abovementioned Osbourne v. Jamaica (2000), a case in which it had used provisional 
measures. In that case it had decided on the merits that, irrespective of the brutality of the crime 
that was to be punished, it was ‘the firm opinion of the Committee’ that corporal punishment 
constituted cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment.22 In the Sooklal case it found that by impos-
ing the sentence of whipping with the birch Trinidad had violated Article 7 ICCPR. In other 
words, the imposition of the sentence was already a violation, even if it had not been carried out. 
This time it did point out, in the paragraph discussing the entitlement to an effective remedy, that 
if the State had not yet executed the sentence of corporal punishment it was under an obligation 
not to do so.23 It appears, however, that pending the proceedings before it, it did not order provi-
sional measures proprio motu in this case, while it could have done so.  
The ECtHR already determined in Tyrer v. UK (1978) that Article 3 ECHR did not allow 
for corporal punishment: 
                                                                                                                       
criminal offences, are not compatible with the Covenant. (…) By ratifying the Covenant, the 
State party has undertaken to comply with all its articles; penalties which are inconsistent with 
articles 7 and 10 must be abolished”. See also Concluding Observations about Iraq’s fourth 
periodic report CCPR/C/79/Add.84, 5 November 1997 (expressing deep concern about the use of 
punishment such as amputation and branding, pointing out that such punishments should cease 
immediately). 
18 HRC Matthews v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 March 1998. 
19 When it discussed the merits, however, it noted that the State had not provided any information 
on the issue and that the petitioner himself had not raised it. It considered that this implied ‘that 
the punishment, if imposed on him, may not have been carried out’. The Committee noted that it 
‘maintains that corporal punishment is incompatible with the provisions of article 7 of the 
Covenant, but makes no finding in this respect in the present case’. HRC Matthews v. Trinidad 
and Tobago, 31 March 1998, §7.2. 
20 This is a case from the time period during which the HRC did not provide information on the use 
provisional measures in its Views. A consultation of the file in Geneva confirms that the note 
verbale to the State party of 5 January 1994 was transmitted under Rule 91 (transfer of petition to 
State and requests for information) alone. A further Rule 91 decision of 4 April 1995 did not refer 
to the issue either (on file with the author).  
21 HRC Boodlal Sooklal v. Trinidad and Tobago, 25 October 2001. 
22 HRC Osbourne v. Jamaica, 15 March 2000. 
23 HRC Boodlal Sooklal v. Trinidad and Tobago, 25 October 2001. 
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“The very nature of judicial corporal punishment is that it involves one human being inflicting 
physical violence on another human being. Furthermore, it is institutionalised violence that is in 
the present case violence permitted by the law, ordered by the judicial authorities of the State 
and carried out by the police authorities of the State (…). Thus, although the applicant did not 
suffer any severe or long-lasting physical effects, his punishment – whereby he was treated as 
an object in the power of the authorities – constituted an assault on precisely that which it is one 
of the main purposes of Article 3 (art. 3) to protect, namely a person’s dignity and physical 
integrity. Neither can it be excluded that the punishment may have had adverse psychological 
effects”.24 
As judicial corporal punishment and disciplinary corporal punishment in detention (administrative 
punishment) no longer exist in Europe, the ECtHR has dealt with no further cases in this respect. 
In Doebbler v. Sudan (2003) the African Commission found that the punishment of flagella-
tion was a violation of the right to respect for physical integrity and human dignity (Article 5 
ACHPR).25 In this light, should it deal with a complaint involving a sentence of corporal punish-
ment that has not yet been executed, its use of provisional measures may be expected. 
As discussed in section 2 of this Chapter in 2003 the Inter-American Commission has al-
ready used provisional measures to halt corporal punishment in a complaint involving the Ameri-
can Declaration. In this case it found on the merits (2007) that:  
“While there is no evidence before the Commission that Mr. Pinder has actually been subjected 
to corporal punishment, the Commission considers that the jurisprudence makes it palpably 
clear that the mere anticipation of flogging is within the parameters of the cruel, inhuman and 
degrading elements of judicial corporal punishment. Corporal punishment is not simply about 
the actual pain or humiliation of a flogging, but also about the mental suffering that is generated 
by anticipating the flogging”.26  
                                                 
24 ECtHR Tyrer v. UK, 25 April 1978, §33. It added, also at §33: “The institutionalised character of 
this violence is further compounded by the whole aura of official procedure attending the 
punishment and by the fact that those inflicting it were total strangers to the offender. Admittedly, 
the relevant legislation provides that in any event birching shall not take place later than six 
months after the passing of sentence. However, this does not alter the fact that there had been an 
interval of several weeks since the applicant’s conviction by the juvenile court and a considerable 
delay in the police station where the punishment was carried out. Accordingly, in addition to the 
physical pain he experienced, Mr. Tyrer was subjected to the mental anguish of anticipating the 
violence he was to have inflicted on him”. Moreover, at §35: “The indignity of having the 
punishment administered over the bare posterior aggravated to some extent the degrading 
character of the applicant’s punishment but it was not the only or determining factor”. 
25 ACHPR Curtis Francis Doebbler v. Sudan, May 2003. 
26 CIDH Prince Pinder v. Bahamas, 15 October 2007 (merits), §35. Both the Court of Appeal of the 
Bahamas and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council had identified flogging as inhuman 
and degrading, but because of a so-called ‘savings clause’ they decided to nevertheless dismiss 
the complaint. They had held that corporal punishment is permitted under the Constitution of the 
Bahamas by virtue of Article 17 (2), which provides that ‘nothing contained in or done under 
authority of law shall be held inconsistent with or in contravention of this Article to the extent 
that the law in question authorizes the infliction of any description of punishment that was lawful 
in the Bahama Islands immediately before 10 July 1973’. See CIDH Prince Pinder v. Bahamas, 
12 October 2005 (adm.), §§14 and 17, referring to the Court of Appeal judgment of 29 January 
1999 and the Privy Council judgment of 15 July 2002. See also the criticisms of a similar 
‘savings clause’, which ‘has the past prevail into the future’, by Judge García Ramírez in his 
Separate Opinion to IACHR Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, 11 March 2005, §§24-28 and by 
Judge Jackman. 
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By this time the Inter-American Court itself, in Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago (2005) had 
confirmed unequivocally that such punishment is prohibited under the ACHR. In this case, 
involving a punishment of 15 strokes with the ‘cat-o-nine-tails’, the Commission had not used 
precautionary measures as the punishment had already been carried out. The Commission had 
found a violation of the right to humane treatment (Article 5 ACHR) and subsequently brought 
the case before the Court. The Court pointed out that the practices of torture as well as other cruel, 
inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment all ‘constitute a violation of peremptory norms of 
international law’, independent of any codification.27 The Court noted ‘the growing trend towards 
recognition, at international and domestic levels, of the impermissible character of corporal 
punishment, with regard to its inherently cruel, inhuman and degrading nature’.28 Consequently, 
State Parties to the ACHR, under Articles 1(1) and 5, are ‘under an obligation erga omnes to 
abstain from imposing corporal punishment, as well as to prevent its administration, for 
constituting, in any circumstance, a cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.29 It 
considered that judicial corporal punishment by flogging, as applied in the law and practice of 
Trinidad and Tobago, by its very nature reflected ‘an institutionalization of violence, which 
although permitted by the law, ordered by the State’s judges and carried out by its prison 
authorities, is a sanction incompatible with the Convention’.30 In fact, corporal punishment by 
flogging constituted as such a from of torture and therefore was ‘a violation per se of the right of 
any person subjected to such punishment to have his physical, mental and moral integrity 
respected, as provided in Article 5(1) and 5(2), in connection with Article 1(1) of the 
Convention’.31 The Court determined that ‘the corporal punishment by flogging, as it was 
examined in the instant case, must be considered as a form of torture and is, therefore, contrary 
per se to Article 5(1) and 5(2) of the Convention and to peremptory norms of international law’.32 
The Court’s finding that corporal punishment constitutes a violation of the prohibition cruel 
treatment (and in some cases, such as that of Caesar involving flogging, even torture)33 brings 
any provisional measures ordered to halt the execution of such punishment firmly within the 
common core of the concept. This is confirmed by the Court’s express reference to peremptory 
norms of international law. Thus, should the Inter-American Court deal with a complaint 
involving a sentence of corporal punishment, imposed at a time when the State party had 
recognized the jurisdiction of the Court,34 but which has not yet been executed, the Court would 
most certainly order provisional measures. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Only two adjudicators, the HRC and the Inter-American Commission, have used provisional 
measures to order a halt to the execution of a sentence of corporal punishment and their practice 
in this regard is limited. Yet the existing case law on the prohibition of corporal punishment is 
straightforward. This punishment is contrary to the prohibition of torture and/or cruel treatment, 
as has been widely accepted among the various human rights adjudicators. The fact that they have 
                                                 
27 IACHR Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, 11 March 2005, §70. 
28 Id., §70. 
29 Id., §70. 
30 Id., §73. 
31 Id., §73. 
32 Id., §88. See also §73. 
33 The Court spoke of flogging as ‘in absolute contravention to the Convention’ and it spoke of the 
‘aberrant character of such punishment’, IACHR Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, 11 March 
2005, §130. 
34 See further Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction). 
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not developed an extensive practice of using provisional measures in this regard seems to be 
based more on the fact that they have not received requests to this effect. Those States that still 
use corporal punishment (several States applying a version of shari’a law and a decreasing 
number of Caribbean States) mostly have not recognized individual complaint mechanisms and in 
most of the States that have recognized such mechanisms, this punishment has been abolished. 
Moreover, in those States in which corporal punishment is still applied that have recognized 
international mechanisms for individual complaint a tradition to resort to such mechanisms is yet 
to be developed. What is clear from the case law on the merits, as well as from other international 
statements and legal documents, is that would they be faced with requests for provisional 
measures to halt corporal punishment, the human rights adjudicators would grant these requests. 
In fact this type of provisional measures belongs to the common core of the concept as it aims to 
prevent irreparable harm to persons.35 
 
                                                 
35 See further Conclusion Part II. 
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 CHAPTER V 
 HALTING EXPULSION OR EXTRADITION 
 IN NON-REFOULEMENT CASES 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Human rights adjudicators take provisional measures to halt a deportation, expulsion or 
extradition pending the proceedings, based on the requirement of non-refoulement. The non-
refoulement principle is laid down, among others, in the UN Refugees Convention. Article 33(1) 
defines this principle as follows: 
“No Contracting State shall expel or return (“refouler”) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to 
the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, 
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or particular political opinion”.1 
The human rights adjudicators have also read this principle into the prohibition of torture and 
cruel treatment included in the respective human rights treaties and virtually all human rights 
adjudicators have used provisional measures in the context of claims involving non-refoulement.  
The previous chapter on halting executions already discussed the treaty provisions and case 
law involving the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment, which are also relevant in the 
context of non-refoulement. This chapter specifically addresses the question which situations 
involving claims of non-refoulement have warranted provisional measures. In expulsion or extra-
dition, are the rights invoked at least capable of being interpreted such that a violation could be 
concluded? As noted, this book argues that the use of provisional measures would otherwise be 
inappropriate. 
2 PRACTICE 
2.1 Introduction 
CAT and the ECtHR have used provisional measures almost exclusively to ensure respect for the 
principle of non-refoulement. Yet most of the case law of these adjudicators is devoted to the 
evidentiary requirements for finding a violation, an issue which is further discussed in Chapter 
XV (Immediacy and risk), rather than to the interpretation and scope of the rights. The Inter-
American Commission and the HRC have used provisional measures less often to halt expulsion 
or extradition, but their practice in this regard nevertheless provides useful information on 
preventing irreparable harm. 
                                                 
1 See 1951 Convention relating to the status of refugees, entered into force 22 April 1954 (143 
State Parties as of 1 September 2005); 1967 Protocol relating to the status of refugees, entered 
into force 4 October 1967 (143 State Parties as of 1 September 2005); some States have ratified 
the Protocol but not the Convention itself, see e.g. the US and Venezuela. About the UN High 
Commissioner on Refugees see e.g. <www.unhcr.ch>. Generally about the rights of refugees see 
e.g. Macklin (1995), pp. 251-277; Cançado Trindade (1997); Gorlick (1999); Clark (1999); 
Nicholson/Twomey (1999); Smeulers (2002), pp. 45-52 and references and Goodwin-Gill (2007). 
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2.2 CAT 
The UN Committee against Torture has used its provisional measures almost exclusively to halt 
expulsion and extradition. Article 3 UN Convention against Torture stipulates:  
“No State Party shall expel, return (‘refouler’) or extradite a person to another State where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”. 
This is the article most often invoked in petitions to the CAT. The Committee has devoted a 
specific General Recommendation to Article 3.2 Many cases have been submitted especially from 
Canada, Switzerland and Sweden. Other addressee States have included Australia, Venezuela, 
France and the Netherlands. The reason why the Committee has not yet dealt with complaints 
against some of the other States Parties that have nevertheless recognised its competence to do so 
may simply be that lawyers from those States have not yet found their way to Geneva.3 
The UN Convention against Torture is the only human rights treaty with a specific provi-
sion on non-refoulement. As noted, on the merits the cases dealt with by CAT are particularly 
relevant for the discussion of evidentiary requirements and most often the reason for the use of 
provisional measures or for denying petitioners’ requests in this respect simply lies in CAT’s 
preliminary assessment of the evidence of risk.4  
In 1993 it started to examine the first petitions. It became clear immediately that most com-
plaints would involve the principle of non-refoulement and would include a request for provi-
sional measures. During the first years the Committee took provisional measures in almost all of 
these cases and very often it found a violation on the merits. Some of the States involved showed 
their unhappiness about this, which appears to have resulted, at least for a period of time, in deci-
sions by the Committee to decrease the number of cases in which it would find a violation. It also 
took provisional measures less often.5 Nevertheless it has used them regularly and has also made 
some strong statements on the merits both with regard to the need to protect petitioners with and 
without refugee status against refoulement.  
In Agiza v. Sweden (2005) CAT recalled ‘that the Convention’s protections are absolute, 
even in the context of national security concerns, and that such considerations emphasise the 
importance of appropriate review mechanisms. While national security concerns might justify 
some adjustments to be made to the particular process of review, the mechanism chosen must 
continue to satisfy article 3’s requirements of effective, independent and impartial review’.6  
It has also confirmed the authority of the UNHCR when it comes to petitioners who have 
been recognized as a refugee. In Elif Pelit v. Azerbaijan (2007) it noted that the petitioner ‘was 
                                                 
2 CAT General Comment No. 1: Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the context of 
Article 22, 21 November 1997. See further Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
3 Of the States parties to the ICAT 61 have also recognised the right of individual petition. See 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/ratification/9.htm> (last updated 18 April 2008). The 
Committee has dealt with individual complaints against 21 of these States, mostly involving the 
issue of non-refoulement. About the individual complaint procedure and case law see Doerfel 
(2005); Ingelse (2001); Gorlick (2000); Gorlick (1999). 
4 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). In some cases States ignored the provisional measures 
decided upon by CAT, see e.g. Tebourski v. France, 1 May 2007; Dar v. Norway, 11 May 2007 
(in which the State subsequently facilitated the petitioner’s return to Norway) and Singh Sogi v. 
Canada, 16 November 2007. State party responses are further discussed in Chapter XVII and the 
legal status of provisional measures in Chapter XVI. 
5 This is further discussed in Chapter XV on immediacy and risk. 
6 CAT Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, §13.8. See also Van Boven 
(2006), pp. 746-758 and Joseph (2005), pp. 339-346. 
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recognised as a refugee in Germany, as it had been concluded that she would be at risk of perse-
cution if she was returned to Turkey. Her refugee status remained valid at the time of her deporta-
tion to Turkey by the State party authorities’. The Committee recalled Conclusion No. 12 of the 
UNHCR's Executive Committee ‘On the extraterritorial effect of the determination of refugee 
status", pursuant to whose letter (f) “the very purpose of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Proto-
col implies that refugee status determined by one Contracting State will be recognized also by the 
other Contracting States”.7 
2.3 HRC 
Apart from CAT, with its explicit reference to non-refoulement, the other human rights adjudica-
tors read the principle of non-refoulement into the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment. The 
HRC has recognised the principle on the basis of the obligations of States under Article 7 ICCPR 
(prohibition of torture and cruel treatment) and Article 6 (right to life), in light of the undertaking 
in Article 2 to ensure the rights in the Covenant to all individuals within its territory and subject to 
its jurisdiction. 
It has also dealt with requests for provisional measures to halt an impending extradition, ex-
pulsion, deportation or other form of forced return until it had been able to determine whether this 
would result in a violation of the principle of non-refoulement underlying Articles 6 and 7 
ICCPR. 
The earliest known expulsion case in which it used provisional measures dates from 1978, a 
year after it had published its first decision on the merits. It involves an unspecified State. The 
Committee intervened almost nine months after it adopted its Rules of Procedure. In this case, 
O.E. v. S. (1978), it decided to inform the State of the Committee’s view ‘that pending further 
consideration of the case, the alleged victim, having sought refuge in S, should not be handed 
over or expelled to country X’.8 The case represents the earliest explicit use of provisional meas-
ures by the HRC, not only in expulsion cases but in general. Insufficient information is available 
about the existing threat in country X. It is not clear whether there was a real risk of the death 
penalty in that country or a real risk of torture or ill treatment.  
Since this case the HRC has taken provisional measures on behalf of a number of persons in 
extradition cases. Most of them were facing the death penalty in the requesting State.9 Canada 
extradited both Kindler and Ng to the United States in September 1991 after the Supreme Court 
of Canada had rendered judgment in their cases. It did so in spite of the Committee’s provisional 
measures taken earlier that month.10 The HRC used provisional measures not only in the cases 
Kindler v. Canada and Ng v. Canada but also in a few other extradition cases. In K.C. v. Canada 
                                                 
7 CAT Elif Pelit v. Azerbaijan, 1 May 2007, §11. 
8 In the same letter, but before mentioning Rule 86, it already asked the State party to inform the 
HRC whether it was contemplating the deportation or extradition of the alleged victim to country 
X. It also requested the petitioner to provide information in substantiation of his claim of 
violation of the Articles 7, 9, 13, 14 and 15 ICCPR. O.E. v. S., 25 January 1978. 
9 See HRC Kindler, Ng, Cox and E.G. v. Canada and Weiss v. Austria. Weiss was not facing the 
death penalty. All other cases relate to Canada and to extradition requests from the US. Canada 
abolished the death penalty in 1976. Article 6 of the 1976 Extradition Treaty between Canada and 
the US provides: “When the offence for which extradition is requested is punishable by death 
under the laws of the requesting State and the laws of the requested State do not permit such 
punishment for that offence, extradition may be refused unless the requesting State provides such 
assurances as the requested State considers efficient that the death penalty shall not be imposed 
or, if imposed, shall not be executed”. 
10 See also Chapter XVII on the official State responses.  
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(inadm. 1992) and in the follow-up case Cox v. Canada (1994), for instance, the petitioner 
equally requested the HRC ‘to adopt interim measures of protection because extradition of the 
author to the United States would deprive the Committee of its jurisdiction to consider the com-
munication, and the author to properly pursue his communication’. This means that counsel 
clearly provided a specific rationale for the use of provisional measures, relating to the right to 
individual complaint and the consequent possibility for the HRC to properly consider such com-
plaints. The HRC Special Rapporteur took provisional measures ‘to defer the author’s extradition 
until the Committee had had an opportunity to consider the admissibility of the issues placed 
before it’.11 E.G. v. Canada (disc. 1997), another extradition case in which provisional measures 
were used, equally involved the death penalty.12 The petitioner had submitted he had ‘an arguable 
case’ of a breach of the ICCPR. One of the arguments related to execution by electric chair. An-
other argument was that of the risk of a death sentence for a federal drugs charge involving large 
quantities of marijuana, which would not meet the ‘most serious crimes’ standard in the ICCPR.13  
There are also expulsion cases in which the HRC used provisional measures to halt re-
foulement (regarding Articles 6 and 7 claims) and one case in which it requested the State to halt 
the return of the petitioner in light of the right to family life (Articles 17 and 23 claim).14 
As noted, the HRC first took provisional measures to halt an expulsion in 1978. Surpris-
ingly, according to the available information the next time it used provisional measures in an 
expulsion case was in 1993.15 In A.A.T. v. Hungary (disc. 1994)16 the petitioner submitted that a 
deportation to Iraq would jeopardise his life and security. Apparently the authorities had already 
issued a deportation order. He had been a soldier in the Iraqi army for two years. He claimed that 
he deserted at the outbreak of the Gulf war in 1991, because he refused to fight for Saddam Hus-
sein in what he felt was a senseless war. He added that he lost five members of his family during 
the war. Several months after his arrival in Hungary he was arrested by the police and charged 
with robbery. He claimed to be innocent and the victim of confusion. Following informal inter-
                                                 
11 HRC K.C. v. Canada, 29 July 1992 (inadm.); Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994. In the View the 
HRC mentions 12 January 1993 (§4.1). On the cover page, on the other hand, it mentions 20 
April 1993. 
12 HRC E.G. v. Canada (738/1997), initial submission of 5 January 1997 (received 7 January 
1997), Rule 86/91 of 17 January 1997; withdrawal of Rule 86 on 28 April 1997; petitioner’s 
request to withdraw the case of 26 May 1997. On 17 November 1997 the HRC informed the 
petitioner that it had discontinued the case (on file with the author). 
13 The Canadian Minister of Justice had authorised his extradition without asking assurances against 
the death penalty, in reference to a sworn affidavit by a State prosecutor stating that the 
prosecution declined to seek the death penalty for the murder he had been charged with under 
Florida law. The petitioner noted, however, that he might be sentenced to death under federal 
law. From the court file establishing probable cause, rather than from the extradition request 
itself, it appeared that the US government had evidence that the petitioner was involved in a 
conspiracy to posses marijuana involving a quantity in excess of 1.000 kilos. The petitioner had 
been advised that if the US could prove that the killing for which he was charged in State court 
was part of the overall drug activity, the federal prosecutor could seek the death penalty pursuant 
to federal law. The federal prosecutor had refused to indicate whether he would seek the death 
penalty and Canada had not obtained assurances from him that it would not be imposed. The 
petitioner requested the HRC to use provisional measures under Rule 86 and ten days after the 
receipt of this request the HRC indeed used Rule 86. Initial submission of 5 January 1997; note 
verbale to the Permanent Representative of Canada of 17 January 1997 (on file with the author). 
In general on Kindler, Ng and Cox, see e.g. Harrington (2006), pp. 82-134. 
14 The latter case is discussed in Chapter XII (Other situations). 
15 As noted, in 1991 and 1992 it used provisional measures to halt extraditions. 
16 HRC A.A.T. v. Hungary, 543/1993 (disc. 1994); initial submission of 10 August 1992; Rule 
86/91 of 2 June 1993 (on file with the author). 
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ventions the Special Rapporteur used provisional measures in June 1993. Apparently the case was 
subsequently solved.17  
The petitioner’s husband in G.T. v. Australia (1997),18 a case similar to A.R.J. v. Australia 
(1997),19 had been convicted for importing around 240 grams of heroin from Malaysia into Aus-
tralia. While he was in prison he applied for refugee status. The Refugee Tribunal refused his 
application because, although it considered that there was indeed a ‘real chance’ that he would 
face imposition of the death penalty in Malaysia, this did not constitute persecution in terms of the 
Refugee Convention.20 The Note Verbale to the State referred explicitly to the fact that Australia 
had abolished the death penalty and had acceded to the Second OP on the abolition of the death 
penalty.21  
In the later case of Ahani v. Canada (2004)22 the HRC used provisional measures for the 
State to refrain from deporting the petitioner to Iran ‘until the Committee has had an opportunity 
to consider the allegations, in particular those that relate to torture, other inhuman treatment or 
even death as a consequence of the deportation’. Mansour Ahani feared torture and ill treatment if 
he were to be returned. The State nevertheless deported him.23 Reportedly he was briefly detained 
upon his return to Iran and has not been heard from since. There have been several other cases as 
well in which the HRC used provisional measures to halt refoulement. These include cases 
against Australia,24 Canada,25 France,26 Denmark27 and Kyrgyzstan.28  
                                                 
17 In August 1994 the HRC sent the petitioner the message that it had discontinued examination of 
his case. This was sent to him at an address in Hungary, which may mean that he had not been 
deported. Correspondence from 10 August 1992 to 17 August 1994 in A.A.T. v. Hungary 
(543/1993), (on file with the author).  
18 HRC Mrs. G.T. v. Australia, 4 November 1997. 
19 HRC A.R.J. v. Australia, 28 July 1997. The alleged victim was an Iranian citizen detained in 
Western Australia. The Australian Refugee Review Tribunal did express sympathy for the 
applicant ‘in that should he return to Iran it is likely that he would face treatment of an extremely 
harsh nature’, yet he could not be considered a refugee because he did not have a well-founded 
fear of being persecuted for one of the reasons stated in the Refugee Convention. Instead, his fear 
arose out of his conviction for a criminal act. The Federal Court of Australia, in turn, determined 
that the Refugee Review Tribunal had not erred ‘in finding that he did not attract Refugee 
Convention protection’. It pointed out that it was not dealing with the question whether or not the 
petitioner could be returned to another country or be permitted to remain in Australia on another 
basis. Like the Refugee Review Tribunal it noted that the risk of unfair trial, imprisonment and 
torture was ‘a matter of serious concern’. Finally, on 11 January 1996, the petitioner was 
informed that the Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs was not prepared to exercise his 
discretion to allow him to remain in Australia. The HRC used provisional measures on 3 April 
1996. 
20 The petitioner expected the federal court to confirm her husband’s deportation and referred to a 
letter from the Australian office of Amnesty International opposing his forcible return since it 
believed that he would face the death penalty in Malaysia as a result of his conviction in 
Australia. Pending the case the HRC requested the State not to deport the petitioner’s husband to 
Malaysia ‘or to any country where he would likely face the death sentence’. See §4.1. 
21 HRC Note Verbale of 17 June 1996 in G.T. v. Australia, 706/1996 (on file with the author).  
22 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004. 
23 See Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
24 See HRC Omar Sharif Baban (also on behalf of his son Bawan Heman Baban) v. Australia, 6 
August 2003 (initial submission of December 2000, provisional measures of September 2001 
after receiving information that the case was listed for a domestic court hearing in October 2001). 
Apparently, however, the petitioner and his son had escaped from Villawood Detention Centre 
already in June. ‘Their current precise whereabouts are unknown’ (see §§1.2, 2.1 and 2.6). 
Subsequently the HRC concluded that domestic remedies were still available in respect of the 
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claim under Article 7 and therefore declared it inadmissible (§6.4). It did find violations of 
Article 9(1) and (4) ICCPR. See further about this case Chapter VII (detention situations 
involving risks to health and safety). In Ali Aqsar Bakhtiyari and Roqaiha Bakhtiyari (also on 
behalf of their five children) v. Australia, 29 October 2003 the HRC used provisional measures to 
halt the deportation of Mrs. Bakhtiyari and her children in March 2002. Subsequently, the Special 
Rapporteur adjusted his provisional measures ‘to be conditional on an adverse decision on the 
application by the High Court’. This case too is particularly relevant in the context of another 
type of provisional measures, discussed in Chapter VII (Detention). Nevertheless, the petitioners 
had also argued that the State had been in error in finding that they were not Afghan nationals 
and that if returned to Pakistan they would be sent on to Afghanistan where they feared exposure 
to violations of Article 7 (see §§1.2 and 3.1). In that light the Rapporteur had used provisional 
measures to halt their expulsion. In May 2003 the petitioners again requested provisional 
measures because the removal would amount to a breach of Articles 7, 17, 23(1) and 24. The 
Rapporteur renewed his request not to expel them (see §7.2). In October 2003 the HRC declared 
inadmissible the claim under Article 7 for failure to substantiate. It found violations of Article 
9(1) and (4). Given ‘the number and age of the children, including a newborn, the traumatic 
experiences of Mrs Bakhtiyari and the children in long-term immigration detention in breach of 
article 9 of the Covenant, the difficulties that Mrs Bakhtiyari and her children would face if 
returned to Pakistan without Mr Bakhtiyari and the absence of arguments by the State party to 
justify removal in these circumstances’, the HRC considered that removing them without the 
final determination in Mr Bakhtiyari’s proceedings would constitute arbitrary interference in the 
family of the petitioners in violation of Articles 17(1) and 23(1) (§9.6). See also Chapter XIII on 
the relationship with forms of reparation. In D. and E. and their two children v. Australia, 11 July 
2006, pending the proceedings, on 12 February 2002, the Special Rapporteur requested the State 
to provide information, ‘on an urgent basis’, on whether the petitioners were under a real risk of 
deportation while their case was being considered by the HRC; the Committee trusted that the 
State would not deport them before it had received such information and had an opportunity to 
consider whether the request for provisional measures should be granted. Two months later the 
State replied that ‘it was in the process of considering the request for information by the Special 
Rapporteur on the possibility of whether there is a real risk or removal’ of the petitioners from 
Australia while the HRC was examining the case. It announced that it would not remove the 
petitioners until the request had been considered, §1.2. On 11 April 2006 counsel informed the 
HRC that the petitioners had obtained a temporary protection visa and therefore there was no 
need to proceed with the case under Article 7, §3.3. They did wish to maintain the case under 
Articles 9 and 24. On the merits the Committee found a violation of Article 9(1) ICCPR for their 
continued immigration detention for three years and two months ‘without any appropriate 
justification’, §7.2. 
25 In HRC Daljit Singh v. Canada, 30 March 2006 (inadm.), on 5 November 2004, the Committee 
had used another qualified provisional measure, namely for the State not to deport the petitioner 
before providing the HRC with information on whether it intended to remove him to India and 
before providing it with its observations pursuant Rule 97 (old Rule 91). On 9 November 2004, 
following a request for clarification, the HRC requested the State not to deport the petitioner to 
India before the State had made its observations on admissibility and merits and before the HRC 
had acknowledged receipt of these observations, §1.2. Subsequently the HRC declared the case 
inadmissible as insufficiently substantiated. 
26 In HRC Samira Karker on behalf of her husband Salah Karker v. France, 26 October 2000, it is 
not evident from the text of the View why the HRC used provisional measures. The case involved 
an islamist sentenced to death in Tunisia in 1997. He had refugee status since 1998, but the 
Minister of the Interior decided to expel him in order to protect French territory. This expulsion 
did not appear to be imminent. The HRC used Rule 86 half a year after the initial submission of 
18 September 1998. It appears from the case file that the provisional measure was to halt his 
expulsion to Tunisia pending the examination of the case. In other words, the Rapporteur decided 
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In a case against Sweden the HRC has also used provisional measures of a different nature, 
but in the context of the refoulement of a petitioner (who was handed over by the Swedish au-
thorities to ‘some ten foreign agents in civilian clothes and hoods’ where later ‘investigations by 
the Swedish Parliamentary Ombudsman, disclosed that the hooded individuals were United 
States’ and Egyptian security agents’) and the subsequent ill treatment and torture he had suf-
fered, as well as the risks his Swedish counsel considered he was facing because of Swedish 
authorities contacting him in Egypt. Counsel had noted this in response to arguments by Sweden 
against the admissibility of the case (with regard to, e.g. counsel’s authorization and the delay in 
the submission before the HRC). In response the HRC, on 16 January 2006, ‘in light of counsel’s 
comments on the State’s submissions (…) and of the material before the Committee related to the 
author’s situation, requested, pursuant to Rule 92 of its Rules of Procedure, that the State party 
take necessary measures to ensure that the author was not exposed to a foreseeable risk of sub-
stantial personal harm as a result of any act of the State party in respect of the author’.29 Thus this 
is not a provisional measure to halt refoulement, as the deportation had already taken place before 
the case was submitted to the HRC. It could be seen as a provisional measure to protect against 
death threats and harassment, but the difference is that Sweden must abstain from action in re-
spect of the petition so that he would not be exposed to a risk of ‘substantial personal harm’. 
To return to the issue of halting refoulement, Section 3.3 discusses cases in which the HRC 
took provisional measures to halt expulsion in the context of ‘lack of proper care’ in the receiving 
State. 
2.4 European Commission and Court 
Most of the provisional measures taken by the European Commission on Human Rights have 
involved the principle of non-refoulement. At least since 1964 it has used provisional measures in 
this context.30 An example of an early case is Becker v. Denmark (1976), involving the impending 
expulsion of 199 children to Vietnam. The Commission decided to request the State ‘not to take 
any steps in the meanwhile’ that ‘might prejudice the conduct of the present proceedings’ and, 
more specifically, to delay ‘any final movement of the children’ pending the proceedings before 
                                                                                                                       
to use this provisional measure just in case his expulsion would become imminent after all. 
Hence, the provisional measure did not relate to the question, also raised by the Working Group, 
about ‘which measures the State party has taken to review regularly the situation of Mr. Karker 
and the necessity of the continuation of the order against him’. See §6.2. Eventually, the HRC 
found no violation of Articles 12 and 13 and considered that the claim under Article 9 was 
inadmissible ratione materiae. See also Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
27 HRC Jonny Rubin Byahuranga v. Denmark, 1 November 2004. On 9 July 2004 the HRC used 
provisional measures not to deport him before it had had an opportunity to address the continued 
need for these measures and on 30 July 2004 it prolonged these until the closing date of the 
session in November of that year. On the merits it found that expulsion would indeed result in a 
violation of Article 7 ICCPR (Wedgwood and Yalden dissenting). 
28 HRC Maksudov & Rakhidov; Tashbaev & Pirmatov v. Kyrgyzstan, 16 July 2008 (provisional 
measures of 6 March 2006, 8 June 2006 and 13 June 2006; on 9 August 2006 they were 
nevertheless handed over to Uzbek law enforcement authorities). See §§1.2, 8.1-8.9 and 10.1-
10.3. 
29 HRC Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, 25 October 2006, §2.3. 
30 See EComHR X v. Austria and Yugoslavia, 30 June 1964 (inadm.), provisional measure of 11 
March 1964 (previously, on 14 February 1964, already communicated by phone).  
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it. At the same time it decided to give precedence to the petition.31 Initially, some provisional 
measures were taken informally, rather than based explicitly on the Rules of Procedure.32 
Often cases in which the European Commission had used provisional measures were subse-
quently closed or by the time they were brought before the Court there was no longer any risk of 
expulsion or extradition. Thus, the previous ECtHR did not often have occasion to use provisional 
measures. It did so for the first time in 1989 in the extradition case Soering v. UK.33 The new 
permanent Court was suddenly faced with many more requests for provisional measures because 
there was no longer a Commission to deal with the bulk of these requests. The European Com-
mission and Court have taken provisional measures on behalf of persons alleging a real risk of 
cruel treatment or torture or to their life itself upon deportation to a specific State for reasons as 
varied as membership of a persecuted minority, being charged with adultery34 or with member-
ship of a terrorist organisation35 or because they were risking female genital mutilation.36 Excep-
tionally, they have also done so in the context of a risk of ‘lack of proper care’ in the receiving 
State.37 
The Court has pointed out that the protection afforded by Article 3 ECHR is wider than that 
provided by Article 33 Refugees Convention.38 This means that it has also used provisional meas-
ures on behalf of persons not considered refugees.39 
The Court denies most of the requests for provisional measures, mostly in light of an as-
sumed lack of ‘evidence’ of future risk,40 but also because while it may be convinced that the 
situation complained of will indeed occur, it does not consider that this would constitute a type of 
harm that would be irreparable.41 
                                                 
31 EComHR Becker v. Denmark, 3 October 1975 (inadm.), provisional measure of 18 July 1975. 
32 See e.g. EComHR X. v. Austria and Yugoslavia, 30 June 1964 (inadm.); X v. Federal Republic of 
Germany, 22 December 1967 (adm.) and 19 December 1969 (Article 31 report); Mohamed 
Kerkoub v. Belgium, 15 December 1971 (inadm.); Tossum Dolani v. Belgium, 31 May 1972 
(inadm.) (invoking provisional measures ‘conformément à la pratique généralement suivie dans 
des affaires analogues’) and X. v. the Netherlands, 27 May 1974 (struck out; invoking provisional 
measures ‘conformément à la pratique de la Commission dans des cas de ce genre’). 
33 ECtHR Soering v. UK, 7 July 1989. 
34 See e.g. EComHR Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000 (provisional measure of 26 February 1998).  
35 See e.g. ECtHR Shamayev et al. v. Georgia and Russia, 16 September 2003 (inadm.) (provisional 
measures to Georgia on 4 October 2002). 
36 See e.g. ECtHR Lunguli v. Sweden, 1 July 2003 (struck out) (provisional measures of 13 
September 2002).  
37 See further section 3 of this Chapter on the relationship with the merits. 
38 See e.g. ECtHR Ryabikin v. Russia, 19 June 2008, §118 and Ahmed v. Austria, 17 December 
1996, §41. 
39 See e.g. the provisional measures ordered in Ryabikin in March 2004 (they were lifted in 
September 2005, probably for lack of immediacy of the risk, as subsequently the Court did find 
that extradition to Turkmenistan would result in a violation of Article 3) and the measures used 
by the Commission on behalf of Ahmed on 15 December 1994 and by the Court on 2 October 
1996, Ahmed v. Austria, 17 December 1996. 
40 See further Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
41 See e.g. Gary McKinnon v. UK, initial decision of 12 August 2008 by the Acting President to 
apply Rule 39 to the effect that the petitioner should not be extradited to the US before a given 
time so as to allow the Court to examine the request at the earliest opportunity (28 August). On 
28 August 2008 the Court decided to refuse his request. ECtHR press release, ‘European Court of 
Human Rights refuses request for interim measures by Gary McKinnon’, 28 August 2008. 
McKinnon was alleged to have gained unauthorised access to military computers in the US from 
his home in the UK. His complaint was mainly under Article 3 ECHR about the conditions of 
detention he would face if he were convicted in the US. 
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While the Court normally does not provide reasoning for its use of provisional measures, on 
occasion it has included some explanatory sentences in certain Notes Verbales to States in order 
to prod these States to take action and prevent a flood of cases from petitioners in a similar posi-
tion.42 Indeed, on the merits it has pointed out that in case of group persecution there is no need to 
show that the petitioner has been especially ‘singled out’ for persecution, the test used in Vilvara-
jah (1991).43 If the Court deals with a situation of large scale violations concerning a whole mi-
nority there is no need for establishing ‘further special distinguishing features’.44  
In 2008 the ECtHR confirmed the absolute nature of the prohibition of refoulement, also in 
the context of persons suspected of terrorism. 
“The concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘dangerousness’ in this context do not lend themselves to a 
balancing test because they are notions that can only be assessed independently of each other. 
Either the evidence adduced before the Court reveals that there is a substantial risk if the person 
is sent back or it does not. The prospect that he may pose a serious threat to the community if 
not returned does not reduce in any way the degree of risk of ill treatment that the person may 
be subjected to on return”.45 
2.5 African Commission 
In 1969 the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), the predecessor of the African Union, adopted 
a specific convention on refugees, with an expanded refugee definition encompassing those who 
                                                 
42 See e.g. President ECtHR, Note Verbale with provisional measure, 3 May 2004, in case 
15243/04, published in the Dutch journal JV 226 (Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht). See 
further Rieter (2005a), pp. 25-44 and Rieter (2006), pp. 736-739. This concerned cases against 
the Netherlands to prevent expulsion of persons to Somalia. Upon the motivated provisional 
measures, a return moratorium was decided for members of minority groups and persons who had 
no family or clan relations in northern Somalia and subsequently, following a provisional 
measure on behalf of a Somali petitioner belonging to a majority clan, and relating to all Somali 
who would be internally displaced upon being sent to Northern Somalia, a deportation 
moratorium for all Somali asylum-seekers who do not originate from one of the so-called safe 
areas. See also NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, which concerned even a greater number of cases 
involving imminent expulsion to Sri Lanka. After 20 provisional measures, on 23 October 2007 
the Court pointed out that, ‘having regard to the security situation in Sri Lanka ‘Rule 39 had been 
applied on each occasion an interim measure had been requested by an ethnic Tamil’. It referred 
to ‘the strain which the processing of numerous Rule 39 applications places on judicial time and 
resources’ and ‘concluded that, pending the adoption of a lead judgment in one or more of the 
applications already communicated, Rule 39 should continue to be applied in any case brought by 
a Tamil seeking to prevent his removal’. The hope was expressed that the Government would 
‘assist the Court by refraining for the time being from issuing removal directions in respect of 
Tamils’. The State responded that it was ‘not in a position to assist the Court by refraining from 
issuing removal directions in all such cases on a voluntary basis’. See §21. The Court had since 
used provisional measures in ‘respect of three hundred and forty-two Tamils’, §22. See also 
Chapter XIII (Protection) and XVII (Official State responses). 
43 ECtHR Vilvarajah v. UK, 30 October 1991. 
44 ECtHR Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007. See also Chapter XV (Immediacy and 
risk). 
45 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, §139 (confirming ECtHR Chahal v. 
UK, 15 November 1996). The Inter-American Court had previously confirmed the absolute 
nature also in the context of detention, see e.g. Medina Quiroga (2005), pp. 142-143. 
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fled armed conflict and civil war.46 This indicates that the Commission may take a more elaborate 
approach to non-refoulement than the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees 
and its 1967 Protocol. 
Moreover, similar to the ICCPR and the other two regional human rights treaties the Afri-
can Convention on Human and Peoples’ Rights itself includes provisions on the right to life and 
integrity (Article 4 ACHPR), the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture (Article 5) and safe-
guards against expulsion (Article 12(4)), which seem to imply a prohibition of refoulement. In-
deed, the practice of the African Commission appears to confirm the approach of the HRC and the 
ECtHR in this respect. An example of a case in which the African Commission used provisional 
measures to halt a deportation involves the allegation that a deportation from Namibia (where the 
alleged victim had lived for the last 25 years) to Angola would put him at a ‘real risk of torture 
and extra judicial death’. Angola had accused him of being a UNITA rebel. The petitioner alleged 
a violation of Articles 4 (life and integrity), 5 (prohibition of cruel treatment and torture) and 
12(4) ACHPR (safeguards against expulsion). In February 2001 the African Commission wrote to 
the minister of foreign affairs of Namibia expressing concern over the impending deportation. 
While the next year it declared the case inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, 
the fact that it used provisional measures to halt deportation suggests that its approach to the 
prohibition of cruel treatment and the right to life is similar to that of the other human rights 
adjudicators.47 In this case the Commission did not expressly invoke Rule 111 but in substance its 
action pending the case constitutes a provisional measure.48 At the end of the decision it specifi-
cally added a note about its intervention. Its arguments emphasize the importance of preventing 
irreparable harm to the victim.49 
2.6 Inter-American Commission 
In the Americas the Cartagena Declaration expanded upon the 1951 United Nations Convention 
on the Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol.50 It was inspired, among others, by the work of 
                                                 
46 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, 1001 UNTS 
45, signed 10 September 1969, entered into force 20 June 1974. Article 1(2): “The term ‘refugee’ 
shall also apply to every person who, owing to external aggression, occupation, foreign 
domination or events seriously disturbing public order in either part or the whole of his country 
of origin or nationality, is compelled to leave his place of habitual residence in order to seek 
refuge in another place outside his country of origin or nationality”. Article 2(3) provides: “No 
person shall be subjected by a Member State to measures such as rejection at the frontier, return 
or expulsion, which would compel him to return to or remain in a territory where his life, 
physical integrity or liberty would be threatened for the reasons set out in Article 1, paragraphs 1 
and 2”. 
47 ACHPR Interights (on behalf of Jose Domingo Sikunda) v. Namibia, May 2002 (inadm.). It has 
also used provisional measures on behalf of persons who had already been deported; for one 
person to the effect that he would be allowed to return, for the other, who had since died, that his 
body could be returned to Zambia for burial, Amnesty International v. Zambia, 5 May 1999 (on 
behalf of William Banda and John Chinula). See also Chapter XIII (Protection) and Chapter XI 
(Mass expulsion). 
48 About the informal provisional measures of the HRC see Chapter VII (Detention). 
49 See further Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
50 Several Latin American countries have collaborated to face the situation of refugees and 
displaced persons in the Americas. In 1984 ten governments and experts from twelve countries 
held a colloquium in Cartagena de Indias (Colombia) on the international protection of refugees 
in Central America, Mexico and Panama. This resulted in the Cartagena Declaration on 
Refugees, adopted at ‘Coloquio Sobre la Proteccion Internacional de los Refugiados en America 
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the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights51 and by the OAU Convention. The Declara-
tion extended its definition of a refugee in Central America to people threatened by, among oth-
ers, internal conflicts, massive violations of human rights and generalised violence.52 
Unlike the ECtHR, the Inter-American Court has not yet used provisional measures to halt 
refoulement, but this appears to be due to the types of cases that have been brought before it by 
the Commission and not to any lack of underlying rationale for their use in this context. Were the 
Commission to deal with a non-refoulement case against a State that has recognized the Court, 
and request the Court’s provisional measures, it is likely that the Court would order these, given 
its general approach to the prevention of irreparable harm to persons. Thus far the Court has used 
                                                                                                                       
Central, México y Panamá: Problemas Jurídicos y Humanitarios’, Cartagena, Colombia, 22 
November 1984. 
51 In conclusion 3 of the Cartagena Declaration it was noted that ‘in view of the experience gained 
from the massive flows of refugees in the Central American area, it is necessary to consider 
enlarging the concept of a refugee, bearing in mind, as far as appropriate and in the light of the 
situation prevailing in the region, the precedent of the OAU Convention (Article 1, paragraph 2) 
and the doctrine employed in the reports of the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights’. 
See also the Commission’s Annual Report 1981-1982: Informe Anual 1981-1982, Capítulo 6, §4 
referring to the 1965 Annual Report. 
52 “Hence the definition or concept of a refugee to be recommended for use in the region is one 
which, in addition to containing the elements of the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol, 
includes among refugees persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or 
freedom have been threatened by generalised violence, foreign aggression, internal conflicts, 
massive violation of human rights or other circumstances which have seriously disturbed public 
order”. Conclusion 3 of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees. Conclusion 5 reiterated ‘the 
importance and meaning of the principle of non-refoulement (including the prohibition of 
rejection at the frontier) as a corner-stone of the international protection of refugees. This 
principle is imperative in regard to refugees and in the present state of international law should be 
acknowledged and observed as a rule of jus cogens’. In 1987 the Presidents of five Central-
American States signed the Esquipulas II Accord to collaborate in their attempts to find solutions 
to displacement and to device plans for social and economic development alleviating ‘the 
poverty, landlessness, and social exclusion that were at the roots of the conflicts’. Statement by 
UN Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees Gerald Walzer, San José, 5 December 1994, to 
mark the 10th anniversary of the Cartagena Declaration on Refugees, ‘the Cartagena Declaration: 
a decade of progress’, Refugees Magazine, 1 March 1995 (<www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/>, 
consulted on 11 June 2002). In this Accord the participating States committed to give refugees 
and displaced persons immediate protection and assistance, especially with regard to health, 
education, work and security and to facilitate their repatriation or resettlement, always on a 
voluntary and individual basis. Acuerdo de Esquipulas II, point 8, Guatemala, 7 August 1987 (see 
the website of the Central-American Parliament: <www.parlacen.org.gt>, consulted 15 June 
2002). Based on these political commitments, the UN was able to organise the first International 
Conference on Central American Refugees (CIREFCA) in 1989. The governments involved 
signed a Plan of Action in which they committed themselves to enact specific measures with 
respect to refugees, displaced persons and repatriates. They also promised to treat refugees in a 
non-discriminatory way. See: Declaration and Concerted Plan of Action in Favour of Central 
American Refugees, Returnees and Displaced Persons, Report of the Secretary-General, Office of 
the UNHCR, 31 October 1989; and Resolution of the OAS General Assembly, Los Refugiados 
Centroamericanos y la Conferencia Internacional sobre Refugiados Centroamericanos, 18 
November 1989, ANG/RES. 1021 (XIX-0/89). Yet as we will see one of the main refugee 
problems in the 1990s, involving Haitians fleeing to the US and the Bahamas, concerned States 
not involved in CIREFCA. 
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provisional measures to halt deportation in the context of complaints about arbitrary and mass 
expulsion.53  
The Inter-American Commission, on the other hand, has taken various precautionary meas-
ures in the context of the principle of non-refoulement inherent in Article 5(2) ACHR and explicit 
in the more limited Article 22(8) ACHR (on the right to asylum).54 Information about the precau-
tionary measures used by the Inter-American Commission in non-refoulement cases is available 
as of the early 1990s. The addressee States have included the US, Canada, the Bahamas, Peru and 
the Dominican Republic. Some of these States have not yet ratified the ACHR, necessitating 
resort to the American Declaration. Evidently, in such cases there is no recognition of the Court 
either, making the Commission the only adjudicator capable of intervening in urgent situations.55 
This section devotes particular attention to the information-rich Haitian refugees case in 
which the Inter-American Commission specifically discussed its use of precautionary measures in 
its decision on the merits.56 This case against the US clearly illustrates the fact that Article I of the 
                                                 
53 See Chapter XI on mass expulsion and forced eviction. In his concurring opinion to the Court’s 
Advisory Opinion on the Juridical conditions and rights of undocumented workers, 17 September 
2003, Judge Cançado Trindade did refer to the principle of non-refoulement. 
54 As noted in Chapter II (Systems), the Inter-American Commission has been involved with the 
problem of refugees on the basis of provisions in the Declaration and the Convention. Both 
documents include articles dealing with asylum and non-refoulement. Article XXVII of the 
Declaration provides: “Every person has the right, in case of pursuit not resulting from ordinary 
crimes, to seek and receive asylum in foreign territory, in accordance with the laws of each 
country and with international agreements”. According to the Commission this article contains 
two criteria, which are cumulative. The first is that the right to seek and receive asylum must be 
in accordance with the laws of the country of which asylum is sought. The second is that this 
right must be in accordance with international agreements. It found that the effect of the dual 
cumulative criteria in the article was that ‘if the right is established in international but not in 
domestic law, it is not a right which is recognised by Article XXVII of the Declaration’. Article 
22(7) ACHR lays down a similar provision. In other words, the Commission observes that, were 
it only to consult these articles, the Inter-American system would not provide, directly or 
indirectly, the rule of non-refoulement. These provisions, however, are not the only ones that are 
relevant. For State Parties to the Convention the principle of non-refoulement is expressly laid 
down in Article 22(8) ACHR: “In no case may an alien be deported or returned to a country, 
regardless of whether or not it is his country of origin, if in that country his right to life or 
personal freedom is in danger of being violated because of his race, nationality, religion, social 
status, or political opinions”. Moreover, it is implied in Article 5(2) ACHR: “No one shall be 
subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment”. 
55 See also Chapter II (Systems). 
56 CIDH The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States (Haitian refugees case), 13 
March 1997, §1 (referring to 1 October 1990 as the day the Commission received the petition) 
and §12 (referring to 3 October 1990). For a background on this case, focussing on the 
proceedings in the US, see e.g. Ratner (1998), pp. 187-220; Koh (1994b), pp. 139-173 and Koh 
(1994), pp. 999-1025. The Inter-American Commission has not only dealt with the problems of 
refugees as part of its adjudicatory function but also in its Annual Reports. In its Annual Report 
1993 the Commission made special mention of the military coup in Haiti in 1991 and the massive 
exodus of Haitians to which the ensuing severe repression and difficult economic conditions had 
led. It noted that more than 50.000 of them went to countries such as the US and the Bahamas 
and many of them died at sea. “Thousands others were ‘turned back’ on the high seas in keeping 
with the United States’ controversial policy for screening the Haitian boat people”. CIDH Annual 
Report 1993, Chapter II. Already in 1985, the Commission noted that the principle of non-
refoulement in Article 22(8) ACHR could not protect directly those refugees dealing with a State 
not a party to the ACHR. Of course, according to the Cartagena Declaration, the general principle 
of non-refoulement ‘should be’ observed as a rule of ius cogens. Yet there was no political 
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American Declaration complements the UN Refugee Convention. Several organisations repre-
senting Haitian refugees had filed a petition against the US in 1990. This petition concerned the 
US practice of stopping (‘interdicting’) boats with Haitians on the high seas and returning them to 
Haiti. It alleged that many of these boat people had a reasonable fear that they would be perse-
cuted if returned to Haiti. The authorities nevertheless denied them a proper forum to process 
their refugee claims. While the petition was pending before the Commission the representatives 
made certain requests, including:  
“To seek immediate, interim relief from the United States Government in the form of temporary 
suspension of the Haitian Migrant Interdiction program, and the deportation of interdicted 
Haitians to Haiti until the restoration of lawful order in Haiti, and the subsiding of the grave 
personal danger that now faces Haitians from random and state-sponsored violence”.57 
In response, the Commission sent several notes to the US, including a telex of 4 October 1991 
sent to the US Secretary of State, James Baker. In this telex it issued an emergency request that 
could be qualified as a precautionary measure. It did not, however, identify specific victims but 
rather challenged the policy as such. The interesting aspect is that the Commission based itself on 
a Resolution of the OAS Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs:  
“It has decided pursuant to paragraph 4 of Resolution 1/91 of the Ad Hoc Meeting of Ministers 
of Foreign Affairs, entitled ‘Support to the Democratic Government of Haiti,’ to request that the 
United States Government suspend its policy of interdiction of Haitian Nationals who are 
attempting to seek asylum in the United States and are being sent back to Haiti, because of the 
danger to their life, until the situation in Haiti has been normalized”.58 
The telex presumably was the Commission’s reply to the petitioners’ Emergency Application for 
Provisional OAS Action to Halt the United States’ Policy of Interdicting and Deporting Haitian 
Refugees, filed on 3 October 1991. Among others, this petition stated that the US policy deprived 
Haitians ‘of a fair opportunity to articulate and substantiate claims for political asylum’. The 
petitioners pointed out that a Haitian who avoided interdiction at high sea and arrived in the US 
had at least a five percent chance of ‘being considered to possess a legitimate asylum claim’, 
while an interdicted Haitian would only have a .005 percent likelihood to be so considered. They 
argued that ‘(t)he strength of the asylum claim did not suddenly change once Haitian boat people 
                                                                                                                       
mechanism monitoring those States that had not ratified the Convention. CIDH Informe Anual 
1984-1985, Capítulo IV, Desplazamientos en la Región y Protección de Refugiados.Vis-à-vis 
OAS member States that have not yet ratified the ACHR it is not only the abovementioned right 
to seek and receive asylum in the American Declaration (Article XXVII) that is relevant with 
regard to the principle of non-refoulement, but especially Article I of the Declaration, providing 
that every human being has the right to life, liberty and the security of his person. In fact, in the 
Inter-American system this article complements the provisions of the UN Refugee Convention 
and its Protocol. Not only the Commission’s Annual Reports and its case law but also its Special 
Country Reports may clarify the obligations of States under the Convention or the Declaration. A 
case in point is the Commission’s Special Report on Canada (2000). In this Report it pointed out 
that the right to asylum in Article XXVII of the Declaration was itself a means to safeguard the 
fundamental right to liberty, integrity and life in Article I. It pointed out as well that ‘the effective 
protection of substantive rights requires an adequate procedural framework for their 
implementation’. Such framework must provide mechanisms effectively establishing whether a 
person meets the applicable standard of risk. CIDH Canada Report 2000, §104. 
57 CIDH The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States (Haitian refugees case), 13 
March 1997, §11(a).  
58 Id., §13. 
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got around the interdiction programme, instead, what changed was the opportunity to be heard’.59 
The Commission sent its telex the day after receipt of the petitioners’ request. 
In February 1992 the petitioners filed another Emergency Application. They argued that the 
US, by maintaining its interdiction programme despite the coup, had ‘deprived Haitians fleeing 
the military junta of a fair opportunity to articulate and substantiate claims of political asylum’. 
Five days later they submitted a Supplemental Filing in Support of this Emergency Application 
pointing out that Haitian soldiers were present on the docks when the interdictees were repatriated 
and asked for their names and addresses. Later many of them were arrested at home or at pre-
established roadblocks. Several of them were killed and some were tortured.60 On that same day 
the Commission sent a note to James Baker to the effect that:  
“The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights notes that the return of the Haitians from 
the United States recommenced on February 3, 1992 and that the implementation of the present 
policy will result in the transfer of some 12,000 Haitians. Given the uncertain situation in Haiti, 
the Members of the Commission unanimously and respectfully request the United States 
Government to suspend, for humanitarian reasons, the return of Haitians”.61 
During a hearing, a year later, the petitioners argued the admissibility of the petition, requested 
precautionary measures and presented documentary evidence about the health condition of the 
Haitians held at Guantanamo Bay. They also presented three witnesses who testified, among 
others, on why the ‘in country processing’ by the US of the asylum requests in Haiti itself was not 
working. Two weeks later the Commission approved a report in which it took the following 
precautionary measures: 
“a. It called upon the United States Government to review, as a matter of urgency, its practice of 
stopping on the high seas vessels destined for the USA with Haitians and returning them to Hai-
ti without affording them an opportunity to establish whether they qualify as refugees under the 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees, or as asylum-seekers under the American Declarati-
on of the Rights and Duties of Man.  
b. It called upon the United States Government to ensure that Haitians who were already in the 
United States are not returned to Haiti without a determination being made as to whether they 
qualify for refugee status, under the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, or as asylees 
[sic] under the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
c. It placed itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to reach a friendly settle-
ment of this matter on the basis of respect for the human rights recognized in the American De-
claration of the Rights and Duties of Man. 
d. It stated that this request is without prejudice to the final decision in this case”.62 
                                                 
59 Id., §6. 
60 Id., §§7-10. 
61 Id., §14. See also Press Communiqué 2/92, following the 81st session of the Commission, which 
closed on 14 February 1992: ‘the Commission studied with concern the situation of the boat 
people, i.e., those Haitian citizens who are being returned to Haiti, particularly from the base at 
Guantanamo. It asked its Chairman to address a letter to the Secretary of State of the United 
States, asking that the return of Haitian citizens to their country be suspended on humanitarian 
grounds, so long as the danger and systematic human rights violations by now known to exist in 
that country persist’, Annual Report 1991 (Annex). 
62 CIDH precautionary measures of 12 March 1993, The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. 
United States (Haitian refugees case), 13 March 1997, §17. The Commission also dealt with the 
situation of the Haitian refugees more generally, rather than only as part of this case. In its 
Annual Report 1993, for instance, it refers to a Declaration it issued on their situation. It called on 
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Seven months later the Commission declared the petition admissible and pointed out that its 
precautionary measures of March 1993 remained in force.63 Six months afterwards the petitioners 
urged the Commission to issue a decision on the merits as soon as possible because of the 
‘continuing deterioration of the human rights situation in Haiti and ongoing reports of abuse of 
Haitians forcibly repatriated by the Government of the United States without political asylum 
interviews’.64 The petitioners did not ask the Commission to repeat its precautionary measure, but 
instead they urged it to give the case priority.65 Nevertheless, the Commission did not specifically 
respond to the petitioners’ request and it decided on the merits only three years later. 
2.7 Bosnia Chamber 
The Bosnia Chamber has also taken provisional measures ordering the respondent Parties ‘to take 
all necessary steps to prevent the applicants from being taken out of the territory of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by the use force’. It did so in the context of a petition invoking a range of rights: the 
prohibition of torture or inhumane or degrading treatment, the right to liberty and security of 
person, the right to a fair trial, the right to respect for family life, the prohibition of expulsion of 
nationals, procedural safeguards in relation to the expulsion of aliens and Protocol 6 on the aboli-
tion of the death penalty. The petitioners were nevertheless handed over to the US forces based in 
Bosnia as part of the Stabilization Force led by the NATO. They were then transferred to the US 
military detention centre at Guantanamo Bay.66 In two other cases the petition was lodged after 
the alleged victims had already been transferred to Guantanamo. In one the petitioner’s wife 
requested the Chamber to order a provisional measure to the effect that he would be ‘treated 
humanely whilst in any form of detention’. The Chamber decided to reject this request.67 In the 
                                                                                                                       
member States ‘to take emergency measures to prevent the dangers suffered by Haitians fleeing 
repression and persecution who are nonetheless being repatriated’, Annual Report 1993 (1a).  
63 CIDH The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States (Haitian refugees case), 13 
October 1993 (adm.); see also merits report of 13 March 1997, §19(d). 
64 Letter of 26 April 1994, CIDH The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States 
(Haitian refugees case), 13 March 1997 (merits), §42. In September 1994 the Commission still 
informed the petitioner that it would decide on the merits later that year. See Koh (1994), p. 1018 
(footnote 84). 
65 See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
66 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed.BiH, 11 October 2002 
(adm. & merits). 
67 Bosnia Chamber Mustafa Ait Idir v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 4 April 2003 (adm. & merits). Such 
provisional measures would, however, have been appropriate given the responsibility of the 
respondent parties for having allowed him to become exposed to the situation at Guantanamo 
Bay. Apparently the Chamber is reluctant to recognize that extraterritorial obligations may 
continue beyond the transfer of authority over a detainee to a third State. After all, it did use 
provisional measures to halt the deportation of the other petitioners, confirming the approach of 
the ECtHR and the other human rights adjudicators about the responsibility of the sending State. 
In this case it could not order such measures because the petitioner had already been transferred. 
Because the respondent parties ignored the provisional measures in the first case, by February 
2002 the petitioners were still in the same situation, detained at Guantanamo Bay. The request of 
Mustafa Ait Idir’s wife was appropriate. Some form of intervention by the State responsible for 
exposing a petitioner to serious violations by another State is certainly warranted. Such an 
approach is in fact to be preferred over simply waiting until the decision on the merits and 
granting (financial) compensation upon the finding of a violation. In other words it would have 
been appropriate for the Chamber to order some form of intervention. Even before the specific 
reports about torture and ill-treatment in Iraq (e.g. the Abu Graib prison operating under US 
 Chapter V 
280 
other case the petitioner’s lawyer also requested provisional measures, but this request seemed 
less appropriate. His counsel requested the Chamber, ‘as a provisional measure, to issue a deci-
sion declaring that the criminal investigation against the applicant was not in accordance with the 
law’. The Chamber rejected this request.68 
The next section specifically discusses some situations that indicate a relationship between 
the provisional measures taken pending the case and the (expected) decision on the merits. 
3 RELATION BETWEEN PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO HALT EXPULSION OR 
EXTRADITION AND THE EXPECTED DECISION ON THE MERITS 
3.1 Introduction 
How do the decisions on the merits by the various adjudicators clarify the types of non-
refoulement claims for which adjudicators are likely to use provisional measures? This section 
discusses the responsibility for future violations in another State and the specific issue of whether 
non-death penalty States are allowed to extradite persons without asking assurances against the 
death penalty. It then deals with the scope of the principle of non-refoulement. The focus is on the 
question whether the principle of non-refoulement extends to the prohibition of ill treatment and 
whether provisional measures have been used in such cases. The discussion mainly involves the 
issue of life imprisonment and so-called ‘lack of proper care’ issues. This is discussed under the 
heading ratione materiae, as it deals with more substantive issues. The other issues involving the 
scope of the principle are taken together and briefly discussed under the heading ratione 
personae. They relate more to issues involving the addressee and victim. The focus here is on 
issues of extra-territorial obligation (intermediary States, non-State actors and extraordinary 
renditions). In all these cases the question arises whether provisional measures may be used.  
3.2 Future violations in another State 
3.2.1 Introduction 
A discussion on the use of provisional measures to ensure respect for the extraterritorial 
obligations of States starts with the issue of future violations in another State. After a general 
discussion of the State’s obligation ‘to ensure’, a question will be singled out that arose in the 
earlier practice of the HRC: the ICCPR and the reintroduction of the death penalty through 
extradition. 
                                                                                                                       
authority) and Cuba (the US facility at Guantanamo Bay) it was clear that the detainees at 
Guantanamo had no access to court and counsel and were not even informed of the charges 
against them, nor were they aware of what would happen to them. It is well known that such 
situations exponentially increase the risk of ill-treatment and torture. Moreover, information 
about attempts by the US to limit the internationally recognised interpretation of the prohibition 
of torture was already publicly available. See also Chapters XIII (Protection) and XV 
(Immediacy and risk). 
68 Bosnia Chamber Belkasem Bensayah v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 4 April 2003. 
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3.2.2 Obligation ‘to ensure’ 
Article 3 UN Convention against Torture is more explicit than the other human rights treaties in 
laying down a prohibition of non-refoulement. This also makes obvious the Committee’s use of 
provisional measures to halt such refoulement. As noted, the CAT devoted a General Recommen-
dation to this principle. For treaties other than the UN Convention against Torture, with its ex-
plicit inclusion of the principle of non-refoulement, it is important to address the issue of the 
responsibility of States not only to deal with past violations, but also with violations that are likely 
to take place in the future and in another State. When an adjudicator were to determine on the 
merits that the sending State has no responsibility for exposing a petitioner to violations in an-
other State, the use of provisional measures to halt such expulsion pending the proceedings would 
be inappropriate. 
The Inter-American Commission, the European Commission, the ECtHR and the Bosnia 
Chamber have equally recognized the principle of non-refoulement in the context of the prohibi-
tion of torture and inhuman treatment, the right to life and the obligation of State Parties to secure 
these rights to everyone within their jurisdiction. 
Already in 1959 the European Commission pointed out that ratification of the ECHR must 
be understood as agreeing to restrict the right to control the entry and exit of foreigners.69 A few 
years later it confirmed this, specifically mentioning the prohibition of inhuman treatment in 
Article 3.70 It had used provisional measures in this case in 1964.71 Although the Commission 
declared the case inadmissible, it confirmed that it had ‘frequently held that expulsion and, con-
sidering this case holds that, repatriation of a person may in certain exceptional circumstances 
raise an issue under the Convention and in particular under Art. 3’.72 Later it specified that a 
decision to deport, extradite or expel a person to face conditions falling within the scope of Arti-
cle 3 incurred the responsibility of the contracting State under Article 1 ECHR.73 This interpreta-
tion ‘is based upon the unqualified terms of Article 3 of the Convention, and the requirement 
which read in conjunction with Article 1 imposes upon the Contracting Parties to the Convention 
to protect ‘everyone within their jurisdiction’ from the real risk of such treatment, in the light of 
its irremediable nature’.74 
The European Court addressed the responsibility issue when it decided in Soering v. UK 
(1989) that State Parties have an ‘inherent obligation’ under Art. 3 ECHR not to extradite a per-
son facing a real risk of exposure to torture, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.75 As 
Judge De Meyer stated in his concurring opinion in this case: 
                                                 
69 EComHR X v. Sweden, 30 June 1959.  
70 EComHR Kuzbari v. Germany, 26 March 1963 (it is not clear whether provisional measures were 
used) and X v. Austria and Yugoslavia, 30 June 1964 (inadm.), provisional measures 14 February 
and 11 March 1964.  
71 EComHR X. v. Austria and Yugoslavia, 30 June 1964 (inadm.), provisional measures 14 
February and 11 March 1964. See also X. v. Germany, 22 December 1967 (adm.); 19 December 
1969 (struck out), informal provisional measures in April 1965. See also Amekrane v. UK, 11 
October 1973 (adm.). In this case there were no provisional measures as the removal had already 
taken place. See further X v. Belgium, 29 May 1961 (inadm.). In this case no information is 
available about the use of provisional measures. 
72 EComHR Becker v. Denmark, 3 October 1975, p. 233. See further Chapter XV (Immediacy and 
risk). 
73 EComHR Altun v. Germany, 3 May 1983 (adm.), p. 219. See also 7 March 1984 (struck out). 
74 See EComHR Kirkwood v. UK, 12 March 1984 (inadm.), under ‘the law’, §3 (last paragraph). 
75 ECtHR Soering v. UK, 7 July 1989. While Article 3 of the UN Convention against Torture spells 
out a specific obligation, based on the ‘abhorrence of torture’, this ‘does not mean that an 
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“When a person's right to life is involved, no requested State can be entitled to allow a 
requesting State to do what the requested State itself is not allowed to do”.76 
Moreover, a departure from the principle that the Convention institutions would not discuss ‘po-
tential violations’ was necessary ‘in view of the serious and irreparable nature of the alleged 
suffering risked, in order to ensure the effectiveness of the safeguard provided’ by Article 3.77 
Soering was the first case in which the ECtHR used provisional measures to halt an extradi-
tion. Moreover, Soering illustrates the special character of Article 3. The ECtHR pointed out that 
the sending State has no power over the practices of the receiving State and that Art. 1 ECHR 
‘cannot be read as justifying a general principle to the effect that, notwithstanding its extradition 
obligations, a Contracting State may not surrender an individual unless satisfied that the condi-
tions awaiting him in the country of destination are in full accord with each of the safeguards of 
the Convention’.78 Thus, it is the fundamental nature of Article 3 that triggers the responsibility of 
the sending State, rather than its human rights obligations in general.79 The HRC has taken a 
similar approach. Article 2 ICCPR stipulates that each State party ‘undertakes to respect and 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’ the rights recognised in 
the ICCPR. According to the General Comment on this article (2004) this obligation ‘entails an 
obligation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as that 
contemplated by Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal is to be 
effected or in any other country to which the person may subsequently be removed’.80 This also 
means that the State should make the relevant judicial and administrative authorities aware of the 
need to ensure such compliance with the ICCPR. 
More than ten years previously, in its General Comment on Article 7 ICCPR (1992), the 
HRC already noted that States must not, by extraditing or expelling persons, expose them to the 
danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. Moreover, before it 
published this General Comment the HRC had used provisional measures three times in an extra-
dition case and once, in 1978, in an expulsion case.81 This shows that already in 1978 the HRC 
implicitly accepted the principle of non-refoulement.82 Like the European Commission before it, 
the HRC made this decision at the provisional measures stage. It considered there was no need to 
                                                                                                                       
essentially similar obligation is not already inherent in the general terms of Article 3’. The Court 
pointed out that another interpretation ‘would plainly be contrary to the spirit and intendment of 
the Article’ and ‘hardly be compatible with the underlying values of the Convention’, §88. 
76 Compare also Article 16 ILC Articles on State Responsibility (aid or assistance in the 
commission of an internationally wrongful act). 
77 ECtHR Soering v. UK, 7 July 1989, §90. See also Cruz Varas et al. v. Sweden, 20 March 1991 
and Vilvarajah et al. v. UK, 30 October 1991, confirming this approach with regard to expulsion. 
78 ECtHR Soering v. UK, 7 July 1989, §86. 
79 Strictly speaking Lawson (1999), p. 245 is correct in considering that the responsibility of the UK 
is based on its failure, in violation of Article 1, to ensure Soering’s rights under Article 3. Thus, a 
failure to ensure other rights in the Convention could also trigger State responsibility. In light of 
similar approaches by the ECtHR in other contexts – including its approach to provisional 
measures, see the Conclusion to Part II and see Chapter XVI (Legal status) – the fact that it refers 
to Article 3 specifically may indicate that its underlying rationale for its interpretation of Article 1 
may be the exceptional importance of certain rights in the Convention.  
80 HRC General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, the nature of the general legal obligation imposed 
on States parties to the Covenant, 21 April 2004, §12. 
81 For the expulsion case see HRC O.E. v. S., 25 January 1978, for the extradition cases see Kindler 
v. Canada and Ng v. Canada, provisional measures of 26 September 1991 and K.C. v. Canada, 
provisional measure of 12 March 1992. 
82 It did not publish any information, however, on whether it discussed this issue at the time. 
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await determination of this legal issue on the merits before using provisional measures for the first 
time in such a case. 
The HRC has determined that State parties must ensure that they carry out all other legal 
commitments, including bilateral treaty obligations, ‘in a manner consistent with the Covenant’.83 
“The starting point for consideration of this issue must be the State party’s obligation, under 
article 2, paragraph 1, of the Covenant, namely, to ensure to all individuals within its territory 
and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the Covenant. The right to life is the most 
essential of these rights”.84 
It noted that extradition as such was outside the scope of the Covenant but that ‘a State party’s 
obligation in relation to a matter itself outside the scope of the Covenant may still be engaged by 
reference to other provisions of the Covenant’.85 
Kindler v. Canada (1993) is the first case the HRC decided on the merits on the existence of 
future violations in another State.86 The issue in such cases is not whether the alleged victim’s 
rights have been or are likely to be violated by the receiving State, which often is not even a party 
to the OP, but whether the sending State would expose him to a real risk of a violation of his 
rights under the Covenant by extraditing him. The HRC found that the State returning the poten-
tial victim could be held responsible under the Covenant for exposing him to danger to his life or 
physical integrity in the receiving State, perpetrated by persons unrelated to the sending State.87 
While a State party is ‘not required to guarantee the rights of persons within another jurisdiction’, 
it may be in violation of the ICCPR if it ‘takes a decision relating to a person within its jurisdic-
                                                 
83 HRC Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §14.1. 
84 Ibid. 
85 See HRC Kindler v. Canada, 25 October 1993, §6.1; Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §6.1 and 
Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994, §10.3, all referring to M.A. v. Italy, 10 April 1984 (inadm.), 
§13.4: “There is no provision of the Covenant making it unlawful for a State party to seek 
extradition of a person from another country”. See also, e.g., Aumeeruddy-Czieffra et al. v. 
Mauritius, 9 April 1981, §9.2. Yet Aguilar Urbina has pointed out that the Committee’s statement 
that extradition as such was outside the scope of application of the Covenant was ‘remiss-and 
even dangerous’. He considered that, in a narrow sense, extradition would be included within the 
procedures regulated by Article 14 ICCPR (fair trial). See Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, 
dissenting opinion Aguilar Urbina, §1-3. 
86 Referring to human rights treaties as living instruments, HRC Kindler v. Canada, 25 October 
1993, §9.2; Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §9.2; Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994, §7.1. In 
Cox v. Canada Herndl and Sadi dissented, seemingly considering that the reference to ‘in good 
faith’ in Article 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties did not refer to the way States 
should interpret and carry out a treaty but rather to the way international bodies such as the HRC 
should ascertain and carry out the intention of the parties to the treaty. 
87 See e.g. HRC Kindler v. Canada, 25 October 1993. In Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994 
Committee member Ban (Hungary) pointed out that his position (on a violation of Article 7) was 
‘strongly motivated by the fact that through Mr. Cox’s surrender to the United States, the 
Committee would lose control over an individual at present within the jurisdiction of a State party 
to the Optional Protocol’. See also decisions by domestic courts, not only confirming the ‘non-
refoulement’ principle, but also determining that removal without assurances against the death 
penalty could not be allowed: South African Constitutional Court Mohamed and another v. 
President of Republic of South Africa and others, 28 May 2001, CCT 17/01 (2001); Canadian 
Supreme Court, United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (15 February 2001); Hoge Raad 
(Dutch Supreme Court) 30 maart 1990 RvdW 1990, 76, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991, No. 
249, March 30 1990 (the Short case, also reported in English, in ILM 29 (1990), pp. 1375 ff. ). 
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tion, and the necessary and foreseeable consequence is that that person’s rights under the Cove-
nant will be violated in another jurisdiction’.88 
“That follows from the fact that a State party’s duty under article 2 of the Covenant would be 
negated by the handing over of a person to another State (whether a State party to the Covenant 
or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant is certain or is the very purpose of the handing 
over. For example, a State party would itself be in violation of the Covenant if it handed over a 
person to another State in circumstances in which it was foreseeable that torture would take 
place. The foreseeability of the consequence would mean that there was a present violation by 
the State party even though the consequence would not occur until later on”.89 
The Inter-American Commission has equally read the principle of non-refoulement in the right to 
life and security of Article I of the Declaration. In the Haitian Refugees case (1997) it found that, 
pursuant to this Article, the US had violated the right to life ‘of those unnamed Haitian refugees 
identified by the petitioners’ who ‘were interdicted by the United States, repatriated to Haiti, and 
later lost their lives after being identified as “repatriates”’. In this respect it also noted the interna-
tional case law on a specific type of extra-territorial obligations, providing that if a State party’s 
extradition or expulsion of a person within its jurisdiction would result in a real risk of violation 
of this person’s human rights in another jurisdiction, the State party may itself be in violation of 
this treaty.90 The Commission also concluded that the act of interdicting the Haitians on the high 
seas and ‘placing them in vessels under their jurisdiction, returning them to Haiti, and leaving 
them exposed to acts of brutality by the Haitian military and its supporters constitutes a breach of 
the right to security of the Haitian refugees’ under Article I.91 
                                                 
88 HRC Kindler v. Canada, 25 October 1993, §6.2. 
89 Ibid. 
90 It also referred to ECtHR and HRC case law. 
91 Still, in this case the Commission started out examining the aforementioned Article XXVII of the 
Declaration laying down the right to seek and receive asylum. It dealt first with the criterion of 
conformity with international instruments and referred to the 1951 Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees and its 1967 Protocol. It noted its belief ‘that international law had developed 
to a level at which there is recognition of a right of a person seeking refuge to a hearing in order 
to determine whether that person meets the criteria in the Convention’. The Haitian Centre for 
Human Rights et al. v. United States (Haitian refugees case), 13 March 1997, §155. The 
Commission referred to Article 33 (1) of the Refugees Convention, laying down the principle of 
non-refoulement. It noted that the US Supreme Court had ‘construed this provision as not being 
applicable in a situation where a person is returned from the high seas to the territory from which 
he or she fled’. This domestic court had held specifically, that the principle of non-refoulement in 
Article 33 ‘did not apply to the Haitians interdicted on the high seas and not in the United States’ 
territory’. US Supreme Court, Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization 
Service, et al. v. Haitian Center Council, INC, et al., 509 U.S. 155, (21 June 1993). The 
Commission did not agree with the US Supreme Court’s finding and pointed out that it shared the 
view of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in her amicus curiae brief to the 
Supreme Court, that ‘Art. 33 had no geographical limitations’, §157. The finding, however, that 
the US had breached its treaty obligations under Article 33 Refugee Convention did not suffice 
for finding a breach of Article XXVII Declaration. Under that article the right to seek and receive 
asylum must be in accordance with the domestic laws of the country in which refuge is sought. 
The Commission noted that in fact the US had recognised and acknowledged the right of Haitian 
refugees to seek and receive asylum in the US both prior to and subsequent to the Supreme Court 
decision. It also noted that the article provides for a right to seek and receive asylum in ‘foreign 
territory’ and that the US had, by interdicting Haitians on the high seas, violated their right to 
seek and receive asylum in some foreign territory other than the US, such as the Dominican 
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The Commission has specified that an ‘essential aspect’ of the right to personal security in 
Article I of the Declaration is the ‘absolute prohibition of torture, a peremptory norm of interna-
tional law creating obligations erga omnes’.92 It pointed out that while a person could be deprived 
of his refugee status under the Refugee Convention, the prohibition of torture as a norm of ius 
cogens applied ‘beyond the terms of the 1951 Convention’. Returning to their home country 
‘persons who have been subject to certain forms of prosecution such as torture’, it noted, ‘would 
place them at a risk which is impermissible under international law’. It referred to the American 
Declaration and Article 3 UN Convention against Torture and emphasised: 
“The fact that a person is suspected of or deemed to have some relation to terrorism does not 
modify the obligation of the State to refrain from return where substantial grounds of a real risk 
of inhuman treatment are at issue”.93 
The Bosnia Chamber has confirmed the abovementioned approach by the ECtHR in Soering and 
pointed out that the respondent Parties are liable for extradition or expulsion giving rise to an 
issue under Articles 2 and 3 (‘or, exceptionally, under Articles 5 and/or 6’). This liability ‘arises 
from the positive obligation enshrined in Article I of the Agreement and Article 1 of the Conven-
                                                                                                                       
Republic, Jamaica, the Bahamas, Cuba, Venezuela, Suriname, Honduras, etc. The Commission 
found that the US ‘summarily interdicted and repatriated Haitian refugees to Haiti without an 
adequate determination of their status, and without granting them a hearing to ascertain whether 
they qualified as “refugees”’. It found that the dual criteria test of the right to seek and receive 
asylum in ‘foreign territory’ had been satisfied and, hence, the US had violated the article, §162. 
It is clear, however, from its case law, that even when the asylum seeker is not intercepted on the 
high seas but in a State that always denied the right to seek and receive asylum in its domestic 
law (so that it would not be possible to claim a violation of Article XXVII), the Commission 
could still find a violation of Article I, because this article implies the principle of non-
refoulement. 
92 CIDH Canada Report 2000, §118. 
93 CIDH Canada Report 2000, §154. The Inter-American Commission also referred to a judgment 
of the ECtHR: Chahal v. United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, §§79-80. In its Concluding 
Observations to the fourth periodic report of Canada the HRC equally expressed concern ‘that 
Canada takes the position that compelling security interests may be invoked to justify the 
removal of aliens to countries where they may face a substantial risk of torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment’. It referred to its General Comment on Article 7 and recommended a 
revision of this policy ‘in order to comply with the requirements of article 7 and to meet its 
obligation never to expel, extradite, deport or otherwise remove a person to a place where 
treatment or punishment that is contrary to article 7 is a substantial risk’. See CCPR/C/79/Add. 
105, adopted on 6 April 1999, §13. In HRC Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, counsel had 
pointed out that the Canadian Supreme Court had envisaged extraordinary situations in which 
Canada could return a person even when there was a substantial risk of torture. She emphasised 
that this was contrary to the absolute ban on torture in international law, §6.4. In the context of 
the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Suresh Weiser (2004), p. 141 (accompanying 
footnote) considers that ‘it is particularly astounding for the court to suggest that the prohibition 
against torture can ever be derogated from’. The Inter-American Commission also dealt with the 
case of Suresh albeit only initially in the context of non-refoulement, see its precautionary 
measures of 16 January 1998, CIDH Suresh v. Canada, 27 February 2002 (adm.), §8. In Ahani v. 
Canada, 29 March 2004, neither the domestic courts nor the HRC itself had determined whether 
a substantial risk of torture existed in the case of the petitioner. Thus, the latter would express ‘no 
further view on this issue other than to note that the prohibition of torture, including as expressed 
in article 7 of the Covenant, is an absolute one that is not subject to countervailing 
considerations’. Ahani §10.10. 
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tion to secure the rights and freedoms in regard to all persons within their jurisdiction’. To extra-
dite a person to another State where there was a substantial risk of a violation of the above articles 
‘would be against the general spirit of the Convention and of the Agreement’.94  
The obligation to cooperate in the international fight against terrorism did not relieve the re-
spondent Parties from their obligation to ensure respect for the rights protected in the Agreement. 
The Chamber referred to the ‘Guidelines of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
on human rights and the fight against terrorism’ (2002), as ‘an authoritative clarification of the 
principles deriving from the Convention’. The Committee of Ministers recalled that ‘it is not only 
possible, but also absolutely necessary, to fight terrorism while respecting human rights’. The 
Guidelines restated Convention principles: an extradition may only be granted if there are ade-
quate guarantees that the requested person will not be sentenced to death. Moreover, extradition 
‘may not be granted when there is serious reason to believe that the person whose extradition has 
been requested will be subjected to torture or to inhumane or degrading treatment or punish-
ment’.95  
In the three cases involving petitioners detained in Guantanamo Bay the Chamber, among 
others, found violations of their right not to be subjected to the death penalty (Protocol 6). Con-
siderable uncertainty existed regarding the charges that would be brought against the petitioners, 
the applicable law and what sentence would be sought. This uncertainty did not exclude the impo-
sition of the death penalty. “This risk is compounded by the fact that the applicants face a real risk 
of being tried by a military commission that is not independent from the executive power and that 
operates with significantly reduced procedural safeguards”. The Chamber also referred to the 
potentially unlimited duration of the petitioners’ detention. The uncertainties involved gave rise to 
an obligation by the respondent Parties to seek assurances from the US against imposition of the 
death penalty. Yet, BiH and Fed. BiH had failed to do so.96  
Similar reasoning applies to the African Commission’s use of provisional measures to halt a 
deportation.97 All human rights adjudicators have used provisional measures in these circum-
stances before deciding on the merits on the principle of non-refoulement. While the case in 
which the African Commission took provisional measures was later declared inadmissible, this 
decision was unrelated to the merits of the case.98 The principle of non-refoulement has equally 
                                                 
94 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §259. The Chamber pointed out that the cases involving handing over the petitioners to US 
forces did not call for ‘extra-territorial application’ of the Agreement. The Agreement did not 
cover the actions of the US nor require the Parties to impose observance of the rights protected in 
the Agreement on the US, §258. See also Bensayah v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 7 March 2003, §182.  
95 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §259. The Chamber pointed out that the cases involving handing over the petitioners to US 
forces did not call for ‘extra-territorial application’ of the Agreement. The Agreement did not 
cover the actions of the US nor require the Parties to impose observance of the rights protected in 
the Agreement on the US, §§265-267. See also Bensayah v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 7 March 2003, 
§183. 
96 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §§270-300; Bensayah v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 4 April 2003, §§185-199; Ait Idir v. BiH and 
Fed. BiH, 4 April 2003, §§139-153. It recalled the relationship in international human rights law 
between the fairness of the trial and the imposition of the death penalty. It found that ‘as a matter 
of experience intimately related’ to the ‘principle of human rights law’ as laid down in Safeguard 
No. 5 of the 1984 ‘Safeguards guaranteeing protection of the rights of those facing the death 
penalty’, courts that are ‘not fully independent from the executive power and that offer reduced 
procedural safeguards and limitations on the right to legal assistance’ are more likely to impose 
the death penalty.  
97 ACHPR Interights (on behalf of Jose Domingo Sikunda) v. Namibia, May 2002 (inadm.). 
98 The case was declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
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been recognized by the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture99 and the ICTY.100 In fact, the prohibi-
tion of torture, from which the principle of non-refoulement is derived, is a peremptory norm of 
international law or ius cogens.101 
3.2.3 The ICCPR and re-introduction of the death penalty through extradi-
tion 
With regard to the HRC another issue to be addressed when discussing the appropriateness of 
provisional measures is its approach to the right to life and the relationship between Article 6(1) 
and (2) ICCPR.102 Article 6 ICCPR prohibits the expansion of the scope of the death penalty. The 
article is often interpreted as not allowing reinstatement of the death penalty after it has been 
abolished.103 Yet in Kindler v. Canada (1993), in Ng and in Cox, the HRC argued that Article 
6(1) must be read together with 6(2).104 This meant that Article 6(2), rather than Article 6(1), was 
applicable in case of extradition of a non-death penalty State to a death penalty State. Canada 
would only violate Article 6(1) ‘(i)f Mr. Kindler had been exposed, through extradition from 
Canada, to a real risk of a violation of Article 6(2) in the United States’.105 In light of its analysis 
                                                 
99 See e.g. UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Theo van Boven, (the ‘principle of non-refoulement 
is an inherent part of the overall absolute and imperative nature of the prohibition of torture and 
other forms of ill-treatment’), 1 August 2004, A/59/324, §28 and UN Special Rapporteur on 
Torture Manfred Nowak, 30 August 2005, A/60/316, §29 (referring to the ‘absolute principle’of 
non-refoulement). 
100 See ICTY Prosecutor v. Furundzija, case IT-95-17/I-T, 10 December 1998, 38 ILM 317 (1999) 
where the Yugoslavia Tribunal pointed out that the prohibition of torture as laid down in human 
rights treaties was an absolute right, which could not even be derogated from in times of 
emergency. It noted that this was linked to the fact that it is a peremptory norm. It then stated: 
“This prohibition is so extensive that States are even barred by international law from expelling, 
returning or extraditing a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for 
believing that the person would be in danger of being subjected to torture”, §144. See also 
Manfred Nowak, referring to the principle of non-refoulement as ‘an important general principle 
of international law’: Ait Idir v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 4 April 2003, §1 of his partly dissenting 
opinion.  
101 See e.g. ICTY Prosecutor v. Furundzija, case IT-95-17/I-T, 10 December 1998, 38 ILM 317 
(1999), §§144-154; Prosecutor v. Delacic and Others, case IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, 
§454; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, cases IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1, 22 February 2001, §466; ECtHR 
Case of Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom, 21 November 2001, §61; HRC General Comment 29 
(under 11); IACHR Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Judgment of 18 August 2000 and Maritza 
Urrutia v. Guatemala, Judgment of 27 November 2003 (‘The absolute prohibition of torture, in 
all its forms, is now part of international jus cogens’, §92); Cartagena Declaration, Conclusion 5, 
which calls the non-refoulement principle itself a rule of ius cogens; CIDH Special Report on 
Canada (2000), §154; see also Allain (2002), pp. 533-558 (concluding that the principle of non-
refoulement itself has become a rule of ius cogens); see also the various references to decisions of 
domestic courts in Smeulers (2002), p. 83 and see e.g. Seiderman (2001), p. 275; Bassiouni 
(1996), p. 68; Alleweldt (1996), p. 1 ; Burgers/Danelius (1988), p. 12; Verdross/Simma (1984), p. 
819; O’Boyle (1977), p. 687. 
102 See also Chapter III on halting executions.  
103 See e.g. HRC General Comment no. 6, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1, pp. 4-5; UN Special Rapporteur on 
Extra-judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions Report on his mission to the USA, UN Doc. 
E/CN.4/1998/68/Add.3, 22 January 1998, p. 3. 
104 See HRC Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993; Chitat Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993; Cox v. 
Canada, 31 October 1994. 
105 HRC Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993. 
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of the requirements of Article 6(2) the Committee pointed out that the petitioner had not claimed 
a violation of Article 14 (fair trial), that he was over eighteen years of age when the crime was 
committed and that the penalty was imposed for a very serious crime.  
The majority opinion in Kindler is surprising since it would seem that the exception of Arti-
cle 6(2) is not applicable to Canada, which does not have the death penalty.106 Indeed, Kindler 
gave rise to several strong dissents.107 The same happened in other cases involving the death 
penalty.108 The decision led to a construction of Art. 6 that made its constituent parts meaningless, 
                                                 
106 See HRC Roger Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003, in which the HRC indeed reversed its case law 
on this point.  
107 HRC Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993. Wennergren emphasised that Article 6(1) guaranteed to 
every human being the inherent right to life. “The other provisions of article 6 concern a 
secondary and subordinate object, namely to allow States parties that have not abolished capital 
punishment to resort to it until such time they feel ready to abolish it (...). It would appear to be 
logical to interpret the fundamental rule in article 6(1) in a wide sense, whereas paragraph 2, 
which addresses the death penalty, should be interpreted narrowly”. Article 6(2), he argued, is 
merely an exception or ‘dispensation’ for those States that have not abolished the death penalty 
but ‘what article 6, paragraph 2 does not’, he noted, ‘is to permit States parties that have 
abolished the death penalty to reintroduce it at a later stage’. The fact that Article 6(2) is 
applicable to the US, he considered, should not be construed so as to absolve Canada from its 
own obligations under Article 6(1). Lallah, in his dissent, also stated that Article 6(2) is not 
applicable to Canada, since Canada had abolished the death penalty. Pocar equally stated that 
Article 6(2) merely tolerates the death penalty, within certain limits and in view of future 
abolition, and that States that have abolished it should not reintroduce it, neither directly nor 
indirectly. Chanet observed that the HRC, in order to conclude that Canada had violated Article 
6, was forced to undertake a joint analysis of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 6. The fact that the 
Committee found it necessary to use both paragraphs in support of its argument, ‘clearly shows 
that each paragraph, taken separately, led to the opposite conclusion, namely, that a violation had 
occurred’. Since Article 6(2) only refers to countries in which the death penalty has not been 
abolished, this ‘rules out the application of the text to countries which have abolished the death 
penalty’ (italics omitted). The Committee erred, she said, by subjecting Canada, ‘as if it were a 
non-abolitionist country, to a scrutiny of the obligations imposed on non-abolitionist States’. 
‘This analysis shows’, she noted, ‘that, according to the Committee, Canada, which had abolished 
the death penalty on its territory, has by extraditing Mr. Kindler to the United States re-
established it by proxy in respect of a certain category of persons under its jurisdiction’. She did 
not think this type of ‘reintroduction by proxy’ was authorised by the Covenant. Being merely an 
implicit recognition of the existence of the death penalty, Article 6(2) could not be regarded as an 
authorisation to re-establish this penalty. Aguilar Urbina noted that the majority had interpreted 
the exception extensively by reading Article 6(1) in light of Article 6(2). He pointed out that it 
should be the reverse as Article 6(2) is the exception to the rule in Article 6(1) and should 
therefore be interpreted restrictively. Article 6(2) constituted a limitation on the application of the 
death penalty for those States that had not abolished it, while for those that had abolished it, 
Article 6 ‘represents an insurmountable barrier’ against reintroduction. He noted that the spirit of 
the article was to eliminate the death penalty as a punishment and he emphasised the absolute 
nature of the article as a non-derogable right. He pointed out that Canada’s abolition of the death 
penalty prevented it from applying it directly or indirectly (‘through the handing-over to another 
State’). 
108 Apart from being an unwarranted extensive interpretation of the provision itself, it ran counter to 
the proviso in Article 6(6) that ‘nothing in this article shall be invoked (...) to prevent the 
abolition of capital punishment’. Dissenting opinion Chanet, HRC Kindler v. Canada. In Cox v. 
Canada, 31 October 1994, she noted that by undertaking a joint analysis of Article 6(1) and 
Article 6(2) ICCPR the HRC made three legal errors. The first was that it applied to an 
abolitionist State a text that has been, ‘expressly and without ambiguity, reserved exclusively’ to 
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while human rights provisions should be interpreted in such a way as to provide individuals with 
the most meaningful protection.109 The majority interpretation over-emphasised one paragraph in 
the Covenant, thereby ignoring the overall purpose of the article and the Convention as a whole, 
including the prohibition of cruel treatment in Art. 7. The HRC acknowledged this when it over-
turned Kindler (1993) in Judge v. Canada (2003).110  
As noted, the HRC used provisional measures in all extradition cases involving risk of the 
death penalty. It did so in K.C. and Cox while the complaint did not seem to be based on argu-
ments other than those that had already been dismissed in Kindler and Ng. This means that the 
HRC would be unlikely to find a violation on the merits if the petitioner would be extradited. 
Nevertheless, pending the proceedings it used provisional measures. In Judge v. Canada (2003) 
this friction between the provisional measures and the end result was solved.111 
                                                                                                                       
non-abolitionist States. The second was that it considered the simple implicit recognition of its 
existence as an authorisation to re-establish the death penalty in a State that has abolished it. This 
is an extensive interpretation that clashes with the meaning of Articles 6(6) and 5(2) ICCPR. 
Those texts, taken together, forbid a State to selectively apply the death penalty. The third 
mistake was a consequence of the previous two. When the HRC considers that Canada is 
implicitly authorised by Article 6(2) to re-establish the death penalty and apply it in certain cases, 
the Committee submits Canada to the obligations imposed on non-abolitionist States as if it had 
not abolished the death penalty. She also pointed out that the State could have requested 
assurances under the bilateral treaty and the fact that it did not do so meant that it deliberately 
exposed persons in the situation of Mr. Cox to the application of the death penalty in the 
requesting State. This constituted discrimination as well, in violation of Articles 2(1) and 26 
ICCPR. She considered the approach of Canada, leaving the choice of requesting assurances or 
not in the hands of a government deciding on the basis of its criminal law policies, an arbitrary 
deprivation of the right to life in violation of Article 6(1). 
109 It is clear that, even when the Convention was formulated, the underlying goal was the abolition 
of the death penalty. This would make a major contribution to respect for the right to life. 
Subsequent developments, including the adoption of the Second OP, only enhanced this view. 
110 HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003. As a significant factor the HRC referred to the fact that, 
since Kindler, Canada itself, in the Supreme Court case of US v. Burns (2001), had recognised 
‘the need to amend its own domestic law to secure the protection of those extradited from 
Canada’. It noted that the ICCPR should be interpreted as a ‘living instrument’ and the rights 
protected under it ‘should be applied in context and in the light of present-day conditions’, §10.3. 
In reference to the provision on interpretation in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, it 
pointed out that Article 6(1) ICCPR constitutes the general rule. Its purpose is to protect life. 
States that have abolished the death penalty are obliged under this paragraph to protect life in all 
circumstances. As noted, paragraphs 2 to 6 ‘have the dual function of creating an exception to the 
right to life in respect of the death penalty and laying down limits on the scope of that exception’. 
“Among these limitations are that found in the opening words of paragraph 2, namely, that only 
States parties that ‘have not abolished the death penalty’ can avail themselves of the exceptions 
created in paragraphs 2 to 6. For countries that have abolished the death penalty, there is an 
obligation not to expose a person to the real risk of its application. Thus, they may not remove, 
either by deportation or extradition, individuals from their jurisdiction if it may be reasonably 
anticipated that they will be sentenced to death, without ensuring that the death sentence would 
not be carried out”. See §10.4. 
111 Two cases against Australia, a State party that had abolished capital punishment and had ratified 
the Second OP, had already indicated its evolving position on this particular issue. Rather than 
the question whether the application of capital punishment would violate the Covenant it 
addressed the question ‘whether there was a real risk of capital punishment as such’. See HRC 
G.T. v. Australia, 4 November 1997 and A.R.J. v. Australia, 28 July 1997. The reasoning of the 
HRC was similar in both cases. It did not find violations of Articles 6 and 7. In one case it noted 
Article 1 of the Second OP, but it established that Australia would not violate this article because 
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Judge was a fugitive who had been sentenced to death in Pennsylvania, but he escaped and 
fled to Canada. Following conviction for two robberies Canada ordered him to be deported. He 
requested a stay until Canada would seek and receive an extradition request from the US, but he 
was removed on the day of his submission to the HRC. The Special Rapporteur was not in a 
position to use provisional measures.112 If he had been removed under the bilateral extradition 
treaty between the US and Canada the latter could have asked for assurances against execution. 
The HRC noted that the speed of the removal appeared to have been an ‘attempt to prevent him 
from exercising his right of appeal to the Court of Appeal’.113 It found that the State party ‘failed 
to demonstrate that the author’s contention that his deportation to a country where he faces execu-
tion would violate his right to life, was sufficiently considered’. The decision to deport the peti-
tioner was taken arbitrarily and in violation of Article 6 together with Article 2(3) ICCPR.114 He 
was entitled to an appropriate remedy ‘which would include making such representations as are 
possible to the receiving state to prevent the carrying out of the death penalty on the author’.115  
3.3 Findings ratione materiae 
3.3.1 Introduction 
While the prohibition of refoulement is explicitly included in the UN Convention against Torture 
(ICAT) it is considered only to relate to the limited definition of torture in Article 1 of the Con-
vention. As noted, according to CAT the principle of non-refoulement does not apply to the pro-
hibition of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in Article 16 ICAT.116 
                                                                                                                       
the death penalty was not a foreseeable and necessary consequence of his deportation. There were 
some other claims in this case, relating to the right to family life (Articles 17 and 23), but the 
Committee found that they were inadmissible for insufficient substantiation. Although it declared 
the Article 9 claim admissible, it found that the deportation would not amount to a violation by 
Australia of that article. The State party had argued that preventive detention was not automatic 
in Malaysia and was ‘not likely to occur in the instant case, taking into account T.’s limited 
knowledge of the trafficking in which he was involved’. Since the petitioner had not challenged 
this information and only relied on the existence of certain legislation, the State’s information 
was the decisive factor in the Committee’s assessment of the risk involved. See more generally 
Chapter XV on assessment of risk. 
112 See Chapter II (Systems), section 2.4 on the power and promptness of the HRC. 
113 HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003, §10.8.  
114 Id., §10.9. Irrespective of the fact that it had not yet ratified the second OP (aiming at the 
abolition of the death penalty) Canada, as a State party that has abolished the death penalty, had 
violated Article 6(1) by deporting the petitioner to the US ‘without ensuring that the death 
penalty would not be carried out’. Thus, it established ‘the crucial link in the causal chain that 
would make possible the execution of the author’, §10.6. The State had submitted that its conduct 
should be assessed in light of the law applicable at the time when the alleged violation took place. 
However, the HRC considered that the protection of human rights was evolving and that ‘the 
meaning of Covenant rights should in principle be interpreted by reference to the time of 
examination’, §10.8. 
115 See HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003, §12. Solari Yrigoyen suggested a different, more 
precise, remedy. The State party was ‘to do everything possible, as a matter of urgency to avoid 
the imposition of the death penalty or to provide the author with a full review of his conviction 
and sentence’. He also added the customary obligation to ensure that similar violations do not 
occur in the future. See further Chapter XIII (Protection). 
116 See CAT B.S. v. Canada, 14 November 2001 and T.M. v. Sweden, 18 November 2003 (but see 
partly dissenting opinion by Fernando Mariño Menéndez). 
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It does not apply either to situations that do not fit the limited definition of torture in this 
Convention (only if ‘inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
public official or other person acting in an official capacity’; only pain or suffering not arising 
from, inherent in or incidental to ‘lawful sanctions’). Thus, Article 3 ICAT only deals with non-
refoulement in case of risk of torture and it refers to the limited definition of torture in Article 
1.117 Obviously, this approach has implications for the use of provisional measures. CAT has only 
used them in the context of claims about a real risk of torture in the receiving or requesting State. 
Article 7 ICCPR, on the other hand, is not restricted by a limited definition of torture. Moreover, 
it also prohibits expulsion in the face of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.118 
The same applies for the provisions in the regional human rights treaties.119  
In its General Comment on Article 7 ICCPR (1992) the HRC pointed out that the distinc-
tions between the different kinds of punishment or treatment would depend on the nature, purpose 
and severity of the treatment applied. It was not necessary ‘to draw up a list of prohibited acts or 
to establish sharp distinctions’. In any case, the prohibition of Article 7 extends to corporal pun-
ishment as well as to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim. Moreover, prolonged solitary 
confinement may amount to a violation of Article 7 as well.120 
In light of the Committee’s interpretation of Article 6 ICCPR in the decades before Judge v. 
Canada (2003) the question arises how it interpreted Article 7. After all, in these cases it had used 
provisional measures to halt deportations in death penalty cases while it did not accept on the 
merits that this would constitute a violation of Article 6 (right to life). As discussed in the chapter 
on halting executions, in Ng v. Canada the HRC considered that Canada could reasonably have 
foreseen that the petitioner, if sentenced to death, would be executed in a way that amounts to a 
violation of Article 7, because execution by gas asphyxiation did not meet the test of ‘least possi-
ble physical and mental suffering’.121 Consequently Canada had failed to comply with its obliga-
                                                 
117 Yet ‘lawful’ has been argued to refer to international law as well. After all, international human 
rights norms may not be violated either. See e.g. Smeulers (2002), p. 53 and Alleweldt (1996), p. 
94. CAT has pointed out that corporal punishment does not fall under the exception of ‘lawful 
sanctions’. See further Ingelse (2001), p. 278. 
118 See also Ingelse (2001), p. 397 (pointing out that most provisions in the Convention against 
Torture and their interpretation by CAT ‘did not extend beyond and sometimes do not even 
extend as far as the case law of the Human Rights Committee’). 
119 See e.g. ECtHR Soering v. UK, 7 July 1989, §88 and Vilvarajah et al. v. UK, 30 October 1991, 
§103. 
120 HRC General Comment 20 [44], 3 April 1992, A/47/40 (1992), annex VI, p. 193, §§6 and 11. 
See El-Megreisi v. Libya, 23 March 1994, §5.4 (‘by being subjected to prolonged 
incommunicado detention in an unknown location’, the petitioner was the victim of torture and 
cruel and inhuman treatment). See also Mukong v. Cameroon, 21 July 1994, §9.4. The ECtHR 
(third section) has found a violation of Art. 3 when a petitioner was ‘kept in solitary confinement 
for an excessive and unnecessarily protracted period, that he was kept for at least seven months in 
a cell that failed to offer adequate protection against the weather and the climate, and that he was 
kept in a location from which he could only gain access to outdoor exercise and fresh air at the 
expense of unnecessary and avoidable physical suffering’. See Mathew v. the Netherlands, 29 
September 2005, §217. If there is a general practice in a requesting State of exposing certain 
(extradited) persons to such treatment provisional measures to halt their extradition would be 
appropriate. See also an earlier case like Dhoest v. Belgium, 14 May 1987 (no violation Article 
3), in which the European Commission on Human Rights had refused to take provisional 
measures and later found no violation of Article 3 (for evidentiary reasons) and just noted that 
prolonged solitary confinement was ‘undesirable’, §116. See also Ingelse (2001), p. 256. 
121 HRC Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §16.4. 
 Chapter V 
292 
tions under the Covenant by extraditing Ng without having sought assurances that he would not 
be executed.122  
Specific issues of contention regarding the prohibition of ill treatment are the death row 
phenomenon, life imprisonment and expulsion of a person facing ‘lack of proper care’ in the 
receiving State. These issues have played a role in decision making on provisional measures.123 
3.3.2 Death row phenomenon 
Chapter III (halting executions) discussed the approach of the European Court and the HRC to the 
death row phenomenon. The HRC does not consider this phenomenon, as such, to constitute a 
violation of the prohibition of cruel treatment. Since its judgment in Soering v. UK (1989) the 
ECtHR does. The European Commission had previously found that exposing a petitioner to the 
death row phenomenon did not constitute a violation of the prohibition of cruel treatment. Never-
theless, it had used provisional measures in Soering, as it did in the previous case of Kirkwood v. 
                                                 
122 Five members of the HRC would have found a violation of Article 7 on different grounds. Pocar 
and Lallah considered that because they would find a violation of Article 6, they would 
necessarily find a violation of Article 7 as well. Aguilar Urbina pointed out that the death penalty 
as such constituted cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of that article and not 
only in case of gas asphyxiation. In any case he considered that the application of the death 
penalty was subsumed by the violation of Article 6. See §11 of Ng v. Canada. Chanet considered 
that the HRC had engaged in ‘questionable discussion’ when it assessed the suffering caused by 
cyanide gas and took ‘into consideration the duration of the agony’. She wondered whether it 
would find no violation if the agony lasted nine minutes, now it has deemed unacceptable an 
agony lasting more than ten minutes. She noted that a strict interpretation of Article 6 could have 
prevented this debate. Wennergren, finally, quoted one of the dissenting justices of the US 
Supreme Court in a 1992 case denying an individual a stay of execution by gas asphyxiation in 
California. Justice John Paul Stevens wrote: “The barbaric use of cyanide gas in the Holocaust, 
the development of cyanide agents as chemical weapons, our contemporary understanding of 
execution by lethal gas, and the development of less cruel methods of execution all demonstrate 
that execution by cyanide gas is unnecessarily cruel”. Wennergren considered that this 
summarised ‘in a very convincing way’ why the use of this method amounts to a violation of 
Article 7. He also explained that he did not consider execution by lethal injection acceptable 
either ‘from a point of view of humanity’ but at least this did ‘not stand out as an unnecessarily 
cruel and inhumane method of execution, as does gas asphyxiation’. On the other hand, two other 
members of the HRC would not have found a violation of Article 7 at all. Herndl emphatically 
disagreed with the HRC’s finding of a violation of Article 7 because of the execution method. He 
criticised the fact that the HRC gave only one reason to substantiate its finding of a violation, 
namely that the execution method did not meet the test of the ‘least possible physical and mental 
suffering’. He considered it futile to attempt to establish categories of execution methods, 
because it was ‘futile to attempt to quantify the pain and suffering of any human being subjected 
to capital punishment’. This was so, as long as ‘such methods were not manifestly arbitrary and 
grossly contrary to the moral values of a democratic society, and as long as such methods are 
based on a uniformly applicable legislation adopted by democratic processes’. Ando equally 
disagreed with the finding of a violation of Article 7. The only thing he was certain of was that 
the article ‘prohibits any method of execution which is intended for prolonging suffering of the 
executed or causing unnecessary pain to him or her’. 
123 Obviously there have been other issues as well, such as that of female genital mutilation. The 
ECtHR has pointed out in this context that ‘it is not in dispute that subjecting a woman to female 
genital mutilation amounts to ill-treatment’ contrary to Article 3 ECHR. What is the issue in such 
cases is whether the petitioner is facing a real risk of such treatment. ECtHR Collins and 
Akaziebie v. Sweden, 8 March 2007 (inadm. by a majority). In this case on 8 July 2005 
provisional measures were used but withdrawn in the finding on inadmissibility. 
 Halting Expulsion or Extradition in Non-Refoulement Cases 
293 
UK (inadm. 1984). In the latter case it had first taken and renewed provisional measures, but five 
months after it had initially taken them it decided not to renew them and only to resume its ex-
amination of the case more than two months later. The next month the petitioner informed it that 
the State had signed the relevant extradition warrant. Counsel requested the President to take 
provisional measures ‘in view of the proximity of the Commission’s resumption of its examina-
tion of the admissibility of the matter’. The President declined to do so. On the day the proceed-
ings before the Commission were to resume the petitioner once more requested the use of provi-
sional measures. Counsel invoked Art. 13 ECHR and noted the unsuccessful outcome of the 
proceedings for habeas corpus. Again the Commission declined to use provisional measures. 
The fact that it used provisional measures initially indicates its willingness to do so also 
when the case law on the merits is not yet clear. The fact that it later decided not to renew the 
measures may indicate that by then the Commission had already deliberated about it and the 
likelihood of a majority for finding a violation on the merits seemed too limited to continue ask-
ing the UK to postpone the extradition.  
Given that a few years later, in the Soering case, the Commission again used provisional 
measures, several members may have believed that Soering could be distinguished from Kirk-
wood. It may also be that it was clear, already at the stage of provisional measures, that there had 
been a shift in approaches within the Commission or that a different approach by the Court would 
be likely. Eventually, the Commission concluded by 6 votes to 5 that Soering’s extradition would 
not constitute a violation of Article 3, while the ECtHR concluded unanimously that it would.124 
Should the Commission have decided not to take provisional measures in this case, the petitioner 
would already have been extradited. This would have made redundant the Court’s provisional 
measures. 
As noted, thus far the HRC has not found the death row phenomenon as such to be in viola-
tion of Article 7 ICCPR. Nevertheless, it has found violations of this article in the context of 
detention situations on death row. An argument may be made that States should not be allowed to 
extradite someone to a situation such as those in which the HRC found violations of Article 7 
ICCPR in Jamaican cases involving death row inmates. In such a case provisional measures could 
be used in order to prevent irreparable harm and the decision on the merits would forbid the State 
to extradite. In result for the petitioner this would be strikingly different from the Committee’s 
case law relating to persons who are already on death row. In the latter cases its eventual decision 
on the merits does not indicate that the State should abstain from executing persons who have 
experienced violations of Article 7 on death row.125 
The fact that CAT has not used provisional measures to halt refoulement in cases involving 
a real risk of inhuman treatment rather than torture does not mean that its interpretation is not 
significant to help understand the concept of provisional measures in human rights adjudication 
generally. Under Article 16 Convention against Torture, the obligation to take general measures 
against cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, CAT has expressed its concern 
about solitary confinement and, even more so, incommunicado detention. In the latter situation 
the detainee is not only deprived of all contact with the outside world, but equally of all contact 
with other detainees. CAT has found that such detention violated Article 2(1), because such situa-
tions were conducive to torture. Torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment is more 
likely to occur in situations in which there is no access to court and counsel, family members or 
independent medical assistance. The longer the period before a detainee is brought before a court, 
the greater the risk of ill treatment. Detainees are normally tortured most severely in the first days 
                                                 
124 EComHR Soering v. UK, 19 January 1989; ECtHR Soering v. UK, 26 June 1989. For a 
discussion of the case see e.g. Van der Wilt (1995), pp. 53-80; Shea (1992), pp. 85-138; Lillich 
(1991), pp. 128-149; Van den Wyngaard (1990), pp. 757-779 and Quigley/Shank (1989), pp. 
241-272. 
125 See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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of their detention. Moreover, a lengthy period of detention may make it difficult to find visible 
traces of ill treatment.126  
3.3.3 Life imprisonment  
Petitioners have also requested the use of provisional measures to prevent extradition facing long 
prison sentences rather than the death penalty. While the evidentiary issues are similar to those in 
other extradition cases, the type of harm threatened is different. In S.I.G. v. the Netherlands 
(1985) the European Commission had taken provisional measures to halt an extradition to the US 
for someone awaiting a prison sentence of 50 years.127 In another case, a few years later, it re-
fused to take provisional measures and pointed out, when it subsequently declared the case inad-
missible, that Article 3 ‘cannot be interpreted in the sense that it would require a procedure for the 
reconsideration of a life sentence with a view to its remission or termination in any country to 
which extradition from a Convention State is envisaged’.128 In Einhorn v. France (2001) the 
Court had taken provisional measures, but lifted them only a few days later. On the merits it 
pointed out that it did ‘not rule out the possibility that the imposition of an irreducible life sen-
tence may raise an issue under Article 3’. “Consequently, it is likewise not to be excluded that the 
extradition of an individual to a State in which he runs the risk of being sentenced to death with-
out any possibility of early release may raise an issue under Article 3”.129 This case did not relate 
to such a situation. In other words, the fact that the Court lifted its provisional measures may 
relate to evidentiary requirements rather than to expectations on a decision on the merits. In Weiss 
v. Austria (2002) the petitioner had been tried in absentia for fraud, racketeering and money 
laundering. He was sentenced to a period of 845 years without opportunity for release until hav-
ing served at least 711 years. ECtHR first used provisional measures to halt his extradition, but 
then, on request of Austria, it decided not to prolong them. The petitioner subsequently withdrew 
the case in order to submit it to the HRC.130 In May 2002 the Special Rapporteur of the HRC used 
provisional measures to halt his extradition until the Committee ‘had received and addressed the 
State party’s submission on whether there was a risk of irreparable harm to the author, as alleged 
by counsel’.131 The ECtHR had not indicated how it had phrased the provisional measure nor why 
it subsequently did not prolong them. The HRC, on the other hand, did specify its provisional 
measure, the phrasing of which was more cautious than usual. Instead of requesting the State to 
halt the extradition until the HRC had examined the merits (or admissibility) it requested it to halt 
the extradition until the Committee had dealt with the State’s comments about the existence of a 
risk of irreparable harm. In fact adjudicators may always withdraw, or decide not to prolong, their 
provisional measures upon receipt of information showing that there was no risk or the circum-
stances had since changed and there was no longer any imminence or risk.132 In this case, how-
                                                 
126 See also Chapter VIII (Procedural rights). 
127 EComHR S.I.G. v. the Netherlands, 10 October 1985 (inadm.). 
128 ECtHR P. and R.H. and L.L. v. Austria, 5 December 1989 (inadm.). See also Nivette v. France, 3 
July 2001 (inadm.). While it is unclear whether provisional measures were requested in Nivette, 
the Court indicated that the relevant criterion is whether there is a risk of a sentence of life 
imprisonment ‘without any possibility of early release’. 
129 ECtHR Einhorn v. France, 16 October 2001 (inadm.). Among others it referred to Council of 
Europe documents that were ‘not without relevance’, §27. 
130 ECtHR Weiss v. Austria, 13 June 2002 (struck out). 
131 HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003. (initial submission 24 May 2002, Rule 86 of 24 
May 2002; extradition 9 June 2002). See also Chapter XIII on the protection required. 
132 See Chapter XV on Immediacy and Risk. 
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ever, the cautious phrasing appears to be related to doubts not about the risks involved, but about 
whether these would warrant the use of provisional measures.133  
An example in which the HRC Special Rapporteur refused to use provisional measures to 
prevent a long prison sentence is that of J. v. Canada (disc. 2003).134 The case was submitted in 
March 1996 on behalf of an American citizen who had fled to Canada after he was charged with 
drug trafficking. His counsel requested the HRC to use provisional measures in order to prevent 
his extradition if the Supreme Court of Canada would decide so. Counsel argued that the peti-
tioner could be condemned to at least 20 years imprisonment in the US while the sentence for the 
same crime would be substantially lower in Canada. The argument appeared to be that the sen-
tence would be disproportionate, in violation of Articles 7 and 10. A week later the Special Rap-
porteur registered the case under Rule 91 (current Rule 97), but refused to use provisional meas-
ures. Subsequently, the HRC did not hear anything from the State until July 1998, when it in-
formed the Committee that in March 1996 the Supreme Court of Canada had decided to allow the 
extradition which would take place the same day. The refusal to use provisional measures shows 
the Committee’s reluctance to use them other than in the most extreme circumstances.135 
The HRC has not yet determined on the merits whether life imprisonment without the pos-
sibility of parole would constitute a violation of Article 7 ICCPR, either generally or in the spe-
cific circumstances of the case.136 In Weiss v. Austria (2003),137 it considered that the petitioner’s 
conviction and sentence were not yet final, ‘pending the outcome of the re-sentencing process 
which would open the possibility to appeal against the initial conviction itself’. In this light it 
considered it was premature for it to decide, on the basis of hypothetical facts, whether his extra-
dition to serve life imprisonment without the possibility of early release gave rise to the State’s 
responsibility under the ICCPR.138 The petitioner had submitted that a sentence of 845 years for 
offences of fraud was ‘grossly disproportionate’ and amounted to inhuman punishment and that a 
life sentence without parole for a non-violent offence was inhuman per se.139  
                                                 
133 For a recent example see ECtHR Press release 4 August 2008 regarding Mustafa Kamal Mustafa 
(Abu Hamza) v. UK. His complaint was that if extradited he would be exposed to treatment in 
breach Article 3 ECHR ‘because he risks a life sentence without parole and, particularly in view 
of his health problems, as a result of the fact that he might be detained in a so-called “supermax” 
detention facility’. In other words the life imprisonment claim was combined with a claim 
involving health issues. 
134 HRC J. v. Canada (685/1996) discontinued in April 2003 (on file with the author). 
135 Equally, it shows that some States indeed extradite a person immediately upon exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, warranting the use of provisional measures in advance of such exhaustion. 
See Chapter XV on immediacy (assessment of temporal urgency). In April 2003, after several 
reminders sent to counsel, the HRC decided to discontinue the case. The case also illustrates the 
main reason for discontinuance other than that the case has been solved. When a person has been 
extradited or expelled it is very difficult to contact the petitioner, even if expelled or extradited to 
an accessible State like the US. 
136 See Ingelse (2001), p. 279 on the CAT and life imprisonment as cruel treatment.  
137 HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003 (initial submission 24 May 2002, Rule 86 of 24 May 
2002; extradition 9 June 2002). 
138 HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §9.4. 
139 Id., §6.7. The HRC did find a violation of Article 14(1) on equality before the courts, taken 
together with the right to an effective and enforceable remedy under Article 2(3), because the 
petitioner was extradited in breach of a stay issued by the Administrative Court and because he 
had not been able to appeal the decision of the Upper Regional Court, while the prosecutor could 
and did appeal an earlier judgment of this Court, §9.6. It also reiterated that the State had violated 
its obligations under the OP by extraditing the petitioner before the HRC had been able to address 
his allegation that this would cause irreparable harm, §10.1. See Chapter XVI (Legal status) and 
XVII (Official responses). 
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Given its reluctance to interpret the death penalty and the death row phenomenon as a viola-
tion of Article 7 presently it is not likely that the HRC would find a violation of this article in the 
context of imprisonment for life. In this context the use of provisional measures seems less ap-
propriate.140 
Austria did not respect the provisional measure and extradited Weiss.141 Irrespective of 
doubts about the appropriateness of these measures in a given case, respect for the HRC and good 
faith application of the obligations arising under the individual complaint procedure demands 
compliance with the Committee’s provisional measures.142 The HRC pointed out once more, but 
this time in the context of extradition and expulsion, that these measures are essential to the its 
role under the OP. Flouting the rule on provisional measures undermines the protection of Cove-
nant rights under the OP, especially if States did this ‘by irreversible measures such as the execu-
tion of the alleged victim or his/her deportation from the country’.143 On the one hand the refer-
ence to ‘especially’ indicates that the HRC considers that States could ignore their obligations 
also through reversible measures. One might think of ignoring deadlines for response or stating 
disagreement but, on the basis of factors other than the Committee’s provisional measures, re-
fraining from taking irreversible action. On the other hand, the word ‘especially’ indicates the 
particularly reprehensible nature of irreversible acts in cases in which it had used provisional 
measures. At the same time it is noteworthy that the HRC does not use the term ‘irreparable’. By 
using the term irreversible instead it potentially extends the range of cases in which it could use 
provisional measures. This could indicate that it is not ready to reverse its approach taken in 
Stewart v. Canada (1996) in which it used provisional measures in family life cases.144 
3.3.4 Lack of proper care 
Both the European Commission and the ECtHR have used provisional measures to prevent depor-
tation in some cases of ‘lack of proper care’ in the receiving State, but only very exceptionally. 
An early case in which the European Commission took such provisional measures was Taspinar 
v. the Netherlands (1985).145 In July 1984 the Commission had taken provisional measures and 
requested information ‘concerning the grounds on which the Government considered it justified 
to conclude that the applicant’s child would be taken care of if returned to Turkey’. This question, 
relating to a seven year old child, helps explain the rationale for the use of provisional measures 
to halt the expulsion pending further examination of the case.146 The European Commission sub-
sequently used provisional measures in other cases involving lack of proper care as well. It 
pointed out that it did ‘not exclude that a lack of proper care in a case where someone is suffering 
from a serious illness could in certain circumstances amount to treatment contrary to Article 3’.147 
The Commission was unlikely to take provisional measures because of the psychological 
condition of a petitioner, including the risk of suicide.148 Yet it did use provisional measures 
                                                 
140 This may explain the cautious phrasing of its provisional measures in this case. Yet, it does not 
justify Austria’s non compliance. See Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
141 See Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
142 See further Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
143 HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §7.2. 
144 HRC Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996. See Chapter XII on provisional measures in other 
situations, under the heading ‘halting deportation in family life cases’. 
145 EComHR Taspinar v. the Netherlands, 9 October 1985 (struck out after a statement by the 
authorities that they would grant the 7 year old son a residence permit). 
146 The provisional measure was taken under Rule 36 and the question was asked under Rule 42. 
147 See e.g. EComHR Tanko v. Finland, 19 May 1994 (inadm.). 
148 See e.g. EComHR Choudry v. UK, 13 May 1996 (inadm.). This case involved a risk of serious 
deterioration of the psychiatric illness of one petitioner upon deportation of her husband, as well 
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because of the age (unaccompanied child)149 or physical condition of the petitioner and in light of 
the availability of (medical) care in the receiving State (e.g. claims of lack of proper care for deaf 
petitioner with little communication skills;150 of lack of medication to prevent a petitioner from 
losing his eyesight;151 or of adverse circumstances for terminally ill persons).152 
The ECtHR has been less forthcoming in this context. It did use provisional measures to 
halt the expulsion of D. who was in the final stages of a terminal illness (AIDS) and had no pros-
pect of family support nor medical care upon expulsion. On the merits in D. v. UK (1997) it first 
pointed out that ‘aliens who are subject to expulsion cannot in principle claim any entitlement to 
remain in the territory of a Contracting State in order to continue to benefit from medical, social 
or other forms of assistance provided by the expelling State’. However, it then found that compel-
ling humanitarian considerations may exceptionally result in a violation of Article 3. In this case 
expulsion of the petitioner to St. Kitts would violate this article. The lack of family support and 
medical care upon expulsion would hasten his death and subject him to acute mental and physical 
suffering.153 Subsequently, in another case still dealt with by the Commission, deportation of a 
                                                                                                                       
as a claim of lack of proper care for the husband regarding his leg and arm prostheses. The 
President refused to take provisional measures in July 1995. Two months later the Commission 
did give the case priority, but the petitioners subsequently moved to Ireland and were no longer at 
risk of deportation to Pakistan. The case was declared inadmissible. Yet see D. et al. v. Sweden, 8 
September 1993 (struck out) and Harron and Alayo v. Sweden, 7 March 1996 (adm.) and 3 
December 1996 (struck out) in which the Commission did use provisional measures on behalf of 
petitioners claiming a real risk of permanent physical and mental injuries upon their expulsion to 
Uganda. In this case there was a suicide risk as well. 
149 See the above EComHR Taspinar v. the Netherlands, 9 October 1985. On the other hand, on 31 
January 1994, in Nsona v. the Netherlands, the President of the Commission decided not to use 
provisional measures to halt the expulsion of nine year old Francine Nsona to Zaire (Congo) (he 
‘found no basis’ for a Rule 36 decision). That same day she was sent to Switzerland where Swiss 
Air decided to provide shelter in its nursery. Subsequently she was sent to Kinshasa, apparently 
travelling alone. A business relation of Swiss Air collected her at the airport and brought her to 
the immigration authorities in Zaire. On the merits the Commission accepted that her removal to 
Zaire ‘might have exposed her to some hardship’ but not to the risk of treatment prohibited by 
Article 3, see Rule 31 Report, 2 March 1995 (20 votes to 4). The ECtHR found no violation of 
Article 3 either, Judgment of 26 October 1996 (dissenting opinion by judge De Meyer arguing 
that her removal did give rise to an issue under Article 3 because of the haste to remove such a 
young child without appropriate investigation and because the State handed over to others all 
responsibility for her welfare as soon as she had left its territory; this was not merely an ‘attitude’ 
that was ‘open to criticism’, but treatment ‘difficult to consider human’). 
150 See EComHR Nasri v. France, 13 July 1995 (provisional measure more than three years 
previously). 
151 See EComHR Tanko v. Finland, 19 May 1994 (inadm.). In this case the petitioner invoked risk of 
losing his eyesight in view of the inadequate facilities for treating him and possibly operating on 
him in Ghana. The Commission took provisional measures in March 1994 and prolonged these in 
April. Subsequently it did not find it established that the petitioner could not obtain his 
medication in Ghana or bring it with him from Finland. Thus, it declared the case inadmissible. 
More generally about the assessment of risk see Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
152 See e.g. EComHR D. v. UK, 15 October 1996 (Rule 31 report); Harron and Alayo v. Sweden, 7 
March 1996 (adm.) and 3 December 1996 (struck out); ECtHR D. v. UK, 2 May 1997; ECtHR 
Tatete v. Switzerland, 18 November 1999 (adm.) and 6 July 2000 (Judgment) (the first 
provisional measure was still taken by the Commission); ECtHR S.C.C. v. Sweden, 15 February 
2000 (inadm.); ECtHR Taskin v. Germany, 22 May 2001 (adm.) and 23 July 2002 (struck out); 
ECtHR Cardoso and Johansen v. UK, 5 December 2000 (struck out). 
153 ECtHR D. v. UK, 2 May 1997, §§51-54. 
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person to Congo would also violate Article 3. His HIV infection had ‘already reached an ad-
vanced stage necessitating repeated hospital stays’ and the care facilities in Congo were precari-
ous.154 On the other hand, in S.C.C. v. Sweden (2000) the ECtHR declared inadmissible a claim 
under Article 3. In this case there were no exceptional circumstances in which removing the 
petitioner may result in a violation ‘owing to compelling humanitarian considerations’. She was 
not in the advanced stages of AIDS, her children and other family members were living in Zambia 
and, according to a report from the Swedish Embassy, AIDS treatment was available.155 In this 
case the Court did use provisional measures. 
Bensaid v. UK (2001) is another example of the strict approach of the ECtHR on the mer-
its.156 This case involved a petitioner suffering from a serious and long-term mental illness. On 
the merits the Court expressed awareness of the difficulties of obtaining medication in Algeria 
and ‘the stress inherent in returning to that part of Algeria, where there is violence and active 
terrorism’. Nevertheless, it considered that medical treatment was available in Algeria and the fact 
that his circumstances would be ‘less favourable than those enjoyed by him in the United King-
dom is not decisive’ from the point of view of Article 3. The Court emphasised the ‘high thresh-
old’ set by Article 3, ‘particularly where the case does not concern the direct responsibility of the 
Contracting State for the infliction of harm’. Thus, it did not find ‘a sufficiently real risk’ because 
the case did not disclose the exceptional circumstances of D. v. UK. Yet, pending the proceedings 
it had taken provisional measures.157  
More recently the ECtHR has confirmed its strict approach.158 
Even if it initially did use provisional measures pending the proceedings in these cases, it 
sometimes let itself be easily swayed by the State’s submissions and decided not to prolong these 
measures.159 In N. v. UK (2008), the Court apparently did use and continue to use provisional 
                                                 
154 EComHR B.B. v. France, 8 September 1997 (adm.), 9 March 1998 (Article 31 report finding by 
29 to 2 votes that there would be a breach of Article 3) and 7 September 1998 (struck out after 
French undertaking not to deport him). The provisional measures were of 2 April 1996. 
155 ECtHR (first section) S.C.C. v. Sweden, 15 February 2000 (inadm.). 
156 ECtHR Bensaid v. UK, 6 February 2001. 
157 The Court does not specify the date on which it took provisional measures in this case. It simply 
indicates that it used them. 
158 See e.g. ECtHR Arcila Henao v. the Netherlands, 24 June 2003 (inadm.); Ndangoya v. Sweden, 
22 June 2004 (inadm.); Amemignan v. the Netherlands, 25 November 2004 (inadm.); Hida v. 
Denmark, 19 February 2004 (inadm.); Haliti et al. v. Denmark, 19 February 2004 (inadm.); 
Muratovic v. Denmark, 19 February 2004 (inadm) (involving PTSD); Kaldik v. Germany, 22 
September 2005 (inadm. by a majority) (involving PTSD) and N. v. UK, 27 May 2008 (Grand 
Chamber). While in these cases no mention is made of petitioners’ requests for provisional 
measures nor of the Court’s decision to use or not to use Rule 39, the dissenting opinion by 
Judges Tulkens, Bonello and Spielmann in ECtHR (Grand Chamber), N. v. UK, 27 May 2008 
points out that provisional measures were used in that case. More generally they point out that 
‘(a) glance at the Court’s Rule 39 statistics concerning the United Kingdom shows that, when one 
compares the total number of requests received (and those refused and accepted) as against the 
number of HIV cases, the so-called “floodgate” argument is totally misconceived’, §8. They 
discuss the statistics in a footnote, noting that of the more than 300 provisional measures used 
between June 2005 and April 2008 less than 30 involved HIV cases; while this shows that this is 
a minority, it nevertheless indicates that the Court has used provisional measures in these ‘lack of 
proper care’ cases. 
159 See e.g. ECtHR Salkic et al. v. Sweden, 29 June 2004 (inadm.), §2. In this case the President 
initially used provisional measures and considered it necessary to obtain information on the 
question whether there was anyone that would assist the family upon their arrival in Sarajevo and 
the State responded that ‘no arrangements had been made for assistance to the applicants upon 
their arrival in Sarajevo. However, the Migration Authority had scheduled a meeting with them 
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measures, but subsequently found that the case was not sufficiently ‘exceptional’ for a finding of 
a violation of Article 3 ECHR for lack of proper care in the receiving State. In its discussion of 
general issues in this case the Court noted that the decision ‘to remove an alien who is suffering 
from a serious mental or physical illness to a country where the facilities for the treatment of that 
illness are inferior to those available in the Contracting State may raise an issue under Article 3, 
but only in a very exceptional case, where the humanitarian grounds against the removal are 
compelling’.160 The Court has decided to maintain the ‘high threshold’ it set in D. v. UK, only 
finding a violation of Article 3 in ‘very exceptional circumstances’ (D., for instance, was critically 
ill and appeared to be close to death, no nursing or medical care was available, nor family ‘willing 
or able to care for him or provide him with even a basic level of food, shelter or social sup-
port’).161 As a reason for using this high threshold it noted that ‘the alleged future harm would 
emanate not from the intentional acts or omissions of public authorities or non-State bodies, but 
instead from a naturally occurring illness and the lack of resources to deal with it in the receiving 
country’.162 It considered that while many of the rights in the ECHR ‘have implications of a social 
or economic nature’, the Convention’ is essentially directed at the protection of civil and political 
rights’.163 It concluded its general discussion of the issue by pointing out that it is ‘necessary, 
given the fundamental importance of Article 3 in the Convention system, for the Court to retain a 
degree of flexibility to prevent expulsion in very exceptional cases’. Nevertheless, Article 3 ‘does 
not place an obligation on the Contracting State to alleviate such disparities through the provision 
of free and unlimited health care to aliens without a right to stay within its jurisdiction. A finding 
to the contrary would place too great a burden on the Contracting States’.164 The Court even 
referred to the ‘search for a fair balance between the demands of the general interest of the com-
munity and the requirements of the protection of the individual’s fundamental rights’.165 This is a 
controversial statement as Article 3 ECHR is absolute and does not allow for such a balance.166 It 
has been suggested, therefore, that it might be more appropriate to discuss lack of proper care 
cases under Article 8 ECHR, where such a balance would be possible.167 It is argued in this book 
that in those exceptional cases where the Court would be likely to find a violation on the merits, 
the use of provisional measures would be appropriate also in the context of an Article 8 claim as it 
does concern risk of irreparable harm to persons. 
The use of provisional measures to halt expulsion in cases involving lack of proper care in 
the receiving State has not remained a practice, albeit modest, of the Strasbourg organs alone. The 
HRC has equally used provisional measures to halt deportation in the face of an expected lack of 
                                                                                                                       
on 12 March 2004 where the issues would be discussed and similar meetings had taken place on 
earlier occasions’. On 9 March 2004 the Chamber reconsidered the petition ‘in the light of the 
information provided by the Swedish Government’ and decided not to prolong the provisional 
measure. A few days later the petitioners informed the Court that the meeting with the Migration 
Authority had been cancelled. In addition they ‘disputed that any such meetings had been held on 
earlier occasions’. Subsequently they were deported. 
160 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) N. v. UK, 27 May 2008, §42. 
161 Ibid. 
162 Id., §43. 
163 Id., §44. 
164 Ibid. 
165 Ibid. 
166 See e.g. ECtHR Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, §127. See also the dissent by Judges Tulkens, 
Bonello and Spielmann in N. v. UK, §7 and, e.g. Terlouw (2008) and Bruin (2008). 
167 See the annotation of N. v. UK, 27 May 2008, by Battjes (HBA) in Jurisprudentie 
Vreemdelingenrecht JV 2008/266, §5. 
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proper medical treatment in the receiving State. In C. v. Australia (2002)168 the petitioner was an 
Assyrian Christian with a psychiatric condition, which he incurred in immigration detention. 
During this detention as a ‘non-citizen’ without an entry permit he had developed a serious psy-
chiatric illness.169 Only in August 1994, after more than two years, he was released from deten-
tion into his family’s custody, on the basis of his special (mental) health needs. At this point he 
was behaving delusional and in May 1996 he was convicted for aggravated burglary and threats to 
kill. Subsequently he was sentenced to a prison term. Following this the State planned to deport 
him to Iran.170 In December 1999 the HRC used provisional measures to stay his deportation and 
the State respected them. Almost three years later, in its decision on the merits, the HRC indeed 
considered that the petitioner’s continued detention, when the State was aware of his mental 
condition and failed to take the necessary steps to ameliorate his mental deterioration, constituted 
a violation of Article 7 ICCPR.171 Moreover, it found that his deportation would amount to a 
separate violation of this article. It attached weight to the fact that he ‘was originally granted a 
refugee status on the basis of well-founded fear of persecution as an Assyrian Christian, coupled 
with the likely consequence of return of his illness’. The State had ‘not established that the current 
circumstances in the receiving State are such that a grant of refugee status no longer holds valid-
ity’. It further observed that the domestic courts had accepted ‘that it was unlikely that the only 
effective medication (Clorazil) and back-up treatment would be available in Iran’ and found the 
petitioner ‘blameless for his mental illness’ that was ‘first triggered while in Australia’. Thus, the 
                                                 
168 HRC C. v. Australia, 28 October 2002 (initial submission 23 November 1999, Rule 86, 2 
December 1999). 
169 He was detained in July 1992 and psychologically assessed for his deteriorating psychiatric 
condition since August 1993. 
170 In October 1996 he underwent psychiatric assessment. The assessment report noted that ‘no 
previous illness was apparent and that his morbid-origin persecutory beliefs developed in 
detention’. It found ‘little doubt that there was a direct causal relationship between the offence for 
which he is currently incarcerated and the persecutory beliefs that he held on account of his 
[paranoid schizophrenic] illness’. ‘As a result of treatment’ it found ‘a decreasing risk of future 
acts based on his illness, but an ongoing need for careful psychiatric supervision’. A subsequent 
assessment came to similar conclusions. On this basis the minister ordered his deportation. See 
§2.8. The Administrative Appeals Tribunal found that his case fell outside the provisions of the 
Refugee Convention because ‘while he could suffer a recurrence of his delusional behaviour in 
Iran which given his ethnicity and religion could lead to a loss of freedom, this would not be ‘on 
account of’ his race or religion’. Moreover, it made no findings on the standard of health care 
facilities in Iran, although it found a ‘lack of certainty’ that the petitioner ‘would be able to obtain 
Clorazil in Iran’. See §2.10. The Federal Court equally noted that ‘while [his] illness can be 
controlled by medication available in Australia [Clorazil], the medication is probably not 
available in Iran’. See §2.11. 
171 The HRC noted that the psychiatric ‘evidence was essentially unanimous’ about the fact that the 
psychiatric illness ‘developed as a result of the protracted period of immigration detention’. It 
pointed out that the State was aware of this at least since August 1992 and that by August 1993 ‘it 
was evident that there was a conflict between the author’s continued detention and his sanity’. 
“Despite increasingly serious assessments of the author’s conditions in February and June 1994 
(and a suicide attempt), it was only in August 1994 that the Minister exercised his exceptional 
power to release him from immigration detention on medical grounds”. By that time his ‘illness 
had reached such level of severity that irreversible consequences were to follow’. HRC C. v. 
Australia, 28 October 2002, §8.4. Among others, the HRC also considered that given the 
circumstances, ‘whatever the reasons for the original detention, continuance of immigration 
detention for over two years without individual justification and without any chance of 
substantive judicial review was in the Committee’s view, arbitrary and constituted a violation of 
article 9, paragraph 1’, §8.1. 
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HRC considered that his deportation ‘to a country where it is unlikely that he would receive the 
treatment necessary for the illness caused, in whole or in part, because of the State party’s viola-
tion’ of his rights would amount to a violation of Article 7.172 
The second time the HRC used provisional measures in the context of lack of proper care in 
the receiving State was in December 2001. In Romans v. Canada (2004) it requested the State not 
to deport a petitioner to Jamaica. His family had expressed fear for his life and physical integrity 
because of his mental illness and the situation in Jamaican prisons.173 This provisional measure 
was taken before the decision on the merits in the aforementioned C. v. Australia (2002), indicat-
ing an expectation that the full Committee would indeed find a violation in the circumstances.174 
Some failed requests for provisional measures could also provide insight in the approach of 
an adjudicator. A subcategory of a ‘lack of proper care’ case relates to claims of risk to the family 
members of the person to be deported. In Choudry v. UK the main claim related to the risk of a 
serious deterioration of the psychiatric illness of the wife of the person to be deported. The 
ECtHR refused to take provisional measures in this case.175 In P.L.-B. v. Canada (disc. 1996)176 
                                                 
172 HRC C. v. Australia, 28 October 2002, §8.5. Ando, Klein and Yalden dissented with regard to 
the finding of a violation of Article 7. They considered that arguing that the conflict between the 
petitioner’s continued detention and his sanity could only be solved by his release would expand 
the scope of Article 7 too far. They did not think that the fact that the State did not immediately 
order the release of the petitioner amounted to a violation of Article 7. They did not agree either 
with the other ground the HRC had found for a violation of Article 7. They considered that the 
State had provided ‘detailed arguments’ to the effect that the petitioner, as an Assyrian Christian, 
would not suffer a persecution in Iran and would be able to receive an effective medical 
treatment. 
173 HRC Steven Romans v. Canada, 9 July 2004. By 1995 this petitioner had been diagnosed to 
suffer from chronic paranoid schizophrenia and from substance abuse and personality disorders. 
At the end of 1996 he was convicted of assault. A deportation order was issued in July 1999. The 
Appeal Division of the Immigration Board accepted that there would be ‘great emotional 
hardship’ inflicted on his family if he were deported, but ‘on balance of probabilities’ he himself 
would not suffer ‘undue hardship’. His counsel argued that he was mentally incompetent to act 
on his own and to care for himself, which was recognised by the Appeal Division. Deportation 
would leave him with ‘virtually no treatment facilities’. “Bellevue Hospital in Jamaica had 
advised that it could not treat violent patients, and such persons are placed in regular prison 
facilities”. Counsel before the HRC also argued that Jamaica had a long history of mistreating the 
mentally ill in correctional facilities. Counsel had referred to the ECtHR case D. v. UK. In May 
2002 the State contended that the case was inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies. 
Apart from this it considered that ‘an alleged deterioration of his condition after return was 
largely speculative’ and that he had presented ‘no evidence that death would be a necessary and 
foreseeable consequence of a return to Jamaica’. Eventually the HRC declared the case 
inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. See also Chapter XIV on the relationship 
with admissibility and the issue of suspensive effect. 
174 Even CAT, which does not recognize the application of the principle of non-refoulement in the 
context of cruel treatment, as it makes a formal link between non-refoulement in Article 3 ICAT 
and the definition of torture in Art. 1 ICAT, has nevertheless taken into account medical evidence 
of the psychological state of the petitioner who ‘does not appear capable of coping with a forcible 
return’ which ‘would entail a definite risk to his health’ when determining on the merits that the 
petitioner could not be returned to Libya. Yet the Committee equally pointed out the petitioner’s 
political activities subsequent from his departure from Libya ‘and the persistent reports 
concerning the treatment generally meted out to such activists when they are forcibly returned’. 
CAT Gamal El Rgeig v. Switzerland, 15 November 2006, §7.4. 
175 ECtHR Choudry v. UK, 13 May 1996 (inadm.). 
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one of the arguments of counsel related to the risk of irreparable harm to the petitioner’s children 
if he would be separated from them, also given the fact that their mother was terminally ill.177 The 
HRC was unable to use provisional measures in time.178 The case provides useful information on 
counsel’s argument about irreparable harm to both the alleged victim and the children under his 
care. The fact that in this case the petitioner did not report for removal and could not be found at 
his home address taking care of his children does not diminish the value of an argument about 
threats of irreparable harm to family members of the petitioner. Such argument may apply when 
they are in a vulnerable position, for instance because of their age, illness or disability.  
3.4 Findings ratione personae 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Several aspects of findings ratione personae are also relevant in a discussion on the issue of 
provisional measures to halt expulsion. One is the issue whether provisional measures are used to 
halt removal to a safe State that may subsequently remove the petitioner to a State where she runs 
the risk of irreparable harm. Another is whether they are used when the risk of harm emanates 
from non-State actors, and yet another whether they have been used to deal with the phenomenon 
of extraordinary rendition. 
3.4.2 Indirect danger through removal 
The HRC, CAT and ECtHR have specifically noted that sending States are responsible for expos-
ing a person to a real risk of ill-treatment ‘either in the country to which removal is to be effected 
                                                                                                                       
176 HRC P. L.-B. v. Canada, 556/1993, discontinued 17 April 1996, request for urgent measures of 4 
October 1993, initial submission of 5 October 1993, information about his deportation on 7 
October 1993 and Rule 91 of 18 January 1994 (on file with the author). 
177 Counsel had further requested the HRC to take provisional measures because the petitioner would 
face irreparable harm should he be returned to Angola. She pointed out that, ‘given the medical 
support for his account of detention and torture in 1991’, it was reasonable to infer that his 
collaboration with the UNITA rebels was known to the Angolan authorities and that he ran the 
risk of being detained upon his return. She pointed out that, once he had been expelled, even if 
the HRC would eventually decide favourably on the merits, it would be unlikely that he could be 
found and returned to Canada. She also referred to the rise in hostilities in Angola and the risk 
that he would not survive a forced return. She concluded that the removal of the petitioner at this 
stage ‘would effectively frustrate any possible good that could come out of the submission of a 
communication to the Committee’. She emphasised that granting provisional measures in this 
case ‘would not have any adverse impact on the public interest in Canada’ as it was ‘a unique 
factual situation’. They ‘would have no generalised effect on the operation of Canada’s 
immigration system’. Submission of 5 October 1993, in P. L.-B. v. Canada (556/1993), 
discontinued 17 April 1996 (on file with the author). 
178 See Chapters II (Systems) and XV (Immediacy and risk). Subsequently, the Rapporteur requested 
the State to clarify the circumstances of the petitioner’s deportation in October 1993. The State 
responded six months later. Apart from providing information and arguments about admissibility 
and the domestic law and proceedings, it also noted that ‘contrary to the impression which the 
Committee may have’ immigration officials had not removed the petitioner from Canada. The 
State did acknowledge that he was scheduled for removal in October 1993, but pointed out that 
he did not appear and that his current whereabouts were unknown. Note verbale transmitting the 
case under Rule 91 of 18 January 1994; Submission of the State of 19 July 1994, in P. L.-B. v. 
Canada (556/1993), discontinued 17 April 1996 (on file with the author). 
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or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed’.179 This is often referred to 
as indirect removal to third States or removal to intermediary States. In T.I. v. UK, for instance, 
the ECtHR took provisional measures to halt expulsion to Germany in order to prevent an expul-
sion from Germany to Sri Lanka.180 
As a precondition for a State’s reliance on an ‘internal flight alternative’ the Court has also 
listed certain guarantees that have to be in place: ‘the person to be expelled must be able to travel 
to the area concerned, to gain admittance and be able to settle there, failing which an issue under 
Article 3 may arise, the more so if in the absence of such guarantees there is a possibility of the 
expellee ending up in a part of the country of origin where he or she may be subject to ill-
treatment’.181  
3.4.3 Threats by non-State actors 
CAT deals with a limited definition of the prohibition of torture, which it has found to exclude 
torture by non-State actors. This has repercussions for its use of provisional measures. In fact it 
has not used them in such cases.182 The HRC and the ECtHR, on the other hand, have used 
provisional measures in situations involving threats by non-state actors.183 
                                                 
179 See HRC General Comment No. 31 [80], Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on 
States Parties to the Covenant, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13, 26 May 2004, §12; See also CAT 
Korban v. Sweden, 16 November 1998 and CAT General Comment 1 on Article 3 ICAT. 
180 ECtHR T.I. v. UK, 7 March 2000. The Commission did not always take into account the 
possibility that the State would return a petitioner to another State where he would also be at risk. 
In e.g. EComHR Barir et al. v. France, 18 October 1993, the Commission had used provisional 
measures (on 27 March 1992) for France not to expel the petitioners to Somalia, upon which 
France proceeded to expel four of them to Syria (on 29 March 1992). The petitioners had stressed 
from the start that their expulsion to Syria or Egypt would also expose them to ill treatment. 
181 ECtHR Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, §141 (provisional measures were used 
pending the proceedings).The Court added that there was no guarantee that once there the 
petitioner would be able to stay in the territory and ‘with no monitoring of deported rejected 
asylum seekers taking place, the Government have no way of verifying whether or not the 
applicant will have succeeded in gaining admittance’. “In view of the position taken by the 
Puntland and particularly the Somaliland authorities, it seems to the Court rather unlikely that the 
applicant would be allowed to settle there. Consequently there is a real chance of his being 
removed, or of his having no alternative but to go to areas of the country which both the 
Government and UNHCR consider unsafe”, §141. See more closely on this case, e.g. Terlouw 
(2007), pp. 185-194. 
182 See e.g. CAT Rocha Chorlango v. Sweden, 22 November 2004, §5.2 and S.S v. the Netherlands, 
5 May 2003, §6.4 (in this case provisional measures were used, but the claim not only related to 
risks originating from a non-governmental entity but also related to risks originating from the 
State). See further on non-governmental entities Ingelse (2001), p. 400, pp. 403-404. 
183 See e.g. ECtHR Ahmed v. Austria, 17 December 1996. See also e.g. Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 
11 January 2007, in which provisional measures were used pending the proceedings and where 
the Court stated on the merits, at §137: “Owing to the absolute character of the right guaranted, 
Article 3 of the Convention may also apply where the danger emanates from persons or groups of 
persons who are not public officials. However, it must be shown that the risk is real and that the 
authorities of the reiceiving State are not able to obviate the risk by providing appropriate 
protection”. In Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §10.7 the HRC emphasized that both the right 
to life and the right to be free from torture also required the State to take ‘steps of due diligence 
to avoid a threat to an individual of torture from third parties’(finding a violation of Article 13 in 
conjunction with Article 7 ICCPR for the failure to provide the petitioner with ‘the procedural 
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3.4.4 Extraordinary renditions and other forms of transfer 
It may be assumed that the human rights adjudicators will take provisional measures in situations 
involving involuntary return, independent of the term used for this return (expulsion, extradition, 
rendition, removal, etc.), or involuntary transfer (from the authority of one State to those of an-
other, on the same territory). The risk facing the person involved should be the determining fac-
tor. So-called extraordinary renditions, for instance, could violate the principle of non-
refoulement even more than an extradition or expulsion following the appropriate procedures.184 
In the face of a growing practice of making use of these extraordinary renditions alertness by the 
relevant human rights adjudicators would be warranted, including with regard to (proprio motu) 
use of provisional measures in pending cases. 
With regard to Article 3 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR (prohibition of expulsion of nationals) 
and Article 1 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR (procedural safeguards in relation to expulsion of aliens) 
the Bosnia Chamber has clarified the terms ‘expelled’ and ‘expulsion’. It has pointed out that the 
protection afforded by these two articles ‘applies also in cases in which a person is deported, 
removed from the territory in pursuance of a refusal of entry order or handed over to officials of a 
foreign power’. In one case it found that the respondent Parties had not followed the requirements 
of a legal expulsion procedure arising from the domestic law. The violations fell within the re-
sponsibility of both respondent Parties. The factual actions taken by them, with regard to the 
revocation of citizenship, the decision on refusal of entry and ‘the handing-over the applicant for 
expulsion to the US forces, after making sure in diplomatic contact that those forces would take 
him into custody and bring him out of the country, involved action of both Parties which consti-
tutes a violation of the applicant’s rights’.185 
The request for provisional measures by lawyers acting on behalf of Saddam Hussein and 
refused by the ECtHR in June 2004 did not relate to transporting people from one State to another 
to be ‘interrogated’, but involved the transmission of a former dictator to a transitional govern-
ment (Iraq’s interim government) in a State that has not abolished the death penalty. Lawyers 
acting on behalf of Saddam Hussein asked the ECtHR ‘to permanently prohibit the United King-
dom from facilitating, allowing for, acquiescing in, or in any other form whatsoever effectively 
participating, through an act or omission, in the transfer of the applicant to the custody of the Iraqi 
Interim Government unless and until the Iraqi Interim Government has provided adequate assur-
ances that the applicant will not be subject to the death penalty’. They relied on Articles 2 and 3 
ECHR and on Protocols 6 (abolition in times of peace) and 13 (abolition in all circumstances) to 
the Convention, arguing that the UK ‘has an obligation to ensure individuals are not subject to the 
death penalty and therefore not to surrender legal or physical custody of individuals to a country 
                                                                                                                       
protections’ required to prevent irreparable harm, §10.8; given this finding there was no need to 
determine the extent of the risk of torture prior to Ahani’s deportation nor was there a need to 
determine whether he suffered torture or ill treatment subsequent to his return, §10.10). See also 
the Concluding Observations of the HRC to the report by France, CCPR/C/60/FRA/4, 31 July 
1997, §20: “The Committee is particularly concerned by the restrictive definition given to the 
concept of ‘persecution’ for refugees by the French authorities as it does not take into account 
possible prosecution proceedings from non-state actors”. 
184 See e.g. ‘Torture by proxy’, the report by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York and 
the Center for Human Rights at New York University (2004); American Civil Liberties Union 
(2005), pp. 10-12 and pp. 25-36; Human Rights Watch (2005); Amnesty International (2005); 
Mayer (2005). See further e.g. Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, e.g. Mission to the 
US, A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, 22 November 2007, p. 18. 
185 Bosnia Chamber Bensayah v. BiH and Fed.BiH, 7 March 2003, §§111-127. See also Ait Idir v. 
BiH and Fed.BiH, 4 April 2003, §101 and Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and 
Fed.BiH, 11 October 2002 (adm. & merits), §§177-205. 
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or jurisdiction where they would face such consequences and other breaches of the Convention’. 
The ECtHR decided not to grant this request.186 Press agency Reuters, observing that the decision 
was not motivated,187 noted that a spokesperson for the Court had indicated to it that it only takes 
provisional measures if it is convinced that there is a risk of physical harm that is very important, 
irreversible and imminent.188  
The question arises whether the Court refused to take provisional measures mainly for po-
litical reasons, because of the person involved, or for policy reasons, fearing a flood of new sub-
missions regarding extraordinary renditions. In light of its Bankovic judgment it is also possible 
that it considered itself incompetent to deal with human rights violations committed by Member 
States outside their own territory. In that case it would consider itself prima facie incompetent to 
take provisional measures.189 Yet since that time it has used provisional measures, e.g. to halt 
transfer of detainees by UK authorities in Iraq to the Iraqi authorities.190 The most plausible rea-
son may be the fact that the Provisional Coalition Authority did not actively implement the death 
penalty at the time of the intended transmission. Just a few weeks after the ECtHR refused to take 
provisional measures the new Iraqi Interim Government re-instated the death penalty. It was one 
of its first decisions following the transfer of sovereignty. The ECtHR may not have foreseen this 
risk.  
                                                 
186 ECtHR Press release 337, ‘European Court of Human Rights rejects requests for interim 
measures by Saddam Hussein’, 30 June 2004. 
187 On the lack of publication and motivation in most systems see also Chapter II. 
188 See Reuters, ‘Conseil de l’Europe: pas de “mesures provisoires” pour Saddam Hussein’, 30 June 
2004 (‘n’impose à un État des «mesures provisoires », en vertu de l’article 39 de son règlement, 
que lorsqu’elle est «convaincu qu’il y a un risque de préjudice physique très important, 
irrémédiable et imminent»’), posted on <www.peinedemort.org> (accessed on 13 August 2004). 
189 See ECtHR Bankovic et al. v. Belgium and 16 other States, 12 December 2001 (inadm.). The 
Court’s approach to extraterritorial obligations as it appears from Bankovic seems to be contrary 
to its normal interpretation methods. Moreover, the Court put itself outside present day reality. 
See e.g. Lawson (2004), pp. 83-123. Subsequent to Bankovic it seems to have adapted its 
approach somewhat, gravitating more towards the approach of the Inter-American Commission, 
HRC and ICJ. See e.g. ICJ Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied 
Palestinian territory (Advisory Opinion), 9 July 2004, holding that the ICCPR is applicable in 
respect of ‘acts done’ by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory, §§107-
113; Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), judgment of 19 
December 2005, §§179-180 and Case concerning the application of the International Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russia), Order for 
provisional measures of 15 October 2008, §109. The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary 
Disappearances has equally expressed concern about the ‘extraordinary renditions’ that had been 
used to ‘transport terrorist suspects to other States for aggressive interrogation’. Report of the 
Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, E/CN.4/2006/56, 27 December 
2005, §22. See also e.g. Gondek (2005) and Coomans/Kamminga (2004). For a different 
approach see O’Boyle (2004), pp. 125-139. Further on jurisdiction and provisional measures see 
Chapter XIV. 
190 Provisional measures in case of Faisal al-Saadoon and Khalef Mufdhi v. UK, 30 December 2008 
(by the Acting President of the Fourth Section). A scan of the ECtHR letter to counsel confirming 
its use of provisional measures was posted at <http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2009/ 
01/uk-breaches-provisional-measures.html>. The provisional measure was ignored by the UK in 
reference to a decision of a domestic court. See also Chapters XIV (Jurisdiction) and XVII 
(Official responses). 
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4 CONCLUSION 
The HRC and CAT, the adjudicators in the three regional systems as well as the Bosnia Chamber 
have all used provisional measures to halt refoulement. This means that they consider that they 
can use such measures to prevent a State from exposing an alleged victim to future violations in 
another State. Moreover, it may be expected that all adjudicators would be able to take provi-
sional measures also to halt removal to a third State that is likely to subsequently remove the 
alleged victim to a State where he is at risk of torture. It may equally be expected that all adjudi-
cators could use provisional measures in the context of extraordinary renditions and other forms 
of transfer. CAT has not used provisional measures in the face of risk of torture by non-State 
actors and in light of its case law on the merits is unlikely to do so. The other adjudicators may 
indeed use them in such circumstances. When the petitioner claims a real risk not of torture but of 
cruel treatment CAT does not use provisional measures either. The HRC and ECtHR have used 
provisional measures in the face of a real risk of cruel treatment in the receiving or requesting 
State and in light of the relevant provisions and case law the other adjudicators may do so as well.  
In the European system provisional measures have been used on occasion to halt expulsion 
of a person facing lack of proper care in the receiving State. The HRC has recently confirmed this 
approach on the international plane and it is not unlikely that the other adjudicators, with the 
exception of CAT, will interpret the obligations under the respective treaties in a similar manner. 
Nevertheless the use of provisional measures by these adjudicators in cases involving lack of 
proper care is by no means certain, for instance because the ECtHR, the only adjudicator with 
some established practice on the issue, has a very strict approach on the merits. Nevertheless, the 
use of provisional measures would tie in with what they could do on the merits. 
Both the HRC and the ECtHR have been ambivalent with regard to the issue of life impris-
onment. This is also reflected in their provisional measures to halt extradition of people facing 
this punishment. They are reluctant to take such measures and, if they do, are likely to be con-
vinced by the State’s arguments not prolong them.  
The ECtHR has used provisional measures to halt extradition of a person facing the death 
penalty in light of the death row phenomenon. In Soering it eventually determined that this phe-
nomenon could constitute cruel treatment. As virtually all Member States of the Council of 
Europe have ratified at least one of the two Protocols on the death penalty by now, extradition to 
face such a penalty would in any case constitute a violation of the right to life. Moreover, the 
Court has now acknowledged that the developments regarding the attitudes towards the death 
penalty may have removed textual limitations in the interpretation of the right to life in the ECHR 
itself. This means that there is no longer a need to take provisional measures just in order to halt 
exposure to the death row phenomenon. This is not yet the case in the interpretation of the ICCPR 
by the HRC. While it has not yet recognised the death row phenomenon as such to constitute a 
violation of Article 7, some of its members would be willing to do so and counsel for petitioners 
is likely to continue invoking the argument. Thus, the issue is bound to recur in the context of 
provisional measures. 
In the range of situations involving claims of non-refoulement provisional measures have 
been used by various adjudicators. Given their case law on the merits some of these claims are 
almost certain to trigger the use of provisional measures because the adjudicators consider that 
expulsion or extradition would result in irreparable harm to the claim. Of course the actual use of 
the provisional measures then still depends on whether the adjudicator considers there is a real 
and immediate risk of such harm.191 For other claims, such as those involving lack of proper care 
                                                 
191 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
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or life imprisonment, the case law on the merits is not so clear and neither is the likelihood of 
adjudicators using provisional measures pending the proceedings to prevent irreparable harm. 
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 CHAPTER VI 
 LOCATING AND PROTECTING 
 DISAPPEARED PERSONS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Several of the adjudicators have used provisional measures to intervene in disappearance cases. 
The term ‘disappearance’ refers to a technique of unacknowledged detention, often followed by 
extrajudicial execution, generally ‘as the result of a deliberate plan, carefully executed, either 
directly by government authorities or with their tacit approval, in a manner designed to avoid 
accountability’.1 Disappearances are not restricted to military regimes although they often take 
place ‘in countries where the military establishment is either in power or has a high degree of 
autonomy from civilian authority’.2 The preamble to the UN Declaration on the Protection of all 
Persons from Enforced Disappearance describes the phenomenon as follows: ‘persons are ar-
rested, detained or abducted against their will or otherwise deprived of their liberty by officials of 
different branches or levels of Government, or by organized groups or private individuals acting 
on behalf of, or with the support, direct or indirect, consent or acquiescence of the Government, 
followed by a refusal to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the persons concerned or a refusal to 
acknowledge the deprivation of their liberty, which places such persons outside the protection of 
the law’.3  
The Inter-American Commission has used precautionary measures several times in disap-
pearance cases. The HRC has intervened occasionally in such cases, albeit generally without 
formally invoking its rule on provisional measures. The Bosnia Chamber has used provisional 
measures in this context as well. The ECtHR, on the other hand, while having dealt with petitions 
relating to disappearances, has not yet done so through the use of provisional measures.  
The phenomenon of disappearances is very relevant still. While it first became known in the 
1970s in the Americas, it has since become a serious human rights issue in various other parts of 
                                                 
1 Berman/Clark (1982), p. 532. 
2 Méndez/Vivanco (1990), pp. 510-511; see also Grossman (1992) and Brody/González (1997). 
3 Preamble to the UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance, 
General Assembly resolution 47/133, 18 December 1992. Thus far this has been the international 
instrument generally referred to internationally, e.g. by the UN Working Group on Enforced and 
Involuntary Disappearances. See e.g. Brody/González (1997). The UN Working Group on 
Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances ‘deems that it should construe the definition provided 
by the Declaration, in a way that is most conducive to the protection of all persons from enforced 
disappearance’. Definition of enforced disappearance, General Comment by WG, during 81st 
session, 20 March 2007. The International Convention for the Protection of All Persons against 
Enforced Disappearances, adopted 20 December 2006, but not yet entered into force, provides a 
working definition in Article 2: ‘the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation 
of liberty by agents of the State or by persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, 
support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of 
liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared person, which place such 
a person outside the protection of the law’. By 1 November 2008, 79 States had signed and five 
States had ratified this treaty. It will enter into force upon 20 ratifications or accessions. Often a 
reference is also made to the definition in Article 7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute of the International 
Criminal Court, which is similar to the definition found in the new Convention.  
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the world as well, including in the context of the ‘war on terror’ launched after the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks in the US (2001).4 This chapter first discusses the practice of the human rights adjudica-
tors in urgently dealing with disappearance cases. Then it explores how this practice relates to 
their decisions on the merits. 
2 PRACTICE 
Several delegations in the working group drafting the International Convention for the Protection 
of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance5 had argued in favour of the inclusion of a reference 
to provisional measures in the treaty itself, for the purpose of emphasising the importance of such 
measures in the context of disappearances, ‘especially in order to avoid irreparable harm and 
preserve evidence’.6 Indeed, Article 31, which provides for an optional individual complaint 
procedure, specifically includes the possibility of using provisional measures. Article 31(4) 
stipulates: 
“At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits has 
been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent 
consideration a request that the State Party will take such interim measures as may be necessary 
to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victims of the alleged violation. Where the 
Committee exercises its discretion, this does not imply a determination on admissibility or on 
the merits of the communication”. 
Yet in urgent cases the Committee introduced by this treaty may address even States parties that 
have not recognized the individual complaint procedure under Article 31. The innovative Article 
30 introduces the possibility for the Committee to intervene upon a request ‘by relatives of the 
disappeared person or their legal representatives, their counsel or any person authorized by them, 
as well as by any other person having a legitimate interest’ that ‘a disappeared person should be 
sought and found’. In fact when it considers that a range of procedural requirements is met, it 
‘shall request the State Party concerned to provide it with information on the situation of the 
                                                 
4 See e.g. Paust (2004), pp. 79-96. See further Berman/Clark (1982). See also the discussion on 
secret detention centres, e.g. the Marty report presented on behalf of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Document 10957 and 
Add.; AS (2006) CR 17, 27 June 2006; Res. 1507 (2006), 27 June 2006 and Rec. 1754 (2006), 27 
June 2006; Amnesty International, Below the radar: secret flights to torture and disappearance, 5 
April 2006, AI Index: AMR 51/051/2006; Amnesty International, Partners in crime: Europe’s 
role in US renditions, 14 June 2006, AI Index: EUR 01/008/2006; Amnesty International, Secret 
detention in CIA ‘Black Sites’, 8 November 2005, AI Index: AMR 51/177/2005; Amnesty 
International, USA: Torture and secret detention, testimony of the ‘disappeared’ in the ‘war on 
terror’, 4 August 2005, AI Index: AMR 51/108/2005; Amnesty International urgent action 
regarding the possible ‘disappearance’ of Canadian national Maher Arar, 21 October 2002, AI 
Index: AMR 51/159/2002 and subsequent actions; Human Rights Watch, The United States’ 
Disappeared; the CIA’s long-term ghost detainees’, a Human Rights Watch briefing paper, 
October 2004. The issue discussed here is obviously related to those discussed in the chapters on 
non-refoulement (Chapter V, in particular its discussion of ‘extraordinary renditions’), treatment 
in detention (Chapter VII), ensuring procedural rights to protect the right to life and personal 
integrity (VIII) and jurisdiction (Chapter XIV). 
5 Adopted 20 December 2006, not yet entered into force (by 1 November 2008: 79 signatories and 
5 ratifications). 
6 E/CN.4/2005/WG.22/CRP.9/Rev.1, 22 September 2005, §24. On this new treaty see also 
Chapters II (Systems) and XVI (Legal status). 
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persons sought, within a time limit set by the Committee’.7 A related provision is Article 34 on 
widespread disappearances: 
“If the Committee receives information which appears to it to contain well-founded indications 
that enforced disappearance is being practised on a widespread or systematic basis in the 
territory under the jurisdiction of a State Party, it may, after seeking from the State Party 
concerned all relevant information on the situation, urgently bring the matter to the attention of 
the General Assembly of the United Nations, through the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations”.8 
2.1 HRC 
In the early detention cases, mostly involving Uruguay, the HRC often not only requested infor-
mation regarding the state of health of detainees but also regarding their whereabouts. In those 
cases it did not formally invoke its rule on provisional measures, but instead it used its rule on the 
transmission of cases. Yet it did so at least partially to intervene in ongoing situations. Under this 
rule the HRC informs the State concerned of the case brought against it, in order to allow it to 
respond.9 In other words, it used ‘informal provisional measures’ rather than formal provisional 
measures under Rule 86 (current Rule 92). The very first enquiry of this kind dates from 1978 and 
concerned an unspecified State.10 The next of such inquiries were made between 1979 and 1981 
in cases involving Uruguay. An example of an enquiry in one of the early cases is Martinez 
Machado v. Uruguay (1983). The petitioner was a Uruguayan national living in France acting on 
behalf of his brother. Eight years after his brother, a history teacher, was arrested, he was sen-
tenced by a military court to nine and a half years imprisonment. Subsequently, in November 
1980, he disappeared from Libertad prison.11 His family had no contact with him and ‘felt great 
concern for his state of health’. Within a month the HRC transmitted the case and also requested 
information on his whereabouts. This decision seems to have been taken proprio motu on the 
basis of the facts mentioned in the complaint.12 Mr. Martinez only resurfaced more than five 
months later. In 1983 the HRC found that Uruguay had violated the Covenant, including Article 
10(1) ICCPR, because it had held him incommunicado for more than five months.13  
A decade later, with no information on the intervening period, it was Libya that was re-
quested to provide the Committee with information on the whereabouts of an alleged victim. As 
                                                 
7 On the procedural requirements see Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
8 See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on the group of beneficiaries. The treaty also 
contains a compromissory clause for submission to the ICJ, see Article 42. 
9 Rule 91, current Rule 97. 
10 HRC M.A. v. S., 24 April 1979. 
11 As he noted, previously the same had happened to Teti Izquierdo, see Chapter VI on intervention 
in detention situations involving risks to health and safety. 
12 The HRC did not enquire, however, about the alleged victim’s state of health, although the 
petitioner had noted the family’s great concern: Martinez Machado v. Uruguay, 4 November 
1983. 
13 In the decision on the merits the HRC determined the State was under an obligation to take 
immediate steps to ensure strict observance of the Covenant. It must also treat him with humanity 
as required by Article 10(1). It was expected, moreover, to transmit a copy of the Committee’s 
decision to the victim. See further HRC Drescher Caldas (represented by his wife Ibarburu de 
Drescher) v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983; Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by Setelich) v. Uruguay, 28 
October 1981; Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay, 1 April 1982; Martinez Machado v. Uruguay, 4 
November 1983, but also Dave Marais v. Madagascar, 24 March 1984. 
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the full Committee had done in the previous cases, when there was not yet a Special Rapporteur 
on New Communications, the request was made under its rule on the transmission of cases.14  
Thus far there is only one case involving the health and/or whereabouts of the alleged vic-
tim in which the HRC explicitly used provisional measures, requesting the State to ‘avoid any 
action which might cause irreparable harm to the alleged victim’. This was the case Tshishimbi v. 
Zaire (1996).15 In April 1993 the petitioner, residing in Belgium, had submitted a complaint to the 
HRC on behalf of her husband. He had been abducted in Zaire (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo) the previous month. He was a career military officer who had been imprisoned in 1973 
for his refusal to obey orders. Since the late 1970s he had sympathized with the opposition par-
ties. In 1992 Etienne Tshisekedi, the leader of the main opposition movement, became Prime 
Minister and appointed Tshishimbi as his military advisor. President Mobutu did not recognise 
the new Government and the petitioner noted that the military and especially the members of the 
special presidential division, loyal to President Mobutu, subjected the new Prime Minister, his 
Cabinet and his special advisors to ‘constant surveillance, and at times harassment and bullying’. 
In this context, she claimed, her husband was abducted.16 The disappearance took place after he 
had left the residence of the Prime Minister to go home. A month later Belgian press reported that 
he was believed to be detained at the headquarters of the National Intelligence Service. Ill treat-
ment apparently was common in this place. It was on that day that his wife petitioned the HRC 
and requested provisional measures.17 The Special Rapporteur transmitted the case to the State 
Party requesting information on the whereabouts and state of health of the alleged victim, as the 
full Committee had done in the previous six cases. The difference was that the Rapporteur used 
formal provisional measures under Rule 86 (current Rule 92) as well. She did so a month after 
receipt of the initial submission, urging the State ‘to avoid any action which might cause irrepara-
ble harm to the alleged victim’.18 It is remarkable that, next to the provisional measure proper, the 
Rapporteur posed a question under the general rule on transmission and inquiry. She asked the 
State ‘to clarify the circumstances’ of his abduction, to investigate the allegations and ‘to provide 
                                                 
14 HRC Mohammed Bashir El-Megreisi (submitted by his brother Youssef El-Megreisi) v. Libya, 23 
March 1994. The petitioner’s brother had disappeared in January 1989. Almost two years later, 
he submitted a complaint to the HRC. The Optional Protocol entered into force for Libya on 16 
August 1989. Seven months later the Special Rapporteur requested information under Rule 91 on 
the whereabouts of the brother and his state of health.  
15 HRC Tshishimbi v. Zaire, 25 March 1996. 
16 Early April 1993 Belgian press reports mentioned that he had been arrested. The exact 
circumstances of his abduction, however, remained unknown. 
17 The submission pointed out that his family and the Government of Prime Minister Tshisekedi had 
been without news about Colonel Tshishimbi since 28 March 1983 when he was taken to an 
unknown destination where they expected him to be tortured. The petitioner expressed great 
anxiety about his fate. She referred to the activities by President Mobutu against those close to 
Prime Minister Tshisekedi. She also requested the Committee to use an urgent admissibility 
procedure in light of the risks to the life of Tshishimbi (submission of 21 April 1993, on file with 
the author). In its View the Committee pointed out that counsel for the petitioner did not indicate 
whether any steps had been taken in Kinshasa to pursue domestic remedies, but it concluded that 
it was apparent that the petitioner and her counsel considered any resort to such remedies to be 
futile, ‘given in particular the absence of reliable information about the whereabouts of Mr. 
Tshishimbi’. 
18 “Par ailleurs, conformément à l’article 86 du règlement intérieur du Comité, le Gouvernement de 
son excellence est prié de prendre toutes les mesures appropriées pour éviter qu’un préjudice 
irréparable ne soit causé à la victime de la violation alléguée”. Note verbale of 21 May 1993 (on 
file with the author). 
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information about Mr. Tshishimbi’s whereabouts and state of health’.19 It may be that she in-
tended to maintain the practice of requesting information on the whereabouts and state of health 
under that Rule and reserve the use of Rule 86 (current Rule 92) to very exceptional cases. It is 
also possible that she wished to maintain some continuity with the previous cases or that she 
considered that provisional measures could draw the attention of the State only to the obligation 
to refrain from acting and not to any positive obligations. The latter would then be within the 
purview of the rule on the transmission of cases. 
2.2 Inter-American Commission 
As discussed in Chapter II the first precautionary measures taken by the Inter-American Commis-
sion dealt with disappearances, but its use of (informal) precautionary measures was often rather 
discretionary.20 The Commission is the adjudicator that has used precautionary measures most 
often in order to locate disappeared persons. It is very sensitive to the experiences of the Ameri-
can continent with disappearances that took place mainly in the 1970s and 1980s. Since then the 
number of disappearances decreased but once in a while the Commission did request a State to 
ascertain the whereabouts of a person recently disappeared. The use of precautionary measures in 
these cases is not always clearly documented. More information is available as of the late 1990s. 
There have been several cases in Colombia in which the Commission took precautionary meas-
ures in order to find disappeared persons.21 Other addressee States have included Guatemala, 
Mexico and Guyana.22 
                                                 
19 It was phrased as follows: ‘et d’informer le Comité sur l’adresse ainsi que l’état de santé actuel 
de l’auteur de la communication’. Note verbale of 21 May 1993 (on file with the author). 
20 Author’s interview with Commissioner Juan Méndez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. In the 
1980s he was working as a practitioner at Human Rights Watch. 
21 See e.g. CIDH lawyers collective ‘José Alvear Restrepo’ v. Colombia, precautionary measures of 
14 March 1997 (probably informally), on 15 March 1997 the beneficiary was released (see Case 
of Mr. Vilalba Vargas, CEJIL case docket 1997); 4 Investigators Popular Training Institute v. 
Colombia, precautionary measure of 28 January 1999, they were released on 11 and 19 February 
1999, Annual Report 1999, §17; Robinson Ríos Uribe and José Gregorio Villada v. Colombia 
(“they were last seen at a Medellín metropolitan police checkpoint on November 27, 2001, as 
they were travelling toward Cali. Some days later, the two young men contacted their families 
and told them they had been abducted by a paramilitary group. The Commission undertook a 
series of steps toward clearing up this situation during its on-site visit (December 7-13, 2001); 
finally, on December 18, 2001, it asked the Colombian government, as a matter of urgency, to 
take the steps necessary to reveal the whereabouts and guarantee the lives and persons of the 
aforesaid individuals and to launch a prompt and effective investigation using the urgent search 
mechanism established by Law 589/2000”), Annual Report 2001, §26; Luis Alberto Sabando 
Véliz v. Colombia, precautionary measure of 19 October 2004, Annual Report 2004, §27; More 
than 9 members of the Embera Katio indigenous community of Alto Sinú v. Colombia, 
precautionary measure of 4 June 2001, Annual Report 2001, §17. 
22 See e.g. CIDH Jorge Alberto Rosal Paz v. Guatemala, 11 March 2004 (friendly settlement), 
precautionary measures of 10 August 1983, 30 May 1984, 19 February 1985 and 1 August 1985; 
Franz Britton (Collie Wills) v. Guyana, precautionary measures of 4 & 5 April 2000, 24 August 
2000, 4 February 2001, 10 October 2001 (adm.), Annual Report 2000, §34 and Franz Britton AKA 
Collie Wills v. Guyana, 10 October 2001 (adm.), §§11 and 18; Faustino Jiménez Alvarez v. 
Mexico, precautionary measures of 13 July 2001 and extension of 28 November 2001 to protect 
his wife and a witness against threats, Annual Report 2001, §39 and Oscar Umberto Duarte Paiz 
v. Guatemala, precautionary measures of 5 July 2006, 18 (12) Guatemala Human Rights Update, 
13 July 2006, pp. 4-5. 
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In March 1997 lawyers collective ‘José Alvear Restrepo’ in Colombia23 requested the 
Commission to take precautionary measures on behalf of one of its lawyers. Members of the 
National Police in Bogotá had arbitrarily detained him after a demonstration involving professors 
and students. The Commission immediately requested information from the Colombian govern-
ment with regard to his detention. The government responded and he was freed the next day.24 It 
is not clear whether the Commission simply requested information or indeed took actual precau-
tionary measures. This example does not necessarily fall within the category of protecting disap-
peared persons but the detention took place in unclear circumstances conducive to disappear-
ance.25 
In January 1999 the Commission was informed that a group of armed civilians had force-
fully entered the headquarters of the Popular Training Institute (IPC) in Medellin, Antioquia and 
had abducted four of its investigators.26 The Commission took precautionary measures that same 
afternoon. It urgently contacted Colombia to take the necessary measures to ascertain the where-
abouts of the victims and protect their lives, physical integrity and liberty. Two of them were 
freed within two weeks and the two others a week later.27  
In November 1999 the Commission requested Colombia to ascertain the whereabouts of 
two spokesmen for the peasant migration28 and ensure their life and physical integrity. Military 
units had apparently arrested them the previous day. According to eyewitness accounts they had 
been tied to a tree and tortured. Following this, the self-defence units (‘Autodefensas’) had kept 
them in detention, publicly acknowledging their participation in the incident.29 In its Third Report 
on the human rights situation in Colombia, published in March 1999, the Commission noted that 
it had taken precautionary measures on behalf of these two persons, but had received no further 
news on their whereabouts.30 This case is an example of the close links these self-defence units 
can have with the police, military or other government authorities in certain areas of Colombia. It 
indicates also how clearly interrelated the different types of violations are, as well as the reasons 
for the perpetrators to commit them. The case related to issues of migration and possibly land 
rights and involved human rights defenders and witnesses to human rights violations. In such 
situations the Commission may order a State to ascertain the whereabouts of certain disappeared 
persons, but also to protect persons against attacks, often by members of paramilitary groups.31 
In March 2000 the Commission requested Colombia to protect the life, physical integrity 
and liberty of a human rights defender who had disappeared six days earlier. He had held various 
                                                 
23 The submission was made together with CEJIL. 
24 CIDH Case of Mr. Vilalba Vargas, CEJIL case docket 1997 (on file with the author). 
25 On provisional measures in detention cases, see Chapter VI. 
26 The ‘Autodefensas’ (paramilitaries) of Córdoba and Urabá had claimed responsibility for the 
kidnappings. 
27 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III.C.1, §17. 
28 They were from the Middle Magdalena region. 
29 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III.C.1, §23. The Autodefensas described one of these 
human rights defenders as a ‘terrorist of the ELN’. 
30 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter V – Colombia, §120. 
31 The Commission had also requested the State to guarantee the lives and physical integrity of the 
residents of La Vereda La Placita who had witnessed and denounced the acts of torture. Several 
days later, on 6 December 1999, it requested Colombia to amplify the precautionary measures to 
include eight other persons who had also served as spokespersons for the peasant migration. 
Their personal security was in danger as well. During the period covered by the 1999 Annual 
Report the petitioner and the State continued to present information on the precautionary 
measures. Annual Report 1999, Chapter III.C.1, §§23-24. 
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elected positions and was working in marginalised, black and indigenous communities. Prior to 
his disappearance, several actors in the armed conflict had threatened him.32 
In June 2001 the Commission took precautionary measures to clarify the whereabouts and 
protect the lives and personal integrity of nine named persons as well as ‘other members of the 
Embera Katio indigenous community of Alto Sinú’ who had been abducted from the commu-
nity’s main town and the neighbouring areas.33 
Since 1996 the Annual Reports mention only a few States other than Colombia with regard 
to which the Inter-American Commission had used a precautionary measure requesting to locate a 
disappeared person. In April 2000 it took such a measure on behalf of Franz Britton, also known 
as Collie Wills. The petitioner reported that Mr. Britton had not been seen since his re-arrest in 
Guyana on 25 January 1999.34 Earlier he had been arrested, and released four days later. Upon 
request, he reported to the police station the next day and was re-arrested by Leon Fraser, the 
Commissioner of Police. Eyewitnesses subsequently claimed they had seen him in the company 
of Mr. Fraser, who was head of the dreaded ‘Black Clothes’ police. They claimed he was being 
bundled into a silver grey car. According to the petitioner the ‘Black Clothes’ police unit was 
responsible for most of the extra-judicial killings in Guyana. A week later a domestic court or-
dered the Commissioner of Police to bring Mr. Britton before a court, by a writ of habeas corpus. 
In an affidavit the Commissioner stated that he had released him two days after his re-arrest and 
that he was no longer in police custody. The Commission took precautionary measures, request-
ing the State to take the appropriate measures to protect the life of Mr. Britton. The Commission 
also requested information on his health status, the reason for his arrest and detention and the 
location of the detention facilities where he was being held.35 It is noteworthy that when the peti-
tioner requested it to take provisional measures he had already been disappeared for more than a 
year.36 The question arises whether this disappearance was still so recent that a precautionary 
measure could prevent irreparable harm. Still, in October 2001, when the Commission declared 
the case admissible, it also decided to maintain in effect its precautionary measures.37  
In July 2001 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of someone who had 
been violently detained in Mexico the month before, without a warrant. His family had witnessed 
how agents of the judicial police had abducted him in an operation involving several vehicles also 
marked as belonging to this police force. They filed complaints with the Attorney General of the 
state of Guerrero, who apparently took no effective steps to locate him. Upon the petitioners’ 
request the Commission’s precautionary measures asked for intervention by the federal Attorney 
General because the petitioners suspected complicity between the kidnappers and the public 
prosecution service of Guerrero. In August Mexico responded that an investigation had begun, 
with the involvement of the wife of the disappeared man. The next month the petitioners informed 
the Commission that there were still irregularities in the investigation. In November Mexico 
                                                 
32 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III.C.1, §25. 
33 On behalf of the other members of that indigenous community who had not yet been abducted 
but who were working together with the petitioners, the Commission took precautionary 
measures as well, to the effect that the State should protect them against further attacks. The 
Commission also requested Colombia to investigate, prosecute and punish those responsible for 
the attacks against the indigenous community. CIDH Annual Report 2001, §17. 
34 The petitioner was the Chairman for Economic Empowerment in Guyana. 
35 CIDH Franz Britton AKA Collie Wills v. Guyana, 10 October 2001. By letters of 4 and 5 April 
2000, 24 August 2000 and 4 February 2001 the Commission requested information about the 
adoption of the precautionary measures, the admissibility of the petition and the merits. It did not 
receive a reply, §§11 and 18. 
36 Commission took precautionary measures one year and two months after the alleged 
disappearance, which was ten days after they were requested by the petitioner. 
37 CIDH Franz Britton AKA Collie Wills v. Guyana, 10 October 2001, §§11 and 18. 
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reported that it was continuing its search to locate him and it had arrested two suspected perpetra-
tors. Subsequently the Commission extended its precautionary measures to cover the wife of the 
disappeared man, who was in grave danger because of her search. The precautionary measure also 
came to include a former officer of the judicial police in Guerrero who was under arrest and 
whose life was being threatened if he continued to make allegations about the involvement of 
judicial police officers and their superiors in kidnappings.38 
2.3 European system 
While the European Commission and Court have dealt with disappearance cases as well they do 
not seem to have used formal provisional measures in this context.39 The next section examines 
their case law in disappearance cases to assess whether it would give occasion to the use of provi-
sional measures. 
2.4 Bosnia Chamber 
Many disappearances took place in former Yugoslavia between 1991 and 1995. According to 
conservative estimates ‘some 17,000 persons in Bosnia-Herzegovina are still recorded as 
missing’.40 Nevertheless, the only known occasion in which the Bosnia Chamber used provisional 
measures was in 1996, requesting Republika Srpska to find a priest and his parents who had 
disappeared.41 Families of disappeared persons may have focussed their efforts on other types of 
recourse, in particular the International Commission on Missing Persons (ICMP). In 1996 this 
Commission was specifically instituted to assist these families in order to ‘secure the co-operation 
                                                 
38 CIDH Annual Report 2001, §39. Another example is the Commissions precautionary measure on 
behalf of Oscar Umberto Duarte Paiz who was kidnapped on 24 May 2006, requesting ‘an 
expedited transfer of any information’ regarding his whereabouts. Mr. Duarte Paiz was the leader 
of the San Juan Integral Association for the Development of Quetzal City and Bordering 
Communities (ASIDECQ). It also asked for protection of his family members and seven 
members of his organization, Guatemala Human Rights Commission (US), 18 (12) Guatemala 
Human Rights Update, 13 July 2006, pp. 4-5. On provisional measures to protect against death 
threats and harassment generally, see Chapter IX. 
39 There is one case, ECtHR Istrate v. Moldova, 13 June 2006 (4th section), in which the ECtHR, 
dealing with a case involving Article 6 ECHR, approximately 2 years after the initial submission, 
received a letter signed by the petitioner, ‘dated 1 September 2003’, posted 7 April 2005, in 
which he stated ‘that he had previously been the victim of an attempted murder, that he was 
afraid for his life and that he sought the Court’s protection’. ‘He had also stated that the letter had 
been given to a third person who had been instructed to post it in case of his disappearance’. 
Subsequently the ECtHR inquired with the State, asking it to comment on the letter. In June 2005 
the petitioner contacted the Court again and the case was pursued under Article 6 ECHR without 
further reference to the right to life. See also the Court’s request for information on 8 March 
2004, asking Georgia and Russia to ‘provide information on the disappearance of Mr Khashiev 
and Mr Baymurzayev and, if applicable, on their health and place of detention in Russia’. ECtHR 
Shamayev et al. v. Georgia and Russia, 12 April 2005, §45. 
40 Amnesty International, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina: Human Rights Chamber decision on Srebrenica – a 
first step to justice’, AI Index: EUR 63/007/2003, 7 March 2003. 
41 Bosnia Chamber Matanović v. Srpska, 6 August 1997; in other disappearance cases (Balić v. 
Srpska, 10 September 1998 (adm.) and Grgić v. Srpska, 3 September 1997) no mention is made 
of the use of provisional measures. 
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of Governments and other authorities in locating and identifying persons missing as a result of 
armed conflicts, other hostilities or violations of human rights and to assist them in doing so’.42  
3 RELATION BETWEEN PROVISIONAL MEASURES LOCATE AND PROTECT 
DISAPPEARED PERSONS AND THE EXPECTED DECISION ON THE MERITS 
3.1 Introduction 
In some of the cases in which adjudicators used provisional measures to locate disappeared 
persons a decision on the merits is available as well that could shed light on the relation between 
the case law on the merits and the use of provisional measures. Moreover, disappearance cases in 
which no provisional measures were used could still help clarify the practice of the adjudicators 
vis-à-vis such measures. After all provisional measures may not have been used simply because 
the disappearance was not recent, but the decision on the merits could still justify future use of 
such measures in imminent cases, indicating likelihood of success on the merits. 
3.2 HRC 
From the start of its activities the HRC has dealt with claims in which the whereabouts of the 
alleged victims were unclear. It has emphasised the positive obligations of States under the right 
to life in Article 6 ICCPR.43 The obligation under this article to take preventive measures against 
disappearances, combined with the obligation to protect the right to security of person under 
                                                 
42 See the website of the ICMP: <http://www.ic-mp.org/home>. Subsequently its mandate was 
expanded. It is headquartered in Sarajevo, BiH, but also has offices in the Republic of Croatia, 
Serbia and Montenegro, and Kosovo. 
43 See e.g. HRC Dermit Barbato (submitted by Mr. Gilmet Dermit on behalf of his cousins) v. 
Uruguay, 21 October 1982. The HRC concluded that the Uruguayan authorities were responsible 
for not taking adequate measures to protect the life of one of the alleged victims, either by act or 
by omission. He had served his sentence in July 1980 but he was still in detention in December of 
that year. He was last seen alive on 24 December. On 28 December the authorities showed his 
mother his dead body for identification. His brother, a medical doctor, had disappeared earlier 
that month, on 2 December 1980. Only on 19 December 1980 his detention was officially 
announced. The authorities described him as belonging to a group of relatives of prisoners who 
had carried out ‘agitation and propaganda activities’. He continued to be held incommunicado. 
The petitioner claimed a violation of Article 10 ICCPR ‘because the treatment of detainees in 
Uruguay did not conform to this provision’. He pointed out that he was unable to provide more 
detailed information about his treatment in detention because he was being held incommunicado. 
The HRC found a violation of Article 6 with regard to the brother who died in detention, and of 
Articles 9(3) (not being brought promptly before a judge), 9(4) (incommunicado detention and 
violation of right habeas corpus) and 14(3)(c) (undue delay). It did not further address the 
Articles 10 and 7 claims. Only in the paragraph on reparations it pointed out that the State was 
obliged to take effective steps, among others, to ensure strict observance of the rights of detained 
persons set forth in Articles 7, 9 and 10 ICCPR. In light of the circumstances of his brother’s 
continued detention and death and in light of the circumstances of his own arrest and 
incommunicado detention the HRC could have requested information about his health status 
under Rule 91 (currently Rule 97). 
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Article 9 ICCPR, underlines the importance of the State’s duty to take positive measures to pro-
tect persons against threats to their life and dignity.44  
In Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay (1983) the HRC not only found violations of the rights 
of the disappeared person, but also of the rights of this person’s family.45 It confirmed this ap-
proach in subsequent cases.46 In El-Megreisi v. Libya (1994), in which the HRC had taken ‘in-
formal’ provisional measures in 1989, it found on the merits that the prolonged incommunicado 
detention in an unknown location constituted a violation of Article 7 ICCPR (prohibition of tor-
ture and cruel and inhuman treatment).47 In the case of Tshishimbi v. Zaire (1996), the only 
known case in which the HRC formally used provisional measures, the State had not responded at 
all. Three years later, in its decision on the merits the HRC found that the State had failed to 
ensure his liberty and security of person, in violation of Article 9(1). It referred to its previous 
jurisprudence that an interpretation of Article 9(1) limited to the context of arrest and detention 
would render ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant by allowing States parties to ‘tolerate, 
condone or ignore threats made by persons in authority to the personal liberty and security of non-
detained individuals within the State party’s jurisdiction’. The HRC also found that the removal 
of the victim and the prevention of contact with his family and with the outside world constituted 
cruel and inhuman treatment in violation of Article 7. It urged the State party to thoroughly inves-
tigate the circumstances of the abduction and unlawful detention and to bring to justice those 
responsible. The State party was under an obligation to ensure that similar violations did not 
occur in the future.48 In Thevaraja Sarma v. Sri Lanka (2003) it found violations of Articles 7 and 
9 ICCPR with regard to the disappeared son and of Article 7 with regard to the petitioner and his 
                                                 
44 HRC General Comment 6 (16) about Article 6 ICCPR points out that States should take ‘specific 
and effective’ measures to prevent disappearance. They should also establish ‘facilities and 
procedures to investigate thoroughly, by an appropriate and impartial body, cases of missing and 
disappeared persons’. In the case of Ana Rosario the HRC found violations of Articles 6(1), 7 
and 9(1), all juncto Article 2(1) and of Article 24(1). Her abduction and disappearance and the 
prevention of contact with her family and the outside world constituted cruel and inhuman 
treatment. Eight days before her disappearance a court had provisionally released her into the 
custody of her grandfather and the armed State agents who abducted her from her home had not 
acted on the basis of an arrest warrant or the orders of a judicial officer. The State, moreover, had 
ignored the HRC’s request for information about the results of her grandfather’s petition for 
habeas corpus, all in violation of Article 9. Finally, in violation of Article 24(1), the State did not 
adopt any particular measures of protection to investigate her disappearance and ensure her 
security and welfare. Such special measures were required because of her status as a minor. Ana 
Rosario Celis Laureano (submitted by her grandfather Laureano Atachahua) v. Peru, 25 March 
1996. See also Alfredo and Samuel Sanjuán Arévalo (submitted by their mother Elcida Arévalo 
Perez) v. Colombia, 3 November 1989. 
45 HRC Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983. “The Committee understands the anguish 
and stress caused to the mother by the disappearance of her daughter and by the continuing 
uncertainty concerning her fate and whereabouts. The author has the right to know what has 
happened to her daughter. In these respects, she too is a victim of the violations of the Covenant 
suffered by her daughter, in particular of article 7”. By letter of 15 June 1987 the victim’s mother 
informed the Committee that the State had failed to implement its Views and requested the 
Committee to urge the State to comply with its Views. By note of 31 October 1991 the State 
party only referred to the relevant paragraphs of Law 15.848 of 22 December 1996, without 
providing any further information on her daughter’s case. 
46 See e.g. HRC J. Thevaraja Sarma (submitted by his father S. Jegatheeswara Sarma) v. Sri 
Lanka, 16 July 2003. 
47 HRC Mohammed Bashir El-Megreisi (submitted by his brother Youssef El-Megreisi) v. Libya, 23 
March 1994. 
48 HRC Tshishimbi v. Zaire, 25 March 1996. See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
 Locating and Protecting Disappeared Persons 
319 
wife. It noted, however, that the petitioner had not asked the HRC to conclude that his son was 
dead and that, while invoking Article 6, he also asked for ‘the release of his son, indicating that he 
has not abandoned hope for his son’s reappearance’. The HRC considered that in such circum-
stances it would be inappropriate to presume his death and make a finding with respect to Article 
6. It pointed out that the State was under an obligation to provide the petitioner and his family 
with an effective remedy, ‘including a thorough and effective investigation into the disappearance 
and fate of the author’s son’ and ‘his immediate release if he is still alive’.49 The HRC also re-
ferred to the UN Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearances 
(1992). Moreover, it referred to the definition of enforced disappearance contained in Article 
7(2)(i) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court and noted that disappearance 
constitutes a violation of many of the rights in the ICCPR, including the right to liberty and secu-
rity of person (Article 9), the right not to be subjected to torture or ill treatment (Article 7) and the 
right of persons deprived of their liberty to be treated with humanity and respect for their inherent 
dignity (Article 10). Finally it pointed out that disappearance constitutes a grave threat to the right 
to life (Article 6).50 
The standard phrase used by the HRC in reference to the burden of proof is that it ‘cannot 
rest on the author of the communication alone, especially considering that the author and the State 
party do not always have equal access to the evidence and that frequently the State party alone has 
access to relevant information’. It then continues with: “It is implicit in article 4(2) of the Op-
tional Protocol that the State party has the duty to investigate in good faith all allegations of the 
violation of the Covenant made against it and its authorities, and to furnish to the Committee the 
information available to it”.51 Moreover, according to McGoldrick the HRC does not apply a 
standard of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, but rather a standard ‘approximating to’ a ‘balance of 
probabilities’.52 
Not only does the case law of the HRC comport with the State’s obligation to ensure that 
similar events do not occur in the future, as traditionally mentioned in the paragraph on repara-
tions in the Committee’s Views,53 it also underlines the State’s duty to act swiftly in the face of 
threats against persons rather than await the HRC’s final determination. While the case is pending 
this certainly justifies a reminder of the State’s positive obligations by the HRC, through the use 
of provisional measures. 
3.3 Inter-American system 
Already in the early 1970s the Inter-American Commission has denounced the act of disappearing 
people.54 Since then it has consistently denounced the phenomenon in strong terms. In 1983 the 
political organs of the OAS became involved as well. The OAS General Assembly declared that 
forced disappearance was ‘an affront to the conscience of the Hemisphere and constitutes a crime 
                                                 
49 HRC J. Thevaraja Sarma (submitted by his father S. Jegatheeswara Sarma) v. Sri Lanka, 16 July 
2003. 
50 Ibid. See also Blaauw (2002) and Froidevaux (2002). In Louisa Bousroual (on behalf of her 
husband Salah Saker) v. Algeria, 30 March 2006 the petitioner assumed that her husband, who 
had been disappeared in 1994, had died. In this case the HRC found a violation of the right to life 
as well. 
51 See e.g. HRC Marais v. Madagascar, 24 March 1983; Bleier v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982 and 
Mukong v. Cameroon, 21 July 1994. 
52 McGoldrick (1994), para. 4.36. Generally see Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
53 See also Chapter XIII on the relationship between provisional measures and forms of reparation. 
54 CIDH Annual Report 1974. 
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against humanity’.55 In 1994 the OAS General Assembly adopted the Inter-American Convention 
on Forced Disappearance of Persons.56 
In Velásquez Rodríguez (1988) the IACHR set out its influential doctrine of state responsi-
bility with regard to disappearances. Taking into account the systematic practice of disappear-
ances and the general human rights situation in Honduras, it found that the disappearance of Mr. 
Velásquez Rodríguez constituted a violation of the right to life, humane treatment, personal lib-
erty and security.57 It found that the act of disappearing people and the subsequent failure to 
investigate these disappearances constituted a violation of a range of rights.  
Subsequently it dealt with various other disappearance cases.58 In Bámaca Velásquez 
(2000), for instance, the Court also found that Guatemala had violated a range of rights: the right 
to personal liberty (Article 7 ACHR) of the disappeared person, Efraín Bámaca Velásquez, as 
well as his right to humane treatment (Article 5(1) and 5(2) ACHR), the right of his wife and 
immediate family to humane treatment, his right to life (Article 4 ACHR), his right to judicial 
guarantees and judicial protection (Articles 8 and 25 ACHR) as well as that of his wife and im-
mediate family. Moreover, the State neither complied with the general obligations of Article 1(1) 
ACHR – in connection with the violations of the aforementioned substantive rights –, nor with the 
obligation to prevent and punish torture (Articles 1, 2, 6 and 8 of the Inter-American Convention 
to Prevent and Punish Torture).59 
The Inter-American Commission has dealt with a considerable range of cases involving dis-
appearances. As noted, it has regularly used precautionary measures in such cases as well.60 The 
Commission and Court have both referred to the UN Declaration against disappearances and to 
other international and regional instruments as well. 
They have also referred to the concept of the burden of proof, which could be relevant not 
only as an indication of the evidence of risk to life required for the use of provisional measures,61 
but also to indicate the general attitude of the adjudicator towards the phenomenon of disappear-
ances. This, in turn, could help clarify the use of provisional measures. The IACHR noted that 
‘because the Commission is accusing the Government of the disappearance of Manfredo 
Velásquez, it, in principle, should bear the burden of proving the facts underlying its petition’.62 It 
seems, however, that the Court simply wished to point out that the Commission should make a 
prima facie case. As Kokott points out, human rights treaties have a ‘non-reciprocal, law-making 
character’. This makes individual complaint proceedings under human rights treaties less adver-
                                                 
55 OAS Resolution AG/RES. 666 (XVIII-0/83), 18 November 1983, §5.  
56 Adopted at Belém do Pará, 9 June 1994; entered into force on 28 March 1996; 12 State parties as 
of 30 July 2006.  
57 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez (Honduras), 29 July 1988. 
58 See e.g. IACHR Godínez Gruz (Honduras), 20 January 1989; Caballero Delgado and Santana 
(Colombia), 8 December 1995; Garrido and Baigorria (Argentina), 2 February 1996; Castillo 
Páez (Peru), 3 November 1997. In Blake (Guatemala), 24 January 1998, it emphasized the rights 
of the next of kin. 
59 IACHR Bámaca Velásquez case (Guatemala), Judgment of 25 November 2000 (merits). See also 
e.g. Juan Humberto Sanchez (Honduras), 7 July 2003 (violations of Articles 4, 5, 7, 8 and 25); 
Molina Thiessen (Guatemala), 4 May 2004 (right to life, humane treatment, right to personal 
liberty, fair trial, rights of the family, rights of the child and judicial protection); Case of 19 
Merchants disappeared in 1987 (Colombia), 5 July 2004 (violations personal liberty, personal 
integrity and life); Serrano Cruz sisters (El Salvador), 1 March 2005 (violations of Articles 5, 8, 
17, 18, 19, 25). 
60 See e.g. CIDH Juan de la Cruz Núñez Santana et al. v. Peru, 13 April 1999; Ignacio Ellacuría et 
al. v. El Salvador, 22 December 1999. 
61 See generally Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
62 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez case, 29 July 1988, §123.  
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sarial than most domestic proceedings. The non-reciprocal or universal character of human rights 
treaties warrants an approach in which the individual petitioner does not bear the burden of proof, 
but rather only the burden of presenting a prima facie case.63 Referring to the burden of proof of 
an individual ‘evokes a perception of a technical burden of producing evidence which is not found 
in human rights law’. Rather than the burden of proof the petitioner has, as Kokott calls it ‘the 
“burden” of presenting a prima facie case in supporting one’s claim (commencement de preuve) 
or the risk of non-persuasion’.64  
The IACHR has ‘set the standard’ on the standard of proof in serious human rights cases: 
“The international protection of human rights should not be confused with criminal justice. 
States do not appear before the Court as defendants in a criminal action. The objective of 
international human rights law is not to punish those individuals who are guilty of violations, 
but rather to protect the victims and to provide for the reparation of damages resulting from the 
acts of the States responsible”.65 
In light of the purpose expressed in the relevant treaties of effective protection of human rights it 
indeed appears ‘illogical’ to apply the high standard of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ to interna-
tional adjudication.66 Kokott referred to decisions by international adjudicators showing that these 
in fact are willing to accept a lower standard of proof than that of ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’, at 
least in cases concerning the most serious human rights violations.67  
The Commission’s as well as the Court’s case law on the merits, finding disappearances to 
constitute a violation of a combination of rights, referring to regional and international instru-
ments and taking into account the position of the individual in the assessment of the evidence, 
clearly confirms the appropriateness of the use of provisional measures.  
3.4 European system 
Both the Inter-American Court and the HRC – as discussed under the previous subheading – have 
found that enforced disappearances could constitute a violation of the rights to life, humane 
treatment and personal liberty and security.68 Similar to the approach of the HRC and the Inter-
American Commission and Court, the European Commission and Court have found that disap-
pearances violate the rights of the next of kin as well.69 In Kurt v. Turkey (1996/98), for instance, 
the European Commission and Court found that the State had violated the prohibition of cruel 
                                                 
63 Kokott (1998), p. 211. 
64 Ibid. 
65 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment of 29 July 1988, §§134-135. 
66 See Kokott (1998), pp. 205-206. 
67 Id., pp. 196-205. 
68 The African Commission does not seem to have had occasion to deal with disappearances on the 
merits, but see ACHPR Africa Legal Aid (on behalf of Mr. Lamin Waa Juwara) v. the Gambia, 
209/97, found inadmissible in May 2000 (no reference to the use of provisional measures in this 
case, which was submitted 1,5 years after the disappearance). 
69 See e.g. ECtHR Timurtas v. Turkey, 13 June 2000, §95; and Çakici v. Turkey, 8 July 1999, §98. 
In subsequent cases it has sometimes found a violation to the disappeared person himself, but it 
has not considered the disappearance itself to be a form of torture or ill treatment. 
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treatment with regard to the mother of the disappeared person. On the other hand they did not 
examine separately whether the disappeared person himself was a victim of such treatment.70  
This context it may be significant that the European Commission and Court do not seem to 
have used provisional measures in order to help find the disappeared person alive. In fact they 
have generally taken a more restrictive approach towards disappearances than the HRC and the 
Inter-American Commission and Court, possibly because they were less attuned to dealing with 
particularly serious and systematic human rights violations. The subsequent paragraphs will fur-
ther refer to differences between the approach in the European system and that of the other sys-
tems. 
In the inter-State case Cyprus v. Turkey (1999) the European Commission did emphasize 
the positive obligations of States to protect human rights and recalled that the HRC stressed that 
States should take ‘specific and effective measures to prevent disappearances and establish effec-
tive facilities and procedures to investigate early, by an appropriate and impartial body, cases of 
disappearances that may involve a violation to the right to life’.71 Subsequently, when the ECtHR 
dealt with this case in 2001, it invoked its distinction between substantive and procedural viola-
tions of the right to life. It found that there had been no breach of Art. 2 ECHR ‘by reason of an 
alleged violation of a substantive obligation under that Article in respect of any of the missing 
persons’.72 At the same time it found that ‘there has been a continuing violation of Article 2 of the 
Convention on account of the failure of the authorities of the respondent State to conduct an 
effective investigation into the whereabouts and fate of Greek-Cypriot missing persons who dis-
appeared in life-threatening circumstances’.73 It equally found that ‘there has been a continuing 
violation of Article 5 of the Convention by virtue of the failure of the authorities of the respondent 
State to conduct an effective investigation into the whereabouts and fate of the Greek-Cypriot 
missing persons in respect of whom there is an arguable claim that they were in Turkish custody 
at the time of their disappearance’.74 Yet it held that ‘no breach of Article 5 of the Convention has 
been established by virtue of the alleged actual detention of Greek-Cypriot missing persons’.75 In 
fact the ‘combination-approach’ taken in the Inter-American system and by the HRC is to be 
preferred.76  
Apart from creating an evidentiary hurdle, as discussed in the subsequent paragraph, the 
European Commission and Court initially did not consider disappearances as the complex mix of 
multiple and continuous human rights violations recognized by the Inter-American Court and 
HRC. They simply found a particularly serious violation of Article 5 ECHR (personal liberty and 
security) in the context of the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment, rather than a 
violation of these rights taken together.77  
Yet this has since changed. The ECtHR has begun finding violations of the right to life as 
well, not only procedurally, but also substantively. It has held that lengthy periods of unacknow-
ledged detentions went ‘beyond a mere irregular detention’ in violation of Article 5 ECHR78 and 
                                                 
70 EComHR Kurt v. Turkey, 5 December 1996, §§197 and 221. See also ECtHR Kurt v. Turkey, 25 
May 1998. In his concurring opinion in Matanović et al. v. Republika Srpska, 6 August 1997 
Nowak notes that this approach was ‘somewhat surprising’, Concurring Opinion, §6. 
71 EComHR Cyprus v. Turkey, 4 June 1999, §202. 
72 ECtHR Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 May 2001, §130. See also EComHR Cyprus v. Turkey, 4 June 
1999. 
73 ECtHR Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 May 2001, §136. 
74 Id., §150. 
75 Id., §151. 
76 See also Taqi (2001), pp. 940-984 and the discussion under the next heading (‘Bosnia Chamber’). 
77 ECtHR Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, §201 (a forced disappearance ‘raises fundamental and 
grave issues under Article 5’). See also EComHR Cyprus v. Turkey, 4 June 1999, §119.  
78 See e.g. ECtHR Timurtaş v. Turkey, 13 June 2000, §83. 
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also examined such allegations from the perspective of Article 2 ECHR (right to life), albeit 
without taking into account the prohibition of torture and ill treatment (Article 3 ECHR).79 
On the other hand, the ECtHR has not yet done away with the evidentiary hurdle it created 
in its earlier case law. By 2006 it still used the evidentiary standard of ‘beyond reasonable 
doubt’.80 Such a standard is in fact more appropriate as imposed on a State in the context of a 
criminal law case than on a petitioner for proving the responsibility of a State in a disappearance 
case.81 The standard does not seem to be required by the text of the ECHR itself. Its context, 
object and purpose certainly do not require it. 
Moreover, the ECtHR has indeed shown an awareness of the special responsibility of the 
State by pointing out that ‘Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend themselves to a rigor-
ous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges something must 
prove that allegation)’.82 It has also noted that this standard ‘should not be interpreted as requiring 
such a high degree of probability as in criminal trials’.83 In this context dropping the reference to 
the criterion of ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ would be the next logical step. After all, when ‘the 
events in issue lie wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities’, ‘the 
burden of proof may be regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and con-
vincing explanation’.84 If it can be established that someone was ‘officially summoned by the 
military or the police, entered a place under their control and has not been seen since’ the onus is 
indeed ‘on the Government to provide a plausible explanation as to what happened on the prem-
ises and to show that the person concerned was not detained by the authorities, but left the prem-
ises without subsequently being deprived of his or her liberty’.  
                                                 
79 See e.g. ECtHR Orhan v. Turkey, 18 June 2002, §§328-332. 
80 See e.g. ECtHR Akdeniz v. Turkey, 31 May 2005 (4th section), §96 (“the Court has generally 
adopted up to now the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”. Such proof may follow from 
the coexistence of sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted 
presumptions of fact; in addition, the conduct of the parties when evidence is being obtained may 
be taken into account”); Bazorkina v. Russia, 27 July 2006 (1st section), §106; Uçar v. Turkey, 11 
April 2006 (2nd section), §74; Şeker v. Turkey, 21 February 2006 (2nd section), §§64-65; Nesibe 
Haran v. Turkey, 6 October 2005 (3rd section), §65; Özgen et al. v. Turkey, 20 September 2005 
(2nd section), §36; Taniş et al. v. Turkey, 2 August 2005 (4th section), §160; Türkoğlu v. Turkey, 
17 March 2005 (3rd section), §116 and Orhan v. Turkey, 18 June 2002 (1st section), §264. 
81 For a critical discussion of the case law until 2000 see Taqi (2001), pp. 940-984 (discussing 
EComHR Kurt v. Turkey, 5 December 1996; ECtHR Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998; Cakici v. 
Turkey, 8 July 1999 and Timurtas v. Turkey, 13 June 2000). In Labita v. Italy, Grand Chamber 
Judgment of 6 April 2000, a Dissenting Opinion of eight judges pointed out that the ‘test, method 
and standard of proof in respect of responsibility under the Convention are different from those 
applicable in the various national systems as regards responsibility of individuals for criminal 
offences’, Joint Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Pastor Ridruejo, Bonello, Makarczyk, 
Tulkens, Strážnická, Butkevych, Casadevall and Zupančič, §1. See also Veznedaroglu v. Turkey, 
Judgment of 11 April 2000, Partly Dissenting Opinion of Judge Bonello, §12: ‘in other fields of 
judicial enquiry, the standard of proof should be proportionate to the aim which the search for the 
truth pursues: the highest degree of certainty, in criminal matters; a workable degree of 
probability in others’ and Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, 8 April 2004 with concurring opinion by Judge 
Bonello, pointing out: “Unacceptable that the applicant is told by a court of justice that he cannot 
win against the State, as he failed to produce evidence which the state had wrongly failed to 
produce”. 
82 ECtHR Taniş et al. v. Turkey, 2 August 2005 (4th section), §163. 
83 ECtHR Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, 26 February 2004, §166. 
84 See ECtHR Salman v. Turkey, 27 June 2000 (Grand Chamber), §100; see also Taniş et al. v. 
Turkey, 2 August 2005 (4th section), §160; as well as Çakıcı v. Turkey, 8 July 1999 (Grand 
Chamber), §85; Timurtaş v. Turkey, 13 June 2000, §82. 
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“In the absence of such an explanation, the Court's examination of the case may extend beyond 
Article 5 to encompass, in certain circumstances, Article 2 of the Convention”.85 
In a recent case, of July 2006, the ECtHR found Russia in violation of the right to life (both sub-
stantively and procedurally), personal liberty and an effective remedy for a disappearance that 
took place in Chechnya.86 Nevertheless, while it found the authorities responsible for his death, it 
found ‘the exact way in which he died and whether he was subjected to ill-treatment while in 
detention’ were ‘not entirely clear’.87 It found insufficient evidence for a violation of Art. 3 
ECHR ‘since the information before it’ did ‘not enable the Court to find beyond all reasonable 
doubt that the applicant’s son was subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3’.88 
This is the first of many disappearance cases regarding Chechnya pending before the 
Court.89 
3.5 Bosnia Chamber 
With regard to the disappearance of the Roman Catholic priest and his parents, mentioned in the 
previous section for its use of provisional measures in 1996, in 1997 the Bosnia Chamber found 
that Republika Srpska had failed to secure the petitioners’ right to liberty and security of person.90 
It decided not to consider whether a forced disappearance also constituted a violation of Articles 2 
and 3 ECHR. In his concurring opinion Nowak rightly pointed out that the Chamber was not 
bound by the restrictive approach taken by the Ombudsperson, only alleging violations of Article 
5. After all the case did not only deal with arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty and security, 
but in fact dealt with enforced disappearance as a larger phenomenon encompassing a wider range 
of rights. This criticism in fact also applies to the approach of the ECtHR at the time. As dis-
cussed, it only started to change this approach around 2000. Nowak noted that while the UN 
Declaration on the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance was not legally bind-
ing, it did constitute ‘the most elaborate and authoritative international instrument in this field’.91 
Enforced disappearances were human rights violations not explicitly referred to in the ECHR 
(1950) and the Declaration should be taken into account when applying the Convention. He 
pointed out that the ‘very act of enforced disappearance is a particularly serious violation of hu-
man rights which clearly goes beyond mere arbitrary deprivation of personal liberty and secu-
rity’.92 Such disappearances constitute ‘a violation of the rules of international law guaranteeing, 
inter alia, the right to recognition as a person before the law, the right to liberty and security of 
the person and the right not to be subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment. It also violates or constitutes a grave threat to the right to life’.93 There 
                                                 
85 ECtHR Taniş et al. v. Turkey, 2 August 2005 (4th section), §160. 
86 ECtHR Bazorkina (regarding the disappearance of her son Yandiev) v. Russia, 27 July 2006. See 
also ECtHR Gongadze v. Ukraine, 8 November 2005, finding violations of Article 2, ‘both in its 
substantive and procedural aspects’, as well as of Articles 3 and 13. Generally about the 
evidentiary requirements for provisional measures see Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
87 ECtHR Bazorkina v. Russia, 27 July 2006, §131. 
88 Id., §133. 
89 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, ‘Russia condemned for ‘disappearance’ of Chechen,’ 27 July 
2006; International Herald Tribune, ‘European Court blames Russia for missing Chechen’, 27 
July 2006; <bbc.co.uk>, ‘Russia censured over Chechen man’, 27 July 2006. 
90 Bosnia Chamber Matanović et al. v. Srpska, 6 August 1997. 
91 Bosnia Chamber Matanović et al. v. Srpska, 6 August 1997, Concurring Opinion Nowak, §3. 
92 Bosnia Chamber Matanović et al. v. Srpska, 6 August 1997, Concurring Opinion Nowak §4. 
93 Ibid. 
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was ‘ample evidence’ that the disappearance of the petitioners was ‘not an isolated case’.94 
Nowak provided some relevant contextual information about the ‘special process on missing 
persons in the territory of the former Yugoslavia’.95 He pointed out that the Chamber should have 
taken into account the provisions of the UN Declarations and the relevant international case law 
as a tool for interpreting the ECHR. Just like the Inter-American Court and the HRC the Bosnia 
Chamber should have found violations of the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment as 
well.96 Again, this comment may well apply to the ECtHR too. 
In this same case the Chamber did refer to the presumption of responsibility of the State that 
is created when someone has disappeared from official custody. It recalled the statement by the 
European Commission that Article 5 ECHR could be understood as a guarantee against disap-
pearances and any ‘unaccounted disappearance of a detained person’ must be considered as a 
particularly serious violation of this Article.97 Finally the Bosnia Chamber expressed its agree-
ment with the approach to evidence taken by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in 
Velasquez Rodriguez.98 
In the Srebrenica cases (2003) the Bosnia Chamber found that Republika Srpska had vio-
lated the human rights of their family members by the continued refusal to inform them of the fate 
of their loved ones.99 It had done ‘almost nothing to clarify the fate and whereabouts of the pre-
sumed victims of the Srebrenica events, or to take other action to relieve the suffering of their 
surviving family members, or to contribute to the process of reconciliation in Bosnia and Herze-
govina’.100 This time the Chamber extensively referred to the ICTY decision Prosecutor v. Ra-
doslav Krstć, international instruments, including the UN Declaration, and international and 
domestic activities and decisions. Moreover, it ordered Republika Srpska, in accordance with the 
‘guiding principles’ on reparation developed by the IACHR,101 ‘as a matter of urgency’, to release 
immediately ‘any such missing persons who are still alive and held in detention unlawfully’.102 
Although the Bosnia Chamber initially took an overly limited approach on the merits in Ma-
tanović et al. v. Srpska (1997), only finding a violation of Article 5 ECHR, it did take provisional 
measures while this case was still pending. 
Moreover, whatever improvements could still be made, the subsequent case law of the 
ECtHR, also finding violations of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR in certain disappearance cases, in fact 
confirms the relationship with the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment that seems to 
underlie the Chamber’s use of provisional measures in Matanović. Finally, the relationship be-
tween the protection required in orders for reparation and for provisional measures was clearly 
                                                 
94 Bosnia Chamber Matanović et al. v. Srpska, 6 August 1997, Concurring Opinion Nowak §5. 
95 Ibid. 
96 In this case Nowak would also have found a violation of Article 3 because ‘the prolonged period 
of incommunicado detention’ to which the petitioners had been exposed constituted as such 
inhuman treatment. Moreover, he would have found a violation of Article 2(1) jo. 1 ‘because the 
enforced disappearance of the applicants for a period of one and a half years as from the entry 
into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement constitutes a grave threat to the right to life, because 
there are certain indications that one or more of the applicants might have died in detention, and 
because the respondent Party has failed to secure and protect the applicants’ right to life’, Bosnia 
Chamber Matanović et al. v. Srpska, 6 August 1997, Concurring Opinion Nowak, §9. 
97 EComHR Cyprus v. Turkey, Application No. 8007/77, 72 DR, p. 38. 
98 Bosnia Chamber Matanović et al. v. Republika Srpska, 6 August 1997, §35. 
99 Bosnia Chamber Srebrenica cases (49 petitions), 7 March 2003. It did find that it had no 
jurisdiction ratione temporis vis-à-vis the disappeared persons themselves since the violations 
took place before the Dayton Peace Agreement was signed (14 December 1995).  
100 Bosnia Chamber Srebrenica cases (49 petitions), 7 March 2003, §188. 
101 See Bosnia Chamber Srebrenica cases (49 petitions), 7 March 2003, §211. 
102 Ibid. 
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confirmed in the Chamber’s judgment in the Srebrenica cases (2003). Sadly, the order to release 
those missing persons that are still alive, while very appropriate, must have been made for rhe-
torical purposes rather than the expectation that persons would still return alive. 
4 CONCLUSION 
The HRC has mainly used informal provisional measures in its early political detention cases, 
when the whereabouts of the detainee were unclear. It once used provisional measures formally. 
The Inter-American Commission has regularly used precautionary measures on behalf of disap-
peared persons. The Bosnia Chamber has also used provisional measures at least once in a disap-
pearance case. The ECtHR, on the other hand, does not appear to have used them yet in the con-
text of the disappearance cases that it has dealt with.  
The discussion in section 3, on the relation to the case law on the merits under the various 
international and regional human rights treaties, confirms that the right to life and the prohibition 
of cruel treatment underlie the use of provisional measures by the HRC, the Inter-American Com-
mission and Court and the Bosnia Chamber. 
The human rights adjudicators have all confirmed that given the inequality between the in-
dividual and the State the burden of proof cannot rest solely with the individual, particularly in 
relation to claims about the right to life. Unfortunately they have not always been that clear on the 
standard of proof. After all, in order to achieve an early shift in the burden of proof from the 
petitioner to the State, the petitioner should not have to meet the standard of evidence ‘beyond a 
reasonable doubt’. The State always has the monopoly of power vis-à-vis the individual. It nor-
mally also has a monopoly on information, especially in relation to disappearances and torture. 
Exactly given this unequal situation between the two, both as to the consequences of any finding 
and in light of the possibility to obtain evidence, the standard of proof in cases between unequal 
parties should vary according to the allocation of the burden of proof. It should be higher if the 
initial burden is on the State (e.g. in a criminal trial, where the State has to prove an individual’s 
guilt in order to deprive him of his freedom). It should be lower if the initial burden is on the 
individual (e.g. in disappearance or torture cases claiming state responsibility). In the latter case 
the burden shifts from the individual to the State once the individual has made a prima facie case. 
After all the individual claims human rights violations of a very serious nature often involving the 
right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment while the consequences for the State simply 
involve refraining from acting, providing access, releasing a person, providing compensation, etc. 
Moreover, the State is able to retrieve and make disappear information and evidence and therefore 
is at a much stronger position than the individual claiming a human rights violation.103 
The best way to urgently deal with disappearances is to prevent them from taking place by 
adequately responding to threats against persons. As discussed in Chapter VII, this includes tak-
ing measures to physically protect persons as well as investigating and prosecuting previous 
threats. Once a disappearance has occurred, the chance of finding the person involved diminishes 
with each day. Intervention in the first days of a disappearance thus has the greatest chance of 
finding the person alive. 
The UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances104 has introduced the 
rule that it would issue an urgent appeal in each case on which it received information within 
three months of the last time the person was seen. Different from the Working Group, however, 
the Inter-American Commission did not regulate its urgent procedure in this respect. As dis-
                                                 
103 See also Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
104 For a brief reference to this Working Group see Chapter II (Systems), section 2.4 ‘Power and 
promptness of the HRC to take provisional measures’, under the subheading ‘prompt intervention 
in disappearance and detention cases’. 
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cussed, at least on one occasion it took precautionary measures to locate the person concerned 
more than a year after he had last been seen. Later it even decided to maintain these measures 
when it declared the case admissible. One may speculate on the Commission’s reasons. It may be 
that it considered this disappearance an unusual occurrence in the State involved and either be-
lieved that there was still a chance to find the disappeared person alive, or at least wished to pre-
serve evidence of the disappearance, or more generally wished to emphasise the seriousness of the 
situation by using precautionary measures in a symbolic gesture aimed at the prevention of new 
disappearances. 
The fact that the ECtHR has not yet used provisional measures to locate disappeared per-
sons may relate to its functioning in general, especially its fear for a flood of urgent disappearance 
cases. Yet it is unlikely that such fear would prod the overworked Court simply to dismiss a well-
reasoned request for provisional measures in a recent disappearance case, in the context of a 
pattern of disappearances with the ensuing impunity. It is more likely that the Court simply has 
not yet received such requests. The reason may be that not just the Court and its staff, but also 
domestic counsel and NGOs are in a ‘non-refoulement mode’ vis-à-vis the Court. The Court is 
accustomed to use provisional measures mainly in expulsion and extradition cases. A related 
explanation may be found in the case law on the merits on this particular subject matter, which 
has been more restrictive than that of the other human rights adjudicators. It has generally as-
signed a heavy burden to the petitioner for proving the State’s direct responsibility for a disap-
pearance. Moreover, those NGOs dealing specifically with disappearances may simply assume 
that they may only submit a case upon exhaustion of domestic remedies, even when domestic 
habeas corpus proceedings are ineffective in locating the disappeared person in time to prevent 
his or her extrajudicial execution. 
Given the importance of the rights involved, the ECtHR should indeed follow the example 
of the other adjudicators and use provisional measures as well when faced with a petition regard-
ing a recent disappearance. This could be relevant not just for disappearances in traditional con-
flict areas within Council of Europe States,105 but also in light of recent reports on the disappear-
ance of persons in the context of the ‘war on terror’.106 
Petitioners may bring complaints against Council of Europe States in which disappeared 
persons were last seen or on the basis of reports about secret detention centres on their territory.107 
                                                 
105 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, Russia/Chechnya, Swept under: torture, forced disappearances, 
and extrajudicial killings during sweep operations in Chechnya, February 2002; Human Rights 
Watch, Russia, Last seen…: continued ‘disappearances’ in Chechnya, April 2002; Amnesty 
International Urgent Action on behalf of at least 34 men from an unofficial settlement for 
internally displaced persons in Altievo, Nazran region, Ingushetia, 24 June 2004, AI Index EUR 
46/039/2004. 
106 The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has also referred to ‘the 
existence of secret detention centres where terrorist suspects are held in complete isolation from 
the outside world’. In this context it pointed out that it was ‘well documented’ that disappearance 
was ‘often a precursor to torture and even to extrajudicial execution’. Report of the Working 
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, E/CN.4/2006/56, 27 December 2005, §22. 
107 See also the references in the Introduction to this Chapter. The Working Group on Enforced and 
Involuntary Disappearances has interpreted Article 10 of the Declaration (stipulating that persons 
‘deprived of liberty be held in an officially recognized place of detention’) to mean that such 
place must always be ‘clearly identifiable’. “Under no circumstances, including states of war or 
public emergency, can any State interests be invoked to justify or legitimize secret centres or 
places of detention which, by definition would violate the Declaration, without exception” 
E/CN.4/1997/34, 13 December 1996, §24. See further Chapter V (Non-refoulement) on 
extraordinary renditions. At the same time complaints may be brought before the Inter-American 
Commission against the US. See further Chapter VIII on procedural rights and Chapter XIV on 
jurisdiction and admissibility. 
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In fact, as ICJ Judge Simma pointed out in his Separate Opinion in Congo v. Uganda (2005), this 
concerns obligations erga omnes in which not just individual petitioners, but also other States 
have a legal interest:  
“If the international community allowed such interest to erode in the face not only of violations 
of obligations erga omnes but of outright attempts to do away with these fundamental duties, 
and in their place to open black holes in the law in which human beings may be disappeared and 
deprived of any legal protection whatsoever for indefinite periods of time, then international 
law, for me, would become much less worthwhile”.108 
 
 
 
                                                 
108 ICJ Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Judgment of 19 December 
2005, Separate Opinion Judge Simma, §41.  
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 CHAPTER VII 
 INTERVENING IN DETENTION SITUATIONS 
 INVOLVING RISKS TO HEALTH AND DIGNITY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Most adjudicators, even the ICJ and ITLOS, have dealt with situations regarding persons deprived 
of their liberty.1 The human rights adjudicators have used provisional measures not only on behalf 
of disappeared persons,2 but also on behalf of persons whose place of detention was known. In 
both cases provisional measures are taken in order to prevent the (further) torture, ill-treatment 
and death of the persons involved.  
The HRC has intervened in detention cases very frequently, especially in the 1970s and 
1980s, but also more recently. In the Inter-American system provisional measures have been used 
repeatedly as well. Examples from these systems, as well as from the European and African sys-
tems will be given in section 2. 
These provisional measures do not generally entail a direct intervention to prevent a specific 
interrogation-method3 or punishment.4 Instead they entail the prevention of and putting a stop to 
ongoing ill-treatment.5 Most often they require positive measures to prevent the further deteriora-
tion of the health of a detainee, for instance by providing access to medical care and by paying 
special attention to particularly vulnerable detainees, such as minors, detainees in mental distress 
and detainees on a hunger strike.  
As pointed out in the Introduction to Part II, the argument in this book rests on the assump-
tion that there is a link between provisional measures and the decision on the merits. Hence in 
order to explain the use of provisional measures there must be a likelihood of finding a violation 
on the merits with regard to the right to life and personal integrity, in this case of detainees. Sec-
tion 3 deals with that issue. 
                                                 
1 See Chapter I, referring to ICJ Hostages case and ITLOS case law regarding release of a vessel or 
crew. 
2 See Chapter VI. For death threats and harassment in detention see Chapter IX. The use of 
provisional measures in cases of lack of access to court and counsel are discussed in Chapter 
VIII.  
3 For a case in which such intervention was requested see section 2.2 of this Chapter. See also the 
Cleveland Principles on the Detention & Treatment of Persons in Connection with ‘The Global 
War on Terror’ adopted at a Conference at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, 
Ohio, 7 October 2005 and subsequently endorsed by many other experts. See further Chapter 
VIII (Procedural rights) on extraterritorial detention (e.g. Guantanamo) and Chapter VII 
(Expulsion) on so-called extraordinary renditions, both in the context of counter-terrorism 
measures. 
4 On provisional measures to prevent corporal punishment see Chapter IV. 
5 See section 2.2 of this Chapter. 
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2 PRACTICE 
2.1 Introduction 
Most human rights adjudicators have used provisional measures in one way or other in the context 
of detention. Section 2 briefly refers to specific measures to protect against ill-treatment,6 
including certain interrogation methods. It then focuses on the use of (informal) provisional 
measures relating to the health situation of detainees, sometimes in the form of requests for 
information, sometimes explicitly in order to ensure access to medical care. This section also pays 
attention to the protection of particularly vulnerable detainees, with a focus on minors, as well as 
to requests for provisional measures by or on behalf of detainees on a hunger strike. Some cases 
involve a request by petitioners to halt the execution of a detention order rather than to ensure 
access to medical treatment.7 The discussion of the use of provisional measures in detention 
situations concludes with a discussion of situations, dealt with by the HRC in the context of death 
row, in which provisional measures could have been used. 
2.2 Protecting against certain interrogation methods and other ill treatment 
2.2.1 European system 
There is one famous case involving the legality of interrogation methods in which the adjudicator 
had been requested to intervene pending the proceedings. In Ireland v. United Kingdom (1972) 
the European Commission was requested to order the UK to halt a specific interrogation method. 
This was at a time when the Commission had indeed used provisional measures previously, gen-
erally in the context of halting an expulsion, extradition or the execution of a death sentence, but 
the possibility to do so had not yet officially been included in its Rules of Procedure.8 
The request to take provisional measures in this case was made as part of the inter-State 
complaint procedure. Ireland had invoked this procedure against the UK in December 1971, 
arguing that the latter’s use of five interrogation techniques ((a) wall-standing;9 (b) hooding;10 (c) 
subjection to noise;11 (d) deprivation of sleep; (e) deprivation of food and drink) against suspected 
IRA terrorists was incompatible with Article 3 ECHR.12 
That same month the Commission decided to give priority to the application.13 Three 
months later Ireland referred to reports by detained persons and by Amnesty International that the 
ill treatment was continuing despite the fact that Ireland’s Article 3 claim was pending before the 
                                                 
6 See also Chapter IX (protecting against death threats and harassment). 
7 In general about the specific protection required by provisional measures see Chapter XIII 
(Protection). 
8 The European Commission did so in 1974. 
9 ‘(F)orcing the detainees to remain for periods of some hours in a “stress position”, described by 
those who underwent it as being “spread eagled against the wall, with their fingers put high above 
the head against the wall, the legs spread apart and the feet back, causing them to stand on their 
toes with the weight of the body mainly on the fingers”’. 
10 ‘(P)utting a black or navy coloured bag over the detainees’ heads and, at least initially, keeping it 
there all the time except during interrogation’. 
11 ‘(P)ending their interrogations, holding the detainees in a room where there was a continuous 
loud and hissing noise’. 
12 The techniques were sometimes referred to as ‘disorientation’ or ‘sensory deprivation’ 
techniques. ECtHR Ireland v. UK, Judgment of 18 January 1978, §96. 
13 See Rule 38(1) of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure. 
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Commission. It requested provisional measures to ensure that such ill treatment was discontinued 
pending a decision in the case, in order to prevent irreparable harm.14 While Ireland recognized 
that the ECHR did not expressly empower the Commission to order or direct a Government to 
adopt such measures, it submitted that the Commission did possess the power to take provisional 
measures as this was ‘the necessary attribute of its judicial functions and therefore covered by the 
doctrine of implied powers’. It also referred to previous cases in which the Commission had 
requested Governments to take provisional measures. In particular it requested the Commission to 
seek an undertaking by the UK that all treatment of detainees complained of under Article 3 
should be discontinued; to seek permission for attendance by observers nominated by the Com-
mission at centres of custody ‘to ascertain whether these persons were subjected to such treat-
ment’; and to seek ‘an undertaking that all such persons in custody should be taken to the centres 
where these observers would be located and that the observers should at all times be given access 
to such persons’. 
Ireland considered that ‘the object of interim measures is generally the preservation of the 
rights of the parties, pending adjudication, insofar as the damage threatened to these rights would 
be irreparable’. It submitted that ‘the measures suggested would not in any way prejudice the 
rights of the respondent Government, but that they would on the other hand protect from irrepara-
ble damage the right to physical integrity of those persons in custody who had been and were still 
being subjected to ill-treatment’.15 
In response the UK observed that the Commission should first decide on the admissibility of 
the case.16 It also noted that the proposal was made in respect of ‘new and unspecified allegations’ 
and not on the material already supplied to the Commission. Finally, it submitted that the Conven-
tion did not include a provision ‘conferring on the Commission competence to order interim 
measures of the kind that were being sought’.17 With this formulation, adding ‘of the kind that 
were being sought’, the UK seemed to have left leave the door slightly ajar. It could be argued 
that this State mainly disagreed with the specific measures of protection requested by Ireland, 
rather than disputed the overall competence of the Commission. It is also possible that it consid-
ered the Commission should only use provisional measures to halt activities that, if they indeed 
are taking place, undisputedly violate Article 3. After all, in the latter situation a provisional 
measure would indicate a likelihood that the Commission would determine that these activities 
constitute ill-treatment as forbidden under Article 3. In the former situation it would indicate a 
likelihood that this treatment (which is forbidden under Article 3) is in fact taking place or will 
occur. 
That same month, in March 1972, the Commission decided that it ‘did not have the power, 
consistent with its functions under the Convention, to meet the request made in the applicant 
Government’s letter’.18 Apart from noting that it made the decision after considering Ireland’s 
letter and the response by the UK it did not explain its decision. It did not say that it did not have 
the power to order provisional measures at all, only that it could not meet the specific request 
made by Ireland.19 
The ECtHR eventually found that ‘(t)he five techniques were applied in combination, with 
premeditation and for hours at a stretch; they caused, if not actual bodily injury, at least intense 
physical and mental suffering to the persons subjected thereto and also led to acute psychiatric 
disturbances during interrogation. They accordingly fell into the category of inhuman treatment 
within the meaning of Article 3 (art. 3). The techniques were also degrading since they were such 
                                                 
14 See ECHR Yearbook 23, p. 82. 
15 Id., p. 84. 
16 Ibid. See further Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
17 It referred to the Commission’s decision in X v. FRG, 20 March 1958, 297/57. 
18 ECHR Yearbook 23, p. 88. 
19 See further Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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as to arouse in their victims feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and 
debasing them and possibly breaking their physical or moral resistance’.20 This recourse to the 
five techniques amounted to a practice of inhuman and degrading treatment in violation of Article 
3.21 
Thus far the judgments and decisions of the ECtHR do not seem to indicate similar cases 
involving requests to order a halt to certain interrogation methods while the case is pending before 
it, but provisional measures are certainly feasible in this respect. 
There could also be other forms of ill treatment unrelated to interrogation methods. To take 
but one example, on the merits the ECtHR has had to deal with the issue of force-feeding. It 
found that a measure that ‘was considered to be medically necessary – such as force-feeding a 
detainee to save her/his life – could not in principle be regarded as inhuman and degrading’. Yet, 
‘such a measure had to have been proved to be medically necessary and the procedural guarantees 
for the decision to force-feed had to be complied with’. “Moreover, the manner in which the 
applicant is subjected to force-feeding during the hunger strike shall not trespass the threshold of 
a minimum level of severity envisaged by the Court’s case law under Article 3 of the Conven-
tion”.22 While it is feasible that a petitioner on hunger strike would request the Court to order a 
State to halt force-feeding, the Court would not easily do so unless faced with information of 
persistent use of force-feeding that is not medically warranted or done in a manner in itself con-
trary to Article 3.23 An example of a case where the Court found a State in violation of Article 3 
for such force-feeding is Ciorap v. Moldova (2007). In this case it concluded that the petitioner’s 
‘repeated force-feeding, not prompted by valid medical reasons but rather with the aim of forcing 
the applicant to stop his protest, and performed in a manner which unnecessarily exposed him to 
great physical pain and humiliation, can only be considered as torture’.24 Were it to receive a 
claim in an ongoing situation of such type of force-feeding the use of provisional measures would 
be warranted. 
2.2.2 Inter-American system 
Adjudicators have regularly dealt with allegations of ill treatment that, once proven, would imme-
diately constitute violations of international law. Often this concerns ill treatment in detention and 
sometimes it is ongoing. In response the Inter-American Commission has used various precau-
                                                 
20 ECtHR Ireland v. UK, Judgment of 18 January 1978, §167. 
21 Id., §168. CAT has also pointed out that suspects must not be blindfolded during interrogation 
and that using ‘moderate physical pressure’ is completely unacceptable as a method of 
interrogation because allowing this, together with the secrecy of the standards of interrogation, 
would create conditions leading to a risk of ill treatment and torture. See e.g. Ingelse (2002), pp. 
254-255 and the references therein. 
22 See ECtHR Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, 5 April 2005, §94. At §93 it noted: “When, however, as in 
the present case, a detained person maintains a hunger strike this may inevitably lead to a conflict 
between an individual’s right to physical integrity and the High Contracting Party’s positive 
obligation under Article 2 of the Convention – a conflict which is not solved by the Convention 
itself” (see X v. Germany (1984) 7 EHRR 152). “In the instant case, the Court finds that the 
force-feeding of the applicant, without any medical justification having been shown by the 
Government, using the equipment foreseen in the decree, but resisted by the applicant, 
constituted treatment of such a severe character warranting the characterisation of torture”, §98. 
See also ECtHR Herczegfalvy v. Austria, Judgment of 24 September 1992, §83.  
23 About the role of physicians in this respect see e.g. World Medical Association, Declaration on 
hunger strikers, November 1991, <www.wma.net/e/policy/h31.htm> and Oguz and Miles (2004). 
For a commentary by the Dutch branch of the International Commission of Jurists on force-
feeding, see Wijnakker (2006), pp. 434-449. 
24 ECtHR Ciorap v. Moldova, 19 June 2007, §89. 
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tionary measures to protect detainees against ill treatment by prison officials and others. The 
Inter-American Court has equally dealt with such issues.25 
In August 1992 the Inter-American Commission took precautionary measures in a case 
against Peru, aimed at the protection of the prisoners who had been at the ‘Miguel Castro Castro 
Prison’ in Lima during an attack by the Army that took place in May 1992. In particular, it re-
quested information on the whereabouts and medical condition of the inmates who had been 
wounded. Formally, the Commission had received the first communication twelve days after the 
attack.26  
In fact, it appears from the Commission’s 1993 Report on Peru that its Executive Secretariat 
received reports about the events already in early April 1992. Unsuccessfully, the Commission 
made several attempts to convince the government to allow it to use its good offices. Apparently, 
the ICRC had not been allowed to play a role at all in the earlier stages of the military operation 
of early May. Only in the night of 8 May was it allowed a brief visit. Reportedly, the prosecutor 
was the only non-military presence in the prison. No institution or individual had been allowed to 
enter the prison as independent observer.27 The Commission noted that, as reported by independ-
ent sources, on 7 May and especially on 8 May the inmates had asked for the presence of institu-
tions such as the ICRC and the Commission, whose good offices could help implement the prison 
transfer. The authorities, however, did not accept these suggestions and on 9 May the ‘combined 
army and police forces’ used force against the inmates, including explosives and weapons of war. 
Four days later the Chairman of the Commission sent the following letter to Peru’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs: 
“I have the honor to address your Excellency in connection with the events that occurred at the 
‘Miguel Castro Castro’ prison starting on May 6, 1992 to request that you kindly adopt the fol-
lowing measures at soon as possible:  
Provide the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a complete list of the male and 
female inmates who were in cellblocks 1A and 4B of that institution on May 5 last.  
Provide the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a complete list of the individu-
als who were killed, wounded, or who have been missing since May 6. 
Provide the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights with a complete list of the survivors, 
and where they are at the present time. 
Re-establish, as soon as possible, visits from relatives of the inmates, so that they provide them 
with any clothing, medications and toiletries that they may need. 
Take the necessary measures to provide the wounded with the medical care they require”.28 
As indicated before, the Commission formally opened the case relating to the incident in June 
1992. In its Special Report on Peru it noted that the next month the ‘disturbing information’ it 
received concerning the situation of the inmates prompted it to request Peru, in August 1992, to 
take measures to protect the rights of the detainees.29 Indeed its admissibility report in the Castro 
                                                 
25 Obviously this is closely related to the discussion in Chapter IX (threats). 
26 The Commission alleged that 500 troops of the Peruvian army had entered the prison to transfer 
the inmates to the ‘Santa Mónica’ prison. During the attack by the Army 34 inmates died and 18 
others were wounded. The Commission also received information from ‘a variety’ of other 
sources including letters sent by inmates. The Commission opened the case the next month. See 
CIDH Hugo Juarez Cruzat et al. (Miguel Castro Castro Prison) v. Peru, 5 March 2001 (adm.).  
27 CIDH Special Report on Peru 1993, §95. 
28 Id., §97. 
29 Before providing the complete text of the precautionary measures taken, the Commission listed 
the situation as denounced by the petitioners and NGOs: “a.That a group of around 80 inmates in 
cellblock 4-B and 2 members of Tupac Amaru Revolutionary Movement had been transferred to 
Yanamayo prison Puno. b. That prison does not have the facilities to provide inmates with the 
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Castro Prison case notes that it took precautionary measures on 18 August 1992. It decided to do 
so ‘(i)n view of the information supplied and the fact that there had been no reply from the Gov-
ernment of Peru’.30 It requested Peru to send an official list of the persons who died or disap-
peared during the incidents in May. It also requested information on the whereabouts and medical 
condition of the surviving inmates.31  
The Commission pointed out that it had received additional information with regard to the 
case ‘to the effect that inmates in the Miguel Castro Castro penal institution were in very bad 
condition, very poorly fed – far below the minimum requirements – and that the sick and those in 
need of medical attention were living alongside healthy inmates. No inmate was allowed to re-
ceive visits from relatives or their attorneys. In general, conditions were such that they posed a 
serious threat to the inmates’ personal security and even their lives’.32  
According to the petitioners, during (and after) the Army attack of May 1992, Peru rejected 
the proposal by the inmates to form a committee with representatives of the ICRC and the Inter-
American Commission. The petitioners pointed out that ‘the prisoners made every effort to re-
solve the situation differently and even went so far as to sign a document with Attorney General 
Mirtha Campos, where the main point was the Red Cross’ presence as a minimum requirement to 
guarantee the lives of the prisoners at the time of surrender’. The petitioners added that they only 
revolted when they realised ‘that the real objective of the Army and police troops was to kill 
everyone’. They stated that the confrontation continued from 6 May to 9 May 1992, ‘when the 
Army troops began to selectively execute prisoners, despite the fact that they had surrendered and 
                                                                                                                       
minimum protection needed to cope with the very low temperature at that altitude and the 
inhospitable climate. c. The individuals being held have been taken to Yanamayo with only the 
clothes on their backs, after having spent several weeks exposed to the elements, poorly fed, and 
subjected to various types of serious mistreatment; a number of them were also wounded. d. No 
authorisation has been given to allow relatives to visit those being held in Yanamayo and they are 
not allowed to send them the food, clothing, coats or medicine the prisoners need to cover their 
basic needs. e. Two inmates have already died as result of the inadequate facilities, their very 
weakened physical condition at the time they were transferred and because of the authorities’ 
refusal to permit the vital necessities of those being held at Yanamayo prison to be supplied by 
those outside. f. Members of rival armed groups are said to be held inside the same facilities, 
which poses a serious threat to their personal safety and life should serious violence occur”. 
CIDH Special Report on Peru 1993, §99. 
30 They consisted of the following: “1. That the Government of Peru authorize the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights to conduct an on site inspection of the Yanamayo prison facilities 
in the Department of Puno. 2. That the Government of Peru authorize the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights to speak with persons deprived of their liberty in that penal 
institution. 3. That the Government of Peru authorize relatives and attorneys to visit prisoners in 
that and other detention centers and that it allow clothing, medicine, coats and toiletries that the 
inmates require to meet their vital needs to enter. 4. That the Government of Peru provide persons 
suffering from health problems with needed medical care and that such persons be transferred to 
establishments where they can receive proper medical attention. 5. That the Government of Peru 
adopt measures to keep separate persons who are considered members of rival armed groups, so 
as to avoid the kind of violence that could threaten the safety or life of the inmates. 6. That the 
Government of Peru forward to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights the official list 
of persons who died and disappeared as a result of the events that occurred at the Miguel Castro 
Castro penal institution, as well as a list of the wounded and the whereabouts of those 
transferred”. CIDH Special Report on Peru 1993, §100. 
31 While it remains unclear whether the exact date was 14 or 18 August, it seems likely that the 
precautionary measures mentioned here are the same as the aforementioned of 14 August 
reproduced in the Commission’s Special Report on Peru. 
32 CIDH Special Report on Peru 1993, §§101-102. 
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were leaving the facility to be transferred to another facility’. The petitioners maintained that the 
Prison Warden, the Assistant Warden and another commander they identified were immediately 
to blame for the events leaving dead 34 prisoners and wounding 13 others. According to them 
‘these three had a plan to isolate and annihilate the inmates’. The petitioners also mentioned 
another incident, later in May 1992, where 500 Army troopers entered the prison again, heavily 
armed and wearing hoods in order to move 300 prisoners. Allegedly, prisoners were ill-treated 
and beaten. This exacerbated the conditions of those who had already been wounded during the 
attack of 6 May. The petitioners claimed that the detainees were held incommunicado and some 
of them without clothing or shoes. ‘There were few mattresses and blankets, little food and no 
proper medical attention’.33 They argued that they had submitted their petition before domestic 
remedies had been exhausted ‘because of the urgency of the situation and to avoid further and 
possibly irreparable harm to the inmates at Miguel Castro Castro prison’.  
Among others, the State contended that the operation was conducted by National Police 
troops and the Army troops were simply guarding the outside perimeter of the prison and never 
directly intervened. It alleged that the police only intervened because the male inmates, who were 
members of Sendero Luminoso (Shining Path), had rejected earlier attempts to persuade the in-
mates to cooperate in the transfer. It also maintained that a document shows that ICRC represen-
tatives were present. It reiterated that its Army ‘did not selectively and summarily execute the 
prisoners as they were leaving the prison, since the Army troops did not have a direct hand in the 
operation (…) instead, they confined their activities to security outside the prison’.  
In December 1992 the President of the Inter-American Court decided not to take urgent 
measures in the Peruvian Prisons cases.34 The Court confirmed this in plenary session by a deci-
sion not to order provisional measures for lack of evidence of risk.35 
In its 1993 Special Report on Peru the Commission pointed out that it had received addi-
tional information with regard to the case ‘to the effect that inmates in the Miguel Castro Castro 
penal institution were in very bad condition, very poorly fed – far below the minimum require-
ments – and that the sick and those in need of medical attention were living alongside healthy 
inmates. No inmate was allowed to receive visits from relatives or their attorneys. In general, 
conditions were such that they posed a serious threat to the inmates’ personal security and even 
their lives’.36 It was only in 2001 that the Commission declared the case admissible.37 It deter-
mined that Peru had waived the requirement to exhaust national remedies because it had not 
asserted this requirement in a timely manner.38  
                                                 
33 In this context they claimed that the treatment of inmates in this prison was ‘inhumane, given the 
scarcity of food, the lack of heating in the cells, the lack of medical care for sick prisoners, the 
absolute ban on visits – both by family members and prisoners’ attorneys –, the harassment, 
abuse and brutality of the guards charged with the custody of the prisoners and the safety of 
prisons’. 
34 IACHR Peruvian Prisons cases, Resolution of the President of 14 December 1992. 
35 IACHR Peruvian Prisons cases, Order of the Court of 27 January 1993. According to the 
Commission the Inter-American Court did order provisional measures in December 1992, in 
connection with the situation at the Peruvian prisons in general (including the ‘Miguel Castro 
Castro Prison’): Hugo Juarez Cruzat et al. (Miguel Castro Castro Prison) v. Peru, 5 March 2001 
(adm.), §5. See further Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
36 CIDH Special Report on Peru 1993, §§101-102. 
37 CIDH Hugo Juarez Cruzat et al. (Miguel Castro Castro Prison) v. Peru, 5 March 2001 (adm.). 
38 It pointed out, moreover, that in July 1992 the habeas corpus petition relating to the events had 
been declared inadmissible by the Peruvian court. 
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Another case in which the Inter-American Commission took precautionary measures, at 
least according to its Annual Report 1998, was that of Damion Thomas.39 The case alleged on-
going ill-treatment by prison officials in the St. Catherine Prison in Jamaica.40 Yet in its Final 
Report the Commission did not refer to the precautionary measure previously mentioned in its 
Annual Report. In fact it related to its refusal to heed to the petitioners’ repeated requests for such 
measures. It noted that in their original petition and subsequent communications the petitioners 
requested such measures ‘based upon an immediate threat posed to Mr. Thomas’ mental and 
physical health’. In April 2000 the Commission responded to the various requests by stating that 
‘based upon the information provided by both parties in the matter, it considered that it could 
effectively address the concerns raised by the petitioners through the Commission’s complaint 
procedure and without the need to adopt precautionary measures at that time’.41  
The petitioners apparently had requested the Commission to ensure their client’s transfer to 
a prison in Jamaica other than St. Catherine’s District Prison.42 A month after the Commission’s 
refusal to adopt precautionary measures, Jamaica sent a communication arguing that ‘the Petition-
ers should be disallowed from applying for precautionary measures until such time as they in-
tended to open a full case before the Commission’. In the alternative, it argued, that ‘the informa-
tion provided by the Petitioners did not substantiate the occurrence or threat of irreparable dam-
age necessary to support the adoption of precautionary measures by the Commission’.43  
Here the State argued that there should be a connection between a request for precautionary 
measures and opening a full case before the Commission. In fact, petitioners have often requested 
precautionary measures before sending in a formal petition in a full case. The Commission, more-
over, has often resorted to precautionary measures before opening a case and in many of these 
situations a case was never formally opened.44 Only in death penalty cases the Commission now 
opens a case immediately and assigns a case number. What is interesting here is that the State 
believed the petitioners should not even be allowed to apply for precautionary measures if they 
did not intend to open a full case.45  
In any case, the Commission seemed to agree with regard to the State’s position that the in-
formation provided by the petitioners did not substantiate the occurrence or threat of irreparable 
harm necessary to support the adoption of precautionary measures.46 Yet in its Final Report the 
                                                 
39 CIDH Annual Report 1998, §43 (to take the necessary measures to prevent him from suffering 
irreparable harm), case 12.069. 
40 Normally, precautionary measures addressed at Jamaica aim at halting the execution of a death 
sentence. 
41 CIDH Damion Thomas v. Jamaica, 4 April 2001 (merits), §14. 
42 CIDH Damion Thomas v. Jamaica, 15 June 2000 (adm.), §3. The petitioner in this case was 
Allen & Overy, a law firm in London. 
43 Id., §13. 
44 See in general about the proceedings Chapter II (Systems). 
45 The petitioners themselves had ‘expressed the view that he communication filed on Mr. Thomas’ 
behalf was not a request to open a full case on their complaint, but rather a request for 
precautionary measures to protect Mr. Thomas’ life and physical integrity’. CIDH Damion 
Thomas v. Jamaica, 15 June 2000 (adm.), §5. The Commission, however, had already opened the 
case in December 1998 and the petitioners had consistently taken part in the procedure set by the 
Commission. In this light the State’s reference to the original intention of the petitioners is 
particularly intriguing. 
46 According to both the Admissibility and the Final Report it never took precautionary measures. It 
is not clear whether the reference in its discussion of precautionary measures in its Annual Report 
1998 to such measures, as taken on 9 December 1998 is mistaken or whether the reports on 
admissibility and merits simply fail to mention that the Commission initially did take them. If the 
Commission indeed took precautionary measures on 9 December, it did so two days before it 
formally opened the case, which was on 11 December 1998. 
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Commission concluded that Jamaica was responsible for failing to respect the physical, mental 
and moral integrity of Mr. Thomas, thereby subjecting him to cruel or inhuman punishment or 
treatment in violation of Articles 5(1) and 5(2) jo. 1(1) ACHR.47 If it never took such measures 
earlier during the proceedings it must either have believed that no irreparable harm had occurred 
or that, at the time, there was no sufficient substantiation of a threat of such occurrence.  
Another example of Commission involvement to protect detainees against ill treatment is 
reported by CEJIL. On an unspecified date this NGO requested the Commission to take precau-
tionary measures to protect the physical integrity of almost 150 labour union members who had 
been arbitrarily detained upon their attendance of an assembly. Allegedly, the Bolivian authorities 
had taken them to various military camps. At these camps they were subjected to torture and 
mistreatment and deprived of access to medical attention. At the same time, the government 
declared a state of emergency, so that they could not file writs of habeas corpus and were denied 
the assistance of counsel. The Commission took precautionary measures in May 1995 and even-
tually the detainees were freed.48 Clearly, this precautionary measure did not only relate to prison 
conditions and access to health care but also to the prevention of torture and disappearances.  
In April 1996 the President of the Inter-American Court requested Ecuador to adopt forth-
with the measures necessary ‘to effectively ensure the physical and moral integrity of Mr. Rafael 
Iván Suárez-Rosero, so that any provisional measures that the Inter-American Court may take can 
have the requisite effect’.49 The beneficiary was detained at that time. In June 1996 the Court 
lifted the urgent measures, having received note from the Commission that ‘it was desisting from 
its requests for provisional measures on the grounds that the circumstances of extreme gravity and 
urgency that had inspired the adoption of urgent measures no longer existed, a fact demonstrated 
by the release of Mr. Rafael Iván Suárez-Rosero by the Government of Ecuador, and that there 
was currently no risk to the safety of Mr. Suárez-Rosero and his family’.50  
More recently the Inter-American Court has also ordered provisional measures in serious 
detention situations of a general nature, affecting larger groups of people.51 In the Urso Branco 
                                                 
47 CIDH Damion Thomas v. Jamaica, case 12.069, Final Report 50/01, 4 April 2001, §VII. It 
recommended Jamaica to grant the petitioner an effective remedy, including compensation, to 
investigate the facts, determine responsibility and undertake ‘appropriate remedial measures’. It 
also recommended it to ensure that detention officials are appropriately trained with regard to 
standards of humane treatment and that complaints about ill treatment and other conditions of 
detention are properly investigated and resolved. 
48 CEJIL case docket 1997 (on file with the author).  
49 IACHR Suárez-Rosero (Ecuador), Order of 12 April 1996 (President). Later that same month the 
President expanded the urgent measures to include the family members of the detainee. 
50 IACHR Suárez-Rosero (Ecuador), Order of 28 June 1996. 
51 For a range of Orders dealing with requests for provisional measures in the context of detention 
see e.g. IACHR Matter of the Penitentiary Center of the Central Occidental Region (Uribana 
Prison) (Venezuela), Order of 2 February 2007; Matter of Urso Branco prison (Brazil), Orders of 
2 May 2008, 21 September 2005, 7 July 2004, 22 April 2004, 29 August 2002 and 18 June 2002; 
Matter of the Mendoza prisons (Argentina), Orders of 27 November 2007, 30 March 2006, 18 
June 2005, 22 November 2004; Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins 
Silveira" Penitentiary in Araraquara São Paulo (Brazil), Order of the President of 10 June 2008; 
Order of 30 September 2006; Matter of Children Deprived of Liberty in the "Complexo do 
Tatuapé" of FEBEM (Brazil), Order of President 10 June 2008, Orders of 3 July 2007, 4 July 
2006, 30 November 2005 and 17 November 2005; Matter of Yare I and Yare II Capital Region 
Penitentiary Center (Venezuela), Orders of 8 February 2008, 30 November 2007 and 30 March 
2006; Matter of Capital El Rodeo I & El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, Order of 8 
February 2008; Matter of Monagas Judicial Confinement Center (‘La Pica’) (Venezuela), Order 
of 3 July 2007 and 9 February 2006; Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Orders of 
29 January 2008 and 30 January 2007. 
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Prison case, for instance, it ordered Brazil to immediately take all necessary measures to protect 
the lives and personal integrity of all persons detained in certain detention centers, as well as 
those working there and visitors.52 Moreover, in its Order for provisional measures in Las peni-
tentiarías de Mendoza v. Argentina the Court required the State to take the necessary measures to 
protect the life and personal integrity of all detainees from the detention centers involved, as well 
as employees and visitors.53 The Court has noted that the State must ‘make the appropriate ad-
justments to deal with the structural problems’, but meanwhile, sometimes the situation makes it 
necessary that detainees ‘who are being affected by such flaws, be protected by provisional meas-
ures if their condition is of extreme seriousness and urgency’.54 In any case extreme seriousness 
‘should be assessed taking into account the specific context’, as ‘it is clear that if the fundamental 
rights such as the right to life and physical integrity are subjected to such type of threat, an order 
for provisional measures should be considered’.55 The urgency criterion ‘refers to special and 
exceptional situations that deserve an immediate measure and response aimed at averting the 
threat’. This involves ‘circumstances that because of their own nature imply an imminent risk’. A 
‘lack of response would mean a danger per se’.56 
In January 2006 the Court took provisional measures on behalf of those persons deprived of 
their liberty by Venezuela, detained in the Detention Centre of Monagas, known as ‘La Pica’. The 
State should efficiently and immediately take measures to prevent violence in La Pica to the effect 
that no-one would die and the personal integrity of the detainees and others present in La Pica 
would be respected. As usual, the measures required should be planned and implemented with the 
participation of the representatives of the beneficiaries. The State was also requested to provide an 
up-to-date list of all persons detained and indicate the circumstances of their detention.57 Finally, 
the State should investigate and prosecute the acts that led to the adoption of the provisional 
measures.58  
2.3 Requests for information on the health situation of detainees  
It has mainly been the HRC that has requested information on the health situation of detainees 
without explicitly requesting States to ensure medical attention. There are at least twenty cases 
involving political prisoners in which the HRC used such informal provisional measures to inter-
vene in ongoing detention situations. The first time it did so was in 1977. Most interventions took 
place in the 1970s and early 1980s and involved Uruguay. There have also been cases against 
Zaire (now the Democratic Republic of Congo), Madagascar, Bolivia, Nicaragua and Peru.  
The Rule 91 (current Rule 97) requests for information about the health of an alleged victim 
clearly aim at ensuring proper proceedings and safeguarding the evidence. At the same time, 
                                                 
52 IACHR Cárcel de Urso Branco (Brazil), Order of 21 September 2005. See also the Orders of 18 
June and 22 August 2002, 22 April and 7 July 2004. See further Chapter XIII (Protection). On 21 
October 2006 the Commission declared this case admissible. Its report includes a list of the 96 
inmates who had died in the Urso Branco prison between 3 November 2000 and 8 February 2006. 
53 IACHR Las penitentiarías de Mendoza (Argentina), Order of 22 November 2004. 
54 IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, 8 February 
2008, 14th ‘Considering’ clause. 
55 Id., 17th ‘Considering’ clause. 
56 Id., 18th ‘Considering’ clause. 
57 More generally on the group of beneficiaries see Chapter XIII. 
58 CIDH Caso del internado judicial de Monagas (‘La Pica’) (Venezuela), Order of 13 January 
2006. Yet analysing compliance with this requirements is a matter to be dealt with on the merits. 
See infra referring to IACHR Matter of the Children Deprived of liberty in the “Complexo do 
Tataupé” of FEBEM, Order of 3 July 2007, 12th ‘Considering’ clause and 7th ‘Decisional’ clause.  
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however, these requests seem to have the additional purpose of preventing irreparable harm to the 
persons involved. Hence, the requests for information on the health and ‘whereabouts’ of alleged 
victims, as found in these communications, seem to function as informal requests for provisional 
measures. If this implies preventing irreparable harm, the next question is whether this means 
refraining from acting or taking positive measures to prevent irreparable harm. In fact the sub-
stance of the HRC’s informal provisional measures in the above cases illustrates a continuum 
between negative and positive action in respect of the obligations under the ICCPR and the OP.59  
The case of M.A. v. S (1978) is one of the first cases in which the HRC requested informa-
tion on the alleged victim’s whereabouts and state of health. It is also one of the few cases in 
which it published such a decision separately,60 although it did not specify the addressee State.61 
The first occasion in which the petitioners explicitly requested the HRC to use provisional 
measures on behalf of a detainee was in 1977 in the case of Altesor v. Uruguay (1982).62 Four 
months after the initial submission they requested the HRC to take provisional measures to avoid 
irreparable harm to their father’s health and life in light of his ‘very poor state of health’.63 The 
                                                 
59 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
60 HRC M.A. v. S., 24 April 1979, com. no. 20/1977, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 5 and 20. Its decision was of 
25 January 1978. On that same day it also requested a State to halt the expulsion of another 
petitioner. This case was published as well: O.E.v. S, 25 January 1978, 22/1977, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 
5 (1984); 26 July 1978, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 6; 27 October 1978, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 35. In December 
1977 Ms. M.A. had submitted a complaint on behalf of her husband. Only very little information 
is available in this case. She stated that her husband was arrested in the unspecified State ‘S’ two 
months previously. He allegedly was detained incommunicado and attempts to resort to domestic 
resources, including habeas corpus, had been unsuccessful. The HRC requested the petitioner to 
inform it whether a case concerning her husband had been submitted to the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. It requested the State to provide information on the state of health 
of the petitioner’s husband. The State party responded, among others, with the observation that 
the alleged victim was a ‘wanted person’ and that the same matter had also been submitted to the 
Inter-American Commission. The petitioner acknowledged this but did not respond to the 
Committee’s request whether it was her intention to withdraw the case from the Inter-American 
Commission. On 24 April 1979 the HRC decided to declare the case inadmissible. 
61 Around 25 January 1978, when it had requested information about his whereabouts and state of 
health, it also dealt with the abovementioned cases Valentini de Bazzano and Altesor. It is not 
clear why the HRC kept anonymous the State involved even after it had declared the case 
inadmissible. Given the state of ratifications of OAS members in 1979 this case may relate to 
Uruguay as well. See also Drescher Caldas (represented by his wife Ibarburu de Drescher) v. 
Uruguay, 21 July 1983. In January 1979 Ms. Ibarburu de Drescher had submitted a complaint 
against Uruguay on behalf of her husband Mr. Drescher Caldas. Among others, she requested that 
a medical examination should be permitted by doctors suggested by her husband’s family. In 
April 1979 the HRC transmitted the case under Rule 91 and also ‘drew the State party’s attention 
to the concern expressed by the petitioner with regard to the state of health and whereabouts of 
her husband’. It requested the State ‘to furnish information to the Committee thereon’. For 
another case in which it enquired about the health of the petitioner see Pietraroia v. Uruguay, 27 
March 1981. The HRC did so two months after initial submission, when it declared the case 
admissible. 
62 HRC Altesor v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982. 
63 The petitioners were Uruguayan nationals residing in Mexico acting on behalf of their father, a 
former trade union leader and member of the Chamber of Deputies. In their initial letter of 10 
March 1977 they stated that he was arrested in 1975 without any formal charges. Shortly before 
his arrest, they noted, ‘he had undergone a heart operation which saved his life but at the same 
time made it necessary for him to observe very strict rules regarding work, diet and medication’. 
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HRC did not formally take provisional measures, but that same month it transmitted the complaint 
to the State party and included a request for information about the alleged victim’s state of 
health.64  
Another case, besides that of Altesor, in which a petitioner specifically requested the use of 
provisional measures in order to avoid irreparable harm to the health of the alleged victim, was 
Sendic v. Uruguay (1981).65 The petitioner was Violeta Setelich, a Uruguayan national living in 
France. She submitted the complaint on behalf of her husband, detained in Uruguay. He had been 
the main founder of the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Tupamaros. She stated that in all 
places of detention where he had been kept between 1973 and 1976 he was subjected to ill treat-
ment. She mentioned solitary confinement, lack of food and harassment. In one of these places he 
developed a hernia as a result of a severe beating by the guards. She also declared that, as of 
February 1978, he was again subjected to inhuman treatment and torture. He was forced to do the 
‘plantón’ (to stand upright with his eyes blindfolded) throughout the day. He was only allowed to 
rest for a few hours at a time. He was beaten and received insufficient food.66 She noted that 
because of his hernia he could only take liquids and was unable to walk without help. Apart from 
this he also suffered from heart disease. His state of health continued to deteriorate and she feared 
for his life.67 In this light she requested the Committee to apply provisional measures ‘to avoid 
irreparable damage to his health’.68 Four months later, in March 1980, the HRC transmitted the 
communication to the State party and also requested it to inform it about the state of health of Mr. 
Sendic, the medical treatment given to him and his exact place of detention.69  
On the merits the Committee found violations of, among others, Articles 7 and 10(1) be-
cause Sendic was ‘held in solitary confinement in an underground cell, was subjected to torture 
for three months in 1978 and is being denied the medical treatment his condition requires’. In this 
respect the State was under an obligation to extend to him the treatment required under Articles 7 
and 10. ‘The State party must also ensure that Raúl Sendic receives promptly all necessary medi-
cal care’.70 It was not until its decision on the merits that it requested the State to provide the 
necessary medical care. In other words, pending the proceedings it only requested information 
                                                                                                                       
Allegedly he was subjected to beatings and electric shocks and later remained handcuffed, 
hooded and in absolute solitary confinement. 
64 Four months later it did request the State to ensure adequate medical treatment. Subsequently, at 
the admissibility stage, it requested information again regarding the state of health of the alleged 
victims. 
65 HRC Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. Uruguay, 28 October 1981. 
66 After three months, when he received his first visit, his state of health was alarming. She stressed 
that his situation had not changed since the entry into force of the ICCPR and the Optional 
Protocol on 23 March 1976. With regard to his medical health she alleged that he had needed an 
operation for his hernia since 1976. There had been, she pointed out, a medical order to perform 
such an operation, but the military authorities had refused to take him to a hospital. 
67 The HRC noted that she ‘even thought that it had been decided to kill him slowly, 
notwithstanding the official abolition of the death penalty in Uruguay in 1976’. 
68 At the time of writing (28 November 1979) she was also unsure about her husband’s whereabouts 
and requested the HRC to obtain information from the State party about his place of detention 
and the conditions of his imprisonment. 
69 In three further letters Ms. Setelich emphasised her deep concern about her husband’s state of 
health. “She reiterated that after soldiers had struck him in the lower abdomen with gun butts at 
Colonials barracks in mid-1974 her husband had developed an inguinal hernia and that there was 
a risk that the hernia might become strangulated”. 
70 HRC Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. Uruguay, 28 October 1981. 
By note of 31 October 1991 the State party informed the Committee that it had released the 
author on 14 March 1985.  
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about medical health, but it did not formally request the provision of medical care. Nevertheless, 
it seems likely that this was, at least partially, underlying the request for information.71 
In another Uruguayan case concerning political prisoner a Brazilian national living in the 
Netherlands submitted a complaint on behalf of her son detained in Uruguay. She expressed deep 
concern about her son’s state of health, mentioning that he suffered from a heart disease, had 
received two operations and urgently needed a third one and that the authorities were denying him 
proper medical attention. The Working Group of the HRC transmitted the case two months after 
initial submission and requested information on the alleged victim’s health at the same time.72 In 
most cases the Committee requested information on the health of the alleged victim when it 
transmitted the case as well as when it declared the case admissible.73 On several subsequent 
occasions the HRC did specifically ask Uruguay to ensure access to medical care,74 but in the last 
two cases against Uruguay the HRC again simply inquired about the health of alleged victim. It 
neither repeated nor intensified this request later.75  
                                                 
71 See also Chapter XIII on the relationship with the forms of reparation. 
72 HRC Estradet Cabreira v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983. She stated that her son had been detained in 
Libertad prison since January 1973. Just like in previous communications by family members of 
political prisoners detained in Libertad, she complained about conditions of imprisonment 
including the small size of the cell, the fact that he was kept there 23 hours a day and about the 
punishments inflicted on detainees, such as being sent for solitary confinement at ‘La Isla’. She 
claimed that ‘the worst part of her son’s imprisonment is the continuous harassment by the guards 
and the severe punishment for such actions as reporting to relatives on prison conditions or 
speaking with other inmates without authorization’. She alleged, furthermore, that ‘detainees are 
continuously kept in a state of anxiety and tension because they live in constant fear of being 
again interrogated in connection with the prior conviction or with purported political activities in 
prison’. This situation seriously endangered the physical and mental health of the detainees at 
Libertad. She mentioned the names of several detainees in poor health who died. 
73 HRC Vasilskis v. Uruguay, 31 March 1983. Despite the fact that the HRC initially did not 
enquire about the health of the alleged victim, the State did respond to the allegations in this 
respect. Her living conditions were the same as those of the other female prisoners and she was 
‘not subject to the slightest discriminatory treatment and it is completely untrue to state that she 
received insufficient food or is subject to ill-treatment’. The State acknowledged that she suffered 
from Raynaud’s disease and pointed out that she was receiving the necessary treatment: ‘her 
present condition can be described as compensated’. See also Dave Marais v. Madagascar, 24 
March 1984. In one case it initially did not enquire about the health of the victim, but when it 
declared the case admissible it did request ‘further information about her health’. See e.g. 
Larrosa Bequio v. Uruguay, 29 March 1993. 
74 See section 3.4. 
75 HRC Lucia Arzuaga Gilboa (submitted by her aunt Felicia Gilboa de Reverdito) v. Uruguay, 1 
November 1985. Ms. Gilboa de Reverdito submitted a case on behalf of her niece Ms. Arzuaga 
Gilboa, a university student who was detained in Uruguay from June 1983 until early September 
1984. The petitioner stated that her niece suffered from the consequences of meningitis 
contracted in 1982 and required special medical treatment. The case was initially submitted in 
July 1983. That same month the Working Group transmitted the case to the State under Rule 91 
and requested to inform it of the alleged victim’s state of health. In a submission of September of 
that year she gave specific information about torture and various forms of cruel and degrading 
treatment to which she claimed her niece had being submitted. She pointed out that she was 
unable to specify its effect ‘because it has not yet been possible to attain any clinical information 
or to have her examined by a reliable doctor’. She did refer to some symptoms, which gave her 
cause for alarm. For instance, after they had strung her up by the chain of her handcuffs, naked, 
in an open yard, in mid winter, she suffered attacks of vomiting. She was then taken for 
examinations the nature of which has remained unclear. “It is known, however, that some of the 
examinations involved electro-encephalograms. In this regard, it should be borne in mind that, as 
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A relevant health inquiry case not involving Uruguay is Jaona v. Madagascar (1985).76 In 
this case counsel claimed that the petitioner, a 77-year-old politician, was arrested ‘on the pretext 
that demonstrations organised in his support were endangering public order and security’ and 
taken to a military camp. He was not brought before a judge. Counsel claimed violations of Arti-
cles 9, 18 and 19. The Working Group decided to transmit the case and requested the State to 
inform it of the petitioner’s state of health. Two months later counsel submitted additional infor-
mation about the petitioner’s state of health and alleged that the authorities were refusing him the 
necessary medical care and had not authorized specialist professors, including the Dean of the 
Faculty of Medicine of Tananarive, to examine him. He also referred to the petitioner’s hunger 
strikes of January 1983. The claim itself related to arbitrary detention and freedom of expression, 
but the informal provisional measures related to the health of the detainee.77 In Marais v. Mada-
gascar (1983) the HRC also requested the State to provide information about the whereabouts and 
health of the alleged victim. In this case, it found violations of Articles 7 and 10 as well.78 
Another case was Lafuente Penarrieta et al. v. Bolivia (1987).79 In April 1984 eight Boliv-
ian citizens, one of them living in the US, submitted a complaint on behalf of four of their rela-
tives and three others who were being held at the San Jorge Barracks in Bolivia. Their submission 
stated that members of the armed forces arrested the alleged victims in October 1983 on suspicion 
of being guerrilleros. Allegedly, they were severely tortured during the first two weeks, kept 
incommunicado for 44 days under inhuman conditions and held in solitary confinement. The 
                                                                                                                       
I stated in my initial communication, my niece contracted meningitis last year. The blows to the 
head which she received were there particularly dangerous in her case”. In the last health case 
against Uruguay, Raul Cariboni (submitted by his wife Ruth Magri de Cariboni) v. Uruguay, 27 
October 1987, the alleged victim’s wife submitted a case in October 1983. Her husband, a former 
professor of history and geography, was detained from 1973 until 13 December 1984. She 
mentioned that he had suffered two heart attacks during torture and that in December 1976 the 
medical board at the Central Hospital of the Armed Forces had concluded that only heart surgery 
could save him. Examinations in 1978 and 1982 resulted in an advice to have special 
examinations, in the form of phonocardiograms, every six months. Such examinations, however, 
were not made possible in the prison. She also stated that, after visits made in 1980 and 1983, the 
ICRC had listed him ‘among the prisoners in most precarious state of health’. She pointed out 
that ‘he was in danger of dying suddenly unless he received adequate medical attention and could 
enjoy conditions of life different from those he was subjected to in prison’. Four months after the 
initial submission the Working Group transmitted the case to the State under Rule 91 and 
requested information on alleged victim’s state of health.  
76 HRC Monja Jaona v. Madagascar, 1 April 1985. The petitioner was represented by Maître Eric 
Hammel, who was a lawyer in Madagascar until his expulsion in February 1982. He was now 
assisting the petitioner from France. Hammel was also counsel in the cases Marais v. 
Madagascar, 24 March 1983 and Wight v. Madagascar, 1 April 1985 (in those cases referred to 
as Hamel). He claimed that his own expulsion by order of the Ministry of Justice had related, 
among others, to his involvement in representing the petitioner in relation to a previous arrest. 
This time Jaona was arrested on 15 December 1982 and taken to the military camp of 
Kellivondrake. Counsel pointed out that the arrest followed Jaona’s public denunciation of 
election fraud and his call for new elections. The HRC was informed of his release on 26 March 
1984. Hammel himself submitted a case against Madagascar in August 1983. See Eric Hammel v. 
Madagascar, 3 April 1987. 
77 On the merits the HRC found violations of Articles 9 and 19 and considered that the petitioner 
should be granted compensation under Article 9(5). After being elected deputy of Madagascar 
Joana was released. 
78 HRC Dave Marais v. Madagascar, 24 March 1984. 
79 HRC Lafuente Penarrieta, Rodriguez Candia, Ruiz Caceres and Toro Dorado v. Bolivia, 2 
November 1987. 
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authorities had denied them proper medical attention and their state of health was very poor. One 
of them was suffering from a skull fracture, which was only attended to four months later. In 
October 1984 they started a hunger strike, which lasted a month. The Working Group on New 
Communications requested the State to inform the HRC about the state of health of the alleged 
victims when it transmitted the case to the State, more than a year after the first submission.80  
In 2003 the Special Rapporteur on New Communications noted that he had used what he 
called a ‘Pocar type’ request for information about the medical situation and medical attention of 
a petitioner who had requested provisional measures to release him so that he could receive medi-
cal attention.81 This remark shows that Pocar also intervened in medical situations when he was a 
Special Rapporteur between 1995 and 1999. Information about such cases is not yet readily avail-
able.  
2.4 Ensuring access to health care in detention 
2.4.1 Introduction 
The HRC, the Inter-American Commission and Court, the African Commission, the (former) 
European Commission and the European Court have all used provisional measures in order to 
ensure access to health care in detention. 
2.4.2 HRC 
At the end of January 1978 the HRC requested the State to ensure adequate medical treatment in 
the aforementioned case of Altesor (1982).82 As noted, the previous year it had already requested 
information on the state of health of the alleged victim in February 1978. Around the same time 
as its request for positive measures in Altesor it requested such measures in Valentini de Bazzano 
v. Uruguay (1979) as well.83 When it declared the complaint admissible it requested the State 
                                                 
80 At this stage the Working Group determined that the petitioners could act on behalf of the four 
alleged victims who were their relatives. With regard to the other three persons, including the 
man who was suffering from a skull fracture, it requested the petitioners to provide written 
evidence of their authority to act. In April 1986 the HRC declared the case admissible in so far as 
it related to the relatives of the petitioners. The petitioners had not submitted evidence on their 
authority to act on behalf of the other three persons. At this stage the group of beneficiaries of 
this request for information had been reduced from seven to four persons. Initially the group of 
beneficiaries for the informal provisional measures was larger. Obviously, in the face of 
insufficient information the HRC initially took the better safe than sorry approach. Only after it 
had given the petitioners the opportunity to show their authority to act on behalf of these three 
persons it decided to declare that part of the case inadmissible for insufficient evidence. For 
another example of an informal provisional measure to enquire about the state of health of a 
detainee see Juan E. Zelaya Blanco and Myriam Zelaya Dunaway (on behalf of Roberto Zelaya 
who later joined) v. Nicaragua, 20 July 1994. 
81 Interview by author with Special Rapporteur Scheinin, Geneva, April 2003. 
82 HRC Altesor v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982. 
83 HRC Valentini de Bazzano v. Uruguay, 15 August 1979. The petitioner did not specifically 
request the HRC to use Rule 86 on provisional measures or request information about their health 
under Rule 91 and, initially, the Committee did not do so proprio motu either when it transmitted 
the case to the State under Rule 91. The petitioner claimed that her husband, Mr. Bazzano 
Ambrosini, had been tortured upon his arrest in 1975. A judge granted him conditional release 
after a one-year detention, but without the judge’s knowledge he had been removed from the 
place of detention and taken to an unknown place. Later he was once more taken to an 
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party proprio motu to arrange for the medical examination of the petitioner’s husband and stepfa-
ther and to give them ‘all necessary medication and treatment if this had not already been done’.84 
One and a half years later it adopted its View, which included a reference only to the health of the 
petitioner’s husband, not to that of the other two alleged victims. It noted that the husband ‘re-
mained imprisoned in conditions seriously detrimental to his health’ and found violations of 
Articles 7 and 10(1) in this respect.85 Even more remarkable than the fact that, pending the pro-
ceedings, the HRC had inquired proprio motu about the health of the petitioner’s relatives, was 
that at the admissibility stage it also requested the State to provide all necessary treatment and 
medication. In other words, this encompasses more than requesting the necessary information for 
the conclusion of proceedings under the OP.  
Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay (1982)86 related to a disappearance87 and to access to medical 
care, entailing informal provisional measures to act rather than abstain from acting.88 The peti-
tioner specifically discussed the treatment of her detained brother, and enclosed, among others, 
the testimony of a former detainee who was released and expelled to France in April 1980:  
                                                                                                                       
unidentified place and confined incommunicado. In February 1977 he was charged with 
‘subversive association’ and remained ‘together with four other political prisoners in a cell 
measuring 4.50 by 2.50 meters in conditions seriously detrimental to his health’. With regard to 
her stepfather, Mr. Massera, a professor of mathematics and former Deputy to the National 
Assembly, she noted, among others, that he had been forced to remain standing with his head 
hooded for long hours. When he lost his balance he fell down and broke his leg. Since he did not 
immediately receive medical treatment the leg that was broken is now several centimetres shorter 
than the other leg. The health related complaint on behalf of her mother, Ms Valentini de 
Massera, was that she had been subjected to ill treatment and had suffered from inadequate diet 
and unhealthy working conditions.  
84 The HRC did not mention the health of the petitioner’s mother. 
85 It gave its own summary of the facts on which it would base its views and noted that the State 
party had not contradicted these. It found several other violations with regard to all three of them, 
including of Article 10(1) for the denial to receive visits by any family member. Some of these 
violations might also bear a relationship with the Committee’s request, pending the proceedings, 
about the health of the author’s husband and stepfather. One was that the State had held her 
husband incommunicado for months in violation of Article 10(1) and another was that it was 
responsible for the torture of her stepfather who suffered permanent physical damage as a result, 
in violation of Articles 7 and 10(1). Using the general expression it would often use in subsequent 
findings of violations of various types the HRC considered that the State party was ‘under an 
obligation to take immediate steps to ensure strict observance of the provisions of the Covenant 
and to provide effective remedies to the victims’.  
86 HRC Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay, 24 October 1980 (Rule 91 decision), 73/1981, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 
7 (1984). Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay, 1 April 1982. 
87 See Chapter VI on intervention in disappearance cases. 
88 See also Chapter VI on (informal) provisional measures in disappearance cases. Ms. Teti 
Izquierdo had submitted a case on behalf of her brother Mario on 7 July 1980. She was an 
Uruguayan national residing in France. Her brother was detained in Uruguay. He held dual 
nationality, Urugayan and Italian. She stated that he was a medical student arrested on 24 May 
1972. After his arrest he was held incommunicado and tortured several times, as a result of which 
he suffered serious physical and psychological injury. In 1974 he attempted suicide. In 1978 he 
was sentenced to ten years imprisonment, a sentence that he would have served in May 1982. 
Because of good conduct and his advanced studies in medicine, the prison authorities had 
allowed him to provide medical treatment to the other prisoners. He did this for several years, 
earning him the esteem of his fellow prisoners. 
 Intervening in Detention Situations Involving Risks 
345 
“It was towards the end of 1979 that Major Maurino took over the post of Prison Director. He 
questioned Mario several times. The Major knew him already because he was the officer who 
had tortured him during the interrogations”. 
The petitioner alleged that this Major held her brother responsible ‘for having instigated state-
ments made by prisoners to the Red Cross Mission which visited the prisoners in the Libertad 
Prison in February/March 1980’. Consequently, a group of prisoners including her brother was 
subjected to reprisals, consisting of death threats and physical attacks. Ms. Teti alleged that in 
June 1980 her brother was forced to sign a statement in connection with new charges against him. 
In August 1980 they moved him to a punishment cell, in total isolation. The above-mentioned 
former detainee also testified that her brother was questioned again by the Major after the Red 
Cross delegation left. He ‘accused Mario of being responsible for the complaints allegedly made 
by the prisoners to the Red Cross that he was a torturer. Until the day I left, Mario was constantly 
harassed and threatened’. While this indicated ongoing threats the HRC only used informal provi-
sional measures after it was informed of the petitioner’s disappearance.89 Subsequently the peti-
tioner submitted some more information about her brother’s removal from the Libertad Prison. 
Afterwards, ‘neither his relatives nor the international agencies nor the Italian Embassy in Uru-
guay had managed to see him or to obtain any definite information regarding his situation and 
place of detention’. It was only towards the end of May 1981, however, that he was brought back 
to the Libertad Prison. He had been kept incommunicado for eight months.90 The State did not 
provide any of the information requested.91 
                                                 
89 See also Chapter IX on death threats and harassment. Three months after her initial submission 
the petitioner sent a telegram informing the HRC that her brother had disappeared from Libertad 
prison. She expressed fear for his physical safety. Two weeks afterwards the HRC decided to use 
‘informal’ provisional measures by transmitting the case while requesting information on the 
whereabouts and state of health of the alleged victim. There was no Special Rapporteur on New 
Communications yet and only the full Committee decided on such issues. About prompt 
decision-making see also Chapter II.  
90 A week later the petitioner expressed extreme alarm about her brother's health. When he was 
moved from Libertad Prison he weighed 80 kilograms and upon his return he weighed only 60 
kilograms. She was afraid that ‘if he continued to be subjected to unsatisfactory conditions of 
imprisonment, his health might suffer even more, to the point where his life might be in danger’. 
More than four months after the HRC's request about the health and whereabouts of Teti 
Izquierdo, the State Party submitted that the military examining magistrate had ordered another 
inquiry because further evidence had appeared that would warrant new proceedings. The 
authorities had identified ‘new ringleaders of the “Tupamaros Extremist Movement”’. 
Accordingly the State pointed out he ‘was moved from Military Detention Establishment No. 1 to 
another Detention Establishment, with the agreement and knowledge of the competent court, for 
the purpose of the requisite investigation, interrogation and inquiries, and also for reasons of 
security, with a view to dismantling the said plan. His state of health is good’. On 6 May 1981 it 
stated the same. 
91 See generally Chapter XVII (official responses). Ms. Teti alleged that General Rafela had 
revealed the new charges against her brother in a press communiqué denouncing an alleged 
invasion plan organised from Libertad Prison. The authorities brought several charges against her 
brother that they said would justify a retrial. During the time he was removed from Libertad 
Prison the authorities did not mention his whereabouts and he was not allowed any contact with 
his defence lawyer or relatives. She pointed out that the military authorities had also charged 
several other political prisoners who were, like her brother, close to the end of their full 
sentences. She mentioned as examples professor Raul Martinez and psychologist Orlando 
Pereira. She also noted that any ‘invasion plan’ against Libertad Prison was very unlikely given 
the conditions at this prison. It was one of the prisons with the most efficient security systems. 
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When the HRC declared the case admissible in July 1981 it not only requested the State 
Party to inform it (for the second time) ‘of Mario Teti's state of health’ but also ‘to ensure that he 
was given suitable medical treatment’. In September 1981 the petitioner informed the HRC that 
her brother received an electrocardiogram upon his return to Libertad. This ‘revealed that the 
heart attack he had suffered in 1980 had resulted in a blockage of the left artery’. Because of his 
chronic asthmatic condition, she pointed out, it was very difficult to treat his cardiac disease. 
Apart from this, her brother was suffering from thrombophlebitis in both legs. The HRC did not 
intervene with regard to his health any further until its decision on the merits almost a year later 
when it noted that the State party should also ensure that he ‘receives promptly all necessary 
medical care’.  
Thus the HRC intensified its request for information in its admissibility decision by asking 
the State to ‘ensure he was given suitable medical treatment’.92  
In Marais v. Madagascar (1983) the HRC also used informal provisional measures of a 
positive nature. It did so first in October 1981.93 In its admissibility declaration the Committee 
reiterated its request to provide it with detailed information about the alleged victim’s state of 
health. ‘[W]ithout prejudging the merits of the case’, it pointed out that the State party ‘should 
ensure that Mr. Marais was held under humane conditions of imprisonment’ in accordance with 
Article 10 ICCPR.94 On the merits the HRC found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) and pointed 
out that it ‘would welcome a decision by the State party to release Mr. Marais, prior to completion 
of his sentence, in response to his petition for clemency’. 
In Muteba v. Zaire (1990)95 the HRC’s Working Group sought information about the al-
leged victim’s state of health and it specifically requested the State to ‘ensure that Tshitenge 
Muteba received adequate medical care’.96 In March 1983 the full Committee confirmed this, 
when it declared the case admissible, it once more sought information about his state of health 
and requested the State to ensure he received adequate medical care.97 
                                                 
92 See also HRC Raul Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. Uruguay, 28 
October 1981. 
93 HRC Dave Marais v. Madagascar, 24 March 1984. 
94 See also Chapter VIII on ensuring procedural rights to protect the right to life and personal 
integrity, discussing the Committee’s informal provisional measure to ensure access to counsel.  
95 HRC Muteba v. Zaire, 24 July 1984. Nina Muteba submitted the case on 13 June 1982 on behalf 
of her husband who was being detained in Zaire at the time of submission. Later, her husband 
was able to leave for France and joined her in the submission before the HRC. In February 1982 
she received a copy of a note from her husband sent to the ICRC. He explained that he had been 
arrested on 31 October 1981, that he had no contact with the outside world and that food was 
insufficient. In addition, Ms. Muteba informed the HRC that she received information from one 
of her brothers and from a former detainee ‘that her husband had been subjected to such severe 
torture that he became unrecognizable and that he continued to be held under inhuman prison 
conditions’. She explained that her husband could not take legal steps to address the situation 
locally because he ‘had never been allowed to establish contact with a lawyer or a judge’, and ‘no 
member of his family dared to do anything on his behalf because they were afraid of retaliation’.  
96 See also the inquiry into access to court and the ability to contact a lawyer.  
97 In March 1984 Mr. Muteba informed the Committee that he was released following an amnesty 
and had joined his family in France in August 1983. He submitted ‘a detailed report on his 
detention substantiating the allegations made by his wife and legal representative’. He was able to 
mention names of persons responsible for torturing him. He also referred to mock executions and 
the expectation by the regime that certain ‘special treatment’ would result in madness or death by 
torture, starvation or sickness. He alleged he was able to survive with the help of some 
discontented soldiers of Mobutu’s presidential guard. The HRC found violations of Articles 7 and 
10(1) because he was subjected to torture and not treated ‘with humanity and the inherent dignity 
of the human person, in particular because he was held incommunicado for several months’.  
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A more recent case in which the HRC urged a State, pending the proceedings before it, to 
provide the alleged victim with adequate medical treatment is Polay Campos v. Peru (1997).98 In 
July 1992 the authorities had transferred petitioner’s husband to the Miguel Castro Castro Prison 
in Yanamayo, situated at an altitude of 4000 meters. In April 1993, a month after initial submis-
sion, a tribunal of faceless judges, established under special anti-terrorist legislation, sentenced 
him to life imprisonment. The HRC noted that it appeared from the file that he was convicted of 
‘aggravated terrorism’.99 At the end of that month he was transferred to the Maximum Security 
Prison in the Callao Naval base in Lima. The petitioner provided the HRC with a newspaper 
clipping showing her husband handcuffed and locked up in a cage. She claimed that he was 
beaten and had received electric shocks during this transfer. He was now held ‘in a subterranean 
cell where sunlight only penetrates for 10 minutes a day, through a small opening in the ceiling’. 
She also pointed out that his lawyer was himself imprisoned in June 1993, allegedly for defending 
her husband. The case was transmitted to the State in May 1994. At this point the Rapporteur did 
not yet make a request about the health situation of Polay Campos.100 In June 1994 the petitioner 
noted that her mother-in-law had finally been able to visit her son the previous month. She de-
scribed his situation as very serious. He lost about twenty kilos, was detained incommunicado 
and, because of the lack of sunlight (except for fifteen minutes), his vision had been seriously 
affected. The petitioner also noted that her mother-in-law had initiated a habeas corpus action, 
which she enclosed. In this appeal extreme worry was expressed about his life, health and physi-
cal and psychological integrity. This domestic appeal also noted that Vladimir Montesinos had 
visited him at the naval base, told him he would only leave his cell in a coffin, for which he 
should already arrange payment. Allegedly Montesinos also noted that once the death penalty 
would have been approved in the new Constitution Polay Campos would be the first to be exe-
cuted.101  
When it declared the case admissible in March 1996 (three years after the first submission), 
the HRC requested information not only about the operation of special tribunals under the anti-
terrorist legislation but also about ‘the victim’s current conditions of detention’. It was at this 
point that it also enquired about his medical condition and urged the State to provide him with 
adequate medical treatment.102 Similar to the cases previously discussed, such inquiry could serve 
the examination of the merits. At the same time, however, it could also be seen as an act to keep 
the State on guard concerning any failure to ensure the right to life and humane treatment of the 
alleged victim pending the proceedings. The fact, finally, that the Committee not only requested 
                                                 
98 HRC Polay Campos (submitted by his wife Espinoza de Polay) v. Peru, 6 November 1997. On 5 
March 1993 Ms. Espinoza de Polay submitted the case on behalf of her husband who was 
detained in Peru. She sent her submission from France. 
99 The petitioner’s husband was the leader of the Movimiento Revolucionario Túpac Amaru 
(MRTA). 
100 The Committee’s View does not provide information about its transmission of the case to the 
State, but the file shows the Rapporteur transmitted it in May 1994, fourteen months after initial 
submission. Note verbale of 5 May 1994 (on file with the author). 
101 ‘Accion de habeas corpus’ brought before the Superior Court of Callao, 3 June 1993, sent to the 
Committee on 20 June 1994 (on file with the author). General Montesinos was infamous during 
the Fujimori reign, for orchestrating (and participating in) torture and for fraud. See e.g. National 
Security Archive, a non-governmental foreign policy documentation centre at George 
Washington University, <http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB37/> (consulted 25 
August 2008). 
102 The inquiry about his health consisted of a request to forward copies of the relevant reports of the 
ICRC delegates and of the District Attorney and doctor who had visited and examined him in 
December 1994. It also consisted of a request to forward reports of subsequent visits. See §6.5 of 
the View.  
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information but urged Peru to provide the alleged victim with adequate treatment, clearly estab-
lishes this case as one in which the HRC, used positive provisional measures informally, without 
mentioning the Rule on provisional measures.103  
In November 1997 the HRC adopted its View in this case. With regard to the victim’s de-
tention in the Miguel Castro Castro prison it found that the State had not refuted the allegation 
that he had been detained incommunicado, also implying he had been unable to talk to a legal 
representative. Another allegation the State had not refuted was that he was kept in an unlit cell 
for 23 and a half hours a day in freezing temperatures. The Committee concluded this amounted 
to a violation of Article 10(1). During the last month of the victim’s stay in this prison his case 
was already under examination by the HRC, but it did not intervene at the time to prevent irrepa-
rable harm. 
Regarding his transfer to the prison at Callao the HRC also found that the fact that the au-
thorities displayed him to the press in a cage was a degrading treatment contrary to Articles 7 and 
10(1). About his detention at Callao the HRC concluded that his total isolation for a period of a 
year and the restrictions on correspondence with his family violated Articles 7 and 10(1). It dis-
cussed the general conditions of detention at this prison and noted Peru’s detailed information 
about the medical treatment ‘as well as his entitlements to recreation and sanitation, personal 
hygiene, access to reading material and ability to correspond with relatives’. It concluded, on the 
other hand, that the State party had not provided any information about the claim that he contin-
ued ‘to be kept in solitary confinement in a cell measuring two metres by two, and that apart from 
his daily recreation, he cannot see the light of day for more than 10 minutes a day’. In this respect 
it found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) as well. It did not make the usual comment about the 
obligation to treat the detainee with the respect required under Article 10, to ensure adequate 
medical care and take the necessary steps to prevent any further violations. This could be ex-
plained by the fact that it had found a violation of Article 14 as well, because of his trial by a 
special tribunal of ‘faceless judges’. In this light it considered that the victim should be released 
‘unless Peruvian law provides for the possibility of a fresh trial that does offer all the guarantees 
required by article 14 of the Covenant’.104 
In one case the HRC used provisional measures on behalf of a person who tried to prevent 
the execution of a detention order. Within a month of receipt of the initial communication Special 
Rapporteur Lallah contacted the Ministry of Justice of Spain on behalf of a sixty-four-year-old 
petitioner claiming violation of Article 14. He mentioned that the petitioner had presented a medi-
cal affidavit indicating he was suffering from cancer and other grave illnesses.105 The State re-
sponded ten days later arguing, among others, that a domestic court had considered that he could 
receive adequate medical treatment while in detention. It summarised the situation by concluding 
that there appeared to be no case of irreparable harm. It also noted that once it would have re-
ceived relevant medical information it would adopt the appropriate measures and that it had sent 
the Committee’s provisional measures to the relevant judicial body.106  
                                                 
103 It was Prado Vallejo, member of the HRC (Ecuador) and Rapporteur in this specific case who 
suggested the inclusion of a formal request in the admissibility decision to the effect that the 
victim would receive the requisite medical attention, letter Julio Prado Vallejo to Secretariat, 2 
January 1996 (on file with the author). 
104 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
105 HRC V. v. Spain, 495/1992 (disc. 1995), provisional measures of 22 May 1992. The telegram to 
the Ministry of Justice contained more information than the official Note Verbale to the 
Permanent Representative, but probably the other information could be found in the annexes to 
the Note Verbale (on file with the author).  
106 Letter Ministry of Justice to the Special Rappporteur, 1 June 1992 (on file with the author). 
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2.4.3 Inter-American system  
The Inter-American Commission and Court have also taken provisional measures in detention 
cases involving access to health care. Moreover, during a country visit the Inter-American Com-
mission sometimes requests certain authorities to take action in urgent cases. This approach is not 
unlike what the European ‘prison visiting’ Committee against torture (CPT Committee) does in 
urgent cases, as well the activities of UN Special Rapporteurs and other UN officials taking part 
in a country mission. 
Occasionally the Inter-American Commission has taken precautionary measures for access 
to health care in detention.107 In April 2001 the Commission took precautionary measures on 
behalf of a prisoner in Cuba. In its Annual Report the Commission quoted from the petitioners’ 
request for precautionary measures that ‘his health is delicate because of a tumor on his right 
lung’ and that the prisoner began a hunger strike in February 2001 in demand of medical care.108 
The Commission requested Cuba:  
“(1) To transfer inmate […] to a hospital specializing in the kind of physical ailments from 
which he is suffering. (2) To grant him specialized medical attention, to be administered in 
collaboration with a physician selected by his family”.109 
In February 1997 Mr. Cesti-Hurtado was detained in the Simón Bolívar barracks in Peru without 
contact with the outside world. He was ‘prevented from receiving food or medicines’, despite the 
fact that his wife had arranged with the Public Defender to bring him these herself three times a 
day as he was suffering from heart problems (cardiac ischemia) since 1994. The Commission’s 
petition before the Inter-American Court argued that this could ‘pose a threat to his life, given the 
tense situation to which he has been subjected’.110 The Commission requested the Court to order 
Peru to comply with a domestic habeas corpus ruling, but the President decided not to issue such 
urgent measures.111 Invoking Article 5 ACHR (respect for physical, mental and moral integrity 
and the prohibition of cruel treatment) he nevertheless ordered urgent measures proprio motu. He 
concluded ‘from the content of the Commission’s request’, ‘that in reference to the state of health 
of Mr. Cesti Hurtado, it is necessary to request the Government of Peru to take urgent measures to 
ensure his physical, psychological and moral integrity by providing adequate medical treatment 
                                                 
107 The case of Mr. Esquina Mendoza and others, in preventive detention in Sololá in Guatemala, 
serves as an example. In April 1998 the Commission took precautionary measures requesting 
Guatemala to take the necessary measures to protect their physical integrity. They were seriously 
ill and the poor conditions of their detention resulted in a dangerous health situation. Annual 
Report 1998, §24. Other examples date from October 1998 and January 1999 when the 
Commission requested Peru to take the necessary measures for the medical care of two gravely ill 
detainees. Case 11.167 of Mr. Morales Zapata. Annual Report 1998, §49 and case 12.171 of Mr. 
Tulich Morales, Annual Report 1999, Chapter III C.1, §48. In 2002 they were pardoned for 
humanitarian reasons. CIDH, Press Release 16/00, 20 October 2002, §13 (the Commission noted 
that it had previously adopted precautionary measures ‘pertaining to their medical care’). See also 
e.g. on behalf of a detainee at the Miguel Castro Castro prison (Peru), apparently suffering from 
diabetes and kidney disease, CIDH Annual Report 2005, Chapter III, §35 and on behalf of a 
detainee in Suriname apparently suffering from ‘complete occlusion of the aorta and gangrene in 
the lower limbs’, CIDH Annual Report 2004, chapter III, §44.  
108 Generally on hunger strikes see section 2.5.4 of this chapter. 
109 CIDH Annual Report 2001, §28. On Cuba’s response see Chapter XVII (official responses). 
110 IACHR Cesti Hurtado (Peru), Order of the President of 29 July 1997, (having seen clause 2(f)). 
111 See further Chapter XI on provisional measures in other situations. 
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for his heart problems’.112 In September 1997 the Inter-American Court confirmed this by order-
ing provisional measures to ensure the physical, psychological and moral integrity of Mr Cesti-
Hurtado, in detention in Peru. It subsequently ordered Peru to maintain the provisional measures 
it had adopted to ensure his personal integrity and ‘permit him to receive the medical treatment of 
his choice’. In addition, in June 1999 it ordered the State to expand the provisional measures to 
ensure the physical and psychological integrity of three of his family members. 
The Court’s discussion of Article 5 in the judgment on the merits (1999) is significant in the 
context of the provisional measures taken while the case was still pending. The State had declared 
that it has always respected the right to physical safety and that Cesti Hurtado enjoyed ‘special 
treatment in compliance with the orders of the Court itself, is subject to medical evaluations, and 
has a series of amenities enjoyed by no other prisoner in Peru’.113 The Court observed ‘that the 
substance of this alleged violation was closely connected to the objective of the provisional meas-
ures adopted in favor of Gustavo Cesti Hurtado’. Therefore, it would ‘study the allegations of the 
parties in the light of the information contained in the State’s latest reports’ and the observations 
presented by the Inter-American Commission.114 Among others, it found that Peru should indeed 
comply with the domestic decision on habeas corpus, but also that ‘based on the evidence in the 
proceedings’, it had not been shown that the treatment received by Gustavo Cesti Hurtado during 
his detention has been inadequate in violation of Article 5(2) ACHR.115 
Two months later Peru released him, but the Court decided to maintain the provisional 
measures for his protection and that of his family. The next year the Commission acquiesced in 
the State’s request to lift them, noting that the victim had already been released and that it had 
included in its application for reparations ‘a chapter on the deterioration of Mr. Cesti’s health 
because of his imprisonment and the medical care that had been offered him’. In August 2000 the 
Court indeed lifted its provisional measures.116 
2.4.4 African system 
There have been several cases involving detainees, but it is not always clear whether the African 
Commission had taken provisional measures. The death sentences of political prisoners Orton and 
Vera Chirwa had been commuted due to international pressure, but they remained in prison in 
Malawi in extremely adverse conditions. 
They had been in detention since 1981, the year when the African Charter was adopted. It is 
not clear when the case was first brought before the Commission, but the Commission decided to 
bring it to the attention of Malawi early March 1992. Orton Chirwa died in prison in October of 
that year. His wife was released in January 1993, ‘for strictly humanitarian reasons’, after a period 
of 12 years in prison. She later became a member of the African Commission and its Special 
Rapporteur on Detention. In December 1993 the Commission ‘decided that the communications 
                                                 
112 IACHR Cesti Hurtado (Peru), Order of the President of 29 July 1997, (7-9th considering clauses). 
See further XIII (beneficiaries) which also addresses the rights of addressees. 
113 IACHR Cesti Hurtado (Peru), Judgment of 29 September 1999, §155. The State pointed out that 
Captain Cesti Hurtado had received ‘due and adequate medical attention in the Military 
Hospital’, where he went to the dentist and the doctor every week. All the specialized 
examinations that he requested for his heart condition had been carried out in the Military 
Hospital. It had not been possible to agree to his request to be treated in a private clinic ‘because 
it was necessary to avoid making distinctions between prisoners’, §157. 
114 Id., §158. 
115 Id., §160. 
116 IACHR Cesti Hurtado (Peru), Orders of 11 September 1997, 21 January 1998, 3 June 1999, 19 
November 1999 and 14 August 2000; Judgment of 29 September 1999. See also Chapter XII 
(other situations), referring to a follow-up request by the Commission. 
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gave evidence of a series of serious or massive violations of human rights in Malawi’. It resorted 
to the Assembly of Heads of State of the Organization of African Unity (now African Union), 
under Article 58 ACHPR.117 The official version of its decision on the merits does not mention its 
use of provisional measures, but in an older version mention is made of Rule 109, which used to 
be the rule on provisional measures. 
On the other hand, in December 1993 official action regarding Malawi may indeed have 
been useful, but intervention to alleviate the detention situation of Orton and Vera Chirwa would 
have been futile, as Orton had already died in October 1992 and Vera was released in January 
1993. It is possible that the Commission tried to intervene previously, but there is no public re-
cord in this regard.  
In its decision on the merits, taken in 1994, the Commission found that they had been tor-
tured and ill treated, including by a ‘reduction in diet, chaining for two days of the arms and legs 
with no access to sanitary facilities, detention in a dark cell without access to natural light, water 
or food, forced nudity, and beating with sticks and iron bars’. The Commission found that these 
acts, jointly and separately, clearly constituted violations of Article 5 ACHPR. It also found a 
range of general prison conditions in violation of this article, including ‘shackling of hands in the 
cell so that the prisoner is unable to move (sometimes during the night and day), serving of rotten 
food, solitary confinement, or overcrowding such that cells for 70 people are occupied by up to 
200’.118 
A known case in which the African Commission has taken provisional measures is that of 
Constitutional Rights Project and Others v. Nigeria.119 The health of the detainees involved was 
deteriorating and early 2005 the Commission invoked Rule 109 on provisional measures to call 
upon Nigeria to ensure that their health was not in danger.120 In other detention cases, sometimes 
explicitly including claims of lack of access to medication and medical attention, it is again un-
clear whether provisional measures were used. On the merits it has found a violation of Article 5 
for ‘deprivation of light, insufficient food and lack of access to medicine or medical care’.121 
                                                 
117 ACHPR Amnesty International on behalf of Orton and Vera Chirwa v. Malawi, 16th session, 
October/November 1994, §16, referring to Rule 109 of the Rules of Procedure (on the use of 
provisional measures). 
118 Id., §§33-34. The UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention notes in Decision 13/1993 that the 
‘very harsh conditions of detention might have been the cause of death of Orton Chirwa’. This 
‘justified the Working Group’s urgent appeal to the Government of Malawi concerning Chihana 
Chakfwa, an appeal that has unfortunately gone unanswered’, E/CN.4/1994/27.  
119 ACHPR Constitutional Rights Project and Others v. Nigeria, decided at the 26th ordinary session, 
13th Annual Activity Report 2000. This was part of a range of cases involving detention: 
Constitutional Rights Project and Others v. Nigeria, 140/94, Decided at the 26th ordinary session, 
13th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 227; Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria 
(I), 148/96, decided at the 26th ordinary session, 13th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR; 
Constitutional Rights Project and Another v. Nigeria, 150/96, decided at the 26th ordinary 
session, 13th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 235; Civil Liberties Organisation v. 
Nigeria, 151/96, decided at the 26th ordinary session, 13th Annual Activity Report and (2000) 
AHRLR 243. 
120 ACHPR Constitutional Rights Project and Others v. Nigeria, decided at the 26th ordinary session, 
13th Annual Activity Report 2000, §17. In March 1997 it sent a Mission to Nigeria, which also 
took up the complaints. On the merits it found violations of Article 5 ACHPR. 
121 ACHPR Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, 151/96, decided at the 26th ordinary session, 
November 1999, 13th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 243, §27. 
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2.4.5 European system 
Worth mentioning here is that already in 1957 the Commission has dealt with a request for provi-
sional measures on account of the poor state of health of a detainee. In this case, however, the 
Commission simply considered itself incompetent to order provisional measures (these were not 
included in the Rules of Procedure at the time) and rejected the petition in this respect as incom-
patible with the provisions of the Convention.122 
Obviously, since that time provisional measures have been taken, also in the context of de-
tention. The case of Demir et al. v. Turkey is an example in which the European Commission 
intervened on the basis of a request for information on the petitioners’ health situation and access 
to medical examination, as has been the practice with the HRC.123 
This attention to the health situation of detainees was confirmed in subsequent cases. In 
Paladi v. Moldova, for instance, the European Court used provisional measures to the effect that 
the petitioner should not be transferred from a medical centre back to a prison hospital. The next 
day he was nevertheless so transferred and only a few days later was he allowed to return to the 
medical centre. On the merits both the fourth section and the Grand Chamber determined that a 
delay in the implementation of a provisional measure constituted a violation of the right of indi-
vidual petition as well.124  
With regard to general conditions of detention the Court has not been keen to intervene.125 
In Ghvaladze v. Georgia, for instance, initially it refused a request for provisional measures. 
Nevertheless, several months later it did decide to use provisional measures. In addition it noted 
‘the existence of other applications before it, which it had already communicated to the respon-
dent Government’ It ‘put a question to the parties asking whether there existed within the Geor-
gian prison system an administrative practice consisting of keeping detainees in unsatisfactory 
conditions, and/or a structural problem underlying the lack of medical treatment in provision’. It 
pointed out that in that case the petitioner would be exempted from the requirement to exhaust 
                                                 
122 EComHR X. v. FRG, p. 212, Yearbook 2, pp. 204-214, 22 March 1958 (inadm.). 
123 It did so on 15 February 1993, on the basis of Rule 48(2a) of its Rules of Procedure. EComHR 
Hüseyin Demir, Faik Kaplan, Sükrü Süsin v. Turkey, Report of 29 May 1997. 
124 ECtHR Paladi v. Moldova, 10 July 2007 (referring to provisional measures of 10 November 
2005) (unanimous finding of a violation of Article 3, 6-1 on a violation of Article 34, Judge 
Bratza dissenting). ECtHR Paladi v. Moldova (Grand Chamber) 10 March 2009 (15-2 on the 
violation of Article 3; 9-8 on the violation of Article 34). See also Kotsaftsis v. Greece, in which 
provisional measures were used on 9 March 2007 requesting Greece ‘to order the transfer of the 
applicant to a specialized medical centre so that he could undergo all the necessary tests and 
remain in hospital until his doctors considered that he could return to prison without his life being 
endangered’. On 15 March 2007 the petitioner was indeed so transferred. ECtHR Press Release 
431 of 12 June 2006 on Chamber judgment in Kotsafstis v. Greece, 12 June 2008, §§4 and 32-37. 
On the merits the Court found that for a certain period Greece had not fulfilled its obligation to 
safeguard the petitioner’s physical integrity, in violation of Article 3 ECHR. 
125 In the alternative it intervenes but only uses Rule 41 on priority. See e.g. Sarban v. Moldova, 
Fourth Section Annual Report 2005, p. 9. The judgment on the merits indicates that in January 
2005 the petitioner had asked for provisional measures ‘requesting his immediate release from 
detention on remand in order to undergo medical treatment’, Sarban v. Moldova, 4 October 2005, 
§5. Early February the Chamber communicated the case to the State (apparently without 
provisional measures). Later that month the petitioner withdrew his request for provisional 
measures after he was given access to his doctor and wife, §5. On the merits the Court found that 
‘the failure to provide basic medical assistance to the applicant when he clearly needed and had 
requested it, as well as the refusal to allow independent specialised medical assistance, together 
with other forms of humiliation’ amounted to degrading treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR, 
§90. 
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domestic remedies for purposes of his complaints under Article 3 ECHR.126 This may also mean 
that in this context provisional measures are taken sooner and with increased specificity, possibly 
also covering a larger group of detainees, as in the Inter-American system.127 Other relevant 
instances of the use of provisional measures in the context of detention are discussed under sec-
tion 2.5 on protecting particularly vulnerable detainees.  
2.5 Protecting particularly vulnerable detainees 
2.5.1 Introduction 
This section provides examples of provisional measures on behalf of particularly vulnerable 
detainees. It discusses situations of minors and of detainees in psychological distress (e.g. mental 
illness). It also discusses how the Inter-American and European systems deal with the situation of 
detainees on a hunger strike pending the proceedings and how the HRC deals with the question of 
access to health care by death row inmates pending the proceedings before it.  
2.5.2 Protecting the health and safety of minors in detention 
Because of the vulnerability of children circumstances of detention more rapidly result in irrepa-
rable harm to children than to adults. This may explain why the HRC and the Inter-American 
Commission and Court have often used provisional measures on their behalf. 
In most health cases examined the HRC has invoked Rule 91 (current Rule 97) rather than 
used provisional measures proper. It did invoke formal provisional measures in a case involving 
detained children.128  
In 2001-2002 the Special Rapporteur on New Communications received various requests to 
use provisional measures on behalf of refugees detained in Australia. In some of these cases he 
did indeed use them. In other cases he simply made enquiries into their health status, similar to 
the Committee’s early practice.129  
Several news accounts have provided information about specific cases involving risk of ir-
reparable harm.130 A ten-year-old boy had reportedly tried to hang himself and was cut down by 
detention centre staff.131 A six-year-old boy reportedly stopped eating and drinking and was ad-
mitted to hospital. He was diagnosed with chronic posttraumatic stress disorder. A leaked report 
by the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission noted that there was insufficient evi-
dence that the Commonwealth had taken all appropriate measures to prevent the boy from wit-
nessing self-harm and riots. It considered his human rights had been violated by the failure of the 
Department and the Minister to remove him from detention ‘despite strong medical advice’.132 If 
                                                 
126 See ECtHR Case law information note No. 100, 30 September 2007, p. 10. 
127 In general on the specificity of provisional measures and the group of beneficiaries, see Chapter 
XIII (Protection). 
128 See infra. 
129 Interview by author with Martin Scheinin, Maastricht 20 September 2002. 
130 An example is the denial of medication to asylum seekers taking part in a hunger strike at 
Woomera detention centre. They were denied medication unless they drank two glasses of milk 
first. This applied to a sixty-year-old schizophrenic woman as well. AAP, ‘Hunger strikers denied 
medicine’, 27 March 2003, <www.news.com.al> (consulted 9 April 2003). 
131 AAP, ‘Suicide bid by detention boy, 10’, the Age, 20 July 2002, <www.theage.com.au> 
(consulted 9 April 2003). 
132 AAP, ‘Boy detainees rights breached’, the Age, 9 May 2002, <www.theage.com.au> (consulted 9 
April 2003). 
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the HRC would be involved in such cases it would be feasible that it would use provisional meas-
ures.  
The case of the Bakhtiari family (2003) was brought before the HRC in March 2002. The 
plight of the two eldest boys received particular attention in the media.133 The fourteen-year-old 
Almadar and twelve-year-old Mentazer Bakhtiari escaped the detention centre twice.134 They 
attempted to claim political asylum at the British Consulate, but they were returned after the 
British Government had rejected their claim.135  
An employee of Australasian Correctional Management said that when Almadar arrived at 
Woomera he turned up regularly for activities and was a lively, inquisitive, ‘proud and happy’ 
child who was ‘excited to be in Australia’.  
“But as the months in detention passed and the family’s claim for asylum turned down he 
seemed to lose his grip on things (...). He fell under the influence of older men who were 
organising the riots and hunger strikes and who themselves were committing acts of self-harm. 
He witnessed grown men slashing themselves and others attempting to harm themselves”.136 
Initially the Special Rapporteur only used provisional measures to halt their deportation.137 Sub-
sequently, the petitioners provided the Committee with several reports,138 finding that ‘ongoing 
detention was causing deep depressive effects upon the children’. In particular these reports re-
ferred to several instances of self-harm, including where Almadar and Mentazer stitched their lips 
together, slashed their arms, ‘voluntarily starved themselves and behaved in numerous erratic 
ways, including drawing disturbed pictures’. The Department of Human Services ‘strongly rec-
ommended’ that the children and their mother should have ‘ongoing assessment outside the 
Woomera facility’.  
Five days after receipt of these reports the Special Rapporteur used provisional measures 
requesting the State to ‘inform the Committee within 30 days of the measures it had taken on the 
basis of evaluation by the State party’s own expert authorities that, as a result of incidents of self 
harm inflicted by at least two of the children upon themselves, Mrs. Bakhtiyari and her children 
should have ongoing assessment outside of Woomera detention centre, in order to ensure that 
further such acts of harm were not suffered’.139  
In September 2002 the petitioners provided the HRC with an Assessment Report of the De-
partment of Human Services, recommending that the children and their mother ‘be released into 
the community in order to prevent further social and emotional harm being done to the children, 
especially the boys’. It was the Department of Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous 
Affairs that had requested this assessment. However, the Rapporteur did not repeat the provisional 
measures.140 
                                                 
133 HRC Bakhtiari family v. Australia, 29 October 2003. 
134 The HRC itself did not mention that the detention centre was privately run.  
135 Alamdar had told ABC radio: “In camp, we didn’t learn English; we learned too many bad things 
(...) we learn how to cut ourselves, how to drink shampoo, how to suicide. Two times I killed 
myself by razor, two times I suicide me”. Larissa Dubecki, Andra Jackson, ‘Boys despair over 
return to Woomera’, 20 July 2002, <www.theage.com.au> (consulted 9 April 2003). 
136 Russell Skelton, ‘No happy ending in sight for two young boys’, 20 July 2002, 
<www.theage.com.au> (consulted on 9 April 2003). 
137 See Chapter V on halting expulsion or extradition. 
138 A psychologist’s report, a report of the South Australian State government’s Department of 
Human Services and a report of an Australian Correctional Management Youth Worker. 
139 Provisional measures of 3 May 2002. 
140 In its submission of October 2002 the State party pointed out that the family did not cooperate 
with the assessment that took place in August 2002. ‘Mrs Bakhtiyari did not allow the authorities 
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It is possible that the petitioners in the Bakhtiari case asked the HRC to request the State to 
release the children.141 In the European and the Inter-American human rights system the Commis-
sion and/or Court have indeed requested release in a few instances. Even the HRC itself has once 
requested a State, as a formal provisional measure, to take into account the health of one peti-
tioner and not to execute the detention order against him while it was examining the admissibility 
of the case.142 It is unlikely, however, that Australian counsel would have been aware of this case 
because it was discontinued and the HRC does not publish information about such cases.143  
In August 2003 the Full Bench of the Family Court ordered the immediate release of all the 
children, pending resolution of the final application to the High Court. They were released on that 
day.144 More than two months later the HRC published its decision on the merits. Apart from 
violations of Article 9 (1) and (4), it also found violations of Article 24(1) and, potentially, of 
Articles 17(1) and 23(1) ICCPR.  
It pointed out that, under Article 24(1) ICCPR, ‘the principle that in all decisions affecting a 
child, its best interests shall be a primary consideration, forms an integral part of every child’s 
right to such measures of protection as required by his or her status as a minor’. It observed that in 
this case the children ‘have suffered demonstrable, documented and on-going adverse effects of 
detention’. It noted that this had been so until their release, that their detention had been arbitrary 
and in violation of Article 9(1) and that the two eldest sons had suffered in particular. Among 
others, the state was obliged to pay appropriate compensation to the children. The State should 
also refrain from deporting the children and their mother while their father was pursuing domestic 
proceedings, because any such action would result in violations of Articles 17(1) and 23(1) 
ICCPR. 
Awareness of the vulnerability of children caused the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights to intervene in situations where minors (unaccompanied by their families) were de-
tained, not segregated from adults.145 The HRC has also dealt with such cases but, thus far, the 
only information available on the use of provisional measures in this context is in the case of 
Baroy v. the Philippines (inadm. 2003). The petitioner had been sentenced to death and allegedly 
was seventeen years old at the time of the submission of the case in January 2002. The Rappor-
teur used provisional measures to halt his execution and ‘further requested the State party speed-
ily to determine the age of the author and meanwhile to treat him as a minor, in accordance with 
                                                                                                                       
to speak to the two eldest sons, which compromised the assessment. An independent psychologist 
made an assessment on 2 and 3 September 2002, and made recommendations the Department is 
considering’. 
141 The State reported in the press its view that the lawyers were aggravating the situation of the 
children. A situation such as this is not easy to assess by a non-permanent international body 
based in another continent. 
142 HRC V. v. Spain, disc. 1995. The official Note Verbale to the State was less specific than the 
telegram sent to the Ministry of Justice. The latter referred to an affidavit indicating that the 
petitioner suffered from cancer and other grave illnesses. It also specified that this request was 
made for humanitarian reasons. On 1 June 1992 the Ministry of Justice responded that, according 
to the information it had received, there appeared to be no case of irreparable harm if the 
petitioner would be detained and that the State would adopt the appropriate measures once it had 
received the medical information. It noted that the Committee’s provisional measure was sent to 
the relevant judicial body for determination (on file with the author).  
143 The letter to the petitioner, moreover, referred only to Rule 91 and did not mention that the 
Rapporteur had used provisional measures under Rule 86 in the Note Verbale sent to the State on 
the same date. 
144 See further Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
145 See infra. 
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the provisions of the Covenant’.146 The case Damian Thomas v. Jamaica (1999) was not a death 
penalty case. At the time of submission of the communication the petitioner was a minor.147 Pend-
ing the proceedings the HRC did not use provisional measures to stop or prevent an Article 24 
violation. Later it did find violations of Articles 24 and 10(2) and (3) requiring an effective rem-
edy ‘entailing his placement in a juvenile institution, separated from adult prisoners if Jamaica 
legislation authorises it’.148 The Committee had mentioned that it had received a letter from sev-
eral inmates at the General Penitentiary, requesting that it act on behalf of the petitioner. The 
petitioner himself had written to the Commissioner for Prisons requesting that he be removed 
from the General Penitentiary, an adult prison. Yet when he was moved it was to St. Catherine 
District Prison, again an adult prison. In a later submission the petitioner added that he had been 
systematically beaten by warders both at the General Penitentiary and at St. Catherine District 
Prison.149 The petitioner had not invoked any particular articles of the Covenant, but the commu-
nication appeared to raise issues under Articles 7, 10 and 14. It is customary for the Committee, 
or rather its Secretariat, to indicate under which articles issues seem to arise in such complaints. 
In this case, however, at the merits stage, the HRC added that another article of the Covenant was 
at stake as well. It concluded proprio motu that the facts of the present case also constituted a 
violation of Article 24 of the Covenant, since the State party has failed to provide to Damian 
Thomas ‘such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor’. It regretted the 
State party’s lack of cooperation with respect to the non-segregation of the petitioner from adult 
prisoners.150 
                                                 
146 HRC Alfredo Baroy v. the Philippines, 31 October 2003 (inadm.). 
147 In §1 the HRC mentions he was sixteen years old at the time, while in §6.5 it concludes he was 
seventeen years old.  
148 HRC Damian Thomas v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999 (no Rule 86). 
149 The HRC declared part of the claim inadmissible because of Jamaica’s denunciation of the OP. 
This was the claim relating to ill treatment by warders on specific dates. On the merits the 
Committee noted that the petitioner had made precise allegations of ill treatment by warders on 
specific dates, about which he had complained to the prison authorities. It noted that these claims 
had not been refuted by the State party, which had promised to investigate these but had failed to 
forward its findings to the Committee, eleven months after promising to do so and in spite of a 
reminder by the HRC. It recalled that a State party is under the obligation to investigate seriously 
allegations of violations of the Covenant made under the OP. In this case, however, the 
Committee considered the claims inadmissible under Article 1 of the OP since the allegations 
were transmitted to the State party after Jamaica’s denunciation of the OP came into force on 23 
January 1998. Committee member Solari Yrigoyen dissented. He would have concluded a 
violation of Articles 10(1) and 7 in relation to the treatment suffered by the petitioner. He stated 
that although the State party denounced the OP, the events described in the complaint occurred 
before that date and were handled in the same manner as the original complaint. For this reason, 
he argued, the terms of the OP continued to apply to the communication. At the same time the 
HRC did declare admissible the remainder of the claim, which had been transmitted to the State 
party before Jamaica’s denunciation of the OP came into force. See §6.4. The HRC referred to 
the State party’s contention that the circumstances under which the author was being held were 
not clear and observed that ‘given the name, date of birth, date of arrest and of conviction and the 
location in 1998 in St. Catherine District Prison, all in relation to the author, the State party 
should have no difficulty in identifying the details relevant to this matter’. 
150 The petitioner was entitled to an effective remedy for the violation of Articles 10(2) and (3) and 
24 ‘entailing his placement in a juvenile institution, separated from adult prisoners if Jamaican 
legislation authorises it’. This remedy, moreover, was to include compensation for his non-
segregation from adult prisoners while he was a minor. One may wonder what the remedy may 
entail when Jamaican legislation does not authorise separation from adult prisoners. 
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It would be interesting to know whether, if the possibility of a violation of Article 24 had 
been mentioned at an earlier stage, the Special Rapporteur on New Communications would have 
taken provisional measures in order to prevent a ‘further violation of Art. 24’, especially when 
there are allegations of abuse or threats by adults. The HRC could have intervened for the peti-
tioner’s protection and requested his segregation from adult prisoners and treatment appropriate to 
his age and legal status. If the rationale of Article 24 is to protect minors from abuse by adult 
prisoners, in that way it is also a means to prevent torture and cruel treatment. 
In the Inter-American human rights system, the Commission and Court have indeed inter-
vened in an increasing number of cases in order to ensure segregation of minors from adults or, 
more generally, to prevent irreparable harm.151 
In one early case against Paraguay the beneficiaries were 255 minors who had been held at 
the Panchito López re-education centre for minors. After a fire had broken out in which nine 
minors died, the Commission used precautionary measures and the minors were transferred.152  
One case involving Honduras has generated information that may be useful to clarify the 
meaning of the Commission’s precautionary measures on behalf of minors in detention. In 1995 
the Commission dealt with a case against Honduras alleging the unlawful arrest of street children 
and their incarceration in the Central Penitentiary of Tegucigalpa. These children were detained 
together with in each cell approximately 80 adult prisoners. One of the NGOs that brought the 
case noted that it was ‘of great interest because of the international and national media coverage it 
has received’. “This case is representative of an urgent situation wherein minors suffer serious 
mistreatment in detention centres, including sexual abuse and torture. Children have also been 
killed in detention centres meant for adults”.153Nine days after the initial submission the petition-
ers urgently requested the Commission to adopt precautionary measures to guarantee the life and 
physical safety of the juveniles held in that prison and ‘to ensure that they were housed in facili-
ties that were appropriate to their status’. The petitioners requested that the juveniles be separated 
from the adult prisoners. The State should provide medical and psychological treatment to juve-
niles who had been the victims of physical, sexual and psychological abuse and that it should take 
the necessary security measures to guarantee the lives and safety of the juveniles detained in the 
Central Penitentiary.154 In response, the State noted that it was under enormous economic con-
                                                 
151 For precautionary measures by the Inter-American Commission see e.g. Annual Report 1996, 
Chapter II, §4a (Minors in detention v. Brazil); Annual Report 2001, §48 (255 minors in 
detention v. Paraguay); Annual Report 2004, §36 (62 children held in the Juvenile Center of 
Provisional Confinement v. Guatemala); Annual Report 2004, §14 (Children confined in the 
State Foundation for the Well-being of Children v. Brazil). 
152 During the fire a guard shot one youngster, who later died. On 8 August 2001 the Commission 
took precautionary measures. See Instituto “Coronel Panchito López”, case 11.666. Subsequently 
the Court became involved as well. IACHR “Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” (Paraguay), 
Judgment of 2 September 2004. 
153 CEJIL case docket 1997 referring to street children detained with adults at the Central 
Penitentiary of Tegucigalpa (Honduras). See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
154 According to CEJIL’s own case docket this case began with a petition for precautionary measures 
in February 1995, while the Commission’s final report mentions 13 April 1995 as the day the 
petition itself was submitted and 22 May 1995 as the day on which the petitioners requested 
precautionary measures. The Commission notes that this request was amplified on 6 June 1996 to 
include three children in the Choluteca jail and 34 children in the San Pedro Sula Prison. CIDH 
Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999 (merits), §49. While the phrasing is unclear, the 
context leads one to conclude that the Commission indeed used the precautionary measures 
requested and later amplified them. Literally, the Commission reports that the petitioners’ request 
was amplified. 
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straints but was making ‘supreme efforts’ to comply with international obligations.155 It pointed 
out the alarming rate of juvenile felonies.156  
On the basis of Article 29 ACHR (on interpretation) and the consistent practice of the 
Commission and Court, the Commission combined the regional and the universal human rights 
systems to interpret the Convention. It pointed out that other international instruments contained 
even more specific rules with regard to the protection of children. The Commission concluded 
that the practice of incarcerating minors in adult penal institutions, thereby endangering their 
physical, mental and moral health, was indeed a violation of Article 19 ACHR. It pointed out that 
the obligation to provide special protection for children was a non-derogable obligation under 
Article 27(2) ACHR. It also referred more generally to the non-derogable rights of the child.157 
The Commission pointed out that the State’s duty to house minors and adults in separate de-
tention facilities was based on Article 5(5) jo. Article 19 ACHR. It also noted that the ‘essential 
aim of reform and social rehabilitation of prisoners’ under Article 5(6) was ‘absolutely impossible 
to achieve in penal institutions in which children are forced to live alongside adult criminals’. It 
then continued discussing the obligations under Article 5(1) (right to respect for physical, mental 
and moral integrity) and 5(2) (prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment or 
treatment and the right of all person deprived of their liberty to be treated with respect for their 
inherent dignity). It considered that ‘the cohabitation of juvenile and adult inmates is a violation 
of the human dignity of these minors and has led to abuses of the juveniles’ personal integrity. 
The physical superiority of the adult inmates enables them to force themselves upon the juveniles 
and abuse them’.158 In conclusion Honduras had violated the ‘special right of minors’ to have 
their physical, moral and mental integrity respected. It had subjected the juveniles in question to 
inhuman and degrading treatment and had failed to take the necessary steps to prevent adult in-
mates from physically and sexually assaulting or abusing the juvenile inmates.159  
                                                 
155 In this case they had alleged that the situation of the children violated the international law 
relating to the detention of minors including Articles 5, 7, 19 and 29(b) ACHR, Articles 7 and 
10(b) ICCPR, Articles 3(1), 19(1) and 37 Convention on the Rights of the Child and Article 13(4) 
of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing Rules). 
156 More generally on official State responses see Chapter XVII. 
157 CIDH Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §98. 
158 The Commission mentioned as evidence the reports represented by the petitioners, several 
newspaper articles with statements by judges and prosecutors (included in the Commission’s 
merits report) and the statements of the juveniles themselves. It pointed out that the acts or 
omissions by prison, police and judicial officials in relation to the allegations were directly 
imputable to the State. CIDH Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §125-130. It also 
referred to statements made to the press by a Supreme Court justice. These confirmed that the 
authorities were aware of the fact that juveniles were being raped in the Central Penitentiary but 
nevertheless transferred them (upon the discovery of one particular case of rape) to another cell 
occupied by adults, ‘where they would continue to face similar risks’. Minors in detention v. 
Honduras, 10 March 1999, §133. 
159 In its decision declaring admissible a complaint against Peru on the detention of juveniles, the 
Commission made no mention of precautionary measures. The complaint concerned insufficient 
separation from adult detainees, inadequate conditions of detention and lack of regular access to 
health care. In this case, however, the complaint was only brought after the youths had already 
left the detention facility complained of). CIDH Leoncio Florian López et al. v. Peru, 3 October 
2000 (adm.). With regard to Paraguay the Tekojoja Foundation and CEJIL petitioned the 
Commission, on 14 August 1996, alleging adverse prison conditions and ‘extreme physical and 
psychological violence’ to which children and young people were subjected in the Panchito 
López Penitentiary for minors. Previously, the Tekojoja Foundation had brought a habeas corpus 
proceeding before the courts in Paraguay with the aim to stop the detention of minors in that 
penitentiary. They had provided evidence of the uninhabitable conditions of this penitentiary and 
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The Inter-American Court ordered Brazil, among others, to protect the lives and personal 
integrity of those minors detained in a detention centre in Brazil as well as others present, in 
particular to prevent further violent outbursts, to guarantee safety, maintain order and prevent 
cruel treatment. Moreover, the State should take the necessary measures to reduce overcrowding, 
confiscate any arms, separate the detainees in accordance with the relevant international standards 
and keeping in mind the best interests of the child, provide the necessary medical care, periodi-
cally monitor the detention conditions and the physical and moral conditions of the children de-
tained.160 It has pointed out that ‘problems relating to detention centers require medium and long-
term actions to adapt their conditions to the corresponding international standards’. Yet States 
also have the obligation to take immediate action in order to ‘guarantee the physical, mental and 
moral integrity of the inmates, as well as their right to life and their right to enjoy the minimum 
conditions for a decent life, especially in the case of children, who require special attention from 
the State’.161 It specified that the measures to be adopted based on its Order for provisional meas-
ures must be adopted ‘immediately and effectively’.162 On the other hand, ‘the analysis of the 
effectiveness of the investigations and proceedings relating to the facts that gave rise to these 
provisional measures’ corresponded to the examination of the merits of the case, which was pend-
ing before the Commission.163 In other words, while the State was expected to investigate the 
facts as part of the provisional measures, in order to prevent (further) irreparable harm, it would 
not analyse the effectiveness of the measures undertaken by the State in this respect, as this was 
reserved for the merits.164 
In its Orders for provisional measures the Inter-American Court has also included general 
statements on existing law, such as that ‘as a consequence of its positive obligation to protect the 
right to life and physical integrity, the State has the duty to prevent that individuals under its 
custody be subject to conditions such as overcrowding’.165 It has observed that, together with the 
                                                                                                                       
the degrading treatment to which the minors were subjected. This included overcrowded 
conditions, continuous violence and malnourishment, a lack of beds or mattresses and insufficient 
basic medical attention. The Supreme Court of Paraguay, however, ‘paralyzed’ the case, which 
prompted the Foundation and CEJIL to bring a complaint before the Commission. CEJIL case 
docket 1997 (on file with the author). Apparently, the petitioners did not request and the 
Commission did not take precautionary measures.  
160 IACHR Case of the children and adolescents deprived of their liberty in the ‘Complexo do 
Tatuapé’ of FEBEM (Brazil), Orders of 17 and 30 November 2005. Attached to the 17 November 
Order is a Concurring Opinion by Judge Cançado Trindade criticizing the long period of adverse 
detention circumstances before the Commission finally resorted to the Court for provisional 
measures. See also IACHR Jorge Castañeda Gutman (Mexico), Order of 25 November 2005, 
Concurring Opinion by Judges Cançado Trindade and Ventura Robles, §§4 and 8.  
161 See e.g. IACHR Matter of Yare I and Yare II Capital Region Penitentiary Center, Order of 30 
March 2006, 17th ‘Considering’ clause; Matter of the Monagas Judicial Detention Center (‘La 
Pica’), 9 February 2006, 19th ‘Considering’ clause; Matter of the Children Deprived of liberty in 
the “Complexo do Tataupé” of FEBEM, Order of 4 July 2006, 12th ‘Considering’ clause and 
Order of 3 July 2007, 10th ‘Considering’ clause. 
162 IACHR Matter of the Children Deprived of liberty in the “Complexo do Tataupé” of FEBEM, 
Order of 3 July 2007, 11th ‘Considering’ clause.  
163 Id., 12th ‘Considering’ clause and 7th ‘Decisional’ clause.  
164 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
165 IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in 
Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, 15th ‘Considering’ clause. See also 
IACHR Las penitentiarías de Mendoza (Argentina), Order of 22 November 2004. Here the Court 
noted that in light of the relation between the conditions of detention and the right to life and 
personal integrity it was possible to protect detainees thorough its provisional measures, 11th 
‘Considering’ clause.  
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precarious detention situation in a case and the State’s failed ‘duty to divide inmates into different 
categories’, these circumstances ‘may give rise to violent events (…) and might cause an immedi-
ate loss of lives and generalized attacks affecting the inmates’ personal integrity’.166 After all the 
State’s obligation to protect in the detention context extends to the protection against threats and 
harassment originating from third parties, like other detainees.167 “Given the characteristics of the 
detention centers, the State must protect prisoners from violent acts which, if there is no State 
control, might take place among the detainees”.168 In this light the Court has stressed that ‘the acts 
of the state security officers, specially those aimed at keeping order’, or at the referral from one 
detention centre to the other, ‘must be carried out strictly respecting the human rights of the pris-
oners and preventing unduly violent acts’.169  
2.5.3 (Method of) confinement and protecting detainees in psychological dis-
tress 
Precautionary and provisional measures may also be warranted because of the specific vulnerabil-
ity of people for reasons other than their age.170 In December 1994 a petitioner requested the 
Inter-American Commission to intervene on behalf of an Argentine citizen detained in Bolivia. 
She had been arrested for possession and transportation of cocaine. Despite her long and docu-
mented medical history of mental illness the Bolivian authorities detained her at a women’s 
prison facility lacking the capability to provide the special treatment required by her condition. 
During this detention she was raped several times. The Bolivian judiciary refused to transfer her 
to a specialised psychiatric facility. While it is not clear whether the Commission took the precau-
tionary measures requested to safeguard her physical integrity, it did start an investigation in 
loco.171 In February 1995 a domestic court acquitted her because of mental incompetence. Yet she 
remained in detention awaiting fulfilment of procedural requirements. According to CEJIL she 
was transferred from the women’s prison to a psychiatric facility as a result of pressure from 
international groups and eventually could return home to the care of her family.172  
In Cesti Hurtado the Commission requested the Inter-American Court twice to order Peru to 
release Mr. Cesti. The Court did not do this as this would constitute an anticipation of the merits 
of the case.173 Instead it noted that ‘the President of this Court, in his Order, instructed the State of 
Peru to adopt urgent measures by providing Mr. Cesti-Hurtado with proper medical treatment for 
                                                 
166 IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in 
Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, 15th ‘Considering’ clause. 
167 IACHR Las penitentiarías de Mendoza (Argentina), Order of 22 November 2004, 12th 
considering clause. 
168 IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in 
Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, 16th ‘Considering’ clause. 
169 Id., referring to Matter of Yare I y Yare II Capital Region Penitentiary Center, Order of 30 March 
2006, 14th ‘Considering’ clause; Matter of Monagas Judicial Confinement Center (‘La Pica’), 
Order of 9 February 2006, 16th ‘Considering’ clause and Matter of Children Deprived of Liberty 
in the “Complexo do Tatuapé” of FEBEM, Order of 17 November 2005, 14th ‘Considering’ 
clause.  
170 See e.g. CIDH Jorge Bernal, Julio César Rotela and 458 patients of the Neuro-psychiatric 
Hospital v. Paraguay, Annual Report 2003, §60. 
171 SERPAJ, a human rights organization from her home country (Argentina), initially submitted the 
request and was subsequently supported by CEJIL. 
172 CEJIL case docket 1997. 
173 See IACHR Cesti Hurtado (Peru), Order of the President, 29 July 1997, 5th and 6th ‘Considering’ 
clauses and Order of the Court of 11 September 1997, 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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his heart disease, with a view to protecting his physical, psychological and moral integrity. The 
Court ratifies that order and decides to maintain those measures’.174  
A famous early detention case dealt with by the Inter-American Court is that of María Elena 
Loayza Tamayo, who was serving a 20-year prison sentence. Pending the case the Court had 
ordered Peru to take ‘all provisional measures necessary for the effective safeguard of her physi-
cal, psychological and moral integrity’.175 In light of the danger to her physical, psychological and 
moral health, it ordered Peru to modify her prison conditions, in particular with regard to her 
solitary confinement. It also expected Peru to provide her with medical treatment, both physical 
and psychiatric, without delay. On the merits the Court found, among others, that Peru had vio-
lated her right to humane treatment, as recognized in Article 5 jo. 1(1) ACHR.176 
In Patanè v. Italy (1986) the European Commission took provisional measures on behalf of 
a petitioner serving a five year prison sentence ‘who was suffering from a severe state of depres-
sion and whose health was, according to medical certificates submitted, continuously deteriorat-
ing to the point where there existed an acute threat to her life’.177 
In Keenan v. UK (2001) a mentally ill detainee had committed suicide in detention. His 
mother complained of failure by the detention authorities to protect his life. While the ECtHR 
considered that there had indeed been a particular risk of suicide in this case, of which the au-
thorities could have been aware, it did not find a violation of the right to life in this case. It did, 
however, find that the treatment of the detainee had violated the prohibition of cruel treatment.178 
                                                 
174 IACHR Cesti Hurtado (Peru), Order of the Court of 11 September 1997, 6th ‘Considering’ clause. 
Subsequently the Commission brought the casse before the Court on the merits and again 
requested provisional measures for the provisional release of Mr Cesti. Once more the Court 
denied this, Order of 29 January 1998, calling upon Peru ‘to permit Mr. Cesti Hurtado to receive 
the medical treatment of his choice’, 2nd ‘Decisional’ clause. On 3 June 1999 the Court expanded 
its provisional measures to protect his family against threats and harassment. Shortly upon Cesti’s 
release, on 11 November 1999, the Court decided to maintain its provisional measures for the 
protection of Cesti and his family. By Order of 14 August 2000 it lifted its provisional measures. 
See further the Court’s decisions on the merits and reparations: Judgment on the merits, 29 
September 1999, Interpretation of judgment of 29 January 2000; Judgment on Reparations of 21 
May 2001 and Interpretation of that judgment of 27 November 2001; Resolution on Compliance 
of 17 November 2004 (continuing supervision of compliance) and Order by the President of 21 
December 2005 (denying renewed request for provisional measures aimed at ensuring 
compliance with the Court’s judgments). 
175 IACHR Loayza Tamayo (Peru), Orders for provisional measures of 2 July and 13 September 
1996. Clearly provisional measures taken in the context of incommunicado detention could also 
help prevent disappearances and torture. Ms Loayza was released on 16 October 1997. On 11 
November 1997 the Court ordered the provisional measures closed. In 2000 the Court ordered 
provisional measures on her behalf again, but this time relating to her socioeconomic 
circumstances: 13 December 2000 (President) and 3 February 2001. In 2001 (28 August 2001) 
these were lifted on request of the State (see also Chapter XII on provisional measures in other 
situations). 
176 IACHR Loayza Tamayo (Peru), Judgment of 17 September 1997. 
177 While the Commission had not specified its provisional measures of 15 October 1985 and the 
State decided to release the petitioner, who subsequently disappeared. EComHR Patanè v. Italy, 
3 December 1986 (struck out). See more generally Chapter XIII (Protection) and XVII (Official 
responses). See also, in a different factual situation involving a risk of suicide) and a possible 
transfer to communist East-Germany, 27 May 1974, Brückmann v. FRG, EuRGZ 1974, p. 113 
and 1976, p. 451. 
178 ECtHR Keenan v. UK, 3 April 2001. 
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In a situation similar to that occurring in Keenan it is feasible that a petitioner, having exhausted 
domestic remedies, would request the intervention of the ECtHR.179 
Indeed in more recent cases the Court had used provisional measures to protect detainees in 
psychological distress. In Prezec v. Croatia (2008), the ECtHR had used provisional measures in 
September 2007, ordering the State to provide a prisoner with the requisite psychiatric treatment. 
In response, in January 2008 the State carried out a psychiatric examination. “The report drawn 
up on 15 January 2008 concluded that the applicant suffered from a personality disorder and was 
in need of an active, permanent and differential psychiatric treatment”. In March 2008 he was 
placed in a psychiatric hospital with a treatment programme specifically designed for him. It 
includes ‘compulsory psychiatric treatment of the applicant in the Zagreb Prison Hospital, con-
sisting of intensive psychiatric treatment in small groups and therapeutic communities, organised 
art and computer workshops as part of the applicant’s therapy and his preparation for the return to 
the normal life’. The treatment was to last until his release.180 
In some other contexts requests for provisional measures have remained unsuccessful. In 
Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands (2003)181 counsel had requested the ECtHR to take provisional 
measures to the effect that Lorsé would be immediately transferred from the maximum security 
prison (EBI) in Vught to an ordinary prison. Alternatively the Court was requested to take provi-
sional measures of a more general nature, namely those ‘necessary to put an end to the continuing 
violation of Article 3 of the Convention’.182 The President of the first section decided not to take 
any provisional measures.183  
Counsel for the petitioner had noted that the request for provisional measures was made in 
light of the physical and mental situation of the petitioners.184 A letter by the Secretariat respond-
ing to the request for provisional measures informed counsel for the petitioner ‘that such a request 
can normally be acceded to only if there is imminent danger of harm that cannot subsequently be 
remedied or made good, as can be the case, in particular, if the applicant is in danger of being 
expelled or deported’.185 Subsequently the Court examined the request and informed counsel 
officially that it had decided ‘not to indicate to the Government the measure you suggest’.186  
In earlier cases the ECtHR had held that ‘complete sensory isolation, coupled with total so-
cial isolation, can destroy the personality and constitutes a form of inhuman treatment which 
cannot be justified by the requirements of security or any other reason’.187  
                                                 
179 See also e.g. ECtHR Dybeku v. Albania, 18 December 2007. 
180 ECtHR Prezec v. Croatia, 28 August 2008 (struck out after friendly settlement). 
181 ECtHR Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, judgment of 4 February 2003 (former first section). See 
also Van der Ven v. The Netherlands, judgment of 4 February 2003 (former first section). 
182 ECtHR Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, letter of 19 November 1999 (on file with the author). 
183 ECtHR Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, 18 January 2000 (adm.). 
184 A recent domestic decision had had a profound psychological impact on him and he was on 
hunger strike since 15 November 1999. ECtHR Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, initial petition of 
19 November 1999 (on file with the author). The Court did not further discuss the petitioner’s 
hunger strike. Its description of the facts in admissibility decision of 18 January 2000 briefly 
notes that he began a hunger strike on 17 November 1999. 
185 ECtHR Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, letter by the Secretariat of 19 November 1999 (on file 
with the author). 
186 ECtHR Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, letter by Registrar section 1, 30 November 1999 (on file 
with the author). 
187 See e.g. ECtHR Messina v. Italy, 8 June 1999 (inadm. as to the conditions of detention claim), 1st 
‘As to the law’ clause (10th paragraph). 
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“On the other hand, the removal from association with other prisoners for security, disciplinary 
or protective reasons does not in itself amount to inhuman treatment or degrading 
punishment”.188 
In January 2000 the first section began its examination of the admissibility of the Lorsé case. It 
did decide to give it priority under Rule 41.189 The admissibility decision indicates that the Presi-
dent of the first section decided not to take provisional measures. 
On the merits the Court did not find that the petitioner was subjected to sensory isolation or 
total isolation. In fact, it noted, that the Italian special regime in an earlier case ‘was significantly 
more restrictive’.  
It found that the combination of the routine strip-searching and the other security measures 
amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3. It considered ‘that in the 
situation where Mr Lorsé was already subjected to a great number of control measures, and in the 
absence of convincing security needs, the practice of weekly strip-searches that was applied to Mr 
Lorsé for a period for more than six years diminished his human dignity and must have given rise 
to feelings of anguish and inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing him’. 
The judgment on the merits does not refer to the request for provisional measures and the 
admissibility decision only notes that the President decided not to take them. It might be feasible, 
in future, to use provisional measures to halt such strip-searches that are performed routinely even 
on those occasions in which the petitioner has not been in contact with the outside world. 
2.5.4 Protecting detainees on a hunger strike 
In the Inter-American and European systems provisional measures have also been requested by or 
on behalf of detainees on a hunger strike.190 The protection requested may still have been im-
provement of prison conditions or investigation of specific mistreatment. 
There are some examples in which the Inter-American Commission took precautionary 
measures in hunger strike cases.191 It has, for instance, intervened on behalf of a prisoner in Cuba 
who had a tumor on his lung. Two months previously he had begun a hunger strike demanding 
medical care.192 
It is not always clear what role is played by the hunger strike, but it seems unlikely that the 
Inter-American Commission admonishes the beneficiaries of the precautionary measures to end 
their hunger strike, as the European Commission and Court have done in the past.193 
In December 2000 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of the petitioners 
in the case of Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina,194 or the La Tablada case, on which it had made 
public its final Report three years before. The precautionary measures involved twenty of the 
eleven persons whose right to humane treatment the Commission had found violated in 1997. 
                                                 
188 Ibid. 
189 ECtHR Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, letter by Registrar section 1, received 25 January 2000 
(on file with the author). 
190 See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4.2, on beneficiaries and addressees (under the 
heading ‘the petitioner as addressee’) and Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk), section 3.2.5 on 
health in detention and assessment of risk. 
191 See e.g. CIDH precautionary measures of 16 December 1998 on behalf of María Emilia de 
Marchi (Brazil), case 12.002, Annual Report 1998, §14 and on 27 December 2000 on behalf of 
eleven detainees in case 11.137 (Argentina), Annual Report 2000, §9; See also Chapter XIII 
(Protection, discussing beneficiaries and addressees in section 4). 
192 CIDH Annual Report 2001, §28. 
193 See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4. 
194 CIDH Juan Carlos Abella et al. v. Argentina (La Tablada case), 18 November 1997. 
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With regard to these eleven persons the Commission had also found violations of the right to 
appeal their conviction to a higher court and the right to a simple and effective remedy. It had 
recommended Argentina to ‘take the most appropriate measures to repair the harm suffered’ by 
them.195 Yet apparently, they were still imprisoned in December 2000. They were in an advanced 
stage of a hunger strike and the issue became very important in Argentina. The Commission 
initiated a follow-up in this case.196 Given the urgency of the situation (some of them might die) 
the Commission took precautionary measures asking the government to act and resolve the situa-
tion so that the detainees would abandon their hunger strike. In its Annual Report 2000 the Com-
mission notes that both Argentina and the petitioners later informed it that the State had taken 
measures leading them to stop the hunger strike.197 In a press release of 11 December 2000 the 
Commission had already noted it issued the following precautionary measure to Argentina: “The 
immediate adoption of the necessary measures to implement fully the recommendation of Report 
55/97”. It reproduced these recommendations and noted that, in the past three years, it had repeat-
edly taken steps to ensure their implementation, including visiting Argentina and holding three 
follow-up hearings. It pointed out that the persons involved had been on a hunger strike than 90 
days, reportedly because of the non-implementation of the Commission’s recommendation. “Al-
though the Commission is not in favor of a hunger strike that compromises the health and threat-
ens the lives of the persons involved, it believes that the way to resolve this grave situation is to 
implement the recommendations fully and without further delay”.198 This was the first case where 
the Commission used precautionary measures as part of a follow-up of a case that ended three 
years previously. It shows an approach to the use of these measures that is integrated in the 
Commission’s other activities and takes into account the other obligations of the State as previ-
ously established.  
Thus, with regard to the addressees of the its precautionary measures in cases involving 
hunger strikes it is relevant to note that the Inter-American Commission is not in the habit of 
telling detainees to give up a hunger strike. In the Tablada case such ‘order’ clearly would have 
been awkward as the prisoners started their hunger strike because Argentina was not following 
the Commission’s recommendations that had been based on its findings of violations.  
The approach is quite different in the European system. In April 1981 one of the sisters of 
Robert (Bobby) Sands, MP, urgently contacted the European Commission on his behalf. He was 
in the 54th day of a hunger-strike ‘which he had no choice but to undertake as a more conventional 
domestic remedy was not open to him to protest against prison conditions which he regarded as 
intolerable’. She stated that her brother’s life was in danger. His state of health was ‘such that he 
is unable himself to make an application directly’. In addition she requested an immediate fact-
finding investigation. The Acting President of the Commission took provisional measures, ‘in 
view of the urgency of the situation’. He requested the State ‘to take the necessary steps to enable 
a Delegation from the Commission’ to meet with her brother in prison in order to find out whether 
he indeed intended to make the petition and, if so, to further discuss the substance and proceed-
                                                 
195 Id. In §115 the Commission notes that on 14 May 1993 the petitioners had requested it to visit the 
prisons to verify the status of the prisoners involved as they considered that the lives of these 
prisoners were in danger. The Commission does not provide information on its reaction to this 
request. 
196 In Rule 46 of its Rules of Procedure (2000) the Commission has ratified its practice on follow-up 
and compliance with its recommendations in cases not referred to the Court. 
197 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §9. 
198 CIDH ‘Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Requests Precautionary Measures in the 
“La Tablada” Case’, Press Release 20/00, 11 December 2000, <www.cidh.oas.org/comunicados/ 
english/2000/Press20-00.htm>. The Commission’s Annual Report 2000 notes that the 
Commission took precautionary measures on 27 December 2000, while the press release 
announcing these measures is from 11 December.  
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ings.199 This was an a-typical provisional measure. It could be considered to aim at the safeguard-
ing of the evidence.200 Yet, the urgency of the situation related to the fact that the life of a possible 
petitioner was at risk. The Commission meant to ascertain whether Bobby Sands himself agreed 
with the petition filed by his sister. Meanwhile his life was at risk and the claims involved Arti-
cles 2 and 3. 
The next day a Delegation of the Commission consisting of the Acting President, Mr Nør-
gaard and Mr Opsahl indeed travelled to London for discussions with officials from the Northern-
Ireland Office. On 25 April the delegation travelled to Belfast to visit the Maze Prison. The prison 
doctor informed them that Bobby Sands was ‘lucid and capable of following events’ but ‘physi-
cally very weak’. They also spoke with Marcella Sands and her solicitor and with another pris-
oner. In the end, however, they did not speak with Sands himself. Through the intermediary of his 
sister’s counsel it was established ‘that he did not wish to associate himself’ with the petition.201 
Bobby Sands died from the effects of his hunger-strike on 5 May 1981. On the basis of the infor-
mation provided by the Delegates the Commission considered that his state of health did not 
prevent him from validly indicating his wish not to be associated with the petition and under-
standing the implications. It struck out the case.202 
The European Commission and Court have responded to requests for provisional measures 
by detainees on a hunger strike by invoking its Rule on such measures vis-à-vis the petitioner 
instead in order for them to stop their hunger strike.203 
More recently, the ECtHR has used provisional measures to halt re-imprisonment of peti-
tioners who had been hospitalized because of the after-effects of long-term hunger-strikes.204  
                                                 
199 EComHR Marcella Sands and Robert Sands v. the UK, 14 October 1981 (struck out). 
200 See also Chapter XII (Other situations). 
201 See further Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on beneficiaries. 
202 EComHR Marcella Sands and Robert Sands v. the UK, 14 October 1981 (struck out). 
203 See EComHR S., R., A. and C. v. Portugal, 15 March 1984 (inadm.); Vakalis v. Greece 
(petitioner was in deteriorating health resulting from hunger strike; the provisional measure of 3 
April 1992 did not aim for his release, but it did address both the State and the petitioner), 15 
January 1993 (struck from the role upon release) and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria (complaint about 
continue pre-trial detention and the conditions in which he was force-fed; provisional measure of 
20 October 1997 only to the petitioner to stop his hunger strike; Article 31 Report of 29 October 
1998; Judgment of 26 July 2001). The Court has confirmed the Commission’s approach, see e.g. 
ECtHR Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, 8 July 2004, §11 and ECtHR Taner Tanyeri et 
al. v. Turkey, 6 December 2005 (struck out). In May and June 2001 the three petitioners in this 
case started a hunger strike protesting their solitary confinement in so-called F-type prison cells 
in Turkey. In August they applied to the Court for provisional measures under Rule 39 requesting 
the Court to order that their detention in these F-type prison cells cease. A month later the 
President of the Chamber notified the Government of the respondent Party of the introduction of 
the application under Rule 40 of the Rules of Court and ‘invited the applicants, under Rule 39 of 
the Rules of Court, to discontinue their hunger strike’. In May 2002 the Court was informed by 
the representative of the petitioners that they had suspended their hunger strike and that they had 
been released from detention. See also Rodić et al. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27 May 2008. On 
24 June one of the petitioners and on 29 June 2005 the other three were ‘invited’ under Rule 39 to 
end their hunger strike; they did so on 1 July 2005; on 13 September 2005 the case was granted 
priority under Rule 41, see §4. See further Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4. 
204 See Press release ECtHR 412, ‘Fact-finding mission to Turkey in hunger-strike cases’, 6 
September 2004, referring to this case and ‘52 other cases’. A report by the Human Rights 
Foundation of Turkey, September 2004, notes that the ECtHR delegation examined 54 prisoners 
at the hospital of Istanbul University. The report specifically named petitioners Yanick, Gençay, 
Balyemez, Kör, Kuruçay, Gürbüz, Uyan, Yildiz and Hun. With regard to Balyemez it noted that 
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2.6 Access to health care for death row inmates? 
In light of its practice of using informal provisional measures enquiring about the health situation 
of political detainees, sometimes specifically requesting the State to take positive measures, it is 
interesting to note that the HRC never used such measures on behalf of death row inmates. After 
all, in some of the death penalty cases there is an apparent lack of medical assistance. On the 
merits the HRC often specifically recommended, as part of the remedy, the humane treatment of 
the petitioner in detention. While provisional measures were used in the following cases they 
were only meant to halt the petitioner’s execution and not to intervene to ensure medical assis-
tance. While certain requests by the HRC to the State for information may have triggered changes 
in treatment or access to medication, there are no known cases of informal provisional measures 
comparable to those used on behalf of political (and immigration) detainees. One death row pris-
oner, for instance, asked the HRC whether it could assist him in convincing the Commissioner of 
Prisons to transfer him to a cell where there was adequate natural light. The Secretariat noted: “I 
regret to inform you that the Centre for Human Rights is not in a position to request the prison 
authorities to place you in another cell. You are kindly advised to bring your complaints to the 
Commissioner of Prisons”.205 
As noted, it has found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) in relation to ill treatment on death 
row that included lack of medical attention. A case in point is Henry and Douglas v. Jamaica 
(1996).206 Henry was kept in a cold cell after being diagnosed with cancer and Douglas after he 
incurred medical problems caused by a gunshot wound. The HRC found that the conditions of 
incarceration under which Henry continued to be held until his death, ‘even after the prison au-
thorities were aware of his terminal illness’ and the lack of medical attention to Douglas’ gunshot 
wound, constituted a violation of Articles 7 and 10(1).207 It would have been possible, at an earlier 
stage, to take provisional measures to request medical treatment on their behalf, had the HRC 
been inclined to do so in death penalty cases. 
In other cases the Committee only found a violation of Article 10(1). An example is Hamil-
ton v. Jamaica (1999).208 In this case the petitioner had been shot in the lower area of his spine by 
a police officer after a hearing by a Magistrate as part of the preliminary enquiry. He became 
paralysed in both legs and was unable to move from his cell, unless he was carried by other in-
mates. He was also unable to remove his slop bucket (serving as a toilet) from the cell himself and 
had therefore been obliged to pay other inmates to remove it. Sometimes he was forced to remain 
in his cell until he had obtained the necessary funds. Counsel submitted that the petitioner’s rights 
under Artsicles 7 and 10 of the Covenant were being violated, because the failure of the prison 
authorities to take into account his paralysed condition and to make proper arrangements for him. 
                                                                                                                       
the Court had already taken provisional measures on 5 February 2004 to halt his re-
imprisonment. See also provisional measures not to re-imprison in the cases of Hun Kuruçay, 
Gürbüz, Uyan and Yildiz, all following the fact-finding mission of September 2004, Report 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, <www.tihv.org.tr/report/2004_09/septprison.html>, §4.1. 
On the merits see e.g. ECtHR Yildiz v. Turkey, 20 October 2005. See also Chapter XV 
(Immediacy and risk) on the fact-finding mission dealing with the compatibility with Articles 2 
and 3 of their continued detention, section 3.2.5. Generally on hunger strikes in Turkey, see 
Sevinç (2008). 
205 HRC Letter by the HRC Secretariat of 12 March 1993 (on file with the author).  
206 HRC Henry and Douglas v. Jamaica, 25 July 1996. 
207 It observed that ‘the issues raised in the initial communication concerning lack of medical 
treatment and unsatisfactory conditions of detention relate directly to the circumstances of 
Henry’s death’. The Committee considered that, in the circumstances, counsel had standing to 
continue his representation on the communication despite the fact that Henry had died.  
208 HRC Zephiniah Hamilton v. Jamaica, 23 July 1999. 
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This ‘lack of proper care’209 was also said to be a violation of the UN Standard Minimum Rules 
for the Treatment of Prisoners. The Committee found a violation of Article 10(1).210  
Not only in case of disability or terminal illness would medical treatment be required but 
also, for instance, in case of allergies with serious consequences.211 In Brown v. Jamaica 
(1999)212 the petitioner had claimed that the warders had destroyed his belongings, including an 
asthma pump and other medication and that he had been denied assistance in case of an asthma 
attack.213 When the petitioner brings specific allegations that the prison conditions cause serious 
detriment to his health and that he did not receive medical treatment, despite repeated requests, or 
that the authorities made it impossible to keep the appointment for an operation, the HRC indeed 
finds a violation of Article 10(1).214 It often notes in such cases that the State party had not refuted 
these specific allegations, nor forwarded any results of the announced investigation into the alle-
gations. Sometimes the HRC not only finds a violation of Article 10 in this respect but also of 
Article 7. In one case the petitioner had stated that the sanitary conditions of the prison ‘are dread-
ful, that the quality and quantity of the food is grossly inadequate and that he has been denied 
access to non-legal mail’. Moreover, he had stated that he had been subjected to inadequate medi-
                                                 
209 Note that the HRC uses the same terminology here as the ECtHR (in non-refoulement cases), or 
repeats terminology used by counsel, see Chapter V. 
210 In yet other cases the HRC found that the evidentiary requirements for a claim of denial of 
medical treatment had not been fulfilled. It noted, for instance, that ‘the State party observes that 
its investigations showed that the author did receive treatment for his arthritic condition, while 
the author denies that any treatment was provided. In the circumstances, the Committee considers 
that a violation of Article 10 in this respect has not been established’. HRC Tony Jones v. 
Jamaica, 6 April 1998. The State party had asserted that its investigations had shown that ‘within 
the resources available the author was treated for his arthritis’. Counsel had observed that the 
authorities were informed of the petitioner’s arthritic condition in September 1994 and 1995 and 
in August 1996. “In spite of visits by the Inspector (of Prisons) in April and September 1996, Mr. 
Jones has still not received any medications for his arthritic condition”. 
211 In one case counsel had claimed that the petitioner was allergic to dust and to the paint used in St. 
Catherine Prison and that his allergy provoked attacks of asthma and burning eyes. He claimed 
that he did not receive any treatment for this. The petitioner had also described the conditions of 
detention on death row as inhumane and degrading and claimed that he was beaten on two 
specific occasions and did not receive medical attention for his injuries. Since the State party had 
not answered to any of these allegations, the Committee considered that due weight must be 
given to the petitioner’s claims. It found that the treatment to which he had been subjected and 
the conditions of detention as described by him constituted a violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) 
ICCPR. HRC Beresford Whyte v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998. 
212 HRC Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999. 
213 If the petitioner had not provided any further information regarding a claim, the HRC will 
dismiss it for lack of substantiation. See e.g. HRC Everton Morrison v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998; 
(lack of substantiation that the difficulties in obtaining proper treatment for deteriorating eyesight 
amounted to violation of Article 10(1)). 
214 See e.g. HRC Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998. In this case it is not clear why 
the unsanitary prison conditions, the lack of medical treatment and especially treatment such as 
being hit in the side by a warden ‘to such an extent that he was taken to the prison surgeon’, only 
amounted to a violation of Article 10(1) and not of Article 7 as well. Nicholas Henry v. Jamaica, 
20 October 1998; Conroy Levy v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998 and Leroy Morgan and Samuel 
Williams v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998. 
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cal attention, which had caused the loss of his sight in one eye.215 The HRC found that these 
circumstances disclosed a violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) ICCPR.216  
In Leslie v. Jamaica (1998)217 the HRC noted that the petitioner had made very precise alle-
gations about various beatings and deplorable conditions of detention. Among others, he claimed 
to have been the victim of several assaults. He reported these assaults to the prison authorities and 
repeatedly requested medical attention to no avail. He wrote to the prison Ombudsman and was 
finally taken to hospital early 1992. He claimed that warders had told him on several occasions 
‘that there was no point in providing him with medical treatment, because he was about to be 
executed’. He submitted that this cost him ‘great embarrassment and depression’. He also submit-
ted (providing dates and times) that a warder harassed him, reportedly because he had complained 
about his treatment to the Ombudsman and the ‘Human Rights Office’. He further alleged that a 
warder had stuck a finger in his eye and kicked him several times.218 The HRC found violations 
of Articles 7 and 10(1).219  
These cases indicate the range of detention situations in which the HRC could have used 
(informal) provisional measures. The Committee’s attitude towards reparation for violations 
relating to conditions of detention and access to medical assistance is important as well.220  
In Neptune v. Trinidad and Tobago (1996)221 the HRC found that the victim should be re-
leased for the violation of Article 14. It also found violations of Articles 9(3) and 10(1). Pending 
this release it expected the immediate improvement of the circumstances of his detention. In order 
to avoid similar violations in the future, it also recommended the State party to improve the gen-
eral conditions of detention. This fits into the specific form of reparation called ‘assurances of 
non-repetition’. The HRC normally refers to this type of reparation simply by noting the obliga-
                                                 
215 The State party had not refuted ‘the specific allegations’ and had not, ‘in spite of its explicit 
promise’ and the principle in Article 4(2) OP, forwarded results of the investigation. Errol Smith 
and Oval Stewart v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999. 
216 A related issue is that of access to medical records. In HRC Zheludkova v. Ukraine 29 October 
2002 (no Rule 86) the HRC considered that Article 10(1) had been violated because of the 
‘consistent and unexplained denial of access to medical records’. Rivas Posada, Ando and 
Bhagwati disagreed with this, considering that the interpretation of Article 10(1) should not be 
stretched that far. Medina Quiroga, however, considered that the Committee’s reasoning 
‘excessively restricts’ the interpretation of Article 10(1) ‘by linking the violation of that provision 
to the possible relevance which the victim’s access to the medical records might have had for the 
medical treatment that he received in prison’. She pointed out that the right to have access to 
medical records ‘forms part of the right of all individuals to have access to personal information 
concerning them’. She considered that the denial of the victim’s request for access to the medical 
records in itself constituted a violation of the right in Article 10 to be ‘treated with humanity and 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person’, independent from the question 
‘whether or not this refusal may have had consequences for the medical treatment of the victim’. 
217 HRC Junior Leslie v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998. 
218 Allegedly the same warder subjected him to further physical and verbal abuse on subsequent 
dates. The HRC pointed out that the State party had not contested this ‘except to say some 14 
months later that it would investigate’. 
219 In later cases with regard to prison conditions the HRC would only find violations of Article 
10(1). It would point out that it was not necessary to consider separately the claims arising under 
Article 7, because Article 10 specifically ‘deals with the situation of persons deprived of their 
liberty and encompasses the elements set out generally in article 7’. This may still be different in 
situations where petitioners have been beaten. Devon Simpson v. Jamaica, 31 October 2001. See 
also R. S. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2 April 2002. 
220 For examples of cases in which provisional measures were indeed used see Chapter XIII on the 
relationship between provisional measures and possible forms of reparation.  
221 HRC Clyde Neptune v. Trinidad and Tobago, 16 July 1996. 
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tion to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future. In this case it also gave a recom-
mendation on how to do this, namely by improving the general conditions of detention. In subse-
quent cases this form of reparation (assurances of non-repetition) could lay a foundation for tak-
ing provisional measures to intervene in certain prison situations with a specific impact on a 
petitioner.222 The immediate improvement of the circumstances of detention pending release, as a 
form of specific reparation upon the finding of a violation, may serve as additional argument for 
the use of provisional measures, to intervene in certain detention circumstances threatening ir-
reparable harm, also on death row. In Henry and Douglas v. Jamaica (1996)223 the HRC consid-
ered that, in the circumstances, counsel was allowed to continue his representation despite the fact 
that Henry had died. It observed that ‘the issues raised in the initial communication concerning 
lack of medical treatment and unsatisfactory conditions of detention relate directly to the circum-
stances of Mr. Henry’s death’. Subsequently Jamaica indicated that it had ordered an investigation 
into the complaints that medical attention had been denied to the petitioners. In relation to this 
issue, counsel had argued that the abuse of convicted prisoners had been a common occurrence 
for at least 20 years and that the fear of reprisals prevented prisoners from submitting official 
complaints. The HRC noted that the State party had not contested the allegation that Henry was 
being kept in a cold cell after being diagnosed for cancer nor that Douglas had received insuffi-
cient medical attention for a gunshot wound. It found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1). Pursuant 
to Article 2(3)(a) ICCPR it pointed out that Douglas was entitled to an effective remedy entailing 
compensation for the conditions of his detention, in particular for the inadequate medical attention 
he received for his gunshot wound. It reaffirmed that the obligation in Article 10 to treat individu-
als deprived of their liberty with respect for their inherent dignity ‘encompasses the provision of 
adequate medical care during detention; this obligation, obviously, extends to persons under 
sentence of death’. In this particular case the HRC could have used provisional measures to inter-
vene pending the case to allow Eustace Henry, who was in the final stages of cancer, to die in 
more humane circumstances and it could have requested the State as well to provide medical 
attention to Everald Douglas. Such measures would be similar to those it used on behalf of politi-
cal prisoners.224 
In R. S. v. Trinidad and Tobago (2002)225 the HRC noted the information provided by coun-
sel, showing ‘that the author’s mental state at the time of the reading of the death warrants was 
obvious to those around him and should have been apparent to the prison authorities’. The State 
had not contested this information. In the circumstances, issuing a warrant for the author’s execu-
tion constituted a violation of Article 7.226  
                                                 
222 See the provisional measures by the IACHR and ECtHR in the context of detention. 
223 HRC Henry and Douglas v. Jamaica, 25 July 1996. 
224 Another case in point is Williams v. Jamaica (1997), 4 November 1997. In this case the HRC 
found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) for failure to provide medical treatment for the victim’s 
mental condition while on death row. An effective remedy included, in particular, an entitlement 
to appropriate medical treatment. In relation to the finding of violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) in 
Nicholas Henry v. Jamaica, 20 October 1998, the State party was equally obliged to provide the 
petitioner with an effective remedy ‘including immediate medical examination and treatment if 
necessary, compensation, and consideration for early release’. 
225 HRC R. S. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2 April 2002. Since it had no further information about his 
state of mental health at the earlier stages of the proceedings it was not in a position to decide 
whether the State had also violated Article 6 ICCPR. It also found a violation of Article 10 
because of prison conditions. At the time of the View the victim’s death sentence had already 
been commuted. As a form of reparation the HRC mentioned appropriate medical and psychiatric 
care and improvement of conditions of detention in accordance with Article 10 or release. 
226 HRC R. S. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2 April 2002. McCordie Morrison v. Jamaica, 3 November 
1998, related to ongoing illness in prison. The petitioner developed synovitis, which caused 
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Questions have also been raised on the circumstances of the death of one of the petitioners 
involved in Champagnie, Palmer and Chisholm v. Jamaica (1994).227 In letters to the HRC in-
mates pointed out they were frightened and concerned over his death, mainly because the cause 
was unknown. They noted that inmates serving longer sentences apparently were not entitled to 
go the hospital ‘on the outside’. They mentioned certain guards who, they considered, should not 
have a medical function at the prison clinic. Some of them also noted that whenever an ex-death 
row inmate complained about something the guards would tell them that they should have hanged 
them.228 In Khomidov v. Tajikistan (2004) the HRC had used provisional measures in September 
2002. In March 2004 the petitioner informed the Committee that she had met her son and found 
him in bad health and adverse psychological condition. ‘He was very nervous, shouted throughout 
the meeting, and stated that he could no longer live in such uncertainty and prefer to be executed’. 
She also referred to several health problems for which he received no medical assistance or ex-
amination. The HRC did not comment on this in its decision on he merits and did not refer to 
medical assistance as part of the remedy.229 
                                                                                                                       
swelling of the joints. In its final View the HRC found that the State party had failed to provide 
additional information, despite its promise to do so. Again it recalled that States are under an 
obligation to conduct a serious investigation of alleged violations of the ICCPR made under the 
OP procedure. It referred to Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, 2 November 1987. It specified that this 
entails ‘forwarding the outcome of the investigations to the Committee, in detail and without 
undue delay’. “Consequently, due weight must be given to the author’s allegation that he was 
denied medical treatment, and the Committee finds that the lack of medical treatment to the 
author constitutes a violation of article 10 of the Covenant”. It did not mention provision of 
medical treatment as part of the remedy, probably because it recommended release. Devon 
Simpson v. Jamaica, 31 October 2001, related to prison conditions. As a remedy for the violation 
of Article 10 the HRC referred to ‘adequate compensation, an improvement in the present 
conditions of detention and due consideration of early release’. By this time the HRC had 
changed its approach, pointing out that in detention situations it was sufficient to refer to Article 
10. It was not necessary anymore to mention Article 7 as well. It would have been feasible to use 
Rule 86 in relation to disability and prison conditions. In Hamilton v. Jamaica (1999), the case by 
the petitioner who was paralysed, the HRC found violations of Articles 9(3), 14(3)(c) and 10(1) 
and considered that the State party was under an obligation to provide the victim with ‘an 
effective remedy, entailing compensation and placement in conditions that take full account of 
his disability’. Zephiniah Hamilton v. Jamaica, 23 July 1999. Between the issuance of 
provisional measures and the final View, the death sentence had been commuted. 
227 HRC Champagnie, Palmer and Chisholm v. Jamaica, 18 July 1994. 
228 In this case the HRC found violations of the right of appeal. Palmer had been transferred from 
death row to the general penitentiary. He died in May 1994. The HRC did not mention this in its 
View of July 1994, but in September of that year his counsel provided it with information and 
suggested it to make representations to the Government in relation to his death. The information 
consisted of several letters of inmates received by the Jamaica Council for Human Rights. His 
fellow inmates pointed out that Palmer had been feeling sick already for a month. His condition 
worsened on 6 May after lunch. He was only brought to the hospital section of the prison where 
he was given some ‘yellow colour pills’. On the morning of 7 May the inmates were told he had 
died. Allegedly guards had tried to force a prisoner to give him an injection, which this prisoner 
refused to do. He said to the guards: “You nuh see that the man sick bad and a hospital the man fe 
go”. The officer’s response was: “A dead him fi dead”. It was also noted that Palmer was bawling 
the whole night. Counsel received this information on 16 September and sent it to the HRC by 
letter of 26 September 1994 (on file with the author).  
229 HRC Bakhrom Khomidov (submitted by his mother Saodat Khomidova) v. Tajikistan, 29 July 
2004.  
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Thus far the HRC has never used provisional measures in order to remedy detention situa-
tions for prisoners on death row (such as relating to a deteriorating health situation), although it 
has sometimes suggested such measures in decisions on the merits. One reason for this may be 
that the Secretariat only consults the Special Rapporteur on New Communications to initiate the 
case for registration and for any provisional measures. It may also consult this Rapporteur to 
follow-up on provisional measures already taken, e.g. upon information of a new execution date. 
However, it generally does not consult the Rapporteur on New Communications when it receives 
information relating to threats or lack of medical treatment. It simply prepares this information for 
the Committee member assigned to the case when it will be discussed on admissibility and mer-
its.230 
Obviously, not only in response to claims of lack of medical attention for political prisoners 
or death row inmates, but also in detention situations of other persons an argument for the use of 
provisional measures could be made.231 
3 RELATION BETWEEN PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO INTERVENE IN 
DETENTION SITUATIONS AND THE EXPECTED DECISION ON THE MERITS 
3.1 Introduction 
As the chapters on executions, expulsion and disappearances have already dealt extensively with 
the relationship between provisional measures and the eventual decision on the merits involving 
                                                 
230 In April 2003 the Special Rapporteur indicated his intention to request the Secretariat to start 
contacting him with information relating to new threats of irreparable harm in pending cases. 
Interview by author with HRC Special Rapporteur Scheinin, Geneva, April 2003.  
231 The case of Patterson Matthews serves as an example. He had submitted a complaint not about 
the fact that he had been sentenced to corporal punishment but about, among others, the 
deterioration of his eyesight and the lack of access to medical care. The HRC transmitted the case 
under Rule 91 more than two months after submission. The Rapporteur did not request specific 
information in relation to the condition of his eye and the medical assistance he received in this 
regard. The petitioner attributed the lack of medical attention to the fact that he had written about 
an incident in the prison in November 1988 in which prison warders had killed an inmate. In 
April 1995 the HRC decided, under Rule 91, to request the State party to provide copies of the 
petitioner’s medical file at the prison as well as his medical file at the eye clinic. It also requested 
the petitioner to provide more detailed information about the treatment he received for his eye 
disease and, ‘in particular, whether he was ever operated on, or whether an operation was 
recommended, after May 1991. Patterson Matthews v. Trinidad and Tobago, 4 April 1995. In its 
admissibility decision of October 1995 the HRC noted that it had not received a reply from the 
State party, despite a reminder sent to it of that year. It recalled that it was implicit in the OP that 
States make available to the HRC all information at their disposal and it regretted the lack of 
cooperation. Nevertheless, it noted that it appeared from the file that the petitioner had visited the 
eye clinic regularly and that he underwent an eye operation between March and May 1992. 
Despite the fact that it had this information already when it requested the State to provide it with 
the medical file, it considered that the petitioner had failed to advance a claim under Article 2 OP. 
Patterson Matthews v. Trinidad and Tobago, 13 October 1995 (adm.), CCPR/C/55/D/569/1993, 
25 October 1995 (initial submission 12 October 1993; Rule 91 of 5 January 1994; unpublished 
document on file with the author). See also Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2 April 2002 (claim 
about prison conditions, including that a physician recommended his placement in a brightly-lit 
room in order to prevent the blindness that had begun to set in, and assaults/death threat as a 
result of his correspondence with the UN Centre for Human Rights, only Rule 91, no Rule 86). 
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the right to life and personal integrity, this section addresses this issue only briefly. In cases 
involving provisional measures on behalf of detainees the relevant rights are those involving the 
right to life (Article 6 ICCPR; Article 4 ACHR; Article 4 ACHPR; Article 2(1) ECHR), the 
prohibition of torture and ill-treatment (Article 7 ICCPR; Articles 4, 11 and 16 ICAT; Article 5(2) 
ACHR; Article 5 ACHPR; Article 3 ECHR) and humane treatment in detention (Article 10 
ICCPR).232 Rather than discussing detention rights in general, this section simply refers to some 
case law that could shed light on the use of provisional measures on behalf of detainees.  
3.2 HRC 
From the start of its activities the HRC has faced many ongoing detention situations involving 
risks to health and safety. It has pointed out that Article 10 ‘applies to any one deprived of liberty 
under the laws and authority of the State who is held in prisons, hospitals-particularly psychiatric 
hospitals-detention camps or correctional institutions or elsewhere’.233 It has often found a viola-
tion of both Articles 7 and 10(1) without making a clear distinction between the two. Article 10(1) 
complements Article 7 ICCPR and both articles impose positive obligations. However, there have 
been some cases that dealt with Article 10 (1) on its own without also finding a violation of Arti-
cle 7.234  
The HRC has reaffirmed that Article 10(1) ‘encompasses the provision of, inter alia, ade-
quate medical care during detention’. It also considered that the provision of basic sanitary facili-
ties equally fell within the ambit of Article 10. “The Committee further considers that the provi-
                                                 
232 Article 10 ICCPR stipulates: “1. All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated with 
humanity and with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person. 2. (a) Accused persons 
shall, save in exceptional circumstances, be segregated from convicted persons and shall be 
subject to separate treatment appropriate to their status as unconvicted persons; (b) Accused 
juvenile persons shall be separated from adults and brought as speedy as possible for 
adjudication. 3. The penitentiary system shall comprise treatment of prisoners the essential aim of 
which shall be their reformation and social rehabilitation. Juvenile offenders shall be segregated 
from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age and legal status”. See also, e.g., 
Articles 37 and 25 Children’s Convention, Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of 
Prisoners (First UN Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 
Geneva 1955; approved by the Economic and Social Council, resolutions 663 C (XXIV), 31 July 
1957 and 2076 (LXII), 13 May 1977); Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under 
Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment (General Assembly res. 43/173, 9 December 1988); 
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (“The 
Beijing Rules”; GA res. 40/33, 29 November 1985); in general see e.g. Penal Reform 
International (2001) and Medina Quiroga (2005). 
233 HRC General Comment 21 on the right to humane treatment in detention (Article 10), 10 April 
1992. 
234 In HRC Valentini de Bazzano (also on behalf of her husband Bazzano Ambrosini, her stepfather 
Massera and her mother Valentini de Massera) v. Uruguay, 15 August 1979, the Committee 
found that prolonged incommunicado detention violated Article 10(1), §37. A few years later, in 
a case against Panama, it determined that the detention of the petitioner in a special cell with a 
mentally disturbed prisoner violated Article 10(1). Wolf v. Panama, 26 March 1992. Moreover, 
in a case against Hungary the Committee found that limiting exercise and hygiene periods to five 
minutes a day violated Article 10(1). See HRC Parkanyi v. Hungary, 27 July 1992. As a last 
example, in Abdool Saleem Yasseen and Noel Thomas v. Republic of Guyana, 30 March 1998, 
detainees were required to share mattresses and were deprived of natural lighting except for their 
one hour of daily recreation. This constituted a violation of Article 10(1) as well. 
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sion of inadequate food to detained individuals and the total absence of recreational facilities does 
not, save under exceptional circumstances, meet the requirements of Article 10”.235  
Just like the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,236 Article 10 
ICCPR sets some very basic minimum standards that fall below, for instance, those of the Com-
mittee to the European Convention against Torture. These minimum standards must be safe-
guarded ‘regardless of a State party’s level of development’. This means that ‘lack of resources’ 
is no excuse.237 The Inter-American Commission, the African Commission and the ECtHR have 
expressed themselves similarly.238 The Inter-American Commission, for instance, has pointed out 
that the minimum standards laid down in Article 5 ACHR ‘apply irrespective of the nature of the 
conduct for which a particular individual had been imprisoned’.239 They must be satisfied, more-
over, ‘even if the economic or budgetary circumstances of a State Party may render compliance 
difficult’.240 This case law on the positive obligations of States to guarantee minimum standards 
of detention, including access to health care, also underlies the use of provisional measures pend-
ing detention cases. 
Sometimes a complaint submitted to the HRC refers to Article 10(3) ICCPR.241 The main 
message of Article 10(3) is that ‘no penitentiary system should be merely retributory’. Each peni-
                                                 
235 HRC Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991. See also Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 
July 1990. 
236 Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners (resolution 1955/1977 adopted by the 
First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, 30 
August 1955; approved by United Nations Economic and Social Council resolution 663 C 
(XXIV) of 31 July 1957; and amended by ECOSOC resolution 2076 (LXII) of 13 May 1977) (a 
new rule 95 was added). See also: Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under any 
form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted by the General Assembly, 9 December 1988, 
Resolution 43/173; Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the role of Health Personnel, 
particularly Physicians, in the protection of prisoners and detainees against torture and other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, Adopted by the General Assembly of the 
United Nations on 18 December 1982, resolution 37/194; Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement 
Officials, adopted by United Nations General Assembly resolution 34/169 of 17 December 1979. 
237 The HRC determined this in a case against Cameroon, in which it also referred to the 
aforementioned Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners: “It should be noted that 
these are minimum requirements which the Committee considers should always be observed, 
even if economic or budgetary conditions may make compliance with these obligations difficult”. 
HRC Albert Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, 8 July 1992, §9.3. 
238 On other case law of these adjudicators see later in this section. 
239 CIDH Damion Thomas v. Jamaica, 4 April 2001 (merits), §37. The Commission points out that 
the ECtHR takes a similar approach: Ahmed v. Austria, Judgment of 17 December 1996, §38. 
240 CIDH Damion Thomas v. Jamaica, 4 April 2001 (merits), §37. The Commission referred here to 
its previous case law including Baptiste v. Grenada, Final Report 38/00, 13 April 2000, §136. 
241 Regarding political detainees see HRC Vasilskis v. Uruguay, 31 March 1983 and Oxandabarat 
Scarrone v. Uruguay, 4 November 1983. In Vasilskis the petitioner alleged on behalf of his sister 
‘that the penitentiary system is not aimed at reformation and social rehabilitation of prisoners but 
at the destruction of their will to resist. They are given a number and are never called by their 
name. Elena Beatriz Vasilskis is No. 433 of Sector B. Psychological pressures on the inmates are 
allegedly designed to lead them to denounce other inmates’. Two years later, on 20 March 1985, 
the victim’s brother informed the Committee about her release. By note of 25 March 1985 the 
State party itself informed the Committee about her release on 12 March 1985 on the basis of the 
amnesty act of 8 March 1985, which it confirmed by note of 31 October 1991. In Oxandabarat 
Scarrone a Uruguayan national living in Spain submitted, on 30 June 1981, a complaint on behalf 
of her father, detained in Uruguay. The complaint included specific allegations relating to her 
father’s health, including the statement of a medical doctor who had himself been detained at 
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tentiary system should ‘essentially seek the reformation and social rehabilitation of the pris-
oner’.242  
In this respect, when examining State reports, the Committee expects to receive information 
on work and education programmes and post release programmes, but it has never really ad-
dressed this issue as part of an individual complaint, nor has it used provisional measures specifi-
cally in this context. 
The HRC considers that there are elements in certain provisions of the ICCPR that could 
not be made subject to lawful derogation under Article 4, even though those provisions them-
selves are not listed in Article 4(2). It has mentioned some ‘illustrative examples’. These indicate 
the importance the HRC attaches to certain rights in the Covenant. It referred to the obligation, in 
Article 10, to treat all persons deprived of their liberty with humanity and with respect for the 
inherent dignity of the human person. This article expressed ‘a norm of general international law 
not subject to derogation’. This is ‘supported by the reference to the inherent dignity of the human 
person in the preamble to the Covenant and by the close connection between articles 7 and 10’.243 
The Committee’s provisional measures based on Article 10, relating to the health of detainees, 
reflect this awareness of the irreparable nature of violations of this article, as discussed in the 
previous section. 
The HRC has often dealt with complaints by death row prisoners about their conditions of 
detention. These complaints are often based upon Articles 7 and 10 ICCPR and involve beatings, 
threats and ill treatment upon arrest or in pre-trial detention. Thus far it has not used provisional 
measures to halt torture and ill treatment pending such cases. Some complaints have dealt not so 
much with inhumane conditions of detention as such, but rather with the death row phenomenon 
as a form of cruel treatment. The HRC has often declared them inadmissible because they were 
not properly raised in the domestic proceedings.244 It declared other claims inadmissible for insuf-
ficient substantiation.245 In such cases it has never used provisional measures either. 
                                                                                                                       
Libertad prison. He had examined several prisoners there, including the alleged victim. The 
report stated that the petitioner’s father had suffered a cranioencephalic traumatism in 1976-1977. 
Since then his ‘faculty of perceiving time and space is impaired’. She also alleged that ‘the prison 
regime to which her father is subjected is not designed to produce any kind of reform of 
rehabilitation but aims at psychological and physical annihilation’. 
242 HRC General Comment 21 on the right to humane treatment (Article 10), 10 April 1992. 
243 HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001. 
244 HRC Beresford Whyte v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998 (Medina Quiroga and Scheinin dissenting, 
considering respectively that the claim of beatings should have been dealt with on the merits and 
that a violation of Article 7 should have been established). 
245 See e.g. HRC Samuel Thomas v. Jamaica, 31 March 1999. The petitioner had claimed that he 
was badly beaten by police officers or threatened with further physical violence. Jamaica 
informed the Committee that it had been unable to investigate the petitioner’s allegation ‘in the 
absence of additional information, such as the place where the author was held, the time at which 
the incident allegedly occurred and if possible the name(s) of the officers involved’. The 
Committee noted that the allegations in relation to the treatment while he was in police detention 
were very vague and it considered that it was incumbent upon an alleged victim to provide 
sufficient information so that a State party may investigate an allegation. The HRC also noted 
that the State party did in fact request additional information in order to investigate the claims. It 
found that the information provided by the author and his counsel was insufficient for the State 
party to be able to adequately investigate the matter. Although this position seems clear, it could 
have asked the State party why it did not know the place where the petitioner was held. While in 
the absence of additional information the State party cannot be expected to know how to 
investigate allegations, a State party should be able to find out in which place it has held a person 
in police detention. About the consequences of failure of counsel during the hearing before the 
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In a case against Georgia the Committee found the State responsible for severe beatings and 
physical and moral pressure. This included concussion and broken bones, wounding and burning, 
scarring, torture and threats to family members.246 It is acknowledged internationally that not only 
physical treatment can amount to torture and ill treatment, but also psychological pressure. As 
Rodley explains in his standard work on the treatment of prisoners in international law, psycho-
logical torture is more sophisticated than physical torture in that it leaves little physical trace. 
Examples of psychological torture are: deprivation of light, deprivation of darkness, deprivation 
of sound or sleep, general disorientation, threats of mutilation or death, mock execution and, of 
course, the threat that physical abuses will be extended to persons close to the prisoner.247 On the 
basis of its traditional jurisprudence, if the HRC would find a violation of Articles 7 and 10 this 
would not warrant ‘an appropriate remedy including commutation’.248 Apart from a few cases 
involving corporal punishment,249 as of yet there are no known cases in which the HRC inter-
vened to put an end to (psychological) torture and ill treatment pending the proceedings. 
3.3 Inter-American system 
The law of the Inter-American system is comparable to Article 7 jo. 10 ICCPR as Article 5 
ACHR not only prohibits torture and ill treatment but also provides that every person has the right 
to respect for his physical, mental and moral integrity. Among others, the Inter-American Court 
has pointed out that ‘(i)n the context of health care institutions, whether they are public or private 
centers, the staff in charge of the care of patients exercise a strong control or dominance over 
persons who are under their custody. The intrinsic imbalance in power between hospitalized 
patients and the persons having authority over them is usually greater in psychiatric institu-
tions’.250 It also noted that ‘the personal features of an alleged victim of torture or cruel, inhuman, 
or degrading treatment should be taken into consideration when determining whether his or her 
personal integrity has been violated, for such features may change the insight of his or her indi-
vidual reality and, therefore, increase the suffering and the sense of humiliation when the person 
is subjected to certain types of treatment’.251  
With regard to persons deprived of their liberty Article 5 ACHR provides in particular that 
they shall be treated with respect to their inherent dignity.252 Among others, it stipulates that 
                                                                                                                       
domestic court to substantiate the assault, as well as the lack of medical documents corroborating 
the assault see also Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998. 
246 HRC Victor Domukovsky, Zaza Tsiklauri, Petre Gelbakhiani and Irakli Dokvadze v. Georgia, 6 
April 1998. 
247 See Rodley (1999), p. 10. It is troubling to note that prisoners in the US cannot appeal to even a 
domestic court when they are subjected to psychological torture (Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(1996)). See e.g. Tushnet/Yackle (1997) and Robertson (2000). About the importance of access 
to Court and counsel, also to prevent ill-treatment, see e.g. the precautionary measures by the 
Inter-American Commission with regard to the extraterritorial detention by the U.S. at 
Guantanamo, see Chapter VIII (Procedural rights). 
248 See the discussion about the relationship between provisional measures and the decision on 
reparation in Chapter XIII. 
249 See Chapter XII (Other situations), section 2. 
250 IACHR Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Judgment of 4 July 2006, §107. See also §129 and §140. 
251 Id., §127. 
252 As the IACHR noted in Neira Alegría et al. (Peru), Judgment of 19 January 1995: “In essence, 
Article 5 refers to the rule that nobody should be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman, or 
degrading punishment or treatment, and that all persons deprived of their liberty must be treated 
with respect for the inherent dignity of the human person”. 
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‘(m)inors while subject to criminal proceedings shall be separated from adults and brought before 
specialised tribunals, as speedily as possible, so that they may be treated in accordance with their 
status as minors’. This special attention to minors has been important in the practice of the Inter-
American system with regard to provisional measures. Article 5 ACHR also provides that 
‘(p)unishments consisting of deprivation of liberty shall have as an essential aim the reform and 
social readaptation of the prisoners’. In addition the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man provides in Article I: “Every human being has the right to life, liberty and security 
of his person”. Article XXV lays down the right to humane treatment of everyone in custody and 
Article XXVI prohibits ‘cruel, infamous or unusual punishment’.253 In addition, in 2008 the Inter-
American Commission adopted Principles and Best Practices on the Protection of Persons De-
prived of Liberty in the Americas.254 
The Inter-American Commission has often dealt with complaints about prison situations 
and the obligations of OAS member states. Section 2 has already discussed many Inter-American 
cases. What underlies these cases is the general approach of the Commission and Court towards 
the right to life and respect for personal integrity, which is in turn comparable to that of the other 
human rights adjudicators. The Court has pointed out that the right to life is fundamental to the 
ACHR, as all other rights depend upon it.255 States have the obligation to guarantee the creation 
of the necessary conditions for the full exercise of this right. Moreover, the right to respect for 
personal integrity is of such importance that its protection is particularly emphasized in the 
ACHR, among others by the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment and the 
impossibility to suspend this prohibition during times of emergency.256 The right to life and re-
spect for personal integrity do not just imply negative obligations, but positive obligations as well, 
in order for States to comply with the general obligation laid down in Article 1(1) ACHR.257 
Apart from this general attention, the Court has pointed out the particular obligations vis-à-
vis detainees.258 Persons deprived of their liberty are in a special situation of powerlessness vis-à-
vis the authorities so that States have a special obligation towards them.259 The duty to adopt 
security measures ‘is more evident since these persons are detained in the state detention centers, 
and under such circumstances the State plays a special role as guarantor of the rights of the per-
sons that remain under its custody’.260 Detainees have the right to live in conditions of detention 
                                                 
253 In a resolution of 5 June 2001 the OAS General Assembly expressed its concern over the state of 
penitentiary systems and detention centres in various countries of the Americas. It noted that ‘this 
situation hinders and can even prevent the social rehabilitation of convicts, which is the essential 
aim of prison sentences, according to the Pact of San José’. It pointed out that ‘the topic of all 
aspects of health in prisons is part of the hemispheric agenda’. It only resolved, however, to 
instruct the Permanent Council to consider the advisability of a study on this issue. General 
Assembly Resolution ‘Study of the rights and care of persons under any form of detention or 
imprisonment’, 5 June 2001, AG/RES.1816 (XXXI-O/01). 
254 CIDH Resolution 1/08, 13 March 2008, OEA/Ser/L/V/II.131 doc. 26. 
255 See e.g. IACHR “Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” (Paraguay), Judgment of 2 September 
2004, §156. 
256 Id., §157, referring to Articles 5 and 27 ACHR. 
257 Id., §158. 
258  See e.g. IACHR Asunto de la Cárcel de Urso Branco (Brasil), Resolución de 2 de mayo de 2008, 
19th ‘Considering’ clause. 
259 IACHR “Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” (Paraguay), Judgment of 2 September 2004, §152. 
Significantly, the Court also refers to its Order for provisional measures in the Gómez Paquiyauri 
brothers case, Order of 7 May 2004, 13th ‘Considering’ clause. 
260 See IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the “Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira” 
Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, 11th ‘Considering’ 
clause, referring to Matter of Children Deprived of Liberty in the “Complexo do Tatuapé” of 
FEBEM, Order of 17 November 2005, 7th ‘Considering’ clause; Matter of Urso Branco Prison, 
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that are compatible with their personal dignity. The State has the obligation to respect and ensure 
their right to life and personal integrity.261 It must do so, among others, by guaranteeing minimum 
conditions of detention compatible with their dignity.262 As Judge García Ramírez has pointed 
out, the State cannot avoid the peremptory duty to ‘protect the life and integrity of individuals 
who are subjected to its immediate, complete and constant control and lack, by themselves, the 
effective ability of self-determination and defence’.263 In detention situations the role of the State 
as guarantor is particularly intense and it is thus reasonable to ‘require that the State must avoid, 
immediately and absolutely, losing human lives as a consequence of violent conditions ruling in 
prisons, as the result of a direct action by State’s agents, or as actions of other people, that the 
State should avoid and prevent’.264 
The Court has also stressed that upon a finding of a violation the Court must, as a guarantee 
of non-repetition, ‘take all necessary actions to allow prison conditions to conform to interna-
tional standards’.265 
The Court has also pointed out that the protection of the life of the child ‘requires the State 
to pay special attention to the conditions of a child’s life while it is deprived of liberty, because 
this right has not extinguished or been restricted owing to detention or imprisonment’.266 
Previously, in a case against Honduras dealing with the detention of minors, the Commis-
sion referred to the Judgment of the Inter-American Court in Neira Alegría,267 emphasising that 
the State is the institution responsible for detention establishments and the guarantor of the right 
to life and humane treatment of prisoners.268 In this light the Commission elaborated on the posi-
tion of detainees in general and the ensuing responsibility of the State. 
“[T]he State, by depriving a person of his liberty, places itself in the unique position of 
guarantor of his right to life and to humane treatment. When it detains an individual, the State 
introduces that individual into a “total institution” – such as a prison – where the various aspects 
of his life are subject to an established regimen; where the prisoner is removed from his natural 
and social milieu; where the established regimen is one of absolute control, a loss of privacy, 
limitation of living space and, above all, a radical decline in the individual’s means of defending 
himself. All this means that the act of imprisonment carries with it a specific and material 
commitment to protect the prisoner’s human dignity so long as that individual is in the custody 
of the State, which includes protecting him from possible circumstances that could imperil his 
life, health and personal integrity, among other rights”.269 
                                                                                                                       
Order of 21 September 2005, 6th ‘Considering’ clause; and Matter of the Mendoza Prisons, Order 
of 18 June 2005, 6th ‘Considering’ clause. See also e.g. Matter of Capital El rodeo I and El 
Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, Order of 8 February 2008, 11th ‘Considering’ clause. 
261 See e.g. IACHR “Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” (Paraguay), Judgment of 2 September 
2004, §151 and Hilaire, Constantine, Benjamin et al., Judgment of 21 June 2002, §165. 
262 IACHR “Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” (Paraguay), Judgment of 2 September 2004, §159. 
263 IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and el Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, Order of 8 
February 2008, separate opinion Judge García Ramírez (joined by Judge Medina Quiroga), §15. 
264 Id., §16. 
265 See IACHR Montero Arangunen et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Judgment of 5 
July 2006. 
266 IACHR Bulacio case, Judgment of 18 September 2003, §126 and Matter of children deprived of 
liberty in the ‘Complexo do Tataupé’ of FEBEM, Order of 4 July 2006, 9th ‘Considering’ clause 
and of 3 July 2007, 8th ‘Considering’ clause. 
267 IACHR Neira Alegría et al., Judgment of 19 January 1995, §60. 
268 Given the reasoning this would also apply in case of privatization. 
269 CIDH Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §135. 
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According to Article XI American Declaration “Every person has the right to the preservation of 
his health through sanitary and social measures relating to food, clothing, housing and medical 
care, to the extent permitted by public and community resources”. The Commission has empha-
sised that ‘as the state exercises exclusive control over all aspects of a prisoner’s life and well-
being, it is subject to an enhanced obligation to supervise and secure for prisoners the minimum 
standards of humane treatment prescribed under Art. 5 of the Convention’.  
In light of the specific commitment derived from the act of imprisonment, the Commission 
pointed out that the State had a specific obligation to protect prisoners from attacks by third par-
ties including other inmates. If it failed to do so, it violated Article 5 ACHR and incurred interna-
tional responsibility. This was all the more so with regard to prisoners who are defenceless or at a 
disadvantage, ‘as in the case of juveniles’.270 The Commission was very clear in this respect:  
“In the Commission’s view, the State’s duty to protect the personal integrity of any person 
deprived of liberty includes the obligation to take all measures necessary to prevent attacks and 
assaults against a prisoner by agents of the State or private individuals. These obligations 
become all the more compelling when juveniles are involved. In such cases, the State must not 
only endeavour to protect their personal integrity, but also to promote the full development of 
their personality and their reintegration into society”.271  
The Inter-American system has dealt extensively with the rights of minors in detention. It added 
to the general responsibility of the State to protect persons, and the specific responsibility to 
protect the personal integrity of persons in detention, the even greater responsibility to protect 
minors in detention. Thus the Inter-American Court has pointed out that when children are 
detained, the State has yet additional obligations under Art. 19 ACHR, taking into account the 
special position of children and the concept of ‘best interest of the child’.272 Articles 6 and 27 UN 
Children’s Convention include in the right to life the obligation to ‘ensure to the maximum extent 
possible the survival and development of the child’. The UN Committee supervising this 
Convention has interpreted the term ‘development’ broadly, encompassing the physical, mental, 
spiritual, moral, psychological and social.273 In that light States have the obligation to ensure 
detained children are not deprived of their ‘project of life’.274 In that sense, the Inter-American 
Court has noted that Rule 13 of the UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their 
Liberty275 establishes that ‘Juveniles deprived of their liberty shall not for any reason related to 
their status be denied the civil, economic, political, social or cultural rights to which they are 
entitled under national or international law, and which are compatible with the deprivation of 
                                                 
270 Id., §§136-137. 
271 Id., §140. The Commission also referred here to article 40 of the Children’s Convention. 
272 IACHR “Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” (Paraguay), Judgment of 2 September 2004, 
§160; see also e.g. its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Position and Rights of Children, 28 August 
2002, §§56 and 60. 
273 UN Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Observation of 27 November 2003, §12. 
274 IACHR “Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” (Paraguay), Judgment of 2 September 2004, §161, 
among others referring to its Advisory Opinion on the Legal Position and Rights of Children, 28 
August 2002, §§80-81, 84 and 86-88 and Rule 13.5 of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the 
Administration of Juvenile Justice, (‘The Beijing Rules’), GA 40/33, 29 November 1985. On the 
notion of ‘project of life’ see e.g. IACHR Loayza Tamayo (Peru), 27 November 1998 
(Reparations), §§147-148, referring to the project of life as ‘akin to the concept of personal 
fulfilment, which in turn is based on the options that an individual may have for leading his life 
and achieving the goal that he sets for himself’, §148. See further Chapter XI (Mass expulsion), 
section 2 and Chapter XII (Other situations), section 2.1. 
275 G.A. res. 45/113, annex, 45 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49A) at 205, U.N. Doc. A/45/49 (1990). 
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liberty’.276 Closely related to the argument that the right to life to some extent entails a certain 
quality of life are the obligations of the State regarding the personal integrity of detained children. 
In determining whether treatment or punishment is cruel, inhuman or degrading the fact that those 
subjected to it are children must by necessity be taken into account.277 These findings on the 
merits clearly support the use of provisional measures to protect the life and personal integrity of 
minors in detention. 
3.4 African system 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights contains a provision that is similar to Article 
5 ACHR and Article 7 jo.10 ICCPR and, as the African Commission has noted, Article 5 ACHPR 
‘prohibits not only torture, but also cruel, inhuman or psychological suffering’. “This includes not 
only actions which cause serious physical or psychological suffering, but which humiliate the 
individual or force him or her to act against his will or conscience”.278 The African Commission 
has a Special Rapporteur on prisons and prison conditions who visits States and prepares re-
ports.279 The Rapporteur may also intervene in urgent cases. In 2002 the African Commission, the 
Association for the Prevention of Torture (APT) and several other NGOs, institutions and experts 
adopted the ‘Robben Island Guidelines’ for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa. Regarding conditions of detention 
these Guidelines reiterate the importance of separating pre-trial detainees from convicted persons 
and of ensuring that ‘juveniles, women, and other vulnerable groups are held in appropriate and 
separate detention facilities’. Moreover States should encourage the use of non-custodial sen-
tences for minor crimes and take other measures to reduce over-crowding in places of deten-
tion.280 
Like the aforementioned Article XI of the American Declaration Article 16 ACHPR stipu-
lates that every individual shall have the right to enjoy the ‘best attainable state of physical and 
mental health’ and States parties shall take the necessary measures to ‘ensure that they receive 
medical attention when they are sick’. Analogous to the Inter-American Commission the African 
Commission has pointed out that the State’s responsibility under Article 16 ACHPR is even more 
evident in detention situations ‘to the extent that detention centres are its exclusive preserve, 
hence the physical integrity and welfare of detainees is the responsibility of the competent public 
authorities’.281 Denying a detainee access to doctors while his health is deteriorating is a violation 
of Article 16. After all ‘the authority of the government is heightened in cases where the individ-
ual is in its custody and therefore someone whose integrity and well-being is completely depend-
ent on the activities of the authorities’.282 
                                                 
276 IACHR “Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” (Paraguay), Judgment of 2 September 2004, §161. 
277 Id., §162. The Court also referred to the Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers case (Peru), 8 July 2004, 
§170 as well as Rule 26(2) of the UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of 
Juvenile Justice, (‘The Beijing Rules’), GA 40/33, 29 November 1985. 
278 ACHPR International Pen and Others (on behalf of Ken Saro-Wiwa) v. Nigeria, 31 October 
1998, §79. 
279 Until recently this was Commissioner Vera Chirwa who had previously been the subject of a 
petition before the Commission. 
280 Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Africa (The Robben Island Guidelines, §§ 35-37). 
281 ACHPR Malawi African Association and Others v. Mauritania, 11 May 2000, §120. 
282 ACHPR Media Rights Agenda and others v. Nigeria, 31 October 1998, §91. 
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The African Commission has confirmed that the prohibition of torture, cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment or punishment is absolute.283 It has emphasized, in reference to the UN Body 
of Principles, that the obligations under Article 5 are to be interpreted ‘so as to extend the widest 
possible protection against abuses, whether physical or mental’.284 Denying medical attention 
‘under health-threatening conditions’ and denying ‘access to the outside world’ showed lack of 
respect for the ‘dignity inherent in a human being’ and for the ‘recognition of his legal status’. 
Such denial did not respect principles 1 and 6 of the UN Body of Principles for the Protection of 
all Persons under any form of detention or imprisonment. Thus it also constituted a breach of 
Article 5 ACHR.285 All of this serves as a foundation for the Commission’s use of provisional 
measures in detention cases. 
3.5 European system  
Apart from many cases on the lawfulness of detention286 the case law on detention of the Euro-
pean Commission and Court has involved the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment in (police) 
detention. Sometimes this specifically related to positive obligations of the State, once more 
indicating that their provisional measures in detention cases can be based on substantive case law. 
In the Greek Case, for instance, the European Commission found that overcrowding, inadequate 
heating, inadequate sleeping and toilet facilities, insufficient food, recreation and contacts with 
the outside world constituted a violation of Article 3 ECHR.287 In Cyprus v. Turkey the European 
Commission found the failure to provide sufficient food, water and medical assistance in deten-
tion centres constituted inhuman treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR.288 In Hurtado v. Switzer-
land it found a violation because the State had failed to provide appropriate medical assistance 
during the first six days after his arrest to a prisoner whose rib was fractured.289  
As noted, in Lorsé et al. v. the Netherlands (2003) the ECtHR had refused to take provi-
sional measures for a prison transfer or, more generally, to take measures to halt further violations 
of Article 3. While the Court did not find that the petitioner had been subjected to sensory isola-
tion, it pointed out that it did ‘not diverge from the view’ expressed by the European Committee 
for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) that the 
situation in the prison in Vught ‘is problematic and gives cause for concern’. Moreover, the Court 
noted it was ‘struck by the fact that Mr Lorsé was submitted to the weekly strip-search in addition 
to all the other strict security measures within the EBI’. It considered that this systematic strip-
searching required more justification than the Dutch government had provided, exactly because of 
the awareness by the authorities of the petitioner’s ‘serious difficulties coping with the regime’ 
and the fact that nothing untoward was ever found during the strip searches. Thus, it found that 
the combination of routine strip-searching with the other stringent security measures amounted to 
inhuman or degrading treatment in violation of Article 3.290  
Even if, in the circumstances, it decides not to indicate the specific measures suggested by 
counsel (such as in this case prison transfer), it could decide to take more generally worded meas-
                                                 
283 See e.g. ACHPR Huri-Laws v. Nigeria, October/November 2000, §41. 
284 ACHPR Huri-Laws v. Nigeria, October/November 2000, §40. 
285 Id., §41. 
286 See e.g. ECtHR Conka v. Belgium, Judgment of 5 February 2002 and Amuur et al. v. France, 
Judgment of 25 June 1996. 
287 EComHR Greek Case (first), 5 November 1969. 
288 EComHR Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 July 1976. 
289 EComHR Hurtado v. Switzerland, 26 January 1994. 
290 ECtHR Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 4 February 2003 (former first section). See 
also Van der Ven v. The Netherlands, Judgment of 4 February 2003 (former first section). 
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ures, as counsel had suggested in this case as well. Provisional measures that are more specific 
might be possible as well, especially in systems with a well-developed jurisprudence on repara-
tions.291 Pending the proceedings the adjudicator could order a State to re-examine its strip-search 
practice with regard to a petitioner and inform it urgently on the security concerns requiring this 
practice. It could subsequently order a halt to such searches taking place routinely even when the 
petitioner has had no contact with the outside world. 
While the European Commission has sometimes intervened in the past in cases involving 
psychological distress, the case law on the merits is not that liberal. In Kudla v. Poland (2000) the 
petitioner had complained, among others, that he had not received adequate psychiatric treatment 
during his detention on remand. The Commission considered Article 3 had been violated, but the 
Court found otherwise. It pointed out that Article 3 cannot be interpreted ‘as laying down a gen-
eral obligation to release a detainee on health grounds or to place him in a civil hospital to enable 
him to obtain a particular kind of medical treatment’.292 “Nevertheless, under this provision the 
State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his 
human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to 
distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in deten-
tion and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are ade-
quately secured by, among other things, providing him with the requisite medical assistance”.293 
In this case it accepted that ‘the very nature’ of ‘his psychological condition made him more 
vulnerable than the average detainee and that his detention may have exacerbated to a certain 
extent his feelings of distress, anguish and fear’. It also took note of the fact that he was kept in 
custody for six weeks ‘despite a psychiatric opinion that continuing detention could jeopardize his 
life because of a likelihood of attempted suicide’. Yet ‘on the basis of the evidence before it and 
assessing the relevant facts as a whole,’ it did not find it established that the petitioner was sub-
jected to ‘ill-treatment that attained a sufficient level of severity to come within the scope of 
Article 3 of the Convention’.294 
On the other hand, the Court does take into account the work of the prison visiting Commit-
tee introduced under the European Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment. This treaty introduced non-judicial preventive machinery to 
protect detainees. It is based on a system of visits of prisons and other facilities in which people 
are deprived of their liberty by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhu-
man or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT).295 This Committee sometimes intervenes 
informally in pressing health situations of individual (groups of) detainees, especially in the con-
text of prison visits. Moreover, Rule 32 of its Rules of Procedure, on ad hoc visits stipulates that 
in addition to its regular visits, ‘the Committee may carry out such ad hoc visits as appear to it to 
be required in the circumstances’. When the Committee is not in session, the Bureau (consisting 
of a smaller group of CPT members and several staff members servicing the Committee) may, ‘in 
case of urgency, decide on the Committee's behalf on the carrying out of an ad hoc visit’. “The 
President of the Committee shall report to the Committee at its next meeting on any action which 
has been taken under this paragraph”.296 The activities of CAT under the new Optional Protocol 
Optional Protocol to the Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
                                                 
291 See further Chapter XIII (Protection). 
292 ECtHR Kudla v. Poland, Judgment of 26 October 2000, §93. 
293 Id., §94. 
294 Id., §99. 
295 See also Recommendation (2006)2 of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers to member 
States on the European Prison Rules, adopted 11 January 2006 (952nd meeting). 
296 CPT Rules of Procedure CPT/Inf/C (2008) 1. 
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Treatment or Punishment297 (comparable to the European Convention against Torture) will likely 
confirm this. Its entry into force may also trigger cases being brought before CAT under the 
individual complaint proceedings, with the ensuing possibility of CAT using provisional meas-
ures in detention cases in a manner similar to that of the other adjudicators. 
4 CONCLUSION 
In several cases the human rights adjudicators have shown sensitivity towards the health and 
safety of detainees pending the proceedings.  
The HRC has used (informal) provisional measures mainly, but not exclusively, on behalf 
of political detainees. It seems to have used requests to ensure access to medical care and requests 
for information interchangeably. The HRC has not clarified why it used informal provisional 
measures dealing with medical treatment (either requests for information or requests to ensure) 
under Rule 91 (current Rule 97) rather than formal provisional measures under Rule 86 (current 
Rule 92), but this may be explained by the fact that it initiated the tradition in its early years. It 
has not clearly distinguished those situations in which it only enquires about the health situation 
of a detainee from those in which it requests the State to take positive measures to ensure ade-
quate medical care. In general its approach has been cumulative, first only inquiring, later also 
requesting positive measures. There are several cases in which the HRC requested the State to 
ensure adequate medical treatment pending the proceedings. Sometimes it has also mentioned the 
need to ensure this in its decision on the merits. Hence, in such cases there is a clear correlation 
between the ‘procedural’ request and the final determination of the case.  
A request by the HRC for information about the health situation of a detainee is partly based 
on the Committee’s hope that it will influence the State to pay more attention to the health of the 
detainees involved, partly simply meant to help make a decision on the merits. A request to pro-
vide treatment, on the contrary, amounts to specifically asking the State for positive action. Such 
action clearly is required not just on behalf of the proceedings but on behalf of the alleged victim. 
In other words, it relates to the possible final outcome of the case.  
Thus far the HRC has never used (informal) provisional measures in order to remedy deten-
tion situations for prisoners on death row (such as relating to a deteriorating health situation), 
although it has sometimes suggested such measures in decisions on the merits. One reason for this 
may be that the Secretariat only consults the Special Rapporteur on New Communications to 
initiate the case for registration and for any provisional measures. It generally does not consult the 
Rapporteur on New Communications when it subsequently receives information relating to 
threats or lack of medical treatment. It simply prepares this information for the Committee mem-
ber assigned to the case when it will be discussed on admissibility and merits. It is recommended 
that the HRC should change this approach. 
The Inter-American Commission and Court, the European Commission and Court and the 
Bosnia Chamber have also used provisional measures on behalf of ‘non-political’ detainees. Apart 
from demanding information adjudicators have also specifically requested States to ensure access 
to health care in detention. Because of the vulnerability of children circumstances of detention 
more rapidly result in irreparable harm to children than to adults. In their provisional measures, 
the HRC, the Inter-American Commission and the Inter-American Court have dealt with the 
specific situation of children in detention. 
                                                 
297 Adopted on 18 December 2002 at the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly of the 
United Nations by resolution A/RES/57/199. 
 Intervening in Detention Situations Involving Risks 
383 
Provisional measures have been used to order a halt to violent situations in detention. This 
chapter also argued that the use of provisional measures to order a halt to disputed interrogation 
methods or treatment in detention is certainly feasible as well. 
On occasion the European Commission and Court have used provisional measures vis-à-vis 
the petitioners instead of the State in order for them to stop their hunger strike. The Inter-
American Commission and Court do not use provisional measures to this end.298 The European 
Court has incidentally used provisional measures to halt re-imprisonment of petitioners who had 
been hospitalized because of the after-effects of long-term hunger-strikes, which indicates its 
focus on preventing irreparable harm.  
Both the texts of the respective provisions and the interpretation of the adjudicators in deci-
sions on the merits confirm the fundamental nature of the prohibition of torture and cruel treat-
ment, the special position of detainees and the positive obligations of States to ensure their access 
to health care and respect their dignity. The use of provisional measures requiring States to take 
protective measures on behalf of detainees in various contexts, while the case is pending, is firmly 
based on this case law. 
 
 
                                                 
298 See also Chapter XIII, section 4, criticizing the European approach. 
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 CHAPTER VIII 
 ENSURING PROCEDURAL RIGHTS TO PROTECT 
 THE RIGHT TO LIFE AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The HRC, the Inter-American Commission and the ECtHR have used provisional measures re-
questing States to provide information on and ensure access to court and counsel for persons 
detained incommunicado.1 At first sight these measures relate to due process and arbitrary deten-
tion and are not aimed at preventing irreparable harm to persons, but rather to the claim and, 
indirectly, to the individual complaint procedure. Yet this chapter argues that these provisional 
measures also aim at preventing irreparable harm to persons. They appear to have been based on 
fears for the life and physical integrity of the persons detained.  
The issues of incommunicado detention and access to court and counsel have received in-
creasing attention in the context of the counter-terrorism measures introduced by the US after the 
terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, mainly in the context of extra-territorial detention of so-
called ‘unlawful combatants’, for instance at Guantanamo Bay.2 
The provisional measures used in order to ensure procedural rights3 could be considered a 
very rudimentary form of international habeas corpus, aimed at helping ensure domestic habeas 
corpus in the most serious cases. Indeed, one could also consider, as Cançado Trindade does, that 
all provisional measures are a ‘kind of an embryo of an international habeas corpus’,4 not just 
those aimed at ensuring procedural rights, but this chapter just deals with the latter. 
                                                 
1 Similar to its requests to provide information about and medical attention for an alleged victim or 
to protect against threats, mentioned in the previous chapters. 
2 See e.g. Joint Report on the Situation of detainees at Guantánamo Bay prepared by the Chairper-
son of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, the Special Rapporteur on torture, the 
Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, the Special Rapporteur on 
freedom of religion or believe and the Special Rapporteur on the right of everyone the enjoy the 
highest attainable standard of physical and mental health, E/CN.4/2006/120, 27 February 2006. 
See in general about the respect for human rights in this context e.g. Report of the UN Special 
Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, E/CN.4/2006/98, 28 December 2005 and Communications 
with Governments, E/CN.4/2006/98/Add. 1, 23 December 2005; Report, UN Independent Expert 
Robert Goldman on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
while countering terrorism, E/CN.4/2005/103, 7 February 2005; UN High Commissioner’s Di-
gest of Jurisprudence on Terrorism, 28 July 2003, <http://www.unhchr.ch/html/ 
menu6/2/digest.doc> (last consulted 2 October 2006); CIDH report on terrorism and human 
rights, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.116, Doc. 5 rev.1 corr., 22 October 2002; Guidelines of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe on human rights and the fight against terrorism, 11 July 2002. 
See also The Berlin Declaration of the International Commission of Jurists on Upholding Human 
Rights and the Rule of Law in Combating Terrorism, 28 August 2004 and The Cleveland Princi-
ples on the Detention & Treatment of Persons in Connection with ‘The Global War on Terror’, 
adopted at a Conference at Case Western Reserve University School of Law, Ohio, 7 October 
2005 and subsequently endorsed by many other experts. 
3 This book deals with procedural rights. 
4 Interview of author with IACHR President Cançado Trindade, San José, Costa Rica, December 
2001. 
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As in the previous chapters, section 3 deals with the relation of these provisional measures 
to the decisions on the merits. They all involve procedural rights cases linked to the right to life 
and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment.  
2 THE PRACTICE OF THE ADJUDICATORS 
2.1 Introduction 
The HRC, the Inter-American and African Commissions and the ECtHR have all used provisional 
measures ensuring procedural rights. 
2.2 HRC 
There have been a few cases in which the HRC has used formal or ‘informal’ provisional meas-
ures concerning the right of habeas corpus, access to counsel, family and consul.5 
In Marais v. Madagascar (1983) the alleged victim, a South African national, had been a 
passenger on a chartered aircraft that had been forced to make an emergency landing in Madagas-
car in January 1977, because of lack of fuel. Together with the pilot he was arrested and tried for 
flying over Malagasy territory and sentenced to five-year imprisonment.6 In March 1981, two 
years after initial submission, the HRC noted with concern that it had received no further informa-
tion or clarifications in response to two earlier requests. It ‘strongly urged’ the State to provide 
this information without delay, including on the alleged victim’s state of health and whereabouts. 
In addition it requested information on his access to his legal representative, Maître Eric Hammel. 
It requested the State to remove any obstacles barring Hammel’s access to his client, ‘should there 
hitherto have been any obstacles’. The State should ‘ensure that the lawyer and his client had the 
proper facilities for effective access to each other’.7 When the HRC declared the case admissible 
it reiterated that the State party should ensure proper access to legal counsel and on the merits it 
found a violation of Article 14(3)(b) and (d) ICCPR because the authorities had denied the peti-
tioner adequate opportunities to communicate with his counsel, Maître Hammel.8  
In Muteba v. Zaire (1990)9 the HRC requested the State, almost a month after initial sub-
mission in 1982, to inform it whether Mr. Muteba had been able to contact a lawyer and whether 
he had been brought before a court.10 This was a request additional to the usual request for copies 
of court decisions. Possibly the HRC decided to ask this additional question not just because it 
needed it in order to make a determination on the merits, but also as an informal intervention, 
pending the proceedings before it, to remind the State to ensure access to counsel as well as the 
right to habeas corpus. In March 1983 the HRC declared Muteba’s case admissible. Again it 
requested the State to inform it whether the alleged victim ‘had effective contacts with a lawyer 
and whether he had been brought before a court’.11 Subsequently it found violations of Articles 7 
                                                 
5 See about ‘informal’ provisional measures Chapter VI (Disappearances). 
6 See also HRC John Wight v. Madagascar, 1 April 1985. 
7 See also Chapter VII on intervention in detention situations involving risks to health and safety.  
8 On 11 February 1982 Maître Hammel was expelled from Madagascar. From France he continued 
to represent Dave Marais before the HRC. 
9 HRC Muteba v. Congo (Zaire), 24 July 1984. 
10 See also the health inquiry and request to ensure adequate medical care. 
11 HRC admissibility decision of 25 March 1983 as referred to in Muteba v. Congo (Zaire), 24 July 
1984, §7. 
 Ensuring Procedural Rights to Protect the Right to Life and Personal Integrity 
387 
and 10, in particular in light of his incommunicado detention. He was entitled to ‘effective reme-
dies, including compensation’ and the State was required to halt an inquiry, punish those respon-
sible and to ‘take steps to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future’.12 
A. et al. v. Angola (disc. 2000) was another case relating to a private airplane from South 
Africa, 21 years after the case against Madagascar.13 The plane had been forced to land by the 
Angolan authorities. Counsel for five passengers and three crew members on board the aircraft 
approached the South-African Department of Foreign Affairs as well as the HRC. She pointed out 
that her clients had been detained for almost four weeks without formal charge, during which time 
the South-African consulate had not been allowed access to them. Neither the South-African 
authorities nor the families had received any information about their detention or about legal 
assistance. She noted that family members of three of them had flown to Angola but had been 
denied access to the detainees. She emphasized that due to the lack of information, family mem-
bers feared for the safety of the detainees.14 She requested urgent attention to her clients’ plight, 
as they had already been detained for almost a month. She pointed out that, according to the 
information available, there had been no military equipment or cargo of a dubious nature on board 
the aircraft, but rather foodstuffs and building materials. She pointed out that the Angolan authori-
ties had not afforded consular access to the South-African authorities. There was no information 
whatsoever on the reasons for their detention or what was going to happen to them. Because of 
this they were also unable to appoint a legal representative in Angola: there were neither instruc-
tions nor factual information on the basis of which such a representative could represent the de-
tainees effectively and properly. In light of the unwillingness to provide information and allow 
access to them she argued her clients should be released immediately.15 A few weeks later coun-
sel pointed out that the captain, the co-pilot and the flight engineer had been released and sent 
back to South-Africa. Counsel spoke with two of them, from which conversation it appeared that 
they were not aware of the reasons for their release and did not know the whereabouts of the 
passengers. According to counsel it appeared from this conversation that the persons still detained 
were passengers ‘who could quite possibly not have been aware as to where the flight was going 
to go and what the purpose of the flight was’. She requested advice on what could be done to 
secure their prompt release.16  
Upon receipt of this submission by counsel the Special Rapporteur transmitted the case to 
the State in as far as it concerned the five persons still detained. He also formally used provisional 
measures requesting the State to bring the detainees ‘before a court without delay, and to allow 
them access to their legal representative, family and the South-African consul’.17  
These three cases dealt with by the HRC may be linked to lack of information and fears for 
the lives and physical integrity of detainees, often detained incommunicado. 
                                                 
12 HRC Muteba v. Congo (Zaire), 24 July 1984, §13. 
13 HRC A. et al. v. Angola, disc. 1 August 2000. 
14 HRC Letter by counsel of 13 February 1998 in A. et al. v. Angola (on file with the author). 
15 HRC Submission of 18 February 1998 in A. et al. v. Angola (on file with the author). 
16 HRC Submission of 10 March 1998 in A. et al. v. Angola (on file with the author). 
17 HRC Note Verbale to the State of 10 March 1998, A. et al. v. Angola (on file with the author). In 
May and August of that year the HRC requested information from counsel and in January 2001 it 
informed her that it had decided to discontinue the case in the absence of replies to its letters. 
Letter to counsel of 3 January 2001 informing her of the decision at the Committee’s 69th session 
to discontinue the case (on file with the author). 
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2.3 Inter-American system 
In February 2002 US NGOs filed a petition with the Inter-American Commission calling illegal 
the detention at Guantanamo Bay (the US naval base in Cuba) of al-Qaeda and Taliban suspects 
without charge and without the protection of prisoner of war status.18 They stated: 
“Although the United States has an obligation and right to arrest and try the perpetrators of the 
horrendous crimes of Sept.11, it must do so in compliance with fundamental principles of 
national, human rights and humanitarian law”. 
The Bush administration had refused to consider any of the 300 (at the time) detainees from 26 
countries as prisoners of war.19 It said that they were fighting for an illegal terrorist group and for 
a government that was not recognised. The detainees apparently might be tried in closed military 
tribunals (i.e. by ‘faceless’ judges) that could sentence them to death with a simple two-thirds 
vote from a military commission.20 They had no access to counsel and had not been informed of 
the charges against them. The petitioners requested the Commission to demand that the US give 
the detainees official prisoner of war status. The Vice-President of the Centre for Constitutional 
Rights, one of the petitioners in this case, stated ‘either they were picked up on the battle field, in 
which case they’re POWs, or they did something criminal, in which case they should be charged. 
There is no legal limbo status’.21 
In March 2002 the Inter-American Commission (CIDH) took precautionary measures and 
requested the US ‘to take the urgent measures necessary to have the legal status of the detainees at 
Guantanamo Bay determined by a competent tribunal’.22 It wrote that the available information 
suggested that the detainees were at the ‘unfettered discretion’ of the US government. It con-
cluded that without clarification of their legal status, their rights under international and domestic 
law ‘[could not] be said to be the subject of effective legal protection’. No person under the au-
thority and control of a State could be deprived of his fundamental and non-derogable rights and 
in this case humanitarian law might be relevant next to human rights law. It concluded that the 
precautionary measures were ‘both appropriate and necessary in the present circumstances, in 
order to ensure that the legal status of each of the detainees is clarified and that they are afforded 
                                                 
18 See on the legal status of the detainees or the various proposals for military commissions to try 
them e.g.: Gill/Van Sliedrecht (2005); Amann (2004); Paust (2004a); Steyn (2004); Dahlstrom 
(2003); Paust (2003); see also Amnesty International, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unlawful detention 
of six men from Bosnia-Herzegovina in Guantánamo Bay’, AI Index Eur 63/013/2003, 30 May 
2003; for a defense of the US policies see Yoo/Ho (2003). 
19 By October 2005 the number of persons detained at Guantanamo was reported to be 595, see 
CIDH Precautionary measure of 28 October 2005 (all precautionary measures in this case have 
been made available at the website of the Center for Constitutional Rights, one of the petitioners 
in this case: <http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/sept11Article.asp?ObjID= 
7lt0qaX9CP&Content=134>; consulted 5 october 2006). 
20 The term ‘faceless judges’ became colloquial in the context of Fujimori’s reign in Peru, where 
suspects accused of terrorism were tried by a panel of anonymous judges, whose faces had also 
been made unrecognisable. 
21 Associated Press (Ian James), 25 February 2002.  
22 CIDH Guantanamo Bay case, Precautionary measures of 12 March 2002, 41 ILM (2002), p. 532, 
also published in 23(1-4) Human Rights Law Journal 15 (2002), pp. 14-15 and 96 American 
Journal of International Law (2002), pp. 730-731. See on the Commission’s precautionary 
measures in this case e.g. Tittemore (2006); Cerone (2005); Cerna (2004) and Shelton (2002). 
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the legal protections commensurate with the status that they are found to possess, which may in 
no case fall below the minimum standards of non-derogable rights’.23 
In its precautionary measure the CIDH pointed out that by depriving the detainees at Guan-
tanamo Bay of their right to an independent determination of their status, the US had also ‘effec-
tively deprived them of any other due process rights to which they might be entitled’.24 
Indeed the ICRC has noted that international humanitarian law currently does not recognise 
the status of ‘unlawful combatant’. Thus, the detainees should have either prisoner of war or 
civilian status. As the ICRC put it “There is no intermediate status; nobody in enemy hands can 
be outside the law”.25 
Among others the US had claimed that the Commission’s precautionary measures were in-
appropriate because they did not involve cases in which the life or physical integrity were under 
‘imminent threat of immediate harm’.26 It requested the Commission to reverse its precautionary 
measures. The petitioners, on the other hand, observed that the CIDH was not obliged to ‘confine 
itself to situations in which there is a threat to life and personal integrity’.27 Moreover, they 
pointed out that their lives and personal integrity were indeed at risk and that judicial review was 
essential to the protection of these rights. It noted that the government did not cite independent 
sources to substantiate its claims that the detainees were treated humanely. They also referred to 
the reported increase in mental disorders among the detainees.28 The petitioners noted that the 
                                                 
23 Ibid. See also the follow-up precautionary measure of 23 July 2002. According to the Vice-
President of the Centre for Constitutional Rights the Commission’s decision was ‘a victory for 
advocates of the rule of law and due process. Failure to abide by the Commission’s 
recommendation would be a lawless act and a violation of the US’ treaty obligations’. Press 
Release Center for Constitutional Rights, 13 March 2002 (on file with the author; archived press 
releases at <www.ccr-ny.org> only go back to November 2002; consulted 5 October 2006). See 
also Chapters XVII (Official responses) and XVIII (Follow-up). 
24 See CIDH Guantanamo Bay case, Observations by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the 
Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Justice and International Law 
on the US response to the Commission’s precautionary measures of 12 March 2002, 13 May 
2002, p. 19, available at <http://www.ccr-ny.org/v2/legal/september_11th/docs/5-13-
02ObservationsonGovtResponse.pdf> (consulted 5 October 2006). See also e.g. Special 
Raporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while 
countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, Mission to the US, A/HRC/6/17/Add.3, 22 November 
2007, pp. 9-11. 
25 ICRC Commentary on Geneva Convention IV relative to the protection of civilian persons in 
time of war, Geneva 1958, p. 51 and further references in CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, 
Observations by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law 
School and the Center for Justice and International Law on the US response to the Commission’s 
precautionary measures of 13 March 2002, 13 May 2002, p. 20. 
26 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, US response to the Commission’s precautionary measures 
of 12 March 2002, §32. 
27 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Observations by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the 
Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Justice and International Law 
on the US response to the Commission’s precautionary measures of 12 March 2002, 13 May 
2002, p. 23. 
28 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Observations by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the 
Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Justice and International Law 
on the US response to the Commission’s precautionary measures of 12 March 2002, 13 May 
2002, pp. 24-25. 
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majority of Guantanamo detainees were still detained incommunicado.29 Moreover, the US had 
not disputed the fact that none of the detainees had had access to counsel.30 The CIDH subse-
quently confirmed and expanded its measures.31 
As the CIDH already stressed in its first precautionary measure regarding the ‘unlawful 
combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay, ‘no person under the authority and control of a state, regardless 
of his or her circumstances, is devoid of legal protection for his or her fundamental and non-
derogable human rights’.32 It explained its precautionary measures as appropriate and necessary 
‘in order to ensure that the legal status of each of the detainees is clarified and that they are af-
forded the legal protections commensurate with the status that they are found to possess, which 
may in no case fall below the minimum standards of non-derogable rights’.33 
This indicates that, from the start, the importance of protecting the non-derogable rights of 
detainees was the rationale for the use of precautionary measures. Without legal recourse (regard-
ing their status and detention) and access to counsel the detainees were at risk of irreparable harm.  
To some extent, as a scholar and staff member of the Commission put it, the precautionary 
measures by the CIDH may be seen as injunctive measures taken in order to prevent prejudice to 
the positions of the parties. Yet there are many situations in which they should be regarded more 
as a ‘protective mechanism to preclude the imminent perpetration of human rights violations 
against the life or personal integrity of a person or group of persons’.34 In other words, they aim to 
‘prevent imminent violations of substantive human rights’ or preserve the Commission’s ‘ability 
to adjudicate upon consummated violations’.35  
In July 2002 CIDH reiterated its precautionary measures for the first time. Moreover, it 
noted that additional information had augmented its concerns. “In particular, as indicated by the 
Petitioners and as reported in the media, the manner in which certain detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay were captured raises reasonable doubts concerning whether they belong to the enemy’s 
armed forces or related groups”. Among others it referred to information about the presence of six 
Algerian citizens arrested by US authorities in Bosnia.36  
Two years later, in July 2004, the CIDH pointed out that information had surfaced ‘suggest-
ing that U.S. government officials and agencies have developed legal policies and guidelines 
concerning the methods of treatment and interrogation that are inconsistent with well-established 
international standards governing humane treatment’.37 In a very important statement it observed 
                                                 
29 In January 2002 the ICRC only spoke with an ‘unspecified handful of detainees’ and the ‘almost 
complete lack of contact’ of the detainees ‘with the outside world may violate the non-derogable 
right to be free from cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’. 
30 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Observations by the Center for Constitutional Rights, the 
Human Rights Clinic at Columbia Law School and the Center for Justice and International Law 
on the US response to the Commission’s precautionary measures of 12 March 2002, 13 May 
2002, pp. 25-26. 
31 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 23 July 2002, 18 March 2003, 
29 July 2004 and 28 October 2005. 
32 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 12 March 2002, p. 4. 
33 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 12 March 2002, pp. 4-5. 
34 Tittemore (2006), p. 381. 
35 Tittemore (2006), p. 382. 
36 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 23 July 2002. See also Chapter 
IV (Non-refoulement), referring to the transfer by the Bosnian to the US authorities contrary to a 
provisional measure by the Bosnia Chamber. 
37 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 29 July 2004, p. 2, referring 
among others to the defense department memo on ‘Counter-resistance techniques’ prepared by 
Pentagon general counsel William J. Hayes II and approved by the US secretary of defense on 2 
December 2002, available at <http://www.cdi.org/news/law/memos-release.cfm> and 
<http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2004/d20040622doc6.pdf> (consulted 5 October 2006). 
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that this information ‘appears to contradict previous assurances provided to the Commission by 
Your Excellency’s government that it is the United States’ policy to treat all detainees and con-
duct all interrogations, wherever they may occur, in a manner consistent with the commitment to 
prevent torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, and, if correct, 
may also have contributed to an environment in which a lack of clarity in standards of treatment 
facilitated the possible perpetration of abuses’.38 The Commission also requested information 
regarding the allegation that persons under the age of eighteen were detained in Guantanamo and 
that they had not been segregated from the adult population.39 
In addition, in October 2005 the Commission expanded its precautionary measures specifi-
cally emphasizing the importance of investigating allegations of torture. The Commission also 
pointed out that the US should not use ‘diplomatic assurances’ to circumvent its non-refoulement 
obligations.40  
The measures referred not only to the importance of clarifying the legal status of the detain-
ees and of granting them legal recourse and access to counsel, but also expressed concern regard-
ing reports about the possible ill-treatment of detainees, requesting specific information on the 
whereabouts, status and treatment of detainees in places other than Guantanamo Bay.41 Moreover, 
the Commission emphasized the principle of non-refoulement from Guantanamo to other States 
where detainees would be at risk of irreparable harm to their life or personal integrity. It specified 
the procedural rights that should help prevent this refoulement. Moreover diplomatic assurances 
should not be used to circumvent the obligation of non-refoulement. Regarding the treatment of 
detainees in Guantanamo Bay itself, it emphasized the need for thorough and impartial investiga-
tions and prosecutions. The authorities were not to use statements obtained through torture (unless 
in proceedings to prosecute acts of torture).42 The consecutive expansions of the precautionary 
measures by the CIDH in the Guantanamo case illustrate further the underlying rationale of provi-
sional measures in that they relate to non-refoulement (Chapter V), disappearances (Chapter VI) 
and detention (Chapter VII) as well.  
In a Resolution of July 2006 the CIDH concluded that the US failure to give effect to its 
precautionary measures had ‘resulted in irreparable prejudice to the fundamental rights of the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay including the rights to liberty and to humane treatment’. It urged 
the US, among others, to close Guantanamo without delay.43  
                                                 
38 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 29 July 2004, p. 2 (with 
footnote referring to the US submission of 24 December 2003, pp. 13-17). 
39 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 29 July 2004, p. 3. 
40 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 28 October 2005. 
41 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 18 March 2003 and 29 July 
2004. See also CIDH Precautionary measures of 22 September 2002 on behalf of an unknown 
number of foreign nationals detained in the US itself following 11 September 2001. 
42 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measures of 28 October 2005. 
43 CIDH Resolution 1/06 in Press Release 27/06, ‘Inter-American Commission urges to close 
Guantanamo without delay’, 28 July 2006, available at <http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/ 
English/2006/27.06eng.htm> (consulted 6 October 2006. Several developments took place 
domestically, which cannot be discussed extensively here. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld (2006), for 
instance, the US Supreme Court finally determined that the military commissions constituted 
under the Military Order were unlawful. It found that they had not been expressly authorised by 
the US Congress and were in violation of both international law and US military law. US 
Supreme Court Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006) (29 June 2006). Available at 
<www.supremecourtus.gov/opinions/05pdf/05-184.pdf> (consulted 6 October 2006). In 
September 2006 the US President successfully proposed new legislation and confirmed that the 
CIA had been using secret detention and ‘alternative’ interrogation techniques. He remarked that 
‘unfortunately, the recent Supreme Court decision put the future of this program in question, and 
we need this legislation to save it’. US President’s Radio Address of 12 September 2006, 
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In August 2008 a case was brought before the Inter-American Commission on behalf of 
Djamel Ameziane who had been detained at Guantanamo for more than six years. As part of this 
complaint a request was made for precautionary measures. On 20 August 2008 the Commission 
indeed used precautionary measures. Rather than involving the auxiliary rights of access to court 
and counsel, these measures dealt directly with the prevention of ill-treatment in detention and 
with the prohibition of refoulement.44 The Commission requested the State to immediately take 
all measures necessary to ensure that he is not subjected to ill-treatment or torture, that he has 
access to medical care, that he is not transferred to Algeria contrary to the principle of non-
refoulement. The Commission also noted that diplomatic assurances could not serve to circum-
vent the prohibition of refoulement.45 
Even once Guantanamo is closed (as it had been for a brief period before 11 September 
2001),46 any official (or unofficial) continuation of the secret detention policy and the use of 
certain interrogation methods would warrant continued monitoring by the CIDH and others and 
may trigger further precautionary measures also involving access to court and counsel. 
2.4 African system 
In April 2002 a petition had been filed against Eritrea on behalf of eleven former government 
employees who had been detained in September 2001 and were since being held incommunicado. 
It was alleged that they could be prisoners of conscience, that their whereabouts were ‘currently 
unknown’ and that they had ‘not been given access to their families or lawyers’. The petitioners 
feared for their safety.47 The African Commission took several increasingly specific provisional 
measures in this case. In May 2002 it took a provisional measure requesting the President of 
Eritrea ‘to intervene in the matter being complained of pending the outcome of the consideration 
of the complaint before the Commission’.48 Later that month the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
responded that the alleged victims ‘had their quarters in appropriate government facilities, had not 
been ill-treated, have had continued access to medical services and that the government was 
making every effort to bring them before an appropriate court of law as early as possible’.49 In 
October of that year the Commission followed up on its ‘urgent appeal’ by reminding the State 
                                                                                                                       
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2006/09/20060916.html>. For a critical discussion of 
the compromise reached between three Republican senators and President Bush see Paust (2006). 
See also Amnesty International, 18 September 2006. The Military Commissions Act was 
accepted in October 2006 and it notes that the ‘habeas stripping’ provisions apply to all cases 
without exception. The military Commissions Act also allows the use of evidence extracted from 
certain ‘interrogation techniques’ as long as these were used before the end of 2005 when the 
Detainee Treatment Act became law. On 12 June 2008, in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S._ 
(2008), 128 S. Ct. 2229 (12 June 2008), with a 5-4 majority the US Supreme Court found that 
detainees at Guantanamo did have habeas corpus rights and that the Detainee Treatment Act 
(2005) did not provide an adequate and effective substitute for such habeas. 
44 See Chapters VII (Detention) and V (Non-refoulement). 
45 See Center for Constitutional Rights, press release, 21 August 2008, 
<http://ccrjustice.org/newsroom/press-releases/inter-american-commission-human-rights-moves-
halt-torture-guantanamo%3A-orders>. 
46 See CIDH press release 02/09 on the decision by the new US President, Barack Obama, ‘IACHR 
welcomes order to close Guantanamo detention center’, 27 January 2009, at 
<http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2009/02-09eng.htm> (consulted 27 January 2009). 
47 African Commission Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem v. Eritrea, November 2003. 
48 Id., §10. 
49 Id., §12. 
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that it was its General Prosecutor’s responsibility to bring the accused ‘before a competent court 
of law in accordance with the rules guaranteeing fair trial under relevant national and international 
instruments’.50 In June 2003 the Chairperson of the Commission once more appealed to the 
President of Eritrea ‘to intervene in this matter and urge the authorities holding the 11 individuals 
to release them or bring them before the courts in Eritrea’.51 This example indicates that the 
African Commission has also used provisional measures to ensure access to court and counsel. 
Equally, in this case the prevention of ill treatment and disappearances seems to have been an 
underlying rationale for the use of this type of provisional measure. 
2.5 European system 
With regard to the European system two cases are discussed, one against Turkey, involving ac-
cess to counsel and the right to life, and the other against Russia, about access to counsel and the 
protection of personal integrity. The first case relates to the situation of PKK leader Öcalan sub-
sequent to his arrest. A case was brought before the ECtHR on his behalf in which his (Dutch) 
counsel requested the Court to take provisional measures to ensure access to counsel.52 Despite 
counsel’s emphasis on the serious threat of torture or disappearance, and the importance of imme-
diate access of Turkish and foreign lawyers to the petitioner, as well as immediate medical ex-
amination, initially the ECtHR did not take provisional measures.53 
Yet a remarkable aspect of this case is the fact that the Registry of the Court immediately 
issued a press release on the submission of the case and the request for provisional measures.54 
Subsequently it issued another press release pointing out that a Chamber of seven judges deliber-
ated on the request and decided that ‘at this stage’ the use of provisional measures was ‘not ap-
propriate’. At the same time, given ‘the gravity of the allegations’, the Court decided ‘to seek 
clarification from the Turkish authorities on a number of points concerning the circumstances of 
Mr Öcalan’s arrest and detention’. In particular it asked the Turkish Government for a speedy 
response to a request for information on the question of Mr Öcalan’s access to lawyers.55 In the 
                                                 
50 Id., §15. 
51 Id., §19. During the 33rd Ordinary Session of the Commission petitioner Zegveld submitted that 
local counsel were unable to pursue the case domestically for fear of jeopardising their legal 
practice and even personal persecution. The State responded that the petitioners’ assertion in this 
respect was ‘speculative’ and that Zegveld herself ‘should accredit herself to the courts in Eritrea 
to enable her to bring this matter before the local courts’, §32. In October 2002 the Commission 
also took a provisional measure on behalf of journalists detained without charge in Liberia. The 
nature of this provisional measure was not specified. African Commission Samuel Kofi Woods, II 
and Kabineh M. Ja’neh v. Liberia, October 2002 (this may have been an informal rather than a 
formal provisional measure). 
52 See generally Prakken (2005), Chapter 5 and Böhler (2000). 
53 ECtHR Application by Dutch counsel Britta Böhler and Ties Prakken of 16 February 1999 and 
follow-up fax of 17 February 1999 by counsel Stijn Franken pointing out not only that Böhler 
and Prakken were staying in the transit area of Istanbul airport, not being allowed to enter, but 
also that domestic counsel were besieged by Turkish police or security forces, that several 
attorneys had already been arrested and that Mr Öcalan had not been granted access to counsel 
(on file with the author). 
54 ECtHR Press Release 96, 18 February 1999, available at <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/ 
tkp197/view.asp?item=8&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=&sessionid=8696144&skin=hu
doc-pr-en> (consulted 6 October 2006). 
55 It invoked Rule 54 §3 (a) of its Rules. See ECtHR Press Release 106, 23 February 1999, 
available at <http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action= 
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Court’s letter to the petitioner’s counsel providing information on the clarification sought from 
the Government, the gravity of the allegations was specified by reference to Articles 2 and 3 
ECHR. In addition, the Court pointed out that it attached particular importance to the possibility 
of the petitioner to be assisted by lawyers both in the criminal proceedings against him and in the 
proceedings before the ECtHR. It requested the State to provide such information within three 
days.56  
While initially it had refused the provisional measures requested, the next month the ECtHR 
did decide to take such measures with regard to compliance with the requirements of Article 6 
ECHR. In its letter informing counsel of these measures it explained that it took its decision 
‘[b]earing in mind that the applicant risks being tried by a tribunal which the Court has found in 
two cases not to be in conformity with Article 6 of the Convention and that procedural guarantees 
assume even greater importance in a case, such as the present, involving the death penalty’. As 
part of the provisional measure it requested the State to take all necessary steps to secure Öcalan’s 
rights under Article 6 ECHR, to fully respect the rights of the defence, particularly Öcalan’s right 
‘to have effective consultations in private with the lawyers representing him’ in the proceedings 
brought against him in Turkey. Moreover, the State should also enable him effectively to exercise 
his right of individual petition to the ECtHR, ‘through the lawyers of his choice’.57  
Turkey, however, did not wish to comply with this provisional measure because it consid-
ered that it ‘went far beyond the scope of interim measures within the meaning of Rule 39’.58 In 
its submission to the Court it stressed that the provisional measures were unprecedented. The 
practice of the former Commission had always related to issues of non-refoulement, whereby one 
could speak of an irreversible situation. The criterion of irreparable harm, inherent in the notion of 
provisional measures, had never been verified in the present case and the Court had not put for-
ward any other justification. The State added that domestic recourse had not even been initiated at 
this stage and that the provisional measures constituted a ‘grave anticipation’ of the case, hinder-
ing the domestic proceedings. It regretted that the Court had decided to take provisional measures 
‘based on unfounded allegations by foreign counsel’ and considered that the Court’s ‘unjustified 
and unmotivated’ decisions risked harming the credibility of the system, the most important at-
tribute of which ought to be the legal certainty of the proceedings, avoiding that the Court would 
succumb to external pressure.59 In other words, the State seemed to imply that the provisional 
measures were unrelated to Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, that Öcalan should first exhaust domestic 
remedies and that the provisional measures relating to a fair trial and access to counsel would 
somehow hinder domestic proceedings. The State also suggested that the Court’s provisional 
measures harmed legal certainty by taking seriously the petitioner’s allegations.  
Different from what was suggested by the State the Court does appear to have had in mind 
the protection of the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment in its use of 
                                                                                                                       
html&highlight=%F6calan&sessionid=8696144&skin=hudoc-pr-en> (consulted 6 October 
2006). 
56 Letter by Secretariat ECtHR to counsel Ties Prakken, 23 February 1999 (on file with the author). 
According to this Letter the State had also been requested to provide information, among others, 
on the conditions of his (incommunicado) detention, the frequency of the interrogations and the 
medical supervision of his treatment and state of health. 
57 Letter Registry to counsel Ties Prakken, 4 March 1999 referring to its use of Rule 39 (on file with 
the author). The Court’s Press Release of 4 March 1999, announcing these provisional measures, 
is not currently available at the website of the ECtHR, but see Information Note No. 5 on the 
case-law of the Court, April 1999, available at <http://www.echr.coe.int/Eng/InformationNotes/ 
INFONOTENo05.html> (consulted 6 October 2006). See also Garry (2001), p. 402 and Spronken 
(2001), p. 442. 
58 ECtHR Information Note 5, April 1999, p. 6. 
59 Submission by Turkey of 8 March 1999 (on file with the author). 
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provisional measures in this case, even specifically referring to the fact that the case involved the 
death penalty. Indeed the Court was not the only non-national body making the link between the 
importance of access to counsel and the right to life and prohibition of torture and cruel treatment. 
On the day the case was brought before the Court the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture already 
appealed to Turkey to ensure Öcalan’s right to physical integrity, requesting information on his 
circumstances and calling for ‘immediate access to legal counsel’.60 Moreover, the European 
Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CPT) visited him on 2 March 1999, concluding that his ‘somatic health’ was good, but express-
ing concern about the potentially negative effects on his mental health ‘of being held on his own 
in a remote location under a high security regime’. Among others the CPT remarked: ‘Of course, 
it is also of crucial importance, from a number of standpoints, that Mr Öcalan be guaranteed 
adequate access to a lawyer. However, the CPT does not intend to pursue this matter, given that 
the European Court of Human Rights has adopted interim measures on the subject’.61 
A few days after the State’s submission, counsel for the petitioner pointed out that their cli-
ent was still in ‘almost complete isolation’.62 On the exhaustion of domestic remedies counsel 
pointed out that there was no obligation to seek remedies that are inadequate or ineffective and 
they referred to the maximum security measures taken against him, including his incommunicado 
detention.63 They also referred to earlier judgment by the ECtHR that trial by the Turkish State 
Security Court was not in conformity with the impartiality requirement of Article 6 ECHR. More-
over, counsel added that the Court’s provisional measures regarding fair trial and access to coun-
sel, taken a week previously, had had ‘no positive effect on the proceedings’.64 
Later that month the ECtHR responded by following up on its earlier provisional measure. 
It requested further information on its implementation and referred specifically to the request in 
the last paragraph of its provisional measures to keep it informed ‘of all measures taken by the 
authorities to implement the above request’. It asked questions on all aspects of its provisional 
measures. Among others it wished to know how frequently his lawyers were ‘able to visit him and 
under what conditions of privacy’, to what extent military personnel were involved in the prison 
visits, ‘what steps have been taken by the authorities to ensure that the applicant is not hindered in 
the effective exercise of the right of individual petition’ to the ECtHR. It also questioned whether 
he had been ‘permitted to correspond with his lawyers representing him in these proceedings,’ 
and, if so, under what conditions’ Had he ‘been free to receive visits’ from his lawyers in this 
respect? Finally, the Court wished to know whether the petitioner would be tried before the State 
Security Court and, if so, what would be the composition of this court.65 It appears that the spe-
                                                 
60 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Press release of 16 February 1999. 
61 Visit to Turkey by the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT) from 27 February to 3 March 1999, letter of 22 
March 1999, <http://www.cpt.coe.int/documents/tur/1999-05-04-eng.htm#APPENDIX> 
(consulted 6 October 2006). 
62 He had only been able to see his domestic counsel on 25 February (ten days after his arrest) and 
on 11 March 1999. The only other contact with the outside world had been a visit by a delegation 
of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
of Punishment. 
63 They reminded the Court that the two visits by domestic counsel were very brief. The first lasted 
only 20 minutes and counsel were only allowed to discuss their client’s general health situations. 
A judge and two masked military were present. The second visit could not take place in private 
either. 
64 Submission by counsel of 12 March 1999 (on file with the author). 
65 ECtHR Letter Registrar First Section to the State, 23 March 1999 (on file with the author). 
Subsequently the ECtHR also used provisional measures to halt the execution of the death 
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cific questions all related to the petitioner’s right to a fair trial in the context of the possible impo-
sition of the death penalty and the Court’s earlier experience with the proceedings before the State 
Security Court. 
As noted, this is not the only occasion at which the ECtHR used provisional measures to en-
sure access of a detained petitioner to his lawyer.66 In Shtukaturov v. Russia (2008), for instance, 
the petitioner was confined in a psychiatric hospital against his will. In March 2006 the President 
of the Chamber dealing with his case decided to invoke Rule 39.67 The judgment on the merits 
provides fairly specific information on what was required of the State.68 The Government ‘was 
directed to organise, by appropriate means, a meeting between the applicant and his lawyer. That 
meeting could take place in the presence of the personnel of the hospital where the applicant was 
detained, but outside their hearing. The lawyer was to be provided with the necessary time and 
facilities to consult with the applicant and help him in preparing the application before the Euro-
pean Court. The Russian Government was also requested not to prevent the lawyer from having 
such meeting with his client at regular intervals in future. The lawyer, in his turn, was obliged to 
be cooperative and comply with reasonable requirements of the hospital regulations’.69 
3 RELATION BETWEEN PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO ENSURE PROCEDURAL 
RIGHTS AND THE EXPECTED DECISION ON THE MERITS 
3.1 Introduction 
The foregoing shows that the few instances in which the adjudicators have taken provisional 
measures to ascertain the legal status of detainees and ensure their access to court and counsel all 
somehow relate to the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment.  
In fact they concern rights auxiliary to the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treat-
ment. Were the above-mentioned provisional measures appropriate given the likelihood of suc-
cess on the merits? One question in this respect is whether the adjudicators have determined, on 
the merits, whether procedural rights relating to the right to life and the prohibition of torture and 
cruel treatment have a special status in the human rights systems. Another question arose in the 
                                                                                                                       
sentence imposed on Öcalan, see Press Release 683 of 30 November 1999 and Chapter III 
(Halting executions). 
66 See also ECtHR Shamayev et al. v. Georgia and Russia, 12 April 2005 (Rule 39 of 17 June 
2003 for Russia to grant unhindered access by counsel to the extradited petitioners, 
especially for the preparation of the hearing). 
67 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Shtukaturov v. Russia, Judgment of 27 March 2008, §4. 
68 Generally on the specificity of provisional measures see Chapter XIII (Protection). 
69 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Shtukaturov v. Russia, 27 March 2008, §33. Yet the Chief Doctor of 
the hospital where the petitioner was detained informed the petitioner’s lawyer ‘that he did not 
regard the Court’s decision on interim measures as binding. Furthermore, the applicant’s mother 
objected to the meeting between the applicant and the lawyer’, §35. Initially a domestic court 
declared that the ban on meetings between the petitioner and his lawyer was unlawful given the 
provisional measures by the ECtHR, §36, but this decision was reversed on appeal (that court 
found that the lawyer had not concluded an agreement with the applicant’s mother, while she and 
not the petitioner was entitled to act on behalf of the petitioner in all legal transactions), §39. The 
petitioner was discharged from hospital on the same day and therefore able to meet with his 
lawyer and able to pursue the case before the ECtHR. See generally Chapter XVII on official 
State responses. 
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context of the detention of so-called ‘unlawful combatants’ at Guantanamo Bay: the extra-
territorial responsibility of States.70 
3.2 Status of auxiliary rights 
During armed conflicts humanitarian law is particularly relevant in the interpretation of applicable 
human rights norms. The CIDH has pointed out that human rights law remains applicable and that 
no derogation is allowed from certain of these rights, including the right to due process of law.71 
The UN Special Rapporteur on Torture has referred to incommunicado detention as the most 
important determining factor for risk of torture.72 He has emphasized that basic legal safeguards 
such as habeas corpus and access to a lawyer within 24 hours of the detention as well as the right 
to inform a family member or friend of the detention ‘ensure his or her humane treatment while in 
detention’.73 Indeed prompt and effective access of persons deprived of their liberty to ‘a judicial 
or other competent authority’ is a ‘key safeguard to prevent incidents of torture or other forms of 
ill-treatment’.74 The right to be brought before a court and the right to counsel may serve as safe-
guards to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
The UN Commission on Human Rights has pointed out that prolonged incommunicado de-
tention ‘may facilitate the perpetration of torture and can in itself constitute a form of cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or even torture’.75 
The UN Working Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances has confirmed the 
relevance of access to court and counsel in order to prevent disappearances.76 In particular it 
pointed out that ‘any detention which is prolonged unreasonably or where the detainee is not 
charged so that he can be brought before a court is a violation of the Declaration’. Given the 
object and purpose of Art. 3 Declaration ‘the period in question should be as brief as possible, i.e., 
not more than a few days, as this is the only conceivable interpretation of “promptly after deten-
tion”’.77 
The HRC subsequently confirmed this approach in its General Comment on states of emer-
gency (2001) and emphasised that ‘explicitly non-derogable rights’ such as the right to life and 
the prohibition of cruel treatment ‘must be secured by procedural guarantees, including, often, 
judicial guarantees’. It also gave examples of provisions (or elements thereof) that are not listed in 
Article 4(2) ICCPR, but nevertheless cannot be derogated from. It pointed out that ‘certain ele-
ments of the right to a fair trial are explicitly guaranteed under international humanitarian law 
during armed conflict’ and that it found ‘no justification for derogation from these guarantees 
during other emergency situations’. The principles of legality and the rule of law required that 
                                                 
70 This issue is briefly referred to in this chapter and then further discussed in Chapter XIV 
(Jurisdiction). 
71 CIDH Coard et al. v. US, 29 September 1999 (on the intervention in Grenada), §§39, 55 and 59. 
72 See also UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (Nigel Rodley), report to the General Assembly, 
A/54/426, §42. 
73 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (Theo van Boven), report to the General Assembly A/57/173, 
2 July 2002, §18. See generally §§7-18, esp. 16. 
74 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture (Theo van Boven), Report to the Commission on Human 
Rights, E/CN.4/2004/56, 23 December 2003, §39. 
75 See e.g. Res. 2005/39, 19 April 2005, §9. 
76 See e.g. E/CN.4/1997/34, 13 December 1996, §§26 and 28. 
77 E/CN.4/1997/34,13 December 1996, §29. The international responsibility of States under Article 
3 Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance ‘arises not only 
when acts of enforced disappearance occur, but also when there is a lack of appropriate action to 
prevent or terminate such acts’, E/CN.4/1995/38,15 January 1996, §53. 
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such fundamental elements of fair trial must be respected during a state of emergency. In particu-
lar it referred to the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide without 
delay on the lawfulness of detention.78  
The HRC has noted that it is ‘inherent in the protection of rights explicitly recognised as 
non-derogable’ under the ICCPR that they ‘must be secured by procedural guarantees’. This 
means, for instance, that ‘the right to take proceedings before a court to enable the court to decide 
without delay on the lawfulness of detention’ is a right accessory to the protection of the right to 
life and the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture. In that sense this is in itself a right that 
could not be derogated from even in times of emergency. The Committee has specifically noted 
that even during a state of emergency any trial leading to the imposition of the death penalty 
‘must conform to the provisions of the Covenant, including all the requirements of articles 14 and 
15’.79 It had also pointed out, elsewhere, that it ‘is satisfied that States parties generally under-
stand that the right to habeas corpus and amparo should not be limited in situations of emer-
gency’. It considers that the remedies of Article 9(3) and (4) ICCPR, read together with Article 2 
‘are inherent in the Covenant as a whole’.80  
In 2003 the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention published a legal opinion regarding 
the deprivation of liberty specifically of persons detained in Guantanamo Bay. It had received 
many communications alleging the arbitrary character of their detention. It concluded that ‘so 
long as a “competent tribunal” has not declared whether the status of prisoner of war may be 
considered applicable or not, the persons detained in Guantanamo Bay provisionally enjoy the 
guarantees stipulated in articles 105 and 106 of the third Geneva Convention’. Moreover, ‘should 
such a court issue a ruling on the matter’ in which it would invalidate the provisional prisoner of 
war status, Articles 9 and 14 ICCPR would remain applicable.81 
The situation of the detainees at Guantanamo, as well as that of those detained incommuni-
cado for extended periods elsewhere, illustrates the interrelationship between procedural rights 
and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment. In its follow up to its initial precautionary 
measures on behalf of the Guantanamo detainees the CIDH even expressly included the obliga-
tion of non-refoulement82 as well as the obligation to investigate torture allegations,83 both di-
rectly involving the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment. 
Article XXV of the American Declaration stipulates, among others, that each person de-
prived of his liberty ‘has the right to have the legality of his detention ascertained without delay 
by a court, and the right to be tried without undue delay or, otherwise, to be released. He also had 
the right to humane treatment during the time he is in custody’. In the Inter-American system the 
importance of procedural rights to protect the right to life and personal integrity is already evident 
in Article 27(2) ACHR, enumerating a list of non-derogable rights and adding that no suspension 
of ‘the judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights’ is authorised either. More-
                                                 
78 General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 4 July 2001, §§15-16. See also General 
Comment 24 on reservations, 4 November 1994, §11. See generally on non-derogable rights and 
states of emergency e.g. Seiderman (2001). 
79 HRC General Comment No. 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11, 
31 August 2001, §§11 and 15. See also the joint report on Guantanamo by the UN Special 
mechanisms, E/CN.4/2006/120, 15 February 2006, §14, confirming this interpretation. 
80 HRC Recommendation to the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection 
of Minorities about a draft third optional protocol to the ICCPR, A/49/40, I, Annex XI, §2 
(considering such protocol unnecessary). 
81 Report UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, E/CN.4/2003/8, 16 December 2002, §64. See 
also on the risk of torture and cruel treatment in secret detention: Report of the UN Working 
Group on Arbitrary Detention, E/CN.4/2006/7, 12 December 2005, §§56-57. 
82 See also Chapter V (Non-refoulement). 
83 See also Chapter VII (Detention). 
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over, before the HRC published the General Comment on states of emergency mentioned above, 
the Inter-American Court had already published its Advisory Opinions on habeas corpus in emer-
gency situations and on judicial guarantees in states of emergency. In these Opinions it stressed 
the importance of judicial guarantees (such as access to court and counsel) in order to protect non-
derogable rights.84 Habeas corpus, for instance, the Court has noted, ‘performed a vital role in 
ensuring that a person’s life and physical integrity are respected, in preventing his disappearance 
or the keeping of his whereabouts secret and in protecting him against torture or cruel, inhumane, 
or degrading punishment or treatment’.85 “In a democratic society, the rights and freedoms inher-
ent in the human person, the guarantees applicable to them and the rule of law form a triad. Each 
component thereof defines itself, complements and depends on the others for its meaning”.86 
‘[T]he legal remedies guaranteed in Articles 7 (6) and 25(1) of the Convention may not be sus-
pended because they are judicial guarantees essential for the protection of the rights and freedoms 
whose suspension Article 27(2) prohibits’.87 It has confirmed that ‘the “essential” judicial guaran-
tees which are not subject to derogation, according to Article 27(2) of the Convention, include 
habeas corpus (Art. 7(6)), amparo, and any other effective remedy before judges or competent 
tribunals (Art. 25(1)), which is designed to guarantee the respect of the rights and freedoms whose 
suspension is not authorized by the Convention’.88  
In their decisions on individual cases the IACHR and the CIDH have confirmed the impor-
tance of judicial review for the protection of fundamental rights, also when national security may 
be at stake.89 In its precautionary measures on behalf of the ‘unlawful combatants’ at Guantanamo 
Bay the Commission specifically referred to the Inter-American Court’s judgment in Castillo 
Paéz (1997) discussing the purpose of habeas corpus as ‘not only to guarantee personal liberty 
and humane treatment, but also to prevent disappearance or failure to determine the place of 
detention, and, ultimately, to ensure the right to life’.90 Among others it referred to information 
raising ‘serious possibilities that detainees may have been subjected to treatment that constitutes 
                                                 
84 IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Articles 27(2) and 
7(6) ACHR), 30 January 1987 and OC-9/87, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency 
(Articles 27(2), 25 and 8 ACHR), 6 October 1987. 
85 IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Articles 27(2) and 
7(6) ACHR), 30 January 1987, §35. 
86 IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Articles 27(2) and 
7(6) ACHR), 30 January 1987, §26. 
87 IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-8/87, Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Articles 27(2) and 
7(6) ACHR), 30 January 1987, §44. 
88 IACHR OC-9/87, Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Articles 27(2), 25 and 8 ACHR), 
6 October 1987, §41. On non-derogable rights and provisional measures, see also Conclusion part 
II. 
89 See e.g. IACHR Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, 30 May 1999 (“Clearly, the proceedings in this case 
did not fulfill the minimum requirements of “due process of law”, which is the very essence of 
the judicial guarantees established under the Convention. Failure to fulfill the requirements of 
due process renders the proceedings invalid”, §221) and CIDH Coard v. US, 29 September 1999, 
§§54-55, esp. §55: “The requirement that detention not be left to the sole discretion of the state 
agent(s) responsible for carrying it out is so fundamental that it cannot be overlooked in any 
context. The terms of the American Declaration and of applicable humanitarian law are largely in 
accord in this regard. Article 78 of the Fourth Geneva Convention provides a recourse which, 
implemented according to its object and purpose, is generally consistent with the supervisory 
control required under Article XXV of the American Declaration. Supervisory control over 
detention is an essential safeguard, because it provides effective assurance that the detainee is not 
exclusively at the mercy of the detaining authority. This is an essential rationale of the right to 
habeas corpus, a protection which is not susceptible to abrogation”. 
90 IACHR Castillo Paéz (Peru), Judgment of 3 November 1997, §83. 
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torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, including beatings, sleep 
deprivation, exposure to extreme temperatures, sensory deprivation and prolonged isolation’.91 
The ECtHR has equally emphasized the importance of access to habeas corpus and counsel 
in order to protect basic rights against abuse also in such cases.92 The same applies to the African 
Commission. In the case mentioned in section 2, in which it had taken provisional measures on 
behalf of 11 persons detained incommunicado in Eritrea, it eventually found violations on the 
merits of, among others, the right to liberty and security of person (Article 6 ACHPR) and of 
access to court and due process (Article 7 ACHPR). The Commission pointed out specifically that 
while Art. 6 as such was not an absolute right, in this case the detainees were held incommuni-
cado with no access to their lawyers or families. “Their whereabouts are unknown, putting their 
fate under the exclusive control of the Respondent State”. The Commission followed up on and 
clarified its provisional measures by noting that they were meant to ‘ensure that the 11 persons 
are removed from secret detention and brought before the courts’.  
“Incommunicado detention is a gross human rights violation that can lead to other violations 
such as torture or ill-treatment or interrogation without due process safeguards. Of itself, 
prolonged incommunicado detention and/or solitary confinement could be held to be a form of 
cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment and treatment. The African Commission is of the view 
that all detentions must be subject to basic human right standards. There should be no secret 
detentions and States must disclose the fact that somebody is being detained as well as the place 
of detention. Furthermore, every detained person must have prompt access to a lawyer and to 
their families and their rights with regards to physical and mental health must be protected as 
well as entitlement to proper conditions of detention”.93 
The African Commission pointed out that the eleven persons were detained because of their 
political beliefs and held in secret detention without any access to the courts, lawyer or family, ‘in 
blatant violation of their rights to liberty and recourse to fair trial’.94 It urged Eritrea to order their 
immediate release. Thus this case has shown a gradual specificity of the Commission’s 
provisional measures, from ‘intervening’ on behalf of the detainees to urging either to bring them 
                                                 
91 CIDH Guantanamo Bay case, Precautionary measures of 29 July 2004, p. 2, referring among 
others to the defense department memo on ‘Counter-resistance techniques’ prepared by Pentagon 
general counsel William J. Hayes II and approved by the US secretary of defense on 2 December 
200, available at <www.nimj.org>. 
92 In ECtHR Brannigan and McBride v. UK, 25 May 1993, the ECtHR did not find a violation of 
Article 5 ECHR because it considered that the UK had indeed fulfilled the basic safeguards of 
access to counsel and habeas corpus, §§61-65. On the other hand, in Aksoy v. Turkey the Court 
pointed out that ‘the denial of access to a lawyer, doctor, relative or friend and the absence of any 
realistic possibility of being brought before a court to test the legality of the detention meant that 
he was left completely at the mercy of those holding him’. It took ‘account of the unquestionably 
serious problem of terrorism in South-East Turkey and the difficulties faced by the State in taking 
effective measures against it. However, it is not persuaded that the exigencies of the situation 
necessitated the holding of the applicant on suspicion of involvement in terrorist offences for 
fourteen days or more in incommunicado detention without access to a judge or other judicial 
officer’. Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, §§82-84. In general the Court has stressed that 
‘[n]ational authorities cannot do away with effective control of lawfulness of detention by the 
domestic courts whenever they choose to assert that national security and terrorism are involved’ 
see Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 30 May 2002, §94 referring to Chahal v. UK, 15 November 1996.  
93 African Commission Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem v. Eritrea, November 2003, §55, 
referring to Constitutional Rights Project and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, 
consolidated communication 143/95 and 150/96. 
94 African Commission Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem v. Eritrea, November 2003, §57. 
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before a court or to release them. On the merits this culminated in the finding of a range of 
violations and the Commission´s emphasis on their immediate release. Its awareness of the 
relation between access to counsel and court on the one hand and torture, ill-treatment and 
disappearances on the other, is apparent from the above statement and may be assumed to 
underlie its use of provisional measures in this type of cases.95  
3.3 Effective control 
The other question involving the case law on the merits that has gained particular significance in 
the context of procedural rights, although it obviously applies in other contexts as well, is that of 
the extraterritorial applicability of human rights treaties.96 The use of provisional measures would 
be inappropriate if the adjudicators would generally decline to examine such cases on the merits. 
Do States have responsibility for the acts and omissions of their agents outside their own sover-
eign territory? This question has gained increasing significance in the context of counter terrorism 
activities of States, such as extraordinary renditions and running (secret) detention centres, out-
side their own territory.97 The CIDH has taken provisional measures directed against a State 
operating outside its own territory. Article 1 ACHR refers to ‘all persons subject to their jurisdic-
tion. The American Declaration does not specifically discuss jurisdiction ratione loci. The Inter-
American Commission has determined that OAS member States indeed have obligations under 
the Declaration any time a person is in their jurisdiction or under their control, even if the authori-
ties holding this person are active on territory not their own.98  
The ICJ has pointed out that ‘physical control of a territory, and not sovereignty or legiti-
macy of title, is the basis for State liability for acts affecting other States’.99 Article 1 of the Op-
tional Protocol (OP) to the ICCPR refers to ‘individual subject to its jurisdiction’. Article 2(1) 
ICCPR requires a State party to respect and ensure the rights laid down in the ICCPR refers to ‘all 
individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction’. Already in 1981 the HRC had inter-
preted Article 2(1) such that the ICCPR applies to all persons within s State’s territory and to all 
                                                 
95 See also African Commission Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, (2000) AHRLR 243 
(ACHPR 1999), §26: “While being held in a military detention camp is not necessarily inhuman, 
there is the obvious danger that normal safeguards on the treatment of prisoners will be lacking. 
Being deprived of access to one’s lawyer, even after trial and conviction, is a violation of article 
7(1)(c)”. 
96 See on the extraterritorial application of human rights treaties Coomans/Kamminga (2004). See 
generally on jurisdiction Chapter XIV. 
97 See also Chapter V (Non-refoulement). 
98 See e.g. Saldaňo v. Argentina, 11 March 1999 (inadm.), §§15-20, in particular §17: “The 
Commission does not believe, however, that the term “jurisdiction” in the sense of Article 1(1) is 
limited to or merely coextensive with national territory. Rather, the Commission is of the view 
that a state party to the American Convention may be responsible under certain circumstances for 
the acts and omissions of its agents which produce effects or are undertaken outside that state’s 
own territory”. See also Coard et al. v. US, 29 September 1999, §97. See further Cerna (2004 and 
2006) and Cassel (2004). The ACHPR does not specifically refer to the scope of State obligations 
in this respect. 
99 ICJ Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion of 26 
January 1971, §118. 
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persons subject to their jurisdiction. In other words, it recognised the extraterritorial applicability 
in its case law.100  
In light of the above it is suggested that when dealing with a request for provisional meas-
ures to the effect that a State should act or refrain from acting in order to prevent irreparable harm 
outside of its own territory the main criterion should be whether the State exercises prima facie 
control with regard to the rights of the persons involved.101 
4 CONCLUSION 
As noted in Chapter VI, disappearances are still a serious human rights issue, also in the context 
of the ‘war on terror’ launched after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the US (2001).102 It was argued in 
that chapter that in light of recent reports of such disappearances petitioners could bring com-
plaints before the ECtHR against Council of Europe States in which disappeared persons were 
last seen or on the basis of reports about secret detention centres on their territory.103 This could 
include requests for provisional measures to intervene urgently to clarify the whereabouts and 
circumstances of the detainees. 
Incommunicado detention, prolonged solitary confinement without access to court and 
counsel are circumstances conducive to torture, ill treatment and disappearances.104 The underly-
ing rationale for taking provisional measures to ensure access to counsel and court, exactly in a 
context of incommunicado detention, is indeed the awareness of risk to life and personal integrity. 
Nevertheless, with regard to the Guantanamo Bay detainees the CIDH did not at first specifically 
refer to the threat of ill-treatment. It only did so when information became available on the treat-
ment of the detainees and when the general awareness of the media was growing regarding spe-
cific allegations of ill-treatment of detainees under the control of US authorities. It then also 
                                                 
100 See e.g. HRC Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981 and Lopez Burgos (submitted by 
his wife Delia Saldias de Lopez) v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981. 
101 See also Gondek (2005); Scheinin (2004b) and Lawson (2004). See further the discussion in 
Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction). 
102 See e.g. Paust (2004b), pp. 79-96. See further Berman/Clark (1982). See also the discussion on 
secret detention centres, e.g. the Marty report presented on behalf of the Parliamentary Assembly 
of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Document 10957 and 
Add.; as well as AS (2006) CR 17, 27 June 2006; Res. 1507 (2006), 27 June 2006 and Res. 1754 
(2006), 27 June 2006; Amnesty International, Below the radar: secret flights to torture and 
disappearance, 5 April 2006, AI Index: AMR 51/051/2006; Amnesty International, Partners in 
crime: Europe’s role in US renditions, 14 June 2006, AI Index: EUR 01/008/2006; Amnesty 
International, Secret detention in CIA ‘Black Sites’, 8 November 2005, AI Index: AMR 
51/177/2005; Amnesty International, USA: Torture and secret detention testimony of the 
‘disappeared’ in the ‘war on terror’, 4 August 2005, AI Index: AMR 51/108/2005; Amnesty 
International urgent action regarding the possible ‘disappearance’ of Canadian national Maher 
Arar, 21 October 2002, AI Index: AMR 51/159/2002 and subsequent actions; Human Rights 
Watch, The United States’ Disappeared; the CIA’s long-term ghost detainees’, a Human Rights 
Watch briefing paper, October 2004. The issue discussed here is obviously related to those 
discussed in the chapters on non-refoulement (Chapter V, in particular its discussion of 
‘extraordinary renditions’), treatment in detention (Chapter VII) and jurisdiction (Chapter XIV). 
103 See also the references in the Introduction to this Chapter. See further Chapter IV (Non-
refoulement) on extraordinary renditions. At the same time complaints may be brought before the 
Inter-American Commission against the US. See further Chapter XIV on jurisdiction and 
admissibility. 
104 See Van Boven (2006), pp. 92-93. In general see also Boerefijn (2005b), pp. 240-258. 
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requested information on the location of post 9-11 detainees detained inside and outside of US 
territory.  
Generally speaking the case law on extraterritorial application of human rights obligations 
suggests that provisional measures could be taken vis-à-vis any State Party with the authority and 
control over persons.105 The case law by the three regional adjudicators and by the HRC shows 
that procedural rights relating to the right to life and personal integrity have a special status in the 
human rights systems, warranting the use of provisional measures. Indeed this case law, as well as 
the official statements by UN authorities, suggests that provisional measures to ensure access to 
counsel and legal recourse is essential in cases of incommunicado detention. Legal protection in 
the form of access to Court and counsel could help guard against torture, ill-treatment, disappear-
ances and extra-judicial executions. Awaiting the information on ill treatment in such cases is 
inappropriate given the general knowledge that persons without access to counsel and without 
legal recourse are by definition particularly at risk.  
 
                                                 
105 Yet see further Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction). 
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 CHAPTER IX 
 PROTECTING AGAINST DEATH THREATS 
 AND HARASSMENT 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The main problem the Inter-American human rights system has to deal with is that of the intimi-
dation, assault and murder of human rights defenders, witnesses, journalists and others. The Inter-
American Commission and Court were the first of the human rights adjudicators to use provi-
sional measures to halt death threats and harassment. They have developed the most extensive 
practice in this regard. In fact, most of their provisional measures deal with this problem. 
Yet the problem of death threats and harassment is not limited to the Americas, but relates 
to all regions of the world. Indeed, the two other regional adjudicators, the African Commission 
and the ECtHR, as well as the three relevant international adjudicators, the HRC, CAT and CE-
DAW, have also used provisional measures at least once to protect against death threats and 
harassment.  
This Chapter discusses the practice of the adjudicators in this respect, focussing on the In-
ter-American system. Chapter XIII (Protection) focuses on the specific measures of protection 
that have been ordered to be taken against death threats and harassment, including the obligation 
to investigate and prosecute.1 
The persons threatened may be involved in cases pending before the adjudicators, or in at-
tempts at investigating human rights violations before domestic courts. They may receive threats 
because they are involved as victims, as family members of murder victims or disappeared per-
sons, as witnesses or as counsel, prosecutor or judge.  
They may also receive threats as a reprisal for their work as a human rights defender.2 Ac-
cording to international officials and NGOs ‘armed forces and their paramilitary allies have fre-
quently labelled the activities of human rights defenders as subversive, in an attempt to discredit 
their work and present them as legitimate targets in the counterinsurgency war’.3 
In 2002 the President of the Inter-American Commission pointed out: 
“Human rights defenders and the organizations for which many of them work play a crucial role 
in litigation of human rights cases and in the process of civil society scrutiny of democratic 
institutions. The Commission calls for full protection of the work they do”.4 
                                                 
1 This also includes references to case law on the merits relating to this obligation. See Chapter 
XIII (Protection). 
2 Some witnesses and human rights defenders become the victims of disappearances (see Chapter 
VI). Some are harassed but their life and dignity is not at risk. Rather than direct threats to their 
lives or physical integrity, witnesses and human rights defenders may also receive threats of, for 
instance, deportation, as a reprisal for their activities. See Chapter XI (Mass expulsion). 
3 The quote is from Amnesty International, ‘Human rights defenders’ offices close in climate of 
terror’, AI index: AMR 23/19/99, 19 February 1999. 
4 Address by Dr. Juan E. Méndez, President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
upon presenting the IACHR Annual Report for 2001 to the Committee on Juridical and Political 
Affairs of the Permanent Council of the OAS, 30 April 2002, 
<www.cidh.org/discursos/04.30.02.eng.htm> (consulted 20 January 2006). See also Chapter XIII 
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2 THE PRACTICE OF THE ADJUDICATORS TO TAKE PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
TO HALT DEATH THREATS AND HARASSMENT 
2.1 Introduction 
As noted, most of the practice of using provisional measures to protect persons against death 
threats and harassment relates to the Inter-American Commission and Court.5 This Chapter first 
addresses their practice. It subsequently briefly refers to the practice of the other adjudicators, in 
chronological order. 
The Inter-American Court has referred not only to its authority, but to its duty to prevent ir-
reparable harm to persons. It considered ‘[t]hat the case known as the Blake Case is presently 
before the Court, and it is the duty of this Court to avoid irreparable harm to persons, which is 
understood to include guarding the complete security of witnesses and their relatives and deter-
mining whether the measures adopted by the Government have been sufficient’.6 
The issue of threats may arise in relation to persons in detention (both political detainees 
and persons convicted of common crime) as well as outside the context of detention.7 Threats 
may involve not only the alleged victim, but also family members, attorneys or other people 
connected in some manner to the alleged victim.  
Persons may be threatened directly, for instance because of their work as a human rights de-
fender. In such cases the adjudicator may open a case bringing a claim that in itself concerns 
death threats and harassment (section 2.3). In other cases the threats to life and personal integrity 
may take place in the context of another complaint already pending (section 2.2). 
2.2 Protecting persons involved in international human rights adjudication 
2.2.1 Introduction 
Alleged victims, their family, witnesses, attorneys, prosecutors and judges involved in the 
examination of a specific human rights violation before a domestic court or as part of a case 
pending before an international tribunal may face death threats and harassment. This section 
focuses on the Inter-American practice. As noted, it is mainly in the Inter-American system that 
provisional measures have been used in this context. It also refers to the practice of the other 
adjudicators.  
                                                                                                                       
(Protection). See in general on human rights defenders, e.g. the Declaration on the Rights and 
Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally 
recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A/RES/53/144, Resolution of 8 March 
1999 (text adopted 9 December 1998). Article 12 of this Declaration stipulates that States must 
ensure protection of human rights defenders against violence and threats. In August 2000 a 
Special Representative of the UN Secretary General on Human Rights Defenders was appointed. 
See e.g. her report E/CN.4/2005/101, 13 December 2004. On protecting human rights defenders 
see further e.g. Hallo de Wolf (2002) and Wiseberg (1991). 
5 See e.g. IACHR Matter of Adrián Meléndez Quijano et al. (El Salvador), Order of 12 May 2007; 
Case of 19 Tradesmen (Colombia), Order of 12 May 2007; Matter of Ramírez Hinostroza et al. 
(Peru), Order of 17 May 2007; Matter of Carlos Nieto Palma et al. (Venezuela), Order of 3 July 
2007; Case of Gutiérrez Soler (Colombia), Order of 27 November 2007; Matter of Guerrero 
Gallucci and Martínez Barrios (Venezuela), Order of 29 November 2007. 
6 IACHR Blake case, Order of 22 September 1995, 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
7 See also Chapter VI (Detention). 
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2.2.2 Inter-American Commission and Court 
Already in the Honduran cases, the first three cases examined by the Inter-American Court it had 
to deal with death threats against witnesses that had testified before it, or had been called to do so. 
One witness who had testified before the Court in September 1987, as well as one person who had 
been summoned to appear, were assassinated. In order to prevent further killings in November 
1987 the President of the Court sent a letter calling on Honduras to adopt the necessary measures 
to guarantee the life and property of two persons who had testified at the Court’s hearings. He did 
not have ‘sufficient elements of proof to be sure of who or what entities are responsible for these 
acts’, but he did request Honduras to take the necessary protective measures to guarantee the 
physical security and property of the two witnesses in accordance with its obligations under the 
ACHR. He also requested protective measures for the Committee for the Defence of Human 
Rights in Honduras. He warned the State that if the ‘abnormal situation’ would continue he 
would, after prior consultation with the Permanent Commission of the Court, call the full Court to 
a meeting in Washington where the General Assembly of the OAS was holding its session.  
It is clear that the reference to the General Assembly meeting was meant as ammunition to 
back up his letter. The President also explained that he was submitting the original letter person-
ally to the Ambassador of Honduras in Washington. The Agent of Honduras before the Court 
would receive a copy by fax.8  
In January 1988 the full Court pointed out that the lives of some of the witnesses who testi-
fied in these three cases were being threatened exactly because they gave such testimony. In this 
respect, it referred to the notes sent to Honduras by the President and the Secretariat of the Court 
in November and December 1987 respectively. It strongly condemned the two murders: 
“The physical elimination of actual or possible witnesses constitutes a savage, primitive, 
inhuman and reprehensible act which deeply offends the American conscience and reflects a 
total disregard for the values that are [sic] essence of the inter-American system”.9 
It ordered Honduras to ‘adopt, without delay, such measures as necessary to prevent further in-
fringements on the basic rights of those who have appeared or have been summoned to do so 
before this Court’ in the Honduran cases. It also ordered the State to ‘employ all means within its 
power to investigate these reprehensible crimes, to identify the perpetrators and impose the pun-
ishment provided for by the domestic law of Honduras’. Thus, from the start the Court has in-
cluded in its Orders for provisional measures the obligation to investigate crimes, identify the 
perpetrators and punish them.10  
                                                 
8 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, and Godínez Cruz Cases 
(Honduras), Letter by the President on behalf of witnesses Jiménez-Puerto and Custodio López, 6 
November 1987. Two weeks later the Secretariat, upon instruction of the President, requested 
Honduras once more to take the necessary measures to guarantee the life, personal integrity and 
property of the witnesses. It noted that ‘this afternoon this Secretariat has received a complaint 
regarding the preparation of an attempt on the life of Dr. Ramón Custodio López, President of the 
Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in Honduras’ (CODEH). Velásquez Rodríguez, 
Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, and Godínez Cruz Cases (Honduras), Letter Secretariat on 
behalf of witness Ramón Custodio López, 18 December 1987. See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-
up). 
9 Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, and Godínez Cruz Cases (Honduras), 
Order for provisional measures, 15 January 1988. See also section 3 of this Chapter on the 
relationship with the merits. 
10 See further Chapter XIII (Protection). 
 Chapter IX 
408 
The use of provisional measures to protect witnesses in cases pending before the Court has 
not been limited to these early cases. In the Bámaca Velásquez case, for instance, a witness was 
also receiving threats after he had testified before the Inter-American Court. In 1998 the Court 
ordered provisional measures on his behalf and on behalf of his family. It subsequently decided to 
maintain and expand these measures as they were still necessary during the phase of supervising 
the implementation of the judgement on reparations.11 
Another case in which the Court ordered a State to protect the life and integrity of a witness 
and his family was the Paniagua Morales case (‘the white panel truck case’). In January 1998 
three unknown persons had kidnapped and violently beaten the son of the victim in this case. He 
had been summoned to give testimony to the Inter-American Court during a hearing on the merits 
of that case. Upon receipt of information that the security of the beneficiaries had improved the 
Court lifted its provisional measures.12 
As discussed in Chapter II, upon request of the Commission the Inter-American Court can 
also order provisional measures in cases not yet pending before it. In 1990, for instance, it ordered 
Peru to take provisional measures on behalf of a journalist who had survived an attack as well as 
witnesses of the attack in a case that was pending before the Commission.13 
Since 1994 the Court had been involved in the Colotenango case. Its Orders for provisional 
measures in this case against Guatemala aimed to protect witnesses of an armed attack killing 
several people in a demonstration as well as their family members and the family of the victims 
and the attorneys. In 2007 it decided to lift its provisional measures in this case.14 
In November 1995 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of seven mem-
bers of the Civic Human Rights Committee of Meta (Colombia). Nevertheless, some of them 
continued to receive threats. In October 1996 one of them, Mr. Giraldo, was murdered. In light of 
these events, the Commission requested the Court to take provisional measures on behalf of three 
of his family members as well as three members of the Civic Committee. The Court did so.15  
On several occasions the Inter-American Commission and Court have had to intervene in 
the context of the Aguas Blancas massacre. This massacre took place on 29 June 1995 in the state 
                                                 
11 IACHR Bámaca Velásquez (Guatemala), Orders of 29 August 1998, 5 September 2001, 21 Fe-
bruary 2003, 20 November 2003 and 11 March 2005. 
12 IACHR Paniagua Morales (‘White van’) (Guatemala), Order of 19 June 1998; Order of 27 
November 1998 lifting the provisional measures. 
13 IACHR Bustíos-Rojas v. Peru, Order of 8 August1990, followed up by Order of 17 January 
1991. 
14 The matter of Colotenango (Guatemala), Order of 12 July 2007 (lifting the provisional measures 
ordered by it on 22 June and 1 December 1994, 19 September 1997, 2 February 2000 and 5 
September 2001; and clarifying that this lifting of the provisional measures did not mean that the 
State had complied fully with its Convention obligations described in Report No. 19/97 of the 
Inter-American Commission, or that the State was released from its obligation to continue with 
the respective investigations in the domestic jurisdiction to identify and, if applicable, punish 
those responsible for the facts, and that the Inter-American Commission was responsible for 
verifying effective compliance with these obligations). 
15 Subsequently the Court held a public hearing on the provisional measures. Annual Report 1997, 
Chapter IIIa under ‘Colombia’. It expanded them several times and also lifted them for some 
beneficiaries. On 30 September 1999, for instance, the Court issued an order for provisional 
measures requiring Colombia to maintain the measures necessary to protect the lives and physical 
safety of Sister Noemy Palencia, upon her return to Meta and of Mariela de Giraldo and her two 
children as well as of Ms. Rey. It also required Colombia to investigate the denounced facts, 
which gave rise to the Court’s provisional measures, to inform the Court about the results of this 
investigation, to discover those responsible and punish them. Later it maintained the provisional 
measures on behalf of Mrs. Mariela de Giraldo and her two daughters as well as for one other 
person. See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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of Guerrero in Mexico. The police had stopped members of the Organization Campesina de la 
Sierra Sur (OCSS) who were on their way to take part in protest against the local authorities. 
Seventeen peasants (‘campesinos’) died and 22 were wounded by gunfire. Only two of the po-
licemen were injured.16 In 1996 the Inter-American Commission asked Mexico to protect the life 
and personal integrity of several witnesses and their family members.17 In October 1998 it re-
quested protection on behalf of Bernardo Vásquez and eight other members of OCSS. Between 
June 1996 and ‘the date of the request’ 35 members were assassinated and the Government had 
branded the organisation as ‘subversive’. Reportedly one person, under torture, had implicated the 
involvement of Rocío Mesino in the insurgent People’s Revolutionary Army.18 As a result of her 
statement the Mesino family had been harassed and physically attacked. The organisation’s leader 
Mr. Vásquez Juárez was assassinated in July 1998. Previously he had received several death 
threats from the judicial police. Other members of the organisation had testified about human 
rights violations before an Amnesty International delegation and were beaten afterwards. More-
over, Mexico had refused to comply with the Inter-American Commission’s Report on the merits 
in the Aguas Blancas massacre case. In light of all this the petitioner requested protection ‘for the 
lives and physical integrity of the various members of the OCSS and investigation and punish-
ment of the violations reported, including the death of Vásquez Juárez.19  
A few years later, in July 2001, the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of 
another survivor who had received threats because of his activities aimed at securing justice in the 
Aguas Blancas case. For seven survivors of the massacre, still bearing physical and psychological 
scars from the massacre, the precautionary measures sought medical attention.20  
In its Order of August 2000, in the Haitian case, the Court pointed out, in reference to Arti-
cle 1(1) ACHR, the responsibility of the Dominican Republic to adopt security measures to pro-
tect all persons subject to its jurisdiction. Two witnesses had testified before the Court about the 
Commission’s request for provisional measures to halt deportation in the Haitian case and subse-
quently received threats.21 During the hearing itself the Commission had already pointed out that 
it believed that the witnesses who appeared at the public hearing were ‘justifiably fearful’ and ‘the 
interrogation by the State at said hearing did not help dissipate their fear’. One of the witnesses 
was working with approximately seven small communities or ‘bateyes’ without utilities or basic 
services. She ‘indicated that there are legislators and Government representatives who asked, 
through the media, that she be arrested, investigated and expelled; her children and family have 
been similarly terrorized’. The Court noted, as it had done in other such cases, that this responsi-
bility was ‘still more evident in relationship to those who may be bound by proceedings before 
the supervising organs of the American Convention’.22 On the basis of the affirmations by the 
witnesses themselves, during the public hearing, and on the basis of the Commission’s submis-
sions, the Court found that the two witnesses could, as a consequence of their testimony, become 
the victims of reprisals. This made it necessary to adopt provisional measures in order to prevent 
irreparable harm to their lives and physical integrity. It pointed out its practice to protect, by way 
of provisional measures, witnesses who have testified before it and it ordered the Dominican 
                                                 
16 CIDH Aguas Blancas case, 11.520. The Network of National Civil Organizations ‘All rights for 
everyone’ and the Democratic Revolution Party brought the case before the Commission. CEJIL 
joined later as co-petitioner. 
17 CIDH Annual Report, 1996, 14 March 1997, §4a. 
18 She had been arrested in June 1998, during the events of El Charco. 
19 CIDH Annual Report 1998, §45. 
20 On this type of precautionary measures see XII (Other situations). 
21 See also Chapter XI (Halting mass expulsion). The case itself was still pending before the 
Commission. 
22 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order for 
provisional measures, 18 August 2000. 
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Republic to ‘adopt, forthwith, whatever measures are necessary to protect their lives and personal 
integrity’.23 
2.2.3 African system 
Aware of the requirements inherent in the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment, if not 
of the practice of the Inter-American Commission and Court in this respect, the African Commis-
sion, or its Secretariat, has also intervened to prevent irreparable harm to petitioners or alleged 
victims in the context of death threats and harassment.  
In September 1994 the Commission called on the government of Togo ‘to take the neces-
sary measures to prevent irreparable prejudice to Corporal Bikagni’. Two years before, upon his 
arrest, the petitioner had submitted a complaint on behalf of this Corporal, alleging that he had 
been tortured and maltreated.24 The Commission did not indicate the type of information it re-
ceived subsequently, triggering its use of provisional measures. It may well be that he was being 
threatened with regard to his complaint about torture. It is also possible that he was in need of 
medical attention. In 1994 the Secretariat of the Commission also intervened in Association pour 
                                                 
23 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order for 
provisional measures, 18 August 2000. By Order of 26 May 2001 it reiterated that the State was 
to ‘adopt special measures to protect the life and physical integrity of Father Pedro Ruquoy and 
Solange Pierre’. By Order of the President of 5 October 2005 and the Court’s Order of 2 
February 2006 the State was to ‘adopt such measures as may be necessary to protect the life and 
personal integrity of Benito Tide-Méndez, Antonio Sension, Andrea Alezy, Janty Fils-Aime, 
William Medina-Ferreras, Rafaelito Pérez-Charles, Berson Gelim, Father Pedro Ruquoy, Solain 
Pie or Solain Pierre or Solange Pierre and her four children’. The Court considered ‘as regards 
the background information submitted by the representatives in the instant case, as well as the 
observations submitted by the Commission, it is prima facie evident that the lives and personal 
integrity of Ms. Solain Pie or Solain Pierre or Solange Pierre's four children are under threat’, 
Order of 2 February 2006, 15th ‘Considering’ clause. It pointed out that ‘the Commission and the 
representatives have informed the Court that the threats and harassment suffered by Ms. Solain 
Pie or Solain Pierre or Solange Pierre and her four children have forced them to leave the 
Dominican Republic, by reason of which this Tribunal deems it necessary that the State create 
due conditions for those people to return to their home’. In this respect it referred to previous 
occasions where it had ordered such measures (Matter of the Communities of Jiguamiandó and 
Curbaradó, Order of 6 March 2003, 10th ‘Considering’ clause; Matter of the Peace Community of 
San José de Apartadó, Order of 24 November 2000, 8th ‘Considering’ clause and Matter of 
Giraldo-Cardona, Order of 5 February 1997, 5th ‘Considering’ clause). It stressed that the State 
was to ‘ensure that said beneficiaries of measures do not face any threats or other sources of fear 
that may prevent them from continuing to live in their habitual places of residence’, 17th 
‘Considering’ clause. Even though the beneficiaries were ‘not in the Dominican Republic at 
present, the State must maintain the measures adopted in their favor with a view to making them 
effective when said beneficiaries return to their country’, 18th ‘Considering’ clause. With regard 
to Father Ruquoy, who had left the country out of fear for his life and personal security, after 
having lived there for 30 years, it pointed out that he was a beneficiary of the Court’s provisional 
measures and ‘the State must offer whatever conditions are necessary so that, should Father 
Ruquoy return to the Dominican Republic, he can remain within Dominican territory and have 
his life and personal integrity duly protected’, 19th ‘Considering’ clause. 
24 ACHPR Degli (on behalf of Corporal N. Bikagni), Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, 
International Commission of Jurists v. Togo, March 1995. The official decision does not refer to 
the provisional measures. See e.g. <http://dcregistry.com/users/ACHPR/index3.html> (consulted 
20 October 2005) for the initial decision of March 1995 that does refer to the provisional 
measure. 
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la Défense des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Djibouti (2000). The petitioner was an NGO 
from Djibouti complaining of a series of human rights abuses against members of the Afar ethnic 
group. It referred to 26 people who had been jailed without trial, tortured or executed.25 No spe-
cific information is available on the background of the provisional measures, but given the fact 
that they aimed to avoid ‘irreparable prejudice to the complainant or the victims’ it may be as-
sumed that the petitioners and/or the alleged victims were receiving threats because of their com-
plaints about these violations.26  
2.2.4 CAT 
The three relevant international systems have all used provisional measures at least once to deal 
with the situation of death threats and harassment.  
In B.M’.B. v. Tunisia the petitioner had informed CAT that witnesses had been detained and 
questioned by Tunisian authorities in connection with the petition before the Committee. More-
over, members of the petitioner's and of the victim's families had allegedly been subjected to 
intimidation.27 In April 1994 CAT took provisional measures ‘to ensure that no harm is done to 
the author's family, the alleged victim's family or the witnesses and their families’.28 The peti-
tioner, who himself was staying in France, had requested such measures to protect the ‘physical, 
moral and economic security’ of his family and the other persons threatened.29 CAT later declared 
the case inadmissible because the petitioner had not submitted sufficient proof to establish his 
authority to act on behalf of the victim. At the same time it maintained its provisional measures.30  
2.2.5 HRC 
In January and February 2004 the HRC used provisional measures on behalf of Michael Anthony 
Fernando, who was being threatened in the context of a case pending before the HRC. The Com-
mittee requested Sri Lanka ‘to adopt all necessary measures to protect the life, safety and personal 
integrity of the author and his family members, so as to avoid irreparable damage to them’.31  
The original petition related to arbitrary detention and torture.32 The petitioner was released 
in October 2003 when the case was still pending before the HRC. It discussed his case during its 
                                                 
25 These violations were committed by government troops in areas of fighting with the Front pour la 
Restauration de l’Unité et de la Démocratie, an organisation drawing its support mainly from the 
Afar ethnic group. 
26 Upon confirmation by the petitioner, in March 2000, that it wished to withdraw the complaint 
because a friendly settlement had been reached, the African Commission decided to close the 
case, Association pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Djibouti, May 2000 
(closure). See the informal publication of cases at: <http://dcregistry.com/users/ACHPR/ 
index3.html>. 
27 See CAT B.M’B v. Tunisia, 5 May 1994, §2.6. 
28 Id., §5(c).  
29 Id., §2.4. 
30 See further Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
31 HRC Anthony Michael Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 31 March 2005, §§5.1-5.8. Provisional measures 
of 9 January and 13 February 2004. 
32 The petitioner was sentenced in February 2003 and released in October of that year. The 
petitioner had been detained for contempt of court after he challenged a controversial Chief 
Justice of the Supreme Court of Sri Lanka. The Asian Human Rights Commission, an NGO, 
undertook a combination of actions including an online petition, urgent appeals and press releases 
and a petition filed with the HRC. It has made available an excerpt from the submission. The 
Asian Human Rights Commission is a regional non-governmental organisation monitoring and 
lobbying human rights issues in Asia. It was founded in 1984 and is based in Hong Kong. The 
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public October-November session. It did so in the context of the reporting procedure of Art. 40 
ICCPR. He himself was present in the NGO delegation.33  
The Committee’s Concluding Observations on Sri Lanka (2003) noted with concern reports 
that victims of human rights violations are reluctant to bring complaints because of intimidation 
and threats. The State ‘should ensure in particular that allegations of crimes committed by State 
                                                                                                                       
members of its Board of Directors are from Hong Kong, the Philippines, Japan, South Korea and 
Sri Lanka. Its Advisory Board also includes members from India, Pakistan and Cambodia. See 
www.ahrchk.net. The Asian Legal Resource Centre is a sister group of the Asian Human Rights 
Commission. In its initial submission (June 2003) the Asian Human Rights Commission already 
requested the Committee to use provisional measures, in this case to release the petitioner 
‘pending a full impartial and independent hearing into the alleged contempt’. It noted the 
petitioner’s ‘frail state of health and already substantial period of imprisonment-during which he 
suffered deterioration of his mental health due to imprisonment and degrading treatment’. In that 
light early release would be the most appropriate remedy. The HRC did not heed to this request 
for provisional measures. See <www.ahrchk.net and www.hrschool.org> (consulted on 5 August 
2004). See also HRC Anthony Michael Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 31 March 2005, §1.2. It submitted 
that the petitioner had been hospitalised and, upon his return to the prison, on 10 February 2003, 
‘he was assaulted several times, specifically between 2 and 5 p.m., when he was beaten by prison 
guards outside the prison on the road’. “He was then pushed into a police van where he was 
kicked repeatedly on the back causing damage to his spinal cord. On his arrival in prison, the 
Applicant was taken on a stretcher and left to lie near a putrid toilet. He was then stripped naked 
and left to lie near the toilet for a further 24 hours. Following this sequence of events, the 
Applicant began to urinate blood and was returned to the hospital in a van”. Human Rights 
Correspondence School, a project of the Asian Human Rights Commission, lesson series 33 on 
Fernando’s complaint to the HRC, 8 April 2004, <www.hrschool.org> (consulted on 5 August 
2004). The teaching modules of the internet correspondence school initiated by the above NGO 
also include a general introduction on filing a complaint with the UN treaty based human rights 
mechanisms. This introduction also refers to ‘special circumstances of urgency or sensitivity’. It 
notes, referring to provisional measures: ‘typically, such requests are issued to prevent actions 
that cannot later be undone, for example implementing a death sentence or the deportation of an 
individual facing the risk of ill treatment and/or torture’. “If you wish the Committee to consider 
a request for interim measures, it is advisable to state this explicitly in your complaint, with 
reasons for why you consider such action to be necessary”. The claims based on Articles 7 
(torture on) and 10(1) (conditions of detention) ICCPR were declared inadmissible as a case was 
still pending before the Supreme Court. Anthony Michael Emmanuel Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 21 
March 2005, §8.2. The HRC did find the State responsible for arbitrary detention contrary to Art. 
9 ICCPR, §9.2. Reportedly, in May 2008 the Supreme Court found two prison guards responsible 
for the violation of Fernando’s rights with respect to the pending torture claim, see Asian Human 
Rights Commission, ‘Sri Lanka: SC holds prison officers to have committed torture on Tony 
Fernando’, 15 May 2008, <http://www.universalpeoplesforum.org/news_local/ 
ahrchk.net_20080606.htm> (consulted 8 August 2008). The same source also reports that the 
State would not implement the HRC decision and grant compensation to Tony Fernando because 
of a previous Supreme Court case (the Singarasa case) holding that HRC decisions have no 
binding effect within Sri Lanka. For that case: Supreme Court of Sri Lanka, Singarasa case, 15 
September 2006, <http://www.srilankahr.net/pdf/sc_judgement1.pdf> (last consulted 8 August 
2008). The HRC decision in Nallaratnam Singarasa v. Sri Lanka was of 21 July 2004. See also 
Asian Human Rights Commission, ‘Sri Lanka: The recent judgement of the Supreme Court on 
the Singarasa case is an attack on the sovereignty of the people’, 20 September 2006, 
<www.ahrchk.net/statements/mainfile.php/2006statements/739/> (consulted 8 Augustus 2008). 
33 HRC Concluding Observations with regard to the report of Sri Lanka, 6 November 2003, 
CCPR/CO/79/LKA, 1 December 2003. 
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security forces, especially allegations of torture, abduction and illegal confinement, are investi-
gated promptly and effectively with a view to prosecuting perpetrators’.34  
Yet upon his return to Sri Lanka the petitioner received threats. He submitted to the HRC 
that on 24 November 2003, at 9:35 a.m., an unknown person had called his mother and made 
death threats against him, demanding he withdraw his three complaints (two domestic with regard 
to his torture and one to the HRC). That same day, at 10:27 a.m. an unidentified person visited the 
premises of the Ravaya newspaper that had interviewed the petitioner before and had reported on 
issues involving the independence of the judiciary. This person threatened the reporter and the 
editor and demanded that they cease publishing further news on the petitioner. The newspaper 
reported these threats in its weekend edition. On 28 and 30 November a person visited his parents 
house again threatening to kill him. This person had left before the police arrived. On 4 December 
2003 the petitioner informed the HRC that the two prison officers implicated in his torture com-
plaint had been reinstated. ‘As a result, the author lives in daily fear for his life as well as for the 
life and safety of his wife, his son and his parents. In spite of his complaint to the authorities, he 
has not, to date, received any protection from the police and is unaware of what action has been 
taken to investigate the threats against himself and his family’. He recalled that he had received 
death threats in prison as well. He referred to the Committee’s Views in Delgado Paez v. Colom-
bia, that the State was obliged to investigate death threats and protect the victims. Early January 
2004 the Committee’s Special Rapporteur requested the State party ‘to adopt all necessary meas-
ures to protect the life, safety and personal integrity of the author and his family, so as to avoid 
irreparable damage to them’.35 
It does not appear that the State acted on this provisional measure. In any case, on 3 Febru-
ary 2004 the petitioner submitted that ‘on the morning of 2 February 2004, he had been subjected 
to an attack by an unknown assailant who sprayed chloroform in his face. A van pulled up close 
by during the attack, and the author believes that it was going to be used to kidnap him. He man-
aged to escape and was taken to hospital. Had he not escaped, he would have been the victim of 
an assassination or disappearance’. In response on 13 February 2004 ‘the Committee, through its 
Special Rapporteur on New Communications’ reiterated its previous provisional measures.36 
                                                 
34 HRC Concluding Observations with regard to the report of Sri Lanka, 6 November 2003, 
CCPR/CO/79/LKA, 1 December 2003. The NGO’s urgent appeal of 1 December 2003 also 
referred to the Concluding Observations (2003) that Sri Lanka ‘should diligently enquire into all 
cases of suspected intimidation of witnesses and establish a witness protection program in order 
to put an end to the climate of fear that plagues the investigation and prosecution of such cases’. 
Asian Human Rights Commission, Update on urgent appeal, Michael Anthony Fernando receives 
death threats, 1 December 2003, <www.ahrchk.net> (consulted on 5 August 2004). 
35 HRC Anthony Michael Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 31 March 2005, §5.1-5.5. He explained that he 
had reviewed the petitioner’s request for provisional measures in light of ‘the urgency of this 
matter’. He noted that this request related ‘to various alleged death threats against the author and 
his family, by reason of the author’s communication to the Human Rights Committee’. 
Provisional measure of 9 January 2004 (1189/2003). The Asian Human Rights Commission 
reproduced part of the Special Rapporteur’s letter to the petitioner informing him of this decision. 
See Human Rights Correspondence School, a project of the Asian Human Rights Commission, 
lesson series 33, p. 3, 14 April 2004, <www.hrschool.org> (consulted on 5 August 2004). 
36 HRC Anthony Michael Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 31 March 2005, §5.6. Eventually the HRC found 
that Fernando had been detained arbitrarily in violation of Article 9 ICCPR. It devoted a 
paragraph to its use of provisional measures, but did not return to this issue in its decision on the 
merits. The State party had responded to the second provisional measure the next month by 
submitting ‘that the Attorney General's Department directed the police to investigate the alleged 
attack and to take measures necessary to ensure his safety. The police recorded his statement in 
which he was unable to either name the suspects or to provide the police with the number of the 
vehicle that the alleged assailants had traveled in. The investigations remain in progress and steps 
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In a case involving claims of incommunicado detention, ill-treatment and adverse detention 
conditions, in November 2005 the Special Rapporteur ‘drew the State party's attention to the right 
to submit individual communications to the Committee, under the Optional Protocol to the Cove-
nant, and recalled that an individual and his relatives should not be subjected to intimidation for 
having submitted a communication to the Committee’.37 It is not specified whether this interven-
tion was based on the Rule on provisional measures, but it could in any case be classified as an 
informal provisional measure. Nevertheless the Committee does not discuss what triggered this 
intervention nor what particular measures the State should take to ensure the right of petition. On 
the merits, finding violations of Articles 7, 9 and 10 ICCPR, there is no reference to the acts of 
intimidation that triggered the intervention. 
In a case brought on behalf of ‘X’ against Serbia in 2005 the petitioner, Humanitarian Law 
Center, had requested provisional measures ‘to urge the State party to offer protection to the 
witnesses named in the complaint, to encourage the State party to prevent further interaction 
between the perpetrators of the sexual abuse and the victim, and to urge the State party to provide 
to the victim adequate counseling and continued supervision, as may be necessary’.38 The Special 
Rapporteur rejected these requests.39 The Committee subsequently declared the case inadmissible 
for lack of standing by the Humanitarian Law Center to act on his behalf, while expressing grave 
concern for the welfare of the child in question.40  
The decision not to use provisional measures may be based on the Rapporteur’s estimation 
that the case would be declared inadmissible for lack of standing. If so, this shows a clear distinc-
tion with CAT, which used provisional measures in a case, mentioned above, that also related to 
                                                                                                                       
will be taken to inform the author of the outcome’. It stated that it would take appropriate action 
‘if the investigations reveal credible evidence that the threats were caused by any person with a 
view to subverting the course of justice’. See Anthony Michael Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 31 March 
2005, §5.7. The Committee concluded by noting, with regard to the petitioner’s safety, ‘a police 
patrol book had been placed at his residence and police patrol have been directed to visit his 
residence day and night and to record their visits in the police patrol book. In addition to this, his 
residence is kept under surveillance by plain-cloth policemen’. There was ‘no evidence to 
conclude that the author received threats to his life because of his communication to the Human 
Rights Committee’. See Anthony Michael Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 31 March 2005, §5.8. 
37 HRC Sid Ahmed Aber v. Algeria, 13 July 2007, §1.2. 
38 HRC Humanitarian Law Center v. Serbia, 26 March 2007 (inadm.), §1.2. 
39 Ibid. (decision of 31 January 2005). 
40 It noted that the child was 12 at the time of the petition to the HRC and thus likely to be able to 
give his consent. The petitioner had pointed out that consent from the child, his legal guardian or 
his parents could not be obtained ‘because all are under the influence of the alleged perpetrators 
of the sexual abuse’. See §6.6. The Committee found that ‘In the absence of express 
authorisation, the author should provide evidence that it has a sufficiently close relationship with 
the child to justify it acting without such authorisation’. The Humanitarian Law Center ceased to 
represent the child in the domestic proceedings in August 2003 and had not been in contact with 
him, his guardian or his parents. “In such circumstances, the Committee cannot even assume that 
the child does not object, let alone consent, to the author proceeding with a communication to the 
Committee. Consequently, not withstanding that the Committee is gravely disturbed by the 
evidence in this case, it is precluded by the provisions of the Optional Protocol from considering 
the matter since the author has not shown that it may act on the victim’s behalf in submitting this 
communication”. §6.7. The evidence submitted related to a ten year old Roma boy who had been 
sexually abused by five men in a bar. Initially a complaint was brought against the men. The 
victim was represented by the Humanitarian Law Center. Later the victim changed his testimony 
and the prosecutor dropped the charges. Several witnesses, including the public health nurse that 
had persuaded the boy to report the incident to the police, had received threats. Others, including 
the boy’s parents, were also offered bribes.  
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insufficient authorization, although admittedly in different circumstances. CAT even maintained 
these provisional measures after it declared the case inadmissible.41 What remains clear, however, 
is the Committee’s position, confirmed in 2008, that it follows from Article 1 OP that States 
parties ‘are obliged not to hinder access to the Committee and to prevent any retaliatory measures 
against any person who has addressed a communication to the Committee’.42 In order to help 
ensure the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment, as well as this obligation, the use of 
provisional measures can no longer be excluded. 
2.2.6 ECtHR 
It is only haltingly that the ECtHR has followed the approach of the other human rights adjudica-
tors. It did so in June 2004 in Bitiyeva and X v. Russia (2007). The first petitioner in this case had 
complained under Articles 3 and 5 ECHR about her ill-treatment and illegal detention in January 
and February 2000. Yet in May 2003, while the case was pending, she was killed in her house by 
unidentified gunmen along with three other members of her family. The second petitioner, who is 
the daughter of the first petitioner, expressed her wish to pursue the petition and complained in 
her own name under Articles 2, 3, 13 and 34 ECHR about the death of her family members, the 
lack of effective remedies and hindrance of the right of individual petition.43 She discussed vari-
ous occurrences of threats and intimidation and explained that she ‘felt intimidated and feared for 
her safety, security and life’.44 Subsequently the Court used provisional measures. It ‘requested 
the Russian Government to take all measures to ensure that there was no hindrance in any way of 
the effective exercise of the second applicant's right of individual petition as provided by Article 
34 of the Convention’.45 Again the Court does not make explicit the link between the right of 
individual petition (Article 34) and protecting the right to life (Article 2) and personal integrity 
(Article 3) pending the proceedings. Nevertheless in practice it is the first time it has clearly 
intervened in a case involving claims of death threats and harassment.46 Obviously this is just a 
first step, as no indication is yet provided on what form this protection should take.47 
                                                 
41 In general on the relevance of jurisdiction on the merits and admissibility see Chapter XIV. On 
representation see also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4.4. 
42 HRC General Comment 33, CCPR/C/GC/33, 5 November 2008 (Advance unedited version), §4. 
43 ECtHR Bitiyeva and X v. Russia, Judgment of 21 June 2007 (first section), §3. 
44 Id., §§59-62. 
45 Id., §63. Without further information this paragraph adds that the provisional measure was lifted 
on 20 October 2005. 
46 In its findings on the merits the Court did not return to its provisional measures. It found that 
there was ‘no direct evidence to support the second applicant's assertion that the killings of the 
first applicant and of her family members were related to her application to the Court. A breach 
of Article 34 cannot be found on a mere supposition’. It did recognise, however, ‘that the brutal 
and unresolved killing of the first applicant after she had lodged a complaint in Strasbourg 
alleging serious human-rights violations by State agents would have inevitably had a “chilling 
effect” on other current and prospective applicants to the Court, especially for the residents of 
Chechnya. It can only express its deepest regret and disappointment that there has been no 
effective investigation which could have elucidated the circumstances of the first applicant's 
killing (see paragraphs 144-151 above). However, it does not consider that it should make a 
separate finding of a breach of the respondent State's obligations under Article 34 in this respect, 
having already found a double violation of Article 2 and of Article 13’. ECtHR Bitiyeva and X v. 
Russia, Judgment of 21 June 2007 (first section), §164. It also considered that it did ‘not have 
sufficient material before it to conclude that the respondent Government have breached their 
obligations under Article 34 by putting undue pressure on the second applicant in order to 
dissuade her from pursuing her application to the Court’. See §167, as discussed in §§165-166. 
See also the comment by the rapporteur of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe 
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In August 2008 the ECtHR used provisional measures in the context of the armed action in 
Georgia that month. Georgia had requested the Court to order provisional measures against Rus-
sia. The President of the Court called upon ‘both the High Contracting Parties concerned to com-
ply with their engagements under the Convention particularly in respect of Articles 2 and 3 of the 
Convention’.48 Georgia had brought the inter-State complaint against Russia and, as the ICJ does 
in such cases, the Court called upon both Russia and Georgia to comply with their international 
obligations.49  
                                                                                                                       
on this case suggesting that the Court could have found a violation of Article 34 for failing to 
carry out a proper investigation, Doc. 11183 Addendum, 1 October 2007, §14. 
47 See further on the specificity of provisional measures Chapter XIII (Protection), section 3. See 
also Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Resolution 1571 (2007), calling on the Member 
States to ‘take positive measures to protect applicants, their lawyers or family members from 
reprisals by individuals or groups including, where appropriate, allowing applicants to participate 
in witness protection programmes, providing them with special police protection or granting 
threatened individuals and their families temporary protection or political asylum in an 
unbureaucratic manner’, §17.2 and ‘thoroughly investigate all cases of alleged crimes against 
applicants, their lawyers or family members and to take robust action to prosecute and punish the 
perpetrators and instigators of such acts so as to send out a clear message that such action will not 
be tolerated by the authorities’ §17.3 and noting ‘that member states’ co-operation with the 
European Court of Human Rights would benefit if the Court were to continue to develop its case 
law to ensure full implementation of the member states’ duty to co-operate with the Court, in 
particular by: taking appropriate interim measures, including new types thereof, such as ordering 
police protection or relocation of threatened individuals and their families’, §18.1. 
48 ECtHR Press release issued by the Registrar, ‘European Court of Human Rights grants request 
for interim measures’, 12 August 2008. The press release noted that ‘on 11 August 2008 the 
Georgian Government requested the Court to indicate to the Government of the Russian 
Federation interim measures to the effect that the Russian Government should “refrain from 
taking any measures which may threaten the life or state of health of the civilian population and 
to allow the Georgian emergency forces to carry out all the necessary measures in order to 
provide assistance to the remaining injured civilian population and soldiers via humanitarian 
corridor”. It also pointed out that ‘(t)he Agent of the Georgian Government informed the Court 
that this request was made in the context of an application directed against the Russian Federation 
alleging violations of Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment) of the European Convention on Human Rights and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 
(protection of property) to the Convention’. 
49 See also Chapter I on a request for provisional measures brought by Georgia before the ICJ 
around the same time, in the context of an application based on violations by Russia of CERD. 
The ICJ ordered a similar provisional measure: Application of the International Convention on 
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), 15 October 2008. As 
to the use of provisional measures by human rights adjudicators in inter-State cases, the 
EComHR had previously used provisional measures to halt the execution of death sentences in 
two inter-State cases, see EComHR Application of the ECHR to the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. 
UK), 26 September 1958 (Article 31 report), p. 34 and Partial Decision of the Commission as to 
the admissibility of the application, The Second Greek case (Denmark, Norway and Sweden v. 
Greece), 5 October 1970, §11. In another inter-State case, Ireland v. UK, the EComHR refused a 
request by Ireland for the UK to postpone its five interrogation techniques. See further Chapter 
VII (Detention).  
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2.3 Protecting persons bringing a claim regarding death threats and 
harassment 
2.3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in the previous subsection, the Inter-American Commission and Court have 
regularly taken provisional measures to protect persons (such as alleged victims or witnesses) 
involved in the proceedings before them. In addition they have built up an extensive practice of 
taking provisional measures on behalf of persons who were not already involved in a pending 
case. In response to petitions specifically relating to death threats and requesting provisional 
measures at the same time, they have taken provisional or precautionary measures immediately. 
This subsection will give examples in order to sketch a picture of the types of cases concerned. 
2.3.2 Persons involved in domestic (human rights) investigations 
Witnesses, attorneys and judges involved in local investigations or trials or otherwise perceived as 
a threat by local police or militias are often subjected to death threats and harassment. Even mem-
bers of the military may receive threats, particularly when their (former) colleagues or their ‘asso-
ciates’ (e.g. paramilitary groups) consider them whistleblowers who have ‘ratted’ on them.50 
Prison guards may also harass prisoners because they gave information to human rights defend-
ers, both in retaliation and as a warning never to provide such information again.51  
The Commission has dealt with a greater number of urgent cases than the Court. It has 
taken precautionary measures, for instance, on behalf of an ex-member of the police who had 
participated in a military operation during which several persons were extra-judicially executed. 
His testimony could implicate those who had taken part in these actions.52  
                                                 
50 In 1997 the Commission took precautionary measures requesting Paraguay to take the necessary 
measures to guarantee the life and physical integrity of a Major and his family. He had allegedly 
received threats for testifying before a Special Military Tribunal. CIDH Annual Report 1998, 
§47. 
51 On 4 March 1999 the Commission requested Mexico to take protective measures on behalf of a 
prisoner who had been beaten brutally. The prison concerned was the Nuevo León Social 
Rehabilitation Centre. Other prisoners had been beaten as well. Apparently, these beatings took 
place as a result of their meeting with representatives of Citizens Support of Human Rights 
(CADHAC). Allegedly these representatives had also been harassed. Two weeks later Mexico 
informed the Commission of the measures it had adopted. Mexico had arranged for the 
intervention of the State Human Rights Commission of Nuevo León and of that state’s 
government secretariat. CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III C.1, §42. 
52 The Commission does not indicate whether this testimony would be given as part of a case 
pending before it or of a case pending before a national court. It is clear, however, that he 
himself, or an NGO petitioner on his behalf, had brought a case before the Commission. 
Precautionary measure of 28 February 1996. It appears that he wanted to rejoin the National 
Police, hence the complaint before the Commission, registered as case 11.237, may have been 
about his dismissal because he had blown the whistle about this military operation. In the 
meantime, apparently, he and his family were being threatened. Colombia informed the 
Commission of a meeting between an official of the Presidential Advisory Board for Human 
Rights, the beneficiary and a representative of the Colombian Commission of Jurists in order to 
analyse and study possible measures to be taken. Later, the claimant informed the Commission of 
his wish ‘not to avail himself of any special protection plan and to rejoin the National Police or to 
join National Bureau of Investigation’. In September 1996 the State reported on the concrete 
measures it had taken on behalf of the beneficiary. CIDH Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1997, 
§4a. 
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Family members of persons who have been assassinated are in a vulnerable position as well, 
especially when they seek the investigation of such murder.53 Attorneys are also in a particularly 
vulnerable position. In June 1999 the Commission used precautionary measures on behalf of an 
attorney and a public prosecutor, both of the Brazilian state of Espíritu Santo. The attorney was a 
human rights defender and a key witness in corruption cases. He and the public prosecutor had 
received serious death threats from a paramilitary organisation.54 
Judges and prosecutors trying to deal with human rights cases domestically are equally sub-
jected to threats as well. In March 2001 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf 
of the President of the Constitutional Court of Guatemala. Unknown persons had fired shots at her 
home, causing material damage to it. Previously she had received death threats.55 
In August 2001 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of eight members 
of the National Human Rights Unit of the Colombian Attorney General’s office and their families. 
They had begun a judicial investigation of a General ‘in connection with the alleged creation and 
support of private vigilante groups during his tenure as the commander of the army’s XVII bri-
gade in the Urabá region of Antioquia’.56 As part of this investigation the home of this General 
was searched and he himself was arrested. Immediately, in retaliation, criminal and disciplinary 
proceedings were ordered against six members of the Human Rights Unit and two others were 
asked to resign. One of them was requested to resign as the head of the Anticorruption Unit. The 
General whose activities they were investigating was released at once. The Commission requested 
Colombia to protect the lives of the eight persons, to agree with them on the type of security 
measures to be arranged and to refrain from taking any reprisal against them for simply perform-
ing their duties as prosecutors.57 
Even a former warden requested the protection of the Commission, which in July 2001, 
took precautionary measures on behalf of a man who had been the warden of La Picota peniten-
tiary in Bogotá in Colombia. At his home he had received death threats by telephone. Persons 
unknown to him, but claiming to be members of the Calima Block of the United Self-Defence 
Forces of Colombia (AUC) and other persons claiming to be members of the AUC of South Cesar 
and Santander had made these threats. At the same time unidentified persons riding motorcycles 
were constantly following him.58 
Several people also received threats in the context of the investigation of the murder of 
Bishop Gerardi in Guatemala. The Bishop had been active in the Interdiocesan Historical Mem-
ory Recovery Project (REMHI). He was murdered in April 1998 following the publication of its 
final report ‘Guatemala: nunca mas’. The next year an attorney was targeted who had been work-
ing with monsignor Gerardi. In April 1999, on the first anniversary of Gerardi’s murder, three 
                                                 
53 See e.g. the precautionary measures of 30 January 2001 on behalf of Gloria Gaitán Jaramillo 
(Colombia). Through the so-called ‘National and International Truth Tribunal Campaign’ she 
was trying to further the investigation into the assassination of her father. According to the 
available information she was harassed and persecuted because of this both at home and at her 
workplace. CIDH Annual Report 2000, §26 and Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §13. 
54 The organization Scuderie Le Coq, Case 12.003. On 7 September 1999 the Commission 
reiterated its request to Brazil to protect them. CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III C.1, §13. 
55 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §31. See also, e.g. the precautionary measures of 5 
July 2001 to protect the judicial magistrate in charge of the investigation into the murder of 
journalist Jean Dominique, Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §37. See also Chapter XIII 
(Protection). 
56 It concerned General Rito Alejo del Río Rojas (ret.). 
57 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §20. See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
58 Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §19. Colombia was requested to take the necessary steps to 
protect his life and person, to agree with him on security measures and to investigate the source 
of the threats. 
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unidentified armed persons violently entered the attorney’s home, searched his house, threatened 
one of his daughters and assaulted his housekeeper. The attackers stated that they brought the 
attorney a message consisting of ‘a slab of concrete and stone’. The Commission took precaution-
ary measures that same day. Later that month Guatemala reported to the Commission that it had 
deployed uniformed personnel keeping a constant watch on his residence. The Commission re-
ceived information on this situation ‘until the persons concerned left the country’.59 Although it is 
clear that Guatemala granted some form of protection, the fact that the attorney and his family left 
the country may indicate that they considered this protection insufficient.60 The special prosecutor 
and the deputy prosecutor investigating Gerardi’s murder were threatened as well. In September 
1999 the Commission granted precautionary measures on their behalf. Guatemala provided them 
with personal security and a police patrol was ordered to guard their homes. Subsequently, the 
special prosecutor resigned and went with his family to the US in voluntary exile.61 In June 2001 
the Commission once more took precautionary measures to protect persons involved in the inves-
tigation of Bishop Gerardi’s murder. The measures were specifically intended for two persons, 
one of whom was the coordinator of military affairs at the Myrna Mack Foundation. He had 
received death threats aimed at keeping him from taking the witness stand in the judicial investi-
gation of Gerardi’s murder. Subsequently, Guatemala informed the Commission of the security 
measures offered: uniformed police officers ‘would mount permanent patrols around the perime-
ter of his home and the Mack Foundation’s headquarters’.62 
2.3.3 Human rights defenders generally 
Apart from the group of witnesses and others involved in one specific case many people are also 
at risk simply because of their participation in human rights work generally. The Commission has 
taken a considerable number of precautionary measures on behalf of these human rights defenders 
and the Court has taken provisional measures as well.63  
As with regard to the aforementioned situation, involving human rights litigation, some ex-
amples are given to indicate the range of situations involving human rights defenders. In Novem-
ber 1994 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of a forensic anthropologist in 
charge of exhumations in the clandestine cemeteries found in the Rabinal region of Guatemala.64 
In March 1996 the Commission requested Mexico to protect the life, physical integrity and per-
sonal safety of a Mexican human rights defender who was attacked and threatened for visiting a 
municipal jail to verify complaints by family members of prisoners. The attackers accused her of 
‘defending delinquents and obstructing police work’.65 The Commission had also intervened on 
behalf of a lawyer, her three sons and four co-workers focussing on the rights of women and 
children in Petén (Guatemala).66 
                                                 
59 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III.C.1, §34. 
60 About the official State responses see Chapter XVII. 
61 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III.C.1, §35. 
62 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §32. The Commission does not specify the 
circumstances of the threats against the other beneficiary of its precautionary measures or any 
action undertaken by the State to protect her. 
63 Sometimes these human rights defenders are themselves attorneys involved in specific human 
rights litigation, as discussed under the previous heading. 
64 The threats continued in 1995. Afterwards, they ceased and at the request of the victims CEJIL 
requested the Commission to close the case in April 1996. CEJIL case docket 1997. 
65 CIDH Annual report 1996, 14 March 1997, §4a. 
66 CIDH Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1996, Chapter II, §4a (cont.). She was the director of the 
legal office IXCHEL, involved in human rights and environmental law. On 12 September 1996 
Guatemala informed the Commission of the steps it was taking to protect the beneficiaries. 
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In 2001 the Commission undertook action on behalf of a human rights defender who had 
publicly denounced acts of harassment intended to terrorise the community of Cuarto Pueblo, 
Guatemala. Witnesses in a suit against the military for the crime of genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes (committed between 1982 and 1986) had been harassed in particular.67 
An academic researcher in Guatemala had received threats as well. In 2001 the Commission 
intervened upon receipt of information about a series of threatening and intimidating acts related 
to her professional activities. As a historian and social researcher for the Association for the Ad-
vancement of Social Science in Guatemala she had completed a study ‘on how local power struc-
tures showed ties among local elite, the armed forces, and individuals who served as military 
commissioners and members of civil self-defence patrols during the country’s armed conflict’.68 
Criticism of corruption can equally be life threatening. The Commission requested Ecuador 
to protect the former director of its State Printing Press as well as a former and a current member 
of the Congress of Guatemala and their families. They had publicly denounced ‘the alleged use by 
the Guatemalan vice-president of the national printing press to print 20,000 posters and 500,000 
handbills bearing accusations and slanderous comments of the president of the Guatemalan 
Chamber of Commerce, which were later distributed anonymously in the nation’s capital and 
other cities’. The aforementioned director of the State Printing Press was asked to resign and later 
received a series of serious death threats forcing her to flee Guatemala. The other two persons 
also received death threats and were harassed. Subsequently Guatemala informed the Commission 
that it had provided the member of Congress with personal security. The director general of the 
National Civilian Police had assigned two officers and a vehicle to protect her.69 
Several human rights defenders in Brazil had denounced the activities of members of the 
civil police known as the ‘Golden Boys’ in the North of the state of Rio de Janeiro. As a result a 
death squad composed of members of this group was threatening them. In December 1996 the 
Commission took precautionary measures on their behalf.70 
In 1994 ten members of the Political Prisoners Solidarity Committee (CSPP) in Colombia 
began receiving a series of death threats from members of local paramilitary groups. These groups 
promised that they would execute ‘the lawyers who worked for the guerrilla force’.71  
In August of that year a paramilitary organisation72 issued a press statement that it would 
execute lawyers who were ‘defender of the interest of guerrilla’s’ in the city of Cúcuta. Subse-
quently, paramilitary groups, apparently acting with the approval of members of security forces, 
were threatening members of the CSPP. One of the beneficiaries was working as human rights 
defender in the city of Popoyán in the Cauca region in Colombia. She had participated in proce-
dures pursued by a lawyers association, including a lawsuit dealing with the massacres at Los 
Uvos.73 She had been the victim of many acts of violence, which had increased since June 1995. 
                                                 
67 Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §33. It concerned the president and legal representative of 
the Ixcán Human Rights Association in the community of La Unión Cuarto Pueblo and of the 
Association for Justice and Reconciliation. Apparently an individual armed with a sharp bladed 
weapon had attacked him nine days previously. He was wounded with a stiletto knife that cut 
through his left arm and caused him serious bleeding. He had previously told the Justice of the 
Peace in Ixcán that he had received death threats because of his activities as a human rights 
defender.  
68 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §34. 
69 Id., §35. 
70 CIDH Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1996, Chapter II, §4a (cont.). 
71 CIDH Case Rafael Lozano Garza, et al. 
72 The COLSINGUE (‘Colombia sin guerrilleros’). 
73 See José Alvear Restrepo Lawyers Association (CCA), case 11.020. 
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Apparently, the threats against her were part of a greater pattern of intimidating acts against hu-
man rights defenders who had some relation with the CSPP.74  
In February 1996 the Commission took precautionary measures to protect six members of 
the Cúcuta branch of the CSPP whose lives and personal integrity were at risk. It also requested 
Colombia to protect two attorneys who had received threatening and intimidating calls for defend-
ing political prisoners. The Commission asked the State as well to protect an official of the city of 
Popayán in the Cauca region. She was responsible for processing claims and providing humani-
tarian assistance to political detainees, as a result of which she was subjected to constant harass-
ment and threats against her life and personal integrity.75 This example illustrates that officials 
can be subjected to threats as well.76 
Members of the clergy may also receive threats because of their human rights work. In July 
1997 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of the pastor of Caldon in the Cauca 
region (Colombia). He had conducted the funeral rites for three persons who were killed in a local 
battle between guerrilla forces and the army. One of the persons killed was a guerrilla fighter. 
Afterwards, the Archbishop of Popayan received a letter from the Cauca police force, accusing 
the pastor of Caldon of collaboration with the guerrilla fighters. A clergyman who worked with 
the pastor was kidnapped. Upon his release he was told to give the pastor a message warning him 
to leave the area.77 
A paramilitary group went to the headquarters of the Casa de la Mujer in Puerto Wilches 
and threatened the life of its coordinator. Together with the members of Peace Brigades Interna-
tional the Organización Femenina Popular, headquartered in Barrancabermeja, lodged a com-
plaint with the domestic authorities. Following this, the paramilitary group sent a message stating 
that the international presence would not last forever, while the women would remain in the town 
and would therefore ‘suffer the consequences’. A few days later the Commission requested Co-
lombia to take steps to protect the life and physical integrity of the members of the Organización 
Femenina Popular.78  
In its discussion of Colombia in 1999 the Commission expressed its concern that certain 
State officials were making declarations suggesting that members of human rights organisations 
‘acted improperly or unlawfully’. The State officials who did this most often were those belong-
ing to the security forces. It recommended Colombia to ‘clarify unequivocally to public opinion 
that the work of non-governmental human rights organizations in Colombia is legitimate and 
important’. The Commission pointed out that in April 1999 General Bravo Silva referred to hu-
man rights organisations as ‘international terrorists’. This statement was not clarified until Sep-
tember 1999 when the Office of the President issued a Circular ordering public servants to refrain 
from:  
“(a) questioning the legitimacy of the human rights organizations and their members, (b) 
making statements that discredit, harass, or incite harassment against those organizations and (c) 
issuing public or private statements that stigmatize the work of such organizations”. 
                                                 
74 In April 1995 one of these human rights defenders, Mr. Ortiz Prieto, had disappeared and 
another, Mr. Barriga Vergel, was assassinated on 15 June 1995. CEJIL case docket 1997. On 24 
June 1995 the CSPP received another threatening phone call. Before hanging up, the caller 
played sounds of machine-gun fire. In this case as well, the CCA, America’s Watch and CEJIL 
requested the Commission to issue precautionary measures on 27 July 1995 and the Commission 
did so on 20 February 1996.  
75 CIDH Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1997, §4a.  
76 Some other examples are given at the end of this section. 
77 CIDH Case 11744. Precautionary measures for Fr. Ezio Roattino Bernardi.  
78 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §19. 
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While the Commission considered this to be a positive measure, it noted that recent events did 
cast serious doubt on the government’s willingness to implement its own directive. It pointed out 
that the ‘continual exposure to threats and accusations and assassination attempts’ had forced 
these human rights defenders into internal displacement. It had even forced them ‘to leave the 
country and their valuable work’. Apparently, in regions such as Antioquia by 1999 there were no 
longer human rights defenders permanently based in small municipalities, as they had been left 
unprotected in the face of the paramilitary presence. The civilian or Police authorities had failed 
to act.79 
The Inter-American Court has ordered provisional measures for the protection of human 
rights defenders as well. In July 1991 the President of the Court ordered Guatemala to take urgent 
measures in the Chunimá case. He ordered Guatemala to ‘adopt without delay all necessary 
measures to protect the right to life and the physical integrity’ of 14 persons listed by name, ‘in 
strict compliance with its obligation to respect and guarantee human rights under Article 1(1) of 
the Convention’.80 The persons threatened were members of an indigenous human rights organi-
sation. The case itself was pending before the Commission, which had requested the Court to take 
provisional measures based on the following. 
The petitioners had urged the Commission to seek the Court’s provisional measures because 
the human rights defenders from the village of Chunimá were exposed to grave and continuous 
danger. In the last nine months alone five of them had been killed and one had been seriously 
wounded. They named the two leaders of the civil patrols as the sources of the threats and kill-
ings.81 They noted that on two occasions the police had travelled to the village in an attempt to 
execute the arrest warrants of the perpetrators. The first time a very large group of armed patrol-
lers confronted them, detained them for two hours and let them leave only ‘after extracting a 
promise from the police that they would never come to Chunimá again’. Their second attempt 
failed as well. The petitioners also mentioned several other incidents of threats and assaults. Some 
people, moreover, had distributed anonymous flyers in the village calling CERJ a guerrilla front. 
CERJ was one of the two human rights organisations whose members were being threatened. The 
flyers also named residents of the village who belonged to that organisation. The fourteen people 
                                                 
79 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter V – Colombia, §120. 
80 IACHR Chunimá v. Guatemala, Order of the President of 15 July 1991. 
81 Before the Commission the petitioners had noted that five men in civilian clothes but driving a 
blue pick-up truck ‘known to belong to the army’, had abducted a human rights activist in 
October 1990. The human rights activist was associated with the Mutual Support Group (GAM) 
and the Consejo de Comunidades Etnicas Runujel Junám/Council of ethnic communities ‘we are 
all equal’ (CERJ). It gave the name of the local civil patrol chief who allegedly had shown these 
five men where the victim was waiting for a bus. This chief of the local civil patrol had 
previously threatened the life of this activist. On 10 December 1990, in the Guatemala City bus 
terminal, two masked gunmen shot dead another human rights activist from the community of 
Chunimá. Before his murder he had been under surveillance by the civil patrols commanded by 
the above mentioned chief. While a district court judge had issued a warrant for the arrest of this 
chief in relation to the previous abduction and murder, the police did not carry out the arrest. The 
petition further noted that the above civil patrol leader, together with another leader, also 
mentioned by name, and accompanied by four men that could not be identified, shot three other 
human rights activists from Chunimá. Two of them were killed and one was left seriously 
injured. One of the persons killed and the man who was seriously injured had been witnesses to 
the abduction of 6 October 1990. Following their testimony the district court judge had ordered 
the arrest of the civil patrol leader in Chunimá. The day after they had been shot, the justice of the 
peace in Chichicastenango ordered the arrest of the above civil patrol leader. Again, the police 
did not carry out this order. In March 1991 an attorney for the Human Rights Ombudsman of 
Guatemala took the initiative to evacuate 15 family members of the remaining victim from 
Chunimá to the office of their human rights organisation in Santa Cruz del Quiché. 
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for whom the Commission requested the Court’s provisional measures included one of the wit-
nesses to the abduction of the human rights activist who was later murdered. Subsequently, this 
witness had been shot himself and he is now paralysed. During this shooting he had seen the civil 
patrols murder his father and brother. He and his surviving family members had fled to the office 
of CERJ.  
Another early example dates from April 1996 when the President of the Court issued an or-
der for urgent measures on behalf of Father Vogt, a Catholic priest, who had been harassed and 
persecuted because of his pastoral work. There had been several death threats and attempts on his 
life and ‘a series of false accusations linking him to offences such as sedition and deforestation’. 
Thus, Guatemala should ‘adopt forthwith’ the necessary measures to protect his life and integrity, 
to investigate the events and punish those responsible. In June 1996 the Court ratified the Presi-
dent’s order.82 
2.3.4 Peace Community  
One of the most striking situations of death threats and harassment is that of the Peace Commu-
nity of San José de Apartadó v. Colombia.83 Apart from the particular situation warranting provi-
sional measures, the Peace Community case highlights two important aspects of these measures in 
the Inter-American system: the protective measures required (their specific substance) and the 
evolution in the approach to their beneficiaries.84 It is also an example with regard to a State in 
which the situations the Court faces involve internal armed conflicts. These are difficult to deal 
with in the context of individual adjudication alone.85 
The situation warranting provisional measures involved a group of peasants and other civil-
ians who started the Peace Community in 1997, in an effort to isolate themselves from the armed 
conflict. The Community consists of approximately 1200 civilians and is located in the region of 
Urabá in the state of Antioquia in Colombia, a region suffering under intensive armed conflict 
between the FARC on the one hand and military and paramilitary groups on the other. The Com-
munity is based on humanitarian principles and collective neutrality, including neutrality vis-à-vis 
all armed actors and no direct or indirect participation in the war. Its members have pledged not to 
carry arms and to refrain from offering or manipulating information in favour of any of the armed 
actors. The Community is ruled by an internal council of eight peasants. The members of the 
Community elect them democratically for a three-year term. 
Despite all this, or maybe because of it, since its origin in 1997 this Community has been 
subjected to constant paramilitary violence and stigmatisation. The paramilitaries have pointed 
out inhabitants of the Community as guerrillas or as people helping the guerrillas, for instance by 
providing them with food. Three months after the Community was created, the paramilitaries 
                                                 
82 A year and four months later the Commission requested the Court to withdraw the provisional 
measures. It noted that the threats and harassment had diminished considerably as a result of the 
provisional measures and that they were not necessary anymore. By order of 11 November 1997 
the Court decided indeed to close the provisional measures, Vogt case, Order of 11 November 
1997, Compendium July 1996-June 2000, p. 425. 
83 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó v. Colombia, Orders of 9 October 2000 
(President), 24 November 2000, 18 June 2002, 17 November 2004, Order of 15 March 2005, 
Order of 2 February 2006, 17 December 2007 (President), 6 February 2008. The case itself was 
pending before the Commission as case 12.325. See Chapter II about the relationship between the 
Commission and the Court. 
84 See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
85 See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
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established a roadblock between San José and Apartadó and detained people travelling there.86 
This roadblock was four minutes away from the army base. The paramilitaries had limited the 
free passage of food and made lists of people that later appeared in the hands of other paramilita-
ries who assassinated them. Initially, the paramilitaries only selectively killed people, but this 
changed later. Between the creation of the Community early 1997 and December 1997, when the 
Commission first decided to take precautionary measures, 43 of the Community’s members had 
been murdered.87 
The Commission requested that precautionary measures be adopted for the members of the 
Community and for the mayor of Apartado and her family. During her term of office she had 
criticised both the activities of the guerrillas and those of the paramilitary groups supporting the 
army.88 The Inter-American Commission has been involved in the case since the end of 1997 and 
has maintained and expanded its precautionary measures several times. In June 1998, for instance, 
it requested Colombia to adopt precautionary measures on behalf of a member of the Missionary 
Team of the Intercongegrational Commission for Justice and Peace accompanying the peace 
community. He had received threats from members of the National Army in Carepa, Urabá.89 
The Commission’s precautionary measures proved insufficient and in October 2000 it de-
cided to appeal to the Inter-American Court for provisional measures. In its petition it pointed out 
the liability of the members of the Colombian army for the violence and harassment by paramili-
tary groups. It informed the Court that it had been notified of the murders of 47 of the members of 
the Community within a nine-month period.  
In light of the seriousness of the situation the Court detailed some of the facts presented by 
the Commission in its request for provisional measures. It concerns 21 incidents over a period of 
almost three years. In relation to the level of responsibility of the State and the type of measures it 
should take to protect people under threat, it is important to clarify who are normally the perpetra-
tors of the threats and violent acts committed against the Community.90 It appears that paramili-
tary groups (‘autodefensas’) and one division of the Army were often involved. With regard to 
eight of the first nine attacks, which took place between December 1997 and April 1998, mem-
bers of the 17th Brigade of the National Army reportedly were the perpetrators. About the subse-
quent events, from April 1999 until September 2000, villagers spoke of military, paramilitary or, 
more generally, armed men.91 In one case even the local authorities themselves alleged that the 
crime was committed by paramilitaries. In another case paramilitaries had forced a member of the 
Community to get off a public bus. His body was later found in Finca El Bajo. Lying next to him 
was the body of a woman ‘who had also been detained in the same paramilitary reserve’. Accord-
ing to the Commission she was a guerrilla. She had been wounded and members of the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) had been evacuating her when three men of the para-
military organisation Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) intercepted their vehicle. The 
ICRC delegates had tried to negotiate with them for an hour in an attempt to safeguard her life, 
                                                 
86 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional 
measures, 24 November 2000. The Spanish text speaks of a ‘retén’, which in the context seems to 
be a roadblock where people are being detained. 
87 On 12 December 1997 two Community members disappeared at a short distance from the 
military base of the 17th Brigade on the road leading to the village of San José de Apartado. Five 
days later the Commission took its precautionary measures. 
88 As a result she had been the target of threats and harassment and after her term of office ended 
the danger to her life and personal integrity grew even worse. CIDH Annual Report 1999, 
Chapter 3.C.1, §26. 
89 CIDH Annual Report 1998, §20. 
90 See further Chapter XIII (Protection). 
91 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional 
measures, 24 November 2000.  
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but despite their opposition the AUC took her out of the vehicle and forced the delegates to leave. 
In yet another instance a group of about twenty hooded men assassinated six members of the 
Community and burned the community centre, also destroying its telephone connection. The 17th 
Brigade may have been involved in this attack. In any case, the next day members of this Brigade, 
together with paramilitaries, forced themselves into a house, plundered it and threatened the 
inhabitant as well as the entire Community. 
During this period many members of the Community were murdered, some disappeared and 
several people were injured. People were attacked in their houses, the community centre and 
while travelling by public transportation. The last incident before the Commission decided to 
petition the Inter-American Court took place in September 2000 when six armed men forced 
themselves into a house and kidnapped three persons who were later assassinated.92 Early No-
vember 2000 the President of the Court ordered urgent measures on behalf of all persons specifi-
cally named by the Commission. Later that month the full Court decided to order provisional 
measures on behalf of all members of the Community, also those it could not specify by name.93 
The Court expanded its provisional measures several times, following the Commission’s informa-
tion on new violent acts.94 
2.3.5 Union leaders 
Yet another popular target-group for threats and attacks are trade unionists. In March 1996 the 
Commission requested Guatemala to take precautionary measures to protect two persons working 
for the Union of Bank Workers in Guatemala had received serious death threats in connection 
                                                 
92 In October 2000 the Commission requested the Court to order provisional measures to protect the 
lives and personal integrity of the members of this peace community, Peace Community of San 
José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional measures, 24 November 2000. 
93 See further Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on beneficiaries. During the hearing of November 
2000 the Commission clarified that there had been several massacres. Since the massacre of 19 
February 2000 the Community had requested the involvement of the Vice-Presidency of 
Colombia. They had a meeting a month later in which the Community proposed a series of 
measures that were not followed up. A return of inhabitants was nevertheless prepared and 
another massacre took place on 8 July 2000. In the afternoon some hooded people entered the 
Community and killed six peasants who, according to medical reports, were shot forty times 
each. Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional 
measures, 24 November 2000. 
94 The Commission had presented 23 incidents that took place between 15 December 2001 and 18 
June 2002, the very day on which the Court indeed expanded its provisional measures. Again, the 
perpetrators were described as soldiers and paramilitaries. To give a specific example of a 
situation where there may be a link between the paramilitary and the military, on 15 December 
2001 three armed men assassinated a member of the Community in the centre of the town of San 
José de Apartadó and then left for the road leading from Apartadó to San José. At the time, the 
military were based three minutes from the place where the armed men entered the village. Twice 
the information of the Commission mentioned one particular member of the paramilitary, known 
under the name ‘Torolo’, who had previously been recognised as a participant in the massacre 
that took place on 8 July 2000. Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), 
Order for provisional measures, 18 June 2002. There is one occasion where the presence of the 
military actually seems to have prevented a paramilitary group from murdering someone. 
Paramilitaries had detained thirteen inhabitants of Apartadó, who were on their way to San José, 
and had accused them of being guerrillas. They threatened to kill them. They interrogated them 
about their identities and registered their personal information. When they were beating one of 
them and it looked like they were going to kill him, an army truck appeared and the paramilitaries 
withdrew. 
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with their union work. Some days later, however, one of the two beneficiaries was kidnapped and 
tortured. In response, the Commission reiterated its request. In May 1996 Guatemala stated that 
after the kidnapping it had taken protective measures.95 
In March 1997 heavily armed men in uniforms attacked a car carrying the staff, including 
Alberto Jaramillo, the President of the Consorcio Porce II Workers Union in Colombia. The 
uniformed men checked a list they were carrying, identified Alberto Jaramillo and told him to get 
out. He was later assassinated. Afterwards, groups of armed men in uniform appeared several 
times at the house of Sergio Jaramillo, the co-founder and former secretary of the Consorcio 
Porce II Workers Union in Amalfi, Antioquia. In April 1997 the Commission took precautionary 
measures on his behalf and on behalf of his family.96  
Mr. Tovar, a member of the Executive Committee of the Unified Workers Central in Co-
lombia had received death threats because of its work as a trade union leader.97 The Commission 
requested precautionary measures on his behalf in November 1997. In January 1998 he left Co-
lombia and the Commission shelved its precautionary measures.98 Upon his return he again re-
ceived threats. These coincided with the assassination of the Vice-President of the Unified Work-
ers Central, Jorge Ortega. In October 1998 the Commission requested Colombia to reactivate the 
precautionary measures it had adopted previously to protect the lives and physical integrity of Mr. 
Tovar and his family.99 
In June 2000 the Commission requested Colombia to take steps to protect the lives and 
physical integrity of the leaders of four unions.100 The next month the Commission decided to 
expand the precautionary measures. It decided to include as a beneficiary of the precautionary 
measure someone who was detained by a group of uniformed men with long weapons who said 
they were members of the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia. He had since disappeared. The 
expansion of the precautionary measures also included as a beneficiary a prosecuting attorney 
with the Union of Municipal Workers of Bugalagrande. His name appeared on a list of the para-
military group operating in the centre of the Department of Valle, together with another union 
leader who was recently extra-judicially executed.101  
2.3.6 Persons involved in land disputes and indigenous communities 
Indigenous communities seem to be singularly vulnerable. Not only their cultures and traditional 
way of life are at risk,102 but also the lives and physical integrity of many of their members. They 
                                                 
95 CIDH Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1997, §4a.  
96 The Commission does not refer to a case number. Apparently, at the time this matter had not been 
processed as a Case. 
97 On 14 June 1994, at the transport terminal in Bogotá, he was thrown by force into a car carrying 
four persons, probably members of intelligence and security agencies. Later, he was set free. In 
August 1995, however, he received an anonymous death threat and in May 1997 he was attacked. 
In late September 1997, upon his return from a trip abroad, he received new threats.  
98 CIDH Annual Report 1997, February 17 1998. 
99 CIDH Annual Report 1998, §21. 
100 The unions involved were Municipal Utility Workers Union of Cali-SINTRAEMCALI, the 
National Union of University Workers and Employees of Colombia (Cali-division), ‘Central 
Unitaria de Trabajadores Sub-directiva Valle del Cauca’ and the Union of the Department of 
Valle del Cauca. The Commission notes that the available information indicated that the leaders 
of these unions were in imminent danger because the civil and military authorities in the 
Department of Valle del Cauca were constantly plotting against them and accusing them of being 
guerrillas, terrorists or sympathisers with insurgent groups. 
101 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §21. 
102 See also Chapter X (Culture and religion). 
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may receive threats from the military or the police, from paramilitary groups, large landowners or 
others.103  
Many different groups and individuals in Colombia, including campesinos, have been de-
clared ‘military targets’.104 Moreover, the aforementioned large landowners do not only form a 
threat to indigenous groups but to small peasants and farm-workers as well. Often there are vari-
ous linkages between security forces, paramilitaries and landowners, which may help explain the 
impunity for human rights violations perpetrated by these actors. In a few cases in which persons 
were threatened NGOs resorted to the Inter-American Commission to intervene.105 
                                                 
103 Since the beginning of 1996 members of the Nahuatl, Lenca and Mayan Nations in El Salvador 
had suffered many threats against their lives and physical well-being. The Commission took 
precautionary measures on behalf of the directors of the National Association of the Indigenous 
Peoples of El Salvador (ANIS), who had been continuously harassed and assaulted. Some of 
them had been forced into exile. CEJIL case docket 1997 (precautionary measure undated). ANIS 
and CEJIL had requested the measures in particular for the head of ANIS, who is the spiritual 
chief of the Nahuatl, Lenca and Mayan Nations. In March 1998 the Commission requested the 
Court to protect the lives and integrity of the members of the Zenú Indigenous Community in 
Colombia. Previously the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of the Zenύ 
community in June 1996. The previous month paramilitary groups in the San Andrés de 
Sotavento shelter, in the region of Córdoba, had murdered one of their leaders. Later that month, 
the Secretary of the Town Council of San Andrés was murdered as well and pamphlets were 
distributed threatening the indigenous leaders. Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1996, Chapter II, § 
4a (cont.). In January 1998 it took precautionary measures for the protection of Maximiliano 
Campo and eleven other leaders of the Paez indigenous community (Colombia) who were also 
involved in the Caloto case pending before it. Case 11.101, Annual Report 1997, February 17, 
1998. On 28 and 29 December 1997 members of a paramilitary force murdered six persons in the 
area of the Paez indigenous community with lands in Caloto and other parts of northern Cauca in 
Colombia. Even the official police report mentioned that a paramilitary group was seen in the 
area of the murders. The precautionary measure was of 7 January 1998. It is mentioned again in 
the 1998 Annual Report, §17. Paramilitary groups operating in the area had threatened them. The 
provisional measures requested related to the case Clemente Teherán et al. In March 1998 the 
President of the Court indeed decided to intervene and in June 1998 the full Court ratified this 
decision in its Order for provisional measures to protect the lives and personal integrity of 22 
persons in this community. IACHR Clemente Teherán et al (indigenous community Zenú) v. 
Colombia, Orders of 19 June 1998, 29 January 1999, 12 August 2000. The Court lifted its 
provisional measures by Order of 1 December 2003. 
104 See e.g. precautionary measure of 1 November 2000 to protect the life and physical integrity of 
the members of the Associación Campesina del Valle del Río Simitarra. Paramilitary groups in 
the region had declared them military targets and they had been subjected to systematic threats 
and fatal attacks on their leaders. In 1999 Colombia had already taken measures on behalf of the 
spokespersons for the campesino exodus from southern Bolívar. Annual Report 2000, §23. 
105 In December 1995 the Commission took precautionary measures in order to protect the lives and 
physical integrity of the members of a union of indigenous communities (Union of Indigenous 
Communities of the Northern Zone of Isthmus (UCIZONI), in Mexico who had been threatened 
and harassed because of land-ownership conflicts. It had defended peasants and farm workers 
(‘Campesinos’) in disputes about land in the state of Oaxaca. The conflicts were between villages 
in Aroyo Tejon and Mazatlan on the one hand and landowners on the other. In its Annual Report 
the Commission published the names of these landowners: Fuentes and Raymundo. The 
Commission also noted that the President of the Commission on Justice and Human Rights of 
UCIZONI had reported that he had repeatedly received telephone calls threatening his life. 
Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1997, §4a. In connection with land disputes between the 
indigenous population of Honduras, the Garífuna. Group of Afro-Caribbean descent, speaking 
Igñeri, a combination of Arahuaco, French, Swahili and Bantu. and certain Honduran 
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With regard to some situations in which the Commission took precautionary measures in-
formation is available in the decision on the merits. In 1999, for instance, the Commission found 
violations of the right to life, humane treatment, fair trial and judicial protection in a case involv-
ing impunity against murder and assaults by large landowners in Brazil against landless peasants, 
rural workers and their union leaders. It found violations against specific persons, but noted about 
the ‘setting of the violence’ that there had been 190 murders of peasants in the Xinguara district 
(Southern Pará) since 1990 and that a sentence had been handed down for only one of these mur-
ders. It concluded that there was ‘a campaign of violent and illegal action to silence or murder 
those who support the occupiers of lands and those who assert the legal rights of the rural work-
ers’.106 The Commission considered that ‘this campaign has been abetted directly by police offi-
cers, who by act and omission fail to take the action required to impose order and the rule of 
law’.107 When discussing the right to a fair trial and judicial protection (Arts 8 and 25 ACHR) it 
specifically noted that the victims had to push their domestic complaints forward in the face of 
‘frequent delays and inaction’ as well as persecution and threats. It noted that this even triggered 
its use of precautionary measures.108 
2.3.7 Refugees and internally displaced persons 
Threats may cause people to become internally displaced or to flee to other countries. This, in 
turn, makes them particularly vulnerable for other threats. Refugees, moreover, also risk 
refoulement.109 Several members of a displaced community in the region of Turbo in Colombia 
were murdered in 1997. Some of them had taken refuge in the municipal sports stadium and in 
special shelters. Subsequently, two armed individuals, who were identified as paramilitary, 
entered the sports stadium looking for one of them. Another paramilitary person was seen 
inspecting one of the shelters.110 Within a few days the Commission took precautionary 
measures.111  
2.3.8 Detainees 
In December 1997 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of a detainee and his 
family. He was threatened because he had provided the authorities with information on presumed 
connections between paramilitary groups and officials of the Colombian military.112 The 
Commission and Court have used the tool of provisional measures to request States to improve 
                                                                                                                       
landowners, both the former mayor of the Garífuna community in the municipality of Limón, in 
the Colón region, and the ex-President of the Fraternal Black Organisation had been gravely 
harassed and intimidated. In May 1999 the Commission requested Honduras to take the necessary 
measures to safeguard their lives and personal integrity. CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter 
3.C.1, §38. 
106 CIDH Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil, 13 April 1999 (merits), §98. 
107 Id., §99. 
108 Id., §111. See further Chapters XIII (Protection), XVI (Legal Status) and XVII (Official 
responses). 
109 An example of threats against refugees is the precautionary measure of 12 March 2001, in the 
Camacho case, to protect the right to life and physical integrity of a group of Colombian refugees 
in Colombia, Annual Report 2001, §61. About the threat of refoulement see Chapter V (Non-
refoulement). 
110 The shelter was called ‘Unidos Retornaremos’ (united we will return). Annual Report 1997, 
February 17, 1998. 
111 Annual Report 1999, Chapter III.C.1, §26. 
112 CIDH José Alirio Arcila Vasquez and family v. Colombia, precautionary measures of 17 
December 1997. See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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detention situations or provide access to medication,113 but also in the context of threats against 
the lives and physical integrity of detainees.114 
2.3.9 Journalists 
Clearly, perpetrators of human rights violations or corruption have no fondness for journalists 
who expose them. While their distaste for such journalists may result in the curtailment of their 
freedom of expression, something for which the Commission and Court have used precautionary 
measures as well,115 it may also lead to threats to their lives and physical integrity.116 
Two journalists in Colombia had published an article in which they accused a group called 
CONVIVIR of having committed certain abuses in Medellin. After the publication of their second 
article on this subject, a bomb destroyed the offices of the CONVIVIR group in Medellin. Fol-
lowing this, both journalists received telephone threats blaming them for having caused the bomb-
ing. As a result they were forced to stay in hiding. In July 1997 the Commission took precaution-
ary measures on their behalf.117  
In another Colombian case a journalist for ‘El Espectador’ received a telephone-call from 
someone with the nickname ‘el Panadero’ who ‘expressed interest in having a journalistic piece 
done on the paramilitaries’ version of the outbreak of violence on 27 April 2000 in the National 
Model Prison of Bogotá’. At the door of the facilities the journalist was approached, ‘surrounded, 
sedated, and driven to a nearby house where several individuals gagged and beat her and sub-
                                                 
113 See also Chapter VII (Detention). 
114 See also section 2.5.2, Chapter VII (Detention) on separating minors and adults. In May 2000, for 
instance, the Commission requested Colombia to take steps to protect the life and physical 
integrity of political prisoners threatened by paramilitary prisoners wearing ‘Autodefencas 
Unidas de Colombia’ (AUC) bracelets. The measures of 11 May 2000 were on behalf of the 
prisoners detained in buildings 1 and 2 of the National Model Prison in Bogotá. Based on the 
information available at the time on the precautionary measure, on 27 April 2000 prisoners 
belonging to paramilitary groups, who were detained in cell block 5, violently attacked the 
prisoners in cell block 4. They killed 47 inmates and injured 17 others. According to the 
petitioners several prisoners from cellblocks 3 and 5 were patrolling the facilities carrying long-
range weapons and making threats against political prisoners. Annual Report 2000, §17. 
Elsewhere the Commission refers to the killing of 25 detainees (Annual Report 2000, Chapter IV, 
§93). See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
115 See Chapter XII (Other situations), section 3.4. 
116 On 26 May 2000, for instance, the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of a 
journalist in Peru. Apparently national intelligence service agents had entered the office of the 
newspaper where he worked and tortured him in order to obtain certain videos from him. He was 
hospitalised for cuts on his left arm. On 14 July 2000 the State informed the Commission that it 
could not comply with the precautionary measures as the journalist in question had left Peru on 
31 May 2000, Annual Report 2000, §44. In November 2001 the Commission took precautionary 
measures of four journalists in Colombia. According to information received by the Special 
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, the Southern Liberators Block of the AUC had threatened 
them. This included an AUC communiqué urging them to renounce their professions within 48 
hours or they would be executed. The beneficiaries were the editor of the newspaper ‘Diario Sur’, 
a reporter for the weekly ‘VOZ’ who was also a peace commissioner for the region of Nariño, a 
reporter for the RCN newscast and a cameraman for ‘Caracol Televisión’, Annual Report 2001, 
Chapter III (a), §24. 
117 Apparently this matter was not yet transferred as a case. 
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jected her to degrading treatment’. In June 2000, the Commission requested Colombia to take 
steps to protect her life and physical integrity as well as those of two other editors.118 
2.3.10 Politicians and government officials  
Politicians and government officials may also receive threats. They may be the victims of rivalry 
between colleagues or political parties, or they may put themselves in danger by actually trying to 
find resolutions for violent situations, by exposing corruption or by taking seriously their work at 
a human rights division of their government.119 
In April 2000 the Commission took precautionary measures requesting Brazil to protect the 
state police auditor of São Paulo and his family. The Archbishop Emeritus of São Paulo had 
approached the Commission with a request for such measures. The state police auditor had re-
ceived threats, ‘presumably because of his activities monitoring police conduct’. The State re-
ported that it had granted the precautionary measures.120 
One precautionary measure directed at Nicaragua is particularly interesting because the 
President himself seems to have been involved. In February 1999 the Commission requested 
Nicaragua to protect the lives and physical integrity of three persons who had received threats 
relating to activities undertaken as part of their professional duties in the General Department for 
Integrity in Public Service of the Office of the Comptroller-General of Nicaragua. According to 
the information presented by the petitioner, it was President Alemán himself who had threatened 
one of the victims, the Comptroller.121 A few years earlier the Inter-American Court had ordered 
provisional measures on behalf of Alemán, who was then a presidential candidate. There had been 
an attempt at his life, which killed one of his bodyguards and injured several persons.122  
In March 2001 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of a public prosecu-
tor on Colombia’s specialised judicial circuit and on behalf of her family. For security reasons 
they had relocated outside the country. The petitioners had pointed out that Colombia had denied 
an extension of her leave of absence. As a result, and despite the security concerns, she was 
forced to return to Colombia immediately. The Commission requested Colombia to guarantee the 
right to life and person of this prosecutor and her family. Colombia ‘undertook a series of meas-
ures that concluded satisfactorily for the parties’.123 
The Commission also uses country reports as a tool for human rights protection. These re-
ports, in turn, provide a more in depth context of the violations in specific countries. In its discus-
                                                 
118 The peace editor and the judicial editor of ‘El Espectador’. On 19 June 2000, the Commission 
requested Colombia to expand the precautionary measures to include a journalist working for 
‘NTC Noticias’. She had received threats similar to those of her colleagues. Annual Report 2000, 
§20. 
119 In September 1994, for instance, the Commission requested Colombia to adopt protective 
measures on behalf of one of its own government officials, the delegated Attorney General for 
Human Rights of supporting the guerrilla forces. A member of Congress had accused him of 
supporting the guerrilla forces, Annual Report 1997, (Hernando Valencia Villa case). In March 
1996 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of four members of the Guatemalan 
National Democratic Front, who were elected to the Congress. Later it reiterated them and 
extended the measures to include their families. In May 1996 Guatemala responded that it was 
taking measures to protect the persons involved, CIDH Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1996, 
Chapter II, § 4a (cont.). 
120 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §13. 
121 See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
122 IACHR Alemán Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Order of 2 February 1996. 
123 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §15. Generally about the attitudes of States see Chap-
ter XVII. 
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sion of the human rights situation in Colombia, for instance, it specifically pointed out that the 
persons threatened and attacked also included public employees. It mentioned the example of the 
‘members of the Human Rights Unit of the Office of the Prosecutor-General who are constantly 
threatened, as well as the municipal ombudsmen (‘personeros’), who are involved in human 
rights-related tasks at the local level’.124 
The Commission noted that it had received ‘numerous requests’ for precautionary measures 
on behalf of ‘human rights defenders, members of civil society organizations, and even State 
employees, such as municipal ombudsmen (personeros) who are subject to threats, assassination 
attempts, and/or accused of collaboration with one or another of the parties to the armed conflict’. 
It stated that it had ‘responded to these urgent calls in the manner that it deemed appropriate’.125  
The second commander of the Colombian national army had given a statement implicating 
public employees. He gave this statement during a forum in Miami, Florida organised by the 
Cuban-American Foundation on Tradition, Family and Property: 
“And, finally, what poses greater limitations for us is defending us from the infiltrators of the 
subversion in the Office of the Prosecutor-General, the Office of the Human Rights 
Ombudsman, and the Office of the Procurator-General backed by some international 
organizations that cause us very much harm…the non-governmental human rights 
organizations, misinformed or infiltrated, are as dangerous as the guerrillas themselves”.126 
In response both the Prosecutor-General and the Procurator-General publicly warned that these 
remarks endangered the lives of the members of their institutions.127 The Commission noted that 
such accusations against public employees and members of NGOs and the failure of the 
government to unequivocally reject these statements put the people referred to in serious danger. 
The government needed to adopt ‘specific and effective measures to punish those who practically 
depict people who work for justice and human rights as enemies of the State’.128  
2.3.11 CEDAW and domestic violence 
Thus far the only time an adjudicator other than the Inter-American Commission and Court has 
used a provisional measure to protect against threats in a case in which the claim itself also aimed 
at protection was in October 2003. That month CEDAW used provisional measures for the first 
time as part of its newly established individual complaint procedure. It requested Hungary to take 
measures to protect the petitioner against threats by her former common law husband. The 
petitioner, who was not represented by counsel, had urgently requested it ‘to save her life, which 
she feels is threatened by her violent former partner’.129  
                                                 
124 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter V – Columbia, §105. 
125 Id., §118. The Commission took note of the fact that Colombia had handed down indictments in 
murder cases of five persons including Mr. Valle Jaramillo. It pointed out, however, that seven 
members of the ‘Comité Técnico de Investigaciones’ of the Human Rights Unit in the Office of 
the Prosecutor-General had been assassinated. The Commission also noted that it had learned that 
more than 100 prosecutors were being threatened and some had had to leave Colombia. Annual 
Report 1999, Chapter V – Colombia, §121. 
126 Id., §110. 
127 Id., §111. 
128 Id., §§113-114. See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
129 CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005, §4.1. 
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3 RELATION BETWEEN PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO HALT DEATH THREATS 
AND HARASSMENT AND THE EXPECTED DECISION ON THE MERITS 
3.1 Introduction 
Human rights adjudicators have emphasized the importance for States of implementing their 
positive obligations under the respective treaties to protect the right to life, the prohibition of cruel 
treatment and torture and the right to personal security. States that do not protect persons under 
their jurisdiction against death threats and harassment fail to ‘ensure’ the fundamental rights 
involved.130 Obviously threats to persons who have resorted to an international adjudicator also 
hinder the right of individual petition under the respective treaties.131  
Article 2 ICCPR refers to an undertaking to respect and ensure all rights in the Covenant. 
Similar to the previous Chapters the other relevant provisions are the right to life (Article 6), the 
prohibition of torture and cruel treatment (Article 7) and Article 9 (the right to security).132 Article 
2 ICAT stipulates that States ‘shall take effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other 
measures to prevent acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction’. Article 13 entails the 
obligation to ensure the right to complain to the competent authorities with allegations of torture. 
Moreover, ‘(s)teps shall be taken to ensure that the complainant and witnesses are protected 
against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a consequence of his complaint or any evidence given’. 
Based on Article 16 ICAT States shall ‘undertake to prevent in any territory under its jurisdiction 
other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to torture 
as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the con-
                                                 
130 This issue is relevant in the context of provisional measures, judgments on the merits as well as 
judgments on reparation. See further Chapter XIII (Protection). 
131 See 1st Optional Protocol to the ICCPR; Article 22 ICAT; Article 14 ICERD; Optional Protocol 
to the CEDAW; Article 45(2) ACHPR; Article 44 ACHR; Article 34 ECHR and Article VIII(1) 
Annex 6 Dayton Peace Agreement. For special attention to victims and witnesses see also the law 
and practice of the Yugoslavia and Rwanda Tribunals and the International Criminal Court. On 
protection of witnesses before the Rwanda Tribunal see e.g. Lagrange (2003). See also Article 20 
Statute ICTY: ‘due regard for the protection of victims and witnesses’; Article 22 ‘protection of 
victims and witnesses’. Moreover, Rule 69 (B) Rules of Procedure and Evidence stipulates: “In 
the determination of protective measures for victims and witnesses, the Trial Chamber may 
consult the Victims and Witnesses Section”. Rule 75 (A), finally, provides: “A Judge or a 
Chamber may, proprio motu or at the request of either party, or of the victim or witness 
concerned, or of the Victims and Witnesses Section, order appropriate measures for the privacy 
and protection of witnesses, provided that the measures are consistent with the rights of the 
accused”. 
132 Chapter VII already discussed the positive obligations of States vis-à-vis detainees. The HRC has 
pointed out ‘the positive obligations on States parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully 
discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violation of Covenant rights 
by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the 
enjoyment of Covenant rights insofar as they are amenable to application between private persons 
or entities. Thus, failure to ensure Covenant rights, as required by Article 2, may ‘give rise to 
violations by States Parties of those rights, as a result of States Parties’ permitting or failing to 
take appropriate measures or to exercise due diligence to prevent, punish, investigate or redress 
the harm caused by such acts by private persons or entities’. HRC General Comment 31, 29 
March 2004, §8. Already in 1992, the HRC noted that Article 7 covers acts committed by private 
individuals, implying a duty for States to take appropriate measures to protect persons against 
such acts. HRC General Comment 20 [44] on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment (Article 7), 3 April 1992. 
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sent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity’. Article 4 
ICERD obliges States to take immediate and positive measures against incitement of racial ha-
tred. Article 5(b) lays down the security of the person including the protection from violence or 
bodily harm and Article 6 ICERD refers to the undertaking to ensure effective protection and 
remedies including reparation and satisfaction. 
In its General Recommendation on violence against women the CEDAW pointed out that 
‘the definition of discrimination includes gender-based violence’ and that ‘gender-based violence 
may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of whether those provisions ex-
pressly mention violence’. It also stated that ‘discrimination under the Convention is not restricted 
to action by or on behalf of Governments’.  
“Under general international law and specific human rights covenants, States may also be 
responsible for private acts if they fail to act with due diligence to prevent violations of rights or 
to investigate and punish acts of violence, and for providing compensation”.133 
In the first case it dealt with since the entry into force of the Optional Protocol instituting an 
individual complaint proceeding the CEDAW found violations of Articles 2(a), (b) and (e), 5 and 
16 for failure to protect the petitioner against domestic violence.134 These articles address the 
positive obligations of States to ensure equality and eliminate discrimination against women. 
In the regional systems positive obligations have equally been recognized. Sometimes they 
have been emphasized in the context of human rights activities other than those directly dealing 
with individual complaint. Both the African and the Inter-American Commission, for instance, 
have a Special Rapporteur dealing with the rights of human rights defenders and expressing par-
ticular concern when their right to life and personal integrity are under threat.135 
The Inter-American Court has derived from Articles 4 (right to life) and 5 (humane treat-
ment) together with Articles 1(1) (obligation to respect rights) and 2 ACHR (domestic legal ef-
fects) the obligation of States not only to refrain from threatening people but also to actively 
protect them against threats by others.136 This includes the duty to investigate prior violence and 
                                                 
133 CEDAW General Recommendation 19 on violence against women, 29 January 1992, §9. 
134 CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005. See also Boerefijn (2005a), pp. 470-480 and, more 
generally, Boerefijn (2005c), pp. 35-57. 
135 See e.g. Special Rapporteur of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights 
(ACHPR) on Human Rights Defenders in Africa Me. Reine Alapini-Gansou, Press release on the 
situation in Cameroon, 7 April 2008 (expressing concern regarding the case of Mrs. Madeleine 
Afité, president of la Maison des droits de l’Homme du Cameroun (MDHC) ‘who has been 
threatened to death on several occasions these days. Her car was also ransacked during the night 
of 5 to 6 March, 2008 for having denounced, notably to the international media, human rights 
violations’). The Inter-American Commission has a Special Unit on human Rights Defenders. 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has also paid attention to the issue of 
death threats and harassment in the context of the ECHr. See Resolution 1571 (2007) on the 
member States’duty to cooperate with the ECtHR, as well as its Recommendation 1809 and the 
report by Rapporteur Christos Ourourides, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 
11183, 9 February 2007 and Addendum of 1 October 2007. For case law by the African 
Commission generally acknowledging the positive obligations of States, see e.g. ACHPR Legal 
Resource Foundation v. Zambia, 2001 (positive obligations based on Article 1 ACHPR); Social 
and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights (SERAC) v. Nigeria, 6 June 
2001 (positive obligations based on the rights themselves); Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, 
2003 (obligation to respect and ensure, but taking into account resources); and the ongoing case 
(July 2008) Association of Victims of Political Violence & Interights v. Cameroon. 
136 See e.g. IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, judgement of 29 July 1998, §§172-175 and 
Godínez Cruz v. Honduras, 20 January 1989, §186. 
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threats and to prosecute and punish the perpetrators.137 If the threats have resulted in internal 
displacement the freedom of movement comes into play.138 If the victims of such displacement 
are indigenous peoples, their relation to their ancestral ground play a role as well.139 Given the 
background of many threats the freedom of expression and association and the special recognition 
of human rights defenders are often emphasized. Journalists, human rights defenders, trade union-
ists and others threatened and harassed for their activities have the right to continue these activi-
ties unhindered.140  
The ECtHR only deals with civil and political rights, but these have been interpreted to in-
clude positive obligations.141 This is particularly relevant with regard to Articles 2 (right to life), 3 
(prohibition of ill-treatment and torture) and 8 (private life) in conjunction with Article 1 (ensur-
ing the rights). The Bosnia Chamber has equally confirmed that Article 1 ECHR (to ‘secure’ the 
rights and freedoms in the Convention) also entails positive obligations to protect those rights.142 
This section deals with case law in the various systems involving the above provisions that 
could shed light the relation between provisional measures to halt death threats and the expected 
decision on the merits. 
3.2 Inter-American system 
A case in which the Inter-American Commission took precautionary measures to protect minors 
in detention illustrates that bringing a claim before the Commission may make an NGO 
vulnerable for retaliation. In 1996 the petitioners reported that the members of the Honduran 
section of Casa Alianza had been intimidated and harassed. High-ranking government officials 
had threatened to deprive the organisation of its legal status and to deport Bruce Harris and other 
members of the organisation who were called ‘dangerous aliens’ whose purpose it was to slander 
Honduras.143 They also alleged that the President of the Honduran Bar Association had threatened 
                                                 
137 See e.g. President IACHR, Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, and Godínez 
Cruz Cases (Honduras), Letter President on behalf of witnesses Jiménez-Puerto and Custodio 
López, 6 November 1987. This was conformed In the judgements on the merits, see e.g. 
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, judgement of 29 July 1998, §188. See further on the 
obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish as the main reason to take provisional measures 
Chapter XII (Other situations, section 2.7 on preventing impunity) and as a specific method of 
protection against death threats Chapter XIII (Protection). 
138 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
139 About protecting cultural survival see Chapters X (Cultural and religious rights) and XIII 
(Protection). 
140 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). About provisional measures ordered mainly to protect 
freedom of expression see Chapter XII (Other situations). 
141 See e.g. Mowbray (2004); Van der Velde (2002); Vlemminx (2002); Lawson (1995) and Forder 
(1992). See further Chapter XIII on the protective measures required. The Council of Europe also 
introduced the European Social Charter and its Protocols (including a collective complaint 
system). 
142 See e.g. Bosnia Chamber Matanović et al. v. Republika Srpska, 6 August 1997, §56. 
143 CIDH Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §46. The petitioners included the 
following newspaper articles with their communication: El Heraldo, ‘Casa Alianza seeks 
publicity’, 6 October 1996; La Tribuna, ‘Casa Alianza’s legal status will be revoked if it keeps up 
its complaints’, 10 October 1996; La Prensa, ‘Private Development Organization determined to 
slander Honduras’, 11 October 1996 (p. 4A); El Nuevo Día, ‘Slandering Honduras is no way to 
resolve the juvenile problem’, 12 October 1996 (p. 14); La Prensa, ‘Casa Alianza acting 
recklessly’, 14 October 1996 (p. 20A); El Heraldo, ‘Slander, says Sosa Coella: The Director of 
Casa Alianza should be deported’, 10 October 1996. 
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to revoke the membership of the legal counsel of Casa Alianza in Honduras. As discussed in the 
previous section in such cases it may become necessary to take protective measures to protect 
these persons against threats as well. This section refers to the case law on the merits with regard 
to the obligation of States to protect persons against death threats and harassment. It illustrates 
how both international and regional adjudicators have interpreted the provisions on the right to 
life and security and the prohibition of cruel treatment to encompass a positive obligation of the 
State to protect individuals against threats by private individuals and paramilitaries as well. 
3.3 HRC  
In Delgado Páez v. Colombia (1990) the HRC referred to the obligation under Article 9(1) to 
protect the liberty and security of non-detained persons.144 It pointed out that there was ‘no 
evidence that it was intended to narrow the concept of the right to security only to situations of 
formal deprivation of liberty’. 
“It cannot be the case that, as a matter of law, States can ignore known threats to the life of 
persons under their jurisdiction, just because that (sic) he or she is not arrested or otherwise 
detained. States parties are under an obligation to take reasonable and appropriate measures to 
protect them. An interpretation of article 9 which would allow a State party to ignore threats to 
the personal security of non-detained persons within its jurisdiction would render totally 
ineffective the guarantees of the Covenant”.145 
An interpretation of Article 9(1) limited to the context of arrest and detention would render inef-
fective the guarantees of the ICCPR.  
In its decision on the merits in Tshishimbi v. Zaire (1996)146 the HRC referred to its prior 
jurisprudence that Article 9(1) also included protection against ‘threats made by persons in au-
thority to the personal liberty and security of non-detained individuals within the State party’s 
jurisdiction’. After having found violations of Articles 9(1) and 7 ICCPR it urged the State to 
thoroughly investigate the circumstances of the abduction and detention and to bring to justice 
those responsible. As it usually does, the HRC also referred to the obligation to ensure that similar 
violations do not occur in the future. The investigation and prosecution required could be seen 
both as a form of redress for the victims and as a means to ensure that similar violations do not 
occur in the future, taking a firm stance against impunity.147 
                                                 
144 HRC Delgado Páez v. Colombia, 12 July 1990. The petitioner in this case was a teacher of 
religion and ethics at a secondary school in Leticia, Colombia. As an advocate of ‘liberation 
theology’ his social views differed from those of the man who was the Apostolic Prefect of 
Leticia at the time the author and alleged victim worked there as a teacher. Among others, the 
author alleged to have received anonymous phone calls at his residence in Bogotá threatening 
him with death if he returned to Leticia and did not withdraw his complaint against the Prefect 
and the education authorities. He received death threats as well at the teachers’ residence in 
Leticia. He reported these to the military authorities in Leticia, the teachers union, the Ministry of 
Education and the President of Colombia. On 2 May 1986 unknown killers shot to death a 
colleague, Ms. Rubiela Valencia, outside the teachers’ residence. The author himself was 
attacked five days later in the city of Bogotá. Fearing for his life he left the country and obtained 
political asylum in France in June 1986. 
145 HRC Delgado Páez v. Colombia, 12 July 1990. See also Nowak (1993), p. 163.  
146 HRC Tshishimbi v. Zaire, 25 March 1996. 
147 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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Other cases against, among others, Zambia, Angola and Equatorial Guinea have confirmed 
this.148 In the reparations paragraph in Bahamonde v. Equitorial Guinea (1993) the HRC urged 
the State to guarantee the security of the victim. The petitioner had contended that he ‘was sub-
jected to harassment, intimidation and threats by prominent politicians and their respective ser-
vices on a number of occasions’. Observing that the State party had dismissed this claim in gen-
eral terms without addressing his ‘well-substantiated allegations’, the HRC concluded that the 
State had failed to ensure his right to security of person. The petitioner had fled the country for 
Spain in 1991 and he claimed that since his departure he had received death threats. He claimed 
that ‘the security services of Equatorial Guinea have received the order to eliminate him, if neces-
sary in Spain’.149 The HRC did not specify its call to guarantee the security of the victim. It could 
mean either to guarantee his security if he were to return or to guarantee his security in Spain.  
It is clear, however, that the HRC considers the State to have extra-territorial obligations, in 
the sense that Article 2 ICCPR cannot be interpreted in such a way that a State simply may not 
violate the Covenant on its own territory, but that it is free to do so on the territory of another 
State.150 In Dias v. Angola (2000) the HRC referred to the obligation to ‘take adequate measures 
to protect his personal security from threats of any kind’.151 Several months later, in Chongwe v. 
Zambia (2000) the HRC was more specific, in referring to the obligation, under Article 2(3)(a), to 
‘take adequate measures to protect his personal security and life from threats of any kind’. Not 
only did it refer to ‘life’ as well as to ‘security’, but it also urged the State ‘to carry out independ-
ent investigations of the shooting incident, and to expedite criminal proceedings against the per-
sons responsible for the shooting’.152 Like Mr. Bahamonde, Mr. Chongwe had fled the addressee 
State, but the Committee simply pointed out that this State was obliged to take adequate measures 
to protect his personal security and life from threats of any kind without specifying the territorial 
ramifications.153  
In Dias v. Angola (2000) the HRC also referred to the obligation ‘to take adequate measures 
to protect his personal security from threats of any kind’. Mr. Dias had submitted his complaint 
                                                 
148 See e.g. HRC Bwalya v. Zambia, 14 July 1993; Bahamonde v. Equitorial Guinea, 20 October 
1993; Chongwe v. Zambia, 25 October 2000; Dias v. Angola, 20 March 2000 and Jiménez Vaca 
v. Colombia, 25 March 2002. 
149 HRC Bahamonde v. Equitorial Guinea, 20 October 1993. 
150 HRC Sergio Ruben Lopez Burgos (submitted by his wife Delia Saldias de Lopez) v. Uruguay, 29 
July 1981 and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981. The State party informed the 
HRC by note of 31 October 1991 that Mr. Lopez Burgos had filed a request for compensation 
and that the sum of $ 200.000 had been awarded to him on 21 November 1990, to be paid in four 
instalments. At this date the State also informed the Committee that Mrs. Celiberti had presented 
a claim that was under review and that she was elected to the Council of Montevideo on 26 
November 1989. See follow-up report CCPR/C/45/R.6. On extra-territorial obligations, see also 
Chapter V (Non-refoulement) 
151 HRC Dias v. Angola, 20 March 2000. 
152 Moreover, it pointed out that the remedy should include ‘damages’ to the victim ‘if the outcome 
of the criminal proceedings reveals that persons acting in an official capacity were responsible for 
the shooting and hurting of the author’. HRC Chongwe v. Zambia, 25 October 2000. Mr. 
Chongwe was an advocate and the chairman of a 13-party opposition alliance. He claimed that 
Dr. Kaunda, the former President, and himself were shot at and wounded by the police on 23 
August 1997. He also included a Human Rights Watch report confirming the shooting and 
quoting witness statements and medical reports. The HRC found that the State had failed to 
protect the petitioner’s right to life and security of person.  
153 While in certain cases (e.g. occupation) a State does have positive obligations when it acts 
extraterritorially, it might be far-fetched to require each State also to provide protection against 
death threats occurring outside of their own jurisdiction. On extraterritorial application of human 
rights treaties see also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction). 
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from Portugal. In this case the Committee specifically noted that he had been unable to enter 
Angola due to the threats against him.154 Still, it did not discuss the territorial scope of the obliga-
tion to protect the victim against threats nor did it point out the State’s obligation to ensure his 
safe return to Angola. Only in Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia (2002) did the HRC point out that the 
State was obliged ‘to take appropriate measures to protect his security of person and his life so as 
to allow him to return to the country’. In this case it also urged the State ‘to carry out an inde-
pendent inquiry into the attempt on his life and to expedite the criminal proceedings against those 
responsible for it’. On the other hand, it seemed more cautious with regard to the assurances of 
non-repetition. Rather than the usual reference to the obligation to take measures to prevent simi-
lar violations in the future, it referred to the obligation ‘to try to prevent’ such violations.155 Chap-
ter XII on the relationship between the protection required in provisional measures and in deci-
sions on reparation more closely discusses the Committee’s decisions on reparations in cases 
involving threats and the indications these may give for the use of provisional measures pending 
the proceedings. 
An early case, dating from 1977, involving a claim that family members were being perse-
cuted, is that of Zairian citizen Mbenge who submitted a communication on behalf of members of 
his family and persons in their employ as well as on behalf of himself.156 In his initial letter he 
complained of ‘systematic persecution’ of his family by the Government of Zaire (Congo). He 
submitted his complaint from Belgium where he was residing as a political refugee. He alleged 
that his family was being persecuted because of his political views. He pointed out that he had 
learned through the press that he had been sentenced to death in September 1977 for supposedly 
having participated in the invasion of the province of Shaba (formerly known as Katanga). He 
claimed that President Mobutu had sought in vain to have him extradited from Belgium. Instead, 
the Government arrested several members of his family as well as business associates who might 
give information on his whereabouts.157 On the merits the Committee found a violation of Article 
9 (right to security of person). Neither this decision nor the file shows specific intervention by the 
Committee pending the proceedings before it.158  
                                                 
154 HRC Dias v. Angola, 20 March 2000. 
155 HRC Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia, 25 March 2002. Mr. Jiménez Vaca was a practising trial lawyer 
in the city of Medellín and in the region of Urabá. For his work he was based in the municipality 
of Turbo. In the region he was the legal advisor to several trade unions and organisations of 
peasants, including for Sintagro in Antioquia. From 1980 until his flight to the UK in 1988 he 
was harassed. Several times he asked the authorities for protection. On 26 August 1985 several 
households received pamphlets asking “are you a member of Sintagro? Doesn’t it bother you to 
belong to a group of hired assassins and murderers of the people, drug bandits led by Argemiro 
Correa, Asdrúbal Jiménez and Fabio Villa?” Later on one of his brothers disappeared and another 
was murdered. On 4 April 1988 he was shot at when driving in a taxi in Bogotá. After 5 days in a 
hospital he was transferred to another hospital for security reasons. He stayed there until he was 
well enough to travel to the UK. He had identified members of the fourth and tenth army brigades 
‘as possibly being responsible for the harassment and death threats to which he was subjected’. 
156 HRC Daniel Monguya Mbenge v. Zaire, 25 March 1983.  
157 His younger brother and his father-in-law were arrested in September 1977. Business relation 
Mozola, a pharmacist, as well as the family driver (no name provided) were also arrested the 
same day. Six days later he submitted his case before the HRC. 
158 Eventually the HRC decided that the petitioner was justified to act on behalf of his brothers and 
father-in-law by reason of close family connection. In July 1980 it discontinued consideration of 
the case to the extent it related to his brother Simon and his father-in-law since it appeared that 
they ‘would now be in a position to act on their own behalf’. Regarding his younger brother the 
Committee based its assessment on the undisputed fact that he was arrested in order to force him 
to disclose the whereabouts of his brother Simon and that he was not released from detention 
until late in 1978 or early in 1979. The HRC found a violation of Article 9 ICCPR. With respect 
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Early cases hinting at harassment of counsel are those involving Maître Hammel in Mada-
gascar. In February 1982 his law offices had been searched and he was taken away by officers of 
the ‘political police’ and held in a basement cell. He noted that he was informed that he ‘was 
suspected of being an international spy’ in view of his contacts and communications with Am-
nesty International and the HRC since, ‘according to the Malagasy political police, those contacts 
constituted a crime of international espionage’. After 19 years as a member of the Madagascar 
Bar he was expelled as a French national and had two hours to pack at his home. The State party 
informed the HRC, in January 1987, of the decision of the Supreme Court of Madagascar on his 
case, of August 1986. In this decision the court considered that the Minister of the Interior had 
been correct in expelling him ‘insofar as his continued presence in Madagascar would have dis-
turbed public order and security’. The court pointed out that it was ‘apparent from the investiga-
tion that Mr. Eric Hammel, making use both of his status as a corresponding member of Amnesty 
International and of the Human Rights Committee [sic] at Geneva, and as a Barrister, of his own 
free will took the liberty of discrediting Madagascar by making assertions of such gravity that 
they should have been upheld by irrefutable evidence’. In a case Mr. Hammel submitted on behalf 
of himself, the HRC found violations of Article 9(4) because he had been unable to challenge his 
arrest. It found a violation of Article 13 because he had not been allowed to submit reasons 
against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by a competent authority while there were no 
compelling reasons of national security. It also noted with concern that the decision to expel him 
‘would appear to have been linked to the fact he had represented persons before the Human 
Rights Committee’. ‘Were that to be the case, the Committee observes that it would be both un-
tenable and incompatible with the spirit’ of the ICCPR and its OP.159  
In March 1981 the HRC strongly urged the State to provide detailed information about the 
access of Dave Marais to Maître Hammel, counsel for the alleged victim, and to ensure that they 
could effectively communicate. In May 1981 Maître Hammel informed the Committee that, ‘as a 
consequence of his enquiry into his client’s state of health through the examining magistrate’ he 
‘was charged at the instance of the Attorney General with spreading false rumours’. He also 
stated that the political police had questioned him on two occasions.160 In February 1982 Maître 
Hammel informed the Committee of his expulsion. In this context he referred to an officers’ plot 
of the previous month and pointed out that the political police had seized part of his dossier on the 
Marais case.161 Hammel claimed that his expulsion was also related to his involvement in repre-
senting a politician, Monja Jaona, following an arrest. Later Hammel represented Jaona before the 
HRC with regard to yet another arrest.162 The situation sketched above illustrates that the HRC 
has faced situations in which access to counsel was limited partly through interference with his 
activities. Indeed, the HRC intervened pending Marais to ensure access to counsel.163 Obviously 
this implied that the State should not hinder counsel in his defence. Nevertheless, the HRC did not 
intervene specifically to protect counsel against harassment.  
                                                                                                                       
to the petitioner himself it found a violation of Article 6(2) because he had been sentenced to 
death twice in circumstances contrary to the provisions of the Covenant and of Article 
14(3)(a)(b)(d) and (e). 
159 HRC Eric Hammel v. Madagascar, 3 April 1987. 
160 See also Chapter VIII on ensuring procedural rights to protect the right to life and personal 
integrity, discussing the Committee’s informal provisional measure to ensure access to counsel.  
161 HRC Dave Marais v. Madagascar, 24 March 1984. See also John Wight v. Madagascar, 1 April 
1985.The first month of his representation of John Wight Maître Hammel was still in 
Madagascar. 
162 HRC Monja Jaona v. Madagascar, 1 April 1985. 
163 See Chapter VIII (Ensuring procedural rights). 
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In her first communication in Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay (1982)164 the petitioner mentioned 
continued death threats against her husband, detained in Uruguay. The HRC did not respond to 
this information. Only three months later, in October 1980, when she informed it of his disap-
pearance, it took action and requested to be informed about his health and whereabouts. It is 
possible that an earlier intervention would have been more effective.  
Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia (1995)165 is particularly relevant in the context of the pro-
tection against threats. The case had been submitted by a Colombian lawyer residing in Brussels 
who was instructed by the family of a Colombian citizen who disappeared in August 1987 and 
whose body was subsequently discovered. When the lawyer submitted the complaint, in June 
1993, he also noted that the family of the disappeared person and himself ‘have received death 
threats and are subject to intimidation, because of their insistence in pursuing the case’.166 Coun-
sel pointed out that the authorities promoted the alleged perpetrator to Brigadier General and, in 
August 1995, awarded him an Order for Military Merit. Finally, he referred to an incident that 
same month when the alleged victim’s family, together with members of the Association of Rela-
tives of Disappeared Prisoners (ASFADDES), met in a popular restaurant in Bogotá for a demon-
stration on the occasion of the eighth anniversary of Nydia Bautista’s disappearance.  
“Soon after their arrival, an individual in civilian clothes entered the restaurant and occupied a 
table next to theirs. All those present identified Brigadier General Velandia Hurtado (the alleged 
perpetrator, ER), who continued to monitor the group throughout the meeting. The presence of 
Mr. Velandia Hurtado, who otherwise commands the Third Army Brigade in Cali, on those 
particular premises on that particular day, is considered to be yet another instance of 
intimidation of Nydia Bautista’s family”.167 
Pending the proceedings the HRC could have used provisional measures to protect her family 
members.168 
                                                 
164 HRC Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay, 1 April 1982. 
165 HRC Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, 27 October 1995. 
166 The State explained the disciplinary proceedings that were taking place. It mentioned that the 
Division of Special Investigations took up the case again after the victim’s body had been found. 
In February 1991 it heard the testimony of Mr. Garzón Garzón, who was then a member of the 
National Army. It noted that his testimony could ‘never be corroborated’ and his whereabouts 
were ‘currently unknown’. The HRC pointed out that the file revealed that this witness ‘requested 
special police protection for himself and his family after giving his testimony’. Later, in June 
1995, a domestic court attached full credibility to his testimony about the disappearance of Ms. 
Bautista de Arellana. The National Delegate for Human Rights had also given full credit to this 
testimony by resolution of July 1995. In a later submission to the HRC counsel expressed 
concern for the National Delegate’s physical integrity and referred to ‘recent reports about further 
instances of intimidation of Nydia Bautista’s sister (the sister of the alleged victim, ER) by agents 
of the military’s intelligence service’. By note of 27 July 1995 counsel added that the family of 
the alleged victim, in particular his sister, continued to be subjected to intimidation and 
harassment. He also pointed out that the family’s first lawyer had disappeared in Bogotá on 4 
July 1990. About the latter’s disappearance see CIDH Dr. A. de Jesus Pedraza Becerra v. 
Colombia, 25 September 1992. 
167 HRC Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, 27 October 1995. 
168 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). Another example involving threats is that of Vicente Barzana 
Yutronic (on his own behalf and on behalf of his two sons) v. Chile, 23 July 1999 (inadm.). The 
complaint referred to death threats to the petitioner’s family allegedly because of his human 
rights activities and his Croatian origin. He claimed that his sons had been arbitrarily detained 
and tortured in May 1994, but gave no specific examples of threats that took place following his 
initial submission of 8 July 1996. Hence, it makes sense that on 14 February 1997 the case was 
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The same applies to the case of Jayawardena v. Sri Lanka (2002). The complaint concerned 
death threats and between the initial submission, when the petitioner was an opposition member 
of parliament and December 2001, when his party obtained a majority and he became a minister 
in the new government, he informed the HRC by fax of a range of threats against him. On the 
merits the HRC found, among others, that the failure to investigate these death threats violated his 
right of security of person under Art. 9(1) ICCPR. No information is available on explicit requests 
by the petitioner for provisional measures, not of any informal action by the HRC in this re-
gard.169 
3.4 HRC and death threats on death row 
In cases involving death threats on death row the HRC often specifically recommends, as part of 
the remedy, the humane treatment of the petitioner in detention.170 There are several cases in 
which the submissions of petitioners on death row referred to death threats and harassment. 
In one case the petitioners were beaten unconscious. The beatings resulted in a fractured 
arm and other injuries. They were then left without medical attention for almost a day and one of 
the petitioners was later warned against further pursuing his complaint to the judicial authori-
ties.171 
In another case the petitioner had complained that warders allegedly told death row inmates 
that ‘since the State party was not prepared to hang them’ they would think of ‘other ways of 
decreasing the death row population’. He submitted that ‘the warders (...) are taunting with death 
threats and some of them keep on telling me that they are the ones who will be taking me to the 
gallows and what size rope will fit my neck and how much weight it will take to take my head off 
my body’.172 He claimed that since the death of one of his co-defendants, who died as a result of 
the violence, warders had repeatedly threatened him with death and that ‘the amount of threats 
increased after those responsible for the death of three inmates were indicted’. The HRC noted 
that the petitioner had described the events in detail and the State party had not refuted these 
claims. The State had not informed the Committee ‘whether the threats and ill-treatment to which 
the author himself allegedly was, and remains, subjected, are also under investigation’ (italics 
ER).173 
                                                                                                                       
only transmitted under Rule 91 (current Rule 97). Later the case was declared inadmissible, also 
in relation to the claims on behalf of his sons, because there was nothing in the materials before 
the HRC to suggest that the sons had authorized their father to represent them.  
169 HRC Jayawardena v. Sri Lanka, 22 July 2002. Other cases, such as Afuson Njaru v. Cameroon, 
19 March 2007 also dealt with death threats and harassment, but apparently these were no longer 
ongoing when the case was submitted to the HRC. Nevertheless on the merits the HRC found that 
an effective remedy also entailed the obligation of the State to take effective measures to ensure 
that the petitioner ‘is protected from threats and/or intimidation from members of the security 
forces’, §8. Before the case was submitted to the HRC the UN Special Rapporteur against torture 
had already referred toone of the attacks against the petitioner in his report of his visit to 
Cameroon, 11 November 1999, Annex II, §37. 
170 See further Chapters III (Executions), VII (Detention) and XIII (Protection). 
171 In its decision on the merits the Committee determined that this was an aggravating factor. HRC 
Randolph Barrett and Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992. 
172 Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 8 July 1994. The HRC noted also the allegation that prison warders 
had severely beaten him during a search. 
173 “In the absence of further information on such investigations, and taking into account that such 
investigations as have been undertaken do not appear to have been concluded four and a half 
years after the events, due weight must be given to the author’s allegations to the extent that they 
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In the third example the petitioner had submitted that warders had beaten to death another 
inmate in front of his cell. The day after this beating they returned and maltreated him as well. He 
suffered a kidney injury but was left in his cell for four days before he was brought to a hospi-
tal.174 The State party did not accept that death row inmates were generally afraid to notify the 
authorities of instances of ill treatment. In its admissibility decision the Committee simply regret-
ted that the State had not provided it with information about the results of the investigation it had 
announced.175 Claims do not all concern threats by authorities. They may also relate to failure to 
protect against threats by fellow inmates.176  
In all cases involving claims of ill treatment, beatings and death threats upon conviction the 
HRC expects the State to investigate the situation and inform it accordingly. Lacking this and in 
the face of detailed descriptions by the petitioner it gives due weight to the latter’s allegations.177 
After all, the claims could not have been dealt with during the trial (in which case the HRC nor-
mally defers to the findings of domestic courts) because the allegations related to events subse-
quent to conviction. The HRC did use provisional measures in these cases but not to deal with the 
threats. It only used them to halt the execution of the petitioners. Nevertheless, in its findings it 
recommended the State to cease their continuing ill treatment.178 
                                                                                                                       
have been substantiated”. HRC Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 8 July 1994; note the other case 
Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 16 July 1996. See also Garfield Peart and Andrew Peart v. Jamaica, 
19 July 1995 and Anthony Leehong v. Jamaica, 13 July 1999. 
174 HRC Ian Chung v. Jamaica, 9 April 1998. He had complained about this treatment to the 
Parliamentary Ombudsman. Later his counsel had requested information from the Ombudsman’s 
Office about these complaints, but with no results. 
175 Subsequently, the State party contended that its investigation had not substantiated the allegation 
of ill treatment by warders on death row. The HRC noted that the State party had not indicated 
who had investigated the claim, when it was investigated and whether a formal report was issued 
on the results of these investigations. The HRC also noted that the petitioner had given a detailed 
account of the beatings. It reminded Jamaica of its obligation under the OP to properly 
investigate allegations of violations of the Covenant and forward the outcome of the 
investigations to the Committee in detail and without undue delay. It found violations of Articles 
7 and 10(1). Ian Chung v. Jamaica, 9 April 1998. See also Lennon Stephens v. Jamaica, 18 
October 1995. 
176 See e.g. HRC Silbert Daley v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998. 
177 In March 1993, for example, the HRC declared admissible the case of Garfield and Andrew Peart 
v. Jamaica, 19 July 1995. Subsequently the alleged victims reported ill treatment and threats and 
they claimed they did not receive medical treatment. In relation to the claim that warders had 
beaten Andrew Peart with a metal detector on 4 May 1993, counsel submitted that afterwards he 
was passing blood in his urine and also suffered from shoulder injuries. He did not, however, 
receive medical treatment. He further stated that following this incident his client was locked in 
his cell without water until three days later. Counsel also submitted that Andrew Peart had been 
receiving death threats from warders, ‘allegedly because he testified against one of them before 
the Court after the death of an inmate in 1989’. The State party submitted that Garfield Peart’s 
communication in relation to the way he was treated in prison was inadmissible because of failure 
to exhaust domestic remedies. The Committee noted that the petitioner had complained to the 
acting Superintendent, that his counsel had made a complaint to the Commissioner of Police and 
was subsequently informed that the complaint was referred to the Commission of Correctional 
Services for appropriate action. “In the circumstances, the Committee considers that the author 
and his counsel have shown due diligence in the pursuit of domestic remedies and that there is no 
reason to review the Committee’s decision on admissibility”. On the merits the HRC found 
violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) because of the assaults against both petitioners and the death 
threats against one of them. 
178 See e.g. HRC Willard Collins v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991. 
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The case of Rickly Burrell v. Jamaica (1996)179 is illustrative of situations of ongoing 
threats. The HRC had used provisional measures only to halt the petitioner’s execution.180 Six 
months after his initial submission he was killed during a prison incident. With regard to the 
threats and ill treatment his counsel claimed violations of Articles 7 and 10. The petitioner’s 
violent death, he claimed, constituted a violation of Article 6(1).181 He submitted that there was a 
prima facie case that the authorities had arbitrarily deprived the petitioner of his life. In view of 
the evidence the burden of proof was now on the State, which had sole access to the most signifi-
cant information, such as the autopsy reports.182 Counsel also referred to a letter received from an 
inmate stating that a warder had previously threatened Mr. Burrell with death. Apparently, Burrell 
had been convicted of having murdered a relative of this warder. Following the threats the peti-
tioner had lodged a complaint with the Superintendent. According to the above inmate’s letter it 
was this warder who started the incident and it was him who shot the petitioner in his cell. Coun-
sel also referred to other letters of inmates equally alleging the involvement of this warder.183 
                                                 
179 HRC Rickly Burrell (submitted by Phillip Leach) v. Jamaica, 18 July 1996. After Burrell had 
been killed the HRC accepted that his counsel would maintain the communication. Upon 
consultation with the victim’s family, the Jamaica Council for Human Rights had instructed 
counsel to do so. 
180 Note verbale to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade of 9 June 1993 (on file with 
the author). See also HRC Bakhrom Khomidov (submitted by his mother Saodat Khomidova) v. 
Tajikistan, 29 July 2004. In this case Special Rapporteur used provisional measures in September 
2002 to halt the execution of the petitioner’s son. In March 2004 she re-iterated that investigators 
had beaten her son, but she had filed no complaint with the authorities ‘as she was afraid that they 
would further harm her son or would execute him’.  
181 He referred to HRC Guerrero v. Colombia, 31 March 1982 and Baboeram v. Suriname, 4 April 
1985.  
182 HRC Rickly Burrell (submitted by Phillip Leach) v. Jamaica, 18 July 1996, §3.4. Counsel 
referred to a press release by Amnesty International reporting the killing of four death row 
prisoners. While reports indicated that they were shot dead after they had tried to take prison 
guards hostage, some prisoners had been receiving death threats from prison personnel prior to 
the incident, because they had complained about ill treatment. Counsel wrote to the Parliamentary 
Ombudsman and to the Superintendent of St. Catherine’s prison about the incident and the 
preceding threats. He received no reply. In January 1994 Amnesty International published a 
report about the killings. Among others, it noted that the injuries of the guards appeared to have 
been minor and that none of them were hospitalised. Eyewitnesses among the prisoners had 
stated that the four prisoners had been shot in their cells ‘when they no longer posed a threat to 
the warders’. They also claimed that ‘because of the confined space, it is difficult to see how 
prisoners could have been shot without injuring the warders, if they were still being held 
hostage’. Counsel stated that ‘at least three of the warders named by prisoners as having been 
involved in the shootings have been named repeatedly in other allegations involving threats or 
maltreatment involving prisoners on death row’. No report had been made available about the 
incident. Counsel also contended that complaints about the many incidents of excessive violence 
by prison warders were not adequately dealt with. Instead, prisoners complaining about ill 
treatment were subjected to threats by warders.  
183 Counsel claimed that the warders had not been trained in restraint techniques and the use of 
different levels of force. The incidents, he argued, showed that there was no clear chain of 
command and that ‘if the warders had received proper training in control and restraint techniques, 
they might not have panicked and shot Mr. Burrell and three other inmates’. Among others, the 
State party submitted that while none of the warders were hospitalised, ‘two of them were 
rendered unfit for work for two months, as a result of the injuries received’. The State party 
concluded: “Like Burrell, none of these four warders was involved in the commencement of the 
altercation, but became victims. For Burrell, it was fatal”. The HRC regretted that the State had 
made available neither the autopsy report nor the results of the coroner’s inquest. It observed that 
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Thus, counsel had pointed out that Burrell had been particularly at risk from physical attack and 
had been seriously threatened and abused prior to his death.184 Indeed the HRC found a violation 
of Article 6(1) for failure to take effective measures to protect the victim’s life. 
If a petitioner informs the HRC about threats such as those mentioned here, it would indeed 
be appropriate to intervene by means of provisional measures. It could take a gradual approach in 
this respect, first taking informal provisional measures. As discussed in section 3, the HRC has 
already formally taken provisional measures to protect against threats. This is in agreement with 
its approach on the merits to positive obligations to protect the right to life, the prohibition of 
cruel treatment and torture and the right of personal security. 
3.5 CAT 
In Dzemajl et al v. Yugoslavia (2002) CAT considered that, in the circumstances, the burning and 
destruction of houses constituted acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. 
The nature of these acts was ‘further aggravated by the fact that some of the complainants were 
still hidden in the settlement when the houses were burnt and destroyed, the particular 
vulnerability of the alleged victims and the fact that the acts were committed with a significant 
level of racial discrimination’. It pointed out that while the acts were not committed by public 
officials themselves ‘they were committed with their acquiescence’ and constituted a violation of 
Article 16(1) ICAT. CAT also specifically referred to the positive obligations flowing from this 
provision.185 B’M.B v. Tunisia involved a complaint about Articles 2, 11-14 ICAT, but CAT used 
provisional measures to protect the petitioner’s family and the family of the alleged victim and 
witnesses against death threats and harassment. In its decision declaring the case inadmissible it 
repeated its request ‘to ensure that no harm is done to the author's family, the alleged victim's 
family or the witnesses and their families’. This seems to be based on the acknowledgment that 
States have positive obligations under Articles 5(a) and 16 to protect persons somehow related to 
the case. 
3.6 CEDAW 
In A.T. v. Hungary (2005) the CEDAW concluded that ‘the obligations of the State party set out 
in article 2 (a), (b) and (e) of the Convention extend to the prevention of and protection from 
violence against women, which obligations in the present case remain unfulfilled and constitute a 
violation of the author’s human rights and fundamental freedoms, particularly her right to security 
of person’.186 Among others, it pointed out that Articles 5(a) and 16 had been violated, because 
the petitioner ‘could not have asked for a restraining or protection order since neither option 
                                                                                                                       
the report submitted by the State party acknowledged that the victim’s death ‘was the unfortunate 
result of confusion on the side of the warders, who panicked when seeing some of their 
colleagues being threatened by the inmates’. It also noted that the shooting continued after the 
warders were rescued. 
184 In this light counsel had noted that the HRC had previously decided that a State party could be 
responsible ‘either by act or omission’ for not taking adequate measures to protect against such 
threats. See his submission of 14 February 1994 (on file with the author), referring to HRC 
Dermit Barbato (submitted by Mr. Gilmet Dermit on behalf of his cousins) v. Uruguay, 21 
October 1982. 
185 CAT Dzemajl et al v. Yugoslavia, 21 November 2002, §§9.2 and 9.6. 
186 CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005, §9.3. 
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currently exists in the State party’. She had been ‘unable to flee to a shelter because none are 
equipped to accept her together with her children, one of whom is fully disabled’.187 
3.7 Inter-American Commission and Court 
The Inter-American Court has pointed out in its provisional measures that the State should take 
effective measures to investigate and punish the perpetrators, ‘as a key element of its protective 
duty’.188 In Velásquez Rodríguez (1988) it stressed that ‘under international law a State is 
responsible for the acts of its agents undertaken in their official capacity and for their omissions, 
even when those agents act outside the sphere of their authority or violate internal law’.189 The 
Court had found that ‘in principle, any violation of rights recognized by the Convention carried 
out by an act of public authority or by persons who use their position of authority is imputable to 
the State’.190  
“The State has a legal duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to 
use the means at its disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within 
its jurisdiction, to identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to 
ensure the victim adequate compensation”.191 
It is ‘obligated to investigate every situation involving a violation of the rights protected by the 
Convention’. After all, ‘if the State apparatus acts in such a way that the violation goes unpun-
ished and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as soon as possible, the State 
has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise of those rights to the persons 
within its jurisdiction’. “The same is true when the State allows private persons or groups to act 
freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized by the Convention”.192 
In its judgments on the merits and on reparations the Inter-American Court often refers to 
the obligation to prevent, to investigate and to punish.193 It has pointed out that it mentions this 
obligation in the judgment on the merits because the obligation to guarantee and ensure the effec-
tive exercise of the rights in the ACHR is different from and independent of the obligation to 
make reparation. This means that the State is obliged to investigate the facts and punish those 
responsible even if the victim or his next of kin would decide to waive the measures of repara-
tion.194 Otherwise it would fail to comply with its general obligation to ‘ensure the free and full 
exercise’ of the rights under the ACHR.195 
                                                 
187 Id., §9.4. More closely on this case see Boerefijn (2005a), pp. 470-480. See also IACHR pending 
case Cotton Field (Ramos Monárrez et al.) v. Mexico, lodged by the Commission on 4 November 
2007 concerning the joint cases Nos. 12,496, 12,497 and 12,498, the Cotton Field: Claudia Ivette 
González, Esmeralda Herrera Monreal and Laura Berenice Ramos Monárrez (involving an 
alleged pattern of gender violence that had led to the murder of hundreds of women and girls). 
188 IACHR Giraldo Cardona case (Colombia), Order for provisional measures (on behalf of 
members of the Civic Human Rights Committee of Meta), 19 June 1998. 
189 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment of 29 July 1988, §170.  
190 Id., §172. 
191 Id., §174. 
192 Id., §176. 
193 See e.g. Medina-Quiroga/Nash Rojas (2007), pp. 19-29. 
194 See, e.g. IACHR Garrido and Baigorria, judgment on reparations of 27 August 1998, §72. 
195 See e.g. IACHR Bámaca Velásquez, judgment of 25 November 2000, §129 and Paniagua 
Morales et al, judgment of 8 March 1998, §178 (and sixth operative paragraph). 
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At the same time the Court has expressed an awareness of the difficulties of investigation in 
certain circumstances. It pointed out: 
“The duty to investigate, like the duty to prevent, is not breached merely because the 
investigation does not produce a satisfactory result. Nevertheless, it must be undertaken in a 
serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to be ineffective. An investigation must 
have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step taken by 
private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of 
proof, without an effective search for the truth by the government. This is true regardless of 
what agent is eventually found responsible for the violation. Where the acts of private parties 
that violate the Convention are not seriously investigated, those parties are aided in a sense by 
the government, thereby making the State responsible on the international plane”.196 
The Inter-American Commission and Court regularly refer to the aforementioned judgment in 
Velásquez Rodríguez (1988). In its final decision in the Minors in detention v. Honduras case, for 
instance, the Commission noted that: 
“[that the] insinuation that persons who, for any reason, have recourse to the inter-American 
system for protection of human rights are disloyal to their country is unacceptable and cannot 
constitute a basis for any penalty or negative consequence. Human rights are higher values that 
‘are not derived from the fact that (an individual) is a national of a certain state, but are based 
upon attributes of human personality’ (American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, 
Whereas clauses, and American Convention, Preamble)”. 
The Commission considered that any act of intimidation or threat against the petitioners must be 
duly investigated and punished.197 The protective duty of the Commission and Court explains the 
use of provisional measures to protect persons against threats recognized already in Velasquez 
Rodriguez (1988). This is based on the positive obligation of States to prevent attacks on life and 
dignity, among others by investigating and prosecuting past acts. 
In June 1997 the Commission took precautionary measures in the case of García Prieto et 
al. so as to protect several persons against death threats and harassment. Almost ten years later, in 
September 2006, it requested the Court to order provisional measures. The Court did so that 
month and in January 2007.198 At the end of 2007 it found violations on the merits, including a 
failure to comply with the obligation to investigate the threats and harassment endured. It found ‘a 
lack of diligence by the police and prosecutorial authorities’ in the conduct of the investigations. 
This had ‘impeded the determination of the facts and the identification, trial, and possible pun-
ishment of the perpetrators responsible for the threats and harassment directed at some members 
of the García Prieto Giralt family. Moreover, the lack of an adequate and serious investigation has 
permitted that such events continue to the present’.199 It had been proven ‘that José Mauricio 
García Prieto Hirlemann and Gloria Giralt de García Prieto have lived for years, and continue 
living, with feelings of insecurity, anguish, and powerless due to the lack of an investigation of 
the events perpetrated against them. The failure to investigate the threats and harassment has 
affected the personal integrity of Ramón Mauricio García Prieto’s parents’.200 By way of repara-
tion the Court ordered the State to conclude the pending investigations into the murder of Ramón 
                                                 
196 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, judgment of 29 July 1988, §177. 
197 CIDH Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §§153-155. 
198 IACHR García Prieto family et al. (El Salvador), Order of 26 September 2006 and Order of 27 
January 2007. 
199 IACHR Case of García-Prieto et al. v. El Salvador, Judgment of 20 November 2007 
(Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and Costs), §158. 
200 Id., §159. 
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Mauricio García Prieto and the threats and harassment; as well as to publish the operative para-
graphs of the judgment, and certain specific paragraphs, in the official gazette and in another 
important national newspaper, and to provide the victims with the psychiatric and psychological 
care required, free of charge.201 
3.8 ECtHR 
Of the three regional systems the European is the last one in which provisional measures have 
been used in the context of death threats and harassment, and only quite hesitantly. There are 
various Member States of the Council of Europe in which problems have arisen involving intimi-
dation and harassment of witnesses, human rights defenders, journalists and others.202 An exam-
ple of a case in which the petitioner specifically requested provisional measures against harass-
ment is Aydin v. Turkey (1997). In this case the petitioner requested the ECtHR to take provi-
sional measures against harassment and intimidation. In particular, State officials should stop 
contacting the petitioner and her family about the petition. The Court did not take provisional 
measures, but in its judgment on the merits it did find violations of Articles 3 and 25 (now Article 
34) ECHR.203 
In Osman v. UK (1998) the ECtHR referred to the positive obligation to protect the right to 
life (Article 2) and prevent and suppress offences against the person. In ‘certain well defined 
circumstances’ this would include an obligation to ‘take preventive operational measures to pro-
tect an individual whose life is at risk from the criminal acts of another individual’.204 The Court 
pointed out that ‘it must be established to its satisfaction that the authorities knew or ought to 
have known at the time of the existence of a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified 
individual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party and that they failed to take meas-
ures within the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to 
avoid that risk’. It classified Article 2 as ‘a right fundamental in the scheme of the Convention’. In 
light of the nature of this article it was sufficient for a petitioner ‘to show that the authority did not 
do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and immediate risk to life of 
which they have or ought to have knowledge’. It also referred to Article 1 and the obligation to 
‘secure the practical and effective protection’ of the rights in the Convention, including Article 
                                                 
201 “The Court finds that it is necessary to order measures of reparation in order to reduce the mental 
suffering of José Mauricio García Prieto Hirlemann and Gloria Giralt de García Prieto. To this 
end, the Court orders the State to provide adequate treatment and medication needed by these 
individuals, through its public health services, free of charge, for as long as necessary, and given 
their prior consent and a medical evaluation. When providing the medical, psychological, or 
psychiatric treatment required, the particular needs and circumstances of each person should be 
considered, in order to provide the proper treatment”. IACHR Case of García-Prieto et al. v. El 
Salvador, Judgment of 20 November 2007 (Preliminary Objection, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs), §201. 
202 The following States, for instance, have recognized the competence of the ECtHR: Armenia, 
Azerbaijan (including Nagorno-Karabakh), BiH, Croatia, Georgia, Moldova (incl. 
Transdniestria), Romania, Russian Federation (incl. Chechnya and other North Caucasus 
regions), Serbia and Montenegro, Turkey and Ukraine. Belarus is a candidate for membership of 
the Council of Europe. 
203 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Aydin v. Turkey, Judgment of 25 September 1997. See also section 4 of 
this Chapter. 
204 ECtHR Osman v. UK, 28 October 1998, §115. 
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2.205 The Bosnia Chamber has equally confirmed that Article 1 ECHR (to ‘secure’ the rights and 
freedoms in the Convention) also entails positive obligations to protect those rights.206 
With regard to the right to life the ECtHR recalled that the first sentence of Article 2(1) en-
joined the State ‘not only to refrain from the intentional and unlawful taking of life, but also to 
take appropriate steps to safeguard the lives of those within its jurisdiction’.207 This involved ‘a 
primary duty on the State to secure the right to life by putting in place effective criminal-law 
provisions to deter the commission of offences against the person, backed up by law-enforcement 
machinery for the prevention, suppression and punishment of breaches of such provisions. It also 
extends in appropriate circumstances to a positive obligation on the authorities to take preventive 
operational measures to protect an individual or individuals whose life is at risk from the criminal 
acts of another individual’.208 
The ECtHR has also recognized the positive obligation of States under Article 3. The obli-
gation of States under Article 1 ECHR ‘to secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights 
and freedoms defined in the Convention’, taken together with Article 3, requires States to ‘take 
measures designed to ensure that individuals within their jurisdiction are not subjected to torture 
or inhuman or degrading treatment, including such ill-treatment administered by private individu-
als’.209 ‘State responsibility may therefore be engaged where the framework of law fails to pro-
vide adequate protection’ or ‘where the authorities fail to take reasonable steps to avoid a risk of 
ill-treatment about which they knew or ought to have known’.210 
The Court reiterated that Article 3 ‘enshrines one of the most fundamental values of democ-
ratic society. It prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment’.211 The preventive measures required ‘should provide effective protection, in particular, of 
children and other vulnerable persons and include reasonable steps to prevent ill-treatment of 
which the authorities had or ought to have had knowledge’.212 
Its interpretation of the obligations under Article 8 on the right to family and private life is 
relevant as well. It has determined that the concept of private life covered the ‘physical and moral 
integrity of the person, including his or her sexual life’.213 It has pointed out that ‘these obliga-
tions may involve the adoption of measures designed to secure respect for private life even in the 
sphere of the relations of individuals between themselves’.214 
“Sexual abuse is unquestionably an abhorrent type of wrongdoing, with debilitating effects on 
its victims. Children and other vulnerable individuals are entitled to State protection, in the form 
                                                 
205 Id., §116. 
206 See e.g. Bosnia Chamber Matanović et al. v. Republika Srpska, 6 August 1997, §56. 
207 See e.g. ECtHR Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, §85 and L.C.B. v. UK, 9 June 1998, 
§36. 
208 See e.g. ECtHR Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, §85 and Osman v. UK, 28 October 
1998, §115. 
209 See e.g. ECtHR Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, §115, A. v. UK, 23 September 1998, 
§22 and H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, §40. 
210 See e.g. ECtHR Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, §115, A. v. UK, 23 September 1998, 
§22 and Osman v. UK, 28 October 1998, §§115-116. 
211 See e.g. ECtHR Z. et al. v. UK, 10 May 2001, § 73, Osman v. UK, 28 October 1998, §116 and A. 
v. UK, 23 September 1998, §22. 
212 See e.g. ECtHR Z. et al. v. UK, 10 May 2001, §73, Osman v. UK, 28 October 1998, §116 and A. 
v. UK, 23 September 1998, §22. 
213 ECtHR X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, §22. 
214 Id., §§22-23. See also Stubbings v. UK, 22 October 1996, §§61-62. 
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of effective deterrence, from such grave types of interference with essential aspects of their 
private lives”.215 
In Aydin v. Turkey (1996) counsel for the petitioner specifically requested the Commission to take 
provisional measures (under Rule 36) ‘directing the Government to stop all contact by state offi-
cials with the applicant and her family concerning her application’. The Commission transmitted 
the complaint of harassment of the petitioner and her family by the security forces to Turkey for 
urgent response. Turkey did not respond. Three weeks later the Commission decided not to take 
provisional measures. Nevertheless it drew the attention of the Government to ‘the serious conse-
quences which might arise from intimidation and harassment of an applicant and members of 
his/her family in connection with an application before the Commission’. Further complaints 
relating to intimidation and harassment of family members were forwarded to the State, which 
was reminded of its lack of response to the earlier complaints. Only several weeks later the Gov-
ernment made submissions with regard to the allegations of interfering with the right of individual 
petition. On the merits the Commission found violations of Articles 3 and 25 (now Article 34), 
Articles that have particular relevance in the context of provisional measures.216 
In Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey (2000) the ECtHR was ‘satisfied that Hasan Kaya, as a doctor 
suspected of aiding and abetting the PKK, was at that time at particular risk of falling victim to an 
unlawful attack. Moreover, this risk could in the circumstances be regarded as real and immedi-
ate’. The ‘authorities must be regarded as being aware of this risk’.217 Thus, the case law of the 
ECtHR has confirmed the positive obligations of States to protect persons against violence perpe-
trated by a private party. Both the Court and, in the past, the Commission have regularly dealt 
with positive obligations.218 On the other hand, they have only recently used provisional measures 
for the first time in a context of death threats and harassment, while this was certainly not the first 
occasion on which (potential) petitioners, or witnesses (and their families), have received such 
threats. 
When the Court is faced with situations such as these, involving ongoing threats, it is indeed 
appropriate for it to take provisional measures requesting the State to take specific protective 
measures.219  
4 CONCLUSION 
Throughout the world threats to human rights defenders, and to persons involved in domestic or 
international judicial proceedings, are a recurring problem. The Inter-American Commission and 
                                                 
215 ECtHR X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985, §27. See also Stubbings v. UK, 22 October 
1996, §64 and A. v. UK, 23 September 1998, §22. 
216 ECHR Aydin v. Turkey, 7 March 1996 (Article 31 Report). The Commission also found 
violations of Arts 6 and 13, see partly dissenting opinions Thune and Bratza (joined by Trechsel, 
Soyer, Schermers and Marxer). 
217 ECtHR Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, §§89-91. 
218 See e.g. the aforementioned ECtHR Osman v. the UK, 28 October 1998, §116. See also 
Mastromatteo v. Italy, 24 October 2002, appl. no. 37703/97, §68; Z. et al. v. the UK, 10 May 
2001, appl. no. 29392/95, §109 and E. et al. v. the UK, 26 November 2002, §88. 
219 See Barkhuysen/Van Emmerik/Rieter (2002), p. 87; Rieter (2003b) and the Report by CoE 
Parliamentary Assembly rapporteur Pourgourides, Doc. 11183, 9 February 2007, §52: “As the 
binding effect of the Court’s interim measures is now recognised, such measures can be used to 
counter-act unlawful pressure on applicants to the Court, their lawyers, or members of their 
families. The Court could require respondent states to take positive action to protect applicants, 
as the Inter-American Commission and Court have done”. 
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Court have extensively made use of provisional measures to protect such persons. Apart from 
protecting the lives and physical integrity of these human rights defenders, such provisional 
measures were also meant to ensure that the Court's final decision on the merits would not be 
prejudiced by one of the parties and to preserve the evidence needed in cases before the Court. 
Now that the HRC has been functioning for more than three decades at least in one case it 
has used provisional measures also to halt death threats and harassment.220 It is feasible that it will 
indeed use them in more such cases. In other cases, about which it does not yet have sufficient 
information, even for purposes of provisional measures, it may continue its use of Rule 91 (cur-
rent Rule 97) to enquire about the situation of a petitioner, both in order to be able to properly 
deal with the case and to alert the State about possible concerns by the HRC. This applies as well 
to situations of death threats on death row, in which (informal) intervention might be warranted.  
Next to the HRC, CEDAW and CAT have also used provisional measures to protect per-
sons against death threats and harassment. The African Commission has done so as well. Thus, 
these adjudicators appear to have reaffirmed the extensive practice of the Inter-American Com-
mission and Court with regard to this issue. They may be expected to continue using provisional 
measures to protect persons against death threats while a case is pending before them. Like the 
new African Court, all these adjudicators may draw inspiration from the practice of the Inter-
American Commission and Court and consolidate their own practices in this respect.  
It is only the ECtHR that is lagging behind. Given its case law on the merits (its emphasis 
on positive obligations and the particular importance attached to the right of petition and the 
prohibition of cruel treatment) and in light of the death threats against human rights defenders, 
witnesses and others in various Member States of the Council of Europe, a robust decision by the 
European Court to use provisional measures in this context would be a logical and appropriate 
next step. 
 
                                                 
220 In 2003 Scheinin considered it more likely that the HRC would decide to request a State to halt 
an immediate forced eviction with racist motives (Articles 26, 23, 17 ICCPR) than to request it to 
take positive action to protect against a threat to life. Scheinin, Geneva, April 2003. 
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 CHAPTER X 
 PROTECTING (INDIGENOUS) CULTURAL 
 AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The HRC, the Inter-American Commission and Court and the Bosnia Chamber have used provi-
sional measures to halt certain actions or (industrial) developments that could cause irreparable 
harm to the (indigenous) culture or religion of certain groups.  
In this context the question arises what types of actions or developments would result in ir-
reparable harm to the culture and religion of these groups. A related issue to be addressed in this 
respect is which rights have been invoked by petitioners or proprio motu by the adjudicators in 
order to help stop these developments. It is also important to note on behalf of which groups the 
adjudicators have used provisional measures. 
This chapter first discusses the practice of the human rights adjudicators in urgently dealing 
with cases involving indigenous culture. Then it explores how this practice relates to their case 
law on the merits and whether a finding of a violation is likely in this respect. Among others it 
deals with the question what type of cultural and religious rights have been protected by provi-
sional measures, on behalf of whom and why.1 In conclusion it also asks whether the practice of 
the HRC, the Inter-American Commission and Court and the Bosnia Chamber with regard to the 
use of provisional measures in cases involving culture is confirmed by the approach taken in the 
UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007). 
2 THE PRACTICE OF THE ADJUDICATORS TO TAKE PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
TO PROTECT CULTURAL OR RELIGIOUS RIGHTS 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the practice of the HRC, the Inter-American Commission and Court, the 
African Commission and the Bosnia Chamber with regard to provisional measures to protect 
cultural or religious rights. 
2.2 HRC 
In some cases the HRC has used provisional measures to protect cultural rights. While its practice 
in this regard is not yet extensive, these cases merit close examination because they clarify the 
concept of provisional measures. They relate to land rights of (members of) indigenous groups 
and the collective aspects of the right to culture.  
The first time it used provisional measures was in Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (1990).2 
The petitioner had claimed that the land of the Lubicon Lake Band, approximately 10,000 square 
                                                 
1 See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 (Beneficiaries). 
2 HRC Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990. 
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kilometres, had been expropriated for commercial purposes (oil and gas exploration) and de-
stroyed. He claimed that ‘the rapid destruction of the Band’s economic base and original way of 
life had already caused irreparable injury’.3 The State party, on the other hand, maintained that 
‘continued resource development would not cause irreparable injury to the traditional way of life 
of the Band’.4 Three years and five months after the initial submission, the HRC declared the case 
admissible in so far as it might raise issues under Article 27 ICCPR (minority rights, cultural 
rights) or under other articles. At the same time it requested Canada to take provisional measures 
to avoid irreparable damage to Chief Ominayak and other members of the Lubicon Lake Band.5 
In its summary of the submissions the HRC explained that it used provisional measures ‘(i)n view 
of the seriousness of the author’s allegations that the Lubicon Lake Band was on the verge of 
extinction’.6 
Subsequently it simply renewed its original call for provisional measures, without com-
menting on the non-compliance.7 On the merits it found violations and recommended an unclear 
remedy.8 Even if it had eventually recommended a remedy seeking a permanent or interim injunc-
tion, such recommendation would to some extent have been too late because it was tardy in using 
provisional measures in the first place and because the State did not appear to respect them once 
they had been taken. Pending the case the HRC could have monitored compliance more actively. 
The HRC did deal with the case as part of its mechanism for follow-up on Views. It re-
quested Canada to provide ‘any relevant information on measures taken to implement the remedy 
offered by the State party’.9 A member of federal parliament submitted a letter to the Special 
Rapporteur for Follow-up on Views, emphasising that the violations of Article 27 ICCPR were 
indeed continuing. He also noted that the Committee’s View was ‘frequently misrepresented by 
Canadian government officials’. He requested the Rapporteur to urge the State to ‘abandon its 
“take-it-or-leave-it” offer made to the Lubicon on January 24, 1989 – an offer which demonstra-
bly has not proved to be a remedy – and instead begin negotiations on adequate economic devel-
opment provisions and compensation’.10 
In its Concluding Observations under the reporting procedure (Article 40 ICCPR) of April 
2006 the HRC expressed concern ‘that land claim negotiations between the Government of Can-
ada and the Lubicon Lake Band are currently at an impasse’. It was also ‘concerned about infor-
                                                 
3 Id., §29.1. 
4 Id., §29.2. 
5 Earlier, it had only requested information under Rule 91 (on 16 October 1984 according to the 
text, on 9 November 1984 according to the cover page) and additional information by interim 
decision of 10 April 1986. See also Chapter II on timeliness. 
6 HRC Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990, §29.3. 
7 Id., §25. 
8 See further Chapter XIII (Protection).  
9 Canada responded almost a year later by stating: “As the Committee is aware, that remedy 
consisted of a comprehensive package of benefits and programs valued at $45 million (non-
inclusive of the value of land, mineral rights, or possible provincial contributions) and a 95 
square mile reserve”. It pointed out that meetings with the Band were terminated because of its 
demand ‘for additional compensation of at least $170 million’. It noted that ‘the Government’s 
offer has remained and continues to remain open for acceptance’. It also announced a negotiated 
settlement with the Woodland Cree Band similar to the 1989 offer to the Lubicon Lake Band and 
pointed out that both Bands ‘have the same rights under Treaty 8 and are of similar size’. 
According to Canada the Woodland Cree Band now included about 185 former members of the 
Lubicon Lake Band. Response of the permanent mission of Canada of 25 November 1991 to the 
follow-up request of 12 February 1991 (on file with the author). 
10 Letter by Ross Harvey (MP, Canada) to the Special Rapporteur for Follow-up on Views, 28 
November 1991 (on file with the author and also available at: <nativenet.uthscsa.edu/ 
archive/nl/91d/0189.html>, consulted 13 March 2003).  
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mation that the land of the band continues to be compromised by logging and large-scale oil and 
gas extraction, and regrets that the State party has not provided information on this specific issue 
(arts. 1 and 27)’. It recommended that State ‘to make every effort to resume negotiations’ in order 
to find ‘a solution which respects the rights of the Band under the Covenant, as already found by 
the Committee’. “It should consult with the band before granting licences for economic exploita-
tion of the disputed land, and ensure that in no case such exploitation jeopardizes the rights rec-
ognized under the Covenant”.11 In 2006 the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights specifically addressed the case of the Lubicon Lake Band in its Concluding Observations 
on Canada’s compliance with the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. It recom-
mended ‘strongly’ that Canada ‘resume negotiations with the Lubicon Lake Band, with a view to 
finding a solution to the claims of the Band that ensures the enjoyment of their rights under the 
Covenant’. “The Committee also strongly recommends the State party to conduct effective con-
sultation with the Band prior to the grant of licences for economic purposes in the disputed land, 
and to ensure that such activities do not jeopardize the rights recognized under the Covenant”.12 
Apart from the provisional measures in the Lubicon case, the other provisional measures to 
protect culture involved the Sami in Finland.13 It was in Sara et al. v. Finland (inadm. 1994) that 
the HRC used provisional measures for the second time in order to protect culture.14 The State 
denied that there was a causal link between the measures of protection requested by the petition-
ers and the object of the communication itself.15 Apparently it argued that this was the reason why 
provisional measures should not be taken. Quite apart from the question whether it is appropriate 
in human rights adjudication to be strict about the relationship between the rights claimed and the 
request for provisional measures, it is clear that in this case the material object of the petitioners’ 
complaint was the threat to their traditional economic and cultural rights caused by logging and 
road construction activities in certain reindeer husbandry areas. The HRC found that the material 
object of the complaint was related to the request for provisional measures.16 
In this case the petitioners feared, at the time of initial submission in 1990, that large-scale 
logging activities were imminent in the areas used by them for reindeer breeding. They noted that 
two road construction projects into the petitioners’ herding areas had been started without prior 
consultation.17 When the HRC initially declared the case admissible in 1991, it indeed used provi-
sional measures.18 In 1994, however, it set aside this decision, including the provisional measures, 
                                                 
11 HRC Concluding Observations (Canada), CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, 20 April 2006, §9. 
12 CESCR Concluding Observations (Canada), E/C.12/CAN/CO/4; E/C.12/CAN/CO/5, 22 May 
2006, §38. 
13 See Donders (2002), pp. 301-326 about the Sami as an indigenous people and their cultural 
identity and rights, with a focus on the Sami in Norway, Sweden and Finland. 
14 HRC Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.). 
15 The State argued that the Board’s authority to approve logging activities in areas other than those 
designated as protected wilderness, such as the residual area outside the Hammastunturi 
Wilderness, was not derived from the Wilderness Act. “Accordingly, the State party denies that 
there is a causal link between the measures of protection requested by the authors and the object 
of the communication itself, which only concerns enactment and implementation of the 
Wilderness Act”. However, the HRC noted that the continuation of road construction in the 
residual area could indeed be causally linked to the entry into force of the Wilderness Act. 
16 For purposes of admissibility the petitioners had sufficiently substantiated that this could raise 
issues under Article 27. 
17 See also Chapter XIII (Protection) on consultation and representation.  
18 The cover page does not mention provisional measures, but it appears from the text that the 
petitioners requested them. On 9 July 1991 when it declared the case admissible the Committee 
requested Finland to ‘adopt such measures as appropriate to prevent irreparable damage to the 
authors’. 
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and declared the case inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. Subsequently, by the 
time the petitioners could submit a new complaint to the HRC, the logging they had aimed to 
prevent with their first submission had already taken place. In the follow-up case, moreover, the 
HRC felt it was unable to draw conclusions on the basis of the evidence before it.19  
In Jouni Länsman v. Finland (Länsman II, 1996) the HRC used provisional measures for 
the third time in a case involving indigenous culture.20 However, it later decided to set aside this 
decision. The four petitioners were all members of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee. 
The HRC had denied a request for provisional measures in an earlier case (Länsman I) as being 
premature.21 The petitioners pointed out that about 40 percent of the total number of reindeer 
owned by the Herdsmen’s Committee grazed on the disputed lands during winter. The old un-
touched forests in the area are covered with lichen, which is very important ‘due to its suitability 
as food for young calves and its utility as emergency food for elder reindeer during extreme 
weather conditions’.22 The petitioners relied on the Committee’s previous reference to minor 
infringements on the one hand and a denial of the right to culture on the other.23 They relied upon 
the incremental approach to violations of Article 27 ICCPR that the HRC had acknowledged 
already in Lubicon. According to this approach a series of infringements would at some point in 
time result in a denial of Article 27 ICCPR. They argued that the impending infringement in this 
case would in fact trigger this denial. In order to prevent this, they requested provisional meas-
ures.  
The HRC requested the State ‘to refrain from adopting measures which would cause irrepa-
rable harm to the environment which the authors claim is vital to their culture and livelihood’.24 
This indicates a new phrasing of its provisional measures compared to earlier occasions. In Lubi-
con the HRC requested Canada to avoid irreparable damage to Chief Ominayak and other mem-
bers of the Lubicon Lake Band. It did explain that it used provisional measures because of the 
seriousness of the allegations in that the Band was on the verge of extinction, but it did not yet 
                                                 
19 See HRC Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 24 October 2001. In this case the HRC 
did find violations of Art. 14 (fair trial) and considered that the State party was ‘under an 
obligation to restitute to the petitioners that proportion of the costs award already recovered and 
to refrain from seeking execution of any further portion of the award’. It also considered that 
since the decision of the Court of Appeal was tainted by a substantive violation of fair trial 
provisions (equality of arms), the State was under an obligation to reconsider the petitioners’ 
claims. See also Jarle Jonassen and members of the Riast/Hylling reindeer herding district v. 
Norway, 25 October 2002 (inadm.). 
20 HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland (Länsmann II), 30 October 1996. 
21 See section 3 discussing Ilmari Länsman v. Finland (Länsman I), 26 October 1994. 
22 HRC Länsman II, 30 October 1996, §2.4. They also pointed out that Sami reindeer Herdsmen in 
Finland had difficulties competing with their Swedish counterparts because Sweden subsidised 
the production of reindeer meat. Apart from that, traditional Sami reindeer Herdsmen in the north 
of Finland using nature based Sami methods, had difficulties competing with reindeer meat 
producers in the south who use fencing and feeding with hay. 
23 See the discussion in Ilmari Länsman v. Finland (Länsman I), 26 October 1994, §§9.4-9.8. In its 
subsequent case law the HRC indeed confirmed its approach that not every interference can be 
regarded as a denial. In Länsman II, 30 October 1996, the formulation was that the logging had to 
be of such proportions as to deny the petitioners’ rights to enjoy their culture ‘in that area’. In 
Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 24 October 2001 it used the term ‘threshold’ and referred to 
its practice to enquire whether the interference in the reindeer husbandry was so substantial that it 
failed to properly protect the right of the petitioners to enjoy their culture. In Apirana Mahuika v. 
New Zealand, 27 October 2000 and Länsman I the HRC pointed out specifically that measures 
with a certain limited impact on the way of life of persons belonging to a minority would not 
necessarily amount to a denial of the right under Article 27 ICCPR. 
24 HRC Länsman II, 30 October 1996, §4.1. 
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take the two step approach ‘risk to environment-risk to culture’ taken in Länsman II. In Sara et al. 
v. Finland (1994) it requested the State to adopt the appropriate measures to prevent irreparable 
harm to the petitioners.25 This could be seen as a more traditional approach, as the phrasing did 
not show an awareness of the collective aspects of the case.26 In Länsman II, however, the HRC 
not only showed an awareness of the collective aspects of its provisional measure but it noted 
specifically that the State should refrain from adopting measures that would cause irreparable 
harm to the environment. Only following this it referred to the petitioners rather than the envi-
ronment, by noting that they claimed that this environment was vital to their culture and liveli-
hood. This new two step phrasing shows an awareness of the special relation between indigenous 
peoples and their lands. 
Another new approach taken in Länsman II relates to the Special Rapporteur’s request to 
the State party to inform him ‘if it contended that the request for interim protection was not ap-
propriate in the circumstances of the case’ and, if so, to give reasons for this contention. He would 
then ‘reconsider the appropriateness of maintaining the request under rule 86’.27  
In response the State argued that provisional measures ‘should be issued restrictively, and 
only in serious cases of human rights violations where the possibility of irreparable damage is 
real, e.g. when the life or physical integrity of the victim is at stake’. It did not consider that this 
case revealed circumstances pointing to the possibility of such irreparable damage.28 It noted that 
the present logging area was only a small portion of the relevant State owned forests and that it 
had negotiated with the Muotkatunturi Reindeer Husbandry Herdsmen’s Association to which the 
petitioners also belonged.29 The State noted as well that Rule 86 (current Rule 92) only referred to 
avoiding irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation and stated: “Clearly enough, it 
does not cover measures having ‘otherwise long-lasting damage’ referred to by the authors in 
their communication”.30 
                                                 
25 HRC Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.). 
26 Id. Of course this does not mean that the Rapporteur was not aware of these aspects. See also the 
reference to this case in Kamminga (1996), p. 171 and p. 183. 
27 HRC Länsman II, 30 October 1996, §4.1. It transpires from the Note Verbale to the State that he 
requested it to inform him of its reasons to contest the appropriateness ‘as soon as circumstances 
permit’. Note verbale to the State party of 15 November 1995 (on file with the author). In the 
letter of the same date to counsel the HRC simply noted: ‘under rule 86, the State party has been 
requested to provide information on the alleged irreparable harm caused by logging to the author 
as early as possible’. Letter to the petitioner of 15 November 1995 (on file with the author). 
28 In its submission dated 20 December 1995 but submitted on 15 December (on file with the 
author) it was phrased as follows: “The Government therefore regards the Committee’s request as 
inappropriate in the current circumstances, and is of the opinion that the Committee should set 
aside its request for interim measures”. 
29 See also section 3 of this chapter (the heading on consultation) and Chapter XIII (Protection), 
section 4.4 on representation. 
30 Submission by the Permanent Mission of Finland in Geneva dated 20 December 1995, but 
submitted on 15 December (on file with the author). 
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Subsequently the HRC revoked its provisional measures.31 While it did not explain this de-
cision, one may assume that it agreed with the State party’s interpretation of irreparable harm.32 
Indeed in the text of its admissibility decision of March 1996 (unpublished) the HRC noted that it 
had set aside its provisional measure ‘in the light of the State party’s observations of 15 Decem-
ber 1995 and its pledge to reduce current logging activities in the area specified in the communi-
cation’.33 In their subsequent submission the petitioners welcomed the Committee’s decision to 
declare the case admissible. They did not refer to its decision to set aside its provisional measure, 
possibly for strategic reasons.34 
In 1996 the HRC found that the completed logging of around 250 hectares and the proposed 
logging of a further 250 hectares in the Angeli area did not constitute a violation of Article 27 
ICCPR. On the basis of the information then before it the HRC concluded that the approved 
logging would not be on a scale threatening ‘the survival of reindeer husbandry’. It did point out 
that if faced with evidence that the effects of the logging ‘were more serious than foreseen at 
present’ or new logging plans were to be approved on a larger scale, this could trigger a violation 
of Article 27. After all, ‘though different activities in themselves may not constitute a violation of 
this article, such activities, taken together, may erode the rights of Sami people to enjoy their own 
culture’.35 
Despite the fact that it found no violation in this case, the provisional measures taken pend-
ing the proceedings made sense as they aimed at preventing irreparable harm to the cultural sur-
vival of an indigenous group. As a practical matter they may have served a purpose in triggering 
the State’s efforts to seriously consider the arguments made by the petitioners. They may also 
have contributed to the State’s decision at least to decrease the amount of logging with 25 percent 
until the final view.36 
In November 2000 Jouni and Eino Länsman submitted a new petition. Two years later the 
chairperson of the HRC used provisional measures requesting the State to ‘refrain from conduct-
ing logging activities that would affect the exercise by Mr. Jouni Länsman and others of reindeer 
husbandry in the Angeli area, while their case is under consideration by the Committee’.37 In 
April 2003 it declared the case admissible,38 but another two years later it found that the logging 
                                                 
31 Among others, the petitioners noted that ‘for the authors of the communication the harm is in any 
case irreparable, since the lands in question cannot be used as winter herding lands in their 
lifetime’. They then pointed out that the local Sami had already experienced the first adverse 
effect of the logging namely that ‘the reindeer cannot just be released to the winter herding lands 
from the round-up place just north of the logging area but must be brought to specific places’. 
“This causes a lot of extra work. Within the next months it will be seen whether the reindeer will 
find enough to eat in the remaining winter herding lands”. The HRC considered that the logging 
activities approved for the future would be such that ‘while resulting in additional work and extra 
expenses for the authors and other reindeer herdsmen’ it ‘does not appear to threaten the survival 
of reindeer husbandry’, Länsman II, §10.6. 
32 See also Chapter XV on assessment of risk. 
33 HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 14 March 1996 (unpublished admissibility decision, on 
file with the author).  
34 The petitioners’ submission of 20 May 1996 (on file with the author). 
35 HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland (Länsman II), 30 October 1996, §10.7. 
36 See further Chapter XVII on the official responses of addressee States. 
37 HRC Jouni Länsman, Eino Länsman and the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee v. Finland, 
17 March 2005 (Länsman III), §1.2. In this case it was the Chairperson rather than the Special 
Rapporteur that took the decision on behalf of the Committee. Special Rapporteur Scheinin had 
been involved in bringing the previous Sami cases before the HRC. Moreover, the HRC adheres 
to the rule that Committee members do not take part in decisions involving their own State. 
38 The HRC noted that legal persons such as the Herdsmen’s Committee had no standing and this 
part of the petition was inadmissible under Article 1 OP. 
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carried out had ‘not been shown to be serious enough as to amount to a denial’ of the petitioners’ 
right to enjoy their own culture in community with other members of their group under Article 27 
ICCPR.39 Relevant with regard to the provisional measure may be the Committee’s statement, in 
its decision on the merits, that it was not necessary to consider the negative effect of the proposed 
logging in the area as the State had committed ‘not to proceed to logging’ in the Kippalrova 
area.40 
2.3 Inter-American Commission 
Members of indigenous groups are often threatened and attacked. In such cases the Inter-
American Commission has taken precautionary measures to protect their lives and physical integ-
rity.41 Apart from this, similar to the HRC it has also taken some precautionary measures exactly 
to prevent irreparable harm to indigenous culture. The Commission’s precautionary measures in 
cultural cases equally have a collective component. The beneficiaries include not only each and 
every individual member of the indigenous group involved, but also the group as such. 
In 1993 the Commission took precautionary measures for the first time in the case of Mary 
and Carrie Dann v. US. The US did not respond to this request. The petitioners were two mem-
bers of the Indian Law Resource Center. They claimed that the sisters Dann, who were members 
and spokespersons for the Dann Band of the Western Shoshone Nation, had asserted Western 
Shoshone aboriginal title and treaty right for their lands in Nevada and that their ancestors had 
used and occupied these lands ‘since time immemorial’.42 The petitioners also claimed that the 
sisters’ family ranch was their sole means of support and that their needs were met by the sale of 
their livestock, goods and produce. They argued that the US had violated the rights of the sisters 
by confiscating the land ‘through the use of a grossly unfair procedure that “extinguished” the 
Indian title to the land for a few cents per acre’.43 In August 1993 the petitioners had informed the 
Inter-American Commission that the US Bureau of Land Management intended to confiscate all 
livestock found on the lands where generations of Danns have grazed their livestock. They re-
quested the Commission to take precautionary measures, as they feared that the US would sell the 
livestock of the Danns and of the Western Shoshone National Council that were grazing on these 
lands. In response the Commission requested the US to ‘stay its intention to impound all livestock 
                                                 
39 HRC Jouni Länsman, Eino Länsman and the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee v. Finland, 
17 March 2005, §10. 
40 HRC Jouni Länsman, Eino Länsman and the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee v. Finland, 
17 March 2005, §9.3. Subsequent to the use of provisional measures, in October 2001, Finland 
informed the HRC that it refrained from conducting logging activities in the Angeli area’ (the 
area as defined in the Committee’s previous View) ‘that would affect the exercise by the 
individual authors’ reindeer husbandry while their communication is under consideration by the 
Committee’. 
41 See generally Chapter IX (Death threats). 
42 CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, 27 December 2002, §38. 
43 CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, 27 September 1999 (adm.), §7. In the domestic 
proceedings it was determined that they had lost their lands through ‘gradual encroachment’. 
Before the CIDH the Danns pointed out that they had never left their lands and that there were no 
white settlers on it. In one newspaper article Carrie Dann is quoted questioning whether ‘gradual 
encroachment’ is a valid component of American law: “I certainly don’t want people saying ‘I 
gradually encroached on you, and took your rights away’. Either I am a human being or I am not 
a human being”: J. Mullins, ‘Oh really? Groups endorse plan to end public lands grazing’, Elko 
Daily Free Press, 1 March 2002, posted in a collection of media accounts on the Dann sisters at 
<www.angelfire.com/nv2/wells/danns.html> (consulted 15 December 2006). 
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belonging to the Danns until this case has been resolved’.44 The Commission had to reiterate its 
precautionary measures several times. In June 1999, for instance, the Commission requested the 
US to take appropriate measures in this case ‘to stay the efforts of the Bureau of Land Manage-
ment to impound their livestock, until the Commission had the opportunity to fully investigate the 
claims raised in the petition’.45 Almost ten years after its first precautionary measures in this case, 
in 2002, it found that the State had ‘failed to ensure the Danns’ right to property under conditions 
of equality contrary to Articles II, XVIII and XXIII of the American Declaration in connection 
with their claims to property rights in the Western Shoshone ancestral lands’.46  
More recently the Inter-American Commission has also dealt with urgent indigenous cases 
involving States such as Belize, Paraguay and Nicaragua. The famous judgment of the Inter-
American Court in the Awas Tingni case against Nicaragua started at the Commission level with a 
precautionary measure ‘for the purpose of suspending the concession given by the government to 
the SOLCARSA Company to carry out forestry work on the lands of the Awas Tingni Indigenous 
Community’.47 
With regard to Belize it granted precautionary measures on behalf of the Maya Indigenous 
Communities and their members in October 2000.48 It requested Belize to ‘take the necessary 
steps to suspend all permits, licences, and concessions allowing for the drilling of oil and any 
other tapping of natural resources on lands used and occupied by the Maya Communities in the 
District of Toledo, in order to investigate the allegations in this case’.49 In its report on the merits 
the Commission specified that it requested these measures ‘until the Commission had the oppor-
tunity to investigate the substantive claims raised in the case’.50 
Another famous case that later went to the Inter-American Court (which did not use provi-
sional measures) is that of the Yakye Axa. In August 2001 a criminal court judge had ordered the 
removal of the homes of members of the Enxet speaking Yakye Axa Indigenous Community in 
Paraguay. Under dire circumstances this community had been occupying a strip of land along a 
highway opposite the lands they claimed as part of their traditional habitat. In September 2001 the 
Commission took precautionary measures on their behalf in order to halt this removal.51  
This case shows that the Commission can be elaborate in its precautionary measures. It 
specifies the relevant rights (e.g. property, freedom of movement, physical, mental and moral 
integrity), as well as the positive obligations of the State.52 It noted that the beneficiaries were in 
                                                 
44 CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, 27 September 1999 (adm.), §14. 
45 CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, 27 September 1999 (adm.), §44 and Annual 
Report 1999, Chapter III, C.1. §67. 
46 CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. United States, 27 December 2002, §5. 
47 CIDH Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, case 11.577, Annual Report 1997, Chapter III. Further on this 
case see infra in this chapter.  
48 CIDH Maya Indigenous Communities v. Belize, case 12.053. Annual Report 2000, §11 refers to 
precautionary measures of 5 October 2000. See also Maya Indigenous Communities v. Belize, 12 
October 2004, §8 (noting that it adopted the admissibility report and its decision to take 
precautionary measures on the same date). The admissibility report refers in §43 to precautionary 
measures of 28 October 1999 (not mentioned in the Annual Report 1999). The petition involved 
Mopan and Ke’kchi Maya people of the Toledo District of Soutern Belize, represented by the 
Toledo Maya Council. 
49 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §11. Belize did not respond. 
50 CIDH Maya Indigenous Communities v. Belize, report 40/04, 12 October 2004, §8. 
51 CIDH Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), C. 1, 
§49. 
52 More generally on positive and negative obligations and the specificity of provisional measures 
see Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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‘an extremely needy situation, because of their inadequate access to food supplies and health 
care’. Paraguay was to take the following measures: 
“(1) To suspend the enforcement of any court or administrative order involving the eviction 
and/or removal of the homes of the Yakye Axa indigenous community and of its members.  
(2) To refrain from all other actions and undertakings affecting the right to property, free transit, 
and residence of the Yakye Axa indigenous community and its members. 
(3) To take all steps necessary to ensure the life and physical, mental, and moral integrity of the 
members of the Yakye Axa indigenous community”.53 
The Commission did not specifically refer to prevention of irreparable harm to culture, but this 
purpose seemed an underlying rationale for its precautionary measures in this case. The indige-
nous community itself was the beneficiary of the measures, together with its individual members. 
In that respect the Commission did interpret the right to property, free transit and residence in 
light of a (collective) right to cultural identity. 
Another aspect that played a role here was the utterly inadequate access to food supplies, 
safe water and health care.54 Thus the Commission also requested the State to take all necessary 
steps to ensure the lives and personal integrity of the members of this community. While the 
reference to life and personal integrity is customary in its precautionary measures, in this case the 
Commission equally stressed the importance of ensuring the mental and moral integrity of the 
members of the indigenous community. The wider reference here suggests that the Commission is 
sensitive to the (individual) right to cultural identity. A failure to respect this right would result in 
a failure to ensure the mental and moral integrity of persons. 
In other words, on the basis of the Commission’s precautionary measures the State cannot 
allow the forcible removal of the members of this community to a place where, while they would 
have access to food supplies and health care, this would in fact mean a removal from their tradi-
tional habitat. 
In a case involving the Bio-Bio River of the Pehuenches against Chile (friendly settlement 
2004)55 the petitioners had requested precautionary measures in order to prevent a company from 
flooding the lands occupied by the alleged victims, as part of the construction of the dam for the 
Ralco Hydroelectric Plant Project.56 The Commission initially, in December 2002, requested 
Chile, ‘bearing in mind the nature of the matter... [to] refrain from taking any steps that might 
alter the status quo in the matter, until the organs of the inter-American system of human rights 
have adopted a final decision’.57 For the purposes of this book this request may be qualified as an 
informal provisional measure. By 2002 the Commission generally was more specific in its use of 
(formal) precautionary measures and it was not surprising that Chile immediately asked for clari-
fication about the content of this request. It asked the Commission to ‘explain precisely the con-
                                                 
53 CIDH Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), C. 1, 
§49. 
54 In Press Release 23/99 the CIDH noted that during its 1999 on-site visit it spoke with the Yakye 
Axa and the Sawhoyamaxa and ‘was able to see the deplorable situation of these peoples, who 
live alongside the national highway, without services of any kind, waiting for the authorities to 
allocate them the land they need’. It added that it appreciated the importance of a Presidential 
Decree dating from earlier that year that declared the two indigenous communities to be in a 
‘state of emergency’ given the ‘extreme conditions’ they were facing. The Decree had ordered 
the ‘immediate provision of medical and nutritional assistance, but apparently the measures 
required had not yet been adopted.  
55 CIDH Mercedes Julia Huenteao Beroiza et al., 11 March 2004 (friendly settlement). See also 
<http://www.ciel.org/Hre/hrecomponent2.html>. 
56 CIDH Mercedes Julia Huenteao Beroiza et al., 11 March 2004 (friendly settlement), §2. 
57 Id., §5. 
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tent and scope of the request made to the State’.58 The Commission responded that ‘the purpose of 
the request made to the State of Chile is to ensure that the decisions of the organs of the inter-
American system of human rights are not rendered meaningless efforts to protect the human 
person. Accordingly, the State should refrain from any act that might broaden or exacerbate the 
dispute and impair the effectiveness of any decision that the Commission might potentially 
adopt’.59 Several months later the petitioners renewed their request for precautionary measures 
‘based on the alleged disregard of the request made by the IACHR to the State to maintain the 
status quo’.60 The next day the Commission ‘granted the requested precautionary measures’ (this 
time formally) and requested the State to ‘(r)efrain from taking any steps that might alter the 
status quo in the matter, until the organs of the inter-American system of human rights have 
adopted a final decision on the case, in particular, avoiding or suspending any judicial or adminis-
trative action that entails eviction of the petitioners from their ancestral lands’.61 
Another example involves the Pueblo Indígena de Sarayaku. They were granted legal title 
to their territory in 1992, but Ecuador reserved the right to the subsoil resources. Supported by the 
Ecuadorian Center for Economic and Social Rights (CDES) the Sarayaku petitioned the Commis-
sion fearing negative environmental impact such as pollution, deforestation and threats to the 
biodiversity of the area. They did not wish companies to access their lands for oil extraction.62 In 
May 2003 the Commission decided to take precautionary measures.63 Later it decided to request 
the Court to order provisional measures. The Court indeed did so in order to guarantee not just 
their physical integrity but also their special relation with their territory.64 
In the Kankuamo case the Commission had equally requested the Court to order provisional 
measures not just to protect the life and personal integrity of all members of the Kankuamo com-
munity, but also the cultural identity of the Community as a whole and its special relation to its 
ancestral grounds.65 In fact the Court only heeded to part of the Commission’s request, although it 
did add that the protective measures should respect the freedom of movement of the Community 
members. It observed that all members of this indigenous people were equally at risk of attacks 
against their personal integrity and life, exactly for belonging to the Kankuamo. Moreover, and 
this is relevant in the context of their attachment to the lands, they were all at risk of being forci-
bly displaced. Thus it was necessary for the State to ensure that the beneficiaries of the provi-
sional measures would be able to continue living at their customary place of residence and that 
the necessary conditions were created so that those members that had already suffered forced 
displacement would be able to return.66 The State should also protect them against attacks by third 
parties.67 
Many of the cases dealt with in the Inter-American system involved threats and harassment 
of indigenous peoples.68 The provisional measures protecting against death threats often include 
                                                 
58 On the specificity of provisional measures generally see Chapter XIII (Protection). 
59 CIDH Mercedes Julia Huenteao Beroiza et al., 11 March 2004 (friendly settlement), §6. 
60 Id., §15. 
61 Id., §15. 
62 They also feared that the building of roads for the purpose of oil extraction would lead to 
increased access by other companies and individuals. 
63 Precautionary measures of 5 May 2003, referred to in IACHR Caso Pueblo Indígena de 
Sarayaku, Order of 17 June 2005, ‘Having seen’ clause 2h. 
64 IACHR Caso Pueblo Indígena de Sarayaku (Ecuador), Orders of 6 July 2004 and 17 June 2005. 
65 IACHR Caso Pueblo Indígena Kankuamo (Colombia), Order of 5 July 2004, 2nd ‘Having seen’ 
(‘Vistos’) clause. 
66 Id., 9th and 10th ‘Considering’ clauses. 
67 Id., 11th ‘Considering’ clause. 
68 See Chapter IX (Threats). 
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instructions to protect against internal displacement.69 The adverse effect of uprooting people has 
a particularly pervasive impact on indigenous peoples, because of their particular cultural and 
spiritual ties to their ancestral lands. Moreover, in many cases the forced eviction is closely re-
lated to third party interest in the economic exploitation of indigenous lands. In this light the 
Court could have added, as suggested by the Commission, a reference to the special relation to the 
ancestral grounds. 
2.4 Inter-American Court 
In its abovementioned Order of protection against death threats and internal displacement in the 
Kankuamo case the Court did not explicitly refer to the special relation of indigenous peoples to 
their lands,70 but in September 2002 the Inter-American Court ordered provisional measures 
specifically with the aim to protect indigenous culture. It did so in the context of the Awas Tingni 
case. 
Its Order is remarkable for at least three reasons. It was the first time the Court ordered such 
provisional measures in order to protect indigenous culture as such. Secondly, the timing of the 
provisional measures is noteworthy: they were ordered after the Court had published its Judgment 
on the merits and reparations. The Court has observed that, under Article 63(2) ACHR, it may 
adopt provisional measures ‘in matters it has under consideration’.71 “Said measures can also be 
applied during the stage in which compliance with the judgment is overseen’.72 It added that ‘in 
the instant case it is probable that irreparable damage will occur’. This would ‘preclude faithful 
and full compliance with the judgment on the merits and reparations’.73 The third aspect making 
the Court’s order remarkable is that it was not the Commission but the representatives of the 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni that had appealed to the Court.74 
The Inter-American Court considered that the victims had demonstrated ‘the existence of a 
situation of extreme gravity and urgency regarding the property of the Mayagna Community, 
                                                 
69 See generally Chapter XIII (Protection). 
70 IACHR Caso Pueblo Indígena Kankuamo v. Colombia, Order of 5 July 2004. See also its Order 
of 30 January 2007. 
71 See e.g. IACHR Order for provisional measures (requested by the representatives of the victims), 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 6 September 2002, 2nd ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
72 IACHR Order for provisional measures (requested by the representatives of the victims), 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 6 September 2002, 9th ‘Considering’ 
clause, referring to an earlier occasion on which it had used provisional measures subsequent to 
its Judgment namely in Loayza Tamayo, Order of the president of 13 December 2000 and of the 
Court of 3 February 2001. 
73 Ibid. 
74 As of June 2001, when the Court’s new Rules of Procedure became applicable, the victim (or the 
petitioner) is able to present arguments and claims independently, once the Commission (or the 
State) has brought a case before the Court: Article 23 (Participation of the Alleged Victims) 
Rules of Procedure December 2000, with amendments that entered into force January 2003: “1. 
When the application has been admitted, the alleged victims, their next of kin or their duly 
accredited representatives may submit their pleadings, motions and evidence, autonomously, 
throughout the proceedings. 2. When there are several alleged victims, next of kin or duly 
accredited representatives, they shall designate a common intervenor who shall be the only 
person authorized to present pleadings, motions and evidence during the proceedings, including 
the public hearings. 3. In case of disagreement, the Court shall make the appropriate ruling”. 
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including the resources therein, which are the basis for their subsistence, culture, and traditions’.75 
In other words, threats against the property and resources of indigenous peoples may in certain 
cases warrant the use of provisional measures because of they are essential to the ‘subsistence, 
culture, and traditions’ of these peoples. 
The Inter-American Court publishes and motivates its provisional measures, often referring 
to previous case law. Here it could simply draw on its findings on the merits and reparation in the 
case itself. After all it ordered these measures subsequent to delivering its Judgment. It noted its 
observation in this judgment that ‘a communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of col-
lective property of the land’. It quoted: ‘Indigenous groups, by the fact of their very existence, 
have the right to live freely in their own territory; the close ties of indigenous people with the land 
must be recognized and understood as the fundamental basis of their cultures, their spiritual life, 
their integrity and their economic survival’.76 
Not only did it invoke its Judgment on behalf of the Awas Tingni, but it also referred more 
generally to a finding on the right to life in another case. This indicates that the Court found it 
necessary to explain its expansion of the use of provisional measures from cases involving the 
individual right to life and personal integrity to cases involving cultural survival. It quoted from 
its Judgment in the Street Children case (1999): “In essence the fundamental right to life includes, 
not only the right of every human being not to be deprived of his life arbitrarily, but also the right 
that he will not be prevented from having access to the conditions that guarantee a dignified exis-
tence”.77 
The Court observed that Nicaragua had reached an agreement with the community to provi-
sionally recognize its land rights, but had failed to implement it. Thus it was ‘necessary to protect 
the geographical area where the members of the (…) Community live and conduct their activi-
ties’.78 It decided to order the State to adopt ‘without delay, whatever measures are necessary to 
protect the use and enjoyment of property of lands belonging to the Mayagna Awas Tingni Com-
munity, and of natural resources existing on those lands, specifically those measures geared to-
ward avoiding immediate and irreparable damage resulting from activities of third parties who 
have established themselves inside the territory of the Community or who exploit the natural 
resources that exist within it, until the definitive delimitation, demarcation and titling ordered by 
the Court are carried out’. In addition, it added its – by now customary – order ‘to allow the appli-
cants to participate in planning and implementation of those measures and, in general, to keep 
them informed’. It also expanded its reference to action against impunity from its provisional 
measures ordering the State to protect persons against death threats and harassment to the differ-
ent situation of ensuring cultural survival: ‘to investigate the facts set forth in the claim that gave 
rise to the current measures, so as to discover and punish those responsible’.79 
In sum, the Court clearly established that the situation was extremely grave as the subsis-
tence, culture and traditions of an indigenous people were at risk. It is significant in this respect 
that it quotes from judgments referring to ‘survival’ and the right to life as including the right to a 
dignified existence.80 It noted that ‘in the instant case it is probable that irreparable damage will 
                                                 
75 IACHR Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Order of 6 September 2002 
(requested by the representatives of the victims), 6th ‘Considering’ clause. 
76 Id., 7th ‘Considering’ clause, quoting Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, 
Judgment of 31 August 2001, §149. 
77 IACHR Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Order of 6 September 2002, 8th 
‘Considering’ clause, quoting from Villagrán Morales et al. (‘Street Children’ case) v. 
Guatemala, 19 November 1999, §144. 
78 IACHR Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Order of 6 September 2002, 
10th ‘Considering’ clause. 
79 Id., decisional clauses 1-3. 
80 Id., 7th and 8th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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occur that it will preclude faithful and full compliance with the judgment on the merits and repa-
rations in the case of the Mayagna Community’.81 
In 2007 the Court lifted the provisional measures. It considered that ‘now that more than 
five years have elapsed since the adoption of the provisional measures, the Court has assessed the 
different State reports and the observations of the representatives and the Commission concerning 
the measures adopted to protect the ownership of the ancestral lands of the members of the Awas 
Tigni Community, and observes that the information provided is closely related to compliance 
with the judgment’ of 31 August 2001.82 Hence it decided to lift the provisional measures but 
continue monitoring compliance with the judgment.  
A few years after the Court’s order for provisional measures in Awas Tingni the Court’s 
again used provisional measures specifically aimed at the protection of cultural identity. In July 
2004, in its Order in Pueblo Indígena de Sarayaku v. Ecuador the State not only was to guarantee 
the lives and personal integrity of the Sarayaku, but also their freedom of movement.83 In its 
subsequent Order of June 2005 it added that the State should also immediately take the necessary 
measures to ensure that the Sarayaku can make use of the natural resources where they reside and 
to protect their lives and personal integrity against the activities of third parties exploiting the 
natural resources, especially against explosive devices. It should guarantee the freedom of move-
ment of the indigenous peoples, in particular on the River Borbonanza. It should maintain the 
airstrip on the territory in order to maintain their means of transport. Very relevant with regard to 
the group of beneficiaries is the obligation directed to the state to inform the neighbouring indige-
nous communities about the meaning and scope of the provisional measures, vis-à-vis the State as 
well as particular third parties, in order to create an atmosphere conducive to living together in 
peace.84 
2.5 African Commission 
In June 2004 the African Commission decided to take provisional measures on behalf of the 
pastoralist Endorois community in Kenya. It urged Kenya ‘to take immediate steps to ensure that 
no further issuance of mining concessions or transfers of parts to the land occurred prior to the 
case being concluded’85 Minority Rights Group International (MRG) and the Centre for Minority 
Rights Development (CEMIRIDE) had requested these measures a year previously, in light of 
‘imminent mining activities that would cause irreversible damage to Endorois traditional land’.86 
They had been divided and displaced from their traditional lands and now lived ‘in a number of 
locations on the periphery of the reserve, being forced from fertile lands to semi-arid areas’. The 
priority of the Endorois’ is the restitution of their land. The petitioners argued that the Resolution 
on the Rights of Indigenous Populations/Communities in Africa, adopted in 2003, offered he 
                                                 
81 Id., 9th ‘Considering’ clause. 
82 IACHR Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Order of 6 September 2002, 
Order of 26 November 2007, 10th ‘Considering’ clause. 
83 IACHR Matter of Pueblo Indígena de Sarayaku (Ecuador), Order of 6 July 2004. 
84 IACHR Matter of Pueblo Indígena de Sarayaku (Ecuador), Order of 17 June 2005, 1st Decisional 
clause. 
85 As announced by Minority Rights Group, one of the petitioners, ‘African Commission urged to 
toughen stance on state non-compliance’, 24 January 2005. 
86 Minority Rights Group News release ‘Commission to consider Kenya pastoralist case following 
urgent appeal to state, 8 November 2004, <http://www.minorityrights.org/news_detail.asp? 
ID=316> (accessed on 4 December 2006). 
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Commission ‘a valuable basis upon which to extend its understanding and treatment of 
indigenous and collective rights, including economic, social and cultural rights’.87  
“The Endorois people's health, livelihood, religion and culture are all intimately connected with 
their traditional land, as grazing lands, sacred religious sites and plants used for traditional 
medicine are all situated around the shores of Lake Bogoria. By forcing the community to 
move, not only were the Community's property rights violated, but spiritual, cultural and 
economic ties to the land were severed”.88 
Reportedly, ‘in June 2006, local officials tested Endorois’ drinking water sources and found they 
were poisonously contaminated as a result of ruby mining. Mining has now stopped until the case 
is resolved’.89 
The eventual decision on the merits may indicate the provisions of the African Charter that 
have played a role in the use of provisional measures.90 The fact that the African Commission 
                                                 
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. In November 2004 the District Commissioner of the Lake Bogoria area had summoned the 
Endorois ‘to seek their approval to go forth with mining activities, which they unanimously 
refused. Two days later mining equipment arrived. In response the Endorois ‘gathered to block 
the road and police forces were sent to the scene where some community members were 
detained’. “The Chairperson of the Endorois Welfare Council subsequently received a letter 
requiring his resignation as head teacher of a state school”. Minority Rights Group News release 
‘African Commission urged to toughen stance on state non-compliance’, 24 January 2005, 
<http://www.minorityrights.org/news_detail.asp?ID=342> (accessed on 11 January 2007). 
89 See Minority Rights Group webpage <http://www.minorityrights.org/6779/trouble-in-
paradise/the-facts.html> (accessed 22 November 2008). The UN Special Rapporteur on the 
situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of indigenous peoples, Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen, in his Mission to Kenya report, noted that the Government ‘should aim at a friendly 
settlement in the case of the Endorois before ACHPR, leading to the establishment of a system of 
co-management between the authorities and the local communities in the Lake Bogoria Game 
Reserve’, A/HRC/4/32/Add.3, 26 February 2007, §108. 
90 In their submission the petitioners had invoked the free practice of religion (Article 8 ACHPR), 
the right to property (Article 14), to enjoy the best attainable standard of physical and mental 
health (Article 16) and the right to freely take part in the cultural life of the community (Article 
17(2)). They also invoked rights that are very specific to the African Charter emphasizing issues 
of development and the collective dimension of human rights, such as the right of all peoples to 
exist (Article 20(1): “All peoples shall have the right to existence. They shall have the 
unquestionable and inalienable right to self-determination. They shall freely determine their 
political status and shall pursue their economic and social development according to the policy 
they have freely chosen”). Another right invoked by the Endorois was that of all peoples to freely 
dispose of their wealth and natural resources (Article 21: “1. All peoples shall freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources. This right shall be exercised in the exclusive interest of the 
people. In no case shall a people be deprived of it. 2. In case of spoliation the dispossessed people 
shall have the right to the lawful recovery of its property as well as to an adequate compensation. 
3. The free disposal of wealth and natural resources shall be exercised without prejudice to the 
obligation of promoting international economic cooperation based on mutual respect, equitable 
exchange and the principles of international law. (…) 5. States parties to the present Charter shall 
undertake to eliminate all forms of foreign economic exploitation particularly that practiced by 
international monopolies so as to enable their peoples to fully benefit from the advantages 
derived from their national resources”). Finally, they invoked Article 22(1), which speaks of 
development and identity: “All peoples shall have the right to their economic, social and cultural 
development with due regard to their freedom and identity and in the equal enjoyment of the 
common heritage of mankind”. 
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used provisional measures in this land rights case submitted by the Endorois of Kenya shows an 
awareness of cultural identity of groups within States that may subsequently be reflected in the 
decision on the merits in this case.91  
2.6 Bosnia Human Rights Chamber and cultural/religious survival 
The Bosnia Chamber, with its special nature stemming from the Dayton Peace Agreement, obvi-
ously operated in a special context of ethnic/religious conflict. It has taken provisional measures 
involving the rights of religious minorities, ordering the authorities to desist from implementing a 
local order to exhume the body of the petitioner’s deceased wife from a Muslim cemetery; and 
more generally to protect religious sites and to allow the burial of deceased persons. 
The first years of its existence the Chamber was hesitant to intervene pending the proceed-
ings in order to protect Islamic sites.92 Yet it eventually decided to use them. It did so in July 
1998, three months after it had last refused them in the same case involving the events subsequent 
to the destruction of 15 mosques in Banja Luka. Upon a request by the respondent Party to post-
pone the proceedings the Chamber indeed decided to postpone the public hearing. At the same 
time it used provisional measures ordering the respondent Party ‘to take all necessary action to 
refrain from the construction of buildings or objects of any nature on the sites of the mosques and 
on the cemeteries and other Islamic sites indicated in the application, and not to permit any such 
construction by any other institution or person, whether public or private’. Furthermore, it was 
ordered ‘to refrain from the destruction or removal of any object remaining on the sites of the 
mosques and on the cemeteries and other Islamic sites indicated in the application, and not to 
permit any such destruction or removal by any other institution, whether public or private’.93 The 
substance of this provisional measure of July 1998 corresponds remarkably to part of the decision 
on reparation subsequently ordered, upon the Chamber’s finding of violations of the right to 
peaceful enjoyment of possessions and the freedom of religion, as well as of the prohibition of 
discrimination regarding these rights.94  
                                                 
91 See in general about this case Morel (2004). According to one of the petitioners this decision is 
expected for the end of 2008. See Minority Rights Group webpage 
<http://www.minorityrights.org/6779/trouble-in-paradise/the-facts.html> (accessed 22 November 
2008). The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights and fundamental freedoms of 
indigenous peoples, Rodolfo Stavenhagen, in his Mission to Kenya report, noted that the 
Government ‘should aim at a friendly settlement in the case of the Endorois before ACHPR, 
leading to the establishment of a system of co-management between the authorities and the local 
communities in the Lake Bogoria Game Reserve’, A/HRC/4/32/Add.3, 26 February 2007, §108. 
92 See Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Republika Srpska, 11 
June 1999, referring to decisions to refuse provisional measures of 12 October 1996, 10 October 
1997 (asking the office of the High Representative, UNESCO and the Commission to preserve 
National Monuments to submit any relevant information in their possession and requesting the 
Human Rights ombudsperson to investigate certain of the allegations) and 4 April 1998, §§4, 6 
and 9. 
93 Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina (Banja Luka mosques) v. 
Republika Srpska, 11 June 1999, §12. See Chapter II on the special nature of the Bosnia Chamber 
and the three possible addressees of its Orders for provisional measures. In practice Republika 
Srpska has been the addressee in the religious cases discussed here. 
94 Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Republika Srpska (Banja 
Luka mosques), 11 June 1999, §212. More generally on the relation to reparation see Chapter 
XIII (Protection). 
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That same month the Chamber also used provisional measures in response to the situation 
Mr Mahmutović found himself in. In July 1998 he was ordered ‘to exhume, at his own expense, 
his late wife from the Town Cemetery, and to move her remains “to the new town cemetery lo-
cated in the eastern part of town” within 15 days receipt of the decision’.95 At the same time he 
was obliged ‘to request the Municipal Sanitary Inspection for permission to exhume his late 
wife’.96 He petitioned the Chamber, which ordered Republika Srpska to ‘desist from’ implement-
ing the domestic order for exhumation.97  
Subsequently, in December 1999, in the context of a petition submitted by the Islamic 
Community in Bosnia, the Chamber ordered Republika Srpska more generally not to forbid or 
interfere with any burials in this cemetery ‘carried out by or with the authority of the applicant’.98 
It did so following information that the authorities had issued a decision prohibiting the burial of 
Mrs Behija Zec in the Muslim Cemetery in Prnjavor.99 This provisional measure did not immedi-
ately generate the result required. At the end of that month Mrs Alema Mešić died. She had re-
served and paid for a parcel in the Muslim Town Cemetery since 1971. The Islamic Community 
of Prnjavor requested permission to bury her and informed the International Police Task Force 
(IPTF) station in Prnjavor. When her son was digging his mother’s grave the next day the Mu-
nicipal Inspector of Prnjavor appeared with a policeman. They made a report of the incident and 
ordered the deceased son to cover up the grave again. The representatives of the Islamic Commu-
nity ‘reminded the Municipal authorities of the Chamber’s recent order forbidding any interfer-
ence with burials at the Muslim Town Cemetery’. The Municipal Inspector ‘replied that the 
Chamber’s order was not binding’. “Finally, after several hours of negotiations with the Islamic 
Community, the municipal authorities and IPTF, the burial of Mrs Alema Mešić was performed at 
the Muslim Town Cemetery”.100 
The Chamber used provisional measures in various other cases as well.101 In one case it or-
dered Srpska to ‘take all necessary steps to prevent the christening/consecration’ of ‘or any per-
                                                 
95 See Bosnia Chamber Mahmutović v. Republika Srpska, 8 October 1999, §23. This new town 
cemetery did not yet exist (information OSCE field office in Doboj), §6. See also §13. 
96 Bosnia Chamber Mahmutović v. Republika Srpska, 8 October 1999, §23. 
97 Id., §4. 
98 Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH v. Republika Srpska (Muslim Town Cemetery in 
Prnjavor), 11 January 2000. The Chamber specified the cemetery by indicating its location ‘at 
cadastral lot k.č. 741/1 k.o. in Prnjavor’. Since initially there had not been ‘any individual threat 
of exhumation or interference with burials the Chamber at first refused to order the provisional 
measures requested, §4. 
99 Id., §9. 
100 Id., §33. 
101 See e.g. Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH (former mosque sites in Zvornik) v. 
Republika Srpska, 9 November 2000, provisional measures of 10 July 1999 and 21 October 1999 
and further Order of 7 July 2000, maintained by decision of 11 October 2000, §§2-7 and The 
Islamic Community in BiH (former Atik Mosque, Bijeljina) v. Republika Srpska, 6 December 
2000, provisional measure of 10 July 1999 and further Order to protect site Atik Mosque of 7 
July 2000. See also The Islamic Community in BiH (Jakeš Cemetery) v. Republika Srpska, 8 
October 2001, §6 in which the Chamber ordered provisional measures to the effect that the 
respondent Party was to ‘take all necessary steps to make sure that no burial takes place without 
the consent of the applicant at the Jakeš Cemetery (…) and to prevent any other disturbance of 
the above cemetery, particularly the exhumation of human remains and damage to funerary 
monuments or their removal’. ‘By its express terms this order remains in force until the Chamber 
delivers its final decision in the case, unless it is withdrawn at an earlier stage of the 
proceedings”. On the merits the Chamber recalled, at §47, ‘the tradition in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina to maintain separate burial grounds according to religion. Given this tradition and 
bearing in mind the prevailing circumstances in the country, the chamber finds the unauthorized 
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formance of any Orthodox ceremony’ on the Muslim cemetery of the petitioner’s family in 
Rataj.102 This family had buried their family members there for several centuries.103  
The petitioner had complained that the family graves had been disturbed, tombstones had 
been destroyed, the surrounding fence and gate to the cemetery had repeatedly been torn down 
and in 2002 an Orthodox cross was engraved into an important stone in the centre of the ceme-
tery. In this regard he had also requested the Chamber to issue an order for the authorities to 
remove the engraved Orthodox cross. The Bosnia Chamber had rejected this part of the request 
for provisional measures. It also rejected the request insofar as it was directed against Bosnia and 
Herzegovina as well as against Republika Srpska.104 Subsequently, upon a finding of violations 
on the merits, it did order Republika Srpska ‘to ensure that the competent enterprise properly 
fences in, cleans and maintains the Rataj Muslim graveyard’ and ‘to take all necessary steps to 
prevent the Serb Orthodox Church from carrying out any further activities on the Rataj Muslim 
graveyard’.105 In other words, upon finding violations, in its decision on reparation it confirmed 
the provisional measures previously taken.106 Moreover, it added the obligation to clean, maintain 
and fence in the Muslim graveyard, which includes the removal of products of vandalism, argua-
bly also in the form of symbols engraved in order to revive the heritage of the Serb Orthodox 
church. After all, the Chamber had by now found on the merits that the petitioner had been dis-
criminated against in his right to freedom of religion and the enjoyment of the right to respect for 
private and family life. It had specifically considered that the ‘obligation to create conditions 
conducive to the return of persons expelled during the armed conflict because of the their relig-
ion’ placed a particular burden on the parties to the Dayton Peace Agreement and its Annexes, ‘to 
ensure that returnees will be met with full respect for their religious beliefs and practices, includ-
ing full respect for the sites that are connected to the manifestation of religious beliefs, such as 
graveyards’.107  
Regarding the planned orthodox religious activities at the Čengić family Muslim graveyard, 
specifically the liturgy, planned in August 2002, that triggered the petition, the Chamber noted 
that the authorities ‘did not take any action to prevent this liturgy from taking place, nor have they 
                                                                                                                       
burial on non-Muslims in an exclusively Muslim cemetery to be unjustifiable and provocative’. 
The Chamber has also ordered the respondent Party, ‘as a provisional measures, to prevent the 
implementation’ of certain procedural decisions allocating the site of the Kizlaragina mosque, 
destroyed in 1992, to a private contractor for the construction of business premises: Islamic 
Community in BiH (Mrkonjić Grad) v. Republika Srpska, 22 December 2003, §4. 
102 Bosnia Chamber Čengić v. BiH and Srpska, 5 September 2003, §3. 
103 Id., §18. 
104 Id., §3. 
105 Id., §§125-126. 
106 In general on the relation between provisional measures and reparation see Chapter XIII. The 
petitioner had stated that there was a continued threat of an interference concerning the 
‘consecration-christening’ of the central stone that has not been entirely removed by the 
Chamber’s order for provisional measures’ Bosnia Chamber Čengić v. BiH and Srpska, 5 
September 2003, §108.  
107 Ibid. On the question whether the difference in treatment was justified in that there was a 
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aims sought to be 
realised, the Chamber pointed out that it could not disregard the dramatic events that took place 
in the municipality in question. It referred to an ICTY Trial Chamber judgment noting that ‘only 
about ten Muslims remained at the end of the conflict’. In 1991 there were still more than 20.000 
Muslim inhabitants. Bosnia Chamber Čengić v. BiH and Srpska, 5 September 2003, §117. 
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expressed the opinion that it should be prevented’. The Chamber observes that the liturgy was in 
fact only prevented because of its own Order for provisional measures.108  
3 RELATION BETWEEN PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO PROTECT CULTURAL 
AND RELIGIOUS RIGHTS AND THE EXPECTED DECISION ON THE MERITS 
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed, it was in Sara et al. v. Finland (inadm. 1994) that the HRC used provisional meas-
ures for the second time in order to protect indigenous culture, the first time being on behalf of the 
Lubicon Lake Band.109 In Sara the State denied that there was a causal link between the measures 
of protection requested by the petitioners and the object of the communication itself. Apparently it 
argued that this was the reason why provisional measures should not be taken. Quite apart from 
the question whether it is appropriate in human rights adjudication to be strict about the relation-
ship between the rights claimed and the request for provisional measures, it is clear that in this 
case the material object of the petitioners’ complaint was the threat to their traditional economic 
and cultural rights caused by logging and road construction activities in certain reindeer hus-
bandry areas. Indeed the HRC found that the material object of the complaint was related to the 
request for provisional measures.110  
In practice the provisional measures by the HRC, the Inter-American Commission and 
Court and the African Commission related to claims about indigenous culture. Moreover, when 
the Bosnia Chamber used provisional measures in cases involving religion they in fact aimed at 
protecting the spiritual survival of a group with an important link and long history to the area as 
well.  
The HRC has used provisional measures only in certain of those cases where the petitioner 
claimed a violation of Article 27 ICCPR.111 Still the issues involved are normally interrelated and 
it is important to keep the other rights in mind as they may have an impact on the Committee’s 
decision to take provisional measures to protect indigenous culture. Rights in the Covenant that 
could be relevant for the protection of indigenous culture are the right to self-determination (Arti-
cle 1 ICCPR), the right to respect for privacy, family or home (Article 17 ICCPR), the freedom of 
religion (Article 18 ICCPR), the protection of the family (Article 23 ICCPR), the rights of the 
child (Article 24 ICCPR), the right to participate in public affairs (Article 25 ICCPR) and the 
right of minorities to enjoy their own culture (Article 27 ICCPR). 
                                                 
108 Id., §96. More generally on the official responses of States to provisional measures see Chapter 
XVI. 
109 HRC O. Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.). 
110 The State had argued that the Board’s authority to approve logging activities in areas other than 
those designated as protected wilderness, such as the residual area outside the Hammastunturi 
Wilderness, was not derived from the Wilderness Act. “Accordingly, the State party denies that 
there is a causal link between the measures of protection requested by the authors and the object 
of the communication itself, which only concerns enactment and implementation of the 
Wilderness Act”. However, the HRC noted that the continuation of road construction in the 
residual area could indeed be causally linked to the entry into force of the Wilderness Act. For 
purposes of admissibility the petitioners had sufficiently substantiated that this could raise issues 
under Article 27. 
111 See in general about the protection of minorities Nowak (1993), pp. 480-505; Meijknecht (2001) 
and Donders (2002). See about the interdependence of various Covenant rights in relation to 
indigenous peoples Scheinin (2000).  
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In 2007 the General Assembly adopted the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples, which stresses the importance of land rights and reaffirms the need for special protection 
of and informed consent by indigenous peoples.112 Yet the provisional measures discussed in this 
chapter were all taken before that time, when the international legal setting already included, 
among others, a general recognition of the right to self-determination,113 ILO-Convention 169 
concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries,114 the World Bank Opera-
tional Directive on Indigenous people (1991) and various drafts of the abovementioned Declara-
tion.115 Obviously the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) is 
also relevant in the context of indigenous and minority rights.  
Indigenous groups and minorities have equally resorted to the three regional systems with 
complaints involving their right to culture and religion. The case of the Endorois, in which the 
African Commission took provisional measures, was the first time that this Commission would 
consider the merits of an indigenous land rights case.116 The Inter-American Commission regu-
larly pays attention to the protection of indigenous culture.117 Like the HRC it has done so in the 
context of country reports as well as individual complaints and its concerns are often similar to 
those of the HRC. Yet under the ICCPR the States themselves submit the reports and the HRC 
simply discusses them in a public hearing and publishes Concluding Observations. The Inter-
American Commission, on the other hand, often prepares reports itself, on the basis of fact-
finding missions. Moreover the American Convention does not include a ‘victim requirement’, 
which renders the Inter-American Commission ‘accessible to almost anyone concerned with the 
fate of indigenous groups in the Americas’.118 Despite the inevitable lack of expertise by interna-
tional adjudicators regarding indigenous land rights, the Inter-American Commission has shown 
awareness of the importance of safeguarding the cultural integrity of indigenous peoples. This 
awareness may underlie its use of precautionary measures in cultural cases. The same applies to 
the provisional measures by the Inter-American Court. 
The provisional measures involving culture taken in the Inter-American and African sys-
tems were decided in the context of claims based on culture, property and non-discrimination and 
those taken by the Bosnia Chamber involved religion, property and non-discrimination claims. 
This section discusses the relevance of the case law on the merits in order to explain the practice 
of the adjudicators, taking the case law of the HRC as a point of reference. It pays particular 
attention to the topics of self-determination, land rights/collective rights, the moment of infringe-
ment on land rights, the special status of (indigenous) culture, consultation and impact assess-
ment. 
                                                 
112 A/RES/61/295, 13 September 2007.  
113 See e.g. Article 1(2) UN Charter, Article 1 ICCPR and Article 1 UN Convention on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. 
114 Adopted 27 June 1989 and entered into force 27 June 1989.  
115 See generally on indigenous rights, group rights, minority rights and/or cultural and 
environmental rights e.g. Anaya (1996); Pritchard (1998); Henrard (2000); Scheinin (2000); 
Alston (2001); Donders (2002); Rivera-Salgado (2005). See also the reports of the UN Working 
Group on Indigenous Populations, the reports by UN Sub-Commission Rapporteur Irene Daes 
and UN Special Rapporteurs on the Human Rights of Indigenous People Rodolfo Stavenhagen 
and James Anaya. 
116 Minority Rights Group News release ‘Commission to consider Kenya pastoralist case following 
urgent appeal to state, 8 November 2004, <http://www.minorityrights.org/news_detail. 
asp?ID=316> (accessed on 4 December 2006). In general see also Thornberry (2002), pp. 244-
264. 
117 For a more general discussion see e.g. Thornberry (2002), pp. 265-289 and Hannum (1998), pp. 
323-344. 
118 Meijknecht (2001), p. 198. See also Chapter XIII (Protection), on the group of beneficiaries. 
 Chapter X 
470 
3.2 Self-determination 
As Cançado Trindade noted, already in its Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara (1975), the 
ICJ referred to the cultural practices of the nomad populations and affirmed their right to self-
determination.119 Yet a recurring problem in cases involving indigenous peoples and threats to the 
natural habitat is the fact that the HRC does not consider the right to self-determination (Article 1 
ICCPR) part of the individual complaint procedure under the OP. The HRC discussed the issue in 
Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada (1990), which is also the first case in which it used provisional 
measures to protect an indigenous culture. Because Article 1 ICCPR deals with rights conferred 
upon peoples as such, under the OP the petitioner, as an individual, could not claim to be a victim 
of a violation of these rights.120 The question whether the Lubicon Lake Band constituted a ‘peo-
ple’ was not an issue to be addressed under the OP, because the rights that could be claimed under 
this treaty were the individual rights set out in Articles 6 to 27 ICCPR. Nevertheless, collective 
submissions by groups of individuals claiming to be similarly affected were indeed possible. The 
HRC pointed out that there was no doubt that many of the claims presented raised issues under 
Article 27 and that this article included ‘the right of persons, in community with others, to engage 
in economic and social activities which are part of the culture of the community to which they 
belong’.121 In other words, it introduced the article proprio motu as an alternative to the peti-
tioner’s Article 1 claim. This approach of the HRC towards self-determination in the individual 
complaint procedure helps explain its use of provisional measures to protect indigenous culture.  
The concept of self-determination is relevant in dealing with the question of the identity and 
interests of the beneficiaries of the Committee’s provisional measures. Collective aspects of the 
right to culture (Article 27 ICCPR) play an important role in the use of provisional measures. The 
discussion on these collective aspects has mainly come up in relation to threats to the natural 
habitat. Possibly this has been done in order to compensate for the fact that the HRC has not 
considered the right to self-determination (Article 1 ICCPR) under the OP. It shows the Commit-
tee’s awareness of the special position of indigenous peoples and the fact that they have no re-
course to the HRC except through complaints by individual members of the group. In the Lubicon 
                                                 
119 IACHR Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, 25 November 2000, Separate Opinion Cançado 
Trindade, §13, referring to ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Western Sahara, 16 October 1975, §87. 
120 HRC Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990, §13.3. In 
later cases, however, the HRC did point out that ‘the provisions of article 1 may be relevant in the 
interpretation of other rights protected by the Covenant, in particular articles 25, 26 and 27’. 
Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, 25 July 2000, §10.3. In his concurring opinion Scheinin pointed out 
that this obiter statement represented ‘a proper recognition of the interdependence between the 
various rights protected by the Covenant, including article 1’. In this case he agreed with the 
HRC that the petitioners had failed to substantiate their claim under Article 25 ICCPR, but he 
considered that it had unnecessarily emphasized the individual nature of participation rights 
under this article. He noted that ‘there are situations where article 25 calls for special 
arrangements for rights of participation to be enjoyed by members of minorities and, in 
particular, indigenous peoples’. “When such a situation arises, it is not sufficient under article 25 
to afford individual members of such communities the individual right to vote in general 
elections. Some forms of local, regional or cultural autonomy may be called for in order to 
comply with the requirement of effective rights of participation”. See further Apirana Mahuika et 
al. v. New Zealand, 27 October 2000 and Marie-Hélène Gillot et al. v. France, 15 July 2002. See 
also General Comment 12 on Article 1 ICCPR (1984), HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 6, pp. 134-135 and 
General Comment 23, 8 April 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (summarizing the Committee’s 
case law on Article 27) and Nowak (1993), pp. 480-505 discussing the meaning of Article 27, 
including the travaux préparatoires. 
121 See HRC Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990, §32.1 
and §32.2. See also the Committee’s General Comment 23 on Article 27, 8 April 1994. 
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Lake Band case the HRC implied that Article 27 aims at ensuring survival of the cultural, reli-
gious and social identity of minorities.122 Nevertheless, Article 27 ICCPR only partially addresses 
the problems indigenous peoples face.123 This seems to apply equally to the provisions of regional 
human rights treaties invoked by indigenous peoples. In other words, ‘Indigenous peoples rely on 
human rights mechanisms for lack of a better option’. Such mechanisms ‘can monitor and curb 
excessive State behaviour, but they cannot decide on a transfer of authority’.124 
3.3 Land rights and collective aspects of the right to culture125 
To understand the purpose of the provisional measures it is important to pay attention to the col-
lective aspects of minority rights and the right to culture, especially read in light of the right to 
self-determination. Thus far the adjudicators have only used provisional measures to protect the 
collective aspects of the right to culture, as claimed by individual petitioners and not the individ-
ual aspects of this right in relation to exclusion. Given the nature of the individual complaint 
systems, technically both claims relating to threats to the natural habitat as such and claims relat-
ing to exclusion from an indigenous group involve the individual right to live as members of an 
indigenous group taking part in indigenous culture. Yet in fact the provisional measures have 
related only to issues of land rights.126 
Awareness of the special position of indigenous peoples may explain why adjudicators 
sometimes emphasise collective aspects of land rights and use provisional measures in this con-
text. The preservation of the connection between indigenous peoples and their lands is fundamen-
                                                 
122 See the Committee’s reference to Art. 27 in its admissibility decision and its explanation that it 
had taken provisional measures ‘in view of the seriousness of the author's allegations that the 
Lubicon Lake Band was at the verge of extinction’, Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 
1990, §29.3. 
123 Nowak observes that the specific formulation of Article 27 might seem unsatisfactory, ‘measured 
against the demands for comprehensive collective protection of minorities’, Nowak (1993), p. 
483. Schmidt points out that the Committee’s ‘judicial self-restraint, which shuts the door on the 
examination of claims based on Article 1’, was ‘open to legal criticism’ although ‘wise from a 
political point of view’, Schmidt (1997), p. 340. See further Huff (1999), p. 187 who notes that 
the Committee’s position is ‘untenable’ in light of the plain language of Article 1 OP recognizing 
the Committee’s competence to address communications brought by individuals concerning 
violations of any of the provisions of the ICCPR. Meijknecht notes that ‘the HRC, by 
“translating” the collective claim into a claim under Article 27 ICCPR, basically reduces the 
claim to individual proportions’. Meijknecht (2000), p. 190. For the discussion on individual 
versus collective rights see pp. 184-189. De Feyter compares the right to self-determination to the 
right to development for indigenous peoples. He concludes from the case of the Lubicon Lake 
Band: “Human rights mechanisms are an awkward forum for dealing with indigenous attempts at 
taking control of their own destiny”. De Feyter (2001), p. 153. This is so because their claims ‘go 
beyond what human rights treaties can achieve’ and relate to ‘who should exercise decision 
making power on development’. 
124 De Feyter (2001), p. 153. The claim of the Band, he notes, was ‘not about the individual rights of 
Chief Ominayak, but about the collective right of the Band to decide on its own development’. 
“The claim needs to be transformed into an individual claim because the international human 
rights forum where it is presented so requires”. De Feyter (2001), p. 154. 
125 For a general overview see e.g. Anaya/Williams (2001). 
126 See similarly CERD General Recommendation XXIII (51) concerning indigenous peoples 
(August 18, 1997) (calling upon states parties to the UN Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination to ‘recognize and protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, 
control and use their communal lands, territories and resources’). 
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tal to the effective realization of the human rights of indigenous peoples ‘and therefore warrants 
special measures of protection’.127 
Article 27 ICCPR has been invoked and applied in or with regard to a wide range of States 
throughout the world, in the context of indigenous peoples. The interpretation of this provision by 
the Committee supervising this treaty is thus of special interest, particularly regarding its individ-
ual and collective aspects. As noted, under the ICCPR another explanation, related to the above, 
for the emphasis on collective aspects may be that indigenous peoples as such have no recourse to 
the HRC. The Committee’s special attention to complaints by individual members of indigenous 
groups if these members seem to represent the interests of the collectivity, rather than ‘simply’ 
claim their individual right not to be excluded from the indigenous group, may partly be ex-
plained by its wish to compensate for this procedural hurdle.128 
In Länsman II the HRC indicated that the cumulative effect of certain infringements could 
eventually constitute a violation of Article 27. 
“Even though in the present communication the Committee has reached the conclusion that the 
facts of the case do not reveal a violation of the rights of the authors, the Committee deems it 
important to point out that the State party must bear in mind when taking steps affecting the 
right under article 27, that though different activities in themselves may not constitute a 
violation of this article, such activities, taken together, may erode the rights of Sami people to 
enjoy their own culture”.129 
Scheinin has pointed out that Länsman II was based, at least in part, ‘on assessing the logging 
project on a quantitative scale’.130 He noted that the State party relied heavily on this argument, 
but that it did not do full justice to the petitioners’ case ‘who had emphasised the strategic (quali-
tative) importance of the specific forest lands in question’ (italics in original). With regard to the 
sustainability test used by the HRC he notes that incremental developments related to land use 
could have the effect of eroding the economic basis for an indigenous community’s ‘traditional or 
otherwise typical means of livelihood’ and thereby amount to a denial of the rights in Article 
27.131 
                                                 
127 See CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 27 December 2002, §128. Article 13 of ILO 
Convention 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples also stipulates that States ‘shall 
respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual values of the peoples concerned of 
their relationship with the lands or territories (…) and in particular the collective aspects of this 
relationship’. 
128 In relation to ‘other’ minorities Art. 1 ICCPR does not seem to apply to the same extent, even 
though these minorities do not have recourse to the HRC either, except in an individual capacity. 
See also the discussion of consultation and representation in Chapter XIII (Protection). It has 
been suggested that it is very problematic to define ‘indigenous peoples’ as a distinctive legal 
category or ‘a global abstraction capable of working across different types of society with 
intricate identity politics and rapid cultural and economic change’. See e.g. Kingsbury (2001), p. 
245. The UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly on 13 
September 2007, A/RES/61/295, does not provide a definition either. See in general about the 
discussion on the definition of minorities and indigenous peoples: Meijknecht (2001), Chapters 
III (in particular pp. 115-118) and IV; Donders (2002), pp 169-171 and pp. 204-205; Thornberry 
(2002), pp. 33-60 and Kingsbury (2001), §§II (Minorities) and V (Indigenous peoples). 
129 HRC Länsman II v. Finland, 30 October 1996, §10.7. 
130 Scheinin (2000), pp. 170-171. 
131 Ibid. The European Commission on Human Rights has taken a similar approach in the Alta Dam 
case. It considered that the interference with the private life and traditional activities of the Sami 
caused by the building of a water dam and a hydro-electric power station, was limited to the loss 
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Article 27 ICCPR does not refer explicitly to the individual right to culture. In this respect it 
is different from Article 18 ICCPR, which refers to the exercise of the right to religion individu-
ally or in community with others. While the absence of a reference to ‘individually’ may imply 
that the collective aspect in the right to culture (Article 27 ICCPR) is stronger than in the right to 
religion (Article 18 ICCPR), Article 27 is still an individual right. Hence it seems reasonable to 
assume that the recognition of a collective dimension of the right to culture is meant to enhance 
the quality of the enjoyment of the individual right. In practice, however, the emphasis on this 
collective dimension, through the quantitative approach, seems to favour a collective right to 
culture over an individual right, by simply aiming at guaranteeing that some people may be able 
to maintain this culture. In Lovelace v. Canada (1981)132 the HRC put an emphasis on the rights 
of the individual, while the later case of Kitok v. Sweden (1988)133 gave priority to ‘the group 
interest in cultural survival’.134 In this case the HRC noted that Kitok had ‘always retained some 
links with the Sami community, always living on Sami lands and seeking to return to full-time 
reindeer farming as soon as it became financially possible, in his particular circumstances, for him 
to do so’.135 Nevertheless, it becomes apparent from this case that if the State can show that in-
fringements of individual rights were necessary for the ‘continued viability and welfare of the 
minority as a whole’ the HRC lets them pass. What seems to have played a role is the State’s 
argument that Kitok could enjoy the same rights in practice.136 This is not fully convincing since 
part of being able to enjoy your culture as member of an indigenous group is the knowledge that 
                                                                                                                       
of a piece of land that was comparatively small. See EComHR G. and E. v. Norway, 3 October 
1993. 
132 HRC Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, 30 July 1981. Following publication of this View the State 
explained the process in which it tried to consult Indian people and at the same time amend the 
discriminatory provisions as a matter of urgency. See Response of Canada to the Views of the 
Human Rights Committee, 6 June 1983, Sandra Lovelace v. Canada, 30 July 1981. As becomes 
apparent in the discussion of R.L. and 16 other members of the Whispering Pine Band v. Canada, 
5 November 1991, the eventual amendment of the law by Canada did not receive overall 
approval.  
133 HRC Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, 27 July 1988. 
134 Anaya (1996), p. 101. The State had acknowledged that the non-reindeer herding Sami had no 
special rights under the present law. “These other Sami have found it more difficult to maintain 
their Sami identity and many of them are today assimilated into Swedish society. Indeed, the 
majority of this group does not even live within the area where reindeer herding Sami live”. Kitok 
v. Sweden, 27 July 1988, §4.2. The petitioner pointed out: “It is characteristic that the 1964 Royal 
Committee wanted to call the Lapp village ‘reindeer village’ (renby) and wanted to make the 
renby an entirely economic association with increasing voting power for the big reindeer owners. 
This had also been achieved in the present sameby, where members get a new vote for every 
extra 100 reindeer. It is because of this organisation of the voting power that Ivan Kitok was not 
admitted into his fatherland Sörkaitum Lappby”. Kitok, §5.3. 
135 HRC Kitok v. Sweden, 27 July 1988, §9.7. 
136 Kingsbury (2001), p. 213 puts it as follows: “In so far as the Sameby policy (...) was a response 
to the crisis in the long-term viability of reindeer-herding lifestyle and culture, however, the 
Swedish state was implicated much more fundamentally in not securing sufficient land, 
pasturage, and support for the Sami culture, yet the Committee became more hesitant to 
intervene. This paradox structures the result in the case, a very uneasy compromise in which no 
violation of the ICCPR is found because Kitok was in fact being permitted, although not as of 
right, to herd reindeer, and nothing is said about the systemic assimilationist effects of the 
diminishing resource base or other aspects of historic Swedish state policy”. See also Thornberry 
(2002), pp. 159-160 and Simon (1997), p. 160, the latter emphasising the importance of assessing 
‘the broader harms affecting all Sami’. 
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the other members still recognise you as belonging to their group. If you are excluded this does 
not enhance your enjoyment.  
In short, while procedurally only individuals can claim a violation of Article 27 under the 
OP, materially the collective aspects of Article 27 have priority.137 The article is directed towards 
‘ensuring the survival and continued development of the cultural, religious and social identity of 
the minorities concerned, thus enriching the fabric of society as a whole’.138 Thus, by referring to 
the aim of ensuring survival of the cultural, religious and social identity of minorities, this state-
ment confirms the importance the HRC attaches to the collective aspects of Article 27. 
A few cases involving culture may assist in clarifying the outer limits of provisional meas-
ures exactly because the measures were not used.139 In Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia (2000), for 
                                                 
137 See also Meijknecht (2001), pp. 131-139. She raises the question whether it is the individual’s, 
the group’s or the culture’s existence needing protection and notes that Article 27 is basically 
formulated as a right bestowed upon the individual. She considers that ‘the construction as 
applied in Article 27 suggests that the tension between the individual and the collectivity can be 
avoided by denying a legal status and rights to the collectivity, and by attributing rights 
exclusively to individuals’. The formulation ‘in community with other members of their group’, 
she acknowledges, ‘suggests some sort of compromise between the individual and collective 
approach’, but this, she points out, ‘does not change the fact that the rights in question are 
bestowed upon individuals’. Certainly, from the perspective of the international personality of 
indigenous peoples Article 27 denies legal status to the collectivity. In its interpretation of the 
article, however, the HRC seems to attach rights to collectivities at the cost of the individual. 
General Comment 23 of the HRC points out that while Article 27 ICCPR is expressed in negative 
terms, a right still exists that ‘shall not be denied’. In fact this means that State parties are under 
an obligation to ensure that the exercise of this right is protected. “Positive measures of 
protection are, therefore, required not only against the acts of the State party itself, whether 
through its legislative, judicial or administrative authorities, but also against the acts of other 
persons within the State party”. General Comment 23 on Article 27, 8 April 1994, §6.1 (1994). 
See Crawford (2001), p. 23 for a strictly textual interpretation. 
138 HRC General Comment 23 on Article 27, 8 April 1994, §9. 
139 In HRC R.L. and 16 other members of the Whispering Pine Band v. Canada, 5 November 1991, 
for instance, the HRC specifically noted its refusal to use provisional measures. Like Sandra 
Lovelace v. Canada, 30 July 1981 and Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, 27 July 1988 this case related to the 
issue of exclusion from a cultural group. The petitioners argued that new legislation would have 
an increasingly negative effect on their families. To avoid the termination of family lines through 
the implementation of this legislation, the Band would have to arrange all future marriages of 
Band members with members of other Bands. This, they argued, forced them ‘to choose between 
gradually losing their legal rights and reserve land,’ on the one hand and ‘depriving their children 
of personal freedom and privacy’ on the other. This, they argued, forced them ‘to choose between 
gradually losing their legal rights and reserve land’, on the one hand and ‘depriving their children 
of personal freedom and privacy’ on the other. They sought ‘immediate measures to preserve the 
status quo pendente lite’ and requested the HRC to use provisional measures and urge the State 
party ‘to refrain from making any additions to or deletions from the Band List of the Whispering 
Pines Indian Band, except as may be necessary to ensure that every direct descendant of the 
petitioners is included for the time being as a member of the Band’. HRC R.L. and 16 other 
members of the Whispering Pine Band v. Canada, 5 November 1991, §3.9. Among others, the 
State party noted that it had considered the membership rules as suggested by the Band were ‘not 
acceptable because they excluded certain specified groups, such as women who lost their 
entitlement to Band membership as a result of marriage to non-Indians, their minor children, and 
others’. The HRC did not use provisional measures and declared the case inadmissible for non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies. One could speak of harm to specific children in that they might 
grow up with the knowledge that they could only protect the land and cultural rights of their 
children by finding a registered Indian to marry. Apparently, following the Lovelace case the 
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instance, counsel requested provisional measures to the effect that ‘no expropriation, buying or 
selling of the community land take place, that no rent be collected from tenants and that no herds 
be prevented from grazing on the community land while the communication is under considera-
tion by the Committee’.140 The Rapporteur refused this request. The discussion on the merits 
indicates that the HRC did not consider that the petitioners had established a cultural relationship 
to the lands in question.141 While the Rapporteur did not motivate his refusal to use provisional 
measures, given the decision on the merits it is likely that he equally concluded, from the initial 
complaint, that there was insufficient evidence rendering necessary the use of provisional meas-
ures to prevent irreparable harm to the culture of the petitioners, threatening the very existence.  
In Hopu and Bessert v. France (1997)142 provisional measures were not, but, it is argued, 
could have been used. The petitioners had attempted to halt the building of a hotel on an indige-
nous burial site. They were both ethnic Polynesians living in Tahiti, French Polynesia and the 
descendants of the owners of a land tract of about 4.5 hectares called Tetaitapu. They argued that 
their ancestors were dispossessed of their property in 1961. In 1990 a company was seeking to 
initiate construction work on a luxury hotel complex on the site as soon as possible. In protest the 
petitioners and other descendants of the owners peacefully occupied the site in 1992. They con-
tended that ‘the land and the lagoon bordering it represent an important place in their history, their 
culture and their life’ and added that ‘the land encompasses the site of a pre-European burial 
ground and that the lagoon remains a traditional fishing ground and provides the means of subsis-
tence for some thirty families living next to the lagoon’. They pointed out that their expulsion 
from the land was imminent. In that light the HRC could have used provisional measures, but 
apparently it did not.143  
                                                                                                                       
HRC did express concern about ‘ongoing discrimination against aboriginal women’. In its 
Concluding Observations to Canada’s Fourth Periodic Report it noted that the amendment to the 
Indian Act ‘affects only the woman and her children, not subsequent generations, which may still 
be denied membership in the Community’, CCPR/C/79/Add.105, §19. In 2006 the HRC observed 
in its Concluding Observations ‘that balancing collective and individual interests on reserves to 
the sole detriment of women is not compatible with the Covenant’ (Articles 2, 3, 26 and 27). 
CCPR/C/CAN/CO/5, 20 April 2006, §22. Still, this is not the type of situation that would warrant 
provisional measures by the Committee because the legislation and acts of implementation would 
have results that could indeed be reversed. Measures that are reversible cannot be irreparable. 
140 HRC J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia, 25 
July 2000, §3.7. 
141 It found that there had been no violation of Article 27. “This conclusion is based on Committee’s 
assessment of the relationship between the authors’ way of life and the lands covered by their 
claims. Although the link of the Rehoboth Community to the lands in question dates back some 
125 years, it is not the result of a relationship that would have given rise to a distinctive culture. 
Furthermore, although the Rehoboth Community bears distinctive properties as to the historical 
forms of self-government, the authors have failed to demonstrate how these factors would be 
based on their way of raising cattle”. Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, 25 July 2000, §10.6. The 
concurring opinion of Evatt and Medina Quiroga more closely addresses the question when land 
rights may be based on Article 27 ICCPR. They point out that the claim did not draw the 
protection of this article because it was essentially economic rather than cultural. They note that 
the petitioners had ‘defined their culture almost solely in terms of economic activity of grazing 
cattle’. “They cannot show that they enjoy a distinct culture which is intimately bound up with or 
dependent on the use of these particular lands, to which they moved a little over a century ago, or 
that the diminution of their access to the lands has undermined any such culture”. 
142 HRC Hopu and Bessert v. France, 29 July 1997. 
143 The View was published during the period the HRC did not mention the use of provisional 
measures. Unfortunately, in March/April 2003 and August 2003 the file of this case was not 
available in Geneva. It appears from telephone contacts between F. de Vries and counsel for the 
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The most important legal issue arising from Hopu and Bessert (1997) is the question 
whether and how the HRC may use provisional measures to protect the culture of indigenous 
peoples when Article 27 ICCPR cannot be invoked. Upon accession to the ICCPR France de-
clared that in light of its constitution Article 27 ICCPR was not applicable.144 In a previous case 
dating from 1989 the HRC determined that the French ‘declaration’ was in fact a reservation.145 
                                                                                                                       
petitioners Lestourneaud (Thonon) and Roux (Montpellier) on 11 November 2003 that 
provisional measures had not been taken. Avocat Roux confirmed this by letter of 10 December 
2003 (on file with the author). 
144 No other States parties objected to this declaration, although the Federal Republic of Germany 
declared that it interpreted the French declaration to mean that the French constitution already 
fully guaranteed the individual rights protected by Article 27. CCPR/C/2/Rev. 3 as referred to in 
Nowak (1993), p. 486. Horn (1988), p. 238 points out that ‘reservations and declarations form 
completely distinct categories of acts due to their different functions’. “A reservation affects the 
norm- an interpretative declaration operates on the norm’s formulation; their objects are distinct”. 
Lijnzaad (1994), p. 61 notes: “The interpretative declaration is an opinion as to how a provision 
ought to be understood. It is nothing more than a unilateral statement addressed to other states 
parties and to possible supervisory organs. While the declaration itself has no direct legal effect, 
either for its author or the other states parties, its aim is obviously to arouse support for the 
interpretation proposed”. She acknowledges, however, that the distinctions are not always as 
clear as that. Sometimes the purpose of the State is to condition its acceptance of the treaty not 
only with its reservations but also with its declarations. Scholars have made a distinction between 
‘qualified interpretative declarations’ and ‘mere interpretative declarations’. In relation to the 
first, once an authoritative determination is made about the meaning of a provision and this 
interpretation conflicts with the declaration, the declaration turns into a reservation (see 
references in Lijnzaad (1995), pp. 61-62). She also refers to the judgment of the European Court 
on Human Rights in the case Belilos v. Switzerland, 29 April 1988. In light of, among others, the 
lack of transparency in the distinction of the two types of interpretative declarations suggested, 
Lijnzaad argues that declarations should not have the legal effect of a reservation. “Basically a 
declaration cannot exclude or restrict the legal effect of provisions of the treaty. It should be 
understood that in cases where a state wishes to exclude or restrict the legal effects of a treaty, an 
interpretative declaration cannot be used”. (Lijnzaad (1995), p. 65). 
145 See HRC M.K. v. France, 8 November 1989 (inadm.) and T.K. v. France, 8 November 1989 
(inadm.). It referred to Article 2(1)(d) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It is 
doubtful, however, whether it should be the State’s assumed intent rather than the text of the 
declaration that should be determinative. The text seems to simply observe that the State 
considered Article 27 irrelevant or inapplicable because the French Constitution provides equality 
of all citizens before the law without distinction as to origin, race or religion. In French doctrine 
the latter means that distinctions between citizens on the basis of origin, race or religion are 
prohibited which, in turn, means that there are no minorities in France. This is also what Higgins 
pointed out in her dissenting opinion on this issue in 1989. She considered the French notification 
of Article 27 a declaration and not a reservation. She emphasised that France had submitted both 
reservations and interpretative declarations when it ratified the Covenant in January 1982. In that 
light there was ‘no reason to suppose that the contrast in use, in different paragraphs, of the 
phrase ‘reservation’ and ‘declaration’ was not entirely deliberate, with its legal consequence well 
understood by the Government of the Republic’. Given this distinction it was ‘ultimately for the 
Committee to see if the interpretation of the French Government accords with its own’. The HRC 
had emphasised that the existence of minorities in no way constituted an admission of 
discrimination. The existence of minorities in the sense of Article 27, she noted in reference to 
HRC statements, was a factual matter. In its Concluding Observations to the French report, 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 80, §24 the HRC concluded that it was unable to agree that France was a 
country in which there are no minorities. It pointed out that ‘the mere fact that equal rights are 
granted to all individuals and that all individuals are equal before the law does not preclude the 
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Scheinin has pointed out that even if this were correct, in light of the Committee’s General Com-
ment this ‘reservation’ could be considered contrary to the object and the purpose of the Conven-
tion.146 Yet in its admissibility decision (1994) the HRC confirmed its previous case law that the 
French ‘declaration’ on Article 27 operated as a reservation. This meant it could not consider 
complaints against France under that article. Instead it would consider the claim under Articles 
14, 17 and 23 ICCPR (family life and privacy).147  
Apart from the fact that the ICCPR includes a specific article on the right to culture while 
the ECHR does not, Article 8 ECHR refers to the right of everyone to respect for his ‘private and 
family life’. Article 17 ICCPR prohibits arbitrary or unlawful interference with one’s privacy, 
family, home or correspondence. Article 8 ECHR may thus have a wider scope of application. 
Indeed, prior to the HRC in Hopu the European Commission on Human Rights already acknowl-
edged the possibility of applying the right of private and family life and the home (Art. 8 ECHR) 
in relation to threats to indigenous land. In G. and E. v. Norway (1993),148 it noted ‘a minority 
group is, in principle, entitled to claim the right to respect for the particular life style it may lead 
as being “private life”, “family life” or “home”’.149  
The Bosnia Chamber has also accepted that the authorities’ order for the exhumation of the 
petitioner’s late wife from the family plot was so closely related to his private and family life that 
it came within the ambit of Article 8 ECHR.150 Moreover, in another case, in which it referred as 
                                                                                                                       
existence in fact of minorities in a country’. As Thornberry (2002), p. 154 notes ‘to conclude 
otherwise would be to accept the argument that a group is created by the prejudices of others-
including prejudicial legislation-and that a State has sole authority to make decisions on group 
existence’. 
146 Scheinin (2000), p. 218, referring to the General Comment 24 on reservations to the ICCPR or 
the Optional Protocols, 4 November 1994. One might add that denying the existence of 
minorities could result in a denial of the right to equality in the sense that this right encompasses 
the right to be different and to express this difference in community with others. It also 
noteworthy that the HRC pointed out in its General Comment 23 on the right to culture (Article 
27), 6 April 1994, the HRC pointed out that ‘(s)ome States parties who claimed that they do not 
discriminate on grounds of ethnicity, language or religion, wrongly contend, on that basis alone, 
that they have no minorities’, §4.  
147 Five members of the HRC considered that it should have declared admissible the Article 27 claim 
in Hopu. Rather than arguing to overrule the aforementioned 1989 decision on the French 
declaration, they made a distinction between the applicability of the French declaration in 
metropolitan France and in overseas territories. Apparently during the discussion they attempted 
to re-open the issue of admissibility of the claim. They noted that, after the Committee’s decision 
not to do so, ‘we are able to associate ourselves with the Committee’s views on the remaining 
aspects of the communication’. Partly dissenting opinion by Evatt, Medina Quiroga, Pocar, 
Scheinin and Yalden in Hopu and Bessert v. France, 29 July 1997. Yet the HRC did not re-open 
the discussion on the admissibility of the Article 27 claim because the Committee’s earlier 
decision in this respect had been phrased in general terms. It could have considered that it had 
been the State party that had requested a review of the earlier admissibility decision and that this 
re-opened not only the discussion of those claims declared admissible but also of those declared 
inadmissible. After all the HRC did in fact amend its admissibility decision to include a claim 
based on Article 26 ICCPR. 
148 EComHR G. and E. v. Norway, 3 October 1993, p. 35. 
149 Ibid. It did not find a violation, however, as it considered that the building of a water dam and a 
hydro-electric power station, while it did interfere with the private life and traditional activities of 
the Sami, was justified, among others, in the interest of the economic well-being of the country 
(p. 36). The Commission took a quantitative approach, finding that the interference was limited to 
the loss of a piece of land that was comparatively small. 
150 Bosnia Chamber Mahmutović v. Republika Srpska, 8 October 1999, §84. 
 Chapter X 
478 
well to the HRC’s decision in Hopu, it considered that the petitioner’s complaint equally fell 
within the ambit of Article 8, considering that the graveyard in question had been the graveyard of 
his family for many generations and that his mother was buried there in 1991.151 
The petitioners in Hopu had claimed that the construction of the hotel complex would ‘de-
stroy their ancestral burial grounds, which represent an important place in their history, culture 
and life, would arbitrarily interfere with their privacy and their family life, in violation of articles 
17 and 23’.152 The HRC indeed concluded that the construction of a hotel complex on their ances-
tral burial grounds interfered with their right to family life and privacy. Nothing in the informa-
tion before it showed that the State party duly took into account the importance of the burial 
grounds for the petitioners when it decided to lease the site. The State had not shown that the 
interference with the petitioners’ rights was reasonable in the circumstances and the petitioners 
were entitled to an appropriate remedy.153 The Committee did not refer to the complaint on the 
threat to their traditional means of subsistence. Clearly this could not be linked to the right to 
family life and privacy, but only to the inapplicable Article 27 ICCPR. 
Both the dissenting opinion on the inadmissibility of the Article 27 claim and the dissenting 
opinion on the finding of a violation of Articles 17 and 23 seem to consider that, had the Commit-
tee been able to deal with the Article 27 claim, it would have found a violation. It is clear that 
building a hotel complex on the ancestral burial grounds of the petitioners would be a threat to the 
existence and cultural integrity of the ethnic Polynesians.  
Nevertheless, the Committee members differed in their view on the existence of a violation 
of Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR. The four dissenters who would not have found a violation of those 
articles noted that ‘even when the term “family” is extended, it does have a discrete meaning’.154 
The petitioners had ‘provided no evidence that the burial ground is one that is connected to their 
family, rather than to the whole of the indigenous population in the area’.155 The values to be 
protected were not family or privacy but cultural values. They shared the concern for these values, 
but repeated that they were protected under Article 27 and not 17 or 23 ICCPR. In relation to the 
notion of privacy they pointed out that it ‘revolves around protection of those aspects of a per-
son’s life, or relationships with others, which one chooses to keep from the public eye, or from 
outside intrusion’.156 Interference with participation and public worship or cultural activities that 
play important roles in the identities of persons in different societies, they noted, may indeed 
cause violations of Articles 18 (freedom of religion) and 27 ICCPR. It would be interesting, in 
that sense, to know what position the dissenters would have taken had the petitioners claimed a 
violation of the freedom of religion (Article 18).157 The four dissenters in Hopu regretted that the 
                                                 
151 Bosnia Chamber Čengić v. BiH and Srpska, 5 September 2003, §103. 
152 HRC Hopu and Bessert v. France, 29 July 1997, §10.3. 
153 The Committee did not specify what this remedy would entail. The State was under an obligation 
to protect their rights effectively and to ensure that similar violations did not occur in the future. 
154 HRC Hopu and Bessert v. France, 29 July 1997, dissenting opinion Buergenthal, Kretzmer, 
Ando and Colville.  
155 Ibid. 
156 But see HRC Coeriel and Aurik v. the Netherlands, 31 October 1994. In this case the HRC 
considered that ‘the notion of privacy refers to the sphere of a person’s life in which he or she can 
freely express his or her identity, be it by entering into relationship with others or alone’. It 
considered that ‘a person’s surname constitutes an important component of one’s identity’, §10.2. 
This meant that the privacy rights in Article 17 included the protection against arbitrary or 
unlawful interference with the right to choose and change one’s own name. This shows that the 
HRC also considers part of the right to privacy those expressions of identity which one does not 
choose to keep from the public eye.  
157 In HRC Vakoumé and 28 other persons v. France, 31 October 2000 (inadm.) the petitioners 
indeed did so. However, the HRC declared this case inadmissible for non-exhaustion. 
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Committee was prevented from applying Article 27. They expressed their concern with ‘the fail-
ure of the State party to respect a site that has obvious importance in the cultural heritage of the 
indigenous population of French Polynesia’. Yet they believed, ‘that this concern does not justify 
distorting the meaning of the terms family and privacy beyond their ordinary and generally ac-
cepted meaning’.158 Nevertheless, the majority in Hopu and Bessert considered that Arts 17 and 
23 ICCPR had indeed been violated.  
It is important to examine whether provisional measures could be used in similar situations 
if the HRC maintains its approach towards the French declaration. In Vakoumé v. France (inadm. 
2000)159 a company had similarly begun construction of a hotel complex. The 29 petitioners were 
members of the Touété tribe on the Isle of Pines in Southern New Caledonia. They claimed that 
‘the site on which the complex was built was one of special significance for their history, culture 
and life’. The Rapporteur did not use provisional measures, most likely because the complex had 
already (partially) been built when the petitioners submitted their complaint.160 He may have 
considered it too far reaching to request restoration of the status quo, as part of provisional meas-
ures, rather than as part of a decision on reparations.161 
The petitioners, on the other hand, are likely to have hoped that the HRC would request the 
State, pending the proceedings, to demolish the hotel and restore the status quo. While it is indeed 
possible to order the return to the situation quo ante as part of a provisional measure, this nor-
mally concerns the freedom or the legal status of an individual. In a complex situation involving 
economic constructions and the right to cultural survival, it is preferable to reserve such recom-
mendations for the final determination of the case. Moreover, to the extent demolition of the hotel 
would redress the violation (an would be considered as a possible form of reparation), the request 
for provisional measures concerned a situation that was reversible.162 
Another reason for not using provisional measures upon receipt of the initial complaint may 
have been the French declaration on Article 27 ICCPR, as discussed in Hopu and Bessert. The 
petitioners claimed violations of Articles 17(1), 18 and 23(1) ICCPR instead. In so far as they 
based their complaint on interference of their privacy and family life, similar issues arose as in 
Hopu and Bessert. In relation to Articles 17(1) and 23 they declared that the ‘Baie d’Oro is an 
important part of their natural, historical and cultural heritage. Ancestral burial grounds are to be 
found on the site, which is also the source of legends forming part of the heritage and collective 
                                                 
158 HRC Hopu and Bessert v. France, 29 July 1997, dissenting opinion Buergenthal, Kretzmer, 
Ando and Colville.  
159 HRC Vakoumé and 28 other persons v. France, 31 October 2000 (inadm.).  
160 The View only mentions the petitioners’ request for provisional measures and the fact that the 
Special Rapporteur did not grant these. It does not indicate when and how he responded to this 
request. 
161 The initial submission was of March 1998, when the company involved had already begun 
construction of the hotel complex. The complex was inaugurated in November 1998 and has 
since been operational. The View does not indicate when the Rapporteur registered the case. This 
means it is not clear whether he did so when the complex had not yet been completed or when it 
already had. 
162 In a way, the request for provisional measures may have been too late. At the same time, the 
HRC indicated that the complaint itself was too early because domestic remedies had not been 
exhausted. It may be, therefore, that the Rapporteur would not have used provisional measures 
either if they had been in time to halt construction of the hotel. In light of the inadmissibility 
decision, the Rapporteur may have reasoned that the domestic proceedings did have suspensive 
effect even though they did not in fact halt this construction. Such reasoning, however, would not 
be convincing in all cases because the procedural possibility of suspensive effect does not 
guarantee that a domestic court interprets the risk of irreparable harm in the way required by the 
ICCPR. 
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memory of the Isle of Pines’.163 The difference with Hopu is, however, that the petitioners also 
claimed interference with their freedom to manifest their religion or beliefs in worship (Article 
18). Indeed the HRC could have resorted to Article 18 in this case, with the advantage that a more 
obvious link might be established (with some specification) between the protection of sacred 
indigenous burial sites and the right to have and manifest one’s religion in community with oth-
ers, than the link between the protection of these sites and the right to family life and privacy.164 
The collective aspect of this right, moreover, can also be found in the text of the article.165 The 
petitioners had claimed that they ‘like all Melanesians, live in a natural environment founded on a 
network of ties to their parents, their families and their dead. Veneration of the dead is a manifes-
tation of religion and tradition inherent in their lifestyle, beliefs and culture’.166 Yet the View 
referred to the petitioners’ request for the use of provisional measures without mentioning their 
resort to Article 18 ICCPR. It is possible that the petitioners invoked this article only at a later 
stage and the HRC did not consider it.167 In any case the HRC only noted that the petitioners 
                                                 
163 HRC Vakoumé and 28 other persons v. France, 31 October 2000 (inadm.), §3.4. 
164 The UN and Inter-American draft declarations on indigenous peoples reaffirm, as Kingsbury 
phrases it, ‘historically-grounded and culturally grounded entitlements and responsibilities with 
regard to natural resources, religious sites, and spiritual or guardianship relationships with 
particular land, water, mountains, etc.; (...) duties in relation to ancestors and future generations; 
continuance of certain kinds of economic practices; and perhaps entitlements and responsibilities 
in relation to traditional knowledge’. Kingsbury (2001), pp. 239-240. Articles 18 and 27 could 
assist in protecting religious sites and duties in relation to ancestors, for instance. However, 
Article 27 is the only article in the Covenant that could be of use to protect certain kinds of 
economic practices. 
165 Nowak notes that this article expressly emphasises this right as both an individual and collective 
right (‘individually or in community with others’) while Article 27 does not include a reference to 
‘individually’. “This means that individual enjoyment of a minority culture, individual profession 
to the religion of a minority and the individual use of a minority language are not protected”. The 
individual right, he considers, is that of enforcement of the collective right. This statement may 
be correct at least with regard to the Committee’s use of provisional measures. Nowak (1993), p. 
499. 
166 HRC Vakoumé and 28 other persons v. France, 31 October 2000 (inadm.), §3.6. 
167 Yet another reason why the Rapporteur may have decided not to use provisional measures, once 
he had already decided to await the State party’s comments, may be lack of prima facie evidence 
of irreparable harm. The State party only responded in December 1998, when the hotel complex 
was already in operation. It considered that the case should be declared inadmissible for non-
exhaustion of domestic remedies. The petitioners responded in April 1999. They pointed out that 
all domestic remedies they had invoked to prevent construction and inauguration of the hotel 
complex had proved ineffective and futile. One of the decisions the HRC referred to in its 
description of the domestic proceedings is that of the Nouméa Administrative Tribunal of 4 June 
1998 authorising the work to continue. It found that the construction did not violate the rights of 
the petitioners under the ICCPR ‘because it had not been proved that the hotel was to be placed 
on a site where ancestral tombs were located and because the representatives of the tribe had 
given their consent for the construction’. Under the heading ‘facts and proceedings as they 
emerge from statements by the authors and from the evidence submitted’ the HRC noted that the 
representatives of the Touété tribe participated in the project for the creation of the hotel 
complex, except for the 29 petitioners. The South Province of New Caledonia would provide the 
tribe for a 66 percent holding in the company owning the prospective complex. The 
representatives (with the exception of the petitioners) provided the company with the usufruct, 
for a period of 25 years, of the land needed for the construction. The petitioners did not take part 
in this agreement and claimed to have rights to the plots of land in question. Hypothetically the 
issue of consultation, representation and participation could have played a role in the decision not 
to use provisional measures, to the extent that the information raised some doubts about the 
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claimed ‘that the site on which the complex was built was one of special significance for their 
history, culture and life’.168 
In relation to both Hopu and Vakoumé the question arises whether, when Article 27 ICCPR 
does not apply because of a ‘reservation’, provisional measures clearly aiming at preventing 
irreparable harm to the cultural integrity of a group could be linked to the right to family life and 
privacy (Article 23) rather than to the group’s right to enjoy its own culture under Article 27. 
Even if ‘family’ and ‘privacy’ are interpreted in the context of the petitioners’ culture, as they 
should in light of different cultural notions about these concepts, the texts of these articles still 
relate to an individual right and not the right of a group. The dissenters in Hopu may be correct in 
noting that the petitioners had failed to provide sufficient information to justify a finding of a 
violation of the right to family.169 This could be different if the petitioners had specified why in 
their culture the concept of ‘family’ included the ancestors of their ethnic or cultural group. In 
other words, why it was important not only to respect their ancestral burial grounds as part of 
their culture but also as part of their family life.170 Kingsbury notes that the Committee did ‘not 
specify the analytical structure and limits of the concepts’ on which it relied. He gives a ‘specula-
tive explanation of the Committee’s unarticulated premises’, namely that it ‘was drawing suste-
nance from the developing international commitment to rights of indigenous peoples’.171 He also 
draws attention to ‘the wider problem for the Committee of whether to enunciate only standards 
capable of global application or to try to nudge some governments in a positive direction where 
                                                                                                                       
wishes of the larger group of beneficiaries relevant in this type of provisional measure involving 
rights with collective aspects. However, any doubts about the location of ancestral tombs could 
have been addressed with further questions. See further Chapter XIII, section 4 on representation 
and consultation and Chapter XV on assessment of risk. The HRC declared the case inadmissible 
for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The petitioners had not awaited the outcome of the 
appeal and the Committee could not accept ‘counsel’s contention that given that the construction 
has already been completed, the courts would no longer be able to guarantee an appropriate 
remedy’. It noted that review of its decision was possible upon receipt of a written request 
containing information to the effect that the reasons for inadmissibility no longer applied. 
168 HRC Vakoumé and 28 other persons v. France, 31 October 2000 (inadm.), §3.2. 
169 Scheinin (2000) takes a more positive attitude towards the decision in Hopu. He discusses various 
aspects of the case in pp. 217-222. See also Donders (2001), pp. 187-188, observing that Article 
27 would have been the most appropriate provision, while the use of Articles 17 and 23 ‘may 
appear to be far less tenable’. Nevertheless, now that Article 27 was declared inadmissible it was 
important to find a ‘creative solution’ so that ‘France could not avoid dealing with cases 
concerning cultural aspects of minority rights’. “Such an approach is allowed considering the 
cohesion of human rights, especially in relation to the protection of cultural identity”. See in 
general Chapter VII of her book and, in particular, pp. 340-341 discussing the emergence of 
cultural identity as a principle of human rights law, referring to a ‘freedom of cultural identity’ 
reflecting a ‘more dynamic approach’ and implying ‘the right to change cultural identity’.  
170 One might think of a situation in which clan names are personal genealogical names that are used 
as lineage and family names and that are sometimes counted and memorised for up to sixty 
generations. Among Hani and Akha, for instance, it is reported that such a system underlines the 
alliance of transfer of knowledge and is necessary for their survival. The ancestors’ service and 
the complicated customary rules related to it is considered ‘the ideology and the backbone of the 
ethnic alliance system’. They honour their ancestors nine to twelve times each year in ceremonies 
marking important occasions. Each family in the village performs these ceremonies in honour of 
its ‘line of life’. In such context one could envisage that the concept of family in itself would be 
such as to include all the ancestors in this line and still have a discrete meaning. See e.g. the 
information provided at <www.hani-akha.org> (consulted 2 November 2002).  
171 Kingsbury (2001), p. 242. 
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the local political and legal climate is receptive’. He considers that it had pursued the latter strat-
egy in this case ‘with some success’.172  
While the petitioners necessarily were individuals (to satisfy the requirements of the OP) it 
is clear that the provisional measures used in cases involving indigenous culture have aimed at 
preserving the collective aspects of their rights. It turns out, however, that in Hopu the HRC found 
a violation of an article in which the collective aspect does not prevail. Still it would have made 
sense for the Rapporteur to use provisional measures in this case. After all, at the time of his 
decision on provisional measures he could not have known that the HRC would decide not to deal 
with Articles 27 or 18 ICCPR.173  
From the decision in Hopu onwards the use of provisional measures in similar circum-
stances (only involving Articles 23 claims) would be less opportune, as long as there is no pros-
pect of the Committee changing its attitude towards the French declaration about Article 27. This 
could only be different if, for instance, the HRC considers that the cultural integrity of ethnic 
Polynesians as an indigenous people is subsumed in the concept of family and privacy to the 
extent that the rights to family life and privacy are not individual rights alone. If, moreover, the 
HRC considers that provisional measures protecting the very existence of individuals or groups 
should not only be used to prevent irreparable harm to life (Article 6), personal integrity (Article 
7) or the cultural survival of an indigenous group (Article 27) but also to prevent irreversible 
situations in relation to other rights, this could equally explain its use of provisional measures in 
new cases against France involving cultural issues.174 In that case the HRC should specify this.  
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) has confirmed the 
importance of the relation of indigenous peoples with their lands. It has especially called upon 
States parties to the Convention on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination ‘to recognize and 
protect the rights of indigenous peoples to own, develop, control and use their communal lands, 
territories and resources and, where they have been deprived of their lands and territories tradi-
tionally owned pr otherwise inhabited or used without their free and informed consent, to take 
steps to return those lands and territories’.175  
The Inter-American Commission and Court have been increasingly specific on the collec-
tive rights of indigenous peoples.176 In the early 1990s several organizations petitioned the CIDH 
on behalf of the Haorani people.177 They asserted an imminent threat because oil exploitation 
                                                 
172 Id., p. 243. According to counsel in Hopu and Bessert the French government had not been that 
receptive, see Chapter XVII on the official responses by addressee States. 
173 See Chapter XIV on the relationship with admissibility and jurisdiction on the merits. 
174 This is further discussed in Chapter XII (Other situations) and Conclusion Part II. 
175 CERD General Recommendation XXIII on the rights of indigenous peoples, A/52/18, annex V, 
§5 (adding that this right to restitution should only be substituted by the right to just, fair and 
prompt compensation only when such restitution factually is impossible. In that case the 
compensation ‘should as far as possible take the form of lands and territories’). 
176 Already in 1973 the Inter-American Commission, dealing with a petition on behalf of the Aché 
people in Paraguay (case 1802), discussed the issue of the refusal to recognize collectively owned 
lands and other rights ‘of a clearly collective nature’. In the Miskitos case against Nicaragua the 
Commission confirmed the collective right of the Miskitos to determine the form of ownership 
and use of their ancestral lands. In 1985 the Commission recognized the collective rights of the 
Yamomami and recommended Brazil, among others, to demarcate their lands. On these cases see 
CIDH ‘The human rights situation of the indigenous people in the Americas’, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.108, Doc. 62, 20 October 2000, Chapter III (6A). 
177 The petition, dated 1 June 1990, was filed by the Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de 
la Amazonía Ecuatoriana (CONFENIAE) on behalf of the Huaorani People. Hearings on the 
petition were held on 20 September 1991 and 4 October 1993. The Organización de la 
Nacionalidad Huaorani de la Amazonia Ecuatoriana (ONHAE) became a co-petitioner in 
September of 1992. 
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activities within their traditional lands would irreparably harm them, threatening their physical 
and cultural survival. It was this petition that prompted the Commission’s visit to Ecuador in 
1997. In its report of this visit the Commission refers several times to the importance of ensuring 
cultural survival. It observed that for indigenous peoples the ‘continued utilization of traditional 
systems for the control and use of territory are essential to their survival, as well as to their indi-
vidual and collective well-being’.178 
In the more recent case of the Dann Sisters v. US (2002) the Inter-American Commission 
pointed out on the merits that ‘the provisions of the American Declaration should be interpreted 
and applied (…) with due regard to the particular principles of international human rights law 
governing the individual and collective interests of indigenous peoples’.179 Thus States must take 
special measures to ensure recognition of the particular and collective interest of indigenous 
people in the use of their traditional lands and resources.180 
In this case, in which it had previously used precautionary measures, it found on the merits 
that the US had failed to ensure the right to property of the Danns under conditions of equality. 
They should be provided with an effective remedy ‘in a manner that considers both the collective 
and individual nature of the property rights that the Danns may claim in the Western Shoshone 
ancestral lands’ “The process must also allow for [their] full and informed participation in the 
determination of their claims’.181  
In a case involving the Mopan and Ke’kchi Maya people of the Toledo District of Southern 
Belize the Commission also dealt with claims regarding certain lands and natural resources. The 
Commission noted the development in international human rights law that indigenous human 
rights ‘are frequently exercised and enjoyed by indigenous communities in a collective manner, in 
the sense that they can only be properly ensured through their guarantee to an indigenous people 
as a whole’. In the context of the right to property, which ‘has been recognized as one of the 
rights having such a collective aspect’,182 the Commission has noted that ‘the organs of the Inter-
American human rights system have acknowledged that indigenous peoples enjoy a particular 
relationship with the lands and resources traditionally occupied and used by them’.183 Through 
this relationship ‘those lands and resources are considered to be owned and enjoyed by the in-
                                                 
178 Report on the Situation of Human Rights in Ecuador, Chapter IX, Human rights issues of special 
relevance for the indigenous inhabitants of the country, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.96, Doc. 10 rev. 1, 24 
April 1997. UN sub-commission Rapporteur Daes has pointed out: ‘The very survival of indige-
nous peoples is at risk owing to the continuing threats to their lands, territories and resources’. 
Final working paper prepared by the Special Rapporteur, Mrs. Erica-Irene A. Daes, Indigenous 
peoples and their relationship to land, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/21, 11 June 2001, §119. 
179 CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 27 December 2002, §131, referring, among others, to ‘legal 
recognition of their varied and specific forms and modalities of their control, ownership, use and 
enjoyment of territories and property’ and emphasizing mutual consent. 
180 Relevant provisions of the American Declaration in this respect include Article II (the right to 
equality under the law), Article XVIII (the right to a fair trial), and Article XXIII (the right to 
property). The Commission also referred to Article XVIII Draft American Declaration on the 
Rights of indigenous Peoples, stipulating the protection of traditional forms of ownership, the 
right to land and resources and, more generally, cultural survival. It noted that this Declaration 
had not yet been approved by the OAS General Assembly, but that ‘the basic principles reflected 
in many of the provisions of the Declaration, including aspects of Article XVIII, reflect general 
international principles developing out of and applicable inside and outside of the inter-American 
system and to this extent are properly considered in interpreting and applying the provisions of 
the American Declaration in the context of indigenous peoples’. CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. 
US, 27 December 2002, §129. 
181 CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 27 December 2002, §§171-173. 
182 CIDH Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District (Belize), 12 October 2004, §113. 
183 Id., §114. 
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digenous community as a whole and according to which the use and enjoyment of the land and its 
resources are integral components of the physical and cultural survival of the indigenous commu-
nities and the effective realization of their human rights more broadly’ (footnotes omitted).184 The 
Commission also noted that it has stressed the need for States to protect the rights of indigenous 
peoples to their ancestral territories not only in its decisions on the merits in individual cases, but 
also in its reports on the general situation of human rights in the OAS members States and in its 
use of precautionary measures.185 The right to property under the American Declaration, it has 
pointed out, ‘must be interpreted and applied in the context of indigenous communities with due 
consideration of principles relating to the protection of traditional forms of ownership and cultural 
survival and rights to land, territories and resources’.186 
The Inter-American Court has equally developed a broad concept of property (under Article 
21 ACHR), mindful of the communal ownership by indigenous groups. In the landmark case 
Awas Tingni (2001), which was decided before the Commission’s decision on the merits in the 
aforementioned Belize case, it determined that Article 21 ACHR also protects ‘the rights of mem-
bers of the indigenous communities within the framework of communal property’.187 “As a result 
of customary practices, possession of land should suffice for indigenous communities lacking real 
title to property of the land to obtain official recognition of that property, and for consequent 
registration”.188 
It specifically elaborated on the close ties between indigenous peoples and their lands: 
“Among indigenous peoples there is a communitarian tradition regarding a communal form of 
collective property of the land, in the sense that ownership of the land is not centred on an 
individual but rather on the group and its community. Indigenous groups, by the fact of their 
very existence, have the right to live freely in their own territory; the close ties of indigenous 
people with the land must be recognized and understood to have one basis of their cultures, their 
spiritual life, their integrity, and their economic survival. For indigenous communities, relations 
to the land are not merely a matter of possession and production but a material and spiritual 
element which they must fully enjoy, even to preserve their cultural legacy and transmit it to 
future generations”.189 
It concluded that the State must ‘carry out the delimitation, demarcation, and titling of the terri-
tory belonging to the Community’. Lack thereof had created a ‘climate of constant uncertainty 
among the members of the Awas Tingni Community, insofar as they do not know for certain how 
far their communal property extends geographically and, therefore, they do not know until where 
they can freely use and enjoy their respective property’.190 Until this delimitation the State should 
abstain from actions ‘that might lead the agents of the State itself, or third parties acting with its 
acquiescence or its tolerance, to affect the existence, value, use of enjoyment of the property 
located in the geographical area where the members of the Community live and carry out their 
activities’.191 In Moiwana Village v. Suriname (2005) the Court also found that the State was to 
adopt measures to ensure their property rights, including ‘the creation of an effective mechanism 
for the delimitation, demarcation and titling’ of these traditional territories. The remains of the 
community members killed in November 1986 were to be delivered to the surviving community 
                                                 
184 Id., §114. 
185 Id., §115. 
186 Id., §115. 
187 IACHR Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, 31 August 2001, §148. 
188 Id., §151. 
189 Id., §149. 
190 Id., §153. 
191 Ibid. 
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members.192 Among others this case is interesting as it concerns not an indigenous people, strictly 
speaking, as being indigenous to the region, but a community that settled in Moiwana in the 19th 
century and developed a ‘profound and all-encompassing relationship to their ancestral lands’.193  
In Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay (2005) the Court specifically noted that 
not just the 'right to community property of the indigenous communities over their traditional 
territories’ but also over the ‘natural resources linked to their culture’ in fact correlated with the 
term ‘goods’ in Article 21 ACHR.194 The Court concluded that the State had failed to guarantee 
the rights of the members of the Community to common property, which had affected their right 
to a dignified life, as they were unable to gain access to their traditional means of subsistence, the 
use of natural resources necessary to obtain clean water and for the practice of traditional medi-
cine.195 Among others the Court paid attention to the position of persons of age suffering from 
chronic diseases and the obligation of States to alleviate suffering. It noted that among the Yakye 
Axa mainly the elderly have the task to tell the stories and pass on the culture to the younger 
generations.196 This indicates an awareness of the importance of cultural practices and the obliga-
tion to ensure cultural survival.The majority considered the State was not responsible for the 
death of 16 members of the Yakye Axa community.197 Yet it did find that the State had violated 
Article 4(1) with respect to the surviving community members. It ordered a range of reparations, 
including a public act acknowledging responsibility,198 the demarcation of their traditional land 
and, in the meantime, provision of the basic services necessary for a life in dignity.199 
The next year the Court dealt with the case of the Sawhoyamaxa (2006), an indigenous 
group in circumstances largely similar to those of the Yakye Axa. The Court found that their right 
to property, life, personal integrity and legal personality had been violated. It held the State re-
sponsible for failure to prevent the deaths of 19 children and one adult.200 In addition to forms of 
reparation similar to those ordered in Yakye Axa the Court also ordered to put in place a program 
of registration and documentation.201  
It has been noted that cultural identity can be seen as a component or aggregate of the right 
to life proper.202 For indigenous peoples this is closely related to their ancestral lands. When they 
                                                 
192 IACHR Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 15 June 2005. Among others the Court had found that the 
State had violated the freedom of movement and residence of the community members (Article 
22 ACHR) and the right to property (Article 21) in relation to the traditional territories from 
which they were expelled. Generally on this case see Martin (2006). 
193 IACHR Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 15 June 2005, §132. 
194 IACHR Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, Order of 16 June 2005, §§137 and 154. In 
this case the CIDH had used precautionary measures in September 2001. In March 2003 the 
Commission had submitted this case, in which it had used precautionary measures, to the Inter-
American Court. It noted that the Community’s territorial claims had been under litigation since 
1993. It had been ‘impossible for the community and its members to assert ownership and 
possession of their territory’. “As a result of the situation, the community has been kept in a 
situation of nutritional, medical and sanitary deprivation that poses a constant threat to the 
survival of its members and the integrity of the community”. CIDH Press release 30/03, October 
2003, §15. 
195 IACHR Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, 16 June 2005, §168. 
196 Id., §175. 
197 Id., §177. See also the dissents by Judges Abreu Burelli, Cançado Trindade and Ventura Robles. 
198 IACHR Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, 16 June 2005, §226 (specifying the 
accessibility and reach of the public event). 
199 Id., §221. See also 6 February 2006 (Interpretation of judgment). 
200 IACHR Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, 29 March 2006, §178. See also the 
individual opinions of judges Ventura Robles and Cançado Trindade. 
201 IACHR Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, 29 March 2006. 
202 Id., Individual Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §4. 
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are forcibly displaced, and thereby uprooted from these lands, this seriously affects their cultural 
identity and ultimately their right to life in the broad sense.203 The definite transfer of the commu-
nal lands ‘is a question of survival of the cultural identity of the members of such Community’.204 
The African Commission has also dealt with cases involving indigenous peoples, but rather 
than to cultural identity it has referred to the (collective) right to health, food and housing. Never-
theless its emphasis on the problems created by forced eviction is in fact particularly relevant in 
the case of indigenous peoples. In the context of the Ogoni people it has discussed environmental 
degradation and health problems resulting from the contamination of the environment by oil devel-
opments. It has pointed out that Nigeria had clearly violated the legal protection against forced 
eviction, harassment and other threats. This right to be protected was ‘enjoyed by the Ogonis as a 
collective right’.205 “The survival of the Ogonis depended on their land and farms that were de-
stroyed by the direct involvement of the Government”. This impacted not just individual members 
of the Ogoni, but the life of the ‘Ogoni Community as a whole’.206  
While the provisions of the African Charter invoked in the Endorois case,207 discussed un-
der section 2, originally may have been intended as equating ‘States’ and ‘peoples’ and various 
governments still take the approach that there are no separate indigenous peoples within African 
States, the above Ogoni case, the recent special attention by the Commission in its non-litigious 
activities, such as the introduction of a Working group on Indigenous Populations/ 
                                                 
203 Ibid., §28. 
204 IACHR Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, 16 June 2005, §221. See also 6 February 
2006 (Interpretation of judgment), Individual Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §8. 
205 ACHPR The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria (Ogoni case), October 2001, §63. Specifically it pointed out that the pollution 
and environmental degradation had reached a level ‘humanly unacceptable’, which had made 
‘living in the Ogoni land a nightmare’. In general about this case see Coomans (2003). 
206 ACHPR The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria (Ogoni case), October 2001, §67. The Commission noted that it conducted a 
mission to Nigeria in March 1997 ‘and witnessed first hand the deplorable situation in Ogoni land 
including the environmental degradation’. On this case see also e.g. Coomans (2003). The 
Commission acknowledged that multinational corporations may constitute a potentially positive 
force for development as long as the State and the people concerned are aware of ‘the common 
good and the sacred rights of individuals and communities’. ACHPR The Social and Economic 
Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria (Ogoni case), 
October 2001, §69. It found Nigeria in violation of a range of rights laid down in the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights.206 It listed actions and abstentions that would help 
‘ensure protection of the environment, health and livelihood of the people of Ogoniland’. These 
included ‘stopping all attacks on Ogoni communities and leaders by the Rivers State Internal 
Securities Task Force and permitting citizens and independent investigators free access to the 
territory’ and conducting investigations into human rights violations. Adequate compensation 
should include ‘relief and resettlement assistance to victims of government sponsored raids,’ and 
a ‘comprehensive cleanup of lands and rivers damaged by oil operations’. ACHPR The Social 
and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria 
(Ogoni case), 27 October 2001. 
207 In their submission the petitioners had invoked the free practice of religion (Article 8 ACHPR), 
the right to property (Article 14), to enjoy the best attainable standard of physical and mental 
health (Article 16) and the right to freely take part in the cultural life of the community (Article 
17(2)), the right of all peoples to exist (Article 20(1)), the right of all peoples to freely dispose of 
their wealth and natural resources (Article 21) and Article 22(1) on development and identity. 
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Communities,208 and the provisional measures in the Endorois case all indicate that the African 
Commission itself now considers that indigenous peoples within States may themselves claim 
group rights. Moreover, considering the right to freely take part in the cultural life of the commu-
nity and the right of all peoples to exist it becomes clear that ‘the right to enjoy one’s culture 
cannot be enjoyed if the group no longer exists’.209 This again points at the importance of cultural 
survival. 
In the context of the Bosnia Chamber’s provisional measures it is not surprising that the pe-
titions invoked freedom of religion in Article 9 ECHR,210 combined with the prohibition of dis-
crimination. Another relevant article is Article 8 ECHR on the right to privacy and family life. 
Article 27 ICCPR was not specifically invoked, although the Framework Agreement also refers to 
the ICCPR. 
In a case concerning the aftermath of the destruction of the three mosques in Zvornik, in 
which the Chamber had used provisional measures several times, on the merits it noted that the 
right to religion includes the right to create a space for practicing it.211 It also noted that the prohi-
bition of discrimination is a central objective of the framework Agreement ‘to which it must 
attach particular importance’.212 
                                                 
208 Triggered, among others, by the Arusha resolutions adopted by indigenous peoples from East, 
Central and Southern Africa, January 1998, posted at the website of the International Work 
Group for indigenous Affairs, <www.iwgi.org/sw579.asp>. 
209 Murray/Wheatley (2003), p. 222. 
210 The Chamber has quoted the ECtHR’s qualification of the freedom protected in Article 9 ECHR: 
“It is, in its religious dimension, one of the most vital elements that go to make up the identity of 
believers and their conception of life, but it is also a precious asset for atheists, agnostics, sceptics 
and the unconcerned. The pluralism indissociable from a democratic society, which has been 
dearly won over the centuries, depends on it”. Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH v. 
Republika Srpska, 9 November 2000, §80 quoting ECtHR Kokkinakis v. Greece, 25 May 1993, 
§31. 
211 Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH v. Republika Srpska, 9 November 2000, §86, 
referring to the case of the Banja Luka Mosques, 11 June 1999, §182. 
212 It was ‘appropriate to have particular regard to the importance of preventing – and if necessary, 
stopping – discrimination on religious and ethnic grounds in order to enable refugees and 
displaced persons to return safely to their homes of origin’. Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community 
in BiH v. Republika Srpska, 9 November 2000, §96. See generally Chapter XI on halting mass 
expulsion and forced eviction. As a form of reparation it ordered, among others, the respondent 
Party to allocate a suitable and centrally located building site to replace one of the destroyed 
Mosques, to remove all market stands and a car park from the site of another destroyed mosque 
and grant the necessary permit for its reconstruction ‘at the location at which it previously 
existed’ and, in order to replace the third former mosque, a building site in its vicinity. All of this 
should be done ‘in consultation with the Islamic Community, and for its use only’. Bosnia 
Chamber Islamic Community in BiH v. Republika Srpska, 9 November 2000, §§124 and 120-122. 
More generally on the protection required by provisional measures and their relation with 
reparation see Chapter XIII (Protection). In the previous case involving Banja Luka (1999) the 
Chamber ordered Republika Srpska, among others, to allow the petitioner to erect fences around 
the sites of the 15 destroyed mosques, to refrain from building on the sites, cemeteries, etc. and to 
swiftly grant them the necessary permits to reconstruct 7 of the mosques at the site where they 
previously existed. In another case Republika Srpska had ignored the Chamber’s provisional 
measures and allowed construction of a bank on the site of the destroyed Atik mosque in 
Bijeljina. Upon the finding of various violations, the Chamber ordered reparation to the effect 
that the Islamic Community should be granted the necessary permits for the reconstruction of the 
five mosques and that business facilities were to be removed from these sites. Bosnia Chamber 
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3.4 Moment of infringement-moment of irreparability 
In order to clarify the cases in which the HRC used provisional measures in cases involving cul-
tural rights it is important to refer to the Committee’s substantive discussion in Länsman I (inadm. 
1994). In this case, involving the Angeli area, the HRC used a specific test to examine whether 
activities amounted to a denial of cultural rights. Pending the case it had considered the use of 
provisional measures to be premature.213 It recalled its decision in Kitok v. Sweden (1988) that 
‘economic activities may come within the ambit of article 27, if they are an essential element of 
the culture of an ethnic community’.214 It then pointed out that the right to enjoy one’s culture 
could not be determined in abstracto but was to be placed in context. It observed that, contrary to 
the State party’s submission, the article did not just protect the traditional means of livelihood of 
national minorities.215 The Committee also confirmed that Mt. Riutusvaara ‘continues to have a 
spiritual significance relevant to their culture’.216 Nevertheless, it considered that economic activi-
ties with a limited impact would not necessarily amount to a denial of the right to culture.  
The HRC used the following test: whether the impact of the (economic) activities is so sub-
stantial that it effectively denies the petitioners the right to enjoy their cultural rights.217 While it 
did not find a violation of Article 27, it did point out that in order to comply with this article 
                                                                                                                       
The Islamic Community in BiH (former Atik Mosque, Bijeljina) v. Republika Srpska, 6 December 
2000, provisional measure of 10 July 1999 and further Order of 7 July 2000 to protect the site of 
Atik Mosque. 
213 HRC Ilmari Länsman v. Finland, 26 October 1994 (inadm.). See further Chapter XIV 
(Jurisdiction and admissibility). The HRC phrased the issue to be determined on the merits as 
follows: ‘Whether quarrying on the flank of Mt. Etelä-Riutusvaara, in the amount that has taken 
place until the present time or in the amount that would be permissible under the permit issued to 
the company which has expressed its intention to extract stone from the mountain (i.e. up to a 
total of 5000 cubic metres) would violate the authors’ rights under article 27 of the Covenant’.  
214 HRC Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, 27 July 1988, §9.2. See also the discussion under section 3. In 
General Comment 23 on Article 27 (1994) the HRC refers also to traditional activities such as 
hunting and fishing, §7. 
215 “Therefore, that the authors may have adapted their methods of reindeer herding over the years 
and practice it with the help of modern technology does not prevent them from invoking article 
27 of the Covenant”. Ilmari Länsman v. Finland, 26 October 1994 (inadm.), §9.3. In other words 
the HRC explained that the right to enjoy one’s culture is not static because this culture itself is 
not static and cannot be frozen into a specific time capsule. See also Scheinin (2000), p. 169, 
Meijknecht (2001), p. 96 and Donders (2002), p. 333. 
216 HRC Ilmari Länsman v. Finland, 26 October 1994 (inadm.), §9.3. 
217 It also specifically dismissed the State’s reliance on a margin of appreciation, such as typically 
used by the ECtHR. It pointed out that the scope of the State’s freedom to encourage 
development or allow economic activities by enterprises was ‘not to be assessed by reference to a 
margin of appreciation, but by reference to the obligations it has undertaken in article 27’. Still, it 
showed deference to the State and it did not find a violation of Article 27. Schmidt (1997), p. 338 
points out that in fact the HRC did allow the State a certain margin of appreciation. He notes that 
the Committee ‘had to balance the applicants’ interests against general economic interests 
advanced by the Finnish government’. “In both decisions the Committee implicitly granted the 
state party what amounted to a margin of appreciation in determining whether the applicants’ 
interests had been sufficiently protected, and concluded that their rights had not been violated.” 
Yet, the HRC was unwilling to succumb to the State’s arguments about the general economic 
development. Scheinin (2000), p. 169 points out that the HRC took ‘a very cautious position to 
arguments related to general economic development and well being’. He notes the reference in 
Kitok to the well being of the Sami minority rather than of the country as a whole. Hence the 
Committee does give the State considerable leeway when it argues measures are infringing upon 
individual rights in the interest of the Sami collectivity. 
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economic activities must be ‘carried out in a way that the authors continue to benefit from rein-
deer husbandry’.218 It also emphasized that if the State were to approve mining activities in the 
Angeli area on a large scale and if companies with exploitation permits would significantly ex-
pand their activities this could in fact constitute a violation of Article 27. The State had a duty to 
bear this in mind ‘when either extending contracts or granting new ones’.219  
In relation to the future logging activities, in Länsman II the HRC made a remark clarifying 
its test for finding a violation of the petitioners’ right to enjoy their own culture. It observed that 
logging had been approved ‘on a scale which, while resulting in additional work and expenses for 
the authors and other reindeer herdsmen, does not appear to threaten the survival of reindeer 
husbandry’.220 This suggests that a threat to the survival of such husbandry would indeed result in 
a denial of the right to culture. This, in turn, may mean that in Article 27 cases involving in-
fringements on the natural habitat the HRC would only find a violation if there were a threat of 
irreparable harm (or such harm had already occurred), but not if harm other than irreparable harm 
would occur. Indeed, in relation to the collective aspects of Article 27 the HRC has only found a 
violation in cases in which it had previously considered that further actions would result in irrepa-
rable harm to indigenous peoples (rather than minorities). While in other situations involving 
other rights (without collective aspects) it might find violations of a less serious nature for which 
it would require compensation, thus far it has never done so with regard to collective aspects. In 
other words, in such cases the HRC is only likely to find a violation in cases in which, at an ear-
lier stage, provisional measures were (or would have been) warranted as well. As we have seen, 
however, even in cases in which it did use provisional measures, subsequently, on the merits, it 
did not often find a violation. The HRC has not yet addressed the question when subsequent 
exploitation of the lands would result in a violation and when such violation would be irrepara-
ble.221 
3.5 Collective rights and human dignity: special status right to culture of 
indigenous peoples 
Apart from the emphasis on the collective aspects of the right to culture, the special status of 
indigenous peoples and their right to culture may equally help explain the use of provisional 
measures by some of the adjudicators. For the HRC this has become apparent in its reference to 
Article 27 ICCPR in its discussion on reservations and non-derogable rights. The HRC underlined 
the condition of non-discrimination in Article 4(1) ICCPR (on states of emergency and non-
derogable rights) and pointed out that there were elements in Article 27 ICCPR that must be 
respected in all circumstances, exactly because of their fundamental nature. 
Article 27 ICCPR is not listed as one of the non-derogable rights in Article 4 ICCPR, but 
the HRC has referred to this provision as containing ‘rights of profound importance’.222 More-
over, it has noted that some elements of provisions not explicitly listed as non-derogable in Arti-
                                                 
218 HRC Ilmari Länsman v. Finland, 26 October 1994 (inadm.), §9.8. 
219 Ibid. 
220 HRC Länsman II, 30 October 1996, §10.6. 
221 The CERD has equally confirmed that measures in relation to the status, use and occupation of 
traditional lands ‘may cumulatively lead to irreparable harm’ to the indigenous communities 
involved. CERD Early warning and urgent action procedure decision 1 (68), February-March 
2006, §4. 
222 See HRC General Comment 24 on reservations to the ICCPR or the Optional Protocols, 4 
November 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 6, §10. 
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cle 4(2) cannot be derogated from either. In that context it also referred to elements contained in 
Article 27.223 
As Anaya points out the HRC has ‘acknowledged the importance of lands and resources to 
the survival of indigenous cultures’, which implies an acknowledgement of the importance of 
indigenous self-determination.224 In its discussion of State reports the HRC can be more flexible 
than in the individual complaint procedure. Among others, it specifically requests information 
about compliance with the right to self-determination (Article 1 ICCPR).225 It has noted that a 
reservation to Article 1 would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Covenant.226 
The UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (CERD) discusses the 
rights of indigenous peoples within the general framework of the International Covenant on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) and the norm of non-discrimination. It has ‘effec-
tively promoted the integrity and survival of indigenous groups’.227 Its General Recommendation 
on the rights of indigenous peoples indicates the special status of the indigenous right to culture, 
including the right to control and use of their communal lands and resources.228 Meanwhile, the 
possibility of CERD taking provisional measures for the first time and doing so in relation to land 
rights and indigenous culture cannot be ruled out.229  
                                                 
223 HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, § 13(c). 
224 Anaya (1996), p. 104. 
225 See e.g. the discussion in Kingsbury (2001), pp. 206 and pp. 228-229. About the reporting 
procedure of the Committee in general see Boerefijn (1999). An example is the concern 
expressed by the HRC that the dam projects on the Biobio River in Chile ‘might affect the way of 
life and the rights of persons belonging to the Mapuche and other indigenous communities’. 
Concluding Observations of the HRC in relation to Chile, CCPR/C/79/Add.104 (1999) as 
referred to by Kingsbury (2001), p. 206. According to Schmidt the incremental approach of the 
periodic State reporting mechanism ‘tends to yield positive results’ for the promotion of 
indigenous peoples’ rights. Schmidt (1997), p. 339. Other issues the HRC has emphasised under 
the reporting mechanism are the importance of land demarcation and the protection of cultural 
identity against developments such as oil drilling and their collateral effects. See e.g. references 
in Thornberry (2002), p. 164. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights intervened in 
relation to the above situation involving the Bio-Bio river, using precautionary measures: 
Mercedes Julia Huenteao Beroiza et al. v. Chile, 11 March 2004 (friendly settlement), §§5, 6 and 
15. 
226 See HRC General Comment 24 on reservations to the ICCPR or the Optional Protocols, 4 
November 1994, CCPR/C/21/Rev. 1/Add. 6, §9. In 2006, in its Concluding Observations to the 
US report on its compliance with the ICCPR (2006) the HRC also pointed out that the ‘State 
party should review its policy towards indigenous peoples as regards the extinguishment of 
aboriginal rights on the basis of the plenary power of Congress regarding Indian affairs and grant 
them the same degree of judicial protection that is available to the non-indigenous population’. 
HRC Concluding Observations to the US report, 2006 
227 Anaya (1996), p. 157. 
228 CERD General Recommendation XXIII on the rights of indigenous peoples, 1997, A/52/18, 
annex V. 
229 More generally authors have advocated increased use by indigenous peoples of the individual 
petition system under the ICERD, see e.g. Anaya (1996), p. 157 and Dommen (1998), p. 13, 
pointing out that road and bridge construction projects on lands traditionally belonging to the 
Wichi, Chorote, Nivakle, Toba and Tapiete communities in Northern Argentina could all be 
brought before CERD, claiming that their traditional ways of life are threatened because they do 
not have official title to their lands. Dommen argues that the ‘impacts of environmental harm 
often fall hardest on individuals or groups suffering discrimination, thus a case brought to CERD 
regarding environmental discrimination would likely succeed’, p. 23.  
 Protecting (Indigenous) Cultural and Religious Rights 
491 
It has also taken the historic step to invoke its Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure 
on behalf of the abovementioned Western Shoshone peoples who had been unable to resort to the 
individual complaint procedure under ICERD as the US has not deposited a declaration under 
Article 14 ICERD.230 The Committee pointed out that the procedure was ‘clearly distinct from the 
communication procedure’ under Article 14. “Furthermore, the nature and urgency of the issue 
examined in this decision go well beyond the limits of the communication procedure”.231 
Its decision to invoke the Urgent Action procedure not only indicates a recognition of the 
special position of indigenous peoples in international law, but also follows up on a decision on 
the merits by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights involving specific members of 
the Western Shoshone, confirming the Commission’s approach to land rights.  
CERD was concerned by the State’s position that the Western Shoshone’s ‘legal rights to 
ancestral lands have been extinguished through gradual encroachment, notwithstanding the fact 
that the Western Shoshone peoples have reportedly continued to use and occupy the lands and 
their natural resources in accordance with their traditional land tenure patterns’. Moreover, this 
position was made on the basis of processes before the former Indian Claims Commission that, 
and here CERD quoted from the Dann Sisters case by the Inter-American Commission (2002), 
‘did not comply with contemporary human rights norms, principles and standards that govern 
determination of indigenous property interests’.232 
CERD also referred to‘(t)he reported resumption of underground nuclear testing on Western 
Shoshone ancestral lands’ and the lack of consultation, combined with the reported intimidation 
and harassment ‘through the imposition of grazing fees, trespass and collection notices, impound-
ing of horse and livestock, restrictions on hunting, fishing and gathering, as well as arrests, which 
gravely disturb the enjoyment of their ancestral lands’.233 Among others it urged the State to 
freeze any plan to privatize their lands, abstain from activities in relation to their natural resources 
and stop imposing grazing fees etc. until a final settlement was duly reached.234 
                                                 
230 CERD Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, Decision 1 (68). This is not the first time 
CERD intervened on information that a State was disregarding its previous recommendations and 
that indigenous peoples were facing irreparable harm, see e.g. in response to a draft mining Act 
approved by the Council of Ministers of Suriname, but addressing a range of issues involving 
notification, prior agreement or informed consent, Decision 1 (67), CERD/C/DEC/SUR/2, 18 
August 2005. 
231 CERD Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, Decision 1 (68), §4. It expressed concern 
about the lack of action taken by the State upon its 2001 Concluding Observations, in which it 
had already paid attention to the situation of the Shoshone. CERD Concluding Observations on 
the US report, A/56/18, 13 August 2001, §400. “Although these are indeed long-standing issues, 
as stressed by the State party in its letter, they warrant immediate and effective action from the 
State party”. CERD Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, Decision 1 (68), §5. In the 
background of this decision is the State’s failure to respond to a list of questions, including 
questions relating to the situation of the Shoshone, sent by the Committee in August 2005 in the 
context of the State’s periodic reporting obligation (the report had been due in November 2003). 
232 CERD Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, Decision 1 (68), §6, quoting from Mary and 
Carrie Dann v. US, 27 December 2002. It expressed particular concern about reported legislative 
efforts to privatize the ancestral lands ‘for transfer to multinational extractive industries and 
energy developers’; destructive activities conducted or planned ‘ on areas of spiritual and cultural 
significance to the Western Shoshone peoples, who are denied access to, and use of, such areas’. 
It noted the ‘reinvigorated federal efforts to open a nuclear waste repository at the Yucca 
Mountain; the alleged use of explosives and open pit gold mining activities on Mount Tenabo and 
Horse Canyon; and the alleged issuance of geothermal energy leases at, or near, hot springs’. 
233 CERD Early Warning and Urgent Action Procedure, Decision 1 (68), §7. 
234 Id., §§9-10. 
 Chapter X 
492 
The special status of the indigenous peoples’ right to culture, or at least the particular vul-
nerability of indigenous peoples to human rights violations, is also confirmed by the institution of 
the UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights of indigenous people.235 As noted, in 
2007 the UN General Assembly adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. 
Over the years many drafts had circulated, which had already served either as overviews of the 
developments in the law or otherwise to inspire the case law and the practice of various interna-
tional bodies.236 In addition, in the Inter-American system a draft declaration on the rights of 
indigenous peoples has also played an important role in the development of awareness of the 
importance of indigenous rights. Moreover, both the Inter-American Commission and the African 
Commission have introduced Rapporteurs on the rights of Indigenous Peoples as well. Within the 
European (and Eurasian) region indigenous peoples may resort to the international treaties 
(ICCPR or CERD), to the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities and 
the general opinions of its Advisory Committee237 or to the OSCE High Commissioner on Na-
tional Minorities. Finally, the Inter-American Court has shown particular sensitivity to indigenous 
culture in its judgment on reparations.238 
                                                 
235 See Resolution 2001/57 of the UN Commission on Human Rights (2001), confirmed by 
Resolution 6/12 of the UN Human Rights Council (2007). The first Rapporteur was Rodolfo 
Stavenhagen; the second Rapporteur, since May 2008, is James Anaya. 
236 For a brief overview of the Declaration see e.g. Anaya/Wiessner (2007). 
237 In 2000 the Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities made the following observation regarding the Sami in Finland: “Given the importance 
of reindeer herding, fishing and hunting to the Sami as an indigenous people, the issue of land 
rights in the Sami Homeland is of central relevance to the protection of Sami culture and their 
identity. Therefore, the Advisory Committee expresses the wish that the existing dispute over 
land rights in this area be resolved as expeditiously as possible in a manner that will contribute to 
the protection of the culture of the Sami without interfering with the rights of the non-Sami 
population. The Advisory Committee is of the opinion that the central role of the Sami 
Parliament should be maintained in this process and adequate resources should be secured for the 
Sami Parliament to carry out its tasks in this sphere. The Advisory Committee further emphasises 
that, while the issue of land rights is being reviewed, the existing practices relating to the use of 
the land at issue should be carried out in a manner that does not threaten the maintenance or 
development of Sami culture or the preservation of their identity. This concerns, inter alia, 
logging operations administered by the National Board of Forestry”. Advisory Committee on the 
Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, First Opinion on Finland, 22 
September 2000, ACFC/INF/OP/I(2001)002, §22. Six years later the Committee expressed 
particular concern about reports that logging and other activities State Forest Administration ‘are 
in some cases carried out without adequate attention being paid to the maintenance and 
development of reindeer herding or other aspects of Sami culture, and in a manner that does not 
sufficiently accommodate the views of the Sami Parliament’. “While acknowledging the 
importance of forestry to the economy of the municipalities in the Sami Homeland and while 
being aware that also some Sami are employed in this sector, the Advisory Committee stresses 
that there is a clear obligation to pursue logging and other related economic activities in a manner 
that protects the right of the Sami, as an indigenous people, to develop reindeer herding and other 
elements of their culture. In this context, the Advisory Committee notes with regret that the 
specific status of Sami as the only constitutionally recognised indigenous people of Finland 
seems not to be fully comprehended throughout the State Forest Administration staff”. Advisory 
Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, Second 
Opinion on Finland, 2 March 2006, ACFC/OP/II(2006)003, published 20 April 2006, §55. 
238 See e.g. IACHR Aloeboetoe et al. (Suriname), 10 September 1993; Bámaca Velásquez, 22 
February 2002; Massacre at Plan de Sánchez (Guatemala), 19 November 2004, Moiwana 
Community (Suriname), 15 June 2005. 
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The Inter-American Commission applies not just Inter-American but also international 
norms in relation to indigenous peoples, including Article 27 ICCPR, in particular when it pro-
poses solutions.239 Already in 1985 it interpreted Article 27 ICCPR when it recommended Brazil 
to demarcate and secure the lands of the Yanomami. It referred to the recognition in international 
law of the right of ethnic groups to special protection ‘for all those characteristics necessary for 
the preservation of their cultural identity’.240 In another case it pointed out that preservation of the 
cultural identity of an indigenous group should extend to ‘the aspects linked to productive organi-
zation, which includes, among other things, the issue of ancestral and communal lands’.241 The 
Commission has held this norm ‘to cover all aspects of an indigenous group’s survival as a dis-
tinct culture, understanding culture to include economic or political institutions, land use patterns, 
as well as language and religious practices’.242 
As Anaya and Williams concluded in 2001, ‘rights to lands and resources are property 
rights that are prerequisites for the physical and cultural survival of indigenous communities, and 
they are protected by the American Declaration, the American Convention, and other interna-
tional human rights instruments, such as the Convention of the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination and the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’.243 
The step is not that great from protecting land rights of indigenous peoples to protecting the 
right of peoples that have been subjected to ethnic cleansing to respect for their religious sites. 
In the Mahmutović case the Chamber had first used provisional measures to ‘desist from’ 
implementing the domestic order for the exhumation of his wife from the Muslim cemetery 
closed by Republica Srpska.244 On the merits it found that Mr Mahmutović had been discrimi-
nated against in the enjoyment of his right to private and family life and freedom of religion. It 
noted that the ordinance to close the cemetery ‘affected only the Muslim Cemetery and not the 
Orthodox or Catholic cemeteries situated nearby’.245 The respondent party had never provided a 
reason for the closure. It found that the only plausible explanation of the 1994 ordinance prohibit-
ing burials at the Muslim Town Cemetery ‘was to contribute to the elimination of all traces of the 
Muslim population from the town centre of Prnjavor’.246 As part of its decision on the merits it 
ordered the respondent Party ‘to refrain from any steps to remove the remains of Mrs Mah-
mutović from her place of burial’. In other words the protective measures required as a provi-
sional measure are very similar to those required upon the finding of a violation, except that in the 
latter case the requirement is more precise. 
In another case the Chamber found on the merits that the continued enforcement of a 1994 
ordinance putting the Muslim Town Cemetery out of use and prohibiting further burials consti-
tuted ‘discrimination against the Islamic Community and the Muslim population of Prnjavor in 
the enjoyment of their right to freely practice religious beliefs’. ‘The Chamber therefore deems it 
appropriate to order the respondent Party to revoke the ordinance’ and ‘to desist from any further 
steps of enforcement, such as prohibiting burials at that cemetery or ordering the exhumation of 
                                                 
239 See e.g. the references by Anaya (1996), pp. 168-169 and p. 182. 
240 CIDH Yanomami case (v. Brazil), 5 March 1985 (brought on behalf of a large group of 
Yanomami, recommending the adoption of preventive health measures, the demarcation and 
delimitation of their land, educational programs, etc., all to be carried out in consultation with the 
peoples involved and advised by medical staff, anthropologists and other experts). 
241 See CIDH Miskito report relating to Nicaragua, 16 May 1984 (resolution regarding friendly 
settlement). 
242 See Anaya (1996), p. 100. 
243 Anaya/Williams (2001), p. 53. 
244 Bosnia Chamber Mahmutović v. Republika Srpska, 8 October 1999, §4. 
245 Id., §89. 
246 Ibid. 
 Chapter X 
494 
the remains of persons buried there’.247 Pending the proceedings the Chamber had initially re-
fused to order a provisional measure because there had initially not been any individual threat of 
exhumation or interference with burials in Prnjavor. Following a domestic decision prohibiting a 
specific burial, the Chamber did order provisional measures prohibiting the Municipal authorities 
from obstructing further burials.248 Again there is a clear correlation between the protection re-
quired pending the proceedings and in the decision on the merits, where in the latter is simply 
more broadly worded. 
3.6 Consultation of indigenous peoples and impact assessment  
The requirements of notification and consultation, often mentioned in the context of environ-
mental law, also have their counterparts in the jurisprudence of the HRC in relation to indigenous 
peoples.249 Clearly domestic decisions made on the basis of proper consultation gain legitimacy, 
as is also recognized, at least theoretically, in non-human rights fora.250 In its Concluding Obser-
vations to State reports, the HRC has recommended States with indigenous populations to ‘take 
further steps to secure the rights of all indigenous peoples, under articles 1 and 27 of the Cove-
nant, so as to give them greater influence in decision-making affecting their natural environment 
and their means of subsistence as well as their own culture’.251 The substantive law on consulta-
tion, as interpreted by the human rights adjudicators, could be relevant in the context of future 
decisions about provisional measures, including the group of beneficiaries.  
The HRC has developed a two-part test for examining violations of Article 27 in relation to 
land use: on the one hand consultation and on the other economic sustainability.252 In its General 
Comment on Article 27 the HRC referred to the positive requirement to take measures to ‘ensure 
the effective participation of members of minority communities in decisions which affect 
                                                 
247 Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH v. Republika Srpska (Muslim Town Cemetery in 
Prnjavor), 11 January 2000, §211 (dissenting opinion by Republika Srpska members Popović 
and Pajić).  
248 Id., §§9 and 10. 
249 Environmental impact assessment requires consultation of those persons directly affected by 
certain economic developments such as the construction of a dam. Environmental law 
acknowledges the role of indigenous peoples in particular, at least in theory. Principle 22 of the 
Rio Declaration, for instance, notes: “Indigenous people and their communities, and other local 
communities, have a vital role in environmental management and development because of their 
knowledge and traditional practices. States should recognise and duly support their identity, 
culture and interests and enable their effective participation in the achievement of sustainable 
development.” The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 
1992.  
250 In its Operational Directive on indigenous peoples the World Bank has adopted the rule that Bank 
staff is required to identify the impact of proposed projects on indigenous peoples. World Bank 
officers must identify the indigenous peoples involved ‘through direct consultation’. Operational 
Directive 4.20 of June 1990, § 8, see World Bank Operation Manual at <www.worldbank.org>. 
The World Bank started its first environmental impact assessment in 1992 as part of its decision 
making on funding the Sardar Sarovar hydro-electric dam in North-West India. The government 
proposing a project should show that indigenous people have ‘participated meaningfully in the 
development of the plan’, particularly in relation to land access and use. The burden of proof is 
on the State showing there was adequate consultation of indigenous peoples. See about 
Operational Directive 4.20: De Feyter (2001), pp. 164-167. 
251 HRC Concluding Observations to the US report, 27 July 2006, CCPR/C/USA/CO, §37. 
252 Scheinin (2000), p. 168, referring to the above Sami cases. See also HRC Apirana Mahuika v. 
New Zealand, 27 October 2000. 
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them’.253 Apparently, in the face of disputes about the facts relating to the cultural survival of the 
group and the expected risk to economic sustainability, it finds no violation if it believes the 
group in question has been sufficiently consulted.254 With regard to consultation the HRC noted, 
in Länsman II (1996), that it was uncontested that the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee had 
been consulted ‘in the process of drawing up the logging plans’ and that it ‘did not react nega-
tively to the plans for logging’.255  
“That this consultation process was unsatisfactory for the authors and was capable of greater 
interaction does not alter the Committee’s assessment. It transpires that the State party’s 
authorities did go through the process of weighing the authors’ interests and the general 
economic interests in the area specified in the complaint when deciding on the most appropriate 
measures of forestry management, i.e. logging methods, choice of logging areas and 
construction of roads in these areas”.256 
                                                 
253 HRC General Comment 23 on Article 27, 8 April 1994, §7. 
254 The second Mikmaq case (1991) dealt with the issue of consultation. See HRC Grand Chief 
Donald Marshall et al. v. Canada, 4 November 1991. The complaint was submitted in 1986, two 
years after the HRC declared the first Mikmaq case, A.D. (on behalf of the Mikmaq Tribal 
Society) v. Canada, inadmissible on 29 July 1984. This time A.D. had managed to involve the 
Grand Chief in the complaint. Grand Chief Donald Marshall, Grand Captain Alexander Denny 
and Advisor Simon Marshall submitted the complaint as officers of the Grand Council of the 
Mikmaq tribal society. The HRC gave considerable leeway to the State in its interpretation of the 
right to take part in the conduct of public affairs. It found that the State party’s failure to invite 
representatives of the Mikmaq Tribal Society to the constitutional conferences on aboriginal 
matters did not violate Article 25(a) ICCPR. Scheinin (2000), p. 164 notes that the ‘view taken by 
the HRC suggests that no far-reaching standards can be derived from Art. 25 as regards specific 
arrangements for autonomy or self-government by minorities or indigenous peoples’. In later 
cases, however, the HRC did point out that ‘the provisions of article 1 may be relevant in the 
interpretation of other rights protected by the Covenant, in particular articles 25, 26 and 27’. See 
e.g. Diergaardt et al. v. Namibia, 25 July 2000, §10.3. See in general about consultation: De 
Feyter (2001), pp. 157-171 and Anaya (1996), Chapter 5. 
255 HRC Länsman II, 30 October 1996, §10.5. 
256 Ibid. Among others, the State had pointed out that the records of the Inari District Court showed 
that during the extraordinary meeting between the Central Forestry Board and the Muotkatunturi 
Herdsmen’s Committee of 16 July 1993 two opinions were presented: one in support of and one 
against the petitioners. According to the State the Herdsmen’s Committee did not make 
statements directed against the Central Forestry Board (§6.1). It noted that it had had continuous 
negotiation links with the Herdsmen’s Committee ‘in a framework in which interests of forestry 
and reindeer husbandry are reconciled’. The ‘experiences with this negotiation process have been 
good’ (§6.12). The petitioners, on the other hand, asserted that ‘there had been no negotiation 
process and no real consultation of the local Sami when the State forest authority prepared its 
logging plans’. “At most, the Chairman of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee was 
informed of the logging plans.” They also quoted the resolution adopted by the Sami Parliament 
of 16 December 1995, after it had discussed the experiences with the consultation in relation to 
the logging plans. Among others this resolution noted that it is ‘the opinion of the Sami 
Parliament that the present consultation system between the Central Forestry Board and reindeer 
management does not function in a satisfactory way’. The petitioners contended that ‘what the 
State party refers to as “negotiations” with local reindeer herdsmen amounts to little more than 
invitations extended to the chairmen of the herdsmen’s committees to annual forestry board’s 
meetings, during which they are informed of short-term logging plans’. They emphasised that this 
process involved no real consultation of the Sami (§§7.8 and 7.9). Scheinin (2000), p. 272 notes 
that ‘(g)uidance for a more thorough analysis of the requirement of effective participation can be 
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The discussion in Länsman II shows the importance the HRC attaches to the State’s opinion that 
it consulted the petitioners. The State used this consultation as one of the arguments to convince 
the Committee to set aside its provisional measures. It noted that it had negotiated with the larger 
association to which the petitioners’ Herdsmen Committee belonged, suggesting that consultation 
should already play a role at the provisional measures stage. The State argued, in addition, that 
provisional measures only aimed at avoiding irreparable harm to the victim of the alleged viola-
tion and did not cover measures resulting in otherwise long-lasting damage.257  
In the Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo district case (2004) the Inter-American 
Commission observed that ‘the requirement that states undertake effective and fully informed 
consultations with indigenous communities regarding acts or decisions that may affect their tradi-
tional territories’ was ‘one of the central elements to the protection of indigenous property 
rights’.258 Articles XVIII and XXIII American Declaration ‘specially oblige a member state to 
ensure that any determination of the extent to which indigenous claimants maintain interests in 
the lands to which they have traditionally held title and have occupied and used is based upon a 
process of fully informed consent on the part of the indigenous community as a whole’. “This 
requires, at a minimum, that all of the members of the community are fully and accurately in-
formed of the nature and consequences of the process and provided with an effective opportunity 
to participate individually or as collectives”. The Commission has pointed out that this also ap-
plies to other State decisions ‘such as the granting of concessions to exploit the natural resources 
of indigenous territories’. After all, such decisions will also have an impact on indigenous lands 
and their communities.259  
One could argue that if the State cannot show meaningful participation this may indeed be 
an additional reason to resort to provisional measures immediately. At the same time, however, 
information about some forms of participation should not be a determining factor for not using 
provisional measures at some point during the proceedings.  
As noted, in Länsman II the HRC responded by setting aside its provisional measures. In fu-
ture cases it may have to analyse more in depth what constitutes appropriate consultation. Other-
wise it will not be able to deal effectively with those cases in which consultation of the indigenous 
peoples and environmental impact assessments are little more than window dressing.  
The Inter-American Commission has equally emphasized the importance of consultation. It 
has recommended, for instance, that Colombia would carry out the process of consultation with 
the indigenous communities before it authorised the exploitation of natural resources on their 
lands and not afterwards. Such exploitation of resources should ‘not cause irreparable harm to the 
identity or religious, economic, or cultural rights of the indigenous communities’.260  
In addition to consultation the use of impact assessments may also be relevant in the deci-
sion to order provisional measures. In the context of the aforementioned Ogoni case involving 
environmental degradation and health problems resulting from the contamination of the environ-
                                                                                                                       
sought from domestic jurisdiction, e.g. the Delgamuukw case’. This case established that in 
determining aboriginal land rights the cultural importance of lands and resources must be taken 
into account. See British Columbia v. Delgamuukw, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. About the 
Committee’s lenient assessment of the effectiveness of the participation in this case, see also De 
Feyter (2001), p. 157. 
257 HRC Länsman II, 14 March 1996, §§4.6 (Negotiation) and 4.4 (Irreparable harm). In fact the 
Committee’s emphasis on consultation and representation seems inspired by ILO Convention 
169. Meanwhile the emphasis is now not just on ‘informed consent’ but also on ‘control’. See 
e.g. UN Declaration on Indigenous Peoples, adopted by the General Assembly on 13 September 
2007, A/RES/61/295preamble, Articles 12(1), 14(1), 26(2) and 31(1). 
258 CIDH Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo district (Belize), 12 October 2004, §142. 
259 Ibid. 
260 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter V – Colombia, §148. 
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ment the African Commission has also emphasised the importance of ‘environmental and social 
impact assessment’ and meaningful access to information on health and environmental risks and 
‘to regulatory and decision-making bodies to communities likely to be affected by oil opera-
tions’.261 
4 CONCLUSION 
The rights invoked by the adjudicators in their use of provisional measures in cases involving 
culture are minority rights, the right to culture, the right to religion and the right to property read 
in spiritual rather than financial terms. Several adjudicators have used provisional measures to 
protect collective aspects of these rights where they considered that (industrial) developments 
would cause irreparable harm to the collective enjoyment by indigenous peoples of their culture. 
In the context of the Dayton Peace Accord the Bosnia Chamber has used provisional measures in 
cases involving religious and property rights, individual dignity and pervasive discrimination. 
These cases also include a collective element.  
It has been suggested that a General Comment on indigenous peoples’ rights drafted and 
presented by the UN treaty bodies jointly would both enhance the rights of indigenous peoples in 
the UN system and assist the UN specialised agencies and multilateral institutions, such as the 
World Bank, when their activities may affect the rights of indigenous peoples.262 Meanwhile 
various UN treaty bodies and regional adjudicators have dealt with the above rights in the context 
of indigenous peoples and persecuted minorities. Moreover, the UN General Assembly has 
adopted the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007), which could also help en-
hance the rights of indigenous peoples by providing an authoritative overview of core rights. 
After all ‘there is substantial movement toward a convergence of international opinion on the 
content of indigenous peoples’ rights, including rights over lands and natural resources’.263 In fact 
the text of this UN Declaration confirms and validates the practice of the human rights adjudica-
tors with regard to the use of provisional measures in cases involving indigenous culture.  
This is the case in particular for the Inter-American Commission and Court, which have en-
hanced indigenous rights in the doctrine and also in practice both in their provisional measures 
and in their decisions on the merits, as well as in country reports. The concepts of survival and 
participation applied in the Inter-American system are reflected in the Declaration. The UN Dec-
laration speaks of minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of indigenous 
peoples.264 Its Preamble affirms the collective rights possessed by indigenous peoples that are 
indispensable for their existence and well-being. The Declaration also emphasises the importance 
of participation and the consent of the indigenous peoples affected265 and the special relationship 
between indigenous peoples and their lands.266 It points out the positive obligations of States and 
the right to reparation for wrongs committed against indigenous peoples.267 
                                                 
261 ACHPR The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria (Ogoni case), 27 October 2001. 
262 Asian Centre for Human Rights (an NGO based in New Delhi), ACHR features, strengthening 
the UN treaty bodies, index: ACHRF/2004, <www.achrweb.org> (consulted on 5 August 2004). 
263 Anaya/Williams (2001), p. 54. 
264 The rights recognized in the Declaration ‘constitute the minimum standards for the survival, 
dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the world’ (Article 43). 
265 See Article 41 (on participation) and, on (informed) consent, Articles 10, 11(2), 19, 28, 29(2) and 
32(2). 
266 See e.g. Articles 25 and 26. Indigenous peoples ‘have the right to maintain and strengthen their 
distinctive spiritual relationship with their traditionally owned or otherwise occupied and used 
lands, territories, waters and coastal seas and other resources and to uphold their responsibilities 
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The text of the UN Declaration might also trigger a more pro-active approach by the HRC. 
Thus far the HRC decisions on the cultural rights of indigenous peoples have been unsatisfactory 
from both an individual and a collective rights perspective. Indigenous groups cannot, as such, 
claim the collective right to self-determination under the OP. Neither does the Committee’s ap-
proach necessarily do justice to the rights of individual self-identified members of indigenous 
groups. This may be on the assumption that an individual member of an indigenous group would 
find sufficient satisfaction in the knowledge that some segment of the indigenous group would be 
able to continue its traditional activities, thereby maintaining the existence of its culture, even 
though the individual member would no longer be able to participate in it.268 Thus it appears that 
within the constraints of the ICCPR and the OP the Committee cannot offer sufficient solace to 
indigenous peoples.  
Still, on the basis of the case law it developed, including the Lubicon Lake Band case, it 
could do more than it has thus far. In a similar case it could intervene earlier in the proceedings by 
using provisional measures and motivate them on the basis of its previous case law on irreparable 
harm. Subsequently, it could monitor compliance. If in the discussion on the merits the HRC 
confirms the prima facie evidence of (threats of) irreparable harm and finds violations, it could 
carefully draft in its decision how these should be prevented or halted permanently or, to the 
extent that certain acts or omissions have already become irreversible, what measures of compen-
sation should be taken that would protect cultural survival.  
Although the decisions by the HRC in these cases have not prevented the actions they 
aimed to prevent, neither through provisional measures pending the proceedings, nor (in the 
Lubicon Lake Band and Hopu and Bessert cases) in the final decision, the concepts developed in 
these cases may have a protective impact in the long run, including a more effective use of provi-
sional measures by the HRC itself. After all, its approach already is incremental. While its case 
law in relation to Article 27 may not have brought concrete relief to the indigenous peoples on 
whose behalf the petitioners were acting, it has confirmed several principles that can be useful to 
support these peoples domestically. An example is the Committee’s statement that an accumula-
tion of infringements could result in the denial of the right to culture even if one infringement 
examined in isolation would not violate this right. Another example is its confirmation of the 
dynamic nature of the culture of indigenous groups. 
Provisional measures could aim at halting industrial developments until the adjudicator con-
siders that an appropriate environmental impact assessment has taken place, during which the 
indigenous groups affected have been consulted. The adjudicator could assist in this process, 
inspired by successful national agreements between indigenous peoples and State and provincial 
authorities about environmental impact assessment. This approach may broker better results for 
                                                                                                                       
to future generations in this regard’ (Article 25). They have the right to these lands and resources. 
They have the right to own, use, develop and control them and States shall give legal recognition 
and protection to these lands, territories and resources. “Such recognition shall be conducted with 
due respect to the customs, traditions and land tenure systems of the indigenous peoples 
concerned’’ (Article 26). 
267 Article 8 stipulates, among others, that States shall provide effective mechanisms to prevent and 
redress ‘any action which has the aim or effect of depriving them of their integrity as distinct 
peoples, or of their cultural values or ethnic identities’; ‘any action which has the aim or effect of 
dispossessing them of their lands, territories or resources’ and ‘any form of forced population 
transfer which has the aim or effect of violating or undermining any of their rights’. Article 20 
points out that that indigenous peoples deprived of their means of subsistence and development 
are entitled to just and fair redress. Article 28 notes that if restitution is not possible, a just, fair 
and equitable compensation ‘shall take the form of lands, territories and resources equal in 
quality, size and legal status or of monetary compensation or other appropriate redress’. 
268 See e.g. HRC Ivan Kitok v. Sweden, 27 July 1988. 
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the indigenous communities concerned than the approach taken by the HRC thus far. The Op-
tional Protocol to the ICCPR and the Committee’s Rules of Procedure, for instance, do not rule 
out possibilities for (informal) mediation and forging a friendly settlement. Its decisions may then 
become more practically relevant. This approach may be possible even through long-distance 
paper proceedings, although clearly it would be easier to realise in a regional system making use 
of on-site visits and hearings, as has become clear from the practice of the Inter-American Com-
mission.269  
One of the problems to be dealt with by adjudicators that take a quantitative (rather than 
qualitative) approach to infringements on land rights is how to determine the actual moment at 
which an accumulation of (industrial) activities triggers a human rights violation. Moreover, if 
such moment can be determined, does prevention of such a violation warrant the use of provi-
sional measures? It is suggested that in certain circumstances involving threats to indigenous 
culture human rights adjudicators could and should take provisional measures at once. This would 
be so if the petitioners can show that exploitation or other economic developments are about to 
take place that could result in irreparable harm and there is some indication that those persons 
directly affected have not been consulted or the State has not performed an environmental impact 
assessment, taking into account cultural integrity and sustainability. Upon receipt of information 
to the contrary the adjudicator could decide to not to maintain its provisional measure.  
Because indigenous peoples have acquired a special position in international law, warrant-
ing protection against threats to their cultural survival, the prevention of irreparable harm to per-
sons must take into account the collective aspects of the rights involved. The use of provisional 
measures to halt destruction of indigenous culture could be explained by this special position of 
indigenous peoples and the inappropriateness, in the face of threats to their very existence, of 
forms of reparation limited to financial compensation.  
Another UN treaty body has also taken a pro-active turn. CERD has invoked its Early 
Warning and Urgent Action Procedure in order to be able to speak out on behalf of an indigenous 
group that was unable to formally resort to the individual complaint procedure. In this context it 
also referred to the State’s non-compliance with the decision of a regional human rights adjudica-
tor. This is an illustration of the increasing cross-fertilization, and indeed ‘cross-follow-up’, be-
tween the various adjudicators.270 
The context of the hybrid Bosnia Chamber is different from that of the (other) international 
adjudicators, but its provisional measures have been used to help prevent the further eradication 
of the Muslim religious presence from the region where they have long had their roots. In the 
context of Bosnia the Orders to respect Muslim sites, including cemeteries, seem particularly 
appropriate as they aim to address serious and pervasive discrimination relating, moreover, to 
issues involving respect for religion, for the dead and their community as well as to access to 
religious sites and protection against erasing them from the history of the region, all affecting to 
the core the dignity of the group at issue. 
The use of provisional measures when the cultural/religious survival of an indigenous peo-
ple, or of a group that has been subjected to ethnic cleansing, is at stake could be seen as belong-
ing to the category of provisional measures used to prevent irreparable harm to persons, their 
existence as peoples and their cultural survival.  
Given the practice of the Inter-American Commission and Court, the African Commission 
and the HRC and, in a different context, the Bosnia Chamber the concept of provisional measures 
in international human rights adjudication no longer relates just to the prevention of irreparable 
                                                 
269 See in general Chapter II (Systems), section 4. 
270 Another example is the aforementioned remarks on the situation of the Lubicon Lake Band 
(Canada) in the Concluding Observations by the UN Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. More generally on follow-up see Chapter XVIII and on cross-fertilization see 
Chapter II. 
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harm to individual life and personal integrity, but also encompasses the survival of indigenous 
culture as well as the culture of minorities that have recently suffered extreme violence and strug-
gle to survive as a people in a context of pervasive discrimination. Thus the provisional measures 
of the human rights adjudicators now also aim to prevent irreparable harm to the cultural survival 
of a people rather than only to the life of an individual person.271  
 
                                                 
271 Given the special background and context of the practice developed by the Bosnia Chamber, on 
the one hand, and the focus on indigenous peoples by the other adjudicators, on the other hand, it 
remains to be seen what will be the consequence of this development for minority rights in 
general. 
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 CHAPTER XI 
 HALTING MASS OR ARBITRARY 
 EXPULSION AND FORCED EVICTION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Different from the Inter-American Commission, the Inter-American Court has not yet dealt with 
the issue of non-refoulement.1 This Court has, however, confirmed the Inter-American Commis-
sion’s practice to intervene urgently in situations of arbitrary or mass expulsion. In other words, 
the Inter-American Commission and Court have used provisional measures in the context of mass 
expulsion. Moreover, the Bosnia Human Rights Chamber has dealt extensively with the issue of 
forced eviction and has sometimes used provisional measures in this context as well. This means 
that the Inter-American Commission and Court and the Bosnia Chamber have ordered provisional 
measures in situations not directly involving threats to life and personal integrity or cultural sur-
vival. This section refers to relevant cases in order to illustrate this practice. 
Mass expulsion and forced eviction may also be part of a wider range of threats and har-
assment against the life and physical integrity of the persons involved and sometimes also against 
the cultural survival of an indigenous people.2 In such cases the adjudicator may specify the pro-
visional measures ordered to protect against such threats to make sure that the State does not 
‘ensure’ this protection through internal displacement. Instead, as part of the provisional measures 
to protect their lives and personal integrity, the State must also protect them against forced dis-
placement.3 
Provisional measures to protect against mass or arbitrary expulsion have been used pre-
dominantly in the Inter-American system, although one example can be given involving the Afri-
can system and even the possibility of use in the European system cannot be ruled out.4 Provi-
sional measures to protect against forced eviction have been ordered in the Bosnian system cre-
ated under the Dayton Peace Agreement. These instances in which provisional measures were 
ordered seem particularly adapted to the local situation. Nevertheless, the practice of the adjudica-
tors does indicate a particular kind of provisional measure, ordered in a context of endemic and 
widespread discrimination. This warrants discussion in a separate chapter.5  
In addition there is another atypical, but related, situation in which one adjudicator has used 
provisional measures, namely in order to ensure access to education. It was decided to discuss this 
                                                 
1 See Chapter V (Non-refoulement). 
2 On provisional measures to protect against death threats and harassment see Chapter IX 
(Threats). On cultural survival see Chapter X. 
3 More generally on the protection required as part of provisional measures see Chapter XIII 
(Protection). 
4 With regard to the ICCPR Special Rapporteur Scheinin considered it more likely that he would 
decide to request a State to halt an immediate forced eviction with racist motives (Articles 26, 23, 
17) than to request it to take positive action to protect against a threat to life. Scheinin, Geneva, 
April 2003. In fact he later did use provisional measures on behalf of a person who had been 
harassed and threatened, see Chapter IX (Death threats and harassment). 
5 There is also a clear relation with the previous chapter on provisional measures to protect cultural 
and religious rights, especially in the context of forced eviction of indigenous peoples from their 
lands or destruction of, and discrimination in the access to, religious sites. 
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situation in this Chapter rather than in Chapter XI because it involves another aspect of the Hai-
tian case discussed below and has in common the underlying endemic situation of discrimination. 
2 THE PRACTICE OF THE ADJUDICATORS TO TAKE PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
TO HALT MASS OR ARBITRARY EXPULSION AND FORCED EVICTION 
2.1 Introduction 
This section first discusses the practice developed in the Inter-American system to halt arbitrary 
or mass expulsion and the related provisional measure to ensure access to education. It then 
briefly refers to the approach in the African and European systems, concluding with the specific 
practice developed by the Bosnia Camber to halt forced eviction. 
2.2 The Inter-American system 
In the landmark Order for provisional measures in the matter6 of Haitians and Dominicans of Hai-
tian Origin in the Dominican Republic (2000)7 the Inter-American Court dealt with the issue of 
arbitrary and mass expulsion and the question whether this required urgent intervention. 
In November 1999 the Inter-American Commission decided to take a precautionary meas-
ure on behalf of a group of Haitians and Haitian-origin Dominican people who were at risk of 
being expelled or deported collectively by the Dominican Republic. It requested the State to halt 
these mass expulsions or, at least, ‘in the event that they would continue to be made’ that this 
would be done in conformity with the requirements of due process.8 Six months later it decided to 
appeal to the Court for provisional measures and while the Court did not accept the Commission’s 
request to cover an unnamed number of people with its protective order (at least not in this case),9 
as to subject matter it did expand its use of provisional measures to a broader range of cases. The 
Court not only ordered the government to protect the right to life, but also the right to family 
unification and the free movement of certain people. This was the first time the Inter-American 
Commission persuaded the full Court to go beyond the protection of the rights of physical integ-
rity and life in its use of provisional measures.10 
Commissioner Mendez believes that one of the reasons the Commission achieved this was 
the fact that it had previously taken its own precautionary measures. During the hearing before the 
Court the Dominican Republic repeatedly asked why they were called to the Court. The Commis-
sion answered that it had requested the State to do something about the situation six months pre-
viously and that the State had not even responded. In other words, the Commission had no choice 
                                                 
6 The Court refers to it as ‘matter’ rather than ‘case’ because the case itself was still pending before 
the Commission and the Court was only dealing with the Commission’s request for provisional 
measures. 
7 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000. 
8 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, second ‘Having seen’ clause. 
9 See further on the group of beneficiaries Chapter XIII (Protection). 
10 On the possibility of the President of the Inter-American Court to take urgent measures until the 
full Court would convene to discuss the request for provisional measures, see Chapter II 
(Systems). See further Chapter XII (Other situations), referring to a few cases in which the 
President of the Court took urgent measures. 
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but to go to the Court about this issue.11 It explained that despite its precautionary measures there 
had ‘been no change in the practice of the Dominican authorities of deporting and expelling Hai-
tians and Haitian-origin Dominicans’.12 It also noted that ‘(t)his practice, which is carried out 
arbitrarily, in summary fashion, and without guarantees, continues to be aimed against individuals 
whose skin color is “black”. Because of the fact that they are black, they are suspected to be 
Haitian; it is then presumed that if they are Haitian they are illegally in the country and are there-
fore expelled’.13 Ten days after the hearing the Court ordered provisional measures for the first 
time, on behalf of five of the seven persons specifically mentioned.14 The Court considered that 
the events presented by the Commission prima facie showed a ‘situation of extreme gravity and 
urgency as to the rights to life, personal integrity, special protection for children in the family, and 
to residence and movement’ for the persons identified by the Commission.15 
The Commission had noted that ‘neither the text nor the spirit of Article 63(2) of the 
American Convention establish an impossibility or restriction as to whether the irreparable dam-
age should be against life, integrity or any other right. There is, therefore, the need to recognize 
that other rights protected by the Convention should be subject to a protection similar to the pro-
tection thus far afforded life and personal integrity’.16 This statement is not sufficiently clear. A 
need to recognise that rights other than life and personal integrity should receive a similar protec-
tion does not necessarily follow from the fact that text and spirit of Article 63(2) do not rule out 
such an interpretation. The Court, however, indeed ordered provisional measures to halt arbitrary 
expulsion. It may have combined the fact that Article 63(2) does not rule out such an interpreta-
tion with the seriousness of the situation, creating a need to use provisional measures also in a 
situation of arbitrary expulsion. 
In short, in its Orders of August and November 2000 and May 2001 the Court expected the 
State to respect the lives and personal integrity of the several alleged victims, as well as two 
witnesses, but also to prevent the expulsion of three of them and allow the immediate return of 
three others who had already been expelled in an arbitrary manner. In addition, the State should 
facilitate the family unification of some of the alleged victims and in particular assist one of them 
in finding his family either in the Dominican Republic or in Haiti. The State should also provide 
detailed information on the situation of the inhabitants of the bateyes who could be subjected to 
forced repatriation.17 In its provisional measure of May 2001 the Court confirmed its previous 
orders and added that all the beneficiaries should receive a document of ‘safe passage’ and the 
relevant authorities should be informed of the fact that they were protected by these provisional 
measures. Finally, the State and the Inter-American Commission should take all necessary meas-
                                                 
11 Interview of author with Commissioner Juan Mendez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. 
12 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000.  
13 Id. In its brief of 30 May 2000 the Commission mentioned that it had issued precautionary 
measures on 22 rather than 21 November 1999. 
14 It did not yet include the other two persons for lack of evidence. About evidentiary requirements 
see Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk).  
15 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, 9th ‘Considering’ clause. The Commission had identified 
these persons in its Addendum of 13 June 2000. 
16 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, ‘Having seen’ clause 11d. 
17 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Orders of 18 August 2000 and 12 November 2000. The latter reference to a larger 
group at risk is the only concession by the Court vis-à-vis the Commission’s request to protect a 
larger group of unnamed persons. See further Chapter XIII (Protection) and its section on the 
group of beneficiaries.  
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ures, before the end of June 2001, to create an appropriate mechanism for the coordination of and 
supervision over the implementation of the provisional measures.18 Eventually, in March 2002, 
the State provided the documents of ‘safe passage’ and met with the representatives of the Com-
mission and the petitioners to create a supervisory committee for the implementation of the provi-
sional measures.19  
Yet subsequently the Court received reports that the authorities had destroyed some of the 
‘safe conducts’ and that the children of one of the witnesses were being threatened. Out of fear 
they left their country. The other witness, Father Ruquoy, had also left the country out of fear for 
his life, after having lived there for 30 years. Moreover, the Supreme Court had declared uncon-
stitutional the agreement (‘Acta de Entendimiento’) between the representatives of the State, the 
Commission and the petitioners regarding the implementation of the provisional measures.  
In February 2006 the Court ordered, once more, the protection of the lives and personal in-
tegrity of the petitioners and witnesses, especially of the one witness and her four children. The 
State should ensure the necessary conditions for their return to their place of residence in the 
Dominican Republic.20 The Court repeated the substance of its previous Orders and pointed out 
that the State must (‘debe’) implement these.21 This related not just to the order to protect the 
lives and personal integrity of the beneficiaries, but also to the order to prevent their deportation.22 
For the time being it maintained the provisional measures on behalf of father Ruquoy, even 
though he had left the country. The State should offer the necessary conditions of safety in case 
he would decide to return.23  
The Court further noted the importance of the ‘safe passage’ documents to protect the lives 
and personal integrity of the beneficiaries but also prevent their deportation. Thus it expressed 
concern about the destruction of the ‘safe passage’ documents of two of the beneficiaries. The 
State should investigate the facts that led to the burning of these documents and it was to replace 
them as soon as possible.24 It also observed that, after the judgment by the Constitutional Court, 
the State had not yet informed it on the institution of a new and appropriate mechanism for the 
implementation of the provisional measures.25 
It pointed out that the State was also required to protect the beneficiaries against threats by 
third parties, unrelated to the State.26 Further it stressed that Article 63(2) ACHR made it obliga-
tory on the Addressee State to implement the provisional measures ordered by the Court, just like 
                                                 
18 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 26 May 2001. The content of the Orders is more specific and pressing, yet 
some of the language used initially appears less obligatory: while the previous two Orders used 
the term ‘requerir’/require, this Order used the term ‘solicitar’/seek. 
19 See Acta de Entendimiento, 19 March 2002, reproduced at the website of the National Coalition 
for Haitian Rights, one of the petitioners: <www.nchr.org/dr/iachr_entendimiento.htm> 
(consulted 21 February 2007). 
20 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 2 February 2006,‘Decisional’ clauses 2 and 3. 
21 Id., 9th ‘Considering’ clause. 
22 Id., 21st ‘Considering’ clause. 
23 Id., ‘Considering’ clause 19. It added that the Commission and the representatives should keep 
the Court informed of his situation so that it could evaluate whether these measures should be 
maintained. 
24 Id., 13th ‘Considering’ clause. 
25 Id., 14th ‘Considering’ clause. 
26 Id., ‘Considerando’ ochendo, referring to its provisional measures in the Eloisa Barrios et al. 
case, Order of 22 September 2005, ‘Considerando’ séptimo and Eloisa Barrios et al. case, Order 
of 29 June 2005, ‘Considerando’ octavo and Case of Penitenciarías de Mendoza, Order of 18 
June 2005, ‘Considerando’ cuarto. 
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the basic principle of state responsibility that States must comply with their treaty obligations in 
good faith.27 In addition the State was required to create the necessary mechanism to plan and 
implement the provisional measures.28 
President Cançado Trindade had attached a Concurring Opinion to the Court’s Order of 18 
August 2000, its first provisional measures involving arbitrary expulsion. He discussed the legal 
nature of provisional measures for human rights, pointing out that in order to deal with the trag-
edy of displacement and uprooted people and the consequent alienation, the emphasis must be on 
prevention. The use of provisional measures in those situations was a good example of this pre-
ventive approach. He referred to an ‘intertemporal dimension’29 that manifests itself in the appli-
cation of provisional measures as well as in the phenomenon of uprooted people. Moreover, the 
indivisibility of all human rights was equally clear in the above phenomenon as well as in the 
application of provisional measures.30 He argued that there were no legal or epistemological 
impediments against using provisional measures with regard to rights other than the fundamental 
right to life and personal integrity. As long as the two requirements of ‘extreme gravity and ur-
gency’ and prevention of ‘irreparable damage to persons’ in Article 63(2) ACHR were met, it 
would be possible, he argued, to order provisional measures with regard to all rights in the Con-
vention, because they are all interrelated.31 The extreme complexity of the problem of uprooted 
people caused the extension of the application of provisional measures from the right to life and 
personal integrity to the right to personal liberty, the right to special protection of children and 
family and the freedom of movement and residence (Articles 7, 9 and 22 ACHR). He pointed out 
that this was the first time in the history of the Court that it had used provisional measures this 
way. It had done this because, in light of its evolutive jurisprudence, it was aware of the need to 
develop new ways of protection inspired by the reality and intensity of the human suffering in-
volved.32 
According to Cançado Trindade the Court’s Order revealed that the concept ‘project of life’ 
was also relevant in the field of provisional measures, just as it had surfaced in its Judgment on 
reparations in the case of Loayza Tamayo33 and its Judgment on the merits in the case of the 
Street children killed in Guatemala.34 Provisional measures had their historical roots in domestic 
                                                 
27 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 2 February 2006, ‘Considerando’ ochendo. 
28 Id., Resolutory point 4 and ‘Considering’ clause 9(j). 
29 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §13. In this 
context this notion is used to refer to the continuity between generations of people, ancestors and 
descendants and the consequent need to take preventive action to protect this continuity. 
30 Id., Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §14. 
31 Id., Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §§13-14. 
32 Id., Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §15. 
33 IACHR Loayza Tamayo (Peru), 27 November 1998 (Reparations), §§147-148. The Court has 
referred to the project of life as ‘akin to the concept of personal fulfilment, which in turn is based 
on the options that an individual may have for leading his life and achieving the goal that he sets 
for himself’. See §148.  
34 IACHR Villagrán Morales et al. (the ‘Street Children Case’ v. Guatemala), Judgment of 19 
November 1999, referring to the rights of ‘at-risk children’, and the failure of States to ‘prevent 
them from living in misery, thus depriving them of the minimum conditions for a dignified life 
and preventing them from the “full and harmonious development of their personality”, as referred 
to in the preamble to the Children’s Convention, ‘even though every child has the right to harbor 
a project of life that should be tended and encouraged by the public authorities so that it may 
develop this project for its personal benefit and that of the society to which it belongs’, §191. See 
also the Concurring Opinion of Cançado Trindade and Abreu Burelli. Cançado Trindade also 
attached a Concurring opinion to the Court’s Judgment on Reparations in this case, 26 May 2001, 
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legal proceedings and were originally conceived to safeguard the efficiency of the adjudicatory 
function. Gradually, the autonomy of this precautionary action was confirmed at the international 
level in both the arbitral and judicial practice. Yet with this transfer to the level of public interna-
tional law, the rationale of provisional measures did not change substantively. Provisional meas-
ures continued to aim at preserving the rights claimed by the parties and the integrity of the even-
tual decision on the merits. The change in the object of provisional measures only arose with the 
emergence of the international law of human rights.35 With the transfer from the realm of the 
traditional contentious proceedings between States to that of international human rights law, the 
protective function of provisional measures was enhanced, in order to protect the substantive 
rights of human beings themselves. The Order in Haitians in the Dominican Republic, he noted, 
consolidated this gradual evolution.36 He pointed out that the Court’s approach was innovative yet 
prudent. It had recognised the great complexity of the problem and had taken care that it would 
not prejudge the merits of the case pending before the Commission, in particular with regard to 
the question of due process of law. Its Order contributed to the characterisation of the concept 
‘tutelar’ (protect), more than simply ‘cautelar’ (prevent), of provisional measures in the realm of 
human rights.37 He pointed out that the law evolves in order to attend to social necessities and in 
recognition of the values underlying the norms.38 
In its subsequent Orders, including in the Haitian case, the full Court has confirmed the 
above approach. Indeed in the Haitian case the Court considered, in its Order of May 2001, that 
under national legal systems the purpose of provisional measures is ‘to preserve the rights of the 
parties to a dispute, ensuring that the future judgment on merits will not be prejudiced by their 
actions pendente lite’, but that ‘the purpose of provisional measures in international human rights 
law goes further, because, in addition to their essentially preventive nature, they effectively pro-
tect fundamental rights, since they seek to avoid irreparable damage to persons’.39 In other words 
the Court confirmed that, in human rights law, the concept of provisional measures is evolving 
from the traditional preventive function to a more encompassing protective function.  
Apart from ordering precautionary and provisional measures to halt arbitrary expulsion, the 
Inter-American Commission and Court have also dealt with the issue of citizenship registration 
and access to education of children of Haitian descent born in the Dominican Republic. The Court 
has done so in a judgment on the merits that will be discussed in section 3, while the Commission 
has even intervened pending the proceedings, ordering precautionary measures in August 1999 in 
order to ensure access to primary school for the child Violeta Bosica. It did so in addition to 
ordering precautionary measures to halt her deportation as well as that of the other alleged victim. 
The petitioners had claimed that the State had denied Violeta Bosica her Dominican nationality 
despite the fact that the Constitution established the principle of ius soli and she had indeed been 
born in the Dominican Republic. Many children of Haitian descent who were born in the Domini-
                                                                                                                       
in which he invoked the project of life, §§21 and 33. See further Cantoral Benavides, 3 
December 2001 (Reparations): “The pain and suffering that those events inflicted upon him 
prevented the victim from fulfilling his vocation, aspirations and potential, particularly with 
regard to his preparation for his chosen career and his work as a professional. All this was highly 
detrimental to his “life project””, §60. See also Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, 
§§8, 10, 12-13. See also Chapter VII (Detention), section 3 and Chapter XII (Other situations), 
sections 2.5 (Preservation of IVF embryos) and 2.6 (Arbitrary detention). 
35 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §17. 
36 Id., §18. 
37 Id., §23. 
38 Id., §24. 
39 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order of 26 May 
2001, 7th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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can Republic and would, therefore, have the right to Dominican nationality, have been denied this 
right. Apparently this also means that they are deprived of their right to attend school. A case was 
brought on behalf of Violeta Bosica, 4th grader at the time, as well as on behalf of Dilcia Yean, 
who was still a toddler. The case was originally submitted in October 1998, the year Violeta 
Bosica was denied access to her school. For the school year 1998-1999 she decided to enrol in 
adult evening classes instead. It was only in April 1999 that the Commission received an amended 
petition that included a request for precautionary measures and only in June 1999 this petition was 
submitted in Spanish, as requested by the respondent State. In August 1999 the Commission 
indeed requested the State to adopt precautionary measures on behalf of both children to grant 
them ‘forthwith the necessary guarantees to avoid them being expelled from Dominican territory 
and so that Violeta Bosica (sic) m[ight] continue attending school regularly, and receiving the 
education offered to all other Dominican children’.40 The formulation shows that the Commission 
asserted her Dominican nationality already at this stage. In fact there was no need to do so as by 
1999 the right to access to primary education had already been established as being inherent in 
each child, independent of its nationality.41 The State responded within three days, requesting the 
Commission’s rationale for using these precautionary measures at this stage of the proceedings 
‘and not previously or subsequently’. It also inquired about ‘any new facts that justified this re-
quest’.42 In its response the Commission simply noted that its request referred to a situation that 
met ‘the requirements of truth and urgency, and the need to prevent irreparable harm to per-
sons’.43 Subsequently the State pointed out that it would never repatriate a Haitian citizen who 
was in the country legally, ‘or according to any of the conditions that have been established in 
accepting illegal immigrants, [such as] individuals who have been in the country for a long time, 
or who are related to Dominican nationals’. It noted that the Directorate General of Migration had 
emphasised that both children ‘should not be repatriated while the procedure of verifying the 
legitimacy of their arguments was underway’.44 Violeta Bosica was allowed access to primary 
school education. Although these precautionary measures seem to have been successful for one 
girl, there are apparently many other children deprived of primary education in the Dominican 
Republic.45  
2.3 African Commission  
In the context of a claim of arbitrary expulsion the African Commission has ordered Zambia to 
allow the return of one of the alleged victims to his home country and to allow the body of the 
other alleged victim, who had died upon expulsion, to be returned for burial.46 
                                                 
40 IACHR Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, §8 (including 
comments from the original). 
41 See further section 3 of this Chapter. 
42 IACHR Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, §9. 
43 Id., §9. 
44 Id., §11. 
45 See further in section 3. 
46 ACHPR Amnesty International v. Zambia (on behalf of William Banda and John Chinula), 5 
May 1999 (merits), referring to the Commission’s decision, at its 23rd session, to order 
provisional measures. The Commission informed the State on 19 July 1998. It sent a reminder on 
17 November 1998, §§17-19. 
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2.4 ECtHR 
In October 1999 the ECtHR used provisional measures in a case in which the petitioner had 
invoked both the prohibition of cruel treatment in Article 3 ECHR and the prohibition of 
collective expulsion in Article 4 of Protocol 4 to the ECHR in order to halt the collective 
expulsion of a group of 74 Roma from Belgium to Slovakia. It is not clear whether the Court 
ordered provisional measures simply because Art. 3 had been invoked or also in order to prevent a 
violation of the prohibition of collective expulsion under Article 4 Protocol 4 as such. What is 
clear is that the petitioner requested it to apply its Rule on provisional measures, or in the 
alternative, its Rule on prioritizing cases. Moreover, along with its provisional measures, the 
Court specifically requested information on whether the State had examined the risk of inhuman 
or degrading treatment in Slovakia. Subsequently, when the Court found a violation of Article 4 
Protocol 4, in conjunction with Article 13 ECHR, it did not devote any discussion to its 
provisional measures and the fact that Belgium had ignored them.47 In other words the practice of 
the ECtHR does not yet show an expansion of its use of provisional measures to include cases of 
arbitrary expulsion, yet it does not deny the possibility either. Contrary to the Bosnia Chamber it 
does not use provisional measures in the context of forced eviction. 
2.5 Bosnia Chamber 
Between November 1996 and December 2001 the Bosnia Chamber regularly ordered provisional 
measures to halt forced evictions. In fact this is the situation in which it used provisional measures 
most often.48 After all, under the Dayton Peace Accord it had a particular role in dealing with 
situations involving discrimination. Yet the fact that so many requests for provisional measures 
were successful triggered almost automatic requests for them with each petition. Moreover, the 
Chamber was faced more and more with petitions by individuals requesting the Chamber to order 
provisional measures on their behalf, even though the eviction order had been brought so as to 
enable the return to their homes by the persons who had originally lived there, but had fled or 
been forcibly displaced.49 In response, while it still often granted them, as of July 1998 the Cham-
ber began to deny the majority of the requests to halt such evictions.50  
The Chamber has also ordered provisional measures in cases that are not typical of the post 
war situation in Bosnia, but that have also arisen in other places throughout the world, involving 
                                                 
47 In its decision on admissibility the ECtHR simply echoed Cruz Varas et al. v. Sweden, 20 March 
1991, stating that its provisional measures were not legally binding, Conka v. Belgium, 13 March 
2001 (adm.), §11. It was only in Mamatkulov ((Grand Chamber) Mamatkulov and Askarov v. 
Turkey, 15 December 2004) that the Court found that its provisional measures are legally 
binding. See further Chapter XVI (Legal status). See generally on the official State responses 
Chapter XVII and, on the follow-up by the adjudicator, Chapter XVIII. 
48 During this period the Chamber ordered such provisional measures in more than 30 cases, most 
of them against Republika Srpska.  
49 Interview by author with Jacob Möller, Geneva, October1998. 
50 In 1999, for instance, it denied more than 33 requests for provisional measures in eviction cases, 
while during that year it does not appear to have ordered provisional measures to halt forced 
eviction. See e.g. Bosnia Chamber Aiša Tufekčić v. Federation BiH, 6 December 2001 (adm.). 
While initially, in 2000, provisional measures were ordered in this case, the Chamber 
subsequently rejected a request for extension by the Citizens’ Association for the Protection of 
Human Rights of Temporary Occupants of Abandoned Apartments in the Federation of BiH. In 
Ristić v. Srpska, 4 September 2000 the Chamber initially used provisional measures, but 
subsequently found that the petitioner himself was an illegal occupant and the case was declared 
admissible. See also S.K. v. Srpska, 14 May 1999. 
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industrial developments threatening to displace persons. In 2000 it ordered such measures in the 
case Dautbegović and 51 other villagers from Duge v. Fed. BiH (2001), after the petitioners had 
alleged that the planned construction of a hydroelectric plant near their village threatened their 
livelihood and homes.51 
3 RELATION BETWEEN PROVISIONAL MEASURES TO HALT MASS OR 
ARBITRARY EXPULSION AND FORCED EVICTION AND THE EXPECTED 
DECISION ON THE MERITS  
3.1 Introduction 
As noted in the previous chapters, e.g. on protection against threats and on the right of indigenous 
peoples to respect for their culture, provisional measures often involve several rights that are 
interrelated. In the context of complaints regarding threats to the right to life, personal integrity 
and/or cultural survival, people sometimes face arbitrary expulsion, forced evictions and internal 
displacement. 
What distinguishes the cases discussed in this chapter, in which provisional measures were 
used, is the arbitrary nature of the expulsion or eviction, without any meaningful review, as well 
as the dominance of the element of unequal treatment and discrimination. Already in 1935 the 
Permanent Court of International Justice noted that ‘there would be no true equality between a 
majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of its own institutions, and were consequently 
compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence of its being as a minority’.52 This 
statement may serve as a point of reference in discussing provisional measures dealing with the 
issue of discrimination, such as those of the Bosnia Chamber involving forced evictions and the 
precautionary and provisional measures in the Inter-American system involving arbitrary or mass 
expulsion. 
The fact that various treaties prohibit, and a range of supervisory bodies emphasises, the se-
riousness of forced eviction and mass expulsion,53 especially in the context of discrimination, 
lends support to the practice of the above adjudicators in using provisional measures to halt cer-
tain cases of mass or arbitrary expulsion and forced eviction. 
Article 2(1)(a) ICERD stipulates that States are to refrain from racial discrimination and en-
sure that public authorities and institutions refrain from racial discrimination. Article 5 ICERD 
speaks of, among others, the right to security of the person including the protection from violence 
or bodily harm, but also the right to housing, health care and education. Article 6 ICERD is an 
undertaking to ensure effective protection and remedies including reparation and satisfaction. The 
Committee supervising the ICERD has instituted an Early-Warning and Urgent Action procedure 
in order to deal with particularly urgent cases,54 but it has never invoked its Rule on provisional 
measures. 
The HRC has pointed out that States may not invoke a declaration of a state of emergency, 
made pursuant to Article 4(1) ICCPR, as a justification to engage in propaganda for war, or in 
                                                 
51 Bosnia Chamber Dautbegović and 51 Other Villagers from Duge v. Federation BiH, 2 July 2001. 
In 2000 the Chamber had ordered provisional measures. In reaction the businessmen planning 
construction of the plant requested provisional measures as well. The Chamber rejected these. 
See Drago Lukenda and Miroljub Bevanda v. Federation BiH, 5 July 2001 (inadm.). See also 
Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on the beneficairies. 
52 PCIJ Minority schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion of 6 April 1935, p. 17. 
53 See in general on the issue of mass expulsion in international law Henckaerts (1995). 
54 See Van Boven (1998). 
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advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that would constitute incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence, contrary to Article 20 ICCPR.55 This emphasis on Article 20 could also be 
relevant with regard to the substance of possible provisional measures to halt mass expulsion or 
systematic forced eviction and internal displacement of certain ethnic or religious groups, to the 
extent that a State may be ordered to publicly explain that persons are being protected by provi-
sional measures and that discrimination and threats against them will not be tolerated.56 
The IACHR has noted that ‘the principle of equality and non-discrimination is fundamental 
for the safeguard of human rights in both international law and domestic law’ and that ‘the fun-
damental principle of equality and non-discrimination forms part of general international law’ and 
‘(a)t the current stage of the development of international law, the fundamental principle of equal-
ity and non-discrimination has entered the domain of jus cogens’.57 
This chapter deals with case law on mass and arbitrary expulsion on the one hand and 
forced eviction on the other. 
3.2 Mass and arbitrary expulsion 
A still infamous case of mass expulsion is that by Uganda under Idi Amin, collectively expelling 
large groups of Asians. As Lillich has noted, this expulsion ‘in and of itself violated the UN Char-
ter because it was racially discriminatory in nature’.58 Article 22 International Convention on the 
Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (1990) prohibits 
measures of collective expulsion and determines that each case of expulsion should be ‘examined 
and decided individually’ and in accordance with the law.59 
Are the human rights adjudicators likely to find violations on the merits of the specific 
rights claimed in the cases in which provisional measures have been used? The HRC has pointed 
out that Article 13 ICCPR ‘entitles each alien to a decision in his own case’ and that the obliga-
tions under this article would therefore ‘not be satisfied with laws or decisions providing for 
collective or mass expulsions’.60 
In its Concluding Comments to the State report by the Dominican Republic the HRC ex-
pressed grave concern ‘at the continuing reports of mass expulsions of ethnic Haitians, even when 
                                                 
55 HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4 ICCPR), 24 July 2001, §13. 
56 This is obviously relevant in the context of provisional measures to protect against death threats 
and harassment, see Chapter VII. See also Article 4 ICERD. 
57 IACHR Advisory Opinion 18(3) on the Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented 
Migrants, 17 September 2003, §173(3) and (4). 
58 Lillich/Hannum (1995), p. 65, referring to Article 55 (c) UN Charter, the Universal Declaration 
and the Restatement (3rd) of the Foreign Relations Law of the US (1987). 
59 As of 18 July 2007 this treaty was ratified by 35 States (<www.ohchr.org>, accessed 18 May 
2008). 
60 It also referred to the right to submit reasons against expulsion and to have the decision reviewed 
by the competent authority and emphasized that ‘(d)iscrimination may not be made between 
categories of aliens in the application of article 13’. HRC General Comment 15(27) on the 
position of aliens, 22 July 1986, §10. In 1990 it found the Dominican Republic in violation of 
Article 13 ICCPR because the extradition of Paul Giry was not seen to have been performed 
according to law and he had not been granted an opportunity to contest it. HRC Giry v. 
Dominican Republic, 20 July 1990. In an individual opinion four members of the Committee 
noted that had there been an administrative decision, this case would have come under Article 13, 
but as there was not, the case was to be discussed under Articles 9 and 12 ICCPR. They would 
have found violations of these provisions. Individual Opinion Chanet, Aguilar Urbina, Ando and 
Wennergren. 
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such persons are nationals of the Dominican Republic’. It held ‘mass expulsions of non-nationals 
to be in breach of the Covenant since no account is taken of the situation of individuals for whom 
the Dominican Republic is their own country’, in light of Article 12(4) ICCPR, ‘nor of cases 
where expulsion may be contrary to article 7 given the risk of subsequent cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment, nor yet of cases where the legality of an individual's presence in the country is 
in dispute and must be settled in proceedings that satisfy the requirements of article 13’.61  
Article 12(5) ACHPR stipulates that ‘the mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be prohib-
ited. Mass expulsion shall be that which is aimed at national, racial, ethnic or religious groups’.62 
Subsequent to the mass expulsion from Zambia of 517 East Africans, during two days in February 
1992, a case was submitted to the African Commission on their behalf. The expulsion had already 
taken place and no provisional measures were requested. The Commission found that they were 
‘arrested and assembled over time, with a view to their eventual expulsion. The deportees were 
kept in a camp during this time, not even an ordinary prison, and it was impossible for them to 
contact their lawyers’.63 
Mass expulsions constitute a violation of human rights whether on the basis of nationality, 
religion, ethnic, racial, or other considerations and independent of the challenges faced by many 
African countries.64 The expulsion of West African nationals from Angola, in 1996, violated 
Articles 7 and 12(4) ACHPR as they were not allowed to challenge their expulsion. Article 12(5) 
was violated as well, because they had been expelled based on their nationality.65 In the case of 
John Modise, who was deported from Botswana to South Africa after he had started an opposition 
party, the Commission found, among others, a denial of equal protection before the law and of the 
respect for each individual’s legal status.66 This had ‘greatly jeopardised’ his freedom of move-
ment and infringed upon his right to leave and to return to his country.67 
The case of Malawi African Association et al. v. Mauritania (2000) illustrates that mass ex-
pulsion, forced eviction and the destruction of property often go hand in hand with endemic dis-
crimination.68 Among others, the African Commission found that ‘(e)victing Black Mauritanians 
from their houses and depriving them of their Mauritanian citizenship’ constituted a violation of 
                                                 
61 HRC Concluding Observations, CCPR/CO/71/DOM, 26 April 2001, §16. 
62 In ACHPR Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture v. Rwanda, October 1996 the African 
Commission found a violation of this provision with regard to the expulsion of groups of 
Burundian refugees. Article 12(4), prohibiting the arbitrary expulsion of asylum seekers, was also 
found to have been violated, as well as Article 7(1) ACHPR because of their expulsion from 
Rwanda without giving them the opportunity to be heard by the national judicial authorities. 
63 ACHPR Rencontre Africaine pour la defence des droits de l’homme v. Zambia, October 1997, 
§28. It found violations of Articles 2, 7(1)(a) and 12(5) ACHPR. 
64 ACHPR Federation Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme v. Angola, 11 November 
1997, §§13 and 16. 
65 Id., §14. The African Commission has pointed out that ‘(w)hile the decision as to who is 
permitted to remain in a country is a function of the competent authorities of that country, this 
decision should always be made according to careful and just legal procedures, and with due 
regard to the acceptable international norms and standards’. ACHPR John K. Modise v. 
Botswana, October/November 2000, §83. 
66 ACHPR John K. Modise v. Botswana, October/November 2000, §88. 
67 Id., §93. 
68 This was a case combining a range of complaints, including torture and cruel treatment in 
detention as well as slavery like practices. In the latter context the Commission found that ‘there 
was a violation of article 5 of the Charter due to practices analogous to slavery’ and emphasised 
‘that unremunerated work is tantamount to a violation of the right to respect for the dignity 
inherent in the human being’. It also considered that the conditions to which the descendants of 
slaves are subjected clearly constitute exploitation and degradation of man’, ACHPR Malawi 
African Association et al. v. Mauritania, 11 May 2000, §135. 
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Article 12(1) ACHPR.69 ‘The confiscation and looting of the property of black Mauritanians and 
the expropriation or destruction of their land and houses before forcing them to go abroad’ consti-
tuted a violation of the right to property (Article 14 ACHPR).70 Among others the Commission 
recommended the new government of Mauritania to ‘take diligent measures to replace the na-
tional identity documents of those Mauritanian citizens, which were taken from them at the time 
of their expulsion and ensure their return without delay to Mauritania as well as the restitution of 
the belongings looted from them at the time of the said expulsion’.71 
In July 1998 the African Commission had used provisional measures ordering the return of 
one alleged victim to his home country as well as the return the body of the other alleged victim, 
who had since died. On the merits it confirmed this as definite obligations.72 Pending the proceed-
ings of Amnesty International v. Zambia (1999) the Commission had used provisional measures 
to ensure the return of Mr Banda and the burial of Mr Chinula (who had died in Malawi). On the 
merits the Commission found that Zambia had violated Articles 7 and 12(4) ACHPR with regard 
to Mr Banda, who had unsuccessfully challenged his deportation in the Zambian courts, but was 
denied access to the administrative proceedings.73 Mr. Chinula was not allowed to challenge his 
deportation at all. He was forcibly deported and when he tried to return to Zambia in order to 
challenge his expulsion he was threatened with imprisonment.74 The African Commission found a 
violation of Article 7 ACHPR.75 It also noted that it had previously used provisional measures and 
repeated them in substance by stating that ‘Zambia must be required to allow the return of Wil-
liam Steven Banda with a view to making application for citizenship by naturalisation’.76 It added 
that the family of John Lyson Chinula, who died in Malawi, was ‘requesting the return of his 
body for burial in Zambia. The Government of Zambia should be required to grant that wish’.77 
In 2002 the ECtHR held that the expulsion of 74 Roma from Belgium to Slovakia consti-
tuted a violation of Art. 4 Protocol 4, on the prohibition of collective expulsion, in conjunction 
with Article 13 ECHR.78 The procedure had provided insufficient guarantees to ensure that the 
personal circumstances of each of those concerned would be taken into account ‘genuinely and 
individually’.79 Moreover, petitioners could not depend on the suspensive effect of domestic 
proceedings, contrary to Article 13 ECHR.80 As noted, the Court had ordered provisional meas-
ures in this case, but they were not respected and it is not clear whether the Court decided to order 
them given the Article 3 claim or in light of the collective nature of the impending expulsion. 
As discussed, the Inter-American Court has confirmed the Inter-American Commission’s 
approach to urgent situations of arbitrary or mass expulsion. Thus, it has ordered provisional 
measures in situations not directly involving threats to life and physical integrity. The situation 
                                                 
69 ACHPR Malawi African Association et al. v. Mauritania, 11 May 2000, §126. 
70 Id., §128. 
71 Id., Concluding part, following §142. 
72 ACHPR Amnesty International (on behalf of William Banda and John Chinula) v. Zambia, 5 
May 1999. 
73 Id., §§7 and 44. 
74 Id., §§7 and 11. 
75 Id., §46. The Commission noted that the claw-back clauses such as Article 2(2) must not be 
interpreted contrary to the principles of the Charter and that rules of natural justice must apply, 
§50. 
76 Id., §47. 
77 Id., §48. 
78 ECtHR Conka v. Belgium, 5 February 2002. 
79 Id., §63. 
80 Id., §§78-83. 
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clearly related to human rights violations that were more serious than ‘simple’ mass expulsion.81 
It involved racial discrimination as well. Moreover it concerned a range of rights including the 
right to access to primary education and other children’s rights.  
The Inter-American Court specifically referred to statements by UN bodies82 in its discus-
sion of the case of the Yean and Bosico children (2005), including the forms of reparation re-
quired on their behalf.83 The mothers of Dilcia Yean and Violeta Bosica were Dominican and 
                                                 
81 In his Concurring Opinion to the Order for provisional measures in the Haitian case Cançado 
Trindade sketched the general context of mass expulsion cases, by paying attention to the 
phenomenon of uprooted people and the state responsibility triggered in this regard. He pointed 
out that this issue must be treated not in light of state sovereignty but as a truly global problem 
bearing in mind the erga omnes obligations of protection. Since the phenomenon of uprooted 
people is of a global character, States cannot shirk their responsibility and continue applying 
criteria based on their internal legal order alone. IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian 
Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, Concurring 
Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §§10-11. They must take into account the consequences of the 
norms and public policies they adopt in relation to the issue of migration and, in particular, the 
procedures of deportation and expulsion, id. §12. He emphasized the grave consequences of 
separating persons from their roots. The connection with their roots is necessary to maintain their 
spiritual legacy and to keep open channels of communication between the living and the dead. 
IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §5. He noted 
that uprooting people causes them to lose touch with daily life and their mother tongue as a way 
to express their ideas and feelings as well as with their work that gives everyone a sense of life 
and of being useful. By losing their own way to communicate with the outside world, they also 
lose the possibility of developing a ‘project of life’. IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian 
Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, Concurring 
Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §6. On the concept of ‘project of life’ see also Chapter XII 
(Other situations). While the roots involved in this case seem less deep than those involving 
ancestral lands, this remark shows a more general awareness of the problem of displacement. The 
reference indicates a correlation with the Court’s statements on indigenous peoples and their 
ancestral grounds as well as with those on the importance in general of being able to bury the 
dead. See respectively IACHR Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community case, 31 August 2001; 
Bámaca Velásquez case, 22 February 2002 (Reparations); Villagrán Morales et al. (the ‘Street 
Children Case’), 26 May 2001 (Reparations). See also African Commission Amnesty 
International v. Zambia, 5 May 1999 (on behalf of William Banda and John Chinula). According 
to Cançado Trindade today answers must be found to the new demands for protection even if 
they are not literally contemplated in the international human rights instruments. IACHR 
Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican Republic), 
Order of 18 August 2000, Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §7. 
82 Committee on the Rights of the Child CRC/C/15/Add.150, 21 February 2001. 
83 IACHR Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, §237. The Court 
also invoked its Advisory Opinion 17 on the Juridical Status and Human Rights of the Child, 28 
August 2002 and Advisory Opinion 18 on the Juridical Status and Rights of Undocumented 
Migrants, 17 September 2003. In 1997 the ESC Committee specifically dealt with the plight of 
Haitian workers in the Dominican Republic. It noted ‘that approximately 500,000-600,000 
Haitian illegal workers reside in the Dominican Republic, some of them for one or two 
generations, without any legal status and any protection of their economic, social and cultural 
rights. In this respect, the Committee is particularly concerned about the situation of the children 
who, due to the restrictive interpretation of article 11 of the Constitution by the authorities, do not 
receive Dominican nationality on the grounds that they are children born of foreigners in transit. 
These children are thus denied their most basic social rights, such as the rights to education and 
health care’. ESC-Committee E/C.12/1/Add.16, 12 December 1997, §17. Among others it 
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their fathers Haitian. The two children remained stateless for more than four years despite the fact 
that in the Dominican Republic ius soli applies, meaning that persons born there have the right to 
Dominican nationality.84 They are just two of a great many children whose birth registration was 
made impossible. In this context the Dominican Republic has used the argument that the Haitian 
workers are within its jurisdiction ‘in transit’ and therefore its normal rule on ius soli does not 
apply.85 
                                                                                                                       
recommended ‘that the principle of jus soli under article 11 of the Constitution be applied to the 
children of Haitian residents without delay’. ESC-Committee E/C.12/1/Add.16, 12 December 
1997, §34. It also expressed concern about the inadequate living conditions in the bateyes. ESC-
Committee E/C.12/1/Add.16, 12 December 1997, §18, also referring to its previous report: 
E/C.12/1/Add.6, §13. It urged the State to adopt positive measures to improve the living 
conditions. “To this end, the Committee recommends that the legal status of the bateyes be 
modified and their relationships with municipalities be improved, and that sugar cane companies 
be required to provide inhabitants of the bateyes with basic facilities, such as water and 
electricity, and with health and social services”. ESC-Committee E/C.12/1/Add.16, 12 December 
1997, §34. CERD has equally recommended the Dominican Republic to ‘take urgent measures to 
ensure the enjoyment by persons of Haitian origin of their economic, social and cultural rights 
without discrimination. Efforts should be made, in particular, to improve their living conditions 
in the bateyes (shanty towns)’. CERD Concluding Observations CERD/C/304/Add.74, 26 August 
1999, §11. In addition, CEDAW has expressed concern over the discriminatory character of the 
definition of nationality and the effects on Dominican women and girls of Haitian origin, who 
were among the most vulnerable groups in the State. In particular, this definition obstructed their 
access to education and other basic services. CEDAW Concluding Observations on the report of 
the Dominican Republic, 26 July 2004, §§33-34. 
84 It was only in September 2001 that birth certificates, and, consequently, Dominican nationality, 
were granted to both children. IACHR Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 
September 2005, §147. In its Concluding Comments to the State report by the Dominican 
Republic the HRC paid attention to a range of human rights issues that are also relevant in the 
context of the provisional measures ordered in the Inter-American system. These issues include 
the living and working conditions in the bateyes (see e.g. the direct contact mission by the ILO 
Committee of Experts, January 1991, on the situation of Haitian workers on sugar plantations. 
See CEACR General Report, §60. See also CEACR individual observation on Convention 111, 
2004). Other issues were the difficulties for children born in the Republic to get registered and 
the mass expulsion of Haitians and Dominicans with Haitian background. The HRC noted that 
‘failure to protect Haitians living or working in the Dominican Republic from serious human 
rights abuses such as forced labour and cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment’ and expressed 
‘concern over the living and working conditions of Haitian workers and the tolerated practices 
that restrict their freedom of movement’. HRC Concluding Observations of CCPR/CO/71/DOM, 
26 April 2001, §17. “The State party should give priority to addressing the issue of the working 
and living conditions of Haitian workers, and ensure that those workers can take advantage of the 
rights and safeguards laid down in articles 8, 17 and 22 of the Covenant”. HRC Concluding 
Observations of CCPR/CO/71/DOM, 26 April 2001, §17. It also expressed concern ‘at the abuse 
of the legal notion of “transient aliens”. According to information in its possession, such persons 
may be born in the Dominican Republic to parents who were also born there but are still not 
considered to be nationals of the Dominican Republic’. It pointed out that “The State party 
should regulate the situation of everyone living in the country and grant the rights recognized by 
article 12 of the Covenant”. HRC Concluding Observations of CCPR/CO/71/DOM, 26 April 
2001, §18. 
85 The UN Committee on the Rights of the Child has paid particular attention to the birth 
registration of children in the Dominican Republic. A large percentage were still not registered 
and not provided with identity cards. As a result these children, particularly children of Haitian 
origin or belonging to Haitian migrant families, ‘have not been able to enjoy fully their rights, 
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The Court pointed out that the right to a nationality (Article 20 ACHR) was a fundamental 
human right that could not be derogated from in times of emergency (Article 27 ACHR). It under-
stood nationality as ‘a juridical expression of a social fact that connects an individual to a State’.86 
This allowed ‘the individual to acquire and exercise rights and obligations inherent in member-
ship in a political community’.87 International law had evolved so as to limit the discretional 
authority of States, ‘on the one hand, by their obligation to provide individuals with the equal and 
effective protection of the law and, on the other hand, by their obligation to prevent, avoid and 
reduce statelessness’.88 The Court referred to ‘the peremptory legal principle of the equal and 
effective protection of the law and non-discrimination’.89 It observed that ‘the obligation to re-
spect and ensure the principle of the right to equal protection and non-discrimination is irrespec-
tive of a person’s migratory status in a State’.90 Moreover, ‘to consider that a person is in transit, 
irrespective of the classification used,’ the State must respect a reasonable temporal limit and 
understand that a foreigner who develops connections in a State cannot be equated to a person in 
transit’.91 Finally, ‘under no circumstances, could the State have applied the exception referring to 
the children of a person in transit to the Yean and Bosico children, because the mothers of the 
alleged victims are Dominican and the children were born in the Dominican Republic’.92  
Among others, it found that the State had applied different and more difficult requirements 
than was the norm. Thus it had ‘acted arbitrarily, without using reasonable and objective criteria, 
and in a way that was contrary to the superior interest of the child’. This constituted discrimina-
tory treatment, placing the children outside the State’s juridical system and keeping them state-
less. They were brought in a situation of ‘extreme vulnerability’.93 “Bearing in mind that the 
alleged victims were children, the Court considers that the vulnerability arising from statelessness 
affected the free development of their personalities, since it impeded access to their rights and to 
the special protection to which they are entitled”.94 In addition, ‘the discriminatory treatment 
imposed’ on them was ‘situated within the context of the vulnerable situation of the Haitian popu-
lation and Dominicans of Haitian origin in the Dominican Republic’.95 
The failure to recognize persons’ juridical personality harmed their human dignity.96 The 
Court also discussed that Violeta Bosico had been prevented from attending day school during 
one school year. It observed that the fact that she was forced to study at evening school ‘exacer-
bated her situation of vulnerability, because she did not receive the special protection, due to her 
                                                                                                                       
such as to access to health care and education’ and the State should increase its measures to 
ensure their immediate registration. See e.g. Committee on the Rights of the Child 
CRC/C/15/Add.150, 21 February 2001, §§26-27, referring to Article 7 Children’s Convention. It 
expressed concern at ‘various forms of discrimination and exclusion which still affect the right to 
education of certain groups of children, such as pregnant adolescents, unregistered children, 
children with disabilities and children of Haitian origin born in the State party's territory or 
belonging to Haitian migrant families, reflecting insufficient attention to article 29 of the 
Convention’. Committee on the Rights of the Child CRC/C/15/Add.150, 21 February 2001, §41. 
86 IACHR Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, §136, referring to 
ICJ Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) 2nd phase, 6 April 1955, p. 23. 
87 IACHR Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, §137. 
88 Id., §140. 
89 Id., §141. 
90 Id., §155. 
91 Id., §157. 
92 Id., §158. 
93 Id., §166. 
94 Id., §167. 
95 Id., §168. 
96 Id., §179. 
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as a child, of attending school during appropriate hours together with children of her own age, 
instead of with adults’.97 She should have attended day school ‘together with her peers, owing to 
her age, aptitudes and the appropriate curriculum and level of difficulty. This situation caused the 
child uncertainty and anxiety’.98 The Court noted that the child’s right to special protection, laid 
down in Article 19 ACHR and interpreted in light of the Children’s Convention and the Protocol 
of San Salvador, meant that ‘the State must provide free primary education to all children in an 
appropriate environment and in the conditions necessary to ensure their full intellectual develop-
ment’.99 
The African Commission has also dealt with the issue of access to education. In one case it 
found that the closure of secondary schools and universities for two years was a violation of 
Article 17 ACHPR on the right to education.100 It is unlikely that the Commission would use 
provisional measures in this case, unless the access was hindered just for certain groups. Yet it 
may consider a case like this to be urgent and accelerate its proceedings, especially when it in-
volves access to primary school education. 
In the Yean and Bosico children case the Inter-American Court referred to the vulnerability, 
suffering and uncertainty of the children, but decided to take this into account not in the context 
of finding a violation of the right to humane treatment, but rather when establishing the pertinent 
reparations.101 In other words, with regard to the two children the Court acknowledges a link with 
the prohibition of cruel treatment, but deals with it not in its finding on the merits, but in deter-
mining the appropriate form of remedy.102 With regard to their next of kin the Court did find a 
violation of the right to humane treatment. The situation of vulnerability the children were in also 
caused their mothers and sister uncertainty and insecurity, among others because of ‘the very real 
fear that they could be expelled from the Dominican Republic’.103 
The case law on the merits of the African Commission has made a link between arbitrary 
expulsion and cruel treatment. In Modise v. Botswana (2000) it found that John Modise, after his 
deportation from Botswana, had never been accepted in South Africa as a citizen and had ‘suf-
fered the fate of being deported four times’. He had been forced ‘to live for eight years in the 
“homeland” of Bophuthatswana, and then for another seven years in “No Man’s Land”, a border 
strip between the former South African Homeland of Bophuthatswana and Botswana’ from which 
he was later deported back to Botswana.104 In this context the Commission pointed out that 
‘(d)eportation or expulsion has serious implications on other fundamental rights of the victim, and 
in some instances, the relatives’.105 Modise had argued that ‘his incessant deportation, constant 
threats of deportation and the accompanying disastrous consequences constitute a violation of 
Article 5 of the Charter’ and the Commission indeed found that he had been exposed to ‘personal 
suffering and indignity in violation of the right to freedom from cruel, inhuman or degrading 
                                                 
97 Id., §185. 
98 IACHR Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, §225. 
99 Id., §185. See also §244. It appears that the foreign minister of the Dominican Republic, at a 
General Assembly meeting of the OAS in June 2006, has announced that the State will comply 
with the Court’s ruling in the Yean and Bosico case. See Minority Rights Group, Public letter to 
President Leonel Fernández, 1 October 2006 at: <www.minorityrights.org/media_centre/media_ 
comment/media_centre_letter_do> (consulted 11 January 2007). 
100 ACHPR Free Legal Assistance Group v. Zaire, October 1995, §48. 
101 IACHR Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, §204. 
102 See Chapter XIII (Protection) on the relation between the protection required as part of 
provisional measures and as part of a judgment on reparations. 
103 IACHR Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005, §§205-206. 
104 ACHPR John K. Modise v. Botswana, October/November 2000, §87. 
105 Id., §90. 
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treatment guaranteed under Article 5 of the Charter’.106 In the abovementioned Banda and 
Chinula case the Commission confirmed this approach. It pointed out that by forcing them ‘to live 
as stateless persons under degrading conditions, the government of Zambia has deprived them of 
their family and is depriving their families of the men’s support, and this constitutes a violation of 
the dignity of a human being’.107 
The adjudicators that have dealt with the issue of arbitrary or mass expulsion have ex-
pressed themselves strongly on the prohibition of discrimination. The available case law also 
shows an awareness of the impact of discrimination on personal dignity and have made a link, one 
way or other, to the prohibition of cruel treatment. Finally, on the merits the particularly vulner-
able position of children has been stressed. This case law on the merits would appear to support 
the use of provisional measures in certain cases of arbitrary or mass expulsion. 
3.3 Forced eviction 
The issue of forced evictions has ‘reached the international human rights agenda because it is 
considered a practice that does grave and disastrous harm to the basic civil, political, economic, 
social and cultural rights of large numbers of people, both individual persons and collectiv-
ities’.108 Are the adjudicators likely to find violations on the merits in the type of cases in which 
the Bosnia Chamber has used provisional measures to halt forced eviction? 
Several monitoring bodies that have not dealt with individual complaints have nevertheless 
dealt with the issue of forced eviction in a manner that indicates the importance attached to this 
issue. The Committee supervising the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ESC Committee) has sometimes reacted to planned evictions, or evictions that have al-
ready taken place, outside the context of the consideration of a State report. In 1991 the Commit-
tee asked the Dominican Republic (in a general context involving housing, not specifically related 
to persons of Haitian descent) to ‘suspend any actions which are not in clearly in conformity with 
the provisions of the Covenant’ and to provide it with additional information ‘as a matter of ur-
gency’.109 The country report of the Dominican Republic was not on the Committee’s agenda 
during that session, indicating a special initiative on the part of the Committee. That same year 
the Committee also prepared a General Comment on the right to adequate housing (Article 11 (1) 
ICESCR).110 A few years later it devoted a General Comment specifically to the issue of forced 
eviction, in which it defined this phenomenon as ‘the permanent or temporary removal against 
their will of individuals, families and/or communities from the homes and/or land which they 
occupy, without the provision of, and access to, appropriate forms of legal or other protection’.111 
                                                 
106 Id., §91. 
107 ACHPR Amnesty International v. Zambia, 5 May 1999, §58. 
108 UN study on the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation, final report by Special 
Rapporteur Van Boven, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/18, §21. Particularly on the impact on women, see 
Westendorp (2008). 
109 ESC-Committee E/C.12/1991/4, §330. 
110 ESC-Committee General Comment 4 on the right to adequate housing, 13 December 1991. 
111 ESC-Committee General Comment 7 on the right to adequate housing: forced evictions, 20 May 
1997, §4. Other examples are CERD, which has emphasized the right of all refugees and 
displaced persons freely to return to their homes of origin under conditions of safety. States 
parties are obliged to ensure that the return of such persons is voluntary (CERD General 
Recommendation XXII (49)) and the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights, which in 2005 
adopted ‘Principles on housing and property restitution for refugees and displaced persons’. See 
final report Special Rapporteur Pinheiro, E/CN.4/Sub.2/2005/17. In HRC Dahanayake and 41 
others v. Sri Lanka, 25 July 2006 (inadm.), it is noted that two requests by the petitioners for 
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The African Commission has also shown awareness of the interrelated nature of the rights 
protected in the Charter. In the Ogoni case (2001) it discussed the right to adequate housing of 
members of the Ogoni community under Articless 14 (right to property) and 18(1) (family life) 
ACHPR and pointed out that ‘when housing is destroyed, property, health, and family life are 
adversely affected’. Thus, ‘the combined effect of Articles 14, 16 and 18(1) reads into the Charter 
a right to shelter or housing which the Nigerian Government has apparently violated’.112 It also 
referred to its obligation to prevent the violation of the right to housing by third parties. It ex-
plained that ‘the right to shelter even goes further than a roof over ones head. It extends to em-
body the individual’s right to be let alone and to live in peace – whether under a roof or not’.113 It 
pointed out that the ‘particular violation by the Nigerian Government of the right to adequate 
housing as implicitly protected in the Charter’ also encompassed the right to protection against 
forced evictions.114 It noted that it drew inspiration from the definition of the term ‘forced evic-
tions’ by the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights.115 The African Commis-
sion also referred to an earlier General Comment by the UN Committee, stating that ‘all persons 
should possess a degree of security of tenure which guarantees legal protection against forced 
eviction, harassment and other threats’.116 The African Commission concluded that the conduct of 
the Nigerian government clearly demonstrated a violation of this right enjoyed by the Ogonis ‘as 
a collective right’.117 
The European system takes a more individualistic approach, but has nevertheless dealt with 
the issue of forced eviction. It has mainly done so in the context of Article 8(1) ECHR, referring 
to respect for private and family life and home, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, stipulating the 
right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions. In various cases the ECtHR has found that security 
forces deliberately destroyed the homes and property of certain petitioners, depriving them of 
their livelihood and forcing them to leave their villages.118 
While mass expulsion is always based on a specific decision by the State, a pattern of 
forced evictions may also be based on decisions by private parties against which the State fails to 
act. Whether the responsibility of the State (or entity) is based on an act or omission, the underly-
ing cause is often racial or religious discrimination resulting in ethnic cleansing of (certain parts 
of) a State. This is obvious in the cases dealt with by the Bosnia Chamber under the Dayton Peace 
Accord. The Chamber refers extensively to the case law of the European Commission and Court 
regarding forced eviction. Yet the context of the Chamber’s cases also indicates the rationale for 
its use of provisional measures. It has dealt with many cases brought by persons who had been 
forcibly evicted or had fled in light of the general situation of ethnic cleansing. They subsequently 
faced various obstacles in trying to re-obtain their property. In some cases the authorities had 
                                                                                                                       
provisional measures to the effect that the State should refrain from evicting them and their 
families from their land and homes or ‘involuntarily resettling’ then, were denied by the special 
Rapporteur, §1.2. 
112 ACHPR The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria (Ogoni case), 27 October 2001, §63. 
113 Id., §64. 
114 Id., §66. 
115 Ibid., referring to ESC-Committee General Comment 7 on the right to adequate housing: forced 
evictions (Article 11(1) ICESCR), 20 May 1997. 
116 ACHPR The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria (Ogoni case), 27 October 2001, §66, referring to ESC-Committee General 
Comment 4 on the right to adequate housing, 13 December 1991, §8(a). 
117 ACHPR The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria (Ogoni case), 27 October 2001, §66. 
118 See e.g. ECtHR Akdivar et al. v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, 24 
April 1998, Bilgin v. Turkey, 16 November 2000 and Dulaş v. Turkey, 30 January 2001. 
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failed to enforce domestic court orders and had failed to protect against third parties.119 In many 
cases the Chamber found that pre-war owners or occupants were still not enabled to return to their 
houses, constituting continuing violations of the right to their home and property.120 In other cases 
the Chamber has pointed out that the ‘threatened eviction of a person from their home constitutes 
an “interference by a public authority” with the exercise of the right to respect for the home’.121 In 
such cases there appears to be a clear link between the substantive law on the merits and the 
provisional measures taken pending the proceedings. 
The ECtHR itself has not used provisional measures to halt forced eviction. Yet its case law 
on the merits recognizes the serious nature of ethnic discrimination. In Moldovan et al. v. Roma-
nia (2005) the ECtHR found that ‘police officers were involved in the organised action of burning 
the houses’ of the petitioners (all Roma) and later ‘tried to cover up the incident’. The petitioners, 
‘having been hounded from their village and homes’ had to live ‘and some of them still live, in 
crowded and improper conditions – cellars, hen-houses, stables, etc. – and frequently changed 
address, moving in with friends or family in extremely overcrowded conditions’.122 While the 
incident itself took place before Romania became a Party, in light of ‘the direct repercussions of 
the acts of State agents’ on the petitioners the Court considered that the responsibility of the Gov-
ernment was engaged with regard to their subsequent living conditions.123 There was no doubt in 
this case that these conditions fell within the scope of ‘their right to respect for family and private 
life, as well as their homes’, making Article 8 ECHR clearly applicable.124  
Yet the Court did not ‘just’ find a violation of Article 8, but also of Article 3 ECHR. It 
noted that in previous cases it had deemed treatment to be ‘degrading’ within the meaning of 
Article 3 ECHR, because it was such as to arouse in the victims feelings of fear, anguish and 
inferiority capable of humiliating and debasing them.125 In this respect it would examine whether 
the object of a particular form of treatment ‘is to humiliate and debase the person concerned and 
whether, as far as the consequences are concerned, it adversely affected his or her personality’.126 
Nevertheless ‘the absence of any such purpose cannot conclusively rule out a finding of a viola-
tion’ of Article 3.127 It considered that the petitioners’ ‘living conditions in the last ten years, in 
particular the severely overcrowded and unsanitary environment and its detrimental effect on the 
applicants’ health and well-being, combined with the length of the period during which the appli-
cants have had to live in such conditions and the general attitude of the authorities, must have 
caused them considerable mental suffering, thus diminishing their human dignity and arousing in 
                                                 
119 See e.g. Bosnia Chamber M.J. v. Srpska, 7 November 1997. 
120 One category of cases was based on legislation on so-called ‘abandoned property’. In various 
cases the Chamber found violations of the right to respect for the home and possessions, see 
further Neussl (1999). 
121 See e.g. Bosnia Chamber Turčinović v. Fed. B&H, 11 March 1998, §20 and Nada Blagojević v. 
Srpska, 11 June 1999, §49. Another category of cases in which the Chamber has also used 
provisional measures concerned the so-called ‘JNA cases’ involving a Decree annulling contracts 
in which persons had bought apartments from the Yugoslav National army (JNA). The Chamber 
found that the owners’ right to their property had been violated, see e.g. Medan et al. v. State and 
Fed. B&H, 7 November 1997 and Kalinčević v. B&H and Fed. B&H, 11 March 1998 
(provisional measures of 12 December 1996 and order on the merits not to evict the victim from 
the apartment). 
122 ECtHR Moldovan et al. v. Romania, 12 July 2005, §103. 
123 Id., §104. 
124 Id., §105. 
125 See e.g. ECtHR Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000 (Grand Chamber), §92. 
126 See e.g. ECtHR Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, §55. 
127 ECtHR Moldovan et al. v. Romania, 12 July 2005, §101, referring to Peers v. Greece, 19 April 
2001, §74. 
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them such feelings as to cause humiliation and debasement’.128 It added that the remarks concern-
ing the honesty and way of life of the petitioners, made by some public authorities, ‘in the ab-
sence of any substantiation’, appeared to be ‘purely discriminatory’.129 
The Court reiterated that discrimination based on race could ‘of itself amount to degrading 
treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention’.130 Such discriminatory remarks 
‘should therefore be taken into account as an aggravating factor in the examination’ of the com-
plaint under Article 3 ECHR.131 In conclusion, the ECtHR found that the ‘living conditions and 
the racial discrimination to which they have been publicly subjected by the way in which their 
grievances were dealt with by the various authorities’ constituted ‘an interference with their hu-
man dignity which, in the special circumstances of this case, amounted to “degrading treatment” 
within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention’.132 
Similarly, in certain circumstances the burning and destruction of houses itself constitutes 
acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment. A few years before the ECtHR 
judgment in Moldovan (which for reasons of jurisdiction ratione temporis could only relate to the 
situation subsequent to the burning of houses), the UN Committee against Torture already pointed 
this out in Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia (2002). This case was brought on behalf of 65 
persons of Romani origin, nationals of Yugoslavia, who had been driven out of their homes while 
their property was completely destroyed. After the first weeks of hiding they have since continued 
to live ‘in abject poverty, makeshift shelters or abandoned houses’.133 
CAT added to its statement that the burning of their houses constituted acts of cruel treat-
ment that the ‘nature of these acts is further aggravated by the fact that some of the complainants 
were still hidden in the settlement when the houses were burnt and destroyed, the particular vul-
nerability of the alleged victims and the fact that the acts were committed with a significant level 
of racial motivation’. It also emphasized the positive obligations of the State, considering that the 
complainants had ‘sufficiently demonstrated that the police (public officials), although they had 
been informed of the immediate risk that the complainants were facing and had been present at 
the scene of the events, did not take any appropriate steps in order to protect the complainants, 
thus implying “acquiescence” in the sense of article 16 of the Convention’.134 It found that the 
State had failed to observe its obligations under this article ‘by failing to enable the complainants 
to obtain redress and to provide them with fair and adequate compensation’.135 
4 CONCLUSION  
The practice of the Bosnia Chamber to halt forced eviction in certain cases is closely related to its 
function under the Dayton Peace Accord and must be explained in the context of the recent his-
tory of ethnic cleansing, along with religious and ethnic discrimination that had become endemic, 
as well as the particular hybrid nature of the Human Rights Chamber, both constitutional and 
                                                 
128 ECtHR Moldovan et al. v. Romania, 12 July 2005, §110. 
129 Id., §111. 
130 Id., §111, referring to EComHR East African Asians v. UK, 14 December 1973, p. 62. In fact in 
that case the European Commission noted that, depending on the circumstances, this might 
‘constitute a special affront to human dignity’, §207. It found that the UK immigration legislation 
constituted an interference with the human dignity of the petitioners that, in the circumstances, 
amounted to ‘degrading treatment’ forbidden under Article 3 ECHR, §208. 
131 ECtHR Moldovan et al. v. Romania, 12 July 2005, §111. 
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133 CAT Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, 21 November 2002, §2.27. 
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international. At the same time, while the other adjudicators have not used provisional measures 
to halt forced eviction, their condemnation of the phenomenon of forced eviction on the merits to 
a great extent converges with the approach of the Chamber. It cannot be ruled out that other adju-
dicators, faced with a similar set of circumstances, will use provisional measures to halt forced 
eviction even if their nature is regional or international rather than ‘hybrid’.  
The extension, in the Inter-American system, of the use of provisional measures to situa-
tions of arbitrary expulsion may be based on an extensive interpretation of the requirements of 
protection of personal integrity or on an extension of the application of Article 63(2) ACHR 
preventing irreparable harm to other rights than the right to life and personal integrity. In both 
cases the extension, as the Court puts it, is a confirmation that in human rights law the concept of 
provisional measures is evolving from the traditional preventive function to a more encompassing 
protective function.136 In the Haitian case groups of people found themselves in desperate situa-
tions without legal protection and separated from their families. In this light the urgent interven-
tion could be seen as aiming at preventing irreparable harm to human dignity and – as such – 
bearing some relationship with the prohibition of cruel treatment in Article 5 ACHR. 
The African Commission has made a link between the uncertain situations that have often 
resulted from arbitrary expulsion on the one hand and cruel treatment on the other. The Inter-
American Commission and Court have considered that the inability to register children and the 
uncertainty resulting from it might constitute cruel treatment. Moreover, both in the European 
system and in the system developed under the ICAT discrimination can play a role in the deter-
mination that certain acts or omissions resulted in cruel treatment in violation of international 
obligations.  
The findings on the merits by these adjudicators, which elucidate the fact that arbitrary or 
mass expulsion and forced eviction can result in particular harm to children and may constitute 
cruel treatment, might therefore help justify a movement of this type of provisional measures 
towards the common core.137  
 
                                                 
136 See e.g. IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order 
of 26 May 2001, 7th ‘Considering’ clause. 
137 See the Conclusion to Part II of this book. 
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 PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
 IN OTHER SITUATIONS 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters have discussed situations in which provisional measures have been used by 
more than one adjudicator. It appears that these situations mostly involve threats to rights that the 
various human rights adjudicators have considered particularly crucial for the protection of life 
and personal integrity.  
The Conclusion to Part II will more closely discuss the common core of the concept of pro-
visional measures as used by the human rights adjudicators and will argue that this common core 
involves the prevention of irreparable harm to persons.1 
Yet the concept of provisional measures must be clarified also by examining its outer limits. 
In some situations provisional measures have been used in one system only. In addition there 
have been several situations in which petitioners requested provisional measures to no avail. 
Some of these cases may nevertheless belong to the common core, but most of them are more 
likely to help determine the outer limits of the concept. This chapter provides some examples of 
atypical provisional measures and of failed requests for provisional measures by petitioners.2 It 
appears that most of these examples may be situated on a continuum between ‘towards the com-
mon core’ and ‘towards the outer limits’ (section 2), while some of the examples are clearly 
beyond the outer limits of the concept (section 3).  
As noted in the Introduction to Part II, one of the assumptions underlying this book is that 
the use of provisional measures to prevent reversible harm is beyond the outer limits of the con-
cept of provisional measures. On the other hand, their use to prevent harm that is not only irre-
versible, but also irreparable is more likely to fall within the common core of the concept. The 
‘in-between’ cases involve irreversible harm to the claim or the procedure rather than to persons. 
When it concerns harm to the claim or the procedure, but not to life and physical integrity, the 
term irreversible harm is used. 
2 TOWARDS THE COMMON CORE OR TOWARDS THE OUTER LIMITS? 
2.1 Introduction 
Most human rights adjudicators have used provisional measures at least in one or two atypical 
situations. These range from halting the destruction of a painting to safeguarding documentary 
evidence. Sometimes a broader interpretation is given to the right to life involving a dignified life 
in which the fundamental right to life also means the right not to be prevented from ‘having ac-
                                                 
1 As well as groups in some cases, see particularly Chapter X on indigenous peoples and the 
discussion in the Conclusion to Part II, section 2.3. 
2 It must be born in mind, however, that most adjudicators do not systematically publish 
information on failed requests. Thus, while the examples discussed may help clarify the outer 
limits of the concept, they are not necessarily representative of the range of situations in which a 
petitioner’s request has failed. 
 Chapter XII 
524 
cess to the conditions that guarantee a dignified existence’,3 including the so-called ‘project of 
life’ of the beneficiaries.4 Indeed it is assumed that cases affecting a person’s life in such manner 
may be situated more closely towards the common core, even if most (or all) adjudicators may not 
yet be ready to order provisional measures in that specific situation. That fact, however, does 
indicate that there is insufficient evidence to consider these cases as already falling within the 
common core.  
                                                 
3 IACHR Villagrán Morales et al. (the ‘Street Children Case’ v. Guatemala), Judgment of 19 
November 1999, §144. See also IACHR Advisory Opinion 17 on the Juridical Condition and 
Human Rights of the Child, 28 August 2002, §§80 and 84 (referring to the obligations of the 
State to provide the necessary means for life to develop under decent conditions and stressing in 
this respect the importance of the right to education). 
4 This concept was referred to by the Commission as ‘life plan’ and by the Inter-American Court as 
‘project of life’, or the first time in Loayza Tamayo (Peru), 27 November 1998 (Reparations). 
This Court discussed it as ‘akin to the concept of personal fulfilment, which in turn is based on 
the options that an individual may have for leading his life and achieving the goal that he sets for 
himself’, §148. See also IACHR Villagrán Morales et al. (the ‘Street Children Case’ v. 
Guatemala), Judgment of 19 November 1999, confirming that ‘every child has the right to harbor 
a project of life that should be tended and encouraged by the public authorities so that it may 
develop this project for its personal benefit and that of the society to which it belongs’, §191. The 
representatives of the victims’ next of kin in the Street Children case had pointed out that the 
right to life in the ACHR has an autonomous value and the concept is ‘superimposed on what the 
Commission calls the life plan’, §85. The Commission had indicated that ‘the five youths were 
deprived of the basic measures of safety and protection that the State should have provided to 
them as at-risk children, and also the opportunity to develop and live with dignity. Furthermore, 
the State did not respond to the systematic abuses perpetrated against them’. It considered that the 
‘elimination and reduction of the life plans of these youths has objectively restricted their 
freedom and constitutes the loss of a valuable possession’, §86. Cynically, the State had proposed 
that ‘the precarious situation of the victims makes it highly probable that they did not have a life 
plan to put into practice’. It requested the Court to reject the Commission’s request to establish 
separate financial reparations for this concept. It accepted its responsibility in this case ‘as 
regards to general failure to adopt effective policies to avoid having a street children problem’ but 
pointed out that ‘the victims’ next of kin also bear responsibility in this respect, because they did 
not fulfil their basic functions’, §87. In making its calculation for non-pecuniary damage, the 
Court noted, it had also ‘borne in mind the overall adverse conditions of abandonment endured 
by the five street children, who were in a high-risk situation and without any protection as regards 
their future’, §§88 and 90. In reference to the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child it 
established the content and scope of the ‘measures of protection’ mentioned in Art. 19 ACHR 
(rights of the child). It emphasised ‘non-discrimination, special assistance for children deprived 
of their family environment, the guarantee of survival and development of the child, the right to 
an adequate standard of living, and the social rehabilitation of all children who are abandoned or 
exploited’. It was clear, the Court pointed out, that these rights had been violated by the acts 
perpetrated against the victims in this case, ‘in which State agents were involved’, §196. See 
further Cantoral Benavides, 3 December 2001 (Reparations): “The pain and suffering that those 
events inflicted upon him prevented the victim from fulfilling his vocation, aspirations and 
potential, particularly with regard to his preparation for his chosen career and his work as a 
professional. All this was highly detrimental to his ‘life project’”, §60. Cançado Trindade has 
invoked the notion also in the context of provisional measures: IACHR Haitians and Dominicans 
of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, 
Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §17. See further infra sections 2.5 (Preservation of 
IVF embryos) and 2.6 (Arbitrary detention) of this Chapter. See also Chapter VII (Detention), 
section 3 and Chapter XI (Mass expulsion), section 2 and the Conclusion to Part II, section 3.2. 
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Other atypical cases may not (directly) involve a person’s basic existence and integrity, but 
may nevertheless make sense within a given human rights system. This may be the case given the 
specific function assigned to the adjudicator or the specific aim of the treaty supervised by it. 
After all provisional measures have also been used simply to prevent irreversible harm to the 
claim or procedure, albeit not irreparable harm to persons. Such measures fall within the outer 
limits, but not within the common core.  
2.2 Providing assistance in life threatening situations or situations violating 
personal integrity  
2.2.1 Introduction 
The Inter-American Commission has regularly used precautionary measures to provide medical 
assistance against life threatening illness outside the context of detention, as well as in the context 
of the right to reparation for previous wrongs and to provide humanitarian support. At least on 
one occasion the European Commission on Human Rights used provisional measures in response 
to a situation in which a State had put a group of individuals into an adverse humanitarian 
situation involving lack of basic facilities.5 The Bosnia Chamber has also done so at least once. 
Thus far, the HRC has not used provisional measures in medical assistance cases outside the 
detention context.6 This section discusses the limited European and the more extensive Inter-
American practice. 
2.2.2 Practice of the European Commission on Human Rights 
As noted, there is one example of a provisional measure by the European Commission on Human 
Rights in which it intervened on behalf of 53 persons who had been denied access to Spain and 
were staying on no-man’s land in adverse conditions involving lack of water, medication, sanitary 
facilities. The Commission used provisional measures in July 1992, asking Spain to take measures 
preventing irreparable harm. Spain responded two days later informing the Commission that it 
had allowed several organisations to provide relief. Four days later it allowed the entrance of the 
beneficiaries for humanitarian reasons. While this was just a single case and it involved the 
impact of a refusal by the State to allow entrance, thus seeming to be linked to non-refoulement,7 
                                                 
5 See also Chapter IX (Threats), section 2.2, referring to the ECtHR’s provisional measures of 12 
August 2008 vis-à-vis Russia and Georgia calling on ‘both the High Contracting Parties 
concerned to comply with their engagements under the Convention, particularly in respect of 
Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention’. Georgia had requested the Court to order provisional 
measures to the effect that Russia should ‘refrain from taking any measures which may threaten 
the life or state of health of the civilian population and to allow the Georgian emergency forces to 
carry out all necessary measures in order to provide assistance to the remaining injured civilian 
population and soldiers via humanitarian corridor’. Press release 581 of 12 August 2008. 
6 See HRC W. v. New Zealand, initial submission of 2 October 1997; transmission under Rule 91 
on 15 October 1997. In this case the petitioner had requested the HRC to use provisional 
measures to request the State to make available kidney dialysis so as to prevent irreparable harm. 
The HRC did not do so and eventually the case was discontinued, at the 66th session (1999), after 
the petitioner died. 
7 See Chapter V (Non-refoulement). 
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at least it indicates that a former body of the European human rights system at one point saw fit to 
intervene in a situation involving dire social and economic conditions of life.8  
2.2.3 Practice of the Bosnia Chamber  
At least once the Bosnia Chamber has ordered provisional measures to protect the beneficiaries’ 
health by improving the heating and sanitary conditions in a refugee camp. It also requested the 
addressee parties (the federal government and the constituent state of B&H) to consider urgently 
their transfer to ‘more suitable premises’.9 Subsequently the federal authorities transferred the 
refugees to newly built facilities.10 
2.2.4 Practice of the Inter-American Commission to ensure HIV medication 
outside of the detention context 
Between early 2000 and early 2004 the Inter-American Commission intervened several times (on 
at least twelve different occasions), requesting the State to ensure medication for persons carrying 
the HIV virus. Together this involved more than 190 beneficiaries. This section discusses the first 
of these cases. 
In February 2000 the Inter-American Commission took the first such precautionary meas-
ure. It did so on behalf of 27 members of the Asociación Atlacatl carrying the AIDS virus. They 
had claimed that their rights to life and health were in great danger and that they needed to be able 
to access the medication necessary for treatment. More than four months previously the Commis-
sion had already requested information from El Salvador about the situation. Since then, ten 
members of the Association had died. In its precautionary measure the Commission requested El 
Salvador to provide the necessary treatment and anti-retroviral medication to prevent the deaths of 
the 27 persons, ‘as well as the necessary hospital, pharmacological and nutritional care needed to 
strengthen their immune systems and prevent the development of infections’.11 
The petitioners had alleged, among others, that El Salvador violated the right to life, health 
and well-being of the victims by not providing them with the medication they needed to prevent 
them from dying and to improve their quality of life. They attributed the situation of these 27 
persons to negligence on the part of the State and maintained that this constituted cruel, inhuman 
and degrading treatment.12 
                                                 
8 See EComHR B. M. and 51 others v. Spain, struck out 11 September 1992, following resolution 
of the case. 
9 Bosnia Chamber Dyke Hasanaj et al. (11 adults and 27 children) v. B&H and Fed. B&H, 16 
April 1999, §4 (provisional measure of 4 December 1998). 
10 Id., §9. 
11 The request for precautionary measures was as follows: “[W]ithout prejudice to other actions that 
your Government deems necessary, the Commission holds the view that urgent measures should 
be adopted in order to provide the medical care capable of safe-guarding the life and health of 
Jorge Odir Miranda Cortéz and the other persons listed above. In particular, the IACHR asks that 
your Government provides the anti-retroviral treatment and medication necessary to avoid the 
death of the aforementioned persons, as well as the hospital, pharmacological, and nutritional 
care needed to strengthen their immune systems and to prevent the development of diseases and 
infections”. CIDH Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. v. El Salvador, 7 March 2001 (adm.). 
Precautionary measure of 29 February 2000 (See its footnote 2).  
12 CIDH Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. v. El Salvador, 7 March 2001 (adm.), §24. 
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In January 2001 the petitioners maintained that El Salvador was refusing to purchase ‘the 
triple therapy and other medications that prevent death and improve the quality of life of persons 
living with HIV/AIDS’.13 They stated:  
“The right to life encompasses much more than not dying as a result of action or negligence 
attributable to the State, in accordance with the rules of international law. The right to life, in 
that broader sense, presupposes, inter alia, that a person lives under conditions that are 
conducive to his well being”.14 
In other words, they argued that the State had failed to guarantee the alleged victims ‘the quality 
of life that allows them to achieve well being’.15 According to the petitioners the State’s negligent 
acts ‘can also place or allow a group of persons to be placed in cruel, inhumane, or degrading 
conditions’.16 
“The State should conduct all acts and omissions [sic] that are necessary to improve health, 
leading to the highest level of physical, mental, and social well being through the use of modern 
advances and scientific medical discoveries. The Salvadoran State cannot therefore fail to 
purchase and administer anti-retroviral treatments to persons living with HIV/AIDS for 
budgetary reasons if it did not seek and implement, sometime earlier, reasonable financial 
adjustments to permit their purchase and administration”.17 
In March 2001, when the Commission adopted its admissibility report, three of the alleged vic-
tims mentioned in the petition had died. In its admissibility decision the Commission stated that it 
would determine during the merits phase whether the alleged facts, if found, violated Articles 2 
(duty of implementation), 24 (equal protection of the law), 25 (judicial protection) and 26 (eco-
nomic, social and cultural rights) ACHR. In its interpretation of these articles it would take into 
account the provisions related to health.18 It also deferred to the merits stage of the case the dis-
cussion of admissibility of the claims with regard to the right to life and humane treatment. It 
believed that these claims were secondary in nature and contingent on the conclusions the Com-
mission would reach on the merits of the other claims already declared admissible.19 
Shortly after the Commission’s admissibility decision the Supreme Court of El Salvador fi-
nally ordered the State to provide Odir Miranda with antiretroviral treatment. A UNAIDS report 
                                                 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Ibid. 
16 Id., §25. Moreover, they alleged that the State had violated the victims’ right to health in Article 
XI of the American Declaration and Article 10 of the Protocol of San Salvador as well as the 
social rights laid down in Article 26 of the American Convention. According to them, it is 
possible to infer an ‘immediate legal obligation’ from the aforementioned instruments. 
17 Id., §26. 
18 The Commission considered itself competent to examine the merits of the case. It did note, 
however, that it was not competent ratione materiae to determine, through the system of 
individual petitions, violations of Art. 10 (right to health) of the Protocol of San Salvador. Under 
this instrument the Commission may deal with individual complaints about violations of trade 
union rights (Article 8 (1) (a) and the right to education (Article 13) only. At the same time, it 
could of course ‘consider this Protocol in the interpretation of other applicable provisions, in light 
of the provisions of Articles 26 and 29 of the American Convention’. CIDH Jorge Odir Miranda 
Cortez et al. v. El Salvador, 7 March 2001 (adm.), §36. 
19 CIDH Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. v. El Salvador, 7 March 2001 (adm.), §46. 
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considers that this decision was ‘presumably prompted by the Inter-American Commission’s 
criticism’.20  
In a press release a Costa Rica based organisation supporting the petitioners noted that the 
Commission’s precautionary measure could become a precedent for persons living with AIDS in 
other Latin American States.21 Indeed, subsequently the Commission also resorted to precaution-
ary measures in various similar cases.22 One of them was on behalf of three persons with 
HIV/Aids in Chile. They had contacted the Commission because ‘they believed their right to life 
and health was in serious danger’. In November 2001 the Commission informed Chile that these 
three persons ‘urgently needed basic assistance from state institutions in order to secure the drugs 
needed for their treatment’. It requested Chile to ‘ensure them access to the medicines needed for 
their survival and to medical examinations for the regular monitoring of their health conditions’. 
The State responded two weeks later describing the ‘preliminary steps’ taken at the Ministry of 
Health. It reported that the persons involved were receiving medication and undergoing examina-
tions so that the State’s services could monitor their health conditions.23  
In another case the Commission used precautionary measures ‘on behalf of the 39 persons 
named since they had not been dispensed appropriate medication by the Guatemalan public health 
system’.24 It subsequently declared admissible the complaints based on Article 4 (right to life), 
and Article 25 ACHR (judicial protection).25 Thus in this case it did not consider the right to life 
‘secondary in nature’. 
2.2.5 Practice of the Inter-American Commission to call for the provision of 
humanitarian support  
There are several, quite diverse, situations in which the Commission has intervened pending the 
proceedings because of the dire living conditions of the alleged victims.  
                                                 
20 UNAIDS, Joint UN programme on HIV/AIDS, March 2006, p. 71. 
21 See Aguabuena Asociación de Derechos Humanos, ‘La Comisión Interamericana De Derechos 
Humanos Ordena A El Salvador Que Suministre Medicamentos Contra El Hiv’, 1 March 2000, 
<http://www.aguabuena.org/articulos/salvador.html> (consulted 15 June 2007). 
22 See e.g. CIDH Annual Report 2001, §12; Annual Report 2002, §§13, 42, 51, 53, 58, 64, 71, 74 
and Annual Report 2003, §61, involving (apart from El Salvador), Chile, Bolivia, Colombia, 
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico and Peru. See also CIDH Luis 
Rolando Cuscul Pivaral and 38 others (persons living with HIV/AIDS) v. Guatemala, 7 March 
2005 (adm.) (petition and request for precautionary measures of 26 August 2003; request by 
Commission for additional information on some of the petitioners and their state of health of 3 
October 2003; response of 9 October 2003 that given the petitioners’ whereabouts they would 
need time to gather the information; the petitioners provided this information on 13 April 2004 
(‘except for certain tests like the determination of viral load which were deemed too expensive’); 
on 21 April 2004 the Commission formally forwarded the petition to the State and granted the 
precautionary measures on behalf of the 39 persons named ‘since they had not been dispensed 
appropriate medication by the Guatemalan health system’, §§5 and 7; apparently the Commission 
had previously used precautionary measures already on behalf of 12 of them, §1). 
23 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §12. 
24 The petitioners had requested precautionary measures on behalf of the presumed victims already 
in August 2003. ‘Given the victims’ whereabouts’ (this explanation is not specified in the case 
report) it was difficult to gather the information on their state of health and the Commission only 
decided to grant precautionary measures in April 2004. CIDH Luis Rolando Cuscul Pivaral et al. 
v. Guatemala, 7 March 2005 (adm.), §7. 
25 CIDH Luis Rolando Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala, 7 March 2005 (adm.). 
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In July 2001 the Commission granted precautionary measures on behalf of the survivors of 
the Aguas Blancas massacre in Mexico.26 While the Commission sought protection against threats 
for one of them, for seven survivors ‘who still bear physical and psychological scars from the 
massacre’, it sought medical attention. Within two weeks Mexico ‘reported on the measures 
adopted in compliance with the [Commission’s] request, which included contacting each of the 
protected persons, providing access to health centers in the state of Guerrero, and holding meet-
ings to resolve the problems that have been identified’.27 Obviously this case bears a relation with 
the State’s obligation to provide reparation for past violations as well.28 
In March 2004 the Commission decided to take precautionary measures on behalf of 63 
children and more than 50 adults in the so-called ‘Bello diversion’ situation in Colombia. The 
beneficiaries were victims of internal displacement within the city. They had been forcibly 
evicted ‘under conditions that jeopardized their health and personal safety’.29 The Commission 
requested Colombia to guarantee ‘adequate accommodations and the necessary conditions for the 
subsistence’ of the persons identified.30 The State should also ‘report on the actions adopted to 
clarify the abuse of force that may have been exercised against the beneficiaries’.31 Almost half a 
year later the Commission decided to lift the measures, ‘after receiving information provided by 
the parties on a series of agreements between the State, the beneficiaries and the petitioners’.32  
That same year the Commission took precautionary measures to protect the life and per-
sonal safety of the members of the Community of San Mateo de Huanchor, comprising of more 
than 5,000 families. The Commission noted that the available information indicated that the ‘de-
posits from an open-air mine in the vicinity of the Rimac River’ would severely affect the ‘living 
conditions, health, food, farming and livestock’ of these indigenous campesino families. Envi-
ronmental studies conducted by the Ministry of Health concluded ‘that the cumulative power and 
                                                 
26 In June 1995 17 men, members of a Campesinos organisation, had been executed extra judicially 
in the state of Guerrero, Mexico. See e.g. CIDH Tomas Porfirio Rondin v. Mexico, 18 February 
1998. 
27 In September 2001 ‘the State reported that a meeting had taken place in Chilpancingo, Guerrero, 
between the victims and several state and federal officials. This meeting agreed on several issues 
relating to medical attention, the patients’ traveling and accommodation expenses, specialized 
treatment, and drugs and medical equipment as indicated by their needs’. Annual Report 2001, 
§40. 
28 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
29 CIDH Annual Report 2004, §16. 
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Ibid. In its Annual Report 2006 the Commission appears to discuss this case, even though it 
refers to its precautionary measures as adopted in October 2004, rather than 5 March 2004 (lifted 
on 25 August 2004). It mentions the housing plan formulated by the State, which had allowed the 
Commission to lift its precautionary measures ‘on behalf of a number of families left homeless 
and displaced in the city of Medellin, who were forcibly evicted in spite of the existence of a 
judicial order that defined the specific, non-violent circumstances in which they could be moved 
from the so-called “Bello or river diversion”’. The Commission took new precautionary measures 
in a situation falling ‘within the framework’ of the previous because the aforementioned housing 
plan had apparently excluded nine of the families, ‘because they had been displaced from within 
the city, and they therefore returned to the Bello or river diversion’. These nine families had been 
subjected to threats from groups of paramilitaries. Apart from adopting the necessary measures to 
protect the life and integrity of the leader of this community of nine families, as well as that of his 
wife and children, the state was also requested to ‘provide information on the situation of the nine 
affected families who were beneficiaries of precautionary measure 784-04 64 Children and 50 
Adults in the Bello Diversion’, Annual Report 2006, §15 (precautionary measure on behalf of 
Eduardo César Ariza Ulloque et al. v. Colombia of 23 March 2006). 
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chronic effect of arsenic, lead, and cadmium in the deposits generated a high risk of exposure for 
the communities of the zone; that environmental pollution is affecting the health of the dwellers 
of the communities; and that children are suffering from very high levels of lead concentration in 
their blood’. The Commission did not specify how Peru should protect the life and personal safety 
of the beneficiaries, but it added that ‘likewise’ the State should ‘implement a health assistance 
and care program for the population, particularly for children, to identify the persons who might 
have been affected by the consequences of the pollution and provide the relevant medical care; 
and to begin transferring the deposits in accordance with the best technical conditions as deter-
mined by the relevant environmental impact study’.33 
In the context of murders, death threats, disappearances and stigmatization of 35 displaced 
families living in various districts of the city of Villavicencio (Colombia), the Commission not 
just requested Colombia to take the necessary measures to guarantee the life and physical integ-
rity of the people involved, but added that persons with the status of internally displaced persons 
must be provided with ‘the humanitarian assistance required, in the light of the Governing Princi-
ples of Internal Displacements and domestic law’. In this particular case it referred to information 
that the families were ‘living in misery and/or marginal conditions and under the control of the 
same paramilitary-type structures that led to their displacement from the municipality of Castillo, 
on the border of the former zone of détente’.34 
Thus the Commission’s precautionary measures have sometimes aimed to provide urgent 
medical or other support and improvement of living conditions for victims of massacres, for 
victims of forced displacement (in reference to the Governing Principles) and for victims of envi-
ronmental pollution. They often involve rights that are interrelated. A precautionary measure, for 
instance, may also have the composite purpose to protect against death threats and harassment, to 
ensure cultural survival and, as the Commission stressed in its precautionary measure on behalf of 
the Wiwa People (Colombia), ‘to provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of the displace-
ments and food crises, in particular the indigenous people’s minor children’.35 
2.2.6 Conclusion 
The Inter-American Commission, as discussed above, makes a very interesting use of precaution-
ary measures in these cases as they clearly deal with prevention of irreparable harm to persons, 
but in the context of positive obligations of the government outside the contexts of detention or 
                                                 
33 CIDH Annual Report 2004, §44. See also section 2.5 on protection against nuclear radiation; 
Chapter XIII (Protection) on the specificity of the provisional measures and the group of 
beneficiaries and Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk), including the reference to the use of 
environmental impact assessment. 
34 CIDH Annual Report 2004, §21. 
35 In this precautionary measure, taken on behalf of the members of the Wiwa People of the Sierra 
Nevada, Colombia was also asked ‘to agree on collective protection measures, including the 
presence of a community defender, with the beneficiaries, through their representative 
organizations’. The Commission mentioned two specific organizations, Annual Report 2005, 
§14. See also the Commission’s precautionary measures of 12 October 2004 on behalf of the 
Kelyenmagategma Indigenous Community of the Enxet People. They had been forcibly displaced 
from their ancestral land by individuals who destroyed their homes and working tools. The 
petitioners had alleged that they were now living in ‘deplorable conditions’ and that their 
personal safety was ‘in imminent danger’. The Commission requested Paraguay not just to adopt 
the necessary measures to protect their lives and physical integrity, but also ‘to provide 
humanitarian support to the displaced persons and guarantee their prompt return to their ancestral 
land’. Annual Report 2004, §41. See further Chapter X (Cultural rights) and Chapter XIII 
(Protection), section 4.4 (group of beneficiaries). 
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protection against death threats. While it may take considerable time before the other adjudicators 
follow suit in using provisional measures to improve social and economic conditions of life that 
are life threatening or amount to cruel treatment, for the Inter-American Commission the practice 
now seems firmly established.36 This practice clearly is within the outer limits of the concept of 
provisional measures aiming to prevent irreversible harm to the claim. In addition, the harm in 
question constitutes irreparable harm to persons. Thus the Commission’s practice is leaning 
closely towards the common core. 
Moreover, on the merits other adjudicators have recognized the positive obligations of 
States in the context of basic rights such as the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treat-
ment.37 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, for instance, refers to economic, 
social and cultural rights as rights that may be legally enforceable. In a case against Zaire (Congo) 
the African Commission found that failure by a State to provide basic services such as safe drink-
ing water, electricity and medication was a violation of the right to health in Article 16 ACHPR.38 
While the adjudicators may have qualms to intervene in such cases already pending the proceed-
ings, for fear of entering into the policy choices of States, once several adjudicators have devel-
oped a practice first on the merits and subsequently pending the proceedings (for instance by just 
asking the State to take measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons, but leaving the State free 
in choosing the necessary measures), this type of provisional measure could be considered part of 
the common core not just theoretically, but in practice as well. 
2.3 Protecting the physical or mental integrity of minors 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Outside of the context of detention, refoulement and mass expulsion adjudicators have also been 
faced with the urgent needs of children.39 The European Court likely faces its share of child 
custody cases in which risk of harm to the child is at issue.40 Yet this section discusses a few 
occasions in which provisional measures were used in the Inter-American system, involving 
children of disappeared parents and involving positive obligations to protect against child abuse 
and take remedial measures. It also refers to the practice of the HRC. After all, the latter has 
emphasized that the accessible and effective remedies required in Article 2(1) ICCPR ‘should be 
appropriately adapted so as to take account of the special vulnerability of certain categories of 
persons, including in particular children’.41 
                                                 
36 The Commission appears to take into account, implicitly the specific situation in countries such 
as Colombia, El Salvador, etc. when taking such precautionary measures. 
37 See e.g. IACHR Yakye Axa Indigenous Community v. Paraguay, Judgment of 17 June 2005. 
More generally on positive obligations see also e.g. Chapters VII (Detention) and IX (Threats). 
38 ACHPR Free Legal Assistance group, and others v. Zaire (1995), §47. For the African 
Commission’s provisional measures in the context of culture and land rights, see the case of the 
Endorois referred to in Chapter X (Culture). More generally on basic social and economic rights 
see e.g. Coomans (2003). 
39 See the Chapters VII, V and XI respectively. 
40 See e.g. ECtHR Williams v. Germany, Judgment of 12 September 2002 (struck out) involving a 
refusal by the Court to take provisional measures to halt the return of a child to its father in the 
US, but with a priority decision under Rule 41. 
41 HRC General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, §15. 
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2.3.2 Children of disappeared parents 
On one occasion the Inter-American Court has used provisional measures in the context of iden-
tity, guardianship, visiting rights and access of grandmothers of the disappeared to their grand-
children. 
In 1993 the President of the Court ordered Argentina to adopt, without delay, the necessary 
measures to protect the psychological well-being of two minors to avoid (any further) irreparable 
harm. This was a very difficult case relating to children of disappeared parents. They had been 
brought up by their kidnappers and initially were not aware that these were not their true parents. 
Of course, in such case the irreparable harm had already been done a long time ago but, at the 
same time, the harm was increasing each day the situation continued.42 Yet there could be some 
such situations where the children involved may be harmed even more by having to move to their 
biological parents or grandparents. In this particular case, the full Court did not need to ratify the 
President’s decision because Argentina had reported that the minors were brought in the custody 
of their biological family.43  
One HRC case relates to the rights of a child of disappeared persons to act against visiting 
rights of a former caretaker who was complicit in covering up her parents’ abduction.44 In 1984 
the petitioner found her granddaughter, who was then residing in the house of a nurse (S.S.) who 
claimed that she had taken care of the child since her birth. In January 1989 the petitioner re-
ceived provisional guardianship of her granddaughter, but in September 1989 the nurse was 
granted visiting rights. The Supreme Court held that the petitioner had no standing in the proceed-
ings about guardianship because only the parents and legal guardians have standing. By the end of 
September 1989 the petitioner requested the Court to order a discontinuance of the visits, basing 
herself on the psychiatric reports on the effects of the visits on her granddaughter. Her legal action 
in this respect was equally dismissed for lack of standing.45 The unwanted visits were continuing 
in the Spring of 1991. Eventually the visiting rights were terminated in 1991, without intervention 
by the HRC. In 1995 the HRC found ‘that the protection of children stipulated in article 24 of the 
                                                 
42 As Buergenthal (1994), p. 79 notes, there is no doubt that the mental harm being caused here falls 
within the scope of Article 63(2) ACHR. “The more difficult issue, however, is whether, given all 
the time that has already elapsed, the Commission should not first have decided the claim and 
then referred the entire case to the Court instead of invoking the Article 63(2) procedure”. 
43 See IACHR Reggiardo Tolosa (Argentina), Order of the President, 19 November 1993. Thus, the 
Court decided that there was no longer a need to order the provisional measures requested by the 
Commission, Order of 19 January 1994. 
44 HRC Darwinia Rosa Mónaco de Galliccho and her granddaughter Ximena Vicario v. Argentina, 
3 April 1995. At the time of the submission the petitioner’s granddaughter was 14 years old. In 
February 1977, when she was nine months old, she was taken with her mother to the headquarters 
of the federal police in Buenos Aires. The next day her father was arrested as well. Both her 
parents subsequently disappeared. 
45 She submitted that further appeals in civil proceedings would be unjustifiably prolonged to the 
extent that her granddaughter would likely reach the age of legal competence by the time of final 
decision. Her initial submission was on 2 April 1990. The Special Rapporteur transmitted the ca-
se to the State party on 24 August 1990, four months after the initial submission. In her later 
comments she pointed out that by the spring of 1991 the criminal proceedings about the disappea-
rance had been pending at first instance for more than six years. The psychological state of her 
granddaughter had deteriorated ‘to such an extent that, on an unspecified date, a judge denied 
S.S. the month of summer vacation with Ximena Vicario she had requested’. He did authorise her 
to spend a week with the petitioner’s granddaughter in April 1991. The petitioner claimed that the 
civil proceedings would be unjustifiably prolonged. 
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Covenant required the State party to take affirmative action to grant Ms. Vicario prompt and 
effective relief from her predicament’.46 
Generally speaking the HRC may not be in the most favourable position to assess the best 
interests of the child in this type of situation (simply because of the absence of hearings and the 
lack of geographical proximity), but in the face of convincing and consistent expert reports about 
the situation of a child, together with a declaration of intent (depending on age) of the child on the 
one hand and consistent actions or omissions by the State contrary to his or her interests on the 
other hand, the HRC might indeed consider using provisional measures to prevent irreparable 
harm in such cases.  
Since the situation was ongoing, another question arises, namely at what point interference 
is necessary in order to prevent or put a stop to irreparable harm. Ongoing violations have a cu-
mulative effect. At what point does this result in irreparable harm?47 In light of the different de-
velopmental stages and special vulnerability it is clear that for a child action or omissions could 
have irreparable consequences much sooner than for an adult.48 Article 24 ICCPR already ac-
knowledges this by stipulating that every child shall have the right to ‘such measures of protection 
as are required by his status as a minor on the part of his family, society and the State’. In its 
General Comment to this article the HRC points out that children must benefit from all rights in 
the Covenant, not only Article 24 and emphasises, in the context of cultural rights, that States 
should take every possible measure on behalf of children ‘to foster the development of their per-
sonality’.49  
                                                 
46 The HRC found that the initial denial of standing of her grandmother effectively left Ximena 
Vicario without adequate representation. This way she was deprived of the protection to which 
she was entitled as a minor, in violation of Article 24 ICCPR. The HRC pointed out that it was 
evident that the ‘abduction of Ximena Vicario, the falsification of her birth certificate and her 
adoption by S.S. entailed numerous acts of arbitrary and unlawful interference with their privacy 
and family life’ in violation of Articles 17, 23(1), 24(1) and (2) ICCPR. It noted, however, that 
these acts occurred prior to entry into force of the ICCPR and its OP in November 1986. It then 
proceeded to examine whether there existed continuing effects of those violations, which in 
themselves constituted violations of the ICCPR. The HRC observed that the various judicial 
proceedings extended for more than 10 years. In the meantime the granddaughter, who was 7 
years old when found, turned 18 in 1994. Her legal identity as Ximena Vicario was officially 
recognised only in 1993, when she was 17 years old. “Bearing in mind the suffering already 
endured by Ms. Vicario, who lost both of her parents under tragic circumstances imputable to 
State party, the Committee finds that the special measures required under article 24, paragraph 1, 
of the Covenant were not expeditiously applied by Argentina, and that the failure to recognise the 
standing of Mrs. Monaco in the guardianship and visitation proceedings and the delay in legally 
establishing Ms. Vicario’s real name and issuing identity papers also entailed the violation of 
article 24, paragraph 2, of the Covenant, which is designed to promote recognition of the child’s 
legal personality”. 
47 See also section 2.6 of this chapter and Chapter X (Culture), section 3. 
48 See e.g. Willems (1998). 
49 The ICCPR refers to the family, society and the State as the responsible parties guaranteeing 
children the necessary protection. “Although the Covenant does not indicate how such 
responsibility is to be apportioned, it is primarily incumbent on the family, which is interpreted 
broadly to include all persons composing it in the society of the State party concerned, and 
particularly on the parents, to create conditions to promote the harmonious development of the 
child’s personality and his enjoyment of the rights recognised in the Covenant”. Article 24(4) 
provides that every child has the right to be registered immediately after birth and to have a 
name. The HRC considers that this is closely linked to the right to special measures of protection 
and is designed to promote recognition of the child’s legal personality. Its main purpose is to 
‘reduce the danger of abduction, sale of or traffic in children, or of other types of treatment that 
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As discussed, the Inter-American Court has once intervened urgently in a situation in which 
the child was in the custody of adoptive parents after her biological parents had been disappeared 
and in which her grandmother had been unable to establish guardianship.50 This is an extremely 
painful situation and it is difficult to assess how the mental integrity of the children of disap-
peared parents is ensured best.  
While it may indeed be possible to use provisional measures in such a case, it is vital in 
such circumstances to assess the wishes of the children involved, as a transfer of custody may in 
fact equally result in irreparable harm to children, if they consider their caretakers as their parents. 
Apart from the fact that these cases involve the rights of grandparents and other family to estab-
lish contact with their grandchildren, who grew up among strangers following the disappearance 
of their parents, they may also involve the rights of minors indicating a preference for not know-
ing about their real family, least of all being forced to live with them. In this respect the question 
whether the people who raised them have in fact been complicit in the disappearance of their 
parents, by act or omission, is a relevant consideration as well.  
2.3.3 Children who have suffered abuse from their parents or caretakers 
An interesting case unrelated to a past of disappearances, but more generally involving the posi-
tive obligations of the State to protect the physical and mental integrity of children against harm 
by third parties is that of a five-year-old child in Nicaragua on whose behalf the Inter-American 
Commission took precautionary measures in 2001. According to the complaint her father had 
raped her. The petitioners stated that her physical and mental integrity were at risk for the follow-
ing reasons: her mother refused to believe her relatives’ accusations about her husband, she had 
suspended the psychological treatment recommended by specialists and she had taken the child to 
prison to visit her father, ‘thus causing her emotional problems’.51 In September 2001 the Com-
mission asked Nicaragua to adopt protective measures on her behalf. 
In a different situation, but also involving the positive obligations of the State, in September 
2003 the Commission granted precautionary measures on behalf of a seven-year-old to the effect 
that the State should adopt the necessary measures, ‘including specialized medical treatment’, in 
order to protect his ‘physical, psychological, and moral health’.52 In its Annual Report the Com-
mission noted regarding these precautionary measures that the information available indicated 
that Michael Roberts53 had been ‘a victim of sexual abuse while at children’s homes under the 
Department of Children and Family Services of Jamaica’s Ministry of Health, and that even after 
the abuse was detected, he was the victim of omissions and negligence for lack of adequate treat-
                                                                                                                       
are incompatible with the enjoyment of the rights provided for in the Covenant’. HRC General 
Comment no. 17 on Article 24, 5 April 1989. 
50 IACHR Reggiardo Tolosa (Argentina), Order of the President of 19 November 1993 and Order 
of the Court of 19 January 1994. 
51 CIDH Annual Report 2001, §47. In an interview by the author with the late Henry Schermers, 
member of the European Commission on Human Rights, the latter indicated that he would 
consider feasible the intervention of the Commission in ongoing child abuse cases, if the State 
concerned failed to take action to prevent further harm, interview of 3 March 1998 (on file with 
the author). 
52 Before taking precautionary measures the Commission first sought information from the State 
with regard to the situation of the child. 
53 For the purposes of the proceedings the child was referred to as ‘Michael Roberts. The 
Commission noted that his real name would be kept under seal to protect his identity. 
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ment’.54 The State responded to the measures with the statement ‘that the beneficiary was receiv-
ing specialized medical treatment’ and ‘asked that the precautionary measures be lifted’.55 In 
November of that year the Commission reaffirmed the precautionary measures ‘and requested 
additional information on the medical condition of the beneficiary, and the treatment he was 
receiving’.56 
Another form of abuse flows from illegal adoption procedures. The Commission also inter-
vened in such a context, on behalf of 26 children in the process of being adopted. The Commis-
sion asked Guatemala to define the conditions and the place where the beneficiaries could be 
found, and to report on their legal and family status and on the measures it would be taking to 
protect them.57 
2.3.4 Conclusion 
In situations involving children, adjudicators might use provisional measures in contexts in which 
they would not on behalf of adults. This is because some situations are likely to impact on the 
development and thus the life and personal integrity of the child involved.58 
Yet in the above case by the HRC relating to visiting rights no provisional measures had 
been taken. In this case the child involved had clearly indicated a wish to live with her real family 
and carry her real name. As confirmed by psychological reports, the continued encounters with 
her former caretaker had a negative impact on her.  
What is clear in all cases involving minors is that for provisional measures truly to protect 
the beneficiary there should be sufficient evidence of the psychological impact on the child of 
continued encounters with certain caretakers or parental figures and, taking into account devel-
opmental stages, there should also be sufficient evidence of the will expressed by the child itself, 
e.g. in an interview with an independent psychologist.  
2.4 Protection against nuclear radiation 
The ICJ, but also the HRC and the European Commission on Human Rights have been faced with 
requests for provisional measures to halt nuclear tests. The ICJ dealt with the issue in the Nuclear 
Test cases (1973-1974).59 It used provisional measures in June 1973, ordering France to avoid 
                                                 
54 The Commission added that the ‘diagnosis in the record’ indicated that Michael Roberts ‘suffers 
from post-traumatic stress disorder and that the absence of adequate medical treatment tends to 
give rise to behavior such as sexual aggression directed at other children’. 
55 CIDH Annual Report 2003, §55. 
56 Ibid. 
57 CIDH Annual Report 2007, 33 (“The persons requesting the measures allege that the adoption 
procedures are irregular, and that the children are being housed in private homes without judicial 
authorization and in violation of the law. It is also indicated that there is no information on the 
conditions in which the children were separated from their biological parents, and that adoption 
procedures are being carried out through civil-law notary proceedings without the supervision of 
the competent authorities”). 
58 See e.g. Willems (1998). 
59 ICJ Nuclear Test Cases (New Zealand v. France and Australia v. France), Orders for provisional 
measures of 22 June 1973. In Judgments of 20 December 1974 the ICJ found that the applications 
by the two States, dating from 9 May 1973, no longer had any object. Their aim had been 
achieved in as much as France had announced its intention not to carry out further atmospheric 
nuclear tests now that it had completed the 1974 series. The ICJ considered that France was held 
to adhere to its unilateral declaration in good faith.  
 Chapter XII 
536 
nuclear tests causing a radioactive fall-out on Australian or New Zealand territory. Nevertheless, 
France carried out a series of atmospheric nuclear tests in 1974.60  
Different from the ICJ none of the human rights adjudicators has used provisional measures 
either to halt nuclear tests or to take positive measures to protect persons against nuclear radia-
tion. Thus far petitioners have unsuccessfully requested the HRC and the European Commission 
to order provisional measures to halt nuclear tests. In Bordes and Temeharo v. France (1996) the 
petitioners were French citizens residing in Papeete, Tahiti, French Polynesia.61 In June 1995 
President Chirac announced the intent to conduct a series of underground nuclear tests in the 
South Pacific on the atolls of Mururoa and Fangataufa. The petitioners claimed that these tests 
would threaten their right to life (Article 6 ICCPR) and their right not to be subjected to arbitrary 
interference with their privacy and family life (Article 17 ICCPR).62 They requested the HRC to 
use provisional measures. The HRC decided not to grant the protection requested. It may be 
concluded from the unusual fact that it mentions that it discussed the request for provisional 
measures during two consecutive sessions, that the refusal to order provisional measures had been 
a difficult decision.63 Between 5 September 1995 and the beginning of 1996 the French authori-
ties carried out six underground nuclear tests. In July 1996 the HRC declared the case inadmissi-
ble because the petitioners did not satisfy the victim requirement. The question arises whether the 
Committee’s reason not to use provisional measures was the fact that it already anticipated this,64 
or was more generally based on its reluctance to get involved in such a highly politicised issue. It 
had previously noted, in a different case, that the individual complaint procedure was not meant 
for public policy discussions on issues such as nuclear weapons.65 
In a case brought before the European Commission on Human Rights in order to prevent the 
same tests in the South Pacific, the Commission similarly denied the request for provisional 
measures and subsequently declared the case inadmissible (December 1995).66 As noted, the tests 
had already taken place by that time.  
The President of the Commission had rejected two consecutive requests for provisional 
measures to the effect that the State should be requested not to proceed with the renewed nuclear 
tests.67 The subsequent request was rejected by the Commission as a whole, during its session in 
                                                 
60 See Chapter I. 
61 HRC Vaihere Bordes and John Temeharo v. France, 22 July 1996. Initially Tauira also took part 
in the complaint, but later he withdrew his participation because of his involvement in a case 
pending before the European Commission on Human Rights, also discussed in this section. 
62 See also Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
63 HRC Vaihere Bordes and John Temeharo v. France, 22 July 1996 (inadm.), § 1-2.3 (discussion 
on provisional measures during the 54th and the 55th sessions). 
64 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
65 See e.g. HRC E.W. and others v. the Netherlands, 8 April 1993 (inadm.). It recalled its second 
General Comment on Article 6, in which it noted that ‘the designing, testing, manufacture, 
possession and deployment of nuclear weapons are among the greatest threats to the right to life 
which confront mankind today’, §6.2. At the same time it considered ‘that the procedure laid 
down in the Optional Protocol was not designed for conducting public debate over matters of 
public policy, such as support for disarmament and issues concerning nuclear and other weapons 
of mass destruction’. It declared the case inadmissible as ‘at the relevant period of time’, the 
situation did not ‘place the authors in the position to claim to be victims whose right to life was 
then violated or under imminent prospect of violation’, §6.4. 
66 EComHR Tauira et al. v. France, 4 December 1995 (inadm.). 
67 Requests of 8 and 17 August, rejected by the President on 10 and 21 August, respectively, 
EComHR Tauira et al. v. France, 4 December 1995 (inadm.), under ‘Procedure devant la 
Commission’. 
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September 1995. At that time it did decide to grant the case priority under Rule 33 of its Rules of 
Procedure.68  
When it declared the case inadmissible it noted, among others, that simply invoking risks 
inherent in the use of nuclear energy, whether used for military or for civil purposes, was insuffi-
cient for making a showing that the petitioners would become victims of a violation of the Con-
vention and thereby fulfilled the victim requirement. It pointed out that a great many human 
activities generated risk. The petitioners had failed to substantiate that the likelihood of risk of 
harm, despite the sufficient precautions (‘précautions suffisantes’) taken by the authorities, would 
be such as to constitute a violation of the Convention. Moreover, the Commission considered that 
the consequences of the action were too remote.69 
In order to understand the Commission’s decision not to use provisional measures pending 
the proceedings it may be useful to examine part of the State’s arguments, which involved a 
reference to the concept of irreparable harm. It had argued, among others, that the decision to 
resume nuclear tests was not an act, like extradition or expulsion,70 that would as such and neces-
sarily result in a violation of the Convention. In fact, it argued, the implementation of the decision 
did not itself constitute a violation, but the violations lay only in the consequences that the peti-
tioners attributed to it, namely a pollution of the environment harming the population. It also 
argued that the domestic remedies had not yet been exhausted as there would be several such 
remedies once actual damage were shown. The State then noted that the petitioners’ argument that 
this would be too late was based on the mistaken idea that nuclear tests would necessarily result in 
irreparable harm (‘un préjudice irréparable’).71  
The findings by the Commission itself indicate its difficulty in grappling with the scientific 
claims asserted by both parties. It pointed out that it was only exceptionally that the victim re-
quirement was fulfilled when it concerned a future risk and that the petitioners had failed to pro-
vide sufficient evidence showing that this exception was applicable here. The Commission did not 
consider it opportune to decide on the scientific validity of the various expert reports, particularly 
                                                 
68 Decision of 5 September 1995 on the renewed request by the petitioners of 31 August 1995, 
EComHR Tauira et al. v. France, 4 December 1995 (inadm.), under ‘Procedure devant la 
Commission’. 
69 EComHR Tauira et al. v. France, 4 December 1995 (inadm.), §2 (¶29). The Commission 
considered that accidents could always happen, but the petitioners could not show that France had 
failed to take all necessary measures to prevent such an accident, (¶30). There was such 
controversy among scientists as to the question whether the tests would fracture the atolls, that 
the petitioners could not base themselves on this ‘hypothetical fracturing’ for the purpose of 
proving they met the victim requirement (¶31). It was not contested that in the past the 
atmospheric tests had resulted in radioactive contamination, but what was contested was the level 
of contamination and the consequences for the environment in general and for the health of the 
population in particular. In any case the Commission considered that the petitioners had furnished 
insufficient information on their work at Mururoa in the past, that could have exposed them to the 
radiation (¶32). Moreover, apart from the fact that the petition was directed against the June 1995 
decision to resume the tests halted in 1992 and not at the previous period, the petitioners had 
failed to submit information on their state of health (¶33). Regarding the risk of contamination of 
the food chain, including the consumption of migratory fish (that would be contaminated at the 
sites, more than 1000 km from the residence of the petitioners), the Commission considered that 
the petitioners had provided insufficient evidence for it to conclude that they could be victims of 
a violation of the Convention, as the resumption of the tests would presently have repercussions 
that would be too remote for this resumption to be considered an act that would directly affect 
their personal situation (¶35). 
70  To a State where the petitioner would face a real risk of ill treatment. 
71 EComHR Tauira et al. v. France, 4 December 1995 (inadm.), §2 (¶4). 
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as the experts themselves expressed differing views. The Commission’s decision does not refer to 
the precautionary principle and it would appear that the petitioners had not invoked it.72 
In Athanassoglou et al. v. Switzerland (2000) the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) had decided, by 
sixteen votes with one abstention, not to take provisional measures to halt resumption of the 
operation of a nuclear power plant. It subsequently found on the merits that the rights claimed 
(Article 6 on the right to a fair trial and Article 13 ECHR on the right to an effective remedy) 
were not applicable. The petitioners had claimed that they had no access to court and no effective 
remedy under domestic law to enable them to complain of a violation of their right to life (Article 
2) and of a violation of their right to respect for physical integrity. In the latter context they in-
voked Article 8 (privacy and family life). The Court found that the connection between the do-
mestic procedure about the extension of the operation of the power plant ‘and the domestic-law 
rights to protection of life, physical integrity and property’ invoked by the petitioners ‘was too 
tenuous and remote to attract the application of Article 6 § 1’.73 Equally, the petitioners did not 
have an arguable claim of violations of Articles 2 and 8 in relation to the domestic law decision in 
question and, consequently, no entitlement to a remedy under Article 13.74 The Court, and previ-
ously the Commission, did not directly examine Articles 2 and 8 ECHR. The request for provi-
sional measures, on the other hand, clearly related to life and physical integrity rather than just 
access to court and the right to an effective remedy. An argument could be made that halting 
resumption of the operation of the nuclear power plant would be the only way to ensure the right 
to an effective remedy invoked in the petition. A domestic remedy that could not achieve the aim 
for which it was invoked could not be considered effective. Yet on the merits the majority of the 
Court considered that the petitioners resorted to a domestic remedy that was not sufficiently re-
lated to the right to life and respect for the home. The question arises to what extent this was or 
should have been clear already at the stage of provisional measures. After all, five members of the 
Court had considered that the petitioners’ claims domestically had been arguable and that Arts 6 
and 13 were indeed applicable.75 
Exceptionally, the Judgment indicates that the decision not to take provisional measures 
was made ‘by sixteen votes with one abstention’.76 What it does not indicate is the reasoning for 
this decision. It is possible that some judges did not see a sufficient link with Article 2 because the 
                                                 
72 Id., §2 (¶11) indicates that the petitioners argued that they had had been refused access to 
information in light of military secrets and they had been refused access to medical dossiers. A 
reference was also made to the Rio Declaration, but apparently without specifically invoking the 
precautionary principle (¶14). 
73 ECtHR Athanassoglou et al. v. Switzerland, 6 April 2000, §59. 
74 Five members dissented. In passing they also said something about risk that may explain why the 
Grand Chamber had decided not to take provisional measures: “One might of course question 
whether it is impossible to establish that the danger exists to the requisite degree. For example, it 
is virtually impossible to prove imminent danger in the case of inherently dangerous installations: 
the catastrophes that have happened in a number of countries were obviously unforeseeable or, in 
any event, unforeseen”. See ECtHR Athanassoglou et al. v. Switzerland, 6 April 2000, joint 
dissenting opinion Costa, Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall and Maruste. 
75 ECtHR Athanassoglou et al. v. Switzerland, 6 April 2000, joint dissenting opinion Costa, 
Tulkens, Fischbach, Casadevall and Maruste. They considered that the ‘nature of administrative 
decisions to grant or refuse applications for licences to operate nuclear power plants does not 
mean that they should be exempt from judicial review; on the contrary, the dangers presented to 
the environment and the population by such installations make it, if anything, more necessary for 
such decisions to be subject to review by an independent and impartial tribunal an adversarial 
proceedings aided, of course, by expert evidence’. 
76 ECtHR Athanassoglou et al. v. Switzerland, 6 April 2000, §7. Moreover, usually it is the 
President rather than the full (Grand) Chamber who decides on the use of provisional measures, 
see Chapter II (Systems), but in this case it was the Grand Chamber. 
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petition was based on Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. It is also possible that they considered that if there 
were a link they would still not be able to prove ‘a specific and imminent danger in their personal 
regard’.77 
The HRC has also dealt with a case involving storage of radioactive waste near residential 
areas. The petitioner had requested the Committee ‘to consider the matter and to urge the Cana-
dian Government to remove all radioactive waste from Port Hope to a permanent, properly man-
aged, dumpsite away from human habitation’.78 The HRC transmitted the case to the State party 
more than three months later. It did not use (informal) provisional measures. Almost a year later it 
did request information from the State as to how the residents were assisted in the clearance proc-
ess,79 but upon receipt of the State’s responses in this respect it declared the complaint inadmissi-
ble for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies.80 
These cases indicate that, thus far, the human rights adjudicators have not used provisional 
measures to halt nuclear tests or to order a State to take positive measures to protect residents 
against nuclear radiation. This may be explained by the political sensitivity of the subject matter, 
the conviction that it is a policy issue and the related difficulty in fulfilling the ‘victim require-
ment’. Conflicting scientific evidence in particular appears to be a serious stumbling block for 
                                                 
77 ECtHR Athanassoglou et al. v. Switzerland, 6 April 2000, §52. After all, the Court eventually 
observed that the petitioners were rather alleging ‘a general danger in relation to all nuclear 
power plants’. ‘(M)any of the grounds they relied on related to safety, environmental and 
technical features inherent in the use of nuclear energy’, §52. Thus they were ‘seeking to derive’ 
from Art. 6(1) ECHR ‘a remedy to contest the very principle of the use of nuclear energy’, §53. 
The Court considered that ‘how best to regulate the use of nuclear power is a policy decision for 
each Contracting State to take according to its democratic processes’, §54. See also Chapter XII 
(Protection), discussing the beneficiaries of provisional measures. The dissenters considered that 
the fact ‘that popular initiatives have enabled the public democratically to declare itself in favour 
of the State nuclear programme does not to our mind mean that a concrete judicial review would 
be devoid of purpose’. It is nevertheless possible that the dissenters did vote against the use of 
provisional measures, as did those in the majority, in order to avoid an actio popularis. Another 
explanation may be their doubts about the urgency and risk involved. See Chapter XV 
(Immediacy and Risk). 
78 HRC E.H.P. v. Canada, 27 October 1982 (inadm.), §2. 
79 Id., §6. 
80 Id. The petitioner had submitted the complaint in April 1980, on her own behalf and, ‘as 
Chairman of the Port Hope Environmental Group, on behalf of present and future generations of 
Port Hope, Ontario, Canada, including 129 Port Hope residents who have specifically authorised 
the author to act on their behalf’, §1.1. The HRC treated the petitioner’s reference to ‘future 
generations’ as ‘an expression of concern purporting to put into due perspective the importance 
of the matter raised in the communication’, §8(a). Port Hope was a town of about 10,000 
inhabitants. In 1975 large-scale pollution of their houses and other buildings was discovered. 
About 200,000 tons of radioactive waste remained in this town. During the cleaning process the 
waste was stored in eight ‘temporary’ disposal sites near or directly beside residences. One of 
them was approximately 100 yards from the public swimming pool. Some of these ‘temporary’ 
disposal sites were still in existence more than thirty years after they were licensed. Pending the 
case the HRC had asked the State party whether the federal government was in a position to 
assure the HRC that it would give the necessary assistance if the owners of the sites were 
otherwise unable to heed to an injunction to the effect that they should clear the sites. Canada 
responded that resolving the problem was ‘a matter which necessarily involves delay due to 
certain practical and technical considerations’, §7. If the petitioner was unwilling to accept such 
delay, ‘inherent in resolving the problem, she could seek injunctive relief against the owners of 
the sites’. It also referred to other possibilities for domestic recourse. On the basis of the State’s 
responses the HRC declared the case inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
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them to decide on a nexus between an act or omission and a risk to life.81 Yet a precedent is al-
ready available in general international law in the form of the ICJ’s provisional measures in the 
aforementioned case by Australia and New Zealand against France. Moreover, exposure to risk of 
nuclear radiation potentially concerns preventing irreparable harm to persons, involving their very 
survival, which conceptually would be situated more towards the common core than towards the 
outer limits of the concept. If a practice were to develop in which human rights adjudicators 
would regard the issue as one involving human rights and in which they would start to order 
provisional measures, the type of provisional measure involved would indeed fall within the 
common core. 
2.5 Preservation of IVF embryos 
There is one occasion on which one of the human rights adjudicators, the European Court of 
Human Rights, used provisional measures in order to prevent the destruction of several embryos 
created through the harvesting of eggs and their fertilization in vitro.  
In February 2005 the ECtHR indicated to the UK that ‘it was desirable, in the interests of 
the proper conduct of the proceedings that the Government take appropriate measures to ensure 
that the embryos were preserved until the Court had completed the examination of the case’.82 
For medical reasons (the removal of ovaries because of tumours) the petitioner had been 
told to wait two years before attempting to implant any of the embryos in her uterus. Meanwhile 
the relationship with her partner, with whom she had created the embryos, had broken down and 
her former partner informed the clinic involved of his wish for the embryos to be destroyed. The 
petitioner argued that the particular domestic legislation invoked by her ex partner prevented her 
‘from using the embryos she and J had created together, and thus, given her particular circum-
stances, from ever having a child to whom she is genetically related’.83 
While it was at first the President of the Chamber instituted to deal with the case that had 
ordered the provisional measures (and decided that the case should be given priority treatment), 
four months later the full Chamber confirmed these measures.84  
On the merits the Court held that there had been no violation of Article 2 (life), Article 8 
(respect for private life)85 and Article 14 (non-discrimination) in conjunction with Article 8 
ECHR. Yet it decided to maintain its provisional measures until such time as the judgment would 
become final, or until further order.86 Indeed, the petitioner requested referral of the case to the 
Grand Chamber. A panel of the Grand Chamber granted this request in July 2006 and on that day 
the President of the Court decided to prolong the provisional measures.87 On the merits the Grand 
Chamber’s decision was similar to the above decision by the Chamber.88 This meant that eventu-
ally the petitioner was unable to prevent destruction of the embryos.  
This was the first time that the ECtHR, or any human rights adjudicator, dealt with a case 
such as this and given the irreversible nature of the destruction of the embryos the use of provi-
sional measures was within the outer limits of the concept.  
                                                 
81 See further Chapter I (ICJ), section 5.3.3 and Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
82 ECtHR Evans v. UK, 7 March 2006, §3. See also ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Evans v. UK, 10 
April 2007, §5. 
83 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Evans v. UK, 10 April 2007, §72. 
84 ECtHR Evans v. UK, 7 March 2006, §4. 
85 See dissenting opinion of judges Traja and Mijović. 
86 ECtHR Evans v. UK, 7 March 2006, §77, fifth declaratory clause. 
87 ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Evans v. UK, 10 April 2007, §7. 
88 See also the joint dissenting opinion of Judges Túrmen, Tsatsa-Nikolovska, Spielman and 
Ziemele. 
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Moreover, given that the private life argument may make feasible an argument based on 
personal integrity and the so-called ‘project of life’,89 as to underlying rationale this case may be 
situated more closely towards the common core of the concept than towards the outer limits. Yet 
there is no practice by the other adjudicators and given the judgment on the merits it is unlikely 
that the ECtHR will deal with a similar case in the near future. In addition, in this case the ‘project 
of life’ argument would apply in some measure to the petitioner’s partner as well,90 indeed mak-
ing it a situation that may at present be more appropriately dealt with by each European State 
individually, as the Court considered with its reference to the margin of appreciation.91 
2.6 Releasing from (prolonged) arbitrary detention 
2.6.1 Introduction 
There are a few cases in which international adjudicators have dealt with requests by petitioners 
for provisional measures aimed at someone’s release from arbitrary detention or at preventing an 
arbitrary detention altogether. In yet fewer cases adjudicators have actually ordered such meas-
ures.  
As discussed in Chapter I, in the Hostages case the ICJ had ordered provisional measures to 
the effect that Iran should make sure that the persons taken hostage in the US Consulate in Tehran 
would be released. While its findings on the merits were based on the law of diplomatic and 
consular relations and specifically concerned the detention of internationally protected persons the 
ICJ noted more generally:  
“Wrongfully to deprive human beings of their freedom and to subject them to physical restraint 
in conditions of hardship is in itself manifestly incompatible with the principles of the Charter 
of the United Nations, as well as with the fundamental principles enunciated in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights”.92 
The importance attached by the international community to protection against arbitrary detention 
is apparent from the institution in 1991 of the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which 
constituted the fourth UN thematic mechanism.93 This Working Group has developed a practice 
                                                 
89 On the concept of ‘project of life’ see section 2.1 of this Chapter and references therein. 
90 His life plan might have been affected by becoming a father, even uninvolved, of a child with 
whose mother he no longer is in a relationship. Yet this would appear to impact his project of life 
to a lesser extent, taking into account the impact on him of becoming an (uninvolved) father of a 
child to which he was genetically related, on the one hand, at this point in his life, and the impact 
of destroying the embryos on her project of life, on the other hand, given that this was her only 
chance of becoming a parent of a child to which she was genetically related. 
91 Yet see the criticisms against this approach, e.g. Forder/Wittingham (2006), pp. 863-880; Brems 
(2006), pp. 428-442 and Bomhoff/Zucca (2006), pp. 431-440 commenting the judgment of 7 
March 2006. 
92 ICJ US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (US v. Iran) (Hostages case), Judgment of 24 
May 1980, §91. See further Chapter I, section 3.3.3.  
93 Following the Working Group on Disappearances and the two Special Rapporteurs, one against 
torture and inhuman treatment and the other against summary and arbitrary executions. In 
addition, the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States, §702, dating 
from 1985, mentions the prohibition of prolonged arbitrary detention as a peremptory rule of 
international law. 
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of resorting to an urgent action procedure, which it has referred to as necessarily exceptional in 
principle and summary in method.94 
As noted, some human rights adjudicators have used provisional measures because of the 
alleged arbitrary nature of a detention as well. These measures could aim either at the prevention 
of detention in the first place, or at the release of detainees pending the proceedings. If the benefi-
ciaries of these provisional measures are facing a clear threat to their lives or personal integrity 
the measures clearly belong to the common core.95 If the situations in which these provisional 
measures are used do not involve direct threats of ill-treatment and direct risks to life the question 
arises whether they belong to the common core of the concept of provisional measures or even 
whether they belong within the outer limits.  
2.6.2 Practice in the Inter-American system 
The Inter-American Commission has used precautionary measures several times in order to inter-
vene in a situation of arbitrary detention. The Inter-American Court may have done so once, 
although it continued to stress the life and safety of the beneficiary rather than his release.  
In general the Court has not been keen on using provisional measures in this context.  
In January 1993 it explicitly refused a request for provisional measures. This was in re-
sponse to a request by the Inter-American Commission on behalf of Carlos Chipoco, a ‘human 
rights activist’ who had ‘taken part in the Neira Alegría et al. and in the Cayara case’.96 The 
Commission argued that should he return to Peru and be arrested he could face a prison sentence 
of more than 20 years, lose his nationality and be held in the same detention place as the ‘leaders 
and activists of the terrorist groups whose acts he has publicly condemned, which would consti-
tute a grave threat to his right to life and integrity of the person which are recognized by the Con-
vention’. It considered that the Peruvian Government wanted to ‘punish, penalize and intimidate 
those who utilize international procedures and courts for the protection of human rights’.97 The 
                                                 
94 It was in 1993 that it decided on ‘Criteria to resort to the “urgent action” procedure’. It 
considered that apart from its normal reason for using this procedure, namely ‘where there are 
sufficiently reliable allegations that a person is being detained arbitrarily and that the continuation 
of the detention constitutes a serious danger to the person's health or even life’, it could also use 
this procedure ‘where the detention may not constitute a danger to the person's health or life, but 
where the particular circumstances of the situation warrant urgent action’. It noted that in this 
case the Chairman must secure the agreement of two other members of the Working Group. See 
UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention Deliberation 03 under D. Its Revised Methods of 
work, which are reproduced in Fact Sheet No. 26 on the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, 
Annex IV (undated), discuss the Urgent Action Procedure in §IV: “A procedure known as 
“urgent action” may be resorted to in the following cases: (a) In cases in which there are 
sufficiently reliable allegations that a person is being arbitrarily deprived of his liberty and that 
the continuation of such deprivation constitutes a serious threat to that person's health or even to 
his life; (b) In cases in which, even if no such threat is alleged to exist, there are particular 
circumstances that warrant an urgent action. (c) The Chairman, or in his absence the Vice 
Chairman, shall transmit the appeal by the most rapid means to the Minister for Foreign Affairs 
of the country concerned”. See E/CN.4/1993/24, 12 January 1993. 
95 See also Chapter VII (Health in detention). 
96 IACHR Chipoco case, President’s Order denying provisional measures of 14 December 1992, 4th 
‘Having seen’ clause. 
97 Id., 6th ‘Having seen’ clause. Peru had filed criminal charges against him and other Peruvians 
residing abroad ‘for allegedly committing the crime of justification of terrorism against the state’, 
3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. Among others he was charged with activities in the US ‘in support of 
subversion’ such as ‘maintaining contacts with human rights organizations, with false 
information, in which they denigrate the Armed Forces and the Police and other State institutions 
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Commission, which had yet to decide on the merits in this case, requested the Court’s provisional 
measures.98  
What made the situation urgent, according to the Commission, was the need to avoid that an 
he would be indicted ‘without an exhaustive investigation and without having afforded the ac-
cused or his representatives an opportunity to prepare his defense’.99 This, in the argument of the 
Commission, would violate the right to a fair trial (Article 8 ACHR) and also constitute a viola-
tion of the right to humane treatment (Article 5), freedom of thought and expression (Article 13) 
and the general obligation to respect rights (Article 1(1), as well as the possibility to resort to the 
Commission and Court.100 
The Court decided it was ‘inappropriate at this time’ for it to order provisional measures.101 
It considered that the case concerned ‘a matter which is not presently before the Court, but rather 
before the Commission, and the latter has not submitted information to the Court sufficient to 
support the adoption of such measures, which requires the Commission to have gathered prelimi-
nary evidence to support a presumption of the truth of the allegations and of a situation whose 
grave seriousness and urgency could cause irreparable harm to persons.102 In other words, before 
ordering provisional measures, or apparently even before holding a hearing on the request for 
provisional measures, the Court required more evidence both on the facts alleged and on the 
possibility that the situation could cause irreparable harm to persons.103 
Juan Mendez, who at the time was litigating this case as an attorney at Human Rights 
Watch,104 mentions that the petitioners had alleged that Chipoco’s liberty was at stake, not his life 
or physical integrity.105 This, together with the fact that Mr. Chipoco was still present in the US, 
may also help explain the Court’s refusal to order provisional measures.106 
A few years later the Court dealt with another request by the Commission involving arbi-
trary detention. In 1996 the President of the Court did take urgent measures to the effect that 
Ecuador was to adopt forthwith the measures necessary ‘to effectively ensure the physical and 
                                                                                                                       
related to the struggle against subversion’, see 3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. The Commission’s 
request added that he had condemned the terrorist acts carried out by the Shining Path and 
MRTA and ‘has been critical of the acts of rebels as well as those of the Peruvian Government’. 
Id., 4th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
98 See Article 63(2) ACHR, last sentence. See further Chapter II (Systems). The request was to the 
effect that Peru would ‘establish as soon as possible the veracity of the allegations’ and if they 
‘are found to be true, that it carry out an exhaustive investigation, specify the acts on which the 
charge of justification of terrorism is based, and disclose the evidence against Mr. Chipoco, prior 
to taking any penal actions against him’. Moreover, at all stages of the proceedings Peru was to 
guarantee him ‘the full exercise of his human rights and, in particular, the right to due process 
and personal security, should he be deprived of his personal liberty, and taking into account the 
danger to which he would be exposed wherever he might be held’. Finally, Peru should 
‘guarantee the right to recur to the American system for the protection of human rights’, see 
IACHR Chipoco case, President’s Order denying provisional measures of 14 December 1992, 1st 
‘Having seen’ clause. 
99 IACHR Chipoco case Order of 27 January 1993 denying provisional measures, 4th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
100 IACHR Chipoco case, Order denying provisional measures of 14 December 1992, 7th ‘Having 
seen’ clause 
101 IACHR Chipoco case Order of 27 January 1993 denying provisional measures, 1st ‘Resolving’ 
clause. 
102 Id., 2nd ‘Whereas’ clause. 
103 On evidentiary issues see also Chapter XV. 
104 Subsequently he became a member of the Inter-American Commission. 
105 Interview of author with Juan Mendez, Washington DC, 17 October 2001. 
106 Id. 
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moral integrity of Mr. Rafael Iván Suárez-Rosero, so that any provisional measures that the Inter-
American Court may take can have the requisite effect’.107 Yet he did not heed to the Commis-
sion’s request to seek from Ecuador such provisional measures as were ‘necessary to ensure that 
Mr. Iván Suárez-Rosero is immediately released pending continuation of the procedures’.108 The 
Commission had stated that his situation was ‘extremely grave, inasmuch as it may cause him 
irreparable damage’ as he had been ‘held in preventive detention for a longer period than he 
would have served had he been tried and convicted’.109 The President decided not to take these 
urgent measures, which, he noted, implied ‘anticipation of certain effects that would be produced 
by the judgment on the merits which this Court may deliver’.110 He observed that the Commission 
had found on the merits that the imprisonment of the alleged victim was contrary to the ACHR In 
that sense the measures requested were ‘precautionary measures described in legal writings as 
partially restitutive or anticipatory and which the court cannot prescribe without first hearing the 
adversary, in this case the Government of Ecuador’.111 One requisite for provisional measures was 
‘a preliminary analysis of the situation that necessitates the order for provisional measures’.112 
The President pointed out that he was only authorized to order urgent measures. It was ‘for the 
Court at its next session to decide on the appropriateness of the anticipatory provisional measures 
sought by the Commission, which can only be granted after the Government concerned has been 
heard’.113 This means he did not rule out ‘anticipatory provisional measures’ as such, but just his 
own authority to order urgent measures to this effect.114 The Court itself did not deal with this 
issue. It observed that the reasons for the President to order urgent measures had ceased to exist 
with the release of the beneficiary and the fact that the Commission had noted that ‘there was 
currently no risk to the safety of Mr. Suárez-Rosero and his family’.115  
In the case of Cesti-Hurtado the Inter-American Commission did take precautionary meas-
ures, but the Inter-American Court refused to order provisional measures. In February 1997 Mr. 
Cesti-Hurtado was detained in the Simón Bolívar barracks in Peru. He was tried by military 
courts despite an order by a domestic court for his release issued in a habeas corpus ruling. In 
April the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights took precautionary measures and re-
quested Peru to report within 30 days ‘on whether it had completely complied with the order of 
habeas corpus [and] which measures [would be] adopted’.116 “Furthermore, it requested the State 
to submit information on the medical attention that Gustavo Adolfo Cesti Hurtado had re-
ceived.117 In May Peru responded by arguing that its military courts had jurisdiction and that the 
seven year sentence imposed on Mr Cesti-Hurtado was justified. Subsequently the Commission 
requested the Court to order Peru to comply with the domestic habeas corpus ruling.  
                                                 
107 IACHR Suárez-Rosero (Ecuador), Order of 12 April 1996 (President). Later that same month the 
President expanded the urgent measures to include the family members of the detainee, Order of 
24 April 1996 (President). 
108 IACHR Suárez-Rosero (Ecuador), Order of 12 April 1996 (President), 4th ‘Considering’ clause.  
109 Ibid. 
110 IACHR Suárez-Rosero (Ecuador), Order of 12 April 1996 (President), 6th ‘Considering’ clause.  
111 Ibid. 
112 Ibid. 
113 IACHR Suárez-Rosero (Ecuador), Order of 12 April 1996 (President), 8th ‘Considering’ clause. 
114 See also Chapter II (Systems), section 4.3 on the urgent measures by the President before the 
Court has convened to decide on provisional measures. 
115 IACHR Suárez-Rosero (Ecuador), Order of 28 June 1996, 2nd and 3rd ‘Considering’ clause. 
116 CIDH Cesti Hurtado (Peru) precautionary measures of 25 April 1997, referred to in IACHR 
Order of 29 July 1997, ‘Having Seen’ clause 2(i). 
117 CIDH Cesti Hurtado (Peru) precautionary measure of 25 April 1997, referred to in IACHR 
Judgment of 29 September 1999, §7. 
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As the Court was not sitting at the time, the President had to provide an initial response. He 
did not grant this specific request by the Commission but instead took urgent measures proprio 
motu with the aim to protect his health.118 The Court confirmed this by ordering provisional 
measures proprio motu in order to protect his health.119 It equally noted that ‘the facts and cir-
cumstances raised by the Commission’ implied that there was a ‘direct link’ between the Com-
mission's request for his release, in compliance with the order of habeas corpus issued by the 
domestic court and the very merits of the case placed before the Inter-American Commission. 
This matter was ‘for the Commission to decide at this stage’ and ‘(t)o accept the request of the 
Commission would mean that the Court could advance criteria on the merits of a case which is 
not before it yet’.120 
Eventually this case was completed by the Commission and brought before the Court. Re-
ferring, among others, to the refusal of the military authorities to obey and execute the legitimate 
order of domestic court, the Inter-American Court determined that his right to personal liberty had 
indeed been violated.121 Several years later the President of the Inter-American Court again de-
nied a request by the representative of the victim for provisional measures on his behalf.122 He 
noted that at the stage of provisional measures the merits should not be examined unless strictly 
related to the extreme gravity, urgency and the need to prevent irreparable harm to persons.123 He 
noted that it was not the type of situation that would warrant provisional measures. Instead it 
related to the supervision of compliance with the Court’s judgment in this case.124 Indeed the 
Court subsequently did deal with this issue in an order on the State’s non-compliance.125 
The above cases indicate that the Inter-American Commission has taken a more liberal ap-
proach to the use of provisional measures in these circumstances than the Inter-American 
Court.126 It was in the case of General Gallardo that the Court was persuaded to intervene pending 
the procedure to order a halt to a prolonged arbitrary detention. In November 2001 the Commis-
sion had already taken precautionary measures in this case.127 General Gallardo, who had criti-
                                                 
118 IACHR Cesti Hurtado (Peru), Order of the President of 29 July 1997, 5th and 6th ‘Considering’ 
clauses. 
119 See further Chapter VII (Detention). 
120 IACHR Cesti Hurtado (Peru), Order of 11 September 1997, 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
121 IACHR Cesti Hurtado (Peru), Judgment on the merits of 29 September 1999. See further the 
judgment on reparations of 31 May 2001 and on the request for interpretation of 27 November 
2001 (regarding the indemnities due to Mr Cesti) 
122 IACHR Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Order of the President of 21 December 2005 (denying provisional 
measures). 
123 IACHR Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Order of the President of 21 December 2005, 5th ‘Considering’ 
clause. See also Jorge Castañeda Gutman, Order of 25 November 2005, 8th ‘Considering’ clause 
and James and Others (Trinidad and Tobago), Order of 29 August 1998, 6th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
124 ACHR Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Order of the President of 21 December 2005, 6th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
125 ACHR Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Resolution of 22 September 2006. 
126 This does not mean that it always uses precautionary measures. See e.g. IACHR Figueredo 
Planchart v. Venezuela, 13 April 2000. The petitioner had requested the Commission to order 
precautionary measures to the effect that the execution of his arrest warrant should be suspended 
so as to avert irreparable injury to his ‘physical and moral integrity’ and to allow him to ‘come 
forward at liberty, subject to due assurances and guarantees, to exercise his right of defense in the 
proceedings against him’, §24. At the same time he also requested the Commission to appeal to 
the Court for provisional measures, §25-27. 
127 CIDH Gallardo v. Mexico, precautionary measures of 2 November 2001, Annual Report 2001, 
§43. The substance of the precautionary measures was as follows: ‘measures to protect Gen. 
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cised corruption and human rights violations by the Mexican Army, remained in prison in spite of 
the Commission’s specific recommendations in its decision on the merits with regard to his case, 
determining violations of the ACHR.128 In its Annual Report the Commission subsequently noted 
that the gravity and urgency of this case arose from the ongoing violations faced by General 
Gallardo in jail: ‘the harassment he receives from the prison authorities and a series of threats and 
incidents involving him and his family that have never been fully cleared up’.129 The State did not 
respect the Commission’s precautionary measures and the Commission requested the Court to 
order provisional measures. As noted, this time, and different from the previous cases, the Presi-
dent of the Inter-American Court indeed decided to take urgent measures, in anticipation of the 
Court’s provisional measures.130 The Commission had requested these measures to avoid irrepa-
rable damage to the life, and the physical, psychological and moral well-being’ of the General 
‘and also to his freedom of expression related to his life’. The provisional measures were also 
requested to prevent irreparable harm to the psychological and moral well-being of his wife and 
children. Regarding his eight year old daughter the Commission requested the Court to adopt 
‘special protection measures to safeguard her safety’. In other words, it argued that Gallardo’s 
continued detention was also harming his family. Moreover, it is clear from the reference to harm 
‘to his freedom of expression related to his life’ that the freedom of expression was an important 
incentive for the Commission’s decision to request provisional measures. This is underlined by its 
statement that another purpose of the measures is to ‘avoid irreparable damage to the right of 
Mexican society as a whole to receive information freely’.131 Two days later the President of the 
Court, ‘after having consulted all the judges of the Inter-American Court’, decided to order urgent 
measures calling on the State to adopt without delay all necessary measures to protect Gallardo’s 
life and safety.132 
While the text of the urgent measures is conventional in referring to life and safety, the de-
cision to order them appears to be based on the fact that his detention was illegal and part of a 
continuing pattern of harassment. In its submission the Commission had argued that he was ‘sub-
mitted to numerous acts of harassment, because the prison authorities denied him the right to 
receive visits on several occasions, in an apparently arbitrary manner, and he had been subjected 
to sudden transfers without any explanation’. His right to life was threatened by his ‘de facto 
detention’. This continued detention ‘did not permit safeguarding his life and physical well-being, 
or that of the members of his family’. “In these conditions, the liberation of general Gallardo is a 
                                                                                                                       
Gallardo’s life, person, and liberty, along with guarantees to enable his family and representatives 
to visit the facility where he is being held’. 
128 CIDH Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, 15 October 1996, in which it found that ‘through the 
detention and continuous submission of General José Francisco Gallardo to 16 preliminary 
inquiries and 8 criminal cases without a reasonable and justifiable purpose, the Government of 
Mexico has failed to discharge its obligation to respect and guarantee the rights to personal 
integrity, legal guarantees, honor and dignity, and legal protection of Brigadier General José 
Francisco Gallardo Rodríguez, according to articles 5, 7, 8, 11 and 25 of the American 
Convention, for the repeated acts that have taken place in Mexico since 1988’, §115. Among 
others, he ‘should be set at liberty immediately’, §116. 
129 CIDH Gallardo v. Mexico, precautionary measures of 2 November 2001, Annual Report 2001, 
§43. See also, e.g., Amnesty International, Silencing dissent, An update on General Gallardo, 9 
November 2001, AI Index: AMR 41/037/2001. 
130 See Chapter II, section 4.3 on the urgent measures by the President before the Court has 
convened to decide on provisional measures. 
131 IACHR Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, Order of 18 February 2002, 1st ‘Having seen’ clause. See 
also Order of 23 January 2002. 
132 IACHR Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, Order of the President of 20 December 2001, 1st 
‘Resuelve’ clause. 
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sine qua non condition to avoid the occurrence of the irreparable damage that threatens them”. 
With regard to the claim that the ‘de facto detention’ also ‘generated irreparable damage to his 
freedom of expression in relation to his life’ the Commission had noted that it ‘prevented him 
from fully expounding his version of the campaign of harassment to which he has been subjected 
and freely expressing his opinions about the acts which he considers constitute an abuse of au-
thority within the Mexican army’.133  
Thus, the facts of the case indicate a concern regarding the effects of continued arbitrary de-
tention on the detainee, his family and the freedom of expression at large, rather than indications 
of immediate health problems or death threats that would traditionally warrant the use of provi-
sional measures.134 This is also born out by the witnesses proposed by the Commission, whom the 
Court planned to hear at a public hearing on 19 January 2002. Two of the witnesses were well-
known authors planning to make a statement on the right of both General Gallardo and ‘the popu-
lation of Mexico’ to ‘seek, receive and disseminate information and opinions about the case’.135 
Indeed, the State understood the underlying intention of the urgent measures. It informed the 
Court, a few weeks before the planned hearing on the actual use of provisional measures, that it 
had reduced the General’s sentence and had released him. It also noted that he was ‘protected 24 
hours by an escort’.136  
Subsequently the Commission withdrew its request for provisional measures and requested 
a cancellation of the hearing. The President did the latter, but decided to maintain the urgent 
measures to protect Gallardo’s life and safety.137 As in previous cases, he noted that in human 
rights law provisional measures do not just have a preventive nature, preserving ‘a juridical situa-
tion’, but that they are ‘fundamentally protective, because they protect human rights’. When the 
basic requisites of extreme gravity and urgency and the prevention of irreparable harm to persons 
are present, provisional measures become a ‘real jurisdictional guarantee of a preventive na-
ture’.138 Subsequently, the full Court confirmed ‘all the terms of the orders of the President’.139 In 
its Order of 11 July 2007 the Court discontinued its provisional measures. It noted that the peti-
tioners had submitted, in February 2004, that Gallardo had been threatened by telephone the 
previous month.140 It noted, however, that since that time the situation had been stable.141 The 
State had pointed out that ‘in the last five years the State has adopted measures to protect Mr. 
Gallardo Rodríguez, among them: security detail provided by federal authorities, an official vehi-
cle with two agents at the beneficiary’s home, and a protection service consisting of police patrol-
                                                 
133 IACHR Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, Order of 18 February 2002, 1st ‘Having seen’ clause a) to 
i). 
134 See Chapter VII (Detention situations) and IX (Death threats). 
135 See e.g. IACHR Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, Order of the President of 14 February 2002, 3rd 
‘Having Seen’ clause, referring to the President’s order of 23 January 2002. In fact the President 
had already called these witnesses in his Order for urgent measures of 23 January 2002, 1st 
‘Resuelve’ clause. The authors were Hernán Lara Zavala and Homero Aridjis (involved in 
International PEN). 
136 The escort was composed of agents of the Ministry of Public Security and the Federal preventive 
police. See brief of 8 February 2002, referred to in IACHR Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, Order 
of 18 February 2002, 4th ‘Having Seen’ clause. See also CIDH Press Release 3/02, ‘IACHR 
welcomes freeing of General Gallardo in Mexico’, 12 February 2002. See generally Chapter 
XVII (Official responses). 
137 IACHR Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, Order of the President of 14 February 2002.  
138 Id., 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
139 IACHR Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, Order of 18 February 2002, 1st ‘Decisional’ clause. 
140 IACHR Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, Order of 11 July 2007, 3rd ‘Considering’ clause. 
141 Id., 4th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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ling and 24-hour emergency telephone numbers’.142 The petitioners had argued that he would 
only be safe once investigations into the threats had been completed and those responsible identi-
fied.143 The Court considered that the statements of the representatives ‘regarding the fact that 
there are still judicial processes currently pending’, did not constitute circumstances of extreme 
gravity and urgency that called for the continuance of the provisional measures.144 It added that 
‘the above does not prevent the State from continuing with the corresponding investigations 
within the domestic jurisdiction to identify and, if it is the case, to punish those responsible for the 
threats suffered by Mr. Gallardo Rodríguez’.145 
This was a case that involved respect for the Inter-American system, freedom of speech, 
impunity and arbitrary detention. The detention, implicitly, seemed to have been recognised as 
arbitrary by the then newly elected Government of Mexico, at least to the extent that it had indi-
cated it would comply with the Commission’s reports. Nevertheless, General Gallardo was not 
released but instead remained subjected to prolonged arbitrary detention. Not just civil society 
(e.g. International PEN and Amnesty International, which adopted him as a prisoner of con-
science), but also the Inter-American Commission and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary 
Detention146 had denounced the arbitrariness of his detention. It also constituted a threat to free-
dom of expression. Moreover, after its recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
American Court, the Government had committed itself – in abstracto – to implement the Com-
mission report, but in fact Gallardo remained in detention.147 
To the extent that the Court’s Order was made to intervene in a situation of arbitrary deten-
tion, it could be argued that it is exactly the recognised arbitrariness, in combination with the lack 
of actual redress (even the opposite: a continued detention), that could explain the use of provi-
sional measures to put a stop to this continuing violation. This could help restore, as much as 
possible, the status quo ante, before a further irreparable harm was done to the project of life of 
the General and his family.148  
While the Court does not expressly call for release but instead simply calls for respect for 
the safety of the General and his family, this case could nevertheless be seen as an example of a 
                                                 
142 Id.. 9th ‘Considering’ clause. 
143 Id., 6th ‘Considering’ clause. 
144 Id., 11th ‘Considering’ clause. 
145 Id., 12th ‘Considering’ clause. 
146 The Working Group on Arbitrary Detention had determined that his detention was arbitrary and 
related to a violation of, among others, freedom of speech. In the decision it is not mentioned 
whether it used its urgent appeal procedure, Opinion 28/1998, E/CN.4/2000/4/Add.1, p. 17 and p. 
18. 
147 The Inter-American Commission's determination of arbitrariness in General Gallardo’s case was 
a fact prior to Mexico's recognition of the competence of the Court. Mexico had only recognised 
the Court’s competence for facts subsequent to this recognition. Thus, at the time of the 
Commission’s determination of the arbitrariness of the detention of the General and its 
recommendation for release, the Commission was the ultimate authority in the Inter-American 
system. The new Government, on the other hand, has reopened the Commission cases that had 
been ‘closed’ by the previous Government. It might be argued that, therefore, they constituted 
‘new facts’ falling within the competence of the Court. In particular, the fact that the Government 
had committed itself to comply with these Commission cases was an acknowledgement of its 
obligation to comply with the Inter-American Human Rights system, and in particular the 
Convention, in good faith and, in the case of the General, it may imply an admission of the 
arbitrariness of his detention. Continuing such detention clearly constitutes a lack of respect by 
certain sectors of government for the commitments undertaken under the Convention. It may 
mean that the Commission needs to open the case anew so that the Court can subsequently 
examine it. Consequently, all this time the arbitrary detention is being prolonged. 
148 On the concept of ‘project of life’ see section 2.1 of this Chapter and references therein. 
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case in which de facto the Court intervened in a situation of arbitrary detention that also impli-
cated the right to ‘seek, receive, and impart information and ideas’ (Article 13(1) ACHR). With 
all of this it must be kept in mind though that the Court used its provisional measures based on its 
traditional argument of protection against threats and it was on this basis also that it maintained its 
provisional measures upon Gallardo’s release until 2007. 
In 2003 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of another General, who 
was claimed to have been arbitrarily deprived of his liberty two weeks previously, this time in 
Venezuela. It was alleged that the officers who carried out his arrest and detention ‘did not show 
any judicial or other warrant, did not provide information on the reasons for the detention, nor did 
they indicate which authority had ordered the detention’. Moreover the next day a domestic judge 
had ordered his release. Through its precautionary measure the Commission asked Venezuela ‘to 
implement immediately the habeas corpus order on behalf of Gen. Alfonso Martínez, and to 
guarantee him, adopting the pertinent security measures, his personal security and that of his 
family, and the exercise of his civil and political rights’.149 
2.6.3 Practice in the African system 
In October 2002 the African Commission took a provisional measure on behalf of journalists 
detained without charge in Liberia. The nature of this provisional measure was not specified.150 
The decision on the merits does not provide sufficient information to infer any specific ap-
proach of the Commission in this regard, e.g. in light of the health situation. The Commission 
may have intervened urgently simply because of a general concern about the use of detention 
without charge in order to hinder the freedom of expression. 
2.6.4 Practice by the EComHR 
In several early cases the European Commission refused to take provisional measures to secure 
the provisional release of a petitioner on account of poor health.151 Yet this may have been due to 
                                                 
149 CIDH Gen. Rafael Alfonso Martínez v. Venezuela, Annual Report 2003, §65. 
150 African Commission Samuel Kofi Woods, II and Kabineh M. Ja’neh v. Liberia, November 2001 
(provisional measure of 23 October 2002; this may have been an informal rather than a formal 
provisional measure). See also Chapter VIII (Procedure). 
151 See EComHR X v. Germany (FRG), 22 March 1958 (inadm.) (297/57). The petitioner, a 
commercial representative, was arrested and placed in preventive detention on 22 May 1957 for 
holding a leading position in a ‘clandestine association’ (the German Communist Party, which 
was declared unconstitutional in 1956), Yearbook of the European Convention on Human Rights 
Vol. 2, 1958-59, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1960, pp. 204 and 206. In his second appeal 
against his detention before the national courts he requested, among others, ‘his provisional 
release at least on account of his poor state of health’. Before the Commission, violation of the 
Articles 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13 and 14 ECHR were alleged. The petitioner had asked the 
Commission to declare his application admissible ‘and to intervene with the authorities of the 
Federal Republic of Germany on his behalf in order to secure his immediate release’ “Whereas 
the Convention does not contain any such obligations binding upon the High Contracting Parties 
as invoked by the Applicant; whereas, moreover, the Convention does not contain any provision 
giving the Commission competence to order provisional measures; whereas it therefore appears 
that the application is in this respect incompatible with the provisions of the Convention; whereas 
it should, in pursuance of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention, accordingly be rejected”. 
See Yearbook 2 (1960), p. 212. 
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the Commission’s weariness, at the time, about its competence to order provisional measures in 
the first place, rather than to this specific request to order the release of a detainee.152  
2.6.5 Practice by the Bosnia Chamber 
In October 2001 the Bosnia Chamber ordered provisional measures to prevent resort to compul-
sory pre-trial detention. The petitioners had argued that ‘many citizens had spent several years in 
detention before being finally released with no charges filed against them’.153 The Order would 
remain in force for several days and was not extended, as the State had responded the next day 
that it would respect it ‘completely’154 and the disputed legislation was subsequently repealed as 
well.155 This indicates an approach by the Chamber that is aimed more at preventing undue hard-
ship to persons, or irreparable harm to the Article 5 claim.156 By respecting the Chamber’s provi-
sional measures, the respondent had in fact made the Article 5 claim redundant since as a result 
the petitioners were never subjected to detention under the old legislation.  
In a previous case, in July 1997, it had denied a request for provisional measures for the re-
lease of a petitioner.157 While it appears from the case that the petitioner was in poor health, the 
request for provisional measures may in fact relate to the claim of illegal detention.158 In its deci-
                                                 
152 See for a refusal to take provisional measures in early cases e.g. X. v. FRG, 297/57, 22 March 
1958 (inadm.), Yearbook 2, pp. 204-214; in 1963, a petitioner sought the quashing of a sentence 
and the cessation of certain measures pending the case. In this case the Commission equally 
considered that it was ‘not empowered to order protective measures’, but could only ‘suggest’ 
such measures. Moreover, it considered that the fact that it was dealing with the case did not have 
suspensive effect at the domestic level. It noted that ‘far from obliging national courts to wait for 
the Commission to complete its work before they complete theirs, the Convention, in principle, 
provides for the opposite solution (Article 26) and assigns a mainly subsidiary role to the 
collective guarantee machinery set up by it’. See X and Y v. Belgium (1420/62, 1477/62, 
1478/62), 18 December 1963, Yearbook 2, p. 626. Finally, in Wemhoff v. Germany, 1 April 1966, 
the petitioner had requested the Commission to order his release from prison. In February 1965, 
however, the plenary Commission considered that ‘it results from Article 19 of the Convention 
that the task of the Commission is to ‘ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by 
the High Contracting Parties’ in the Convention; whereas, however, the Convention does not 
contain any provision giving the Commission competence to order provisional measures in the 
exercise of its functions under Article 19’. Thus, it added that it had ‘no competence to order the 
Applicant’s release from prison as requested by him; whereas, furthermore, the Commission does 
not consider it appropriate in the circumstances to take any other steps in this connection’ 
Wemhoff v. Germany, 1 April 1966, pp. 118-121. Again, the reference did not relate to the 
contents of the request. 
153 Bosnia Chamber Ivo Lozančić et al. v. Federation BiH, 8 March 2002, (inadm.), §§14-15. 
154 Id., §16. 
155 This was done by the High Representative. Bosnia Chamber Ivo Lozančić et al. v. Federation 
BiH, 8 March 2002, (inadm.), §§17. 
156 There are also several cases in which the Chamber has refused requests for release or suspension 
of execution of a sentence, often in the context of an alleged arbitrary detention. See e.g. Milorad 
Marčeta v. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 April 1998; Novo Bencuz v. Republika 
Srpska, 8 February 2000 (inadm.); Edin Garplija v. Federation BiH, 9 April 2002; Jasmin Šljivo 
v. Republika Srpska, 9 February 2001 (inadm.); M.A. v. Federation BiH, 7 March 2001 (inadm.) 
and Ibrahim Makić v. Federation BiH, 9 November 2001 (inadm.). 
157 Bosnia Chamber Milorad Marceta v. Fed. B&H, 3 April 1998, §3. 
158 In this case representatives of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees had learned 
that the petitioner had been arrested. It had informed his family and the Ombudsperson. His 
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sion on the merits the Chamber noted its refusal to order provisional measures and added that it 
did so ‘on the basis of the information then available to it’.159 A month later the Deputy Prosecu-
tor of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) stated that ‘the 
evidence was insufficient by international standards to provide reasonable grounds for believing 
that the applicant had committed a serious violation of international humanitarian law’.160 Subse-
quently Senior Deputy High Representative for Bosnia ‘stated in strong terms that a serious viola-
tion of human rights and breach of the Rome Agreement had occurred’.161 He called for the re-
lease of the petitioner and stated that he ‘was referring the case to the Ombudsperson since such a 
gross human rights abuse could not be remedied simply by [his] release’.162 The next day the 
Cantonal Court in Bihać was informed of the decision of the Prosecutor of the ICTY and the 
petitioner was released that same day.163 It is very well possible that the Bosnia Chamber would 
have used provisional measures for the release of the petitioner if it had had more information.164 
2.6.6 Conclusion 
If provisional measures are to be used in the context of an arbitrary detention, somehow it must be 
established at which point the situation of this detention starts to be urgent and why irreparable 
harm is threatened. Otherwise provisional measures should only be used in situations where the 
prison conditions and the individual conditions of the person involved require it and then it would 
concern a traditional reason for using a provisional measure: preventing irreparable harm to life 
and physical integrity (e.g. prolonged incommunicado detention, threat of disappearance, threat of 
torture).165 
At the same time it is suggested that with regard to minors a credible case of arbitrary de-
tention could indeed warrant the use of provisional measures to the effect that they should be 
released. If, for instance, the CIDH had had prima facie evidence of such arbitrariness in the case 
of the Honduran minors discussed in Chapter VII, on halting cruel treatment in detention, it could 
have used precautionary measures to demand their release pending the case.166 After all, in its 
discussion of the legal framework of the right to personal liberty in this case it noted that ‘[t]here 
is a clear tendency in international human rights law to afford greater protection to minors than to 
adults’.167 
                                                                                                                       
family then engaged a lawyer, who lodged a petition with the Ombudsperson. In June of that year 
the latter referred the case to the Chamber. 
159 Bosnia Chamber Milorad Marčeta v. Fed.BiH, 3 April 1998, §3. 
160 Id., §30. 
161 Id., §31. 
162 Id., §31. 
163 Id., §34. 
164 About the information required for the Chamber to take provisional measures see also Chapter 
XV (Immediacy and risk). 
165 The protection required in most such cases would not necessarily have to be ‘release’ but rather 
to provide protection, medicine, access, etc. See in general about the protection required Chapter 
XIII (Protection). 
166 In the actual case the Inter-American Commission noted in its final report that there was 
insufficient evidence with regard to the particular minors participating in the complaint. With 
regard to the study of the Office of the National Human Rights Commissioner about the reasons 
for incarceration of 84 juveniles in the Jalteva prison, the Commission considered that it had not 
been proved that the specific minors referred to by the parties had been detained for motives of 
vagrancy, for their own protection, because they were abandoned, or because they were orphans. 
167 CIDH Minors in detention case (Honduras), case 11.491, Report on the merits 41/99, 10 March 
1999, §113. In this case the CIDH had concluded that a violation of Article 7(2) ACHR had not 
been proved, §120. In an obiter, however, it pointed out the legal framework with regard to 
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While some adjudicators have used provisional measures that appear to aim at preventing 
arbitrary detention, only the Inter-American Commission has done so more than once and it is too 
early, given the dearth of information, to argue that a practice has developed in more than one 
system. Traditionally provisional measures have only been used in detention cases when there 
was a threat of torture or cruel treatment. Thus, the question must be addressed, in cases not in-
volving children in detention, at which point in time the situation of an arbitrary detention starts to 
be urgent and why irreparable harm is threatened. This can only be done on a case by case basis. 
The Inter-American Commission, with its wide protective mandate, and the Bosnia Cham-
ber, with its almost ‘constitutional’ mandate (on a temporary basis), based on the specific post-
war Bosnian situation, have extended this traditional approach at least once to the very limited 
group of cases of prima facie arbitrary detention in combination with another situation of gravity 
(such as continued detention despite Government ‘admission’ of arbitrariness). A similar ap-
proach is taken by the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention, which uses the tool of urgent 
actions in such cases.168 Moreover, as to the merits the approach of all human rights adjudicators 
has indeed converged, showing a clear aversion to the practice of arbitrary detention. 
Prolonged arbitrary detention is seen as a particularly serious violation of customary law.169 
Yet it may be argued that arbitrary detention is a situation that is reversible and therefore the use 
of provisional measures to halt or prevent such detention would be situated beyond the outer 
limits of the concept. Nevertheless there are several examples of provisional measures ordered in 
these circumstances. The question arises how their use can be explained.  
One situation this section singles out is that where an international adjudicator examines a 
case involving a detention situation that has already been determined to constitute arbitrary deten-
tion (for instance as a punishment for the exercise of the freedom of expression), either in a previ-
ous decision by this adjudicator, or by another international adjudicator.  
When a judgment on the merits or reparations has ordered the release of a detainee, each 
day he or she continues to be detained may be argued to result in additional irreversible harm to 
the system of human rights protection. Yet provisional measures do not appear to be the most 
appropriate tool to prevent such harm. In fact most adjudicators have created follow-up mecha-
nisms that could appropriately be used to emphasize the need for compliance. 
On the other hand, there is another situation in which the use of provisional measures to 
prevent irreparable harm to the procedure does appear particularly appropriate. This is when a 
                                                                                                                       
Article 7: “The Commission considers that the practice of incarcerating a minor not because he 
committed a criminalized offence but simply because he was abandoned by society or was at risk, 
or is an orphan or a vagrant, poses a grave threat to Honduran children. The State cannot deprive 
of their freedom children who have committed no crime, without incurring international 
responsibility for the violation of their personal liberty (Art. 7 of the Convention)”, §109. The 
fact that it concerns minors may lead to the conclusion that the ‘grave threat’ mentioned here 
would necessitate precautionary measures to prevent irreparable harm to these children, even if 
detained in special juvenile facilities. “Minors cannot be punished because they are at risk, that is 
to say, that (sic) because they need to work to earn a living, or because they have no home and 
thus have to live on the streets. Far from punishing minors for their supposed vagrancy, the State 
has a duty to prevent and rehabilitate and an obligation to provide them with adequate means for 
growth and self-fulfilment”, §110. See also IACHR Advisory Opinion on judicial status and 
human rights of the child, 28 August 2002. 
168 While insufficient information is available on the approach of the African Commission in this 
respect, its role could be or become similar to that of the Inter-American Commission: protective, 
mediatory and rather informal. 
169 See e.g. the statement of the ICJ quoted in the beginning of this section, as well as the decision to 
institute a UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention and the reference in the US Restatement of 
the law (third). 
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person is faced with detention as a result of participation in the individual petition system, either 
as a petitioner or as a witness. Outside of the latter context the use of provisional measures against 
the predetermined arbitrary detention of a person because ignoring previous decisions by the 
adjudicators would result in irreversible harm to the system is not convincing. 
A second, rather far-reaching, argument for the use of provisional measures to halt a per-
son’s detention in such cases would be that each day a detainee is unlawfully kept in detention she 
is hindered in the further development of her project of life. Particularly when this detention is 
prolonged it may have an irreparable impact on the life plans (blocking the capacity to make 
arrangements for livelihood and life experiences including study, work, family planning, etc.) of 
the person in question. This may trigger right to life issues in the broader sense of the term, com-
bining life and personal integrity rights and encompassing the right not to be deprived of a digni-
fied life. Provisional measures are then aimed at ensuring to some extent the continuance, in an 
adapted form, of the detained person’s original life plans.170 
Yet in order to uphold their authority and effectiveness it is important that provisional 
measures remain exceptional. Clearly the use of provisional measures for the release of persons in 
contested detention (without any health risks) does not fall within the common core of the concept 
of provisional measures in international human rights adjudication. Many petitioners may claim 
the reason for their detention is arbitrary or their trial was so unfair as to render their detention 
arbitrary. Generally speaking, there is no convincing practice supporting the use of provisional 
measures in this type of circumstance. 
In the Gallardo case, on the other hand, there was a situation of established prolonged arbi-
trary detention, both the General himself and his family had been harassed, and the continued 
detention could result in irreparable harm to their project of life. In that sense the Court’s provi-
sional measures could still be seen as somewhat belonging to the traditional group of provisional 
measures. 
While protection against arbitrary detention and supervision of compliance with its judg-
ments are both eminently important, the use of provisional measures to ensure this generally 
speaking is not warranted. This is different when the rights at stake also involve the basic exis-
tence of persons. There may be situations when this existence is at stake because of a prolonged 
and continuing arbitrary detention as well as clear indications of irreparable harm to the project of 
life. 
2.7 Preventing impunity 
2.7.1 Introduction 
On one occasion the Committee against Torture has used an atypical provisional measure 
specifically in order to prevent impunity.171 It did so in light of the obligation in the Convention 
against Torture to either prosecute or extradite persons suspected of having perpetrated torture. 
Thus, this provisional measure was not taken as part of provisional measures against death threats 
and harassment, but in order to ensure compliance with specific provisions of the Convention 
                                                 
170 On the concept of ‘project of life’ see section 2.1 of this Chapter and references therein. Apart 
from stopping the original life plan from being blighted further and ensuring the conditions to 
pursue the initial life plan as much as possible, another purpose of provisional measures may be 
ensuring the conditions for a new project of life: planning a liveable life, or even having the 
option in the first place to plan a life. 
171 It normally takes provisional measures in non-refoulement cases, see Chapters V (Non-
refoulement) and XV (Immediacy and risk). 
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against Torture.172 As compared to other provisional measures, considerable information is 
available on the provisional measure and its aftermath, which will be referred to in this section. 
This serves to illustrate how this provisional measure has been taken to prevent irreversible harm 
to the claim. 
2.7.2 Practice 
In 1999 a Chadian NGO,173 ‘with the Pinochet precedent in mind’, requested Human Rights 
Watch to assist it in bringing the former President of Chad, in exile in Senegal, to justice in that 
country.174 Habré ruled Chad from 1982 until the end of 1990. He then fled to Senegal. In the 
early 1990s a Chadian truth commission published a report on the responsibility of Habré’s gov-
ernment for 40,000 murders as well as for the systematic use of torture.  
In January 2000 seven victims from Chad, acting as private plaintiffs, together with another 
Chadian NGO,175 provided a Senegalese court with details of 97 cases of political killings, 142 
cases of torture and 100 disappearances committed during 1982-1990 by police forces instructed 
by Habré. A coalition of NGOs was formed to support the victims.176 Among others, the victims 
had asserted that the UN Convention against Torture obliged Senegal to either prosecute or extra-
dite alleged torturers present in its territory. The next month the Senegalese judge in question 
indicted Habré on torture charges and placed him under house arrest. In July 2000 the Court of 
Appeals dismissed these charges, considering that Senegalese courts had no jurisdiction over 
torture committed outside the territory of Senegal and against non-nationals. The Cour de Cass-
ation (court of final appeals) upheld this decision in March 2001.177 In the meantime, another 
group of victims had filed a case against Habré in Belgium. They were supported by the same 
coalition.  
In April 2001 the President of Senegal publicly declared that he had given the former dicta-
tor one month to leave Senegal. Assisted by Reed Brody of Human Rights Watch, Suleymane 
Guengueng178 and six others resorted to CAT in order to ensure the principle that perpetrators of 
torture must be either prosecuted or extradited: aut dedere aut iudicare. They also requested 
provisional measures. They were afraid ‘that Habré would move to a country out of reach of an 
                                                 
172 While it is difficult to disentangle these obligations, an attempt is made to discuss the general 
obligation in this section and the obligation as part of protection against death threats in Chapter 
IX and Chapter XIII (Protection). 
173 The Chadian Association for the Promotion and Defence of Human Rights (ATPDH). 
174 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, ‘The case against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet’, May 
2006, <www.hrw.org> (consulted 16 May 2006). 
175 The Chadian Association of Victims of Political Repression and Crime (AVCRP). 
176 It consists of human rights groups from Chad: the Chadian Association of Victims of Political 
Repression and Crime (AVCRP), the ATPDH and the Chadian League for Human Rights 
(LTDH), the African Assembly for the Defence of Human Rights (RADDHO) and the National 
Organisation for Human Rights, both based in Senegal, Agir Ensemble pour les Droits de 
l’Homme and the International Federation of Human Rights Leagues (FIDH), both based in 
France and Interights (UK). 
177 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, United Nations asks Senegal to hold ex-Chad dictator, victory for 
Hissène Habré’s victims, 23 April 2001, <www.hrw.org> (consulted on 10 April 2003).  
178 Guengueng is one of the founders of the AVCRP. Human Rights Watch reports that he almost 
died of dengue fever during two years of mistreatment in prisons in Chad. HRW, Senegalese 
President urged to aid rights prosecution, 27 June 2001, <www.hrw.org> (consulted 10 April 
2003). 
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extradition request or a final U.N. ruling and asked the Committee to issue an interim ruling to 
preserve their ability to bring him to justice’.179  
The complaint before CAT claimed violations of Article 5(2) ICAT (failure to establish ju-
risdiction over the crime of torture committed abroad in cases where the alleged offender is pre-
sent on the State’s territory) and Article 7 ICAT (failure to prosecute or extradite the alleged 
offender).180 As primary forms of remedy for these violations the victims asked the Committee to 
recommend Senegal to amend its legislation to establish jurisdiction over the crime of torture 
committed abroad in cases where the alleged offender is present on its territory, in conformity 
with Article 5(2) and to either extradite Habré or submit his case to the competent authorities in 
Senegal for the purpose of prosecution, as required by Article 7. At the same time the petitioners 
also asked the Committee to take provisional measures in order to prevent Habré from leaving 
Senegal except pursuant to an extradition demand. They first discussed the risk of irreparable 
harm and then the issue of urgency. On the risk of irreparable harm the complaint pointed out: 
“If Hissène Habré leaves Senegal, the authors will suffer irreparable harm because there will 
likely be no possibility to bring the man responsible for their torture, Hissène Habré, to justice, 
and there will thus be no means of remedying the violation of Article 7 which they have 
suffered. Indeed, Senegal would incur supplemental violation of the Convention by letting 
Habré flee. Having initiated the prosecution of Habré, the author/plaintiffs have a right to see 
Habré extradited or prosecuted under Article 7. The victims’ right to bring Habré to justice is 
implicit in their right to a remedy, their right to compensation and their right to reparations, and 
has been recognized by U.N. rapporteurs such as Joinet and van Boven”.181 
The complaint then continued with an explanation of the urgency of the matter, referring to the 
fact that in early April President Wade had declared publicly that he had given Habré one month 
to leave Senegal. The petitioners did not know when the President had notified Habré about this. 
They also explained that other victims of Habré had opened criminal proceedings in Belgium ‘and 
the authors are concerned that any request for extradition by Belgium, as well as any relief rec-
ommended by the Committee against Torture (in particular the prosecution or extradition of 
Habré pursuant to Article 7), would be frustrated if Habré had already left Senegal’.182  
In response, CAT took a provisional measure that same month. It requested the State not to 
expel Habré and to take all necessary measures to prevent him from leaving Senegalese territory 
in any way other than through an extradition proceeding (the principle aut dedere aut iudicare).183 
                                                 
179 Human Rights Watch, United Nations asks Senegal to hold ex-Chad dictator, victory for Hissène 
Habré’s victims, 23 April 2001, <www.hrw.org> (consulted on 10 April 2003).  
180 The complaint referred to the concern expressed jointly by the UN Special Rapporteur on the 
Independence of Judges and Lawyers and the UN Special Rapporteur against Torture about the 
circumstances surrounding the dismissal of the charges against Habré by the Court of Appeals. 
The Rapporteurs had reminded Senegal of its obligations under the UN Convention against 
Torture. 
181 Letter to the United Nations Committee against Torture, 18 April 2001, <http://www.hrw.org/ 
french/themes/habre-cat2.html> (consulted 14 June 2007). 
182 Letter to the United Nations Committee against Torture, 18 April 2001, <http://www.hrw.org/ 
french/themes/habre-cat2.html> (consulted 14 June 2007). See in general about imminence 
Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
183 It sent a note verbale to this effect to the Government of Senegal, on the basis of its Rule 108(9), 
and in so far as the conditions for requesting provisional measures existed: ‘en vertu de l’article 
108, paragraphe 9, de son règlement d’ordre intérieur et dans la mesure où les conditions pour 
demander des mesures provisionnelles sont remplies, le Comité prie l’Etat partie de ne pas 
expulser Mr. Hissène Habré et de prendre toutes les mesures nécessaires pour empêcher que Mr. 
Hissène Habré quitte le territoire du Sénégal autrement qu’en vertu d’une procédure 
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Reed Brody of HRW pointed out that ‘this ruling’ (the decision to take a provisional meas-
ure) was ‘a great victory for Habré’s thousands of victims’.184 His organisation noted that ‘States 
usually comply with its [the Committee’s] decisions, and Senegal is expected to do so’.185 As 
discussed in Part IV to this book (Responses) various actors subsequently played a role in rein-
forcing compliance with the provisional measures by the State. 
In May 2006 CAT published its decision on the merits. It noted that its consideration ‘had 
been delayed at the explicit wish of the parties because of judicial proceedings pending in Bel-
gium for the extradition of Hissène Habré’.186 It found violations of Articles 5(2) and 7 ICAT. 
Senegal was indeed obliged to prosecute Habré ‘for alleged acts of torture unless it could show 
that there was not sufficient evidence to prosecute, at least at the time when the complainants 
submitted their complaint in January 2000’.187 In addition, since 19 September 2005, when Bel-
gium made a formal extradition request, the State party ‘had the choice of proceeding with extra-
dition if it decided not to submit the case to its own judicial authorities for the purpose of prose-
cuting’ him.188 By refusing to comply with this extradition request the State party had ‘again 
failed to perform its obligations under article 7 of the Convention’.189 Under Article 5(2) Senegal 
was obliged to take the necessary measures, including legislative, to establish jurisdiction and 
under Article 7 it was obliged to submit the case ‘to its competent authorities for the purpose of 
prosecution or, failing that, since Belgium has made an extradition request, to comply with that 
request, or, should the case arise, with any other extradition request made by another State, in 
accordance with the Convention’.190 The Committee referred to its provisional measure as a re-
quest not to expel Habré as well as ‘to take all necessary measures to prevent him from leaving 
                                                                                                                       
d’extradition’. At the end of that month the Secretariat of CAT also informed the petitioner of the 
registration of the complaint and the provisional measure requesting the State ‘not to expel Mr. 
Hissene Habré an to take all necessary measures to prevent Mr. Hissène Habré from leaving the 
territory of Senegal except pursuant to an extradition demand, while the communication is under 
examination by the Committee’. Letter of 27 April 2001, posted on the internet site of Human 
Rights Watch, <www.hrw.org> (consulted on 10 April 2003). 
184 Human Rights Watch, ‘United Nations asks Senegal to hold ex-Chad dictator’, press release of 
23 April 2001, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/04/23/senega161.htm> (consulted 14 June 
2001). According the Human Rights Watch the ‘abrupt decision’ of the Senegalese President that 
Habré should leave Senegal within a month ‘was a tribute to the victims’ efforts’. At the same 
time it ‘raised the possibility that Habré would go to a country out of justice’s reach’. This was 
why the victims appealed to CAT and why the latter indeed decided to take provisional measures. 
Human Rights Watch, The case against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet’, May 2006, 
<www.hrw.org> (consulted on 16 May 2006). See also Kirgis (2000/2001). 
185 Human Rights Watch, ‘United Nations asks Senegal to hold ex-Chad dictator’, press release of 
23 April 2001, <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/04/23/senega161.htm> (consulted 14 June 
2001). Senegalese lawyer and President of the Fédération de droits de l’homme (FIDH), Sidiki 
Kaba, was quoted stating that ‘this decision is based on the principle that Senegal is obliged to 
prosecute or extradite alleged torturers like Hissène Habré’. A representative of the African 
Assembly for the Defence of Human Rights (RADDHO) considered it unlikely that Senegal 
would ignore the provisional measure and allow Habré to escape justice. The Chadian victims 
themselves felt supported by the decision and one of the victims involved in the complaint, Mr. 
Guengueng stated: “The United Nations has heard our pleas”. Human Rights Watch, ‘United 
Nations asks Senegal to hold ex-Chad dictator’, press release of 23 April 2001 
<http://hrw.org/english/docs/2001/04/23/senega161.htm> (consulted 14 June 2001). 
186 CAT Guengueng et al. v. Senegal, 17 May 2006, §9.1. 
187 Id., §9.8. 
188 Id., §9.10. 
189 Id., §9.11. 
190 Id., §10. 
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the territory other than under an extradition procedure’. It noted that Senegal had ‘acceded to this 
request’.191 
Subsequently the abovementioned Committee of Eminent African Jurists set up by the Afri-
can Union issued its report recommending his prosecution in Senegal. Indeed, in July 2006 the 
African Union’s Assembly followed this recommendation and called on Senegal to prosecute him 
‘in the name of Africa’. Senegal responded that it would do so.192  
2.7.3 Conclusion 
This section specifically discussed a provisional measure taken by CAT in order to prevent a 
violation by the State of its obligation under Articles 5 and 7 ICAT to act against impunity. 
The obligation to prosecute and punish as part of provisional measures against death threats 
clearly aims at preventing irreparable harm to persons. The provisional measure in the Habré 
case, on the other hand, aims to ensure a core provision of the Convention against Torture in light 
of the general obligation to act against impunity. Thus, it aims to prevent irreversible harm to the 
claim under these articles and, seen more widely, to the system of protection created with this 
Convention. 
The events subsequent to the Committee’s provisional measures revealed a complex web of 
interactions between various actors concerned with the implementation of Articles 5(2) and 7 
ICAT. 
Requiring States to establish jurisdiction over the crime of torture committed abroad and to 
extradite or prosecute perpetrators of torture, Articles 5 and 7 ICAT may be considered essential 
for the implementation of the general obligation to prevent torture. They have been inserted to 
deal with situations in which the State where the torture took place is unwilling or unable to 
prosecute the alleged perpetrator so that prosecution should take place in another jurisdiction in 
order to prevent impunity or, alternatively, to prevent impunity in cases where the alleged perpe-
trator may run a risk to be tortured or receive the death penalty in the State the requesting his 
extradition. 
While the provisional measure taken by CAT does not directly prevent irreparable harm to 
the life and personal integrity of specific individuals, it certainly makes sense in the specific 
context of the Convention against Torture. If Habré would have left Senegal this State could not 
have made him return in order to satisfy its obligation to extradite or prosecute. In that sense the 
situation would have been irreversible. Given that at least the situation would result in irreversible 
harm to the claim, the provisional measures did not stretch beyond the outer limits. After all, once 
the suspect is no longer present on its territory, a State’s chance of implementing this obligation 
becomes almost nil. 
Without the provisional measures it is unlikely that the Committee’s finding on the merits 
would have provoked the African Union to become actively involved in the situation. 
The question arises whether the use of such provisional measures is likely in the other sys-
tems too. While lacking the abovementioned specific provisions on the prosecution or extradition 
of torture suspects, the HRC, Inter-American Commission and Court and ECtHR have neverthe-
                                                 
191 Id., §1.3. 
192 See the African Union’s decision of 2 July 2006, Assembly /Au/3 (Vii), reproduced at 
<http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2006/08/02/chad13897.htm> (consulted 14 may 2007). See 
also Lekha Sriram (2006) and the report by UN Special Rapporteur on torture Manfred Nowak, 
A/HRC/4/33, 15 January 2007, §§ 43-45. For subsequent events see e.g. Human Rights Watch, 
‘Senegal: New law will permit Habré’s trial’, 2 February 2007; ‘Senegal: EU parliament calls for 
support of Hissène Habré trial, Senegal should present reasonable plan to prosecute Chad’s ex-
dictator’, 26 April 2007 and Press release by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights Louise 
Arbour, ‘Senegal constitutional change paves way for Habré trial’, 11 April 2008. 
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less developed case law involving the obligation to investigate human rights violations and bring 
to justice the perpetrators. They have done so on the basis of the positive obligations of States to 
prevent threats to and attacks on the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment. Obviously 
the obligation to investigate extreme human rights violations and bring to justice the perpetrators, 
in order to prevent (further) violations of the rights of specific persons (right to life and right not 
to be subjected to torture and cruel treatment) is closely related to the obligation to act against 
impunity in the general interest of preventing further violations and in order to achieve some form 
of closure for the victims and society as a whole. Impunity often causes further threats against 
witnesses, petitioners or others. Thus, the Inter-American Court generally requires investigation 
and prosecution as part of both its provisional measures and of its judgments on merits and repa-
rations. In the first case it is meant as a concrete protective measure, in the second as a concrete 
step in implementing the obligation of non-repetition. Yet the provisional measures taken in the 
inter-American system that refer to the obligation to investigate and prosecute differ from the 
provisional measure by CAT discussed in this section. The former cases involved the need to 
investigate and prosecute those responsible for direct threats in order to prevent their continua-
tion.193 
This section, however, discussed a provisional measure taken by CAT in order to prevent 
impunity in general. It was based directly on unique treaty provisions (Articles 5(2) and 7 ICAT), 
requiring States to establish jurisdiction over the crime of torture committed abroad and to extra-
dite or prosecute perpetrators of torture. Judge Cançado Trindade refers to it as ‘the right to the 
realization of justice’.194 He notes that only this ‘can alleviate the suffering of victims caused by 
the irreparable damage of torture’.195 He also points out that ‘(i)n the context of impunity, urgency 
increase, rather than decreases, with the passing of time’.196 
This was an obligation aimed at the general prevention of torture, but not specifically re-
lated to the existence of ongoing threats to particular persons. It is within the outer limits, but does 
not (directly) involve preventing irreparable harm to persons. In this light it seems unlikely that 
the other human rights adjudicators, with a more general mandate, will also order such provi-
sional measures in isolation, separately from the need to protect persons against specific death 
threats.197  
2.8 Protecting the independence of the judiciary in the context of 
harassment 
2.8.1 Introduction 
There is one situation in which the Inter-American Court ordered provisional measures that ap-
pear to be motivated partly by a desire to protect the independence of the judiciary. It does not 
                                                 
193 See Chapter IX on provisional measures to protect against death threats and harassment and 
Chapter XIII (Protection) on the general reference of these measures to the State’s obligation to 
investigate and prosecute. 
194 ICJ Questions relating to the obligation to prosecute or extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 
28 May 2009, dissenting opinion by Judge Cançado Trindade, §55. 
195 Id., §75. 
196 Id., §59. 
197 Obviously, the ICJ, when faced with a complaint based specifically on a State’s non-compliance 
with these provisions in ICAT, could indeed order provisional measures, as the ICJ pointed out in 
its Order denying the request for provisional measures in Questions relating to the obligation to 
prosecute or extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 28 May 2009. The ICJ noted that the rights 
asserted appeared plausible but denied the request for other reasons.  
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appear that other adjudicators have used provisional measures in order to protect the independ-
ence of the judiciary, but in a similar set of circumstances it cannot be ruled out.  
More specifically, the provisional measures were taken in the context of the constitutional 
crisis in Peru under Fujimori. They could be argued to belong to the category of protection against 
death threats and harassment. The petitioner, an impeached justice of the Constitutional Court, 
and her family were being harassed and other justices, including the President of the Constitu-
tional Court, had been physically attacked.  
Indeed the Inter-American Court used the traditional phrase to ‘ensure the physical, psycho-
logical and moral integrity’ to motivate its use of provisional measures. In other words, in the text 
of its Order for provisional measures it did not really move away from its practice of ordering 
such measures to prevent irreparable harm to the life of the beneficiary and to his or her personal 
integrity. Yet given the apparent additional rationale of protecting the independence of the judici-
ary, this section sets out this case in more detail in order to examine whether the provisional 
measures aimed at preventing irreversible harm to the claim and whether they aimed to protect 
persons against irreparable harm.198  
2.8.2 The practice in the Inter-American system 
Fujimori had been elected President in 1990. However, two years later he dissolved the Constitu-
tional Court, as well as Congress. The next year a new Constitution was adopted and in 1996 a 
new Constitutional Court was appointed. That same year legislation was adopted that appeared to 
make Fujimori eligible for re-election for a third consecutive term of office. This legislation was 
appealed to the new Constitutional Court, which was divided on the issue. Five of the seven 
judges voted in favour of a draft judgment to the effect that the legislation did not apply to Fuji-
mori’s situation. Such judgment would prevent him from running for re-election. Subsequently 
one of the two pro-Fujimori judges unlawfully took the draft from a file and, as he later con-
fessed, delivered it to the police and the press. This triggered an ‘official campaign to pressure the 
five justices’.199 Two of the justices originally in the majority called for a new vote and eventually 
only three of the five justices confirmed their original vote. The other four justices abstained. As 
it was a ruling on the inapplicability of legislation to a given situation, rather than on the constitu-
tionality of the legislation, the Organic Law on the Constitutional Court determined that the vote 
could be taken by simple majority. This meant that, despite the campaign directed at the justices 
to prevent this conclusion, Fujimori was ineligible to run for re-election. In response the legisla-
ture took various actions against the three judges, culminating in their impeachment. They were 
subjected to various forms of harassment as well, in the context of which one of the justices, Delia 
Revoredo Marsano, sought and received asylum at the Costa Rican embassy.  
                                                 
198 The case includes other factors as well that are relevant to the discussion of the concept of 
provisional measures. It shows the importance attached to the concept of provisional measures in 
the Inter-American system. It was the first case in which the Inter-American Court ordered them 
based on a direct request by the petitioner in a case pending before it, rather than a request by the 
Commission. Moreover, it is one of the instances in which the Court specifically determined on 
the merits that it would only close the case once it considered that the State has complied with its 
judgments on the merits and reparations. See further Chapter XVI (Jurisdiction and admissibility) 
and XVIII (Follow-up). Indeed its judgment on the merits was of January 2001 and its 
provisional measures were only lifted in March of that year. Only then the case was closed. 
Finally, it was just after the submission of this case to the Inter-American Court that Peru 
withdrew its recognition of the Court’s competence. On the Court's jurisdiction see also Chapter 
XVI (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
199 CIDH country report on Peru, 2 June 2000, Chapter II, §60. 
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The subsequent response to the involvement of the Inter-American system illustrates the 
importance attached to the issue in Peru.200 In July 1999 Peru simply decided to withdraw its 
recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction ‘with immediate effect’.201 Yet in September 
1999 the Inter-American Court found that it was competent to deal with the case.202  
In April 2000 Mrs Revoredo Marsano, one of the impeached justices, approached the Court 
directly (rather than going through the Commission first) requesting the use of provisional meas-
ures to the effect that Peru should abstain from harassing her and her husband ‘while the proceed-
ing on the reinstatement of the Constitutional Court justices is being heard’. This harassment was 
manifested in the ‘control and manipulation of judges and courts’.203 
As the Court was not in session, its President initially dealt with the request. He decided to 
order urgent measures ex officio (not requested by the Commission) to ensure Delia Revoredo's 
‘physical, psychological and moral integrity’. In addition, he requested both the State and the 
Commission to provide the Court with detailed information on her situation. As noted, the lan-
guage used in the Order was nothing out of the ordinary. What is significant is the fact that the 
President called for urgent measures. This was subsequently confirmed with provisional measures 
by the full Court, ex officio and in response to a very specific request involving harassment not 
against the life of the petitioner but against judicial independence. More precisely, the petitioner 
had asked for the suspension of the judicial proceedings filed against her for ‘the alleged crimes 
of misappropriation, fraud and crime against the authority to attest documents’.204 She had also 
requested that the company owned by her husband and herself to be allowed the legal recourse of 
appealing against an adverse arbitration award.205 It is clear that the Court did not heed these 
specific requests. Instead it used the more traditional phrase ‘to ensure the physical, psychological 
and moral integrity’. Yet that at that time there were no clear threats against the life of the peti-
tioner, otherwise they would have been mentioned. The fact that the Court nevertheless ordered 
provisional measures indicates its serious concern with the situation in Peru at the time. 
                                                 
200 See further Human Rights Watch, “Torture and Political Persecution in Peru”, A Human Rights 
Watch/Americas Division Short Report, Vol. 9, No. 4(B), December 1997. See also section 3.4 of 
this chapter referring to the threats to the freedom of expression during the Fujimori regime, in 
particular the case of Ivcher Bronstein. In addition see the report of the UN Special Rapporteur, 
Cumaraswamy, on the independence of judges and lawyers, in an addendum regarding his 
mission to Peru (September 1996), expressing his concern ‘as to whether the action of Congress 
in this matter has violated the principle of judicial immunity for decisions made in the exercise of 
judicial functions’, E/CN.4/1998/39/Add.1, 19 February 1998, section III. Also see HRC 
Concluding Observations (Peru), 3 November 2000, §§10 and 14.  
201 The Inter-American Commission brought the case before the Court on 2 July 1999 and the 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Peru received official notice of the case on 14 July. Two days later 
Peru returned all the paper work concerning the case to the Inter-American Court and delivered a 
note to its Secretariat informing it that it had withdrawn its recognition of the Court's contentious 
jurisdiction 'with immediate effect' as of 9 July 1999. This was the date on which it had deposited 
a declaration to this effect with the OAS Secretariat. It stated that this applied ‘to all cases in 
which Peru has not answered the application filed with the Court’. IACHR Constitutional Court 
case (Manuel Aguirre Roca, Guillermo Rey Terry, and Delia Revoredo de Mur v. Peru), 
judgment of 24 September 1999 (Competence), §23. 
202 IACHR Constitutional Court case, judgment of 24 September 1999 (Competence). See further 
Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction). 
203 IACHR Constitutional Court case, Order of 14 March 2001, 1st ‘Having Seen’ clause. 
204 IACHR Constitutional Court case, Order of 14 August 2000, 2nd ‘Having seen’ clause.  
205 See IACHR Constitutional Court case, President’s Order for urgent measures, 7 April 2000 and 
Order for provisional measures of 14 August 2000, confirming the President’s Order ‘in all of its 
aspects’, adding that this was ‘in order to prevent her from suffering irreparable damage’, 1st 
‘Decisional’ clause. 
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Then the situation took an interesting turn. In September 2000 a video showing Vladimiro 
Montesinos, the President's advisor and de facto head of the National Intelligence Service,206 
handing cash to legislators was broadcast and a corruption scandal unfolded. In November Fuji-
mori and Montesinos fled Peru and a transitional government was installed. 
In January 2001 the Court found on the merits that the right to due process (Article 8 
ACHR) and adequate judicial recourse (Article 25 ACHR) of the three justices had been violated. 
It stressed the importance of judicial independence for the rule of law and the added importance 
of the independence of Justices of a constitutional court, ‘owing to the nature of the matters sub-
mitted to their consideration’.207 One of the main purposes of the separation of powers is indeed 
the protection of judicial independence.208 The Court also referred to case law by the European 
Court on the importance of guarantees for judges against external pressure209 and it invoked the 
United Nations Basic Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary.210 
A few days after the publication of the judgment the Commission stated that despite the po-
litical change in Peru the provisional measures should be maintained, as the ‘precautionary meas-
ures corresponding to the legal proceedings filed against [her] have still not been executed’.211 At 
the end of that month the State informed the Court that it had 'executed the necessary actions' to 
comply both with the Court's judgment and with its provisional measures. It stated that it had also 
taken steps to eliminate the political manipulation of the judiciary, which had ‘created favorable 
conditions for deciding the cases that are being processed’. On 17 November the Congress had 
reinstated the three justices and, the day before it approached the Inter-American Court, the State 
had also held a meeting with Delia Revoredo ‘to co-ordinate compliance with the judgment on the 
merits’.212 
The Court decided to lift its provisional measures and to close the file. It pointed out that 
provisional measures ‘have an exceptional nature and are therefore ordered having regard to the 
need for protection and, once ordered, they must be maintained’ as long as the criteria in Article 
63(2) ACHR apply.213 It noted the changes that had occurred in Peru and the developments in the 
Constitutional Court case, in particular Mrs. Revoredo’s reinstatement as a justice. Thus ‘the 
reasons that caused this Court to order provisional measures (..) have terminated’, since the cir-
                                                 
206 In a talk in 2005 Justice Revoredo commented on the role of Montesinos during the Fujimori 
reign. “Justice Revoredo also recalled the “cell-phone” votes, where Fujimori’s secretive security 
chief Vladimiro Montesinos would call members of congress moments before an issue was to be 
decided and tell them how to vote. The dismantling of the legal and legislative system was so 
intricately orchestrated that it was not apparent to anyone, not even those recruited by Fujimori, 
exactly how the laws were being manipulated to favor Fujimori”. See Veronica Herrera, 
‘Fujimori’s Quiet Coup d’Etat and the Restoration of Peru’s Constitutional Court’, 24 January 
2005, report of talk by Justice Delia Revoredo Marsano, co-sponsored by the Center for Latin 
American Studies and Boalt Hall School of Law, University of California, 
<http://socrates.berkeley.edu:7001/Events/spring2005/01-24-05-revoredo/index.html> (consulted 
10 June 2007). 
207 IACHR Constitutional Court case, 31 January 2001 (merits), §73. 
208 Id., §75. 
209 Id., §7, referring to the appointment process (e.g. ECtHR Langborger, 27 January 1989, §32); the 
importance of a fixed term position (see e.g. Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere, 23 June 
1981, §55; and of guarantees against external pressure (see also, e.g. Piersack, 1 October 1982, 
§27). 
210 Adopted by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment 
of Offenders, Milan 26 August-6 September 1985, and confirmed by the General Assembly in its 
resolutions 40/32, 29 November 1985 and 40/146, 13 December 1985. 
211 IACHR Constitutional Court case, Order of 14 March 2001, 5th ‘Having Seen’ clause. 
212 Id., 6th ‘Having Seen’ clause. 
213 Id., 3rd ‘Considering’ clause. 
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cumstances of ‘extreme gravity and urgency’ and the probability of irreparable harm, as required 
by Article 63(2) ACHR, no longer existed. What is relevant to its approach to the concept of 
provisional measures is that the Court specifically considered that the Commission's argument 
that legal proceedings were still pending did ‘not bear any relation to the purpose of the provi-
sional measures adopted by the Court’ in August 2000, ‘in its first operative paragraph; moreover, 
they do not constitute circumstances of extreme gravity and urgency that would warrant maintain-
ing the actual provisional measures’.214 In other words, Mrs Revoredo’s reinstatement had oc-
curred subsequent to the Commission’s submission and seems to have been the most important 
reason for the Court to lift its provisional measures. Its main concern now was to emphasize the 
exceptional nature of its provisional measures. Yet this case indicates that in the context of Fuji-
mori’s reign the Court had considered the legal harassment of a petitioner and her continued 
impeachment as a justice to be a circumstance of extreme gravity and urgency. 
2.8.3 Conclusion 
Lack of judicial independence in one individual case generally speaking can be reversed,215 but 
the same is not the case when there is a climate of fear and corruption of the judiciary. As the 
Court’s provisional measures were ordered in such a context, they may be considered to be aimed 
at the prevention of irreversible harm to the claim. In that sense such provisional measures are 
within the outer limits of the concept. Moreover, to the extent that the legal harassment 
complained of is likely to lead to other types of harassment and threats as well, the provisional 
measures aim to prevent irreparable harm to persons. As the case was brought in a context in 
which death threats and attacks had taken place, the likelihood of irreparable harm to persons was 
not remote. Given the context and wording of the provisional measures in this case, they may be 
argued to fall within the common core of the concept as well.  
2.9 Preserving evidence 
2.9.1 Introduction 
The former European Commission appears to have used provisional measures at least once to 
safeguard evidentiary material. It invoked the rule on provisional measures in a case after the 
deaths of the petitioners. This case may serve as an example where a human rights adjudicator has 
used provisional measures in order to prevent irreversible harm to the procedure, but not irrepara-
ble harm to persons.216 
The chapter on the development of the concept of provisional measures by the ICJ (Chapter 
I), referred to irreparable harm to the claim, to the proceedings or to persons. In this chapter a 
distinction is made between irreparable and irreversible harm. As noted, when it concerns harm to 
the claim or the procedure, but not to life and physical integrity, the term irreversible harm is 
used.217 
                                                 
214 Id., 4th ‘Considering’ clause. 
215 Unless, e.g. the death penalty is imposed, see Chapter III (Executions). 
216 A situation in which the irreparable harm to persons is not directly related to the rights claimed in 
the case pending before the adjudicator but rather to harm to the proceedings is that of death 
threats and harassment to witnesses in the case. In such situation there is irreparable harm to 
persons as well. See Chapter IX (Threats). 
217 See the Introduction to Part II. 
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2.9.2 Practice 
In Ensslin, Baader, Raspe v. Germany (1978) the petitioners before the European Commission 
claimed that they were subject to exceptional conditions of detention, in particular prolonged 
isolation, ‘causing them to undergo considerable physical, psychological and mental suffering’.218 
In October 1977 the Commission decided to postpone its examination of the complaint ‘by reason 
of the circumstances obtaining at that time’.219 A few days later, however, the petitioners were 
found dead. The President of the Commission immediately informed the government, ‘under 
Rules 36, 14 and 28 of the Rules of Procedure’, that ‘he thought it desirable, in the interests of the 
proper conduct of the proceedings, that a Commission’s delegation should be enabled to visit 
Stuttgart-Stammheim prison and make any observations which might prove necessary in order to 
establish the facts’.220 Rule 36 was the Commission’s Rule on provisional measures. With the 
Government’s agreement, two delegates of the Commission travelled to Stuttgart on 19 and 20 
October 1977. The Commission’s provisional measures were taken following the deaths of the 
petitioners on 17 October. They do not involve intervention in detention situations, since the 
petitioners were already dead. The fact that the Commission invoked Rule 36 (together with Rules 
14 and 28) may be explained here by the Commission’s aim to safeguard the evidence in the 
interest of the proceedings pending before it.221 
In this respect it referred to the observations by the delegates of the Commission when they 
inspected the cells of the petitioners on 19 and 20 October.222 It also noted that while it was to 
examine in particular the complaint of sensory and social isolation, and while the circumstances 
of the deaths of the petitioners were ‘not in themselves the subject of the application’, the ques-
tion did arise whether their deaths may have been ‘the consequence of the treatment of which they 
complained’.223 Yet it concluded that there was ‘no objective indication along those lines’.224 
Subsequently the Commission found the claim of violations of Articles 3 and 6 ECHR manifestly 
ill-founded and the case was declared inadmissible. 
As has been pointed out elsewhere, in a similar situation the Court is now more likely to re-
sort to the possibility to ask the State for clarifications, or would carry out an on-site investiga-
tion, both under different rules,225 rather than using provisional measures in this context.226 
2.9.3 Conclusion 
The text of the Rules on provisional measures used by the European Court of Human Rights, the 
former European Commission on Human Rights and the Bosnia Chamber, which are virtually 
                                                 
218 EComHR Ennslin, Baader and Raspe v. FRG, 8 July 1978 (inadm.), §42. 
219 Id., §44. 
220 Id., §44. 
221 The Commission may have deemed it advisable to show an immediate response especially 
because just prior to the deaths of the petitioners it had decided to postpone the proceedings, with 
a rather cryptic justification. It is also possible that the initiative in fact came from the 
government. In any case, the Commission’s decision presents it as the initiative of its President to 
invoke Rule 36. 
222 According to the delegates the cells ‘were well-lit by windows which could be opened from 
inside; the walls were largely covered with books and posters. The cells were not sound-proofed 
either from the inside or from the outside: two persons confined on opposite sides of the central 
corridor could talk to each other by raising their voices’, EComHR Ensslin, Baader, Raspe v. 
FRG, 8 July 1978 (inadm.), §6. 
223 EComHR Ensslin, Baader, Raspe v. FRG, 8 July 1978 (inadm.), §11. 
224 Id., §12. 
225 See Rules 54(2a) and 42(2) respectively. 
226 See Haeck/Burbano Herrera/Zwaak (2008), p. 44. 
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identical, is of particular interest in the context of preventing irreversible harm to the claim and of 
the proceedings. Different from the provisions of the other human rights adjudicators on 
provisional measures it does not refer to preventing irreparable harm, but just to ‘any interim 
measure which it considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper 
conduct of the proceedings before it’.227 In the above case the use of provisional measures could 
be justified as in the interest of the ‘proper conduct of the proceedings before it’. Provisional 
measures to prevent irreversible harm to the proceedings pending before the human rights 
adjudicator could be within the outer limits of the concept. Yet they would require a more 
convincing case than that before the European Commission in this instance. Nevertheless, given 
the specific function assigned to the European Commission (as well as the Court) and given the 
text of the Rule on provisional measures employed in the European system, its invocation of the 
Rule on provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to the procedure could certainly be 
justified. 
2.10 Halting the destruction of a work of art 
The HRC has used provisional measures in one exceptional case involving the threatened destruc-
tion of a painting critical of the South Korean government. In Hak-Chul Shin v. Republic of South 
Korea (2004) the artist was accused of supporting the North Korean government with this paint-
ing. He had been arrested in August 1998 and his painting was seized and allegedly damaged by 
careless handling. The proceedings against him were concluded in November 1999, confirming 
his conviction, following the finding that the picture was an ‘enemy-benefiting expression’. The 
painting ‘was thus ready for destruction following its earlier seizure’.228  
Counsel for the petitioner submitted his case to the HRC several months later and the Spe-
cial Rapporteur used a provisional measure requesting the State, while the case was pending 
before the HRC, not to destroy the painting for which the petitioner had been convicted.229 On the 
merits the HRC found that the painting’s confiscation and the conviction of the petitioner violated 
his right to freedom of expression. The State was to provide him with an effective remedy, includ-
ing compensation for and annulment of his conviction and payment of legal costs. Moreover, 
because it had not shown that any infringement on the petitioner’s freedom of expression, ‘as 
expressed through the painting’ is justified, ‘it should return the painting to him in its original 
condition, bearing any necessary expenses incurred thereby’.230 Clearly, if the painting had been 
destroyed this remedy would have been impossible. In that sense the provisional measures aimed 
to prevent irreversible harm to the claim and may thus be situated within the outer limits. Yet it 
does not concern irreparable harm to persons involving the right to life and the prohibition or 
torture and ill-treatment. Currently it does not fall within the common core of the concept of 
provisional measures in human rights adjudication. 
                                                 
227 See Rule 39 of the current Rules of Court, but also Rule 36 of the former Commission and Rule 
36 of the Bosnia Chamber. 
228 HRC Hak-Chul Shin v. South Korea, 16 March 2004, §2.4. 
229 The petitioner contended that his painting ‘depicts his dream of peaceful unification and 
democratisation of his country based on his experience of rural life from his children’. Among 
others he sought an ‘unconditional and immediate return of the painting in its present condition’ 
and a repeal or suspension of Article 7 of the National Security Law, Id., §3.7. In December 2001 
the State party responded that it could not commit itself to such a suspension or repeal. Among 
others it argued that the case was inadmissible because the judicial proceedings had been 
consistent with the ICCPR, Id., §4.2. 
230 HRC Hak-Chul Shin v. South Korea, 16 March 2004, §9. 
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2.11 Securing political rights 
2.11.1 Introduction 
There have been a few situations, before the Bosnia Chamber and in the Inter-American system, 
in which petitioners requested the use of provisional measures in order to secure political rights. It 
is clear, however, that the European Court does not appreciate receiving requests for provisional 
measures in the context of political rights. In 2007 its Registrar published a press release entitled 
‘Inappropriate use of interim measures procedure’ in which it was noted that the Court within a 
few days the Court had received ‘a large number of requests’ for the Court to adopt provisional 
measures ‘in respect of the French Government’s decision not to organise a referendum on the 
European Union Lisbon Treaty’. Yet ‘as a matter of consistent practice’, it only uses its power to 
adopt provisional measures ‘where the applicant is at an established risk of imminent and irrepa-
rable harm. This typically involves allegations of exposure to ill-treatment in breach of Article 3 
(prohibition of torture and inhuman and degrading treatment) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights and the most common example is where the applicant is on the point of expulsion 
to a country where he or she will be at risk of such treatment or indeed face a life-threatening 
situation (raising issues under Article 2 of the Convention – the right to life)’.231  
Some figures were provided as general background: 
“In 2007 the Court has received approximately 1,060 requests for interim measures and granted 
252 of them. The Court has, however, never granted a request for interim measures in 
circumstances such as the refusal by a government to hold a referendum which falls far outside 
the usual ambit of this procedure. The recent requests, which appear to be part of an 
orchestrated campaign, have no chance whatsoever of success and serve solely to take up time 
which could be spent on more urgent matters in respect of which the Court might be called upon 
to issue an interim measure. The Court has currently some 100,000 applications pending before 
it”.232 
Clearly this type of situation does not deal with irreparable harm to persons. Moreover, the claim 
itself does not appear pressing from an ECHR perspective.233 This section briefly discusses the 
Inter-American practice and the practice of the Bosnia Chamber.  
2.11.2 Practice of the Bosnia Chamber 
In 1998 the Bosnia Chamber ordered provisional measures to secure ballot papers of out-of coun-
try voters for elections taking place in Srpska.234 It subsequently withdrew its Order, but this was 
                                                 
231 ECtHR Press release issued by the Registrar, ‘Inappropriate use of interim measures procedure’, 
21 December 2007. 
232 Ibid. 
233 For a claim that was considered more serious by the Court see Information Note 18 (May 2000) 
regarding Commitato Promotore Referendum Antiproporzionale (del 21/5/2000), Commitato 
Promotore Referendum Maggioritario (del 18/4/1999) v. Italy, where the Court refused to take 
provisional measures ordering a State to take the necessary measures to alter electoral rules, but 
where it did decide to treat the case with priority under Rule 41 (decision of 27 April 2000). See 
also Press Release 555 issued by the Registrar, ‘Information concerning an application lodged 
against Turkey’, 28 July 2008, referring to the Court’s decision not to adopt a provisional 
measure under Rule 39 to prevent the Turkish Constitutional Court from ordering the dissolution 
of the Justice and Development Party AKP. The Court had also rejected the requests for urgent 
notification and granting priority (Rules 40 and 41). 
 Chapter XII 
566 
because it determined it had no competence to deal with the case ratione personae.235 Neverthe-
less, this indicates that had the State BiH and Republika Srpska, rather than the OSCE, been 
responsible for the actions complained of, the Chamber would have maintained its Order. Thus, in 
this national but internationalized hybrid and transitional post-war system provisional measures 
have been used in the context of political rights (free elections).  
In another case the Chamber denied a request for provisional measures to secure participa-
tion in the local elections by certain members of the Serb Radical Party. The petitioners had re-
quested the Chamber to order Bosnia and Herzegovina to take all necessary steps to withdraw a 
specific Article of the Rules and Regulations of the OSCE Provisional Election Commission ‘or 
to suspend the election proceedings until a final decision was reached’.236 The Election Commis-
sion had required the party to replace three leaders and register itself under a new name. As the 
party had failed to do so, it had not met the requirements for registration.  
Like in the previous case the Chamber subsequently declared the case inadmissible ratione 
personae since the General Framework Agreement did not provide for the intervention of the 
respondent Party in the conduct of the elections. ‘Accordingly’, the contested actions were ‘not 
such’ as would be ‘within the responsibility of the respondent Party’.237 The Chamber’s previous 
refusal to order provisional measures may be due to its prima facie lack of jurisdiction to deal 
with the case, which was the more evident as it had already dealt with such a case before. On the 
other hand, the context of these cases is very different. The first dealt with a situation in which 
predominantly Bosniak out-of-country voters were prevented to vote in the Srpska elections and 
the second dealt with disgruntled Serb nationalists wishing to take part in the elections on their 
own terms, contrary to the principles of the Framework Agreement. 
2.11.3 Inter-American practice 
In November 2000 the Inter-American Commission ‘granted general precautionary measures on 
behalf of persons affected by detention resulting from the electoral process in Haiti’ and on behalf 
of three persons in particular. It requested Haiti to take the necessary measures:  
“To respect and ensure the full and free exercise of the following rights: freedom of conscience, 
thought, and expression and the right to assembly, association, free movement, and residence, 
political rights, and due process”.238 
The Commission noted that, according to the information received, members of the government, 
government security forces or private agents tolerated or motivated by such public officials, had 
persecuted and threatened several political opponents. This included acts of violence.239 The 
protective measures required, however, apparently did not relate to protection of life and physical 
integrity but to several political and other rights. Also, the Commission called these ‘general 
precautionary measures’.240 It seems that the purpose of the precautionary measure in this case 
was to prevent irreparable harm to rights such as the freedom of expression in the context of the 
                                                                                                                       
234 Bosnia Chamber Adnan Suljanović, Edita Čišić and Asim Lelić v. State BiH and Republika 
Srpska, 14 May 1998, (inadm.), §12. 
235 Id., §44 (provisional measures ‘no longer appropriate’). On provisional measures and jurisdiction 
see further Chapter XVI (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
236 Bosnia Chamber Srpska Radikalna Stranka v. State BiH, 8 December 2000 (inadm.), §6. 
237 Id., §§12-13. 
238 CIDH Political Opponents v. Haiti, precautionary measure of 13 November 2000), Annual 
Report 2000, §36. 
239 Ibid. 
240 Ibid. 
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electoral process. In that case it may be that the rationale for such measures is that violations of 
aforementioned political rights could not be repaired by allowing such freedoms again after the 
elections, or by monetary damages. After all such violations may negatively influence the results 
of the elections themselves. 
In October 2005 the Commission had used precautionary measures on behalf of Jorge 
Castañeda Gutman (Mexico). He could not be registered at an independent political candidate as 
the domestic rules on elections provided that only political parties could request the registration of 
candidates ‘for popularly elected offices’. According to the Commission ‘this situation could lead 
to irreparable damage to the exercise of political rights’. Thus it requested the government to 
allow his provisional registration as a political candidate.241 Yet it could be argued that these 
measures have the character of summary proceedings rather than provisional measures to prevent 
irreversible harm to the claim. Indeed, when the Commission subsequently requested the Court to 
order provisional measures, the Court denied this request.242 It observed that the case was still 
pending before the Commission. In this case ordering such measures would anticipate a discus-
sion on the merits of a case that was not yet pending before the Court.243 It dismissed the request 
as inadmissible because it could not rule on the presence of a cognizable claim, unless it would 
have a direct bearing with the extreme gravity, urgency and necessity to prevent irreparable harm 
to persons.244 The request was not of the type warranting provisional measures.245 Other legal 
claims could only be brought before the Court in the context of contentious cases pending before 
it, or in request for Consultative Opinions.246  
The Judges Cançado Trindade and Ventura Robles would have preferred this decision to 
have been taken after a public hearing, discussing the scope of orders for provisional measures.247 
They would have had many questions to ask of the legal representatives and the Commission. 
They noted that in this case the Commission requested the Court’s provisional measures before it 
had even decided on the admissibility of the case pending before it. This was in sharp contrast 
with the many cases involving risk of irreparable harm to the life and personal integrity of persons 
in which it first maintained its own precautionary measures for a considerable time before resort-
ing to the Court.248 In many cases it maintained its precautionary measures despite successive 
violations of fundamental rights such as the right to life and personal integrity by the addressee 
State.249 There was an apparent lack of clear criteria applied by the Commission in its decision 
whether to request the Court’s provisional measures.250 Why was the Commission so quick, they 
wished to know, in requesting the Court’s provisional measures in an election dispute in Mexico 
that was still pending before it, while on the other hand it waited more than five years before 
requesting the Court’s provisional measures in the case of the detention circumstances at the 
                                                 
241 CIDH Annual Report 2005, Jorge Castañeda Gutman (Mexico), §32. 
242 IACHR Jorge Castañeda Gutman (Mexico), Order of 25 November 2005 denying a request for 
provisional measures. 
243 Id., 4th and 9th ‘Considering’ clauses. 
244 Id., 8th ‘Considering’ clause. 
245 Id., 9th ‘Considering’ clause. 
246 Id., 8th ‘Considering’ clause. 
247 Id., Voto razonado conunto de los juezes A.A. Cançado Trindade y M.E. Ventura Robles, §1. The 
two judges also observed that the Court had dismissed certain observations sent by the State 
proprio motu because it had not requested them, see §2. 
248 Id., Voto razonado conunto de los juezes A.A. Cançado Trindade y M.E. Ventura Robles, §3. 
249 Id., Voto razonado conunto de los juezes A.A. Cançado Trindade y M.E. Ventura Robles, §8. 
250 Id., Voto razonado conunto de los juezes A.A. Cançado Trindade y M.E. Ventura Robles, §§4 
and 8. 
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FEBEM detention center,251 which had already caused the deaths of children and adolescents? In 
that case, concerning a true human tragedy, it had in vain maintained its own precautionary meas-
ures and only resorted to the Court because of the initiatives taken by the representatives of the 
beneficiaries.252 
The two judges also noted that this was not the first time that the Commission had at-
tempted to resolve the merits of a contentious case through a request for provisional measures. 
They referred to another case in which it had attempted thus to resolve a situation involving the 
electoral process of a State.253 In addition they referred to the Chipoco case (Peru) as ‘another 
example of such trivialization’. In this case the Court had denied the Commission’s request for 
provisional measures ‘to protect the freedom of expression’ of Mr Chipoco, for lack of sufficient 
information.254 
2.11.4 Conclusion 
It depends on the context how ‘irreversible’ hindrance of political rights would be. The result of 
blocking political access of minorities in a context of pervasive discrimination,255 or of blocking 
such access to political opponents, in a context of widespread political persecution, could be 
argued to be irreversible in the long run. Yet blocking candidacy for political elections in one 
single instance is unlikely to be considered irreversible.256 The criterion could be whether the 
hindrance has a considerable and pervasive impact on society as a whole, rather than on an 
individual. In such case provisional measures may still be within the outer limits of the concept, 
but in the other cases they move beyond these limits. 
3 BEYOND THE OUTER LIMITS? 
3.1 Introduction 
There are situations in which petitioners have requested provisional measures where their use 
clearly would be beyond the outer limits of the concept. An example dealt with by the HRC is 
B.L. v. Australia (1996). The petitioner alleged that the legal system and legal profession were 
corrupt and that the State party was responsible for tolerating it.257 She requested ‘interim protec-
tion’ by the HRC. Among others, she considered that it had the obligation to warn members of the 
international community that Australia did not provide equality before the law and that the law 
                                                 
251 See IACHR Case of the children and adolescents deprived of their liberty in the ‘Complexo do 
Tatuapé’ of FEBEM (Brazil), Orders of 17 and 30 November 2005. See further Chapter VI 
(Detention). 
252 IACHR Jorge Castañeda Gutman (Mexico), Order of 25 November 2005, Voto razonado 
conunto de los juezes A.A. Cançado Trindade y M.E. Ventura Robles, §5. 
253 Id., Voto razonado conunto de los juezes A.A. Cançado Trindade y M.E. Ventura Robles, §7 
referring to Delgado Parker (Peru). 
254 See Chipoco case, denial of provisional measures of 27 January 1993 (and previously denial by 
the President of 14 December 1992). See also section 2.6 of this Chapter. 
255 See also the Inter-American Court’s judgment on the merits IACHR Yatama v. Nicaragua, 23 
June 2005, in which an indigenous party was excluded from the elections. Among others the 
Court found violations of Articles 8 and 25 ACHR. See e.g. §248 and §259. 
256 Of course the individual candidate’s plans would be hindered, but he could run for elections at a 
later point. 
257 HRC B.L. v. Australia, 8 November 1996. 
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did not protect overseas investments in Australia. In reference to the Committee’s statement in 
Stewart v. Canada,258 a case discussed in section 3.2, the Secretariat advised her that no provi-
sional measures could be used in her case.259 Indeed, if she had had a case in the first place, com-
pensation would have been an adequate remedy for the violation found. This clearly shows a 
basic requirement of provisional measures, namely that the violation should be prevented because 
any compensation would be inadequate. 
The HRC does not generally refer to failed requests for provisional measures. The above 
example was found in the case files in Geneva during a research visit in October 1998 and it may 
be assumed to represent a range of cases which the petitioners considered urgent, but the HRC did 
not.260 The Inter-American Court has recorded a few instances in which it refused to order provi-
sional measures.261 Moreover, the Bosnia Chamber routinely included a reference to its refusal to 
order provisional measures in its decisions on merits and inadmissibility. Most of them related to 
forced evictions and some to issues such as reinstatement of officials, payment of pensions, and 
other financial issues.  
There have also been cases in which adjudicators have used provisional measures that ap-
pear to be beyond the outer limits of the concept. This section singles out a few of them as well.  
3.2 Halting deportation in ‘family life type’ cases (not involving non-
refoulement) 
Once in a while the ECtHR has used provisional measures in cases pending under Article 8 
ECHR on the right to family life, rather than (also) on Article 3 ECHR on the prohibition of cruel 
treatment.262 On one occasion the HRC has used provisional measures to halt deportation in a 
case involving a lawful alien facing a deportation order. In other words this was not a non-
refoulement case involving a real risk of ill treatment or the imposition of the death penalty in the 
receiving State. While this case seems an exception not just vis-à-vis the other adjudicators, but 
                                                 
258 See e.g. submissions by the petitioner of 17 December 1994, 21 and 29 January 1995, 13 and 25 
February 1995 and letter by the Secretariat to the petitioner of 7 February 1995, B.L. v. Australia, 
8 November 1996 (inadm.) (on file with the author). 
259 At the same time it requested her to substantiate her claim so that the case could be brought to the 
attention of the Special Rapporteur in due time. Subsequently, in a two-page decision, the HRC 
declared the case inadmissible. It observed that the petitioner had not substantiated the claim. The 
allegations remained sweeping and did not in any way reveal how her rights might have been 
violated. HRC B.L. v. Australia, 8 November 1996 (inadm.). 
260 An example of a failed request to which it did refer is in HRC Walter Obodzinsky v. Canada, 19 
March 2007 (petitioner, a war criminal, had sought a stay of his citizenship revocation 
proceedings, which was rejected by the Special Rapporteur on 7 October 2007, §1.2). Another 
example involves a right to privacy claim (Article 17 ICCPR) in which the petitioner had 
requested the Committee’s provisional measures to the effect that it ask the State ‘not to subject 
her to any non-consensual medical or psychiatric examination, or the threat thereof, before the 
Committee has considered her case’, §3.9. In July 2006 the petitioner was informed by the 
Secretariat that the Rapporteur had decided not to take the provisional measures requested, §1.2. 
On the merits the HRC did find a violation of Article 17 as the interference with the privacy of 
the petitioner was unreasonable in the circumstances. See HRC M.G. v. Germany, 23 July 2008. 
261 These are discussed in this chapter. The European Commission initially occasionally noted, in the 
context of specific cases, that it had no power to use provisional measures. See e.g. Chapters II 
(Systems) and XVI (Legal status).  
262 See e.g. ECtHR Hamidovic v. Italy, No. 31956/05 and Useinov v. the Netherlands, No. 61292/00, 
both referred to in Annual Report 2005 of the Third Section, p. 10. 
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also for the HRC itself, it is worth discussing as it provides a rationale for its use of provisional 
measures. Moreover, the case may serve to show the outer limits of the concept.  
Stewart v. Canada (1996)263 dealt with a British citizen who had lived in Canada since he 
was seven years old and was now facing deportation to the UK.264 In April 1993 the Rapporteur 
used provisional measures and almost a year later the HRC confirmed this in its admissibility 
decision.265 Among others, the petitioner had argued that his deportation would amount to cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 7.266 He had pointed out that the 
prison terms he served for various convictions already constituted adequate punishment, that his 
criminal record did not reveal that he was a danger to public safety, that he had lived in Canada 
since the age of seven and that his deportation would effectively and permanently sever all his ties 
in Canada. On the other hand, Canada considered that there were no ‘special or compelling cir-
cumstances in the case that would appear to cause irreparable harm’, although he would ‘un-
doubtedly suffer personal inconvenience’. It noted that it was not deporting the petitioner to a 
country ‘where his safety or life would be in jeopardy’. It also noted that he ‘would not be barred 
once and for all from readmission to Canada’.267 About the use of provisional measures in general 
Canada submitted that the Committee ‘should not impose a general rule on States parties to sus-
                                                 
263 HRC Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996 (while the information on the use of provisional 
measures is not provided on the cover page, §§2.7, 4.1-4.5, 7.7 discuss the issue). The cover page 
of the admissibility decision does refer to provisional measures of 24 April 1993 (§4.1 of the 
View refers to 26 April 1993); admissibility decision of 18 March 1994, 
CCPR/C/50/D/538/1993, 3 May 1994 (unpublished document on file with the author). 
264 The petitioner was living together with his mother and younger brother. His mother was in poor 
health and his brother was mentally disabled and suffering from chronic epilepsy. Apart from his 
older brother, who had been deported to the UK the previous year, all his relatives lived in 
Canada. He had two young children, who were living with their mother. Between September 
1978 and May 1991 he was convicted on 42 occasions mostly for petty offences and traffic 
offences, although one was for assault with bodily harm. His counsel noted that most of her 
client’s convictions were attributable to his substance abuse problems, in particular alcoholism. 
For the last two years and four months he had participated in rehabilitation programs and 
remained alcohol-free, with the exception of one relapse. 
265 As discussed in Chapter II of this book, in between sessions it is the Special Rapporteur 
appointed by the HRC from among its members, who decides on how to proceed with new cases. 
This includes decision-making on the use of provisional measures. 
266 The petitioner claimed violation of Articles 7, 9, 12, 13, 17 and 23 ICCPR. With regard to Article 
7 the HRC should determine on the merits the question ‘whether the permanent separation of an 
individual from his/her family and/or close relatives and the effective banishment of a person 
from the only country he ever knew and in which he grew up may amount to cruel, inhuman and 
degrading treatment’. He submitted that Article 12(4) was applicable to his situation because for 
all practical purposes Canada was his own country and his deportation would result in ‘an 
absolute statutory bar from re-entering Canada’. Article 12(4) stipulates: “No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country”. He pointed out that Article 12(4) used 
the phrase ‘his own country’ rather than country of nationality or country of birth. With regard to 
Article 9 he noted that there was no indication that the concept of liberty only encompassed 
physical freedom. Article 12 recognized liberty in a broader sense as well. He believed that his 
deportation would violate ‘his liberty of movement within Canada and within his community’, 
§3.5. 
267 Canada pointed out, moreover, that ‘although the author’s social ties with his family may be 
affected, his complaint makes it clear that his family has no financial or other objective 
dependence on him: the author does not contribute financially to his brother, has not maintained 
contact with his father for seven or eight years and, after the divorce from his wife in 1989, 
apparently has not maintained any contact with his wife or children’.  
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pend measures or decisions at a domestic level unless there are special circumstances where such 
a measure or decision might conflict with the effective exercise of the author’s right of peti-
tion’.268 In relation to deportation in particular it considered that ‘(t)he fact that a complaint has 
been filed with the Committee should not automatically imply that the State party is restricted in 
its power to implement a deportation decision’.269 According to Canada ‘considerations of state 
security and public policy must be considered prior to imposing restraints on a State party to 
implement a decision lawfully taken’.270 It therefore requested the HRC ‘to clarify the criteria at 
the basis of the Special Rapporteur’s decision to call for interim measures of protection and to 
consider withdrawing the request for interim protection under rule 86’.271 
Counsel emphasised that the test of what may constitute ‘irreparable harm’ to the petitioner 
should be considered by reference to the Committee’s own criteria and not those developed by 
Canadian courts. In Canada, she submitted, the test for irreparable harm in relation to the right to 
family life had become ‘one of almost exclusive financial dependency’. She had resorted to the 
HRC ‘precisely because Canadian courts, including the Immigration Appeal Division, do not 
recognise family interests beyond financial dependency of family members’.272 This test was, in 
fact, the issue before the HRC. It would, therefore, ‘defeat the effectiveness of any order the 
Committee might make in the author’s favour in the future if the rule 86 request were to be can-
celled now’.273 It would be unjustified, moreover, ‘to apply a “balance of convenience” test in 
determining whether or not to invoke rule 86, as this test is inappropriate where fundamental 
human rights are at issue’.274  
In March 1994 the HRC (in full session) maintained the Rapporteur’s provisional measures. 
As part of its admissibility decision the Committee ‘noted’ Canada’s request to clarify the criteria 
for using provisional measures and its request for the withdrawal of the provisional measures in 
this case.275 It observed that ‘what may constitute “irreparable damage” to the victim within the 
meaning of rule 86 cannot be determined generally’. It did clarify, to some extent, what it consid-
ered essential:  
“The essential criterion is indeed the irreversibility of the consequences, in the sense of the 
inability of the author to secure his rights, should there later be a finding of a violation of the 
                                                 
268 HRC Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996, §4.3. 
269 Ibid. 
270 Ibid., §4.3. 
271 About the issue of the official State responses see Chapter XVII. 
272 HRC Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996, §4.5. 
273 Ibid. ‘Rule 86’ refers to the rule on provisional measures. 
274 Ibid. As part of its arguments on admissibility the State pointed out, once more, that its decision 
to deport the petitioner was ‘justified by the facts of the case and by Canada’s duty to enforce 
public interest statutes and to protect society. Canadian courts have held that the most important 
objective for a government is to protect the security of its nationals’. The State noted the 
immigration authorities had taken into account humanitarian and compassionate grounds, 
including family considerations, and balanced these against Canada’s duty to protect society and 
‘properly enforce public interest statutes’, §5.7. According to counsel the humanitarian and 
compassionate discretion of the Minister did not provide an effective mechanism to ensure that 
family interests were balanced against other interests. She also dismissed as ‘patently wrong’ the 
argument by Canada ‘that the Court, upon application for judicial review of a deportation order, 
may balance the hardship caused by removal against the public interest’, §6.4. She pointed out 
that the court had repeatedly explained that it is limited to strict judicial review and cannot 
balance these interests. 
275 HRC Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996, §7.7. 
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Covenant on the merits. The Committee may decide, in any given case, not to issue a request 
under rule 86 where it believes that compensation would be an adequate remedy”.276 
Applying this criterion to the specific situation of deportation cases, the HRC explained that it 
required information on the ability of the petitioner ‘to return, should there be a finding in his 
favour on the merits’.277 In fact it maintained the provisional measure while it declared inadmissi-
ble the complaint that the separation from his family would amount to cruel and inhuman treat-
ment in violation of Article 7 ICCPR.278 This article is often invoked in the context of provisional 
measures. Thus the HRC must have maintained its provisional measures on the basis of the re-
maining claims of Articles 12(4), on the right to enter his ‘own country’, 17 and 23 ICCPR (fam-
ily life). 
Canada’s reference to the petitioner’s right of petition indicates that it considers that the 
Committee’s use of provisional measures is justified at least in order to guarantee this right. The 
HRC itself did not explicitly refer to the right of petition.279 
The State’s first argument against the provisional measure had been that the petitioner 
would not be returned to a country where his safety or life would be in jeopardy and that, ‘fur-
thermore, he would not be barred once and for all from readmission to Canada’.280 It is clear from 
the Committee’s decision not to withdraw its provisional measure, that the HRC required more 
information before it was convinced of the possibility for the petitioner to return to Canada to 
visit his family. 
The State party’s second argument was that his family had ‘no financial or other objective 
dependence’ on him, although his social ties with the family may be affected. Thus, it considered 
that there were no special compelling circumstances in the case that would appear to cause irrepa-
rable harm in that respect either.281 In the context of its decision not to withdraw its provisional 
measures, the Committee did not specifically address this argument. At a later stage, however, in 
its decision on the merits, it did attach importance to it. 
In February 1995 the State considered, once more, that the deportation would not operate as 
an ‘absolute bar’ to re-entry into Canada. This time, this remark probably is a direct, albeit not 
very precise, response to the Committee’s statement relating to the ability of the petitioner to 
return to Canada.282  
                                                 
276 Ibid. 
277 Ibid. 
278 It considered that the petitioner had not substantiated his claim that deportation to the UK and 
separation from his family would amount to cruel and inhuman treatment or violate his right to 
liberty and security of person. As it was not apparent that the State’s decision to deport him was 
reached arbitrarily, it also declared inadmissible the Article 13 (procedural rights of lawful aliens) 
claim for failure to substantiate. 
279 There is, however, a clear link between on the one hand the right of petition and on the other the 
Committee’s discussion of irreparable harm to the victim, the petitioner’s inability to secure his 
rights and the possible findings on the merits. 
280 HRC Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996, §4.2. 
281 Ibid. 
282 Subsequently counsel pointed out that the petitioner would ‘face serious obstacles in gaining 
readmission to Canada as a permanent resident and would have to meet the selection standards 
for admission to qualify as an independent immigrant, taking into account his occupational skills, 
education and experience’, id. §10.2. In any case, he would be barred from readmission as a 
permanent resident unless he was pardoned from his prior criminal convictions. Counsel also 
stressed the ‘emotionally supportive relationship’ with his mother and brother. She argued that 
the domestic court’s emphasis on the financial aspect of the family relationship did not take into 
account the emotional family bond.  
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Possibly, the decision on the merits in Stewart is based on a sense of realism: the HRC did 
not want the consequences of finding a violation, which could be that an extensive range of de-
portation situations would result in cruel treatment. In the meantime, when the provisional meas-
ures had been in place for three years and seven months, the HRC found on the merits that Arti-
cles 12(4), 17 and 23 ICCPR had not been violated.283  
In this case the Special Rapporteur evidently had not considered compensation to be an 
adequate remedy in the event that the HRC would later find a violation of the Covenant on the 
merits.284 The full Committee confirmed this by deciding not to withdraw its provisional meas-
ures.  
Thus far this is the only case in which the HRC has taken such an extensive approach in its 
use of provisional measures in deportation cases. The explanation it provided does not rule out 
that it would use them again in other cases not involving non-refoulement. This may mean that 
the HRC does not limit its use of provisional measures to halt deportation, expulsion or extradi-
tion to cases in which the petitioner is being returned to a country where his safety or life would 
be in jeopardy. In that case it does not limit their use to the prohibition of cruel treatment either. 
In other words, there may be circumstances other than a threat to safety or life in the receiving 
State or a separation from the family as cruel treatment that the Committee considers to be able to 
cause irreparable harm.285  
As a practical matter, this means that in this case the HRC disagreed with the State’s argu-
ment that there were no special or compelling circumstances that would appear to cause irrepara-
ble harm, although the petitioner ‘would undoubtedly suffer personal inconvenience’.286 The 
HRC’s statement implies that before it could withdraw its request it would have to be certain that 
the petitioner would indeed be able to return to Canada, should there be a finding in his favour on 
the merits. In other words, in this type of deportation case the HRC may decide to use provisional 
measures when it considers that, should it later find a violation of the Covenant, the petitioner 
would be unable to secure his rights, in this case to live in the country in which he grew up and to 
stay in touch with his family. Interpreting the Committee’s general statement about its provisional 
measures, they aim at postponing irreversible consequences until the Committee has been able to 
determine, on the merits, whether these would result in ‘irreparable harm’ to the claim.287  
Nevertheless, the HRC may have been proclaiming a general rule to explain its use of pro-
visional measures in this case without actually adhering to that rule in practice. After all, in sub-
sequent cases on the rights of lawful aliens who had considered a State as their own for a consid-
erable number of years and who often had no links with their country of nationality, the HRC did 
                                                 
283 While several members of the HRC would have preferred a less restrictive interpretation of ‘own 
country’ in Article 12(4) and would have found violations of Articles 12 and 13, the majority did 
not. See the dissents by Evatt, Medina Quiroga, Francis, Chanet, Prado Vallejo and Bhagwati. 
Bhagwati considered that the Committee’s narrow interpretation left without any protection 
‘people who have forged close links with a country not only through long residence but having 
regard to various other factors, who have adopted a country as their own, who have come to 
regard a country as their home country’. 
284 See also Chapter XIII on the relationship with forms of reparation. 
285 See also the conclusion to this Chapter arguing that the Committee’s provisional measures should 
indeed be limited to situations causing irreparable harm to persons. 
286 HRC Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996, §4.2. 
287 After all, the HRC speaks of the ‘irreversibility of the consequences’, in the sense of the 
petitioner’s inability to secure his rights, ‘should there later be a finding of a violation of the 
covenant on the merits’. Moreover, it would only take provisional measures when it believes that 
compensation would be an inadequate remedy, see HRC Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996, 
§7.7. 
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not use provisional measures.288 While several of these cases were subsequently discontinued, 
Canepa v. Canada (1997) was decided on the merits. Like the discontinued cases, Canepa dealt 
with issues similar to those raised in Stewart v. Canada (1996) and again no violations were 
found. In fact the main difference between the two cases seems to be that the Committee used 
provisional measures in Stewart but not in Canepa.289  
                                                 
288 See e.g. HRC Canepa v. Canada (1997), J.P.A.F. v. Canada (disc. 1998), L. v. Canada, and A.B. 
v. Canada (disc. 1998). With regard to the latter case counsel submitted a claim on behalf of an 
Italian citizen who had been living in Canada for more than 30 years, since the age of six. His 
parents and brother were living in Canada and he had no real connections with Italy. Between 
1975 and 1992 he was convicted of various crimes, which according to his counsel were mostly 
attributable to alcoholism and drug addiction. She pointed out that if the petitioner would be 
deported he would be barred from readmission to Canada. Counsel claimed deportation would 
interfere with his liberty of movement and with Articles 17 and 23(1) (protection of the family). 
She also made the argument that enforcement of the deportation order would result in cruel 
treatment under Article 7 ICCPR. This argument was based on the separate opinion of Judge de 
Meyer of the ECtHR in Beldjoudi v. France, Judgment of 26 February 1992, stating that the 
removal of an applicant from his country of residence and the severance of the ties with his wife 
and family would amount to inhuman treatment. Counsel pointed out that the deportation order 
could now be enforced at any point in time and she requested the use of Rule 86. She pointed out 
that the consequences of deportation were irreversible and ‘should there later be a finding of a 
violation of rights under the Covenant on the merits’, he would be ‘unable to secure his rights’. 
The Special Rapporteur decided not to use provisional measures. The petitioner was deported as 
scheduled and eventually the Rapporteur transmitted the case under Rule 91. Note verbale to the 
permanent representative of Canada of 3 March 1995 in A.B. v. Canada (622/1995) (on file with 
the author). At the end of 1995 counsel notified the HRC that she was no longer retained to 
continue as counsel for this matter. In August 1998 the HRC informed the petitioner’s parents 
that it had decided to discontinue examination of the case, taking into account that it had received 
no correspondence since 1995. Letter to the petitioner’s parents of 13 August 1998 in A.B. v. 
Canada (622/1995) (on file with the author). Different from cases such as P.L.-B. v. Canada 
(where the reason provisional measures were not used probably related to time constraints) in this 
case there seems to have been a clear decision not to use provisional measures. 
289 HRC Giosue Canepa v. Canada, 3 April 1997. Counsel’s requests for provisional measures in 
Canepa v. Canada (1997), J.P.A.F. v. Canada (disc. 1998), L. v. Canada, and A.B. v. Canada 
(disc. 1998) were made in 1994, shortly after the Committee’s admissibility decision in Stewart 
approving of the Rapporteur’s provisional measures in that case. In 1993 counsel for Canepa and 
Stewart had asked the HRC to deal with the cases jointly since they raised ‘identical issues’. 
Initial submission of 16 April 1993 in Canepa v. Canada (558/1993) (on file with the author). 
The HRC did not do so. The State, on the other hand, had requested the Committee, in November 
1995, to examine the above three cases before formulating its Views in Stewart, because it 
considered the four cases raised similar legal issues while the factual situations were significantly 
different. It believed that the Committee’s consideration of each of those cases would be 
facilitated if it would be familiar with the range of circumstances presented by them. It did not 
refer to Canepa. Letter by the State to the HRC, 1 November 1995 in relation to 538/1993 
(Stewart) and 620-622/1995 (on file with the author). After ‘due consideration’ the HRC decided 
it would nevertheless be appropriate to proceed with the examination of the merits in Stewart at 
its forthcoming session in April 1996, rather than to put this on hold until it would have been able 
to examine the admissibility of the other three cases. It noted that the State could submit 
additional information about the different circumstances mentioned by it in order to facilitate the 
Committee’s task. Letter by the Chairman of the HRC to the Deputy Permanent Representative of 
Canada, 3 November 1995 in relation to 538/1993 and 620-622/1995 (on file with the author). 
Counsel in J.P.A.F. v. Canada, 13 August 1998 (disc.) (on file with the author) worked at the 
same law firm that was dealing with Stewart and Canepa. The petitioner was convicted of a 
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As the situations in these cases were similar to Stewart and the same Rapporteur dealt with 
the requests for provisional measures, it may be assumed either that the Secretariat had not been 
able to contact her in time or the Committee had discussed the issue and decided no longer to use 
provisional measures in this context. After all it did not involve a real risk of torture or inhuman 
treatment in the receiving State. 
In Winata and So Lan Li v. Australia (2001)290 the HRC determined that the removal by the 
State party of the petitioners would result in a violation of Article 17 (prohibition of interference 
with privacy, family etc.), Article 23(1) (protection of the family) and Article 24(1) (protection of 
children).291 Inspired by this decision counsel have requested the use of provisional measures in 
                                                                                                                       
series of criminal offences ‘largely stemming from an alcohol abuse problem and a very 
physically abusive childhood’. On 5 July 1994 he was transferred to a facility for immigration 
detention for deportation to Portugal. Counsel submitted a case on his behalf a week later. She 
considered that provisional measures should be used because the petitioner had been in Canada 
since he was nine years old. He was unfamiliar with Portugal and would experience numerous 
difficulties there. His entire immediate family was in Canada. He was emotionally dependent on 
his mother and five sisters and had a solid relationship with his wife with whom he had been 
married for almost thirteen years. He had two sons, thirteen and five years old. In counsel’s 
opinion the petitioner’s ‘only hope of avoiding a relapse’ in his struggle against his alcohol 
addiction was ‘through family support and ongoing treatment’. She noted that Canada seemed to 
be unwilling to give a guarantee that it would permit a return to Canada should there later be a 
finding of a violation of the Covenant on the merits. Her argument was based on the admissibility 
decision in Stewart, stipulating that ‘the essential criterion for a consideration of action taken 
under Rule 86 was the irreversibility of the consequences, in the sense of the inability of a person 
to secure his rights, should there later be a finding of a violation’. Apart from the risk of harm to 
the petitioner she also referred to the harm to his children. In October 1994 counsel informed the 
HRC of the negative decision of the Appeal Division, upholding the deportation order. She 
expected that her client would be removed in a week. She urged the HRC to consider the request 
for provisional measures. It appears from the file that the Special Rapporteur decided not to use 
them. Submission of 3 October 1994 in J.P.A.F. v. Canada (on file with the author). 
290 HRC Hendrick Winata and So Lan Li v. Australia, 26 July 2001. 
291 It noted that ‘the mere fact that one member of a family is entitled to remain in the territory of a 
State party does not necessarily mean that requiring other members of the family to leave 
involves such interference’ (§7.1). Nevertheless it considered that in this case there was an 
‘interference’ with the family because ‘substantial changes to long-settled family life would 
follow’ from the decision of the State party ‘to deport two parents and to compel the family to 
choose whether a 13-year old child, who has attained citizenship of the State party after living 
there 10 years, either remains alone in the State party or accompanies his parents’. Accordingly, 
the HRC was to determine whether this interference would be arbitrary and contrary to Article 
17. It noted that given the fact that the petitioners’ son had grown up in Australia from his birth 
thirteen years ago, it was ‘incumbent on the State party to demonstrate additional factors 
justifying the removal of both parents that go beyond a simple enforcement of its immigration 
law in order to avoid a characterisation of arbitrariness’. It found a violation of Article 17(1) in 
conjunction with Article 23 in respect of all alleged victims and an additional violation of Article 
24(1) in relation to Barry Winata ‘due to a failure to provide him with the necessary measures of 
protection as a minor’ (§§7.2 and 7.3). Under Article 2(3)(a) the State party was under an 
obligation to provide an effective remedy ‘including refraining from removing the authors from 
Australia before they have had an opportunity to have their application for parent visas examined 
with due consideration given to the protection required by Barry Winata’s status as a minor’. It 
did not further discuss Article 24. Hendrick Winata and So Lan Li v. Australia, 26 July 2001, §9. 
Bhagwati, Khalil, Kretzmer and Yalden dissented with regard to the findings of a violation under 
Articles 17 and 23. See also Burchill (2003) discussing the problematic aspects of this case, 
especially regarding the attitude of the partents and the ‘right to live wherever you want’. 
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several ‘Winata-type claims’, based on Article 24(1) ICCPR, the protection of minors. They 
involved deportation cases in which petitioners were facing the choice between, on the one hand, 
uprooting their child and taking him along on their forced return or, on the other hand, leaving 
him alone in the country he grew up in. The Special Rapporteur, however, has refused to use 
provisional measures in these cases.292 Thus, while Winata type cases concern children, and a 
finding on the merits already is available, the Special Rapporteur is not inclined to use provisional 
measures. This is a clear indication that the HRC has become stricter than it was while the  
Stewart case was pending.  
Especially in light of the Committee’s refusal to take provisional measures in this situation 
involving children, its use of provisional measures in the Stewart case, to halt expulsion in the 
context of a complaint on the rights of aliens (not involving non-refoulement), is likely a one time 
occurrence. After all facing being uprooted or being separated from their parents is more likely to 
have irreparable consequences for children, given their developmental needs, than forced removal 
would have for adults. In this light it may be assumed that the general rule on provisional meas-
ures as proclaimed by the HRC in Stewart does not apply across the board or, in any case, should 
be interpreted restrictively. Despite the obvious hardship that an expulsion such as that of Stewart 
may cause, it does not constitute irreparable harm to the life and personal integrity of the intended 
beneficiary. In fact on a continuum of situations in which provisional measures have been used, 
this case could be situated not altogether beyond the outer limits, as indeed in practice once de-
ported it would be difficult to reverse the situation, but nevertheless just inside the outer limits, 
tending towards its edge.  
Thus, provisional measures used in deportation cases not specifically involving Article 7 
ICCPR could be situated within or beyond the outer limits of the concept, depending on the facts 
of the case. The use of provisional measures in situations involving Articles 12 and 13 claims 
would only be within the outer limits of the concept if their expulsion would be irreversible. In 
such case there might be irreversible harm to the claim. In all other cases provisional measures 
would be beyond the outer limits of the concept. 
On the other hand, when children are involved, in light of the child’s developing life, situa-
tions are less easily reversible and these irreversible situations may also result in irreparable harm 
to persons. If provisional measures were to be taken in such a context, they would in fact not just 
be within the outer limits of the concept, but could be situated more closely towards the common 
core. If several human rights adjudicators would develop a practice to use provisional measures in 
certain irreversible situations involving children, in order to prevent irreparable harm to persons, 
this practice would indeed fall within the common core of the concept.293 
                                                 
292 Interview by author with Martin Scheinin, Geneva, April 2003. Scheinin mentioned two or three 
‘Winata’ type situations involving family life in which he refused to use provisional measures 
because the government act would not be irreversible but just inconvenient. 
293 In this respect the adjudicators might also turn to the Children’s Convention for inspiration with 
regard to the irreversibility and irreparability of certain situations when involving children. 
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3.3 Protecting freedom of expression and access to information (without 
threats to life and physical integrity) 
3.3.1 Introduction 
The Inter-American Commission and Court (and the African Commission)294 have used provi-
sional measures in cases involving freedom of expression and access to information also when 
there was no actual threat to the life and personal integrity of the beneficiaries.295 In this respect it 
is worth noting that the Inter-American Commission attaches particular importance to the free-
dom of expression and in 1997 it instituted the permanent office of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression, ‘with its own functional and budgetary independence’.296 As one of the 
duties and mandates of the Office it named ‘immediately informing the Commission of urgent 
situations that merit the Commission requesting the adoption of precautionary measures or provi-
sional measures that the Commission may request of the Inter-American Court, to prevent grave 
and irreparable harm to human rights’.297 Several press organisations are actively lobbying the 
various organs of the OAS including the Inter-American Commission.298 The OAS Heads of State 
and Government have supported and ratified the mandate of the Rapporteur.299  
The Rapporteur brings cases to the attention of the Commission so that it will take precau-
tionary measures to protect the lives and physical integrity of journalists. In fact in 2006 he im-
plemented a system for daily monitoring in which the Office contacts journalists that are receiv-
ing threats and informs them of the possibility of seeking precautionary measures from the Com-
mission ‘to protect their lives and personal integrity’.300 Yet apart from actively pursuing these 
situations, the Rapporteur also brings cases to the Commission’s attention where journalists’ 
                                                 
294 See ACHPR Open Society Justice Initiative (on behalf of Njawe Noumeni) v. Cameroon, 
provisional measures of 15 July 2004 to ‘ensure that no irreparable damage is done to the 
equipment of Radio Freedom FM’, §12, case discontinued in May 2006 upon an amicable 
settlement. 
295 For provisional measures to protect freedom of expression as well as the right to life and physical 
integrity see Chapter IX (Threats). See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
296 See e.g. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Dr. Ignacio 
Alvarez, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, Doc.4, 3 March 2007, p. 5. In general see Thompson (1996), pp. 
231-254. 
297 Id., p. 6. 
298 The Special Rapporteur on Freedom of Expression is financed by US media, for instance the 
Washington Post special fund and by La Sociedad Interamericana de Prensa (SIP). In 1999 SIP 
had started an extensive campaign to amend internal legislation in the Americas in order to 
abolish desacato (crimes against the honour). See also Inter-American Press Organization 
(IAPA), www.sipiapa.org. See further Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression Dr. Ignacio Alvarez, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, Doc.4, 3 March 2007, p. 3 
referring to the firm support of the sectors with which the Office interacts, including journalists 
and media. In 2006 the Office also organized seminars to train journalists in the use of the Inter-
American system, p. 2. 
299 See e.g. the references to the second and third Summit of the Americas in Report of the Office of 
the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Dr. Ignacio Alvarez, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, 
Doc.4, 3 March 2007, p. 4 and pp. 6-7. See also E. Green, US Info staff writer, ‘United States 
Emphasizes Importance of Protecting Press Freedom, New report from Organization of American 
States details threats to journalists’, 13 April 2007, <http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display. 
html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m=April&x=200704131600481xeneerg6.847781e-02> (con-
sulted 14 June 2007). 
300 See e.g. Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression Dr. Ignacio 
Alvarez, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.127, Doc.4, 3 March 2007, pp. 1-2. 
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freedom of expression is at stake, but their lives and physical integrity are not under threat. He 
specifies that these measures ‘were adopted to make possible the full exercise of the freedom of 
expression and to protect journalists’.301  
3.3.2 Inter-American practice 
In 1995 CEJIL, the main NGO in the Inter-American system of human rights protection, re-
quested the Commission to take precautionary measures directly for the protection of freedom of 
expression. At that time the Commission was not inclined to do so.302  
Two years later it did, in the case of Ivcher Bronstein. The latter was born in Israel but had 
been a Peruvian citizen since 1984. He was the president and majority shareholder of Channel 2, 
which disseminated news on torture and other human rights violations and on the multimillion 
dollar payments to Mr Montesinos, President Fujimori’s right hand man. In April 1997 Peru 
arbitrarily stripped Ivcher Bronstein of his citizenship. Following this, his position as president of 
this television station was revoked and his shareholder rights were suspended. Moreover, judicial 
action was brought against him, his wife and two daughters, his employees and his attorneys. The 
intended purpose was to remove him from editorial control of the TV channel and to abridge his 
freedom of expression, which he was exercising through reports on corruption and serious human 
rights violations. In July 1997 the Commission took precautionary measures on his behalf for the 
first time in order ‘to prevent the victim from being stripped of his nationality, so that he might be 
regarded as a citizen in the legal action he has brought, thereby avoiding irreparable harm to 
him’.303 The State had protested this request arguing that its domestic law provided sufficient 
remedies. Even if he were to win the cases brought before the domestic courts, the damages he 
already sustained were ‘of enormous magnitude and would be very difficult to redress in full’. 
These damages were ‘aggravated day by day’ and required a ‘simple and effective remedy’. “For 
that reason, the Commission, without prejudging the facts but applying the maxim that requires it 
to opt for the interpretation of the law that best protects human rights, agreed to seek precaution-
ary measures for Mr. Ivcher”.304 
In its admissibility decision the Commission observed that the petitioner’s ‘present situation 
is extremely disturbing, as he appears to have suffered virtually irreparable damage’.305 
The domestic remedies had been ‘neither swift nor effective in preventing harm of such se-
verity’. “This harm becomes greater with the passage of time, given the nature of the rights in-
volved (...). The fact that harm has materialized in the interim, before the domestic courts handed 
down a final ruling on the applications filed seeking writs of amparo, demonstrates how slow and 
ineffective the remedies in this case have been, and gives the Commission grounds to declare the 
case admissible”.306 
The Commission found that the State’s refusal to heed to the Commission’s precautionary 
measures and the delay in the domestic proceedings placed him in a defenceless position ‘and 
have thus far been ineffective in avoiding harm to the victim, although eventually everything 
                                                 
301 Id., p. 5. 
302 Interview by author with Viviana Krsticevic, Executive Director CEJIL, Washington, D.C., 10 
October 2001. 
303 CIDH Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 3 March 1998 (adm.), §57. See also §27. 
304 Id., §56. 
305 Id., §57. 
306 Id., §60. 
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might well be settled and any wrong done by the regular courts might eventually be fully righted’. 
It observed that this could happen with the decision of the constitutional court.307 
In August 1997 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of Gorriti Ellen-
bogen, a Peruvian journalist and the associate director of the Panama’s newspaper ‘La Prensa’. It 
requested Panama to ‘suspend his imminent expulsion and enable him to continue exercising his 
profession as a journalist’.308 In June 1999 it took precautionary measures on behalf of two per-
sons who were under a detention order in relation to the publication of the ‘Black Book of Chil-
ean Justice’ by journalist Alejandra Matus. A month later the Commission amplified its measures 
to extend to the journalist. It requested guarantees for her security and physical integrity as well as 
for her right to freedom of expression and her intellectual property rights.309 Moreover, in No-
vember 1999 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of another Peruvian journal-
ist.310 Allegedly, security agents had committed repeated acts of persecution against him. The 
Commission pointed out that the measures it requested Peru to adopt ‘were based on the need to 
enable Mr. Gonzáles Arica to fully exercise his freedom of expression’.311 In other words, the 
emphasis was on his freedom of expression rather than his life and physical integrity. 
In March 2000 the Commission took precautionary measures requesting Peru to respect the 
press freedom and freedom of expression of Mr. Delgado Parker.312 Apparently, the authorities 
had stripped him of control of the television chain ‘Global Network’ and confiscated the broad-
casting equipment of his radio station ‘Radio 1160’.313 In December 2000 Peru reported to the 
Commission that it had complied with its request.314 The precise substance of the precautionary 
measures is not clear, but presumably they dealt with returning the television station to his control 
and also returning the radio broadcasting equipment.315 
In July 2000 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of the director of the 
newspaper ‘El Siglo’ in Panama. He had been detained for violation of the defamation laws (‘de-
sacato’). A critical article in his newspaper had potentially implicated the Attorney General in 
illegal acts. The Commission requested the State to nullify the arrest warrant and guarantee his 
right to physical integrity and freedom of expression.316  
It also took precautionary measures on behalf of a journalist in Honduras. It asked his State 
to ‘prevent the risks he is facing from materialising, based on information presented to the Com-
mission, and to guarantee his unrestricted ability to work as a journalist in Honduras’.317  
In February 2001 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of a Venezuelan 
journalist, director of the weekly ‘La Razón’. The Commission indicated that he was ‘at grave 
                                                 
307 Id., §59. On the merits, 9 December 1998, the Commission found, among others, that he had been 
arbitrarily deprived of his nationality, contrary to Article 20(3), so as to suppress his freedom of 
expression. 
308 CIDH Gorriti Ellenbogen v. Panama, Annual Report 1997. 
309 CIDH Annual Report 1999, §15. 
310 Id., §50. 
311 Ibid. 
312 CIDH Delgado Parker, 12.262, precautionary measures of 10 March 2000, Annual Report 2000, 
Chapter III, C.1., §42. 
313 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §42. 
314 Ibid., §42. 
315 About the specific protection required as part of provisional measures, see also Chapter XIII 
(Protection). 
316 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §41. 
317 Id., §37. 
 Chapter XII 
580 
risk and requested that the affronts on the journalist’s freedom of expression be stopped and, as a 
result, the censorship measures against him be lifted, including those on La Razón’.318  
The aforementioned Ivcher Bronstein case, dealt with by the Commission, was subse-
quently brought before the Court. In 2000 the Court ordered provisional measures as well, on 
behalf of Ivcher Bronstein, his wife, daughters and several others ‘in order to ensure their physi-
cal, psychological and moral integrity and right to judicial guarantees’.319 The Court noted that 
‘the purpose of Provisional Measures in international human rights law is broader since, in addi-
tion to their essentially preventive character, they protect effectively basic rights inasmuch as they 
seek to avoid irreparable damage to persons’.320 While most of the text of the motivation given is 
not that exceptional (physical, psychological and moral integrity), again it is clear here that the 
provisional measures were ordered against a background of increasing concern about the freedom 
of expression and the situation in Peru in general. After the Court found for Ivcher Bronstein on 
the merits, it maintained the case,321 including the provisional measures, until its implementation 
by Peru.322  
A second situation in which the Inter-American Court has used provisional measures is to 
delete the registration of a journalist and a representative of a newspaper from the criminal re-
cords. In the context of freedom of expression and the phenomenon of ‘desacato’ (so-called 
crimes against the honour) the Court has ordered provisional measures in the La Nacion case 
against Costa Rica. Previously, in March 2001, the Commission itself had adopted precautionary 
measures on behalf of journalist Mauricio Herrera Ulloa and Fernán Vargas Rohrmoser, the legal 
representative of La Nación, the main Costa Rican newspaper. Mr Herrera had reported informa-
tion previously published in the Belgian newspaper De Morgen questioning the activities of a 
former Costa Rican ambassador. Subsequently, this journalist was criminally convicted for the 
pain and suffering allegedly caused by this publication. The Supreme Court of Costa Rica upheld 
his conviction. The Commission requested Costa Rica to suspend execution of his sentence in 
order to give it time ‘to conduct a full investigation of the allegations raised in the petition, on the 
grounds that executing it before the Commission investigated the case would cause irreparable 
                                                 
318 Id., §57 (Case 11.762). The journalist had submitted information on this case on November 1999. 
The president of the country’s largest insurance company had sued him because his newspaper 
had identified this man as having funded the political campaign of President Chávez. It had 
accused the insurance company of benefiting from state insurance contracts. A trial judge had 
subsequently ordered the arrest of the journalist and placed a ban on references to the president of 
this insurance company. In 2001 another trial judge ordered an arrest warrant ‘ignoring the 
Commission’s request for precautionary measures’. Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §60. 
319 IACHR Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Order of 21 November 2000. See also the Order of 23 
November 2001 expanding the provisional measures. 
320 IACHR Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Order of 21 November 2000, 9th ‘Considering Clause’. 
321 See Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction) and XVIII (Follow-up) on the practice of the Court to maintain a 
case that has been decided on the merits and reparations until it has been implemented. 
322 IACHR Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment of 6 February 2001 and Order of 14 March 
2001 lifting the provisional measures: “That the changes that have occurred in Peru, the 
willingness of the State to respect the recommendations formulated by the Commission in its 
Report No. 94/98, the developments in the Ivcher Bronstein case, particularly the Ivcher family’s 
return to Peru, the cancelling of the arrest warrants against them, the reinstatement of Mr. Ivcher 
as shareholder and chairman of the board of Compañía Latinoamericana de Radiodifusión S.A., 
the company that operates Peruvian television’s Channel 2, and also other relevant information 
submitted by the parties, lead this Court to conclude that the justification of “extreme gravity and 
urgency” and the probability of irreparable damage required by Article 63.2 of the Convention, 
which led to provisional measures being ordered in the instant case, no longer exist”. Order of 14 
March 2001 lifting the provisional measures, 4th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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harm to Messrs. Herrera and Vargas’.323 The Commission pointed out that it based itself on a 
recommendation from the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression.324 It noted that it 
took these measures ‘in light of the information submitted by the petitioners indicating that these 
individuals’ right to free expression required immediate protection in order to avoid irreparable 
harm’. Apart from the request to suspend execution of the sentence, the precautionary measures 
included as well a request ‘to refrain from any act tending toward the inclusion of the journalist 
Herrera in the Costa Rican Judicial Register of Criminals’ and ‘to refrain from any act or action 
affecting the right of free expression of the aforesaid journalist or of the newspaper La Nación’. 
La Nación published the complete text of the precautionary measures. They consisted of a letter 
by the Executive Secretary of the Commission, to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Costa Rica 
referring to the rule on precautionary measures in its Rules of Procedure as well as of a recom-
mendation of the OAS Special Rapporteur for the Freedom of Expression.325 According to the 
Commission the denounced facts could result in ‘irreparable harm’ to the human rights of journal-
ist Herrera Ulloa and Mr. Vargas Rohrmoser, representative of the newspaper. It pointed out that 
in its interpretation of Article 13 ACHR (freedom of expression) limiting the freedom of expres-
sion would result in irreparable harm.326 It emphasised that the article corresponds to a broad 
concept of freedom of expression and autonomy of persons. The respect for the freedom of ex-
pression, it noted, was the instrument for the free interchange of ideas and functioned as a fortifier 
of democratic processes so as to provide a basic instrument for informed participation. The arti-
cle’s object is to protect and promote access to information, ideas and expression and, thus, to 
fortify the functioning of a pluralist democracy. The Commission pointed out that it has said 
before that the use of powers to limit the expression of ideas lends itself to abuse and that subdu-
ing unpopular ideas or criticism would restrict the debate fundamental for the effective function-
ing of the democratic institutions. It emphasised that penalising expressions directed at public 
functionaries in such a way was a disproportionate punishment in light of the importance of free-
dom of expression and information in a democratic system. Limiting the free flow of ideas, as 
long as they do not incite violence, is incompatible with the freedom of expression and the basic 
principles sustaining pluralistic and democratic societies. The Commission distinguished between 
the individual and the social dimension of the freedom of expression327 and pointed out that the 
denounced facts would constitute irreparable harm both to the individual freedom of expression of 
the two beneficiaries and to the citizens of Costa Rica who find themselves deprived of access to 
information about the activities of public functionaries. At the end of its letter, after describing the 
specific type of measures required of the State,328 it explained that the precautionary measures 
were aimed at preventing the materialisation of the risks facing the two beneficiaries.329 Thus, 
CEJIL pointed out that the Commission had taken precautionary measures to prevent ‘irreparable 
harm’ to the freedom of expression of the journalist and newspaper and of the citizens of Costa 
                                                 
323 CIDH La Nación, Annual Report 2000, §28. 
324 See also Chapter II, section 4.3 referring to the role of this Rapporteur. 
325 In 2001 this Special Rapporteur, Santiago A. Canton, became the new Executive Secretary of the 
Commission. 
326 In the Spanish text it says ‘ha interpretado como “daño irreparable” el cercenamiento de 
medidas que limiten la libertad de expresión’. 
327 It did not use the phrase ‘état de droit’ but appears to be referring to it. 
328 Note that the Commission’s precautionary measures in Spanish apparently use the term ‘requerir’ 
(‘la Comisión requiere al Estado…’) which appears to refer to ‘necessitate’ or ‘require’, while 
the Commission’s precautionary measures in English use the term ‘request’.  
329 Letter of Jorge E. Taiana, Executive Secretary of the Commission, to the Minister of Foreign 
Affairs of Costa Rica, Roberto Rojas L., as published in La Nación, titled ‘Evitar “daños 
irreparables”, 2 March 2001, <www.nacion.com> (consulted 8 May 2002). 
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Rica who would otherwise be deprived of access of information about the activities of public 
functionaries.330 
It is not clear from the information provided by the Commission what would be the irrepa-
rable harm caused. The journalist’s criminal conviction included an order to pay a fine. A civil 
suit for damages was also admitted. The journalist and the newspaper company were held jointly 
liable. The measures did not prevent the public from being informed as they were taken ex post 
facto. Thus, it is not censorship as such.  
This means that the precautionary measures aim at the general risk of inability of journalists 
to inform the public, including the risk of self-censorship. Only if the prosecution took place in a 
general context of harassment and intimidation and amounted to cutting off public access to in-
formation it could properly be considered as causing harm that is irreversible. Provisional meas-
ures to prevent such irreversible harm to the claim could be within the outer limits of the concept 
as used in the Inter-American system. 
Apart from using its own precautionary measures that month, in March 2001 the Commis-
sion also petitioned the Court to order provisional measures to safeguard the freedom of expres-
sion of Mr. Herrera Ulloa and Mr. Vargas Rohrmoser. Costa Rica had not complied with its pre-
cautionary measures taken earlier that month. In September 2001 the Court ordered Costa Rica to 
adopt, without delay, ‘those measures deemed necessary to nullify [their] registration in the Judi-
cial Registry of Criminal Offenders until the case was definitively resolved by the bodies of the 
inter-American human rights system’. It also ordered Costa Rica to stay the order to publish the 
operative provisions of the guilty verdict in the newspaper La Nacion as well as to stay the order 
to establish an online ‘link’ in the digital version of La Nacion between the operative part of the 
verdict and the articles that were the subject of the domestic complaint in the first place.331 A 
month later Costa Rica informed the Court of its decision indeed to stay the execution of the 
criminal verdict against the journalist, as well as his registration in the Judicial Registry of Crimi-
nal Offenders, but in November 2001 the Commission informed the Court that ‘in flagrant disre-
gard for the provisional measures the Court had agreed upon’ there was now an affidavit certify-
ing that Mr. Herrera was nevertheless registered in the judicial registry.  
In the matter of La Nación, brought by the Commission to the Court, the provisional meas-
ure by the Court only indirectly dealt with the freedom of speech. It mainly ordered Costa Rica to 
prevent irreparable harm to the good name of the journalist involved. It does not appear that the 
Court has confirmed this approach in other cases. Several years later, for instance, it noted that 
attacks against the honour and good name do not constitute a situation of extreme gravity and 
urgency.332 The development made by the Court is also illustrated in the Court’s provisional 
measures regarding the matter of Luisiana Ríos et al. At various points in time the Court has put a 
different emphasis on freedom of expression in its provisional measures. The Commission had 
requested the Court to order Venezuela also to protect the freedom of expression of the five em-
ployees of Radio Caracas Televisión (RCTV), but in 2002 the Court only issued its usual order 
for the State to adopt all necessary measures to protect their life and personal integrity.333 Then in 
November 2003 it also referred to the freedom of expression of the journalists, but in subsequent 
Orders it did not repeat this,334 until 2005 when it issued a strongly worded Order for provisional 
                                                 
330 La Competencia de la CIDH, comunicado del Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional 
(CEJIL), in La Nacion, 5 April 2001, <www.nacion.com> (consulted 2 April 2002). 
331 IACHR La Nación, Order of 7 September 2001, 2nd ‘Decisional’ clause. 
332 IACHR Miguel Castro Castro Prison (Peru), Order of 30 January 2007 (denying a request for 
provisional measures), 13th ‘Considering’ clause. 
333 IACHR Luisiana Ríos et al., Orders of 27 November 2002 and 20 February 2003. 
334 IACHR Luisiana Ríos et al., Order of 21 November 2003. Orders of 2 December 2003; 4 May 
2004; 27 July 2004 (President); 8 September 2004 (following up, emphasizing the obligation to 
comply with the provisional measures). 
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measures, among others to take measures to protect the life, personal integrity and freedom of 
expression of all news media people of RCTV. As part of this provisional measure the Court 
stressed the importance of the freedom of expression for a democratic society, noting, among 
others, that a society that is not well-informed is not truly free.335 Since that time the Court has 
explicitly pointed out that in the previous Orders it decided on the ‘protection of freedom of ex-
pression in direct relation to the danger to life and personal integrity as a result of the alleged 
threats and harassment to which the beneficiaries of the measures were being subjected’. Yet it 
denied a request for an expansion of these Orders aimed separately at the protection of freedom of 
expression without such threats. It considered it was not appropriate to order the adoption of the 
measures requested ‘in this case’ because it was ‘not possible to determine fumus boni iuris with-
out making a ruling on the merits of the matter in question, which would imply an assessment of 
whether the facts alleged by the representatives are in conformity with the American Convention. 
A decision on merits is made in a judgement delivered in the course of the proceedings on a con-
tentious case lodged before the Court, and not while processing provisional measures. The adop-
tion of the requested measures could imply an incidental prior judgment, with the subsequent 
establishment of some of the facts and their respective consequences, and these are the object of 
the principal dispute in the case lodged before the Court’.336 
3.3.3 Conclusion 
It is mainly in the Inter-American system that provisional measures have been used to protect the 
freedom of expression and the public’s access to information, although information is available 
with regard to the African Commission as well.337 In practice the activities of the Rapporteur, 
together with those of press organisations, and the institutional support by the OAS for the issue 
                                                 
335 IACHR Luisiana Ríos et al., Order of 12 September 2005, 8th ‘Considering’ clause, referring, 
among others, to its Herrera Ulloa judgment of 2 July 2004, §112, its previous Order for 
provisional measures in Luisiana Rios et al, 8 September 2004, 9th ‘Considering’ clause and its 
early Advisory Opinion Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the 
Practice of Journalism (Articles 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights). Advisory 
Opinion OC-5/85, 13 November 1985, §70. 
336 IACHR Luisiana Ríos et al., Order of 3 July 2007 (maintaining the previous Orders, but rejecting 
a request for expansion), 10th ‘Considering’ clause, referring to Matter of Castañeda Gutman 
(Mexico), Order of 25 November 2005, 6th ‘Considering’ clause. The commission has since 
referred to ‘the precedent set by the Inter-American Court in the La Nación case, in which an 
order was issued requiring that execution of a judicial sentence be suspended’, see CIDH Annual 
Report 2005, §33, in the context of its own precautionary measures asking Panama to suspend 
execution of the order for the arrest of a person for failure to pay a fine for slander and 
defamation for publicly reporting that the attorney general’s office had tapped, recorded and 
published his telephone calls. 
337 See also the HRC’s provisional measures to prevent the destruction of a painting, section 2.11. 
Outside of the Americas importance has also been attached to the freedom of expression, but only 
in case law on the merits, or by instituting special mechanisms. See e.g. the African 
Commission’s Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of Expression, the UN Special Rapporteur on 
the Freedom of Expression and the OSCE Representative on the freedom of the media. For case 
law on the merits see e.g. IACHR Case of Herrera Ulloa, 2 July 2004, §113; Case of Ivcher 
Bronstein, 6 February 2001, §152; Case of “The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et 
al.), 5 February 2001, §69; and ECtHR see e.g. Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft v. 
Austria, 13 November 2003, §29; Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 20 September 1994, §49; 
The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 29 March 1979, §65; Handyside v. United Kingdom, 7 
December 1976, §49. 
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of freedom of expression, may have played a role in the choice by the Inter-American Commis-
sion to expand the scope of its use of precautionary measures. 
Not only does the American Convention on Human Rights contain a provision on provi-
sional measures, but this provision explicitly refers to irreparable damage to persons. Thus, it 
specifies the type of ‘irreparable harm’ warranting provisional measures. Nevertheless, the Inter-
American Court has not always used provisional measures with the limited aim of preventing 
such harm to persons. In the case of the La Nación Newspaper, for instance, it used them to pre-
vent ‘irreparable harm’ to the good name of journalists by ordering the State to take their name 
from the register of delinquents.  
The Court paid lip service to the basic requirements of extreme gravity and urgency and the 
prevention of irreparable damage to persons, mentioned in Article 63(2) ACHR. Yet in fact this 
provisional measure was aimed at ensuring freedom of expression by taking away inhibiting 
factors. Even if entry in this register could be said to be irreversible (which clearly it was not) it 
would result in irreversible harm to the claim, not to persons.  
On its website the Commission refers to its requests to the Court to order provisional meas-
ures in urgent cases involving ‘danger to persons’. On the other hand, when it refers to its func-
tion to request ‘precautionary measures’ it specifies these measures as aimed ‘to avoid serious and 
irreparable harm to human rights in urgent cases’.338 This phrase appears to include irreversible 
harm to the claim, rather than just irreparable harm to persons. Indeed, different from the provi-
sional measures by the Court, given the functions of the Commission it is feasible that its precau-
tionary measures are used more flexibly.  
Despite the fact that the domestic law and practice of various States regarding desacato is 
clearly problematic, and the Inter-American Court has found violations on the merits, the latter’s 
provisional measures in the La Nación case seem to be beyond the outer limits of the concept.339 
3.4 Halting the judicial seizure of assets or other financial measures  
In the European and Inter-American systems the question whether or not to use provisional meas-
ures to halt financial measures has come up not just in cases declared inadmissible ratione mate-
riae340 but also in more ‘serious’ cases.  
                                                 
338 See <http://www.cidh.org/what.htm> (consulted 7 June 2007). 
339 Indeed, concerns have been expressed that the use of provisional measures to protect the freedom 
of expression may be the opening of Pandora’s box. Interview of December 2001 by author with 
Victor Rodriguez, former staff member Court, in December 2001 a senior research fellow at the 
International Human Rights Law Institute of DePaul University. Still, in its Order in the La 
Nación case the Court apparently considered that ‘the basic requirements of extreme gravity and 
urgency and the prevention of irreparable damage to persons’ were met. It was also in this Order 
that it noted that the nature of provisional measures in international human rights law is not only 
‘preventative’ but ‘fundamentally protective’. Provisional measures are preventive ‘in the sense 
that they preserve a juridical situation’. They are protective as well because they ‘protect human 
rights’. It noted that ‘provided the basic requirements of extreme gravity and urgency and the 
prevention of irreparable damage to persons are met, provisional measures become a genuine 
jurisdictional guarantee of a preventive nature’. In other words, the Court seems to consider that 
the protective nature of provisional measures in international human rights law is expressed by 
the fact that they have become a ‘genuine jurisdictional guarantee of a preventive nature’, Order 
of 6 December 2001, 4th ‘Considering’ clause. 
340 See e.g. ECtHR Izquierdo Galbis v. Spain, 20 May 2003 (inadm.), where a provisional measures 
requested by the petitioner on 23 March 2001 was not adopted.  
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The first example is from the European Court. In the summer of 1984, the case Bönisch v. 
Austria (1985) was referred to the ECtHR and in the autumn of that year the petitioner requested 
the Court to recommend the Government to suspend the execution of fines imposed on him in 
Austria until delivery of the Court’s judgment. The petitioner had argued that even if he would be 
awarded compensation later (under Article 50), he would already have paid his debts and his 
means of existence would already have been endangered. The State responded that it had no 
observations on the petitioner’s request. 
The next month the President of the Court ‘took the view that recovery of the fines in ques-
tion did not constitute a serious and irreparable measure’, but nevertheless, ‘acting through the 
Registrar and without prejudice to the Court’s ultimate decision on the merits of the case’, he 
‘expressed the wish that the Austrian authorities should consider the possibility of suspending 
execution’.341 In January 1985 Austria notified the Registrar ‘that this wish had been brought to 
the attention of the responsible authorities’.342 While the petitioner’s request was made under the 
Court’s rule on provisional measures, it is clear from the President’s formulation (not ‘serious and 
irreparable’) that his request to the State was not a provisional measure. Despite the text of the 
European rule on provisional measures, which does not refer to irreparable harm, such harm 
appears to be the criterion used also in 1985. 
The Inter-American Commission appears to have used its precautionary measures at least 
once in a financial context. The first precautionary measure mentioned in the Inter-American 
Commission’s Annual Report of 1997 clearly does not deal with the prevention of irreparable 
harm to life and personal integrity. It consisted of postponement of the judicial seizure of the 
assets of the petitioner, while a friendly settlement procedure was ongoing between him and 
Argentina. The Commission mentioned that, from 1972 on, the petitioner, Mr. Jose Maria Cantos, 
had been stripped of a large number of commercial documents. He claimed that State and provin-
cial officials had caused him economic losses and duress for which he sought restitution and 
indemnity.343 Now judicial seizure of his assets was threatened based on the judgement of costs, 
following ten years of processing the case in the Supreme Court of Justice of Argentina. The 
Commission took precautionary measures in March 1997.  
It is not clear why judicial seizure of his assets would result in irreparable harm. In fact, any 
damage would be reparable at a later stage by returning the money to him. It would be interesting 
to know why the Commission used precautionary measures here. Did it believe that, in the cir-
cumstances of that particular case, the seizure of his assets would cause irreparable harm to his 
livelihood and, thus, his life?344 
                                                 
341 ECtHR Bönisch v. Austria, 6 May 1985, §6. 
342 Ibid. The Court found that there had been no equality of arms with regard to the treatment of 
witnesses, in violation of Article 6(1) ECHR. 
343 CIDH Jose Maria Cantos v. Argentina, case 11.636, Annual Report 1997. CEJIL notes in its case 
docket of 1997 that Mr. Cantos was detained without cause on 40 occasions and subjected to 
other forms of intimidation. It presented this case before the Commission in June 1996 ‘as an 
example of an individual’s lack of access to the judicial process in Argentina’. According to 
CEJIL he was in danger of having to declare bankruptcy, CEJIL case docket 1997. It seems that 
CEJIL and the Commission consider this as the irreparable harm that was to be prevented. See 
also the reference to the Commission’s precautionary measures of 11 March 1997 in IACHR 
Cantos v. Argentina, Judgment of 28 November 2002, §3. 
344 The case was subsequently brought before the Inter-American Court, which found violations of 
Articles 8(1) and 25 ACHR and ordered the State to abstain from any further financial measures 
against Mr Campos and to cover the costs of the various proceedings. See IACHR Cantos v. 
Argentina, 28 November 2002. 
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4 CONCLUSION 
This chapter gave some examples of atypical use of provisional measures and of failed requests 
for provisional measures made by petitioners. It presented these examples as gravitating between 
common core, outer limits and beyond. It distinguished between provisional measures that are 
within and those that are beyond the outer limits of the concept.  
In my view the regional courts and the HRC should reserve their provisional measures 
mainly for situations where life and physical or psychological integrity are at stake. This way, the 
authority and effectiveness of provisional measures is likely to be better upheld. Extensively 
using provisional measures to intervene in pending cases dealing with other rights would inevita-
bly make the use of provisional measures less exceptional and more routine. This could also lead 
to diminished compliance. The Conclusion to Part II (purpose) further discusses the common core 
of the concept of provisional measures and how this relates to preventing irreparable harm to 
persons. 
Provisional measures by the Inter-American Commission, the African Commission and the 
Bosnia Chamber are sometimes used in a context slightly different from those of the other adjudi-
cators. Given their different functions (next to the adjudicatory function also monitoring or State 
reports, or preparing country or thematic reports, organizing on-site visits, informal meetings, 
promotional activities and issuing press releases) and regional nature the Inter-American and 
African Commission are more closely in touch with the petitioners and potentially more aware of 
the local situations in which the victims and the beneficiaries of their provisional measures must 
operate.345 Thus these adjudicators may be better able to adapt their use of provisional measures 
to the exigencies of the situation. 
Because of its more constitutional and local ‘sui generis’ position, a similar reasoning could 
apply to the Bosnia Chamber.346 Moreover, a greater flexibility in the use of provisional measures 
would be warranted because the Chamber was explicitly mandated to order provisional measures 
and this mandate was not limited to irreparable harm to persons. Yet exactly because it was an 
adjudicator of final instance, with a near constitutional status to live up to, this flexibility should 
not extend to the use of provisional measures beyond the outer limits, in other words, provisional 
measures that do not even aim at the prevention of irreversible harm to the claim. 
In this chapter the examples discussed were situated either on a continuum between ‘to-
wards the common core’ and ‘towards the outer limits’, as discussed in section 2, or possibly 
beyond the outer limits of the concept, as discussed in section 3. Those provisional measures 
situated more closely towards the common core should therefore be seen as most convincing and 
authoritative.  
Not just the rights invoked are relevant in this respect, but also the persons involved. Indeed 
the HRC has stressed that the accessible and effective remedies required in Article 2(1) ICCPR 
                                                 
345 Previously this was also the case, to some extent, with the European Commission on Human 
Rights. 
346 See also the advice of the Venice Commission regarding the merger of the temporary Bosnia 
Chamber (whose case law is referred to in this book) and the Constitutional Court of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, which discussed the need for the Constitutional Court to apply provisional 
measures in a similar manner as the Bosnia Chamber: ‘it must be avoided that the broad 
protection accorded by means of provisional measures be diminished by the application, by the 
Constitutional Court, of criteria which may turn out to be more restrictive and thus less 
functional’. European Commission for Democracy Through Law (Venice Commission), Report 
of the Working Group on the Merger of the Human Rights Chamber and the Constitutional Court 
of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Sarajevo, Strasbourg, December 1999-June 2000, 16 June 2000, 
Restricted CDL (2000) 47 fin, §47, <http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2000/CDL(2000)047 
fine.asp> (consulted 22 June 2007). 
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‘should be appropriately adapted so as to take account of the special vulnerability of certain cate-
gories of persons, including in particular children’.347 More specifically, the protection of chil-
dren’s rights may warrant the adjudicators’ early intervention because a violation of their rights is 
more likely to cause irreparable harm than the violation of the same rights, for instance the right 
to respect for family life, would cause adults. In that sense, even a temporary separation from his 
or her parents, for instance through deportation, could cause a child irreparable harm. In fact, this 
harm could be such as to impact on the development and thus the life and personal integrity of the 
child involved. Provisional measures used in this context therefore fit within the rationale of 
provisional measures that all human rights adjudicators seem to have in common. 
In other cases, however, not involving children, a violation of the right to family life, free-
dom of expression, liberty, etc. in itself normally is not irreversible, let alone irreparable in the 
same sense as a violation of the right to life and personal integrity. 
For the sake of argument and presentation this book refers to a common practice when more 
than one adjudicator has clearly used provisional measures in the circumstances at hand. Together 
with a common rationale this would bring such provisional measures within the common core of 
the concept, as discussed in the previous chapters.  
Those provisional measures referred to as beyond the outer limits, because the harm they 
aim to prevent in fact is not irreversible, are in fact inappropriate. This inappropriateness does 
vary depending on the nature of the tasks of the adjudicator. The Inter-American Commission 
appears to have developed a practice in which it sometimes uses precautionary measures more 
loosely in order to publicly intervene and exert pressure pending the proceedings. This way it 
shows that it attaches particular importance to an issue such as the freedom of expression. Strictly 
speaking this type of precautionary measures often is beyond the outer limits of the concept of 
provisional measures. 
It is true that when it comes to the African and Inter-American Commission their flexibility 
is one of their main assets. It could be argued that, given the context of their other, non-
adjudicatory, functions, and the presence of a higher adjudicatory body, the need for them to act 
within the outer limits of the concept of provisional measures is less pressing, so long as the 
decision-making is sufficiently transparent. Yet the fact that they also prepare country and the-
matic reports and take promotional and diplomatic action could help inform their decision-making 
in individual cases, but it should not make this decision-making process and its outcome less 
‘judicial’. Their flexibility lies in resorting to their reporting function both to reinforce their adju-
dicatory function and for more general promotional and advisory action.  
Thus, while they perform their adjudicatory function they should in fact apply the judicial 
tool of provisional measures in a manner that is convincing and does not move beyond the outer 
limits of the concept. This applies all the more for the regional courts and the international adjudi-
cators as judicial bodies of final instance. For them to follow the practice of the Inter-American 
Commission of sometimes moving beyond the outer limits of the concept would dilute the author-
ity of their provisional measures.  
 
 
 
                                                 
347 HRC General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, §15. 
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 CHAPTER XIII 
 PROTECTION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The previous chapters discussed a range of situations in which human rights adjudicators have 
used provisional measures and the relation of these measures with the eventual decision on the 
merits. It appears from the examples discussed that the protection required by provisional meas-
ures may take various forms.  
This chapter deals first with the question whether provisional measures require action or ab-
stention (section 2) and whether, in the former situation, they are phrased in general terms or 
specify the exact measures to be taken by the State (section 3). In addition this chapter deals 
specifically with the approach of the various adjudicators to the beneficiaries and addressees of 
their provisional measures (section 4). 
Finally, in order to properly understand the purpose and scope of provisional measures in 
human rights adjudication, this chapter also examines how the preventive measures required at 
the provisional measures stage relate to the measures required upon a finding of a violation, par-
ticularly in the form of cessation and reparation (section 5). 
With regard to the issues of specificity and the group of beneficiaries, the focus is on the 
practice of the Inter-American Commission and Court, which provides more insights than that of 
the other human rights adjudicators. With regard to the relation to reparation the focus is on the 
somewhat problematic practice of the HRC in this respect. 
2 ACTION OR ABSTENTION: POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS IN ORDERS FOR 
PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
2.1 Introduction 
At first sight the protection requested in provisional measures would seem exclusively negative: 
to refrain from torture, execution or threats to life. In fact, however, States must take at least some 
positive action in order to implement such an Order for provisional measures. We have seen this 
already in the practice of the ICJ and even of its predecessor, which at one point ordered China to 
provide ‘effective protection’ to Belgian citizens.1 The ICJ’s Order to halt an execution in the 
LaGrand case (Germany v. US) was more explicit in this respect in light of the US response to the 
earlier Order on behalf of Breard. It specified that the federal State must ensure that its constituent 
parts comply as well.2  
                                                 
1 PCIJ Sino-Belgian case, Order of the President of 8 January 1927. See Chapter I (ICJ). 
2 ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999. See Chapter I (ICJ). See also ICJ 
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 28 
May 2009, Dissenting opinion of Judge Cançado Trindade, §53 (“The urgency of a situation can 
bedetermined by reference to action as well as omission”). 
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While it is established in all human rights systems that States must make expenditures in 
order to fulfil their human rights obligations, including those relating to the right to life and the 
prohibition of torture, it is mainly in the Inter-American system that this aspect has been intro-
duced in provisional measures as well. Only requiring negative measures, such as halting the 
execution of a death sentence, as part of an order for provisional measures, may in fact make 
insufficient use of this tool. This section first discusses how even negatively phrased provisional 
measures may require positive action. Then it refers to how the human rights adjudicators have 
dealt with positive obligations in their decisions on the merits. Finally it notes how in the Inter-
American system an extensive practice has developed of ordering provisional measures that re-
quire positive action too, a practice which appears to be cautiously followed by other human 
rights adjudicators as well. 
2.2 Positive obligations implied in orders to abstain from acting 
Even a negatively phrased Order without any directions on implementation requires some positive 
action, for instance to inform governors, local authorities, courts and the management of prisons. 
This also implies the use of resources. If the State in question fails to take such positive action, 
the adjudicator may subsequently specify the action required more closely.  
Thus in practice many provisional measures require a State to refrain from certain action. At 
the same time even such abstention from, for instance, executing a death sentence, corporal pun-
ishment or expulsion may imply some obligations to act as well.3  
2.3 Positive obligations on the merits 
In their decisions on the merits the various human rights adjudicators have recognized that certain 
rights have been violated because of omissions by the State. All adjudicators discussed have 
found violations of the right to life and the prohibition of torture or cruel treatment for failure to 
take preventive measures.4 Thus their case law on the merits does not form an obstacle but indeed 
supports the use of provisional measures requiring positive action pending the proceedings.  
Both in the European and in the Inter-American jurisprudence it is possible to speak of a 
continuum between negative and positive obligations under the right to life and the prohibition of 
torture. The ECtHR has also considered that a positive obligation arises when the authorities 
‘knew or ought to have known’, about ‘a real and immediate risk to the life of an identified indi-
vidual or individuals from the criminal acts of a third party’. States should take measures ‘within 
the scope of their powers which, judged reasonably, might have been expected to avoid that 
risk’.5 
                                                 
3 See Chapters III-V, respectively. 
4 The HRC, for instance, has found violations of the right to life (Article 6 ICCPR), the prohibition 
of torture and inhuman or degrading treatment (Article 7), the obligation to treat detainees 
humanely (Article 10) and the obligation to protect their security (Article 9) because of an 
omission by the State and has recommended positive measures to remedy such violations. See 
particularly Chapters VI (Disappearances), VII (Health in detention), IX (Death threats), X 
(Culture) and XI (Mass expulsion). 
5 See e.g. ECtHR Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, §86 and Osman v. UK, 28 October 
1998, §116: “For the Court, and having regard to the nature of the right protected by Article 2, a 
right fundamental in the scheme of the Convention, it is sufficient for an applicant to show that 
the authorities did not do all that could be reasonably expected of them to avoid a real and 
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2.4 Explicit positive obligations in provisional measures 
In the Inter-American system the continuum between positive and negative obligations is not just 
reflected in the Judgments on the merits and reparations, but also in the substance of the provi-
sional measures. Judgments on the merits and reparations may require expenditures, but provi-
sional measures may too. Especially in the Inter-American system, but also in some of the others, 
provisional measures have been ordered in which the State clearly was to act rather than to refrain 
from acting. The Inter-American Court has required a State, as part of a provisional measure, to 
allow a person’s return.6 The European Commission has done so too, but in the particular circum-
stance in which previous provisional measures to halt their expulsion had been ignored. Follow-
ing Sweden’s expulsion of Cruz Varas to Chile and Mansi to Jordan, in contravention of the 
Commission’s provisional measures, the Commission took new provisional measures for Sweden 
to enable them to return as soon as possible.7  
As noted, it is not always easy to distinguish between positive and negative obligations. 
There is at least one case in which the European Commission implicitly requested a State to take 
positive measures. In September 1992 Spain had sent a group of 53 African refugees across the 
border, but Morocco refused their entry. They were waiting on no man’s land in the burning sun, 
without water, shelter or sanitation. In a provisional measure the European Commission indicated 
the desirability of Spain taking the necessary measures to prevent treatment of the petitioners that 
could be contrary to Article 3 ECHR.8 While the Commission did not specify the manner in 
which the State should take the necessary measures, both immediate provision of water, shelter 
and sanitation and allowing immediate access to Spanish territory would require positive action 
rather than abstention. This also illustrates that the obligation to take a positive measure may also 
be phrased in general terms and does not necessarily have to be specific.9  
The Inter-American Commission, moreover, has used precautionary measures ordering 
States to provide HIV medication.10 Examples of positive action required in provisional measures 
                                                                                                                       
immediate risk to life of which they have or ought to have knowledge”. See also Z. et al. v. UK, 
10 May 2001, §121. When there is a credible assertion that authorities have treated someone in 
violation of Article 3, the State has the obligation to investigate this, see e.g. Labita v. Italy, 6 
April 2000. In other cases public authorities have specific obligations, involving persons in a 
vulnerable situation, to investigate a situation before taking certain action. Keenan v. UK, 3 April 
2001, discusses the example of a psychotic detainee who was put in solitary confinement and was 
found dead the next day, judgment of. Clearly the obligation to investigate a situation before 
taking any action applies as well in the face of an impending expulsion when the person involved 
claims a real risk of torture in the receiving State, see Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000. See 
generally for the ECtHR approach to positive measures in the context of private life, freedom of 
expression and the margin of appreciation, e.g. X and Y v. the Netherlands, 26 March 1985; 
Plattform ‘Artze für das Leben’ v. Austria, 21 June 1988; Powell and Rayner v. UK, 21 February 
1990; Keegan v. Ireland, 26 May 1994; Stubbings v. UK, 22 October 1996; Özgür Gündem v. 
Turkey, 16 March 2000 and Von Hannover v. Germany, 24 June 2004. For an analysis see e.g. 
Vlemmincx (2002) and Mowbray (2004). 
6 See Chapter XI (Mass expulsion). 
7 EComHR provisional measure of 19 October 1989 in Mansi v. Sweden, 9 March 1990 (struck 
out) and 7 December 1989 (adm.). Provisional measures of 9 November 1989 and 7 December 
1989 in Cruz Varas et al. v. Sweden, judgment of 20 March 1991. 
8 EComHR B., M. and 51 others v. Spain, 11 September 1992. 
9 See also section 3 on the specificity of provisional measures requiring positive action. 
10 See Chapter XII (Other situations). 
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taken by other adjudicators as well are to ensure access to medication in detention and to ascer-
tain the whereabouts of alleged victims.11 
There have equally been several informal provisional measures requesting information 
about the health, whereabouts or access to counsel of the alleged victim.12 Obviously in such 
cases the State had to take positive action in order to provide such information. At the same time 
the adjudicator may have hoped this would encourage the State to take positive measures to pro-
tect the health and safety of the detainee. 
The Inter-American Commission and Court have gone a step further in their use of provi-
sional measures. In the first case before it the Court ordered provisional measures to protect wit-
nesses against threats, something obviously requiring positive measures. By now the Commission 
and Court have built an extensive practice in this respect.13 On a regular basis they order States to 
take positive action to protect persons (both alleged victims and witnesses) against death threats 
and harassment. In fact most of their provisional measures involve protection against death threats 
and thus require such action. 
Recently, the HRC also used provisional measures to protect someone against death threats 
and harassment.14 More generally, the HRC has noted that the legal obligation under Article 2(1) 
ICCPR is both negative and positive in nature. This provision also underlies the Committee’s use 
of provisional measures.15 
In its first provisional measure CEDAW asked a State to protect the petitioner against 
threats by her former partner.16 The African Commission, CAT and CEDAW have used provi-
sional measures with this aim as well. The ECtHR, however, has not yet done so.17 It was argued 
in Chapter IX (Threats) that all human rights adjudicators should be able to use provisional meas-
ures to order the State to take positive measures pending the proceedings in order to prevent 
irreparable harm to persons. After all, in cases involving life and personal integrity, appropriate 
redress is no longer possible after the harm has occurred. 
In view of the fact that States are expected to devise adequate policies, make expenditures 
and prioritise in order to meet their obligations under human rights treaties, the use of provisional 
measures to prevent attacks against persons has been a logical step, taken clearly in the Inter-
American system, but to a certain extent in most other human rights systems as well. In particular, 
                                                 
11 See e.g. Bosnia Chamber Matanović et al. v. Republika Srpska, 6 August 1997, §63, discussed in 
Chapter VII on disappearances. In this case the Bosnia Chamber used provisional measures 
‘immediately to take all necessary steps to ascertain the whereabouts or fate of the applicants and 
to secure their release if still alive’. It left open ‘the possibility of ordering further steps to be 
taken by the respondent Party as may appear appropriate in the future’. More closely see 
Chapters VII (Health care in detention) and VI (Disappearances). 
12 See Chapters VII (Health care in detention), VI (Disappearances) and VIII (Procedural rights). 
13 This includes positive obligations of the State to protect against acts of third parties as well, e.g. 
IACHR Caso de las Comunidades del Jiguamiandó y del Curbaradó, Order of 15 March 2005, 
7th ‘Considering’ clause; case of the Peace community of San José de Apartadó, Order of 15 
March 2005, 7th ‘Considering’ clause and Case of las penitenciarías de Mendoza, Order of 22 
November 2004, 13th ‘Considering’ clause. See further Chapter IX (Threats). 
14 See Chapter IX (Threats). 
15 HRC General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, 29 March 2004, §6. 
16 CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005 (provisional measures of 20 October 2003). In this 
case CEDAW found violations of Article 2(a), (b) and (e), Article 5 and Article 16. With regard 
to the petitioner the State was to take ‘immediate and effective measures’ to guarantee her 
physical and mental integrity and that of her family. It should also ensure that she was ‘given a 
safe home in which to live with her children, receives appropriate child support and legal 
assistance as well as reparation proportionate to the physical and mental harm undergone and to 
the gravity of the violations of her rights’, §9.6 under I. 
17 See Chapter IX (Threats). 
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preventive measures must be taken to protect the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treat-
ment, which have a special place in the human rights treaties.  
With regard to detention situations, death threats and disappearances provisional measures 
generally order to put a stop to an already continuing situation. Thus, while substantively provi-
sional measures may aim at preserving the status quo, in some cases they may even aim at chang-
ing it. After all when someone is being threatened over a long period of time a provisional meas-
ure could be seen as aiming at changing the status quo, but also as returning to the previous posi-
tion in which there were no threats (the status quo ante). In the interest of the proceedings there 
may also be a need to maintain the status quo or return to the status quo ante in order to prevent 
(further) irreparable harm to the witnesses of a violation or to family or counsel of the petitioner 
or even to human rights defenders in general.  
2.5 Conclusion 
In sum, in certain contexts involving threats to life or personal integrity, provisional measures 
have required States to take positive measures as well as measures to refrain from undertaking 
certain action.18 Qualifying an obligation as one of action or abstention sometimes depends on the 
way it is put: using the word ‘respect’, for instance, seems to point at a duty to refrain from acting 
while in reality it may encompass an obligation to take positive action as well. 
Often there is a continuum between positive and negative obligations as part of the meas-
ures that must be undertaken in order to comply with provisional measures. The key is the preven-
tion of irreparable harm. As has been done in the Inter-American system, in the other systems any 
possible positive measures required could equally be mentioned incrementally.  
States must make expenditures in order to fulfil their human rights obligations. Indeed, in 
decisions on the merits the adjudicators have established that States are not only obliged to refrain 
from certain action, but must also guarantee, by positive measures, that others do not violate these 
rights, especially if there is some relationship with the State in the sense of acquiescence or (indi-
rect) involvement. It is therefore not far-fetched for adjudicators to use provisional measures 
requiring a State to protect persons against death threats and harassment pending the case.  
At first sight the obligation to refrain from action seems less invasive to the State than is 
taking provisional measures that require positive action. Nevertheless, exactly because of this 
continuum and in light of the importance attached to the rights involved, provisional measures 
requiring positive action are sometimes essential to guarantee the right to life and the prohibition 
of cruel treatment and torture. Protection against death threats involves the right to life and pro-
tection of physical integrity. They are core rights whose violation causes irreparable harm to 
persons. Such violations must therefore be prevented even if this entails that the State must take 
positive measures pending the proceedings. 
Provisional measures may be warranted to put a stop to ongoing violations, through positive 
measures, exactly because continuing violations increase the irreparable harm already incurred. 
As noted, sometimes this even requires return to the previous situation (status quo ante). If this is 
the only way to halt further irreparable harm to personal integrity in the context of the prohibition 
of cruel treatment or torture, provisional measures should in fact require this. In other circum-
stances such return to the previous situation would be too far reaching as part of positive meas-
ures required pending the proceedings. For instance, if return to the status quo ante would mean 
the demolition of buildings constructed against the protests of indigenous people, it would be 
more appropriate to require this following the finding of a violation, as part of the decision on 
                                                 
18 See also Nørgaard (1994), p. 184 and Garry (2001), p. 404, noting that provisional measures may 
be either of a ‘prohibitive’ or of a ‘proactive’ nature. 
 Chapter XIII 
594 
reparations.19 On the other hand, if the adjudicator has already used provisional measures to halt 
the construction of these buildings but the State ignores these and the building is nevertheless 
constructed, legally it could be appropriate to require return to the status quo ante already pending 
the proceedings rather than as a form of reparation only. Nevertheless, even in such circumstances 
adjudicators are unlikely to require this type of restoration of the status quo pending the proceed-
ings, if only because financial consequences would be considerable, especially if the adjudicator 
would later conclude that there had been no violation other than the disruption of the provisional 
measure.20  
An element of positive action is present in most provisional measures and should in fact be 
made explicit in cases involving ongoing situations such as adverse detention conditions, recent 
disappearances and death threats. 
3 THE SPECIFICITY OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
3.1 Introduction 
As already became evident in international case law not exclusively dealing with human rights, 
the duty to cooperate is of fundamental importance, for instance in relation to the environment. 
This duty underlies orders for provisional measures, but sometimes these measures explicitly refer 
to this duty as well.21 We will see something similar in the context of the Inter-American human 
rights system in particular. In addition, as ICJ Judge Shahabuddeen has pointed out, provisional 
measures ‘should be framed in self-executing terms, in the sense that [they] should contain all the 
legal elements required for [their] interpretation and application’.22 Again, we will see that such 
specificity is found in the Inter-American system in particular.  
The question of the differences in the specificity of the measures required obviously is 
closely linked to that of the previous section involving the obligation to act. These differences are 
particularly relevant for provisional measures to protect against threats and harassment.23 Already 
in 1927 the PCIJ ordered China to provide ‘effective protection’ to Belgian nationals, among 
others by accompanying any Belgian requiring such protection ‘in safety to the nearest Belgian 
consulate’.24 As we will see, especially in the Inter-American system provisional measures have 
sometimes acquired a similar specificity.  
In the Frontier Dispute case (1986) the ICJ ordered the withdrawal of the armed forces of 
both parties, the terms of which should be determined by agreement between them. Only if the 
states would fail to reach such agreement, the ICJ would step in once more. Again we will find 
similarities in approach in the practice developed by the Inter-American Court ordering the State 
to agree with the beneficiaries on the specific protection required. At the same time this Court 
obviously takes into account the special vulnerability of the individual vis-à-vis the State.  
                                                 
19 This example is inspired on the factual situation in HRC Hopu and Bessert v. France, 29 July 
1997. See Chapter X (Culture). 
20 See e.g. ICJ Passage through the Great Belt case (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991, 
§31 as discussed in Chapter I (ICJ), section 3.6. 
21 See e.g. ITLOS MOX plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 2001. See Chapter I (ICJ 
and ITLOS), section 3.7.2. See also Chapters XV (Immediacy and risk) and XVIII (Follow up). 
22 Declaration of Judge Shahabuddeen attached to the ICJ Order for provisional measures in 
Cameroon v. Nigeria, 15 March 1996. See further Chapter I (ICJ). 
23 Obviously this Chapter should be read in close conjunction with Chapters III to XII on the 
situations in which provisional measures have been used. 
24 PCIJ Sino-Belgian case, Order of the President of 8 January 1927. See Chapter I (ICJ). 
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We have also seen that the ICJ has the authority to order provisional measures proprio motu 
and that it routinely modifies the substance of the provisional measures as requested by one State 
in order to accommodate the interest of the other State, as well as in the general interest of pre-
venting the escalation of a conflict or irreparable harm to human beings squashed in the middle.25 
Human rights adjudicators equally have the authority to order provisional measures proprio motu, 
as well as modify the terms of the provisional measures requested by the petitioner. 
Sometimes human rights adjudicators only point out that States must protect certain persons 
or groups.26 At other times they indicate more concretely the protective measures that States 
should undertake. As noted, all adjudicators have used provisional measures of a rather general 
nature, simply ordering the State to refrain from acting in a certain manner or to act exactly in 
order to achieve a certain result (e.g. protection against threats). At times adjudicators have speci-
fied certain of the positive measures required. This could relate, for instance, to providing infor-
mation about an alleged victim’s state of health or to access to medication. This specification 
could also relate to specific measures protecting against threats, including investigation and 
prosecution of previous threats.  
Leaving the choice of implementation to the State generally is the initial approach of the 
human rights adjudicators. In light of the attitudes of addressee States provisional measures may 
become increasingly more specific. Generally speaking the HRC and CAT do not specify their 
provisional measures. On the other hand, already in its first provisional measure the CEDAW 
specified that the measures to be taken by the State should be ‘immediate’, ‘appropriate’, ‘con-
crete’ and ‘preventive’.27 The African Commission does not specify its provisional measures 
either, at least no specific information is available with regard to their contents.28 Mugwanya 
points out that, thus far, these measures ‘have not been sufficiently elaborate’ or ‘specific’.29 In 
comparison to the Inter-American Commission and Court the ECtHR does not generally specify 
the specific steps to be taken as part of its provisional measures.30 Traditionally the European 
Court has been cautious in its directions, even at the merits stage, possibly still out of fear for 
being considered ‘intrusive’.31 Various reasons are possible for the Court to increasingly specify 
                                                 
25 See Chapter I (ICJ). 
26 The next section deals with the (group of) beneficiaries. 
27 CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005, §4.2. 
28 See also Chapter II (Systems). 
29 Mugwanya (2003), pp. 376-377, referring to ACHPR Degli v. Togo, March 1995 (17th session) 
and Ken Saro Wiwa v. Nigeria, 31 October 1998. 
30 It does appear to do so on occasion, but it takes a very gradual approach. An example where it 
apparently became increasingly specific is provided by the NGO St. Petersburg International 
Collegium of Advocates (London office). It notes that the ECtHR had intervened several times on 
behalf of Alkesanyan who had contracted HIV/AIDS and was being denied medical treatment in 
detention. Allegedly, on 28 November 2007 it requested his immediate in-patient treatment in a 
specialized AIDS hospital; on 5 December it reiterated its provisional measure, indicating it must 
be implemented before 10 December of that year and requesting a response to the petitioner’s 
allegation that he is being pressured to give false testimony in exchange for release for medical 
treatment; on 11 December 2007 it asked what efforts Russia had undertaken to secure his 
transfer to a specialized clinic; and on 21 December 2007 it warned Russia that if the petitioner’s 
health would deteriorate or he would die in detention, ‘it may find Russia responsible’ for a 
violation of his right to life and the right not to be subjected to inhuman and degrading treatment. 
It extended its provisional measure and ‘requires the creation of a bipartisan medical commission 
of doctors’ appointed by the petitioner and the State together in order to ‘assess his medical 
condition and prepare a plan for his treatment’. See <www.mka-london.co.uk/timeline.asp> 
(consulted 23 September 2008). 
31 See further section 5.3 of this Chapter. This may also be related to a specific perception of the 
‘non-activist’ role of an adjudicator. The sensitivity for a specified manner of implementation, 
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the obligations of States. The Court is dealing more and more with extreme situations of gross 
human rights violations. In addition the Court may hope that an increased specificity will assist 
States in implementing their obligations under the ECHR, both pending the case and upon the 
finding of a violation on the merits.32 Both old and new members of the Council of Europe have 
an interest in this. Moreover, the overburdened Court clearly has, in order to avoid the need to 
deal with repeated complaints.33 
In order to clarify the ways in which an international adjudicator could (incrementally) 
specify its provisional measures, this section draws from the rich practice developed in the Inter-
American system. General orders are flexible and leave greater discretion to the State with regard 
to their implementation. Yet in the experience of the Inter-American Commission and Court they 
have appeared to be less appropriate in cases involving risks to life and personal integrity.  
Before discussing whether it is necessary for human rights adjudicators to specify their pro-
visional measures, first another issue is addressed involving cautious phrasing in provisional 
measures in unprecedented cases.  
                                                                                                                       
perceiving this as an ‘imposition’, applies mainly to European States. In Ilascu et al. v. Moldova 
and Russia, 8 July 2004, the ECtHR (Grand Chamber) noted: “Although it is not for the Court to 
indicate which measures the authorities should take in order to comply with their obligations 
most effectively, it must verify that the measures actually taken were appropriate and sufficient in 
the present case. When faced with a partial or total failure to act, the Court’s task is to determine 
to what extent a minimum effort was nevertheless possible and whether it should have been 
made. Determining that question is especially necessary in cases concerning an alleged 
infringement of absolute rights such as those guaranteed by Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention”. 
ECtHR Ilascu et al. v. Moldova and Russia, 8 July 2004, §334. See generally e.g. Van Kempen 
(2003), pp. 92-101. Yet the ECtHR is more specific about the obligations of States when it has 
found a violation of the right to life. In Kaya (2000) it reiterated with regard to the alleged 
inadequacy of the investigation, ‘that the obligation to protect life under Article 2 of the 
Convention, read in conjunction with the State's general duty under Article 1 of the Convention 
“to secure to everyone within [its] jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in [the] 
Convention”, requires by implication that there should be some form of effective official 
investigation when individuals have been killed as a result of the use of force’, ECtHR Mahmut 
Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, §102 also referring to McCann and Others v. UK, 27 September 
1995, §161. See also Assanidze v. Georgia, 8 April 2004 (ordering the petitioner’s immediate 
release). Moreover, the Court is becoming more aware of the possibility to specify the necessary 
changes in law and practice in its judgments on the merits (see e.g. Minutes of meeting between 
Court and organizations representing applicants and/or intervening as third parties, 10 April 
2006, p. 3). For an example see Dybeku v. Albania, 18 December 2007, §64 (‘the Court considers 
that in view of its findings in the present case, the necessary measures should be taken as a matter 
of urgency in order to secure appropriate conditions of detention and adequate medical treatment, 
in particular, for prisoners, like the applicant, who need special care owing to their state of 
health’). 
32 For an example of such specificity ECtHR Shtukaturov v. Russia, 27 March 2008, §33 where the 
provisional measures were as follows: “the respondent government was directed to organize, by 
appropriate means, a meeting between the applicant and his lawyer. That meeting could take 
place in the presence of the personnel of the hospital where the applicant was detained, but 
outside their hearing. The lawyer was to be provided with the necessary time and facilities to 
consult with the applicant and help him in preparing the application before the European Court. 
The Russian Government was also requested not to prevent the lawyer from having such meeting 
with his client at regular intervals in the future. The lawyer, in turn, was obliged to be cooperative 
and comply with reasonable requirements of the hospital regulations”. 
33 See also Rieter (2007), p. 974. 
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3.2 Cautious phrasing and lack of precedent 
The specific terminology used in provisional measures may not only help clarify the nature of the 
State’s obligations, but also indicate the doubts the adjudicator has regarding the appropriateness 
of the use of provisional measures. This may be illustrated by a provisional measure ordered by 
the HRC. In Weiss v. Austria (2003), involving a life sentence in the U.S., the petitioner had 
argued that he would risk irreparable harm.34 In response, the Rapporteur did not request the State 
to halt the extradition until the Committee had been able to examine the case. Instead he requested 
to halt the extradition until it ‘had received and addressed the State party’s submission on whether 
there was a risk of irreparable harm to the author, as alleged by counsel’. In other words, rather 
than assuming a risk of irreparable harm until it had been able to make a final determination it 
requested the State to explain why it considered the extradition would not result in irreparable 
harm. This variation in the substance of the request for provisional measures indicates a special 
limited duration of its provisional measures. It also makes explicit the shift in the burden of proof 
that takes place from the petitioner to the State, once the adjudicator has decided to take provi-
sional measures. At that point it is the State that has to show that there is no risk. Once the HRC 
considers that the State has met this burden it will withdraw the provisional measure.35 
According to Naldi the Committee’s phrasing of its provisional measures in Weiss v. Aus-
tria indicates that ‘irreparable harm is no longer a condition precedent for the granting of interim 
measures’ and that those provisional measures ‘that are issued while the Committee considers 
whether they are justified are similarly considered binding’. This, he notes, broadens ‘the protec-
tive scope’ of provisional measures.36 The phrasing in this case indeed is new, but in fact the HRC 
has also taken provisional measures in earlier cases, which it withdrew or decided not to prolong 
in the face of information provided by the Government. While in some cases this may have been 
new information, for instance the fact that a residence permit has been granted or a death sentence 
commuted, in other cases the information provided by the Government may simply have con-
vinced the Rapporteur that there was no real risk of irreparable harm. At the provisional measures 
stage the Rapporteur does not have to be certain about such a risk in any case. In that sense the 
approach taken in Weiss simply draws attention to the fact that the Rapporteur has rather more 
doubts than usual about the risk of irreparable harm.37  
In Länsman II the Rapporteur equally was rather cautious in the phrasing of the provisional 
measures involving a complaint by Sami in Finland aimed at the protection of the environment 
constituting their cultural habitat.38 In both cases no firmly established case law was available yet 
about the use of provisional measures in the circumstances. In Länsman II there was one prece-
dent, Lubicon v. Canada, in which the HRC had previously used provisional measures in the 
context of cultural survival. In Weiss v. Austria there was no precedent of a provisional measure 
to halt extradition because of a real risk of a life sentence. The cautious phrasing in both cases 
may be attributed exactly to the lack of precedent with regard to the purpose of provisional meas-
ures, rather than to doubts about the assessment of risk.  
                                                 
34 HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003. 
35 See further Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
36 Naldi (2004), p. 450. On the legal status of provisional measures see Chapter XVI. 
37 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
38 See Chapter X (Culture). 
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3.3 Specific requirements found in orders for provisional measures  
3.3.1 Introduction 
This section examines the specificity of provisional measures. The discussion of specific require-
ments first provides examples presented by issue area. The examples range from provisional 
measures halting executions to those (partly) aimed at protecting freedom of expression or a 
combination of rights. Subsequently this section deals with one particular requirement found in 
provisional measures ordered in the context of ongoing situations such as death threats: the obli-
gation to investigate, prosecute and punish. Then the incremental approach to specificity is dis-
cussed that is taken by the Inter-American Court in cases of death threats and harassment, with 
the Peace Community case as a point of departure. Again this illustrates that often a range of 
interrelated rights is involved and again it illustrates the importance of investigation and prosecu-
tion of death threats and harassment. 
Finally this section examines the obligation implicit in all provisional measures, and made 
explicit in the Inter-American system, to provide information on their implementation and more 
generally to cooperate with the adjudicator. 
3.3.2 Concrete provisional measures in various issue areas 
3.3.2.1 HALTING EXECUTIONS 
In 1993 the Inter-American Commission requested ‘that the Governor of Texas and the State 
ensure that the death sentence not be carried out on Mr. Sankofa, for humanitarian reasons and to 
avoid irreparable harm’. It specifically called upon the US ‘to take the necessary measures to 
ensure that Mr. Sankofa was afforded a hearing before the Texas Board of Pardons and Paroles’. 
The protective measures as requested are interesting because they are more specific than just 
requesting a stay of execution. They show an awareness of the specific circumstances in Texas.39 
3.3.2.2 PROTECTING THE LIFE AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY OF RECENTLY DISAP-
PEARED PERSONS 
In December 2001 the Inter-American Commission took precautionary measures to determine the 
whereabouts of two persons from the region of Antioquia and to protect their lives and persons. 
They were last seen three weeks before at a Medellín metropolitan police checkpoint. In its An-
nual Report the Commission notes that it ‘undertook a series of steps toward clearing up this 
situation during its on-site visit’ of 7 to 13 December. Apparently these steps had not been suffi-
ciently effective as five days later the Commission resorted to the formal issuance of precaution-
ary measures. As part of these measures it also asked Colombia to ‘launch a prompt and effective 
investigation using the urgent search mechanism established by Law 589/2000’.40 
                                                 
39 CIDH Gary T. Graham, now known as Shaka Sankofa v. US, 15 June 2000 (adm.). The 
petitioners had asked the Commission, on 4 October, to request the State to ‘ensure that Mr. 
Sankofa was afforded a fair hearing’ before this Board. In Texas, this Board was in the habit of 
deciding on clemency on the basis of just a telephone conference. No hearing would take place 
and no clemency would be granted. The petitioners had also asked the Commission to request 
that the State would ‘urge the Board to recommend that he be pardoned of the capital offence of 
which he was convicted’. 
40 CIDH Annual Report 2001, §26. 
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In July 2001 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of someone who had 
been violently detained, without a warrant, in June 2001. His family had witnessed how agents of 
the judicial police of the state of Guerrero had abducted him in an operation involving several 
vehicles also marked as belonging to this police force. They had filed complaints with the Attor-
ney General of that state, who apparently did not take effective steps to locate him. Upon the 
petitioners’ request the Commission’s precautionary measures included intervention by the fed-
eral Attorney General because they suspected complicity between the kidnappers and the public 
prosecution service of Guerrero.41 
3.3.2.3 PROTECTING THE LIFE AND PERSONAL INTEGRITY OF DETAINEES 
Also in the context of detention the Inter-American Court is increasingly specific in its use of 
provisional measures.42 The case of Elena Loayza Tamayo serves as an example of the possible 
specificity of provisional measures in detention cases. The Court requested Peru to adopt all 
necessary measures to ‘effectively ensure her physical, psychological and moral integrity’.43 The 
Commission had been even more specific in its request to the Court, requesting the end of the 
solitary confinement and incommunicado detention imposed on her and the return to ‘Pavilion 
‘A’ of the Chorrillos Women’s Maximum Security Penitentiary in the same conditions in which 
she had been held prior to her transfer’.44 The Court subsequently did specify its previous meas-
ures by ordering Peru to modify her prison conditions, in particular with regard to her solitary 
confinement, and provide her with medical treatment.45  
In September 1997 it issued its judgment on the merits, finding violations of Articles 5 (per-
sonal integrity), 7 (liberty) and 8 (judicial guarantees), ordering her release.46 She was released 
the next month. Subsequently the Court lifted its provisional measures.47 In 1998 it ordered Peru 
to take several measures of reparation.48 Yet these were not implemented and Ms Loayza contin-
ued to live in destitute conditions. Moreover, a June 1999 judgment by the Supreme Court of Peru 
‘overturned’ the judgment of the Inter-American Court, threatening her renewed detention.49 She 
                                                 
41 In November the Commission extended its precautionary measures to cover the wife of the 
disappeared man who was in grave danger because of her search and a former officer of the 
judicial police in Guerrero who was under arrest and whose life was being threatened if he 
continued to make allegations about the involvement of judicial police officers and their superiors 
in kidnappings. CIDH Annual Report 2001, §39. 
42 See e.g. IACHR Las penitentiarías de Mendoza v. Argentina, Order of 22 November 2004, 
expanded several times, e.g. 30 March 2006 (including the individual votes of García Sayán, 
García Ramírez and Cançado Trindade); Case of the children and adolescents deprived of liberty 
at the ‘Complexo do Tatuapé’ of FEBEM, Order of 30 November 2005 (including the individual 
votes of García Ramírez and Cançado Trindade). See also Order of 4 July 2006; and Cárcel de 
Urso Branco case (Brazil), Order of 21 September 2005 (including the individual opinions of 
García Ramírez and Cançado Trindade). 
43 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Urgent measures of 12 June 1996 and Order of 2 July 1996. 
44 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Order of 2 July 1996, §4. 
45 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Order of 13 September 1996. 
46 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, 17 September 1997 (merits). 
47 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Order of 11 November 1997. 
48 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, 27 November 1998 (reparations). 
49 See also IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, 17 November 1999 (execution of judgment) and letter 
of 12 November 2000 of the Inter-American Court, ‘signed by all of the Judges, addressed to the 
Secretary General of the Organization of American States, where its was stated, inter alia, that 
compliance by the State “has particular effects in the case of Ms. Loayza-Tamayo who, according 
to truthful information received by the Court, is going through serious economic and health 
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went into exile in Chile, where she received some medical support by an NGO that itself was 
lacking adequate means. Because of her physical and emotional condition she was unable to find 
an adequate and more permanent job. The petitioners requested renewed provisional measures, 
arguing that her ‘life project’ had been damaged, and ‘the conduct of the State, to date,’ had pre-
vented her from having ‘the minimum of a dignified life’. In addition her right to health was 
‘seriously violated and diminished’.50 
Arguing that in this case the power to order provisional measures implied ‘to look after the 
personal integrity of Ms. Loayza-Tamayo’,51 the President of the Court noted that the information 
submitted in this case showed prima facie a threat to her integrity.52 He deemed ‘necessary for the 
State to ensure Ms. Loayza-Tamayo the security conditions necessary for her to return to her 
country without fearing consequences on her physical, psychic, and emotional integrity.53 He 
adopted urgent measures on her behalf calling on Peru to ‘adopt, without delay, all necessary 
measures to effectively ensure the return to her country (…), and also her physical, mental and 
moral integrity, so that any provisional measures that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights 
may decide to order in this case may have the pertinent effects’.54 In February 2001 the Court 
confirmed this decision.55 In January 2001 the new government of Peru, installed after Fujimori 
had fled the country, had noted that there was no arrest warrant against Ms Tamayo. It had ex-
pressed its ‘willingness to grant the said citizen the necessary guarantees and measures that her 
physical safety, mental health and moral integrity will not be harmed’. It also pointed out that it 
was taking the ‘pertinent measures’ to comply with the Court’s judgment in her case.56 While, 
given the Court’s Order of February 2001, it was not immediately convinced by these arguments, 
                                                                                                                       
difficulties that could be palliated, at least in part, by the compliance of the respective 
judgement”. In said letter, the Court requested the Secretary General to submit the [...] 
communication “as soon as possible to the Permanent Council, and later, to the General 
Assembly of the Organization”’, IACHR Loayza Tamayo (Peru), Order of 13 December 2000, 4th 
‘Having seen’ clause. 
50 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Urgent measures of 13 December 2000, 1st ‘Having seen’ 
clause. They requested specifically to ‘urgently adopt every provisional measure’ for the teacher 
María Elena Loayza-Tamayo, to recover the sum of money decided by the Court as a fair 
indemnification, together with fair interests in arrears, and all other material and moral damages 
related to the violations resulting from the failure of Peru to comply with the decision on 
indemnifications, that will allow her to leave the condition of misery she is now living in, to 
cease being a cuasi beggar and to begin enjoying a ‘dignified life’; [for her] to be able to develop 
a new (though limited) life project, beginning a new professional formation abroad that would be 
within her reach, while her situation of insecurity in Peru persists; [for her] to be able to take 
adequate care of her health; [and for her] to support directly and personally the needs of her 
children, after suffering the humiliation of having them under the care of the grandparents and 
aunts’. 
51 IACHR Loayza Tamayo, Urgent measures of 13 December 2000, 6th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
52 IACHR Loayza Tamayo, Urgent measures of 13 December 2000, 7th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
53 IACHR Loayza Tamayo, Urgent measures of 13 December 2000, 12th ‘Having seen’ clause, 
referring to Peace Community San José de Apartadó, Order of 24 November 2000, 8th 
‘Considering’ clause and 5th and 6th ‘Resolution’ clauses; Haitians and Haitian-Origin 
Dominicans in the Dominican Republic, Order of 18 August 2000, 4th ‘Resolution’ paragraph; 
Alvarez et al., Order of 21 January 1998, 4th ‘Resolution’ paragraph; Giraldo Cardona, Order of 
5 February 1997, 5th ‘Considering’ clause; Giraldo Cardona, Urgent measures of 28 October 
1996, 2nd ‘Resolution’ paragraph and Colotenango, Order of 22 June 1994, 2nd ‘Resolution’ 
paragraph. 
54 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Urgent measures of 13 December 2000. 
55 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Order of 3 February 2001. 
56 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Order of 3 February 2001, 7th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
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in August 2001, on request of the Commission and the State, it did decide to lift the provisional 
measures. The situation of the beneficiary was no longer extremely serious and urgent to such an 
extent as to require provisional measures.57 
Since this case the Court has regularly dealt with urgent detention cases.58 The Court has 
also increasingly specified what it means with the State’s reporting obligations.59 For instance, it 
has explained that it was essential that the adoption of the priority measures indicated in the Order 
should be reflected in reports that described concrete results based on the specific needs for pro-
tection of the beneficiaries of the measures. It has added that in this respect the supervisory role of 
the Inter-American Commission was particularly important in order to monitor the implementa-
tion of the measures ordered adequately and effectively.60 
It has equally reiterated that the State should take the relevant steps to ensure that the meas-
ures of protection were planned and implemented with the participation of the representatives of 
the beneficiaries of the measures and, in general, keep them informed of progress in implementa-
tion. This also meant that the State must facilitate the entry by the representatives of the benefici-
aries of the measures into the detention facility. It must also facilitate communications between 
the representatives and the young detainees. These communications must be conducted in the 
most confidential manner possible so as to avoid intimidating the youngsters. The Court has 
                                                 
57 IACHR Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Order of 28 August 2001. The State had argued that provisional 
measures were reserved for extremely urgent situations where the beneficiary was facing 
irreparable harm and that this was not the case here (3rd ‘Having seen’ clause). The Court agreed, 
emphasizing that provisional measures are exceptional in character.  
58 See e.g. IACHR Matter of the Penitentiary Center of the Central Occidental Region (Uribana 
Prison) (Venezuela), Order of 2 February 2007 (e.g. measures must be implemented immediately 
to avoid the loss of life or harm the physical, mental and moral integrity of all those deprived of 
liberty in the Uribana Prison, of those who may enter the penitentiary center as prisoners, and 
also of those who work there and who enter the prison as visitors and more long-term measures 
aimed at, e.g. the reduction of overcrowding and the separation of male and female inmates); 
Matter of Urso Branco prison (Brazil), Orders of 2 May 2008, 21 September 2005, 7 July 2004, 
22 April 2004, 29 August 2002 and 18 June 2002; Matter of the Mendoza prisons (Argentina), 27 
November 2007, 30 March 2006 (particularly, to eliminate the risk of violent death and the 
inadequate internal security and monitoring conditions in the prisons), 18 June 2005, 22 
November 2004; Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" 
Penitentiary in Araraquara São Paulo (Brazil), Order of the President of 10 June 2008; Order of 
30 September 2006; Matter of Children Deprived of Liberty in the "Complexo do Tatuapé" of 
FEBEM (Brazil), Order of President 10 June 2008, Orders of 3 July 2007, 4 July 2006, 30 
November 2005 and 17 November 2005; Matter of Yare I and Yare II Capital Region 
Penitentiary Center (Venezuela), Orders of 30 November 2007 and 30 March 2006; Matter of 
Capital El Rodeo I & El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, Order of 8 February 2008; 
Matter of Monagas Judicial Confinement Center (‘La Pica’) (Venezuela), Order of 3 July 2007 
(e.g., as a more long-term measure, the confiscation of weapons and provide the necessary 
medical care), and 9 February 2006; Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Orders of 
29 January 2008 and 30 January 2007 (dismissing the requests by the petitioners). 
59 This is relevant as a measure of follow-up. Generally on follow-up by the adjudicators, see 
Chapter XVIII. 
60 IACHR Matter of the Mendoza Prisons (Argentina), Order of 27 November 2007. See also 
Matter of the Yare I and Yare II Capital Region Penitentiary Center (Yare Prison) (Venezuela), 
Order of 30 November 2007 (to request the State to report on the availability of means and 
mechanisms whereby the persons deprived of liberty in the Capital Region Penitentiary Center 
Yare I and Yare II (Yare Prison) can obtain information on their rights and formulate petitions or 
complaints in this regard). 
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equally stressed the obligation to send it an updated list of all the young people residing in the 
detention facility.61 
In a follow up provisional measure the Court has even specified that those beneficiaries who 
would be or had been transferred to another detention center subsequent to the Court’s earlier 
provisional measures, continued under the protection of the Court’s provisional measures. Their 
next of kin were to be informed of these transfers and the State was to avoid unduly violent acts 
by State officers, particularly during those transfers. It was also to make sure that the beneficiary 
was not exposed to overcrowded detention conditions upon transfer, that convicted prisoners and 
pre-trial detainees were not detained together, that access to medical staff was provided and that 
the right of access to defense counsel and next of kin was respected.62 
Yet the Inter-American Court now distinguishes between the more long-term measures re-
quired in the context of detention and the immediate measures required to prevent violations of 
the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment. In this respect in a separate opinion Judge 
García Ramírez pointed out the difference between the material and temporal scope and nature of 
provisional measures on the one hand and of judgments of the Court on the other. The more long-
term measures (often requiring legal reforms and reorganisation) are matters to be examined on 
the merits rather than in the context of provisional measures.63 Judge García Ramírez drew atten-
tion to the fact that multiple, complex and persistent measures were necessary to deal with struc-
tural problems in the short, medium and long run.64 At the same time, of course, the Court has 
stressed that while the State makes the appropriate adjustments to deal with the structural prob-
lems, the detainees affected by the existing flaws must be protected by provisional measures if 
their condition is of extreme gravity and urgency.65 In a subsequent matter involving detention the 
Court itself observed that the improvement and correction of the situation in the detention center 
Urso Branco constituted a process that required the State to take measures in the short, medium 
and long run to deal with the structural problems affecting the detainees. The duty to adopt such 
measures derived from the general obligation to respect and guarantee their rights. The compati-
bility of the measures taken by the State with the Inter-American standards must be examined at 
the appropriate moment, at the stage of the examination of the merits. Meanwhile, as part of the 
provisional measures, the state was to concretely eradicate the risk of violent deaths and attacks 
against the personal integrity.66 Yet a detailed analysis of the compatibility of the detention condi-
tions with the ACHR was to be made on the merits of the case, which was still pending before the 
Commission.67 In this respect, in the face of allegations of inhuman detention conditions, it was 
the Commission that should take the measures it considered pertinent, based on its own func-
tions.68 
At the same time the Court has pointed out that its competence to order provisional meas-
ures is not necessarily limited by the existence of a case relating to measures pending before the 
                                                 
61 See e.g. IACHR Matter of the Children and Adolescents Deprived of Liberty in the “Tatuapé 
Complex” of the CASA Foundation (Brazil), Order of 3 July 2007. 
62 IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in 
Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, 21st-24th ‘Considering’ clauses. 
63 IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, 8 February 
2008, Separate opinion Judge García Ramírez (joined by Judge Medina Quiroga), §§18 and 19. 
64 IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, 8 February 
2008, Separate opinion Judge García Ramírez (joined by Judge Medina Quiroga), §20. 
65 IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, 8 February 
2008, 14th ‘Considering’ clause. 
66 IACHR Asunto de la Cárcel de Urso Branco (Brasil), Resolución de 2 de mayo de 2008, 20th 
‘Considering’ clause. 
67 Id., 21st ‘Considering’ clause. 
68 Id., 22nd ‘Considering’ clause. 
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Commission, as in certain circumstances, in light of the rights at stake, the Court has recognized 
that its provisional measures do not just have a preventive, but in fact have a truly protective 
character.69 Nevertheless, in the context of these measures the Court may only consider arguments 
that relate strictly and directly to the extreme gravity that is required for the use of provisional 
measures.70 In a situation where the Court must decide whether its provisional measures previ-
ously ordered, must be maintained, it must examine whether the situation of extreme gravity 
persists or whether new circumstances that are equally grave merit the maintenance of the provi-
sional measures. Any other claim can only be brought to the Court’s attention through the corre-
sponding contentious proceedings.71  
It is noteworthy that in the matter that triggered these statements the State had argued many 
structural steps that it had undertaken. It had hired new prison staff, prison populations had de-
creased and prison cells that were previously connected had been repaired so that aggression 
between detainees was limited. Moreover the administration of Urso Branco prison had a policy 
of eliminating all violence, while the sanctions against detainees were limited to prohibiting vis-
its.72 Yet the Commission argued that the measures had not been sufficient to guarantee the lives 
and integrity of the detainees and the petitioners noted, among others, that by the end of 2006 the 
State had substituted its laisser faire policy for an new repressive policy that included the use of 
torture in order to guarantee control over the detention centre. Among others, within six months, 
four directors had been fired for committing or allowing torture.73 The Court concluded that the 
continued attacks and killings indicated the persistence of a situation of extreme gravity and 
urgency and the recent allegations of torture by state agents represented an aggravation of the 
imminent risk to life and personal integrity of the detainees.74 The State had not provided infor-
mation on concrete measures to put a stop to the killings and deal with the allegations of torture. It 
had limited itself to offering information on hiring new personnel and improving the detention 
conditions.75 It observed that the fact that Brazil is a federal state cannot serve as an excuse for 
non-compliance. The Court found that there had been no major improvement during the six years 
of provisional measures and it specifically took note of the request by the petitioners at the inter-
nal level for the federal government to intervene in the detention system of the constitutive state 
Rondônia.76 In the circumstances the measures to be adopted by Brazil must include some directly 
aimed to protect the right to life and integrity of the detainees, both in their relations amongst 
themselves and between them and the State agents. In particular the State was to take immediate 
measures necessary to eradicate concretely the risks of violent killings and grave attacks against 
personal integrity, making sure that its agents do not commit unjustified acts against the life and 
integrity of detainees and prohibiting, in all circumstances, the practice of torture. The measures 
were to include a confiscation of weapons and the maintenance of state control in a manner that 
fully respected the human rights of the detainees.77 In other words, in the face of the continuing 
grave situation the Court specified its provisional measures and, in passing, also reminded the 
State of a request by the petitioners to intervene in the detention system of a constituent state. 
None of the adjudicators have used provisional measures regularly to secure release, halt the 
execution of a detention order, halt re-imprisonment or arrange a prison transfer in light of the 
                                                 
69 Id., 4th ‘Considering’ clause. 
70 Id., 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
71 Id., 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
72 Id., 7th ‘Considering’ clause. 
73 Id., 8th ‘Considering’ clause. 
74 Id., 10th ‘Considering’ clause. 
75 Id., 12th ‘Considering’ clause. 
76 Id., 14th ‘Considering’ clause. 
77 Id., 15th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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petitioner’s state of health. The HRC nevertheless has done so at least once.78 Moreover, the 
ECtHR has recently done so on behalf of several persons alleging to be suffering serious health 
problems as a result of a prolonged hunger strike.79  
In the Inter-American system the transfer of detainees has also been suggested or even or-
dered explicitly. A fire had broken out in a juvenile detention centre in Paraguay, killing nine 
minors protesting the detention conditions. Subsequently 125 minors were transferred to another 
facility, but this did not meet the minimum standards for the protection of minors either. In addi-
tion the authorities sent the other 130 minors to different parts of the country and placed them in 
prisons together with adults, in overcrowded cells.80 The relocation of these minors to distant 
prisons aggravated their critical situation and made family visits impossible. In its precautionary 
measure of August 2001 the Commission very specifically requested that:  
“(1) The minors be immediately transferred to the Itaguá Education Center. (2) The physical, 
mental, and moral integrity of the minors be ensured and, in particular, that minors and adults 
be kept completely separate during the temporary relocation of the young inmates in the 
aforesaid facilities. (3) Access to the minors by their legal counsel and family visitors be 
granted. (4) The circumstances that gave rise to these measures be investigated, in particular, 
those that led to the death of Benito Augusto Moreno (or Augusto Benitez), and that the 
perpetrators thereof be punished”.81 
Yet the Inter-American Court has also indicated certain limits to its protective task. In the context 
of a request to amplify a pre-existing Order by the Inter-American Court for provisional measures 
on behalf of the detainees of Mendoza, which the President of the Court denied, he quoted 
extensively from judgments and orders by Argentina’s domestic courts aimed at the 
implementation of the State’s human rights obligations and explicitly referring to the previous 
Order of the Inter-American Court.82 In this respect he specifically referred to the principle of 
subsidiarity ‘that informs the Inter-American human rights system’. This meant that provisional 
measures would be used only in cases of extreme gravity and urgency when the normally existing 
guarantees available in the State are insufficient or ineffective and the authorities will not or 
cannot make them prevail.83 The full Court confirmed this approach, noting among others that 
                                                 
78 See e.g. HRC V. v. Spain, 495/1992 (disc. 1995), provisional measures of 22 May 1992. The 
telegram to the Ministry of Justice contained more information than the official Note Verbale to 
the Permanent Representative, but probably the other information could be found in the annexes 
to the Note Verbale (on file with the author). 
79 See e.g. ECtHR Yildiz v. Turkey, 20 October 2005. 
80 Only in the San Juan Bautista and Emboscada facilities were they placed in separate children’s 
blocks. 
81 CIDH Annual Report 2001, §48. See also the subsequent judgment of the Court: IACHR 
“Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” (Paraguay), Judgment of 2 September 2004. 
82 IACHR Las Penitentiarias de Mendoza (Argentina), President’s Order of 22 August 2007 
(maintaining the existing provisional measures, but refusing to amplify them), 11-13th 
‘Considering’ clause. See e.g. Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, 13 February 2007 (“como 
custodio que es de las garantías constitucionales, y en atención a la falta de resultados obtenidos 
con relación a la orden dada por la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, se ve en la 
ineludible obligación de, intimar al Estado Nacional a que en el plazo de veinte días adopte las 
medidas que pongan fin a la situación que se vive en las unidades carcelarias de la Provincia de 
Mendoza, y de tomar las medidas que se indicarán en las parte dispositiva de esta sentencia”). 
83 IACHR Las Penitentiarias de Mendoza (Argentina), President’s Order of 22 August 2007 
(maintaining the existing provisional measures, but refusing to amplify them), 14th ‘Considering 
clause’. See also Matter of Yare I and Yare II Capital Region Penitentiary Center (Venezuela), 
Order of 8 February 2008, 15th ‘Considering’ clause.  
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overcrowding was one of the situations that had generated its previous Order for provisional 
measures and that Argentina had constructed a new detention centre and transferred detainees to 
this centre exactly to deal with this issue of overcrowding. As no facts had been brought to the 
Court’s attention implying a situation of extreme urgency and gravity for the life and integrity of 
the people held in that ne centre, the Court decided not to extend its provisional measures. It did 
remind the State, however, of its general obligations under Article 1(1) ACHR, in particular in the 
context of detention.84 
3.3.2.4 PREVENTING EXPULSION OR EXTRADITION 
In November 2002 the Bosnia Chamber ordered provisional measures for the respondent Parties 
‘to take all necessary steps to prevent the applicants from being taken out of the territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina by the use of force’.85 They were nevertheless handed over to the US 
authorities and transferred to Guantanamo Bay. In response, in its decision on the merits and 
reparation the Chamber was very precise on the measures required of the respondent Parties. The 
Chamber ordered Bosnia and Herzegovina to ‘use diplomatic channels’ in order to protect their 
basic rights. In particular it ordered the State to ‘take all possible steps to establish contacts with 
the applicants and provide them with consular support’. Equally Bosnia was ordered to take all 
possible steps to prevent imposition and execution of the death penalty, including seeking, ex post 
facto, assurances of the US authorities, ‘via diplomatic contacts’, that the death penalty would not 
be imposed.86 In addition, both respondent Parties (not only BiH but also the constituent State 
Fed.BiH, each bearing half of the costs) were ordered to retain lawyers ‘authorised and admitted 
to practice in the relevant jurisdictions and before the relevant courts, tribunals and other 
authoritative bodies in order to take all necessary action to protect the applicants’ rights while in 
US custody and in case of possible military, criminal or other proceedings involving the 
applicants’.87 This very precise order already indicates a relation between provisional measures 
and reparation, a link further explored in section 4 of this chapter. The increased precision also 
serves as a form of follow-up for earlier non-compliance.88 
3.3.2.5 PHYSICAL PROTECTION AGAINST DEATH THREATS89 
The Inter-American Commission has brokered specific agreements between the beneficiaries 
(and/or their representatives)90 and the State such as installing armoured glass or a telephone 
connection and providing bodyguards to human rights defenders. In the context of death threats 
by one group of detainees against another the Commission obtained a promise by Colombia to 
build a ‘separating partition’ in the prison.91 
                                                 
84 IACHR Matter of the Mendoza Prisons, Order of 27 November 2007, 9th and 10th ‘Considering’ 
clauses. 
85 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed.BiH, 11 October 2002 
(adm. & merits), §5. 
86 Id., §330. 
87 Id., §331. 
88 On follow up see Chapter XVIII. 
89 See also section 3.3.3. 
90 See also section 4 (beneficiaries). 
91 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter IV, §16 and Press release 33/01 ‘Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights concludes its visit to the Republic of Colombia’, 13 December 
2001, §18. 
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As part of the protective measures required of a State sometimes physical protection is war-
ranted. The beneficiaries of such measures, however, do not necessarily feel protected by the 
members of the police or military proposed. The Commission now includes in its precautionary 
measures references to the obligation of the State to agree with the beneficiaries about the precise 
substance of the protective measures. In this respect it is not surprising that organisations like 
Peace Brigades International (PBI) are sometimes proposed to provide protection.92 This organi-
sation has built up credibility in certain areas of, for instance, Mexico. The type of protection 
provided, however, is that of providing an unarmed international presence, peacefully and con-
tinuously accompanying persons threatened. Normally persons threatened seem to either contact 
non-governmental organisations such as PBI, or the Commission requesting it to take precaution-
ary measures. If the Commission does so, it points out to the State concerned its obligation to 
provide protection against threats. In such cases one often thinks of providing armed protection as 
well as investigation of the threats and prosecution of the perpetrators. More and more often, 
however, the protective measures suggested include providing mobile phones, closed-circuit TV 
systems etc.93 The beneficiaries of precautionary measures sometimes do not trust the (local) 
police but they do trust a certain division within the army, or the other way around. In other situa-
tions they do not trust any armed public officials. In such case the State and the beneficiaries are 
forced to find alternatives. They may make a list of persons mutually trusted. The State may have 
to train these persons and provide them with weapons.  
In other cases, where international accompanying organisations such as PBI are involved, 
who do not carry arms, the State may have to provide them with facilities or cover their expenses. 
It may also be that the State has offered some form of armed protection that is accepted by the 
beneficiaries as long as an unarmed international organisation can be present to monitor this as 
well. 
In 1996 the Commission suggested, for instance, that the Court would order the State to 
give the relatives of a presidential candidate who was receiving threats, ‘the name and telephone 
number of a person in a position of authority in the Government who will be responsible for 
providing him with protection should it become necessary’ and provide him with an ‘armoured 
car’ so that he could travel the entire national territory.94 
In Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil (1997) the Commission initially asked for each 
individual name included on a specific list of persons targeted by death squads. It only took pre-
cautionary measures on behalf of Father Ricardo Rezende. He had left the region due to the 
threats against him, but he was planning to return.95 With regard to the names of the other in-
tended beneficiaries the petitioner responded that ‘local police knew whose names were on the 
list’, but ‘the petitioner had not gained access to most of the names of the persons threatened due 
to the complicity of the police with the criminals’.96 Subsequently the Commission did take pre-
                                                 
92 See e.g. CIDH Teodoro Cabrera García and Rodolfo Montiel Flores v. Mexico, 27 February 
2004 (adm.), §7. In April 2002 the Commission allowed the measures to expire when it did not 
hear anymore from either the beneficiaries or the State. See §8. See also Annual Report 2001, 
Chapter III (a), §44. 
93 See e.g. CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §45, referring to precautionary measures of 
November 2001 on behalf of two members of the Zapotec indigenous people in Mexico to 
provide them ‘with vehicles, mobile telephones, and closed-circuit TV systems’. 
94 Communication of 2 February 1996 quoted in IACHR Alemán Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Order of 2 
February 1996, 2nd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
95 CIDH Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil, 1 October 1997 (adm.); precautionary measures 
of 20 March 1996, §§50-51. 
96 CIDH Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil, 1 October 1997 (adm.); precautionary measures 
of 20 March 1996, §§14 and 57. 
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cautionary measures on behalf of all persons.97 It requested ‘more specifically that: (a) the agents 
entrusted with protecting the persons threatened by the “Xinguara list”, including Father Ricardo 
Rezende, be trained in the use of firearms, and that they be adequately armed so as to guarantee 
effective protection for the persons threatened; (b) the individuals for whom preventive arrest 
warrants have been issued be detained; (c) the persons responsible be tried and punished; and, (d) 
the actions taken in this respect be reported’.98 When it reiterated its request the next month, it 
added the names of six persons whom the State should detain, as their arrest had been ordered for 
their involvement in the murders and death threats. Even more specifically, the Commission 
added that if the involvement of the Pará civilian police in the escape of one of the suspects was 
confirmed, the protection of the widow of one of the persons murdered should be provided by 
another police force.99 
An issue that is relevant as well is the geographic scope of the protection in death threat 
cases. It is insufficient for the State to provide protection only at the home of the beneficiary. In 
its follow-up order in Blake, for instance, the Court specified that protection should be provided to 
the beneficiaries also when they ventured outside of their homes.100 
3.3.2.6 PROTECTION AGAINST MASS EXPULSION 
In the Haitian case (2000) the Inter-American Commission had requested several concrete meas-
ures of protection on behalf of the group as a whole.101 It argued that the expulsions and deporta-
tions placed at risk the life and physical integrity of those deported as well as of the family mem-
bers who had been separated from them, ‘especially children under age who are left aban-
doned’.102 It requested the Court to order the State to establish procedures distinguishing ‘cases 
where deportation is not applicable, from cases where it is applicable’. In any such case of appli-
cability the State must strictly observe due process ‘including a minimum term for notification, 
access to family members, adequate hearings, and decisions adopted lawfully by the competent 
authorities’.103 In any case, the State must make decisions on deportations with regard to the 
intended group of beneficiaries on an individual basis. 
Later it also urged the Court to order provisional measures on behalf of seven specific per-
sons. These measures were to permit their immediate return from Haiti to the Dominican Repub-
lic or, in the alternative, protect them from any ‘detention or deportation action based on racial or 
national origin, or on the suspicion that they are not full-fledged citizens’.104  
In addition it requested the Court to urge the State more generally ‘to establish adequate 
procedures for the detention and determination of measures for the deportation of deportable 
aliens, including the holding of hearings to prove the right that the person may have to remain on 
                                                 
97 CIDH Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil, 1 October 1997 (adm.); precautionary measures 
of 17 February 1995, §59. See also section 5 of this chapter. 
98 CIDH Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil, 1 October 1997 (adm.); precautionary measures 
of 17 February 1995, §59. 
99 CIDH Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil, 1 October 1997 (adm.); precautionary measures 
of 23 April 1996, §61. See also the follow up precautionary measures of 1 August 1996. 
100 IACHR Blake (Guatemala), Order of 18 April 1997. See further section 3.3.3. 
101 See also section 5 of this Chapter (Beneficiaries). 
102 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, 2nd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
103 Id., 2nd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
104 Id., 3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
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Dominican soil or, in its defect, to communicate with their families and employers, in order to 
normalize the collection of salaries and the protection of their property and personal effects’.105  
The Court did not order the exact provisional measures the Commission had requested. It 
did not take over the Commission’s emphasis on due process and it did not refer to the possible 
racist motivation behind the arbitrary expulsions.106 It did require the State to abstain from deport-
ing specific persons. With regard to two others it required the State to allow their immediate 
return to the Dominican Republic. This reaffirmed the Commission’s precedent with regard to its 
own precautionary measures in this respect.107  
Moreover, the Court required the State to permit ‘within the shortest possible time, the fam-
ily reunification’ of one person whose wife and minor children had already been deported. The 
State was also to collaborate with him in order ‘to obtain information on the whereabouts of his 
next of kin either in Haiti or the Dominican Republic’.108  
With regard to two persons on whose behalf the Commission had requested the Court’s in-
tervention, the Court initially considered that it had insufficient information, in light of the diverg-
ing statements of the Commission and the State about them. Thus, the Court required the Com-
mission to ‘urgently report in detail’ about their current situation. It required the State, moreover, 
to investigate the situation of these two persons so as to expedite the Commission’s examination 
of their situations.109 Here the protective measures required (investigation of the situation) are 
connected to the Court’s evidentiary requirements for accepting persons as beneficiaries of its 
protective Order. By September 2000 the President required the State to protect these two persons 
as well. As requested by the Commission the State was to refrain from deporting one of them and 
to allow the immediate return of the other, ‘even making it possible for him to meet with his 
son’.110 Two months later the full Court confirmed this.111  
In May 2001 the Court ordered the Dominican Republic, in compliance with its previous 
Orders, to refrain from deporting or expelling three of the beneficiaries, to allow the immediate 
return of three other persons and to allow, as soon as possible, the reunification of a family. The 
Court requested the State to collaborate with one of the beneficiaries, a father and husband, to 
obtain information about the whereabouts of his family, either in Haiti or in the Dominican Re-
public. It specified its previous Orders by requiring the State ‘to notify the competent authorities 
in writing’ of the names of six beneficiaries of the provisional measures to prevent them from 
being deported or expelled from the Dominican Republic.112 The Commission had also suggested 
that a ‘special document’ should be given to them, indicating that they were subject to interna-
                                                 
105 Id., 3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
106 In his Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade considered that the Court had taken care that 
it would not prejudge the merits of the case pending before the Commission, in particular with 
regard to the question of due process of law. This may mean he considers that ordering a State to 
observe principles of due process of law would prejudge the merits. 
107 Part of the Court’s provisional measures simply dealt with the protection of two witnesses who 
had testified before the Court about the need to order provisional measures to halt arbitrary 
expulsion. After their testimony they received several threats. This triggered the Court’s already 
established use of provisional measures to protect witnesses. 
108 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order for 
provisional measures, 18 August 2000, 5th and 6th decisional clauses. 
109 Id., 2nd ‘Decisional’ clause. See also Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
110 President IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, 
Decision of 14 September 2000, 3rd ‘Decisional’ clause. 
111 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order of 12 
November 2000, 3rd ‘Decisional’ clause. 
112 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order of 26 May 
2001, 4th ‘Decisional’ clause. 
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tional protection.113 Indeed, the Court ordered the State to grant these six persons identification 
documents that would indicate that they were the beneficiaries of the Court’s provisional meas-
ures.114 It ordered the State to continue following up on the investigations with regard to the 
situations of the beneficiaries and it requested both the State and the Commission to ‘take the 
necessary steps to create appropriate mechanisms to coordinate and monitor’ the measures or-
dered within a month.115 
In this case the Commission and Court operated in a continuum, ordering both an abstention 
from deporting and the immediate return of those already deported. They also emphasised the 
importance of family reunification, although the Commission put more emphasis on protecting 
the rights of children and preventing the separation of families. On the Commission’s request, the 
Court ordered the State to grant the beneficiaries identification documents indicating their status 
as beneficiaries of the Court’s provisional measures. It ordered the State and the Commission to 
follow up the situation as well.  
3.3.2.7 PROTECTING FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 
In Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, the Commission requested Peru to ‘refrain from taking or executing 
any action or measure that would worsen his situation, including his capture by Interpol’ while his 
case was pending before it.116 The Court ordered provisional measures as well, but these were 
generally phrased, referring to the prevention of irreparable harm to his life, personal integrity, 
but also the right to judicial guarantees.117 
The Commission’s precautionary measure on behalf of a journalist and director of a weekly 
magazine in Venezuela included a request to lift the ‘previous censorship measures’ against the 
journalist and the magazine, to guarantee the full exercise of the journalist’s right to defend him-
self and to ensure his exercise of his personal freedom, freedom of expression and the right to due 
process of law.118 
3.3.2.8 PROTECTING A RANGE OF RIGHTS 
In July 2001 the Commission requested Haiti to protect the judicial magistrate in charge of the 
investigation into the murder of journalist Jean Dominique on 3 April 2000.119 Two earlier judges 
had also received threats and subsequently withdrew from the investigation. In light of ‘the lack 
of adequate protective measures’ he felt forced to withdraw from the case as well. The 
government, however, did not accept his withdrawal. The Commission noted that, ‘with the 
beneficiary’s agreement’, it requested Haiti to adopt the following measures: 
“(1) Immediate adoption of all measures necessary to protect their life and personal integrity of 
Mr. Claudy Gassant; (2) Adoption of all measures necessary to ensure the exercise of his right 
                                                 
113 Id., 5th and 9th ‘Having seen’ clauses. 
114 Id., 4th ‘Decisional’ clause. 
115 Id., 5th ‘Decisional’ clause. 
116 CIDH Annual Report 1998, §48. 
117 IACHR Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Order of 21 November 2000. See further Chapter XII 
(Other situations), section 3.3. 
118 CIDH Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Chapter V, §§23-25, in 
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission 2001, Volume II. See also Chapter XII (Other 
situations). 
119 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §37. 
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to investigate, receive, and disseminate information with respect to the investigation of the facts 
surrounding the death of the journalist Jean Dominique, pursuant to the provisions of Art. 13 of 
the American Convention on Human Rights and the second principle of the Declaration of 
Principles on Freedom of Expression”.120 
Apart from the express reference to the beneficiary’s agreement with the precautionary meas-
ures121 the protective measures required are themselves remarkable. The Commission requested 
the State to adopt measures not only to protect the life and personal integrity of the judge but also 
to ensure the exercise of his right to investigate as well as receive and disseminate information 
with respect to the investigation of the death of said journalist. In other words, the precautionary 
measure seems to combine the aim of protecting the life and integrity of persons threatened with 
the aims of protecting judicial independence and preventing impunity in another case by enabling 
a judge to properly perform his function. In a sense this is comparable to some other precaution-
ary measures taken by the Commission in which it specified that measures to protect persons, in 
practice human rights defenders or family members of victims, were not to limit the freedom of 
movement of the beneficiaries. In other words, they should be able to continue their activities. 
The reason why the Commission was so specific in this case may have been the fact that the judge 
was involved in the investigation of the murder of a journalist, freedom of expression being a 
particular interest of the Commission and the OAS.122  
Equally, the Commission has shown its awareness of the interrelated nature of certain rights 
in the case of the Yakye Axa indigenous community. When it took precautionary measures on 
behalf of this Community in Paraguay the Inter-American Commission noted that they were in 
‘an extremely needy situation, because of their inadequate access to food supplies and health 
care’. It requested Paraguay to take the following measures: 
“(1) To suspend the enforcement of any court or administrative order involving the eviction 
and/or removal of the homes of the Yakye Axa indigenous community and of its members.  
(2) To refrain from all other actions and undertakings affecting the right to property, free transit, 
and residence of the Yakye Axa indigenous community and its members. 
(3) To take all steps necessary to ensure the life and physical, mental, and moral integrity of the 
members of the Yakye Axa indigenous community”.123 
Thus the Commission was aware that access to food and healthcare alone would not be sufficient 
because it might ensure their life and physical integrity, but not their mental and moral integrity. 
In other words, it took into account the right to cultural integrity and indicated that the State 
                                                 
120 Ibid. 
121 See Chapter XIII. 
122 In fact, the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression mentions this case in his Annual 
Report as one of the four cases involving the freedom of expression in which the Commission 
took precautionary measures. He gave some additional information on this case, noting that the 
judge involved had ‘conducted a series of investigation of political leaders and other Haitian 
citizens, in spite of having received direct death threats’. He also added that the assassination plot 
of 8 June was not only directed against this judge but also against a Senator ‘who had been 
demanding justice since the death of the journalist Jean Dominique’. Apparently, the 
Commission’s precautionary measures did not extend to this Senator. The Rapporteur also 
specified that the ‘absence of effective protective measures to ensure the personal safety of Judge 
Gassant has led him to leave the country’. Report of the Special Rapporteur of Freedom of 
Expression, Chapter V, §22, in Annual Report 2001. Whatever action Haiti had undertaken to 
protect him, apparently it was insufficient. The fact that the Rapporteur and not the Commission 
itself provides this information may show that he has been closely involved in this case.  
123 CIDH case 12.313, Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), C.1, §49.  
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should not force members of the Community to move to another area away from their traditional 
territories, even if they would have better access to food and medical care. Instead, pending the 
case it should ensure access to food and healthcare on their traditional territories.124  
3.3.3 An incremental approach to specificity: the Peace Community and death 
threats and harassment 
3.3.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Generally the Inter-American Commission’s precautionary measures are more specific than the 
provisional measures of the Inter-American Court. This applies even more clearly to the earlier 
cases. In Chunimá (1991) the Commission had requested the Court to order provisional measures 
protecting a list of witnesses, relatives, human rights activists and judges. It had also requested it 
to order Guatemala to ‘inform the human rights organizations affected of the name and phone-
number of a civilian official in the government who will be responsible for providing them with 
protection should the need arise’.125 Moreover, Guatemala should effectively ensure the return of 
human rights activists to their homes in Chunimá. It should carry out the arrest warrants issued 
against the members of the civil patrol of this village, who are the main suspects. Finally, the 
highest authorities in the government should ‘make a public declaration to be published in the 
major media establishment in the country recognising the legitimacy of the work of human rights 
monitors in Guatemala and acknowledging that their activities are protected not only by the 
American Convention on Human Rights, but also by the Constitution of the Republic of Guate-
mala’.126  
The President of the Inter-American Court indeed ordered Guatemala to take ‘all necessary 
measures’ to protect the right to life and physical integrity of the fourteen persons.127 The Court 
later confirmed this.128 It did not indicate precisely what type of measures Guatemala was ex-
pected to take to protect each of the fourteen persons involved. Thus, the Court’s provisional 
measures were of a more general nature. Yet it did emphasize that the State should indeed 
‘promptly specify’ what measures have been taken to protect each of the beneficiaries.129  
The specificity of provisional measures has increased since, to include ‘the granting of a 
permanent escort at the domicile of each one of the beneficiaries’, as well as of the premises of a 
human rights institute of a university, and a specification that the ‘security personnel assigned be 
given special training and adequate equipment’ and that the aforementioned ‘escorts should not 
belong to the law enforcement forces that, pursuant to the beneficiaries’ statements, might be 
involved in the events reported’.130 
                                                 
124 In its Judgment of 17 June 2005 the Court ordered the State to take all necessary steps to ensure 
the life and physical, mental, and moral integrity of its members.  
125 IACHR Chunimá case (Guatemala), Order of 15 July 1991 (President), 3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
126 Id., 3rd and 4th ‘Having seen’ clauses. 
127 Id. 
128 IACHR Chunimá case (Guatemala), Order of 1 August 1991. 
129 Id., 2nd ‘Decisional’ clause. The order specified that the provisional measures would be in force 
until 3 December 1991. Apparently, in December 1991 the Commission requested the Court to 
re-establish the provisional measures, but the Court did not do so. IACHR Chunimá case. Letter 
of the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights addressed to the Executive 
Secretary of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 14 January 1992, Compendium 
1987-1996, p. 49.  
130 IACHR García Prieto family et al. (El Salvador), Order of 26 September 2006, 11th 
‘Considering‘ clause. Protective measures must be provided diligently and effectively and must 
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Rather than discussing a large range of cases that provide extensive information on the spe-
cific action required of the State to protect persons against death threats, and different approaches 
by the Commission and Court in this respect, this section focuses on the Peace Community case 
dealt with by the Inter-American Court. This case is illustrative of the provisional measures or-
dered in the Inter-American system with their awareness of the interrelationship between various 
rights. In the Peace Community case the Commission’s requests to the Court for provisional 
measures were very precise not only about the specific action required but also about the manner 
in which it wished the State to implement provisional measures. An examination of the views of 
the Commission and the State in this case also shows that the dialogue between these two parties 
has gone into considerable detail. The Commission’s requests included: preventing forced dis-
placement; guaranteeing a safe return home; confronting the paramilitary; investigating threats 
and violence, prosecuting and punishing; severing existing links between (local) authorities and 
paramilitary groups; forbidding local authorities to make statements that could trigger violence 
and threats, instead formally recognising and publicly supporting the beneficiaries; political coor-
dination and early warning; practical measures for physical protection; ensuring that the benefici-
aries can travel freely and ensuring the free transport of goods to and from the Community.  
In order to clarify the protective measures required to satisfy the overall requirement of pro-
tecting persons against threats, the discussion is subdivided into several different requirements, as 
they have been suggested by the Commission and sometimes ordered by the Court. The Court’s 
consecutive Orders in the Peace Community case show that, when the adverse situation persists, 
the Court may order more of the measures requested by the Commission in each subsequent 
Order. Where relevant reference is also made to provisional measures ordered in other cases. 
3.3.3.2 PREVENTING FORCED DISPLACEMENT 
Due to the violence committed against them, the members of the Peace Community had been 
displaced to other parts of the country. The Commission had expressed concern about a group of 
inhabitants of the Municipality of Apartadó who chose their right not to be forcibly displaced 
from their place of origin.131 The Commission suggested the State would take the necessary action 
                                                                                                                       
be planned and implemented with the participation of the beneficiaries of the measures or their 
representatives. IACHR Matter of Ramírez Hinostroza et al. (Peru), Order of 17 May 2007. 
Sometimes ‘diligently and effectively’ is further qualified by a reference to who should provide 
the protective measures: ‘by adequately trained and qualified personnel who do not form part of 
the security units that have been denounced by the beneficiary’. IACHR Matter of Guerrero 
Gallucci and Martínez Barrios (Venezuela), Order of 29 November 2007. Sometimes the Order 
refers to the protection of the life and personal integrity of some of the beneficiaries and adds 
‘personal liberty’ with regard to others. See e.g. IACHR Case of Gutiérrez Soler (Colombia), 
Order of 27 November 2007 and Matter of Carlos Nieto Palma et al. (Venezuela), Order of 3 
July 2007. 
131 The original Spanish text provides: ‘un grupo de habitantes del Municipio de Apartadó optó por 
ejercer su derecho a no desplazarse de su lugar de origen, derecho reconocido en el Derecho 
Internacional y plasmado en los principos rectores del desplazamiento interno recogidos por el 
representante del Secretario General de la Naciones Unidas para los desplazados internos’. The 
English translation speaks of a group of inhabitants of the Municipality of Apartadó which ‘chose 
to exercise their right not to move to their place of origin, which is a right recognized in 
International Law and stipulated in the governing principles of the internal moving collected by 
the representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for internal movings’. In the 
context (see also the reference to the representative of the UN Secretary General on the issue of 
forced displacement) it is more likely that the inhabitants in question refused to be forcibly 
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guaranteeing that the people of the Community could continue living in their homes or could 
return to them. It must offer them ‘the guarantee that they will not be persecuted or threatened by 
the State’s agents or by people acting with their acquiescence or by particular individuals’.132  
Meanwhile, the State had made available to the Court several documents aiming to show its 
commitment to fight forced displacement.133 In November 2000, following the hearing and the 
examination of the written materials, the Court ordered several measures to be taken by the State 
to prevent displacement and enable displaced persons to return safely. It required the State to 
guarantee that the beneficiaries of its provisional measures would be able to continue to live in 
their normal place of residence and to enable those persons who had been forced to leave to return 
to their homes in San José de Apartadó.134 In other words, in cases involving death threats the 
Court has taken over the Commission’s request to specifically order protection against forced 
displacement and guaranteeing safe return for those persons already displaced. Thus it specified 
that it is insufficient if the State ‘protects’ persons against death threats by ‘ensuring’ their protec-
tion away from their homes. It explicitly referred to the prevention of displacement.135 
3.3.3.3 CONFRONTING THE PARAMILITARIES 
The Court did not specifically address another request by the Commission, namely to require the 
State to take the necessary measures to ‘repel and neutralise’ the paramilitary groups active in the 
region. The Commission had pointed out that one of the factors explaining the violence against 
the Community was the presence of paramilitary groups operating in the area freely and openly. 
Because of their close link with agents of the Colombian State, these paramilitaries had been the 
main source of hostile acts against the Community. The State should arrange for vigilance in the 
area surrounding the Community and carry out, in particular, effective operations to repress the 
                                                                                                                       
displaced from the Municipality of Apartadó, IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó 
case (Colombia), Order for provisional measures, 24 November 2000. 
132 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional 
measures, 24 November 2000. 
133 This included its Law 589 of 2000 and a teaching course for members of the public security force 
in the region of Urabá about the prevention of forced displacement and the protection of forcibly 
displaced persons (July 2000). Other examples were a workshop on human rights, international 
humanitarian law and forced displacement (August 2000) as well as a training workshop for 
instructors of the 17th Brigade of the national army in October 2000. It must be recalled that the 
17th Brigade was implicated in violent acts perpetrated against members of the Community. See 
generally Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
134 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. See also Order of 18 June 2002. The Court referred to its earlier provisional measures in 
the case of Giraldo Cardona, Orders of 28 October 1996 (the President’s urgent measures) and 5 
February 1997. It also referred to the Colotenango case, Order of 22 June 1994.  
135 Obviously the wishes of the beneficiaries are what matters. Thus, in May 1999 the Commission 
issued precautionary measures asking Argentina to relocate a witness and his family to a safe 
place and investigate the facts alleged so as to determine who was responsible for the injuries and 
threats received. The petitioners later requested the maintenance of the precautionary measures 
because the State had made very little progress in its investigation. Moreover, the arrangements, 
it had made for relocation to a safe place had been temporary. See Annual Report 1999, Chapter 
III C.1, §8. Luzia Canuto was the daughter of an agricultural labour union leader who was 
assassinated. She was a plaintiff and witness in the trial of those responsible for her father’s 
death. In March 1998 the Commission requested Brazil to take precautionary measures to protect 
her and, in particular, to halt her involuntary transfer to a place where she would have to teach in 
an area that was especially dangerous for her. Annual Report 1998, §12. 
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actions of paramilitary groups and to order the agents of the State not to collaborate with these 
groups. Instead, the Commission had emphasised, the State was expected to order its agents to 
protect the Community and to refrain from performing acts or making statements that would 
stigmatise and endanger the Community.136 The Court did not refer either to the need to cut links 
between the State and paramilitary groups. During the public hearing the representatives of the 
State had argued that there was no civil war in Colombia because there was no popular support 
for the actors.137 They denied accusations that its agents acquiesced in the activities of such 
groups or that they failed to take action against them.138 At the same time they noted that the State 
was intent on putting an end to any commitment or link that may exist between the public security 
forces (army and police) and the paramilitaries. In order to achieve this, it intended to provide 
workshops for alternative dispute settlement and to review the justice-related work already under-
taken in the Community, while respecting the Community’s own mechanisms of supervision.139 
In another case, in October 2000, the Commission had used precautionary measures re-
questing Colombia to take steps to protect the life and physical integrity of the management and 
workers at the regional Committee for the Protection of Human Rights in Magdalena Medio 
(CREDHOS). It very specifically requested Colombia to report on measures taken to ‘(a) shed 
light on the serious complaints of law enforcement’s tolerance or sponsorship of paramilitary 
groups stationed in Barrancabermeja and Yondó; and (b) guarantee that law enforcement com-
plies with its legal functions and does not tolerate or sponsor paramilitary groups operating in the 
area’.140 
3.3.3.4 OFFICIAL RECOGNITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENDERS 
One important example of a protective measure is the formal recognition by government authori-
ties of the legitimacy and importance of the work of human rights defenders and others, as well as 
the recognition of peace communities. During the hearing the Commission requested the Court to 
order the State to issue a presidential directive expressly recognising the legality and legitimacy 
of the Community and expressing the State’s support as well as its respect for the national and 
international organisations accompanying the Community.141 This probably was a reference to 
organisations such as Peace Brigades International and the Human Rights Accompaniment volun-
                                                 
136 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000 (Commission request during hearing). 
137 On the other hand, they acknowledged that armed non-state actors had indeed caused 
confrontations. The State was taking efforts to fight them. It shared the same purposes of peace as 
the Peace Community and did not subscribe to the accusations that there was a relationship 
between the State and paramilitaries or illegal groups of armed actors.  
138 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000 (statement by the representative of Colombia). 
139 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. See also Chapter XVII (Official responses).  
140 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §22. A course called ‘Forum for Life and Human Rights’ had been 
held in Barrancabermeja. State representatives and human rights defenders participated. Several 
of the human rights defenders were working with CREDHOS. This organisation has its 
headquarters in Barrancabermeja. When they were taking part in the aforementioned course they 
apparently found copies of a ‘condolence card’ making death threats against members of the 
organisation.  
141 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional 
measures, 24 November 2000. 
 Protection 
615 
teers of the US based Fellowship of Reconciliation. In its Order of November 2000 the Court did 
not heed to this specific request.  
In its later reports the Commission again emphasised the need to give the Community the 
necessary support in the eyes of public opinion and in the eyes of the security forces operating 
locally. After all, the latter were responsible for their safety.142  
3.3.3.5 PRACTICAL MEASURES FOR PHYSICAL PROTECTION 
The Court did not specify the practical measures that should be taken by the State in order to 
implement its provisional measure and ensure the physical protection of the beneficiaries. The 
Commission had suggested several concrete measures. In particular, it expected the State to 
strengthen its preventive and protective measures ‘in compliance with the commitments assumed 
by the Red de Solidaridad Social’.143 These measures would include supplying short wave radios 
to San José de Apartadó and other dwellings144 to which displaced persons had returned, installing 
reflectors to light the surroundings of the urban central area; providing exterior lighting of both 
this area and that of La Unión; installation of an alarm system; repairs of the roads between San 
José and Apartadó and repair of the telephone system between the municipality and the smaller 
dwellings.145 
3.3.3.6 PROTECTING FREE PASSAGE 
In its first submission to the Court, the Commission already referred to the roadblock between 
Apartadó and San José. Inhabitants and others were accused of providing the guerrillas with food. 
The submission referred to paramilitaries entering vehicles in which Community members were 
travelling. Furthermore, on 11 and 14 November 2000, a month after the President of the Court 
ordered the State to take urgent measures on behalf of 193 members of the Community, some 
armed civilians boarded a bus travelling from Apartadó to San José. They forced it to alter its 
course. They also made the passengers get off the bus and show their identification, verifying 
whether they were on a list. They took all the food that the passengers were carrying.146  
Following the Court’s Order of 24 November 2000, which did not specifically address this 
problem, the Commission submitted several reports informing the Court of various violent acts 
and threats that subsequently occurred in the Community. According to the Commission these 
acts affected not only the members of the Community as beneficiaries of the measures but also 
various other persons providing services to the Community.  
                                                 
142 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional 
measures, 18 June 2002. The Commission had also requested the Court to order the State to 
reinforce the political mechanisms of protection, which could help restore the confidence 
between the Community and the local authorities: IACHR Peace Community of San José de 
Apartadó case (Colombia), Orders for provisional measures, 24 November 2000. 
143 This is a network for social solidarity.  
144 The English translation of the Order mentions ‘trails’. Presumably, these trails (‘las veredas’) also 
refer to the dwellings along these trails. In other places, the Spanish text mentions ‘la Vereda la 
Unión’ suggesting again that ‘la vereda’ refers to a location and not just a route. 
145 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Orders for provisional 
measures, 24 November 2000. 
146 Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional measures, 24 
November 2000. 
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In its second Order, of June 2002, the Court did order the State to guarantee the necessary 
security conditions on the route between Apartadó and San José de Apartadó as well as in the 
transportation terminal of Apartadó and in Tierra Amarilla. This protection was to ensure that 
public transportation would not be subjected to new acts of violence. At the same time this should 
ensure that the Community members would be able to effectively use transport and receive sup-
plies on a permanent basis.147 
As noted, the problems of armed attacks during public transport and of confiscation of food 
were already clear from the Commission’s first request for provisional measures, even though it 
did not ask for measures specifically dealing with those two problems.  
In its first request the Commission had also mentioned the involvement of groups accompa-
nying the members of the Community. It had requested the Court to order the State to issue a 
Presidential Directive expressing the State’s support and respect for the national and international 
organisations accompanying the Community. The Court’s Order of 24 November 2000, however, 
did not contain such a requirement. In its next Order, of 18 June 2002, the Court did require the 
protection of everyone providing services to the members of the community. This could also 
encompass the protection of unarmed (international) groups accompanying Community members 
for their protection.  
3.3.3.7 INVESTIGATION AND PROSECUTION 
The Commission stressed the importance of acting against impunity, remarking that it was neces-
sary to adopt more effective measures to investigate the serious acts of violence and intimidation 
committed against members of the Community and to prosecute and punish those responsible, as 
this was ‘an essential part of the process of control and elimination of the violence’. It asked the 
Court to order the dismissal or suspension those State agents with respect to whom there was 
serious evidence of complicity with paramilitary groups. It specifically mentioned the need to 
investigate and punish the members of the 17th Brigade Army as well as the police of Urabá in-
volved in the violent acts. These investigations should take place before courts of ordinary juris-
diction. The investigations under military jurisdiction should be suspended. The Commission also 
emphasised that in order to ensure the effectiveness of the investigations, they should not be 
treated in a fragmented way as if they were 83 different acts of violence, but they should be ac-
cumulated. This request by the Commission again shows that it has become very precise about the 
type of protection it would like the Court to order. Nevertheless, as we will see, the Court usually 
does not order measures as precise as that.  
The Court did order Colombia to investigate the facts that had prompted the adoption of the 
provisional measures, in order to identify those responsible and impose the corresponding sanc-
tions. It also ordered the State to inform the Court about the situation of the beneficiaries of this 
Order.148 It neither specified that the investigation and prosecution should take place under ordi-
nary jurisdiction, rather than military, nor that the investigations should be taken together rather 
than be dealt with in a fragmentary way. 
In the context of provisional measures ordering a State to protect persons against death 
threats and harassment, the Inter-American Commission and Court generally point out in their 
provisional measures that the State should take effective measures to investigate and punish the 
                                                 
147 Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional measures, 18 
June 2002, 5th ‘Decisional’ clause. 
148 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. According to the English translation Colombia was required ‘to inform the people 
indicated in the above operative paragraphs about this situation’. The Spanish text provides: 
‘informe sobre la situación de las personas indicadas en los puntos resolutivos anteriores’.  
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perpetrators, ‘as a key element of its protective duty’.149 Yet at the stage of provisional measures 
the Court no longer monitors compliance with this requirement. Instead it reserves this for the 
merits of the case.150 
In the face of specific death threats the Commission has sometimes been very specific in the 
protective measures required in this respect. In a case against Brazil it specified in its precaution-
ary measures, among others, that ‘the agents entrusted with protecting the persons threatened by 
the “Xinguara list”, including Father Ricardo Rezende, be trained in the use of firearms, and that 
they be adequately armed so as to guarantee effective protection for the persons threatened’ and 
that ‘the persons responsible be tried and punished’.151 It also requested that ‘if the involvement 
of the civilian police in the escape of Wanderley Borges de Mendonça is confirmed’, the protec-
tion to be provided to one of the beneficiaries should be by a police force other than the civilian 
police implicated in the escape.152 Moreover, once it was informed of the name of one of the 
Civilian Police officers involved in the escape, the Commission noted that the State should also 
adopt urgent measures to detain, try, and punish him.153 
3.3.3.8 RESPECT OTHER RIGHTS 
For the Court’s provisional measures to have proper effect the conditions of implementation are 
crucial. The Court itself has indicated the importance of mutual agreement between the benefici-
aries and the State on the necessary protective measures. Equally, it has emphasised the impor-
tance of keeping the beneficiaries informed and respecting their dignity or the nature of the group, 
respecting the freedom of movement, information and expression of the beneficiaries and of 
ensuring that the protective measures do not hinder their normal activities (e.g. as human rights 
defenders). 
In the Peace Community case the Commission had specified its request by stating that the 
Community members, the petitioners and Colombia must mutually agree on the substance of the 
protective measures.154 It had also stressed the importance of considering the compatibility of the 
protective measures offered by the State with the collective neutrality and humanitarian principles 
on which the Peace Community was founded.155  
The difference in specificity between the Commission’s and the Court’s approach is also il-
lustrated in the Giraldo Cardona case. In this case many of the members of the Meta Human 
Rights Civic Committee had been killed, had been forced to flee or otherwise to halt their activi-
ties. Eventually there were hardly any members left in Meta. As part of an order for provisional 
measures the Court pointed out that Colombia had to provide information on the efforts made to 
reopen this organization’s Office.156 
                                                 
149 See e.g. IACHR Giraldo Cardona case (Colombia), Order for provisional measures (on behalf of 
members of the Civic Human Rights Committee of Meta), 19 June 1998, 4th ‘Decisional’ clause. 
150 See IACHR Cárcel de Urso Branco (Brasil), Order of 2 May 2008, 26th ‘Considering’ clause. 
See also Asunto de los niños y adolescentes privados de libertad en el “Complexo do Tatuapé” 
de la Fundação CASA (Brasil), Order of 3 July 2007, 16th ‘Considering’ clause. 
151 CIDH Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil, 1 October 1997, §59. 
152 Id., §61. 
153 Id., §62. See section 5.4 on the more cautious approach by the Court, distinguishing between 
obligations to act against impunity pending the proceedings and in judgments on reparation.  
154 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. 
155 Id., 3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
156 IACHR Giraldo Cardona, Order of 30 September 1999, 3rd ‘Decisional’ clause. 
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3.3.4 The obligation of the State and the Inter-American Commission to pro-
vide information  
Apart from requiring the State to ‘take all measures necessary’ to preserve the lives and physical 
integrity of the beneficiaries, the Court’s Orders also require the State to inform it on the meas-
ures taken. The Court often calls this an ‘urgent communication’ by the State. At certain intervals 
thereafter, the State is expected to send in follow-up reports. If the full Court has not yet decided 
on the Commission’s request for provisional measures or their amplification, the President’s 
Orders require the State to submit its observations on such request. This way, the Court can take 
into account the views of both parties about the urgency and the risk of irreparable harm.  
The Orders of the President and the Court itself are not only addressed to the State but also 
to the Commission. The Court requires the Commission to present its observations on the State’s 
urgent communications and follow-up reports. The State and the Commission must send in these 
reports within certain time limits. After submission of the first report, the Court generally allots 
them more time for the submission of follow-up reports.157  
States used to send very general information in response to provisional measures. In re-
sponse to this, the provisional measures ordered in the Inter-American system are now more 
detailed. 
The specific information the Court requires from the State concerns ‘the status of the cases 
of all the persons protected by the Provisional Measures’ or ‘detailed information concerning the 
proceedings’ of a specific person. As part of its follow-up the Court urges the State to continue to 
report, usually every two months, ‘on the status of the appeals and scheduled executions’ of the 
persons concerned. With regard to the initial report, the precise time limits depend on the prox-
imity of an execution date. The Court also urges the State and the Commission to inform it imme-
diately of ‘any significant developments concerning the circumstances’ of the cases of the benefi-
ciaries. It may summon the parties to a public hearing as well.158 
In his first Order to halt executions the President of the IACHR required the State to inform 
the Court, by a certain date, on the measures taken in compliance with his Order and to give the 
Court its views on the provisional measures requested by the Commission.159 The Court received 
the State’s observations exactly on the deadline. In these observations it ‘gave the reasons why, in 
its opinion, the execution of the alleged victims could not be stayed’.160  
In a provisional measure to halt an execution by Trinidad, scheduled early the next morning, 
the President ordered the State to inform it, that same day, on the measures taken in compliance 
with the Order. It also required the Commission to present its observations on the urgent commu-
nication submitted by the State within two days of its receipt.161 As the execution would take 
place the next day it is clear why the President wished immediately to receive information on 
compliance with his Order. In this respect he may have adapted the deadline for the Commission 
as well, in order to conform more closely to the time limits required of the State. Normally the 
                                                 
157 Follow-up reports normally are expected every two months and the Commission must comment 
on them within six weeks of their receipt. See also section 4 of this Chapter (Beneficiaries). 
158 See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
159 IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order of 27 May 1998 (President). 
160 The Court confirmed the President’s urgent measures and not only ordered the State to take all 
necessary measures to preserve the life and physical integrity of the six persons, but also to 
submit a report, by the end of the month, on the measures taken in compliance with the Order. It 
required the Commission to submit its observations on that report within two weeks of its receipt. 
James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order of 14 June 1998. As the Court’s session 
took place from 8 to 19 June, one may assume that there were no indications that Trinidad would 
proceed with the execution during the first half of that month. 
161 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 29 June 1998 (President). 
 Protection 
619 
Commission’s deadline is within two weeks of receipt of the State’s first report.162 He required 
the State to submit an urgent communication by 20 May 1999 on the measures taken to comply 
with the Court’s Order. In fact, its next session would be held from 24 May to 4 June. This may 
explain why the Court ordered Trinidad to submit an urgent communication within nine days 
rather than the usual fifteen, as normally required, in cases in which there is no immediate execu-
tion date. This way the Court’s staff could still process the information in time to be included for 
discussion during the Court’s session. In its communication the Commission also mentioned the 
fact that the State’s denunciation of the Convention would become effective on 26 May 1999. 
Possibly, the Court wanted to make sure that Trinidad would submit the information before 26 
May because it expected a decreasing likelihood of compliance beyond this date.163 In fact, Trini-
dad responded on 19 May 1999 claiming that the provisional measures requested by the Commis-
sion concerned matters falling within the reservation Trinidad made in recognising the compul-
sory jurisdiction of the Court.164 
3.4 Conclusion on the specificity of provisional measures 
As the practice of the Inter-American Commission and Court shows, provisional measures must 
indeed be sufficiently specific, especially in relation to protection against threats.165 The Commis-
sion and Court started with general orders, indicating what should be the end result.166 Over the 
years they built up a practice of greater specificity that they now apply generally. The level of 
specificity is based on previous experiences in the system and with the State in question. Initially 
the measures must leave room for flexibility, as long as the beneficiaries are consulted about the 
protective measures. When there is a chain of provisional measures relating to one case, they may 
become increasingly specific in a follow-up to previous State (in-)action.  
Faced with the realities in many countries in the Americas the Inter-American Commission 
and Court became more resourceful in their ways to deal with evasive State practices. In response 
to initial abuse by States of their more generally phrased provisional measures they became more 
specific in their provisional measures. States had informed the Court, for instance, that they had 
increased police surveillance in the neighbourhood of the beneficiaries of the Court’s Order. 
However, the beneficiaries, rather than feel protected by this measure, became more afraid be-
cause the police division involved was in fact closely linked to the paramilitary group posing the 
threats. In cases involving threats resulting in internal displacement of persons, a State would 
argue something like: ‘well, where they are now they are safe’. This meant that the Commission 
and Court had to be more precise and require the State to ‘enable them to return home and be 
safe’ rather than just ‘be safe’.167  
Based on the experiences of the Commission, the Court started to include in its Orders a 
reference to the obligation of the State to meet with the beneficiaries, their representatives and 
                                                 
162 On timing see also Chapter II (Systems). 
163 IACHR James et al. case, Urgent measures of 11 May 1999.  
164 IACHR James et al. case, Order of 25 May 1999. See also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction). 
165 Already in 1994 Buergenthal, p. 94, pointed out the importance of specificity, at the same time 
considering that the ‘remedy sought’ should also be ‘narrow in scope’, because ‘the broader the 
request the more difficult it will be for the Commission or the Court to monitor compliance’. 
166 This brings to mind the old distinction between obligations of conduct and result. Sepúlveda 
(2003), pp. 184-196 discusses these concepts and rightly criticizes the use of this distinction. 
Clearly in the context of defining human rights obligations it is unhelpful. While it may not create 
additional difficulties in the context of the specificity of provisional measures, the distinction 
does not seem to provide great additional value either. 
167 See e.g. the discussion of the Peace Community case in section 3.3.3. 
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representatives of the Commission in order to agree on specific protective measures that could be 
agreeable to all parties. The authorities in States such as Guatemala and Colombia have grown 
accustomed to the directive approach taken in the Court’s Orders. In fact generally speaking they 
do not appear to find fault with this approach, possibly also because the provisional measures 
concern the most basic of rights: the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment. 
The practice of the Commission and Court in this respect is now well established and is used vis-
à-vis other States as well. 
Especially when there is a chain of provisional measures relating to one case, it appears that 
the substance of the Order becomes increasingly specific. Often new Orders confirm and build on 
agreements made between the Commission, the State and the (representatives of the) beneficiar-
ies.  
These specific Orders could include the building of a protective wall between one division 
of a prison and another in order to prevent violence between the prison wing detaining the para-
militaries and the wing detaining opposing rebels. They could also include the obligation to fi-
nance bodyguards for human rights defenders, leaders of indigenous groups, trade unionists or 
religious leaders who are being threatened and attacked by paramilitary groups. Other examples 
are the obligation to repair a telephone connection to a remote area where a peace community is 
located or to install armoured glass in the offices of a human rights organisation. All these meas-
ures require the use of resources and at the same time they must be taken on an urgent basis.  
Both the Inter-American Commission and the Court have taken an incremental approach, 
specifying more and more the exact measures required to achieve the necessary protection against 
death threats and harassment. Their specificity is increased particularly in response to previous 
State (in-)action. Especially the Commission is now very precise on what it wants a State to do. 
The Court still makes room for flexibility. By referring, for instance, to the possibility of report-
ing on alternative measures, it allows the State to take a different approach so long as it does 
prevent irreparable harm. Moreover, even now, the Court often simply directs the State to reach 
an agreement with the Commission and the petitioners on the specific measures to be taken.168 
This way it provides pressure and follow-up, but the concrete solution can be prepared by the 
State, as long as certain conditions are fulfilled. In this respect it has also explicitly referred to the 
principle of subsidiarity.169 
While the Inter-American Court has not detailed the measures required to the same extent as 
the Commission, it always requires the State to consult with the representatives of the beneficiar-
ies and of the Commission about the specific protective measures necessary. This way some of 
the specific measures proposed by the Commission are discussed again during the implementation 
phase of the provisional measures. After all, the Commission proposed these measures based on 
the concrete information about and requests by the beneficiaries.170 
                                                 
168 Note, however, the scepticism expressed by Judge Cançado Trindade in his individual opinion to 
IACHR Las penitentiarías de Mendoza v. Argentina, Order of 30 March 2006: with regard to 
attempts to ‘look for a “negotiation” or “conciliation” between the “parties” in a summary 
proceeding in connection with the extreme gravity and urgency as is the case of provisional 
measures of protection. The Inter-American Court is not a “conciliation body”, and must act as 
the international court it is, with even more power in cases of provisional measures of 
protection’), §16, noting that the participants, including the State, agreed on the need for a ‘clear 
and firm order of the Court’. 
169 IACHR Las Penitentiarias de Mendoza (Argentina), President’s Order of 22 August 2007 
(maintaining the existing provisional measures, but refusing to amplify them), 14th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
170 See also section 5 of this Chapter (Beneficiaries). 
 Protection 
621 
Thus, in the Inter-American system the provisional measures have become increasingly 
specific, partly in light of the experiences of the Commission and Court with certain States.171 In 
fact they provide insight into the ways States could or must protect persons under their jurisdic-
tion against threats by paramilitary groups or other groups operating with the acquiescence of 
(certain factions of) the army, the police, or other authorities. They show that protection against 
threats means that the State must protect the beneficiaries in the area in which they live and work, 
rather than banishing them to ‘safe areas’, claiming that this would absolve it from taking protec-
tive measures. Providing effective protection against death threats is not divorced from other 
human rights obligations, which means that States must assist internally displaced persons to 
return safely and allow human rights defenders or journalists to continue the activities that had 
triggered the threats in the first place.172 In other words, the State’s obligations vis-à-vis the per-
sons under threat do not just relate to the right to life and the prohibition of torture and ill-
treatment (even though this was the reason for asking provisional measures), but also involve 
respect for the cultural heritage of the persons threatened, their privacy, freedom of movement 
and expression and their access to basic resources. Moreover, the measures undertaken by the 
State should enable the beneficiaries to continue their activities as human rights defenders, jour-
nalists, etc. and should help protect against internal displacement.  
Another specification introduced by the Inter-American Commission and Court is that the 
State is to report on the specific measures of protection and, as noted, that the representatives of 
the beneficiaries and the Commission should agree on these measures.173 Finally, all provisional 
measures aiming to protect against death threats and harassment have specified the requirement of 
investigation and the punishment of those responsible.174  
Often provisional measures indicate the required result, such as to refrain from executing a 
death sentence or to protect persons against threats. Sometimes they are also more precise as to 
how the State should achieve this result, or at least they rule out certain activities that do not 
qualify as compliance.  
In the other systems it may be wise to follow the incremental approach taken by the Inter-
American Court. The more information adjudicators have, the more precise they can be about the 
substance of the Orders for provisional measures. Collecting and interpreting information may be 
assumed to be easier in a regional than in a universal system. Indeed the specific nature of the 
Inter-American Commission’s precautionary measures may also be explained by its range of 
functions, visiting States, negotiating with governments and petitioners and acting as an interme-
diary between the petitioners and the Court. In the Inter-American system specific information 
may relate to the links between paramilitary groups, such as the Colombian self-defence units, 
and the police, military or other government authorities. It is assumed that international (rather 
than regional) adjudicators should also incrementally specify their provisional measures, so as to 
provide clarity to States as to what is expected of them, but they should do so even more gradu-
ally. This gradual approach is warranted exactly because of the less cohesive nature of an interna-
tional as opposed to a regional monitoring system and the diminished possibility of collecting and 
interpreting information. Another aspect that might play a role is the sensitivity of some States 
                                                 
171 This applies in particular to their provisional measures ordering States such as Guatemala and 
Colombia to protect persons against death threats and harassment, but see also the increasingly 
specific precautionary measures by the CIDH in the case of the ‘unlawful combatants’ at 
Guantanamo Bay, directed at the US: 12 March 2002, 23 July 2002, 18 March 2003, 29 July 
2004 and 28 October 2005. 
172 See Chapter IX (Threats). 
173 See section 4 of this chapter on the beneficiaries of provisional measures. 
174 See Chapter IX (Threats). See also section 5 of this Chapter, dealing with the relation to 
reparation. 
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and the way these States would base their disagreement with certain provisional measures on 
regional doctrine, or insist on sovereignty over protection of human rights.  
In fact States basing their objections on regional doctrine may predominantly be European. 
The subsidiarity principle, the principle of trust and the margin of appreciation seem rather spe-
cific to the European system,175 although mention has been made of the principle of subsidiarity 
that ‘informs the Inter-American human rights system’ as well.176  
It could be argued that the Inter-American system simply is more expansive and specific in 
its use of provisional measures because the more extreme violations involved require a more 
extreme response. In the Americas there appears to be a closer link than in Europe between ‘situa-
tions’ and ‘cases’ and between collectivities and individuals. In addition, in relation to states of 
emergency some of the States most often addressed with provisional measures are disrupted 
anyway. A case in point is Colombia which, with regard to certain areas and in some respects, 
almost is a failing State. Yet it should be added, on the one hand, that Colombia, for instance, is 
an established constitutional democracy (with a functioning judicial system including a rather 
liberal constitutional court) and on the other hand that many European States currently appear to 
require specific explanations as well on what measures they should take to implement the provi-
sional measures of the ECtHR. This applies not just to the new member States of the Council of 
Europe, but also to States that have considerable experience with the Strasbourg system. After all, 
for provisional measures to serve their purpose, the primary concern should be the prevention of 
irreparable harm to persons. The right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment 
may be compromised in the context of the concerted activities against immigration and the so-
called ‘war on terror’. To the extent these activities lead to a greater tendency to evade the pur-
pose of generally phrased provisional measures, an increased specificity of their terms would be 
warranted.177 
The discussion on subsidiarity (and on the related margin of appreciation in the interpreta-
tion of treaty obligations) is more important in some systems than in others and plays out differ-
ently in each system.178 In fact the theory of margin of appreciation and, to some extent, that of 
subsidiarity has been invoked mainly in the European system.179 According to staff at the Secre-
tariat of the Inter-American Commission the theory of obligation of conduct and result equally is 
more European. European States may be more sensitive to being allowed the flexibility to deter-
mine how they will protect persons. Nevertheless, this may be relevant with regard to provisional 
measures that are leaning more closely towards the outer limits of the concept. Especially with 
regard to core rights the provisional measures taken by the other human rights adjudicators should 
at least give some direction of what the State is expected to do or to abstain from in order to pre-
vent irreparable harm to persons.180  
                                                 
175 In the Inter-American system the Commission and Court may be more directive without risking 
negative State responses. Still, they were not directive from the start.  
176 IACHR Las Penitentiarias de Mendoza (Argentina), President’s Order of 22 August 2007 
(maintaining the existing provisional measures, but refusing to amplify them), 14th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
177 See also Chapter XVII (Official responses) and XVIII (Follow up). 
178 See e.g. Carozza (2003) and Petzold (1993). 
179 Carozza (2003) argues that the principle of subsidiarity applies both internationally and 
regionally and is not limited to the European system. The President of the IACHR appears to 
agree: IACHR Las Penitentiarias de Mendoza (Argentina), President’s Order of 22 August 2007 
(maintaining the existing provisional measures, but refusing to amplify them), 14th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
180 More in general there appears to be a tendency in the European system now as well to make 
decisions more specific, allowing the State to have more clarity of what changes are required 
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4 THE BENEFICIARIES AND ADDRESSEES OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
4.1 Introduction  
Beneficiaries of provisional measures are individuals or groups whose immediate protection is the 
direct concern of the adjudicator. In that sense they always involve persons or groups in a vulner-
able position vis-à-vis those in power. In this book beneficiaries are dealt with as rights-bearers, 
not as objects of charity.  
In Alemán Lacayo (1996) the Inter-American Court initially ordered provisional measures, 
but subsequently it heeded to the Commission’s request to lift them, because the beneficiary had 
become the president of Nicaragua. This made it ‘inappropriate for an international body to adopt 
provisional measures to be instituted by a government on behalf of its own Head of State’.181 It is 
interesting to see how subsequently the Commission used precautionary measures, to be imple-
mented by the State, represented by President Aleman, to protect persons against threats that they 
claimed originated from the President.182 Here over time a transformation took place from benefi-
ciary to addressee of provisional (precautionary) measures. While this section focuses on the 
(group of) beneficiaries of provisional measures, it will also briefly deal with the addressees of 
these measures. This is an issue that may play out differently in the various systems. The ICJ as 
an inter-State adjudicator obviously has to take into account the interests of the addressee State as 
well as the complaining state, in the formulation of its provisional measures. The human rights 
systems are vertical systems, involving an individual or group on the one hand and a State party 
to a human rights treaty on the other. Do the human rights adjudicators also take into account the 
interests of the addressee States in their use of provisional measures? 
Under the Dayton Peace accord the complaints before the Bosnia Chamber could be 
brought against three different state entities (Bosnia Herzegovina as a whole and the constituent 
States Bosnia en Republika Srpska). In addition, there are some systems in which provisional 
measures have addressed others than the respondent States. The Inter-American Court addresses 
the Inter-American Commission to negotiate with representatives of the State and the beneficiar-
ies and report back to the Court on the implementation of the provisional measures, within certain 
time limits. In the European system the rule on provisional measures has occasionally been in-
voked to address the petitioner. These issues are discussed in this section. 
An aspect of provisional measures that can be found already in provisional measures or-
dered by ITLOS and the ICJ, is the awareness of an overarching general interest to be protected. 
For ITLOS the protection of the (marine) environment is such a general interest and for the ICJ, 
for instance, the prevention of extension or aggravation of the dispute. While taken in response to 
a request by a party to the conflict, here one may speak of protection of the general interest, next 
to the specific interests of the States in question.  
Both in the border conflicts, in which the ICJ paid attention to the population of a border 
area, and in cases brought before the ICJ explicitly invoking human rights, the Court appeared to 
have in mind a large, definite group of beneficiaries, but without names of individuals being 
                                                                                                                       
domestically, see e.g. Response by President Wildhaber to a remark by a representative of the 
Irish Human Rights Commission, Minutes of meeting between Court and organisations 
representing applicants and/or intervening as third parties, 10 April 2006, Strasbourg, p. 3, 
<http://unionedirittiumani.it/AutoGest/NewsFiles/incontro%20Corte%20ONG.pdf>. This could 
be the result of an incremental development in the attitude of the ECtHR as well, both as it is 
more frequently dealing with situations involving gross human rights violations and because 
States generally appear to prefer greater precision in what is required of them. 
181 IACHR Alemán Lacayo (Nicaragua), Order of 6 February 1997, 3rd ‘Considering’ clause. 
182 CIDH Annual report 1999, Chapter 3., C.1, §46. 
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listed.183 From the human rights adjudicators it is in particular the Inter-American Court that has 
struggled with the level of specificity of the group of beneficiaries that is required for the use of 
provisional measures.  
Preventing irreparable harm to persons may include preventing harm to the alleged victim 
(and to the rights claimed) as well as to persons other than the alleged victim. In the latter case 
provisional measures may relate to the integrity of the proceedings on the one hand and on the 
other hand to the right to life and dignity of the other persons, such as witnesses, family or coun-
sel.184 
Awareness of the role of the beneficiaries of provisional measures is particularly relevant in 
the context of adjudication in which the petitioner and the alleged victim are not the same. The 
beneficiary of the provisional measure does not always coincide with the alleged victim. Instead 
the beneficiary may be a witness in the case of the alleged victim, receiving threats. In both cases 
it is necessary to establish whether the beneficiaries indeed wish a certain provisional measure to 
be taken.  
Even if a de iure representation is not necessary, it is still important to establish whether the 
petitioners substantively represent the persons on whose behalf they claim to be acting. When the 
petitioner is one of the alleged victims, claiming to represent a large group, it is important to find 
out whether this claim is justified. With regard to representation of the beneficiaries this section 
addresses in particular the issue of representation of indigenous peoples.  
A related issue is that of consultation. Consultation is important in order to establish that the 
beneficiaries really want the provisional measures requested. In this light the question arises not 
only whether the NGO185 consulted the beneficiaries before it requested provisional measures, but 
also whether the adjudicator consulted with the beneficiaries when drafting its provisional meas-
ures and whether the State consulted with them in its implementation of these measures.186  
Apart from the issues of representation and consultation, this section deals with the issue of 
individualisation. Sometimes provisional measures aim to protect large groups of persons, where 
no names can be provided for each and every individual beneficiary. It is not always clear 
whether they must be individualised, what are the advantages and risks of providing the names of 
the beneficiaries and what is the approach of adjudicators towards actio popularis. 
4.2 The relation between beneficiaries, petitioners and addressees 
4.2.1 Petitioners and victims 
It has been noted that in light of the emergence of erga omnes obligations the human being is the 
ultimate subject of the rights of protection, the so called titulaire.187 The procedural rules with 
                                                 
183 See Chapter I. 
184 See also Chapter IX (Threats). 
185 See section 4.2 on NGOs as petitioners in the Inter-American and African systems, where there is 
no ‘victim requirement’. 
186 In addition, the criterion of consultation seems to play a role in the decision making on the use of 
provisional measures by at least one adjudicator to the extent that when indigenous peoples have 
been consulted domestically regarding industrial developments the HRC seems less likely to use 
provisional measures, see further Chapter X (Protecting (indigenous) cultural and religious 
rights). 
187 See IACHR Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment on reparations of 22 January 1999, Separate Opinion 
Judge Cançado Trindade, §29. In its Order of 18 June 2002 in the Peace Community case the 
Inter-American Court discussed the issue of erga omnes obligations of protection. State Parties 
have the obligation, erga omnes, to provide protection to everyone under their jurisdiction in 
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regard to the submission of petitions in general are important in order to understand the specific 
practices of the adjudicators with regard to provisional measures. In the international systems of 
the UN treaty bodies and in the European system the so-called ‘victim requirement’ applies, 
meaning that the petitioner must be the alleged victim of the violation claimed. This is different in 
the Inter-American and African systems. NGOs that are not themselves the victims of the 
violations claimed may submit petitions in these systems. Their ‘actio popularis’ standing can be 
inferred from the respective treaty provisions that do not refer to any victim requirement. Article 
44 of the American Convention (ACHR) stipulates: 
“Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognised in one or 
more member states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing 
denunciations or complaints of violation of this Convention by a State Party”. 
Article 55 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR) speaks of 
‘communications other than those of States parties’, which has been interpreted to mean that 
individuals and organizations may communicate to the African Commission alleging that a State 
party has violated one or more of the rights in the Charter. Article 5 Protocol to the ACHPR on 
the establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights (1998) entitles the African 
Commission and the States involved to submit cases to the Court. It adds, however, that ‘the 
Court may entitle relevant Non Governmental organizations (NGOs) with observer status before 
the Commission, and individuals to institute cases directly before it, in accordance with article 34 
(6) of this Protocol’.188 With regard to accepting representatives of an NGO or individuals without 
legal qualifications it has been noted that the African Court ‘should display flexibility in order to 
take account of the lack of material resources from which a sizeable portion of the populations of 
the African continent still suffers. This solution would also enable the Court to avoid being 
burdened with requests for free legal aid, which possibility is provided for by the Protocol’.189 Art 
30 of the Protocol on the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2008) refers to ‘relevant 
Non-Governmental Organizations accredited to the African Union or to its organs’. 
                                                                                                                       
order to effectively guarantee the rights set forth in the Convention. According to the Court, the 
State has this obligation not only with regard to direct threats by official functionaries but also in 
relation to acts perpetrated by third parties, including irregular armed groups. It observed that, 
because of the special characteristics of the case and the overall conditions of the armed conflict 
in Colombia, and in light of the Convention and international humanitarian law, it was necessary 
to extend the protection of the right to life and personal integrity through the use of provisional 
measures. This extension was necessary to protect not only all members of the Peace Community 
but also those people who were connected to this Community by way of the services they 
provided. IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for 
provisional measures, 18 June 2002. A few years before, in 2000, the State’s representatives had 
acknowledged the important antecedents of international law upholding the provisional measures 
as well as their collective nature. IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case 
(Colombia), Order for provisional measures, 24 November 2000. In the original text: ‘Estas 
medidas adoptadas con su carácter colectivo, están sustentadas en importantes antecedentes del 
derecho internacional’. On the official responses by States see Chapter XVII. 
188 Article 34(6) stipulates: “At the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the 
State shall make a declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under 
article 5 (3) of this Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under article 5 (3) involving 
a State Party which has not made such a declaration”. 
189 Ouguergouz (2003), p. 737. This reference to free legal aid was not meant to apply as of right, 
but as an option for the Court, if it ‘were to be given the budgetary resources required’, p. 738. 
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4.2.2 Individuals or groups 
Another issue that arises is whether only individuals or also groups can submit a petition. Before 
the HRC generally only individuals can do so.190 The same applies to CAT.191 NGOs cannot bring 
a claim, unless each member submits such a claim on a personal basis. Under Article 14 ICERD 
and Article 2 Protocol to the CEDAW there is a possibility to bring a complaint on behalf of a 
group of individuals as well. Under Article 34 ECHR the ECtHR may deal not just with petitions 
by individuals, but also by groups of individuals or by NGOs, as long as they themselves claim to 
be the victim of a violation of any of the rights in the Convention. The Inter-American Commis-
sion and Court and the African Commission have all accepted claims involving groups of alleged 
victims as well as individual victims. As noted, these petitions are being brought either by the 
alleged victims or by petitioners who are not themselves the alleged victims.  
In the Blake case (Guatemala)192 the Inter-American Court draws attention to a related mat-
ter, stressing the authority of the Commission to refer proprio motu to an additional deceased 
victim, if his family members show no interest. The Court regretted that the Commission had 
failed to make use of this authority in this case. It observed that ‘there were two people who 
disappeared in the same circumstances, Mr. Nicholas Blake and Mr. Griffith Davis’. 
“Given that the remains of two people were found and that those of Mr. Griffith Davis were 
identified before Mr. Nicholas Blake’s, the Court is surprised that the Commission did not use 
its authority to include Mr. Griffith Davis as an alleged victim in the application. Moreover, at 
the public hearing held before this Court on April 17, 1997, the Commission, in reply to a 
question from Judge Cançado Trindade, merely declared that Mr. Griffith Davis' relatives had 
not shown any interest in bringing an action before the Commission. Since the Commission did 
not use the authority established in Article 26(2) of its Rules of Procedure which enabled it to 
act motu proprio on the basis of any available information, even without an explicit petition by 
Mr. Griffith Davis' relatives, the Court concludes that it may rule only on the events that 
occurred in connection with Mr. Nicholas Blake”.193 
Yet another issue relates to representation. Before the HRC a petitioner may only submit a claim 
on behalf of a victim when the victim is a family member who has been disappeared, detained 
incommunicado or killed.194 The Rules of Procedure of CEDAW are a little less strict. Under Art. 
2 of the Optional Protocol the CEDAW may examine petitions without explicit consent by the 
alleged victim, if the petitioner can justify this.195 Its Rule 68 specifies that the petitioner should 
provide her reasons for this in writing. There is no mention of an obligation that the author of the 
petition must have a family relationship with the alleged victim(s). 
                                                 
190 The HRC can examine a complaint by a group if the individuals involved are similarly situated 
and the petitioner properly represents them. See e.g. D.F. v. Sweden, 26 March 1998 (inadm.). As 
noted, in cases involving indigenous culture the HRC has taken provisional measures on behalf of 
groups, see e.g. Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990. 
191 See Article 22(1) ICAT: ‘from or on behalf of individuals’. 
192 Certain witnesses in this case were the beneficiaries of provisional measures.  
193 IACHR Blake case (Guatemala), Judgment of 24 January 1998, §85. 
194 See e.g. the examples in Zwart (1994), pp. 72-77 and McGoldrick (1994), pp.170-172. Under the 
Rules of Procedure of ICERD and ICAT, family members can also submit a complaint on behalf 
of victims. For an interpretation by CAT see e.g. B.M’.B v. Tunisia, 5 May 1994 (inadm.). 
195 This Article points out that when a petition ‘is submitted on behalf of individuals or groups of 
individuals this shall be with their consent unless the author can justify acting on their behalf 
without such consent’. 
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As noted, in the Inter-American and African systems NGOs have a specific role.196 They 
can be the petitioners in cases without having to fulfil the victim requirement necessary for the 
UN treaties and the ECHR. Without this it is likely that the majority of cases that have in fact 
been brought before the African and Inter-American Commissions would not have been brought. 
Without the ability to bring individual petitions, regional or international NGOs can assist indi-
viduals and groups that are being harassed and may have difficulty accessing the adjudicators on 
their own. This way these regional and international NGOs are able to perform their function of 
helping protect members of local NGOs, especially human rights defenders.197 Thus petitioners 
are often NGOs representing the victim, rather than the victims themselves. Especially useful is 
the fact that, in the Inter-American system, for an NGO to be accepted as a petitioner, it needs to 
be recognised in just one OAS Member State.198  
In the Inter-American human rights system the Center for Justice and International Law 
(CEJIL) is the petitioner in a great majority of cases.199 The downside obviously is that the posi-
tion of one NGO may become too dominant. No matter the quality and sincerity of such organiza-
tion, it is generally preferable for victims to be able to choose among a number of NGOs to effec-
tively represent them. In addition transparency and media interest is particularly important to help 
counter any complacency that might otherwise occur. 
A more specific question is who has standing to request the Inter-American Commission or 
Court to take provisional measures. In general, the petitioners request the Commission to take 
precautionary measures. In cases still pending before the Commission, it is the Commission that 
requests the Court to order provisional measures.200 It appears, however, that in freedom of 
speech cases, the OAS Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression and the journalists’ organi-
sations funding his Office are actively involved as well.201  
The Inter-American Commission and Court may also take urgent action proprio motu.202 In 
the Constitutional Court case against Peru, that was pending before the Court rather than the 
Commission, the President indeed adopted urgent measures that were not requested by the Com-
mission.203 He did this ex officio after one of the alleged victims sent information to the Court.204 
                                                 
196 See also, e.g. Grossman (1992), pp. 363-389. 
197 The importance of the protection of human rights defenders is further emphasized in the more 
recent UN principles on the protection of human rights defenders. See further Chapter IX 
(Protecting against death threats and harassment). About the Declaration see Hallo de Wolf 
(2002). 
198 In general on the evolving status of NGOs in international law, see e.g. Kamminga (20020, pp. 
387-406. 
199 CEJIL has several offices including its headquarters in Washington D.C., the seat of the 
Commission, and an office in San José, Costa Rica, the seat of the Court. Through its proximity 
to both the Commission and the Court it is able to attend hearings and maintain a close 
relationship with the Secretariats of both bodies. Hence, individual victims and local human 
rights groups very often depend on CEJIL to bring individual complaints before the Commission.  
200 See Chapter II (Systems). 
201 See the report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur attached to the CIDH Annual Reports. 
202 See Chapter II (Systems). 
203 IACHR Constitutional Court (Peru), Urgent measures of 7 April 2000 (President). 
204 “4. That, from these provisions [Art. 63(2) ACHR and Rules 25(1) and (4)], it is evident that the 
Court, or, when appropriate, its President, may act de oficio in cases of extreme gravity and 
urgency to avoid irreparable damage to persons. The Court has already done so previously (Order 
of January 15, 1988, Provisional Measures in the Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi and Solís 
Corrales, and Godínez Cruz cases, fourth and fifth preambular paragraphs). As the Court is not 
sitting, the President is authorized to adopt urgent measures de oficio in such cases of extreme 
gravity and urgency to avoid irreparable damages to persons”. IACHR Constitutional Court 
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Later, during the hearing, the Commission backed up this request. The full Court confirmed the 
President’s urgent measure as an official provisional measure.205 
In the summer of 2001 the Inter-American Commission requested the Inter-American Court 
to interpret its Rules of Procedure specifically with regard to provisional measures and the role of 
the victims before the Court.206 Pursuant to Article 63(2) ACHR and Articles 23(1) and 25 of the 
Court’s Rules of Procedure the Court decided the following: 
“1. The Court will admit and hear autonomous requests, arguments, and evidence from the 
beneficiaries of provisional measures which it adopts in cases where the application has been 
presented before it; this will however, not exempt the Commission from its obligation under the 
Convention to provide the Court, at its request, with all the relevant information. 2. Only the 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights is authorised to provide information to the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights during the processing of measures ordered by the Court in 
cases where no application is pending before it”.207 
Subsequently the Court included the following in Article 25 of its Rules of Procedure: “In conten-
tious cases already submitted to the Court, the victims or alleged victims, their next of kin, or 
their duly accredited representatives, may present a request for provisional measures directly to 
the Court”.208 It also added a new Article 23 to the effect that ‘(w)hen the application has been 
admitted, the alleged victims, their next of kin or their duly accredited representatives may submit 
their pleadings, motions and evidence, autonomously, throughout the proceeding’.209 This consti-
tutes a general norm applicable both to ordinary proceedings in contentious cases and to provi-
sional measures. It affords victims the opportunity to autonomously submit their requests, argu-
ments and evidence once the Court has admitted the application. 
The beneficiaries in cases that are pending before the Commission still cannot go directly to 
Court to request provisional measures or a change in provisional measures already ordered. They 
need to convince the Commission to approach the Court on their behalf.210 The beneficiaries of 
provisional measures in cases that are already before the Court, on the other hand, may now ap-
proach the Court themselves.  
                                                                                                                       
(Peru), Urgent measures of 7 April 2000 (President). He did so after consultation with all the 
other judges. 
205 IACHR Constitutional Court (Peru), Order of 14 August 2000. 
206 The Commission requested this in its submissions of 16 and 26 July and 1 and 9 August 2001, in 
relation to the Court’s provisional measures in the cases of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian 
Origin in the Dominican Republic, Digna Ochoa and Placido et al., Colotenango and Bámaca 
Velásquez. 
207 IACHR Order on the issue of provisional measures, 29 August 2001. 
208 Rules of Procedure approved by the Court during its XLIX Ordinary Period of Sessions, held 
from 16 to 25 November 2000, and partially reformed by the Court during its LXI Ordinary 
Period of Sessions, held from 20 November to 4 December 2003. 
209 Rules of Procedure approved by the Court during its XLIX Ordinary Period of Sessions, held 
from 16 to 25 November 2000, and partially reformed by the Court during its LXI Ordinary 
Period of Sessions, held from 20 November to 4 December 2003. 
210 Judge Cançado Trindade has proposed an amendment to Art. 61(1) ACHR to the effect that with 
regard to a case not yet submitted to its consideration, the Court may order provisional measures 
not only at the request of the Commission, but also of the alleged potential victims. IACHR 
Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in 
Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, Separate Opinion Judge Cançado 
Trindade, §31. 
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4.2.3 Addressees 
The issue of the addressees of the provisional measures ordered by the adjudicators also deserves 
attention. As a general rule the addressees are the States against which a petition has been filed, 
but in the context of the provisional measures by the Bosnia Chamber the addressees are also (and 
more often) the constituent entities Republika Srpska and Fed. BiH, rather than just the State of 
BiH. The ECtHR has sometimes addressed more than one State party with a request to take provi-
sional measures.211 
The HRC generally addresses the State channelled through its diplomatic mission in Ge-
neva, but in light of certain negative experiences in this regard it has also (informally) sent the 
information on its decision to take provisional measures to a government minister, prison warden 
or the judiciary.212 The ECtHR has equally been known to send its messages directly to the Agent 
for the Government at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and only copied them to the permanent 
representative in Strasbourg. Similarly the Inter-American Commission has sometimes directed 
itself not only to the US but also to the Governors of constituent states, as it did in 1993 when it 
approached the Governor of Texas in order to halt the execution of Gary Graham, aka Shaka 
Sankofa.213 Obviously this must be seen as extra step in order to assist a State with a federal 
system in the implementation of its obligations. Article 29 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties stipulates that a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire territory and this 
applies to the OAS Charter as well, meaning that a State is also responsible for its constituent 
parts (such as states making up a federation).214 
In the Inter-American system one can speak of the Inter-American Commission as a secon-
dary addressee of the Court’s provisional measures in the sense that the Inter-American Court 
orders it to monitor compliance and to send its observations to the Court within a certain time 
period. 
Moreover, as discussed, the Inter-American Commission and Court often specify to some 
extent the measures required, including references to the need to contact different (regional) 
branches of government.215 
The Inter-American Commission has more flexibility than the Court in its decision-making 
with regard to urgent cases. It may even take some action vis-à-vis groups that are not the ad-
dressees proper of its precautionary measures. Faced with extreme human rights violations by 
insurgents and other non-state actors, it issues press releases condemning their acts and pointing 
                                                 
211 See e.g. ECtHR Shamayev and 12 others v. Georgia and Russia, 1 July 2003 (provisional 
measure of 4 October 2002 addressed to Georgia and of 17 June 2003 addressed to Russia). 
212 For these negative experiences see also Chapter II (Systems). 
213 CIDH Gary T. Graham, now known as Shaka Sankofa v. US, 15 June 2000 (adm.). This was not 
only so in October 1993 but already in April, when the Commission sent its first note to the 
Governor requesting a stay. On this case see also Chapter III (Halting executions) and Chapter 
XVII (Official responses). 
214 As confirmed also by the US, see e.g. ICJ Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 
2004 in the case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order for 
provisional measures of 16 July 2008, §42. 
215 The ICJ has also pointed out the obligations of the Addressee by specifying that the Respondent 
State should transmit the Court’s order to its constituent parts, such as the Governor of Arizona in 
LaGrand. ICJ LaGrand case (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999, §28. 
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out their obligation to respect humanitarian law.216 Its precautionary measures proper, however, 
are addressed to OAS member States only. 
4.2.4 The petitioner as addressee 
The European Court has pointed out: “In most cases, measures are indicated to the respondent 
Government, although there is nothing to stop the Court from indicating measures to appli-
cants”.217 
In this respect it has adopted the approach of the former European Commission. In Altun v. 
Germany (1983) the European Commission had taken provisional measures to halt the extradition 
of the petitioner, but also informed the petitioner himself ‘in accordance with Rule 36 of the Rules 
of Procedure, that it was desirable in the interests of the parties and the normal conduct of the 
proceedings that, if he was released, he should remain at the disposal of the German authorities 
pending the decision which the Commission might make at its session commencing 2 May 
1983’.218 In other words Germany could not keep him in detention any longer without breaking its 
domestic laws; hence the Commission’s ‘indication’ for the petitioner not to abscond. The peti-
tioner did not and reported to the police as required. Subsequently the Commission was convinced 
by the State that a provisional measure to halt his extradition was no longer necessary given cer-
tain assurances offered by the requesting State. At the start of a court hearing on his extradition 
the petitioner killed himself.219 
The petitioner has also been addressed as part of a decision based on the rule on provisional 
measures in order to stop a hunger strike.220 In the context of complaints about detention situa-
tions or lack of access to medical treatment in detention, petitioners have requested provisional 
                                                 
216 An example is: CIDH press release ‘IACHR urges the FARC to free Corporal José Norberto 
Pérez’, 31/01, 3 December 2001, appealing to FARC to free this corporal for humanitarian 
reasons so that his son, who was in a very advanced stage of cancer, could still see him.  
217 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §105 the Court 
referred to Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, 8 July 2004, §11 (“On 15 January 2004 the 
President decided to urge Mr Ivanţoc under Rule 39 to call off his hunger strike. On 24 January 
2004 Mr Ivanţoc’s representative informed the Court that his client had ended his hunger strike 
on 15 January 2004”). In this case a provisional measure was addressed to the State first, see §10 
(“On 12 January 2004 the President of the Grand Chamber decided to invite the respondent 
Governments under Rule 39 to take all necessary steps to ensure that Mr Ivanţoc, who had been 
on hunger strike since 28 December 2003, was detained in conditions which were consistent with 
respect for his rights under the Convention. The parties were invited, in accordance with Rule 24 
§2 (a), to provide information about the implementation of the interim measures requested. Mr 
Ivanţoc’s representative, Mr V. Gribincea, and the Moldovan Government provided the Court 
with the information requested in letters dated 24 and 26 January 2004 respectively”). See also 
Chapter VII (Detention), section 2.5.4 (Protecting detainees on a hunger strike) and Chapter XV 
(Immediacy and risk), section 3.2.5 on health in detention and assessment of risk. 
218 EComHR Altun v. Germany, 3 May 1983 (adm.), §8. 
219 See also Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk), section 3.3. 
220 See e.g. EComHR S., R., A. and C. v. Portugal, 15 March 1984 (inadm.); Vakalis v. Greece 
(petitioner was in deteriorating health resulting from hunger strike; the provisional measure of 3 
April 1992 did not aim for his release, but indeed aimed at addressing the situation, it was 
directed to the petitioner as well as to the State), 15 January 1993 (struck from the role upon 
release) and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria (complaint about continued pre-trial detention and the conditions 
in which he was force-fed; provisional measure of 20 October 1997 only to the petitioner to stop 
his hunger strike; Article 31 Report of 29 October 1998; Judgment of 26 July 2001). See also the 
aforementioned ECtHR Ilaşcu and others v. Moldova and Russia, 8 July 2004, §11 and Rodić et 
al. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 27 May 2008. See further Zwart (1994), p. 34. 
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measures. In some cases this request boomeranged and the petitioner himself was addressed by 
the Commission or Court and advised to put a stop to his hunger strike. This has been interpreted 
as a condition for the further examination of the case.221 On the one hand, it makes sense for 
adjudicators to suggest to petitioners that if they choose recourse to an international adjudicator, 
and this adjudicator intervenes urgently in order to ensure that no irreparable harm occurs, they 
should not continue their hunger strike in the meantime. On the other hand, in my view it is not 
appropriate to suggest to the petitioner that stopping this hunger strike is a prerequisite for exam-
ining the case and that he, rather than the State, should apply provisional measures.222 Given the 
difference in what is at stake, as well as the more vulnerable procedural position of the petitioner, 
the practice developed by the European Commission and apparently accepted by the Court is 
puzzling.223  
The reason why this practice was introduced in the European system, but not in the other 
systems, may be that in the European system the text of the Rule on provisional measures is dif-
ferent, referring to the interests of the parties and the proceedings, rather than the prevention of 
irreparable harm to persons. Yet in practice the European Court also applies the criterion of pre-
venting irreparable harm.  
Of course de facto a hunger strike often results in irreparable harm as well and, as noted, an 
adjudicator may have good reason to indicate to the petitioner that apart from using provisional 
measures addressed to the State in order to improve his detention situation, etc., it is also request-
ing the petitioner to put a stop to his hunger strike so that the case could be properly examined 
and concluded.224 Yet it does not seem appropriate to do this on the basis of the rule on provi-
sional measures. Instead the Court could refer to the duty to cooperate, which includes taking 
‘such action within their power as the Court considers necessary for the appropriate administra-
tion of justice’ (Rule 44A ECtHR Rules of Court). In case of failure to comply with an order of 
the Court concerning the conduct of the proceedings the President of the Chamber may take any 
steps he or she considers appropriate (Rule 44B). Where a party fails to participate effectively in 
the proceedings, the Court may draw such inferences as it deems appropriate (Rule 44C). 
                                                 
221 See Zwart (1994), p. 34. 
222 Yet the Court uses the term ‘invites’ in this context. See ECtHR Rodić et al. v. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, 27 May 2008, §4 where on 24 June one of the petitioners and on 29 June 2005 the 
other three were ‘invited’ under Rule 39 to end their hunger strike; they did so on 1 July 2005; on 
13 September 2005 the case was granted priority under Rule 41. There have also been cases in 
which petitioners were on hunger strike but the Court did not use a provisional measure against 
them nor against the State, see ECtHR Lorsé case 52750/99 (Lorsé et al. v. the Netherlands), 
initial application, 19 November 1999, request for provisional measures (cover page and p. 16, 
referring to a hunger strike since 15 November 1996 (on file with the author). Only the partial 
inadm. decision refers to the hunger strike, in the description of the facts, referring to 17 rather 
than 15 November. For the judgment on the merits see Lorsé et al. v. the Netherlands, 4 February 
2003. With regard to the Bosnia Chamber the Berg Handbook (1999), p. 10 notes that the 
Chamber’s Rule 36 on provisional measures may also be applied on the Chamber’s own motion. 
It then adds that an ‘injunction could also be issued against an applicant’. It does not give 
examples in which the Chamber had done so. It is not clear whether the Chamber formally 
decided that it could do so, or whether the author of the handbook, legal secretary of the ECtHR 
and legal officer of the former European Commission, has assumed this based on the fact that the 
Chamber has taken over many rules and practices of the Strasbourg bodies. In a footnote the 
Handbook refers to the practice of the former European Commission to recommend petitioners to 
stop their hunger strike. 
223 See also, e.g., Rieter (2007), p. 974. 
224 See e.g. EComHR Bhuyian v. Sweden, 14 September 1995 (inadm.). Request of 14 September 
1995 to stop hunger strike and suicide attempts pending the case, but also to the State to 
provisionally suspend the expulsion. 
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The procedural responsibility of the petitioner may play a role in the decision-making on the 
use of provisional measures. The petitioners’ negligence may have consequences for the progress 
of the case.225 If the beneficiaries differ from the petitioners, the petitioners have the responsibil-
ity to consult them and obtain their cooperation. In the Inter-American system petitioners in cases 
already pending before the Court have now procedural responsibility because they deal directly 
with the Court without the Commission serving as an intermediary. If potential beneficiaries 
contact the Court in the context of a case pending before it and they are not the petitioners and not 
even the alleged victims, these beneficiaries have now acquired procedural rights as well, with the 
consequent responsibilities. Yet this does not mean that the Court’s provisional measures could be 
directed at them. Indeed the Inter-American Commission and Court have never done so. At most 
they could request information or other forms of cooperation (such as postponing a hunger strike) 
so that they could perform their function by ordering provisional measures that would indeed 
have a chance to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
4.2.5 Rights of addressees 
As discussed with regard to the inter-State cases dealt with by the ICJ, that Court’s Orders for 
provisional measures often are less far reaching than the original request by (one of) the parties 
and the ICJ often takes into account the rights of the respondent as well.226 While this applies 
more to inter-State cases not involving the rights of individuals, the statement that, given the 
interests of the addressee State, provisional measures should not accomplish more than necessary 
to prevent the irreparable harm,227 appears to hold true for provisional measures by the human 
rights adjudicators as well. While the main criterion is the protection against irreparable harm, 
meaning that the means to be chosen must be truly protective against such harm, if there are 
several options to achieve this, the option that is least invasive to the general interest should be 
chosen.  
Sometimes adjudicators have been very accommodating to the State. In Länsman II the 
HRC used provisional measures before it declared the case admissible, but it almost invited the 
State to object by suggesting the possibility that it would reconsider its use of provisional meas-
                                                 
225 See e.g. ECtHR Hun v. Turkey, 10 November 2005 (struck out). The petitioner had been invited 
under Rule 39 to respect its provisional measures in that she was to provide a medical report 
ordered by the committee of experts appointed by the ECtHR. She had responded that she had 
been unable to obtain this because of administrative difficulties, §35. Nevertheless, since then the 
petitioner had still failed to provide these reports and the Court was not convinced of these 
difficulties. It noted that she had not attempted to obtain the documents from another hospital 
either and that the government’s explanations were more convincing. Moreover, it commended 
the exemplary cooperation of the State with the Court’s provisional measures in this context 
(noting that even in this case, where at some point the petitioner had been arrested despite the 
Court’s provisional measures to the State to halt her re-imprisonment, she had been released at 
once when the authorities realized their mistake, see also §§23-24), contrasting this with the 
failure of the petitioner to do the same, §§36 and 37. To be sure, the petitioner had initially 
complied with the provisional measures directed to her, by presenting herself for examination by 
the medical expert mission appointed by the ECtHR. Yet these experts had recommended a 
neurological examination before they could examine her condition. When almost 7 months later 
the Court had still not received the report requested of such examination, it decided to lift the 
provisional measures directed to the State halting her re-imprisonment. This withdrawal (as well 
as the subsequent striking out of the case) appears to be a reasonable response to the petitioner’s 
procedural attitude.  
226 See Chapter I (ICJ). 
227 See e.g. Merrills (1995), p. 100. 
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ures if the State party disagreed.228 This was a new approach to the presentation of its provisional 
measures.229 CAT even has included in its Rules a specific reference to the possibility for the 
State to request withdrawal of the provisional measures.230 It is to be expected, however, that 
States disagreeing with the use of provisional measures in a given case would protest their use in 
any case, also without invitation. CAT has observed ‘that its procedures are sufficiently flexible 
and its powers sufficiently broad to prevent an abuse of process in a particular case’, which would 
protect the rights of the addressee States as well.231  
States have sometimes argued that their rights should be protected beyond ensuring proce-
dural fairness, by stating that the rights and interests of the parties should be balanced, invoking 
principles such as ‘balance of convenience’.232  
Yet as further discussed in the Conclusion to Part II international human rights adjudicators 
generally take provisional measures in only a very limited range of cases involving rights that are 
                                                 
228 HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 30 October 1996 (initial submission of 28 August 1995, 
Rule 86/91 of 15 November 1995); decision of 14 March 1996 to set aside its provisional 
measures (together with admissibility declaration). 
229 Apart from referring to the possibility of reconsideration already in the Note Verbale, with the 
provisional measure, sent to the State or even already in the Rules of Procedure, there are also 
other ways to accommodate the State. In the same Länsman II case, in early December 1995 the 
petitioners informed the HRC, by urgent message, that a division of the Central Forestry Board 
had started logging at the end of November, despite the Committee’s provisional measure taken 
two weeks previously. This logging was scheduled to continue until the end of March 1996. The 
petitioners requested a reiteration of the provisional measure so that the State party would 
discontinue logging immediately. See §4.2 of Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, (Länsman II), 
30 October 1996. Clearly, the Central Forestry Board should have known about the Committee’s 
provisional measures of 15 November 1995. The urgent request for provisional measures 
specified that the local branch of the Board was aware of the Rule 86 request before it started the 
logging. “Some kind of a meeting or consultation between the branch and the Foreign Ministry 
took place, apparently on Friday 24 November, some days before the logging was started”. Fax 
of the petitioner of 8 December 1995 (on file with the author). In Länsman I, Ilmari Länsman v. 
Finland, 26 October 1994, the HRC did not use provisional measures because it considered they 
would be premature. It is the only case involving culture in which the HRC motivated its refusal 
to use them. Yet the HRC did not reiterate the provisional measures it had initially ordered, 
despite the request by the petitioners. Apparently, in December 1995 a negotiation took place 
between the parties, during which a solution was actively sought. The Finnish Foreign Ministry 
had also indicated that it would respond to the Committee’s provisional measures and concede 
admissibility in the next week and would then indicate whether it might stop or scale down 
logging. Note of the Secretariat of 8 December 1995 (on file with the author). In this context the 
Rapporteur may have decided that it would serve little purpose to use provisional measures for 
the second time before he had seen the reply promised by the State. In fact, the question whether 
to maintain the first Rule 86 request was put before the Committee’s Working Group and decided 
in the negative on 14 March 1996. A month after the Committee had indicated provisional 
measures and more than two weeks after logging had been resumed, the State party indeed 
submitted its formal response. The State considered that the provisional measures were 
inappropriate in the circumstances of the case and requested the HRC to set them aside. 
Nevertheless, it undertook ‘not to elaborate further logging plans in the area in question, and to 
decrease the current amount of logging by 25 percent, while awaiting the Committee’s final 
decision’ (on file with the author). 
230 See also Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
231 CAT Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, §13.10. 
232 See e.g. Ontario Court of Appeal, Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, dissenting opinion of 
Rosenberg, §107. 
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absolute. In such cases the balance of convenience no longer applies.233 This principle should 
apply in relations between equal parties and is therefore more suitable for proceedings not involv-
ing a threat to the very existence of a person or indigenous peoples. Balancing the interest of the 
petitioner with those of the State (or ‘the general interest’) normally is inappropriate in relation to 
those rights singled out in the treaties for their fundamental nature, not allowing for derogation 
even in times of emergency. 
4.2.6 Indirect beneficiaries 
While provisional measures only bind the addressee vis-à-vis the direct beneficiaries, they could 
also have an effect beyond the particular case. Other potential beneficiaries could refer to these 
provisional measures. While a provisional measure does not concern an ‘examination’ of the case, 
persons similarly situated to the beneficiary could refer domestically to the provisional measures 
by an international or regional adjudicator. This applies to persons claiming the same rights 
before domestic decision makers. They would then have to use this to underscore their own claim, 
as an indication of the risk perceived by this adjudicator in similar situations of urgency. If the 
provisional measure concerns halting an expulsion of certain persons to a certain State (e.g. in a 
situation of civil war) counsel for other persons similarly situated and risking expulsion to that 
same State could argue that it would be a pro-active good faith application of the treaty to halt 
these other expulsions as well, pending determination of the proceeding in which the provisional 
measures were used. This would also be in accordance with the rationale of the rule on exhaustion 
of domestic remedies. Moreover the State would prevent recourse to international proceedings by 
these other persons as well as the ensuing embarrassment of more provisional measures of a 
similar nature. Of course such an argument would apply only if the persons involved were truly 
similarly situated.234 
4.3 Consent, consultation and representation  
4.3.1 Introduction 
It is inherent in the function of human rights adjudicators to take into account in particular the 
perspectives of the powerless. How well they can perform their function depends to a large extent 
on how the case is presented before them, in other words, on the power of the narrative. Yet in a 
sense those that are able to get across a powerful narrative are not among the most powerless and 
it is only to be hoped that the judicial follow-up to their stories will ultimately have an impact on 
the most powerless as well, or in jargon, ‘empower’ them. In any case, the question of who is 
represented by whom, and how, is quite relevant as well, not just in that this may influence 
whether an adjudicator decides to order provisional measures, but also the contents of these provi-
sional measures and the scope of the group requiring protection.  
In a strict inter-State approach, in which the individual is not much more than a pawn in the 
hands of the conflicting Parties, provisional measures function in a different way than they do as 
part of human rights adjudication proper. This becomes clear particularly in the context of the role 
of the beneficiary. Traditionally, there is no obligation to consult with the beneficiaries to see 
whether they consent to the provisional measures and, if so, how they consider they would best be 
protected. Yet in the Inter-American human rights system a practice has been developed in which 
                                                 
233 If human rights adjudicators take provisional measures in a wider range of cases the balance of 
convenience may apply. 
234 See e.g. the ECtHR and cases against the Netherlands involving non-refoulement to regions in 
Somalia, discussed in Chapter II (Systems) and XVII (Official responses). 
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such consultation serves as a focal point. Given the purpose of preventing irreparable harm to 
persons, for instance in the face of death threats, such consultation is particularly warranted. 
Moreover, in the Inter-American and African systems the petitioners often are not the victims, let 
alone the beneficiaries of the provisional measures, which makes consultation all the more impor-
tant.  
Under the ICCPR the issue of consultation has mainly surfaced in the context of provisional 
measures to protect indigenous culture. In other words, in the practice of the HRC it is important 
when dealing with the issue of collective rights. This section first deals with the issue of consent, 
particularly in the context of provisional measures to protect against death threats. It then exam-
ines the issues of consultation and representation, focussing on the rights of collectivities, in 
particular indigenous cultures. 
4.3.2 Beneficiaries and their consent 
In cases involving multiple beneficiaries it is especially important to establish that the petitioner 
does not misrepresent the interests of the beneficiaries.235 This means that the issue of representa-
tion and consent, which often arises in relation to the alleged victim(s), also has relevance with 
regard to the potential beneficiaries.236 
In Sands v. UK (1981) the petitioner had requested the European Commission to intervene 
urgently on behalf of her brother who was on hunger-strike. As his life was at stake the Commis-
sion invoked Rule 36 on provisional measures. Under this Rule it expressed a wish to visit the 
petitioner’s brother to enquire whether he indeed intended to make the petition. In other words 
this was a special type of provisional measure. While it involved a risk of irreparable harm to 
persons the Commission still wished to be sure that the person at risk agreed with the involvement 
of the Commission. It struck out the case once it had ascertained during its on site visit, triggered 
by its provisional measures, that the petitioner’s brother did not intend to make the petition.237  
Checking whether the beneficiary really wants the provisional measures also includes tak-
ing into account that the beneficiary may sometimes only withdraw a request for precautionary 
measures exactly because of intimidation. In the Blake case the Inter-American Commission had 
requested the Court to order provisional measures on behalf of certain people, including Justo 
Victoriano Martínez-Morales. He was ‘a key witness in the Blake Case’ because of ‘his investiga-
tion of the circumstances that led to Mr. Nicholas Blake’s abduction and disappearance’. The 
President of the Court indeed ordered these measures, pending discussion by the full Court. The 
                                                 
235 See also subsection 4.4.4 of this Chapter on identification and representation. 
236 On this issue in relation to the alleged victims see e.g. Mutua (2004), pp. 191-215; Juma (2004), 
pp. 235-271; and Nmehielle (2001), pp. 309-324. 
237 ECHR Marcella Sands and Robert Sands v. the UK, 14 October 1981 (struck out). Bobby Sands 
did express a willingness ‘to see the Delegates in the presence of three persons previously named 
by him in a press statement which had been issued in his name’. “After further consultations the 
Delegates decided that in the circumstances it was not possible to see and confer with Mr Sands 
and accordingly no meeting took place”. According to a statement by the Republican Prisoners in 
the H-Blocks, at the end of the second hunger strike, Marcella Sands had acted on the advice of 
the Premier of the Republic of Ireland, convincing her that the intervention of the European 
Commission could solve the issue. After the Delegation of the European Commission had left 
without meeting Sands and the people he had proposed, Bobby Sands released a statement 
attacking the Premier for ‘unscrupulously exploiting his family’s anxiety to cover his own 
inactivity’. Bobby Sands died from the effects of his hunger-strike on 5 May 1981. Later the 
other prisoners decided to end the hunger strike, ‘faced with the reality of sustained family 
intervention’, see <larkspirit.com/hungerstrikes/81statement_end.html> (consulted 8 September 
2005). 
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State responded, among others, that Mr Victoriano Martínez himself ‘had denied being subjected 
to threats or attacks against his person or his family and would not agree to any personal safety 
measures. Because of this refusal, the National Police of Huehuetenango offered to guard his 
residence with a night patrol after 8 p.m., to which he agreed’.238 Subsequently the Commission 
‘reiterated that a case of extreme urgency did exist for the aforementioned reasons, and that the 
threats extended’ to his family.239 The Court ratified the President’s Order and requested the State 
to maintain the provisional measures on behalf of the five persons involved.240 More than 1,5 year 
later Mr Victoriano Martínez-Morales testified at the public hearing on the merits of the Blake 
case. He ‘said that he feared for his and his family’s life and physical safety and that he was only 
protected at his place of residence’.241 The Court responded to this by requiring the State ‘to 
provide those measures to the persons in whose favor they were adopted, not only while they are 
in their homes but also when they are away from them’. It decided to maintain the provisional 
measures so long as the circumstances of extreme gravity still existed.242 
In the Paniagua case the fifteen year old son of one of the victims had testified at the public 
hearings on Reparations of the Inter-American Court in August 2000. Subsequently he was 
threatened. The Inter-American Commission informed the Court of the situation but did not re-
quest it to take provisional measures. The Court, though, took provisional measures proprio 
motu.243 It turned out, however, that the beneficiary felt that the Court’s order might work coun-
terproductive. Thus, the petitioner wanted the provisional measures lifted. The Commission re-
quested the Court to lift its provisional measures and the Court did so.244 
4.3.3 Consultation 
As discussed, the letters by the Inter-American Commission to the State have become more spe-
cific245 in its awareness of the importance of consultation between the State and the petitioner 
about the implementation of its precautionary measures. In its letters to governments it now notes 
that precautionary measures must be implemented in consultation with the interested parties and 
their representatives.246 The Inter-American Court takes a similar approach.  
                                                 
238 IACHR Blake case (Guatemala), Judgment of 24 January 1998, §38. 
239 Id., §39. 
240 Id., §40. 
241 Id., §41. 
242 Id., §42. 
243 IACHR Paniagua Morales et al. case, Order of 29 January 2001. 
244 Id., noting, in the 5th ‘Having seen’ clause, the submission by the State that the harassment 
experienced by the beneficiary ‘was due “to personal problems with a gang of hoodlums” and 
that the State was providing the minor with protection to and from the high school where he was 
a student’ and referring, in the 6th clause, to the ‘letter from the representative of the individual 
under protection (…) wherein the representative requests that the measures ordered by the Court 
be lifted’; finally mentioning the note by the Commission in which it agreed that ‘the provisional 
measures ordered for the minor should be lifted’(7th ‘Having seen’ clause). The Court also 
pointed out, in its 4th ‘Considering’ clause, that the Commission would ‘continue to monitor the 
situation and, if need be, provide pertinent information’. 
245 See section 3 of this Chapter. 
246 States, especially those that are often the addressees of provisonal measures, have now become 
accustomed to this type of provisional measures. This has not always been the case. According to 
Charles Moyer, Inter-American Institute of Human Rights, formerly Secretary of the Court and 
Commission, interview of December 2001, at least in the type of cases that he had dealt with in 
the ten years he worked at the Commission and the other ten years he worked at the Court, States 
would have been too antagonistic to sit around the table and discuss matters. 
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In the context of the Inter-American (and African) system we may assume that the petition-
ers representing the victims, also represent witnesses and other people involved in the case do-
mestically (such as counsel, prosecutor or judge in domestic proceedings) when they are sub-
jected to threats. In this context the interested parties (‘los interesados’) that must be consulted 
are all the beneficiaries of these precautionary measures. 
In its Annual Reports the Inter-American Commission sometimes explicitly notes that the 
measures requested should be taken ‘with the beneficiary’s agreement’,247 or that a State is ex-
pected to investigate the threats and agree with the petitioners on security measures.248 Yet if it 
does not mention in its Annual Report the even more obvious need for an agreement with the 
actual beneficiary, rather than the petitioner, this does not necessarily mean that the Commission 
did not require such agreement.  
In the Peace Community case the Inter-American Court ordered the State to allow the par-
ticipation of the petitioners in planning and implementing and, in general, to keep them informed 
about the progress in the implementation of the Court’s provisional measures. Likewise, the State 
was to continue allowing the beneficiaries or their representatives to participate in the planning 
and implementation of the measures and, in general, to keep them informed about all develop-
ments.249 
In August 1998 the Court took provisional measures again in the context of Alvarez et al. 
(Colombia), on behalf of an attorney and his family. He had been threatened because he was 
representing the families of detainees and missing persons in several criminal cases and suits for 
compensation. It requested Colombia to effectively investigate the alleged acts in order to deter-
mine the perpetrators and punish them. It requested the Commission to ‘urge the beneficiaries of 
the provisional measures adopted by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the matter to 
cooperate with the State of Colombia in order to enable the latter to more effectively adopt the 
necessary security measures’.250  
4.3.4 Representation and collective rights 
Many of the rights in the ICCPR may be enjoyed in community with others.251 The HRC has 
noted that Article 1 OP restricts its competence to dealing with individual complaints, but that this 
‘does not prevent such individuals from claiming that actions or omissions that concern legal 
persons and similar entities amount to a violation of their own rights’.252  
Regarding the relationship between petitioners and beneficiaries it is important to note that 
while the HRC does not accept the group itself as a petitioner (although it came close in the Lubi-
                                                 
247 CIDH precautionary measures of 5 July 2001 to protect the judicial magistrate in charge of the 
investigation into the murder of journalist Jean Dominique, Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), 
§37. 
248 A security cooperative in Colombia had been threatening a trade union leader. This group had 
earlier claimed responsibility for several killings and for attacks on union leaders, Annual Report 
2001, Chapter III (a), §22. 
249 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional 
measures, 18 June 2002. 
250 IACHR Álvarez et al.(Colombia), Order of 29 August 1998, 5th ‘Decisional clause’. See also the 
even stronger expression in the 6th ‘Considering’ clause: ‘The beneficiaries of the provisional 
measures adopted by the Court in the instant case have the obligation to cooperate with the State 
so that the latter might more effectively adopt the necessary security measures’. 
251 See Chapter X (Culture). See also e.g. Coomans (2003), pp. 749-760; Martin (2006), pp. 491-504 
and Murray and Wheatley (2003), pp. 213-236. 
252 HRC General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, the nature of the general legal obligation imposed 
on States parties to the Covenant, 21 April 2004, §9. 
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con case), it certainly takes into account group aspects when it uses provisional measures involv-
ing the protection of indigenous culture. This was already the case in Lubicon, but it was con-
firmed in subsequent cases. In Lubicon the petitioner was Chief Ominayak but the HRC specifi-
cally made the Band members beneficiaries of the provisional measures, next to Chief Ominayak. 
It explained that it used provisional measures in light of the seriousness of the allegations ‘that the 
Lubicon Lake Band was at the verge of extinction’.253  
In its arguments on admissibility in Länsman III the HRC declared inadmissible the com-
plaint in so far as it related to the Herdsmen’s Committee and/or its constituent members other 
than Jouni and Eino Länsman. It noted that there was no indication that individual members had 
authorised the Herdsmen’s Committee to bring a claim on their behalf or that Jouni and/or Eino 
Länsman were authorised to act on behalf of the Herdsmen’s Committee and its members. Yet the 
provisional measure taken in this case had specified Jouni Länsman et al. as the beneficiaries, 
which could still include the Herdsmen’s Committee. After all, previously the Committee had 
only taken provisional measures in Article 27 ICCPR cases in which the collective aspects were 
predominant.254 
When dealing with the question of the identity and interests of the beneficiaries of the pro-
visional measures used by the HRC to protect indigenous culture it is important to keep in mind 
the discussion about self-determination. If collective aspects play an important role in the en-
forcement of individual rights, the issue of who represents a group in international fora is relevant 
in order to clarify the possible group of beneficiaries of provisional measures.255 It is not clear, 
however, to what extent considerations about representation and consultation indeed already play 
a role in the decision whether or not to take provisional measures in cases involving culture.256 
Clearly, if the aim is to prevent irreparable harm to an indigenous group the victim-
petitioner must be seen to represent the interests of its members. Also, the provisional measures 
required should not be such as to cause irreparable harm to other indigenous groups in the area. 
Irreparable harm, however, is not likely to result from a request to postpone industrial activities 
threatening the natural habitat. The fact that the interests of other indigenous groups could even-
tually justify certain infringements of the rights of the petitioners does not mean that the HRC 
could not take provisional measures protecting these rights pending the proceedings.257 In other 
                                                 
253 HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 1990, §29.2. 
254 See Chapter X (Culture). 
255 The first Mikmaq case (1984), HRC A.D. v. Canada (1st Mikmaq case), 29 July 1984 (inadm.) 
relates to representation. See generally about representation Meijknecht (2001), pp. 103-120 and 
p. 189. The Committee observed that the petitioner had not proven that he was authorised to act 
as a representative of the Mikmaq and the HRC declared the case inadmissible. Furthermore, he 
had failed to advance relevant facts supporting the claim that he was personally a victim. One 
member of the Committee pointed out that it should also have dealt with the fundamental 
question whether the right to self-determination in Article 1 could be dealt with under the OP. 
Individual opinion by Roger Errera in A.D. v. Canada, 29 July 1984 (inadm.). 
256 See about the requirement to be personally affected, requirements for other members of a group 
to be similarly affected, the possibility to submit a communication collectively and the role of the 
representative Meijknecht (2001), pp. 184-190. About the international legal capacity, 
international subjectivity and ius standi of indigenous peoples in general see Meijknecht (2001), 
Chapters 3-5. 
257 In this case the State had pointed out that there were competing claims from ‘several other native 
communities in the area’, but the Band accused Canada of having sent agents to the area 
immediately surrounding the traditional Lubicon territory in order to induce native individuals to 
strike their own private deals with the federal government. HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 
1990, §5.7. In the discussion following the Committee’s interlocutory decision of July 1989, 
requesting information and repeating its provisional measures, the petitioner submitted that the 
State party had further violated Articles 1, 26 and 27 ICCPR by creating the ‘Woodland Cree 
 Protection 
639 
words, competing interests should generally not prevent the use of this type of provisional meas-
ures. On the other hand, by arguing or implying that other indigenous groups or other members of 
the same group have differing views about the risk of irreparable harm to the natural habitat a 
State could try to convince the Committee not to take provisional measures or to withdraw those 
measures already taken.258  
In any case, it is not clear whether or to what extent the State’s argument about conflicting 
interests of indigenous groups, or the lack of clarity in general about the factual situation, played a 
role in the HRC’s eventual decision in Lubicon on the reparation required, with its ambiguous 
wording and consequent reflection on the purpose of its provisional measures in future cases.259 
Discord among potential beneficiaries of the Committee’s provisional measures could be 
relevant to the Committee’s assessment whether such measures are warranted.260  
                                                                                                                       
Band’ in an alleged attempt to ‘fabricate’ a competing claim to traditional Lubicon lands. He 
pointed out that the federal government had supported the new Band both financially and legally, 
‘recognising it “with unprecedented dispatch”, thereby bypassing more than 70 other groups, 
including six different homogenous Cree communities in northern Alberta that had been awaiting 
recognition as Bands for over 50 years’, §27.5. The Lubicon Lake Band received support from 
the Assembly of First Nations and others. On 7 November 1989 the National Chief of the 
Assembly of First Nations sent a letter to the Prime Minister of Canada, pointing out that the 
Lubicon Lake Nation had been waiting for more than 50 years for ‘an acknowledgment of their 
rights to their unceded, traditional lands’. In this letter he expressed concern about apparent 
tampering with Band membership lists. In January 1990 the Mohawk Council of Kahnawake 
considered it ‘extremely prejudicial’ that the authorities created the Woodland Cree Band ‘in the 
face of long standing, unresolved negotiations over the Lubicon Lake Indian Nation unceded 
territory and compensation’. He expressed concern that this ‘divide and conquer tactic’ would be 
used elsewhere too when the authorities would consider the negotiation process with existing 
Bands unsatisfactory. On 8 March 1990 the Grand Council of Treaty 8 Nations passed a 
resolution strongly supporting the Lubicon Lake Nation ‘and its inherent jurisdiction to determine 
its own membership and to the ownership of the Lands and Resources in its Traditional 
Territory’. It condemned the actions of the Canadian government, seeking ‘to undermine the 
rights and jurisdiction of the Lubicon Lake Nation by the creation of the Woodland Cree Band’ 
and resolved not to recognize the Woodland Cree Band. On 20 March 1990 the Chief of the 
Assembly of First Nations addressed the Prime Minister once more. He also sent copies of this 
letter to several addresses, including the HRC. See <nativenet.uthscsa.edu/archive/nl/91d/ 
0071.html> (accessed on 23 August 2003) The HRC did not refer to this, but dismissed as an 
abuse of the right of submission under Article 3 OP the Lubicon Lake Band’s allegations ‘that the 
State party has conspired to create an artificial band, the Woodland Cree Band, said to have 
competing claims to traditional Lubicon land’. See HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 1990, 
§32.3. On 22 December 1990 the Edmonton Journal published an editorial in which it noted that 
it was time for a Lubicon deal. It pointed out that Bands with legal status under the Indian Act 
had submitted 578 specific claims since 1973, only 205 of which had been either rejected or 
resolved. It noted that according to the Assembly of First Nations only 44 claims had been 
‘settled to mutual satisfaction in the past 17 years’. The editorial noted the ‘cynical motivation 
behind Ottawa’s generosity to the Woodland Cree in Northern Alberta’ and pointed out that the 
authorities hoped that the Lubicon Lake band would now give in and ‘stop claiming 
compensation for millions of dollars in resource revenue pumped from their own land for years 
without their permission’. Republished on <nativenet.uthscsa.edu/archive/nl/91d/0071.html> 
(accessed on 23 August 2003). 
258 On the assessment of material urgency for the use of provisional measures see Chapter XV. 
259 See Chapter X (Indigenous culture) and section 5 of this chapter, on the relationship between 
provisional measures and reparation. 
260 The issue of conflicting rights also surfaced briefly in Länsman II when a group of Sami other 
than the petitioners addressed the Committee, disagreeing with them. HRC Länsman II, 30 
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In Sara et al. v. Finland (inadm. 1994)261 the addressee State had also referred to conflicting 
positions by reindeer herdsmen. By doing this it equally may have been suggesting disagreement 
between the beneficiaries about the risk of irreparable harm to the environment.262 The petitioners 
pointed out that their rights under Article 27 ICCPR should not be denied just because they had 
not been able to maintain all traditional methods of reindeer herding.263 Equally, they noted that 
not all herdsmen in Finland were in fact Sami. This could put into perspective the supposed dis-
agreement among the beneficiaries.  
The question also arises whether only the petitioners are the beneficiaries of the provisional 
measures, whether all the members of the two Sami Herdsmen Committees are or all Finnish 
Sami. 
Equally the question arises whether the rights of the non-Sami Herdsmen, who clearly are 
no beneficiaries of the provisional measures, should play a role in the Committee’s decision to 
take or maintain provisional measures. In Sara, for instance, the State pointed out that the Wil-
derness Act was based on a ‘philosophy of co-existence of reindeer herding and forest economy’. 
Referring to the unemployment figures in Finnish Lapland it noted:  
“While the Government fully took into account the requirements of article 27 of the Covenant, 
it could not ignore the economic and social rights of that part of the population whose 
subsistence depends on logging activities”.264 
Another concept that has entered the equation is that of the economic well-being of the State’s 
population in general.265 In Länsman I the HRC pointed out that a ‘State may understandably 
                                                                                                                       
October 1996, §4.3. After the HRC had taken provisional measures, a group of Sami Forestry 
officials from the Inari area, earning their living from forestry and wood economy, submitted that 
reindeer husbandry and forestry could be practised simultaneously with reindeer herding. They 
pointed out that when forestry activities would be forbidden in the area, ‘Sami groups practising 
two different professions would be subject to unequal treatment’, ibid. In response the petitioners 
stated that the local branch of the Central Forestry Board had apparently organized a small group 
of its employees of Sami ethnic origin to approach the Committee for the purpose of expressing 
concern for their employment. 
261 HRC Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.). 
262 The State had noted that other herdsmen had in fact requested preservative logging, arguing that 
this would be to the advantage of the lichen and would sustain the tree population. It also referred 
to the Association of Herdsmen’s Committees, which had noted that ‘the income derived from 
logging is essential for securing the herdsmen’s livelihood and, furthermore, forestry jobs are 
essential to forest workers and those Sami herdsmen who work in the forests apart from breeding 
reindeer’. 
263 “While Finnish Sami have not been able to maintain all traditional methods of reindeer herding, 
their practice still is a distinct Sami form of reindeer herding, carried out in community with other 
members to the group and prescribed by the natural habitat. Snow scooters have not destroyed 
this form of nomadic reindeer herding. Other than in Sweden and Norway, Finland allows 
reindeer herding for others than Samis; thus, the southern parts of the country are used by 
herdsmen’s committees which now largely resort to fencing and artificial feeding”. HRC Sara et 
al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.), §7.4. 
264 HRC Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.), §4.6. 
265 States have tried to convince the HRC that economic and social rights of the general population 
could justify transgressions upon the cultural rights of indigenous peoples. The European 
Commission on Human Rights indeed acknowledged as a justification for infringements on the 
right to respect for the particular life style of the Sami the interest of the economic well being of 
the country as a whole. See G. and E. v. Norway (inadm. 1993). The Commission noted ‘a 
minority group is, in principle, entitled to claim the right to respect for the particular life style it 
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wish to encourage development or allow economic activity by enterprises’ but the ‘scope of its 
freedom to do so is not to be assessed by reference to a margin of appreciation’.266 Rather, the 
scope of this freedom must be assessed by reference to its obligations in Art. 27 ICCPR. Still, the 
HRC pointed out that measures with ‘a certain limited impact’ will not necessarily amount to a 
denial of this article.267 Schmidt notes that the HRC ‘had to balance the applicants’ interests 
against general economic interests advanced by the Finnish Government’. Thus it ‘implicitly 
granted the state party what amounted to a margin of appreciation’ in determining whether their 
rights had been protected sufficiently.268 On the other hand, Scheinin notes the Committee’s 
decision in Kitok in which the HRC ‘referred to the well-being of the Sami minority, not to the 
economic well-being of the country as a whole’.269 Hence, he considers that the HRC has been 
willing to accept justifications for infringements on the right of an individual member of an 
indigenous group to enjoy his own culture if they aim at protecting the indigenous group as a 
whole, rather than if based on arguments about the interests of the general population. When 
taking Scheinin’s interpretation regarding the Committee’s decisions on the merits it seems 
unlikely that arguments about social and economic rights of the general population will play a 
role in its decisions on provisional measures. In any case, the HRC could more appropriately 
consider general interests in the reporting procedure under Article 40 ICCPR.270 
                                                                                                                       
may lead as being “private life”, “family life” or “home”’ (p. 35). It was also ‘prepared to accept’ 
that the consequences for the petitioners arising from the construction of a hydro-electric plant 
did interfere with their private life and traditional activities ‘as a minority, who move their herds 
and deer around over a considerable distance’. Yet this interference was limited to a 
‘comparatively small area’. Thus the Commission seemed to imply that the extent of the 
interference was insufficient for purposes of Article 8(1) ECHR. Nevertheless it continued by 
stating that it did not ascertain ‘the exact extent and nature of the interference’ under Article 8(1), 
but considered that such interference could in any case ‘reasonably be considered as being 
justified’ under Article 8(2) ECHR, among others ‘in the interest of the economic well-being of 
the country’ (p. 36). Following this substantive discussion it declared this part of the petition 
inadmissible as manifestly ill-founded. 
266 HRC Ilmari Länsman et al. v. Finland, 26 October 1994, §9.4. 
267 Ibid. 
268 Schmidt (1997), p. 338. 
269 See Scheinin (2001), p. 169. 
270 An interesting case dealt with by the Bosnia Chamber is Lukenda and Bevanda v. Fed. B&H, 5 
July 2001 (inadm.). Petitioners in this case sought the Chamber’s withdrawal of the provisional 
measures it had ordered in another case, Dautbegović and 51 other villagers from the village of 
Duge v. Fed. B&H, 6 July 2001. These provisional measures required the respondent party ‘to 
take all necessary measures to ensure that the construction works on the planned hydro-electric 
power plant near the village of Duge be stopped’, §3. The petitioners requested ‘as a provisional 
measure’ that the Chamber withdraw this provisional measure, as they wished to continue 
construction of their power plant. The Chamber decided instead to extend its provisional 
measures in Dautbegović until it would adopt its final decision in that case or withdraw the order, 
§5. The case submitted by Lukenda and Bevanda was subsequently declared inadmissible as 
manifestly ill-founded: the approval and permits for the construction of the power plant ‘on a site 
protected as an asset of natural heritage’ were not issued in accordance with law, §107. 
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4.4 Extending the group of beneficiaries, identification and representation 
4.4.1 Introduction 
As noted, the beneficiaries of provisional measures in a given case do not necessarily coincide 
with the alleged victim. Moreover, they may also be a group of beneficiaries rather than just one 
or two persons. The issue of larger groups of beneficiaries has arisen mostly in three types of 
cases: death threats and harassment, mass expulsion and survival of indigenous groups.271 Often, 
in consecutive provisional measures, the group of beneficiaries is extended. At times it is difficult 
to provide the names of all intended beneficiaries. Yet especially if this is not possible, the ques-
tion arises to what extent they consider themselves to be represented by the petitioners. 
This section first deals with extension of the group in general, then focuses on the question 
whether each person to be protected must be identified by name, whether provisional measures 
could play a role in early warning mechanisms, and finally it gives an example where, in a case in 
which not all of them were identified by name, some of them brought a motion for self-
representation. 
4.4.2 Extending the group of beneficiaries 
Usually the HRC has used provisional measures on behalf of an individual or, if the complaint 
was filed by a group of persons, on behalf of all persons. Only in some cases dealing with the 
right to culture the group of beneficiaries encompassed in fact a larger group of persons than just 
those mentioned by name in the application. In the other systems provisional measures have 
sometimes benefited others than the individual victim as well.  
The Inter-American Court’s first provisional measures halting executions aimed to protect 
five persons whose cases were pending before the Inter-American Commission. Subsequently, it 
amplified its provisional measures from five to 41 beneficiaries.272 In the Inter-American system 
the list of beneficiaries is regularly extended to include new persons, most often in cases involv-
                                                 
271 See Chapters IX (Threats); XI (Mass expulsion) and X (Culture).  
272 IACHR James et al. cases, Orders of 25 October 2001 and 26 November 2001 (President). For 
previous Orders see James et al. cases, Orders of 29 June 1998 and 13 July 1998 (President); 
James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order of 22 July 1998. James et al. cases, Order of 
29 August 1998. James et al. cases, Order of 11 May 1999 (President) and Order of 25 May 
1999. James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 27 May 1999. James et al. cases, Order 
of the President for urgent measures, 19 June 1999 and Order for provisional measures, 25 
September 1999. Trinidad executed two of them: Joey Ramiah and Anthony Briggs. Initially, as 
noted before, the cases of these beneficiaries were still pending before the Commission when the 
Court ordered provisional measures. Later, the Commission brought before the Court the three 
cases Hilaire, Constantine et al. and Benjamin et al. IACHR Hilaire v. Trinidad and Tobago 
case, judgment of 1 September 2001 (preliminary objections); Constantine et al. v. Trinidad and 
Tobago, judgment of 1 September 2001 (preliminary objections); Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and 
Tobago case, judgment of 1 September 2001 preliminary objections. Together these cases dealt 
with 32 persons. All beneficiaries, however, were protected under the same Order for provisional 
measures. Of the five beneficiaries of the first Order for provisional measures, only two were 
included in the Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago Judgment. One 
of the persons not included was the aforementioned Anthony Briggs. The other two were 
Anderson Noel and Christopher Bethel. In its Judgment, moreover, the Court did not deal with 
the cases of three more persons who were included as beneficiaries since the Court’s Order of 25 
May 1999: Kevin Dial, Andrew Dottin and Anthony Johnson. 
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ing threats.273 Indeed, in its Annual Reports the Inter-American Commission emphasises that the 
number of precautionary measures is not the same as the number of persons protected by them. 
The Commission grants many precautionary measures aimed at protecting several individuals or 
even ‘a group of persons who cannot be counted, such as entire populations or communities’.274 
As Judge Cançado Trindade pointed out, the Inter-American Court’s provisional measures have 
covered almost 12,000 persons and even the members of whole communities. Thereby they have 
become a true preventive judicial guarantee.275 
As noted, a distinct feature of the provisional measures in the Inter-American system is that 
the beneficiaries are not only the direct victims276 and their family in a pending case before the 
Inter-American Commission or Court, but also witnesses, counsel and others. Many of the per-
sons abducted, disappeared or murdered had received threats previously. Moreover, the Court was 
faced with information of threats to witnesses and others involved in cases pending before it (or 
before the Commission). In response to this situation the Court decided to expand the scope of 
beneficiaries for the provisional measures from alleged victims and their family alone, to wit-
nesses, counsel and others involved. Later the scope became even wider. Witnesses in a case 
pending before a local judge, human rights defenders, persons visiting the premises of a human 
rights organisation, etc. may become the beneficiary of a precautionary or provisional measure as 
well.277 
In the European system at times provisional measures have also been used on behalf of lar-
ger groups of persons. In Becker v. Denmark (1976) the petitioner was the director of an organisa-
tion called Project Children’s Protection and Security International. His petition concerned ‘the 
alleged violation of the Convention by the Danish Government in the envisaged repatriation of 
199 Vietnamese children’. The European Commission indeed used provisional measures on be-
half of this large group of beneficiaries.278 
In Islamic Community in BiH v. Republika Srpska (Muslim Town Cemetery in Prnjavor) the 
Bosnia Chamber initially refused to take provisional measures in the absence of individual threats 
of exhumation or interference with burials. In the face of a specific domestic decision prohibiting 
a burial the Chamber did order provisional measures. Apparently it phrased them more generally, 
                                                 
273 See e.g. IACHR Alvarez et al. case (Colombia), Orders of the President of 22 July 1997 and 
subsequent Orders by the Court, such as that of 8 February 2008. The measures included the 
provision of a cell phone and a security camera.  
274 See e.g. CIDH Annual Report, 2000, §8. 
275 See e.g. IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" 
Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, individual opinion 
Judge Cançado Trindade, §4. This includes about 6,000 beneficiaries in the Matter of Pueblo 
indígena de Kankuamo (Colombia), more than 1,200 in the Matter of the Peace Community of 
San José de Apartadó (Colombia); more than 2,000 in the Matter of the Communities of 
Jiguamiandó and Curbaradó (Colombia), almost 900 in the Matter of Urso Branco Prison 
(Brazil) and about 1,200 in the Matter of Pueblo indígena de Sarayaku (Ecuador). 
276 In practice, the petitioner normally is an international NGO, representing the victims and any 
other beneficiary of the provisional measure. 
277 See also e.g. Matter of the Yare I and Yare II Capital Region Penitentiary Center (Yare Prison) 
(Venezuela), Order of 30 March 2006 (also on behalf of those persons who may, in the future, 
enter the prison as inmates, as well as those who work there, and those who enter as visitors) and 
IACHR Asunto de la Cárcel de Urso Branco (Brasil), Resolución de 2 de mayo de 2008 
(including the protection of the life and personal integrity of visitors and security agents; and the 
obligation of the State to provide an up-to-date list of those who had been killed). 
278 EComHR Becker v. Denmark, 3 October 1975 (inadm.), D&R 4, p. 215. See also e.g. EComHR 
B., M. and 51 others v. Spain, 11 September 1992 involving 53 refugees waiting on no man’s 
land in the burning sun, without water, shelter or sanitation.  
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to apply not only to that specific burial, but instead ordering Srpska to prohibit the Municipal 
authorities of Prnjavor from obstructing further burials at the Muslim Town Cemetery.279 
Sometimes provisional measures have also benefited a larger group than the beneficiaries 
referred to. The provisional measures by the ECtHR ordering the Netherlands to halt the expul-
sion of a Somalian asylum-seeker serve as an example.280 In order to make sure that the Secretary 
of State on migration issues understood that the European Court’s decision also applied to other 
asylum seekers similarly situated, the Court exceptionally281 included an explanatory sentence to 
that effect as well. This was done in order to prevent a flood of cases being brought before the 
Court in Strasbourg. In a way the other, similarly situated, Somalian asylum seekers could be seen 
as de facto beneficiaries of the Court’s provisional measures.282  
If the provisional measure concerns halting an expulsion of certain persons to a certain State 
(e.g. in a situation of civil war) counsel for other persons similarly situated and risking expulsion 
to that same State could argue that it would be a pro-active good faith application of the treaty to 
halt these other expulsions as well, pending determination of the proceeding in which the provi-
sional measures were used. This would also be in accordance with the rationale of the rule on 
exhaustion of domestic remedies and the idea of the subsidiary nature of international supervi-
sion. Moreover the State would prevent recourse to international proceedings by these other per-
sons as well as the ensuing embarrassment of more provisional measures of a similar nature. Of 
course such argument would apply only if the persons involved were truly similarly situated. 
While a provisional measure does not concern an ‘examination’ of the case, persons simi-
larly situated could refer domestically to the provisional measures by an international or regional 
adjudicator.283 
Sometimes groups are in urgent need of protection, but the use of provisional measures is 
not an option. As part of the reporting procedure under Article 40 ICCPR, the HRC has started to 
identify in its Concluding Observations certain urgent issues requiring follow-up. It has also 
decided to appoint one of its members as a Special Rapporteur on the follow-up of Concluding 
Observations.284 Thus, the Special Rapporteur on the follow-up of Views now has its counterpart 
vis-à-vis the reporting procedure. Some of the issues the Rapporteur on Concluding Observations 
may have to deal with could relate to individuals in urgent situations. These situations may be 
comparable to those necessitating provisional measures as part of the individual complaint proce-
                                                 
279 Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH v. Republika Srpska (Muslim Town Cemetery in 
Prnjavor), 11 January 2000. 
280 See President ECtHR, Note Verbale with provisional measure, 3 May 2004, in case 15243/04, 
published in the Dutch journal JV 226 (Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht). See further Rieter 
(2005a) and (2006). 
281 See Chapter II (Systems), section 8.2 on the issue of transparency of information. 
282 See also ECtHR judgment NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, which concerned even a greater number of 
cases involving imminent expulsion to Sri Lanka. The judgment referred to the unwillingness by 
the UK to take a general measure halting the expulsion of Tamils to Sri Lanka, resulting in the 
Court’s being forced to order provisional measures 342 times in individual cases submitted by 
petitioners at risk of being deported from the UK to Sri Lanka, §§21-22. 
283 See further Rieter (2005a) and (2006). See also IACHR Communities of the Jiguamiandó and of 
the Curbaradó, Order of 6 March 2003, Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §4 (‘the 
protection of human rights determined by the American Convention, to be effective, comprises 
not only the relations between the individuals and the public power, but also their relations with 
third parties (…). This reveals the new dimensions of the international protection of human 
rights, as well as the great potential of the existing mechanisms of protection, – such as that of the 
American Convention, – set in motion in order to protect collectively the members of a whole 
community, even though the basis of action is the breach – or the probability or imminence of 
breach – of individual rights’). 
284 See further Chapter XVIII (Follow up) 
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dure. It is likely that these situations would often concern the plight of certain groups, in other 
words that the group of beneficiaries of this follow-up would be larger and have a more collective 
dimension than the group of beneficiaries of the Committee’s provisional measures. The urgent 
situations may also concern threats to rights for the protection of which the HRC does not use 
provisional measures. The urgent issues approach is a useful complementary approach for those 
situations where provisional measures are unsuitable (e.g. involving virtually the whole popula-
tion of a large area) or simply not an option because the State in question did not recognise the 
individual complaint procedure under the Covenant.285 
4.4.3 Early warning 
Early warning systems and other preventive mechanisms aim to protect large groups of people, 
while provisional measures normally concern smaller groups.286 In that respect the approach of 
the Inter-American Court, using provisional measures involving large groups of beneficiaries, 
deserves more attention by other human rights adjudicators. Of course the role of the Inter-
American Commission with its combined function of investigator, adjudicator, mediator and 
petitioner, is very important in this respect. Because of, among others, its country visits it is more 
familiar with specific country situations and able to provide concrete suggestions for the use and 
implementation of provisional measures to protect groups of persons against threats. It is able to 
negotiate with representatives of the beneficiaries and the State. For other, especially for global, 
adjudicators acquiring the relevant knowledge of the situation may be more difficult. 
Nevertheless, they could also be inventive in creating mechanisms for negotiation about the 
implementation of such provisional measures. Maybe international adjudicators could informally 
contact UN Special Rapporteurs of the Human Rights Council in certain States to provide good 
offices for the negotiation of protective measures between the beneficiaries and State authorities. 
In some cases they could even provide suggestions and act as a mediator. If country visits and 
hearings are not possible, regional adjudicators could also suggest the good offices of 
organisations trusted by both the beneficiaries and the State. An example of such an organisation 
could be the OSCE. In some respects organisations such as the OSCE or the European prison 
visiting committee under the European Convention against Torture already perform the function 
of intervening against threats to life and personal integrity. Nevertheless, the latter Committee 
mostly only intervenes in specific cases if it happens to be visiting detention centre concerned.  
4.4.4 Individual identification of each beneficiary? 
4.4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the Inter-American system the group of beneficiaries sometimes even involves unnamed 
individuals. It may be difficult to access all persons at risk or obtain all official information.287 
                                                 
285 On serious and mass violations in general, see e.g. Medina Quiroga (1988) and Murray (1999), 
pp. 109-133. 
286 With regard to high and low intensity conflicts and violent political conflicts in States that have 
ratified individual complaint proceedings, frequent use of provisional measures may be an 
indicator for early warning as well as a form of early intervention in specific cases. Yet in 
practice the step from early warning to early action often proves to be difficult with regard to 
large groups under threat. See e.g. Grünfeld/Huĳboom (2007) and Grünfeld (2000), pp. 131-143. 
287 See e.g. the exchange of information between the Court and the State relating to the death of one 
of the beneficiaries in IACHR Blake case, Order of 6 June 2003: “Justo Victoriano Martínez 
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The Commission and Court have sometimes ordered a State to protect a specific group as such 
rather than just those members of the group mentioned by name. In a mass expulsion case in 2000 
the inter-American Court still refused to do so, but later that year, in a case involving death threats 
to all members of a ‘peace community’ it did grant an Order on behalf of unnamed persons.288 
4.4.4.2 MASS EXPULSION  
In the case of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Haitian 
case, 2000) the Inter-American Commission requested the Court to order the State to suspend the 
massive expulsions and deportations both of legal and non-documented Haitian workers and of 
legal and non-documented Dominicans of Haitian origin living in the Dominican Republic. It had 
‘acquired knowledge of the identity of some of the alleged victims, who had given their approval 
to being named in the context of the request’.289 It described some of the specific circumstances of 
the seven persons it could specifically name, urging the Court to order provisional measures that 
would permit their immediate return from Haiti to the Dominican Republic or, when they were 
still in the Dominican Republic, protect them from any ‘detention or deportation action based on 
racial or national origin, or on the suspicion that they are not full-fledged citizens’.290 The Court 
indeed ordered provisional measures on behalf of the seven persons specifically named. 
The Commission also asked the Court to protect a group of persons not identified by name. 
It pointed out that it could not get access to these persons. It explained that the State’s practice 
made it impossible to distinguish between individual group members, making all of them targets 
of mass expulsion. In addition, members of the group were afraid to come forward individually. 
The Commission also argued that the Inter-American human rights system simply was not 
equipped to process individual complaints of each member, even if they could be reached and 
would not be afraid to come forward individually.291 As a result the Commission suggested some 
sort of actio popularis instead.  
The State protested that it was necessary to reveal the identity of those persons in danger of 
suffering irreparable harm in order for it to take provisional measures. It emphasised that provi-
                                                                                                                       
Morales, Justo Víctor Martínez Morales and Justo Víctor Morales Martínez” identify one and the 
same person, who was a beneficiary of provisional measures, §13. 
288 For a different approach, see e.g. ECtHR Athanassoglou et al. v. Switzerland (2000) the 
petitioners had requested the ECtHR to take provisional measures to halt the resumption of a 
nuclear power plant. The Court decided not to do so. While it did not indicate its reasons, the 
actio popularis nature of the petition may have played a role. The Court subsequently found that 
Articles 6 and 13 ECHR were not applicable. See Chapter XII (Other situations). In passing it 
also noted that the petitioners had not been able to ‘demonstrate a serious, specific and imminent 
danger in their personal regard’. ECtHR Athanassoglou et al. v. Switzerland, 6 April 2000, §§52 
and 54. The admissibility report of the Commission was called Greenpeace Schweiz et al. v. 
Switzerland. In its judgment on the merits the ECtHR has pointed out that the positive obligation 
of States to protect the right to life relates to situations in which the authorities were aware, or 
should have been aware, of a real risk to the life of an identified individual or individuals. See 
e.g. ECtHR Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, §86 and Osman v. UK, 28 October 1998, 
§116. 
289 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, 3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
290 Ibid. 
291 Id., ‘Having seen’ clause 11c. 
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sional measures on behalf of nameless persons would hinder its right to protect its border and 
control the legal status of its inhabitants.292  
The Court decided not to order provisional measures to protect ‘generically those in a given 
situation or those who are affected by certain measures’.293 It deemed ‘it indispensable to identify 
individually the persons in danger of suffering irreparable damage, for which reason it is not 
feasible to order provisional measures without specific names, for protecting generically those in 
a given situation or those who are affected by certain measures: however, it is possible to protect 
the individualized members of a community’.294 At the same time it did decide to order both the 
State and the Commission to provide it with ‘detailed information on the situation of members of 
the border communities or “bateyes” who could be subject to forced repatriations, deportations or 
expulsions’.295  
                                                 
292 During the hearing of August 2000 the State responded that it was necessary to identify the 
persons on whose behalf provisional measures were being requested. It continued as follows: 
‘however, the Dominican Republic is in the best disposition to study any individual case where 
the violation of rights is alleged’, IACHR case of Haitians and Haitian-origin Dominicans in the 
Dominican Republic, Order of 18 August 2000, ‘Having seen’ clause 12e. In the brief it 
submitted after the public hearing of 8 August 2000 the State alleged that ‘the identity of those 
persons who are in danger of suffering irreparable damage must be revealed for the adoption of 
provisional measures; measures adopted in relationship to nameless persons would only hinder 
the Dominican State’s right to protect its border and control the legal status of the persons who 
enter into its territory and live in it’. The Commission objected to the brief submitted by the State 
upon the closing of the public hearing. In response to a question by the President of the Court 
posed during the public hearing, the Commission indicated that its request for provisional 
measures in this case was an actio popularis, 15th “Having seen’ clause. 
293 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic (Dominican 
Republic), Order of 18 August 2000, 8th ‘Considering’ clause. 
294 The IACHR referred to its Orders in Álvarez et al., 21 January 1998, Clemente Teherán et al., 19 
June 1998, Digna Ochoa and Plácido et al., 17 November 1999. 
295 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order of 18 
August 2000. In its response to the Court’s Order to inform it about the situation of people living 
in ‘bateyes’ at the border area, the Dominican Republic noted that there were ‘bateyes’ only in 
Barahona on the border between the Dominican Republic and Haiti. The community was for 
seventy percent Dominican. Thirty percent was contracted and came to the Dominican Republic 
during the sugar cane harvest. The State did not clarify the actual situation of this Community. In 
his concurring opinion Cançado Trindade referred to the ‘undetermined’ character of the 
community and distinguished this from a community or group whose members can be 
individualised. In this case, he noted, taking an actio popularis approach would have risked to 
‘disfigure the character of provisional measures of protection, in their present stage of historical 
evolution’. Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §§21-22. He emphasised that the Court 
needed to individualise the beneficiaries but that it kept an open eye for the context warranting 
the provisional measures. It also required the State to send it detailed information about the 
situation of the communities or ‘bateyes’ at the border. Concurring Opinion Judge Cançado 
Trinidade, Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order of 18 
August 2000, §22. He furthermore expressed the hope that the measures the Dominican Republic 
would take to implement the individualised provisional measures of the Court would benefit all 
the other persons, who were not mentioned by name in the Commission’s petition, but who found 
themselves in the same situation of vulnerability and risk, §24. On the growing emphasis on actio 
popularis in international human rights adjudication, see also the African Commission in the 
Ogoni case: Social and Economic Rights Action Center for Economic and Social Rights v. 
Nigeria, 6 June 2001, §51: “The Commission thanks the two human rights NGOs who brought 
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4.4.4.3 PROTECTION OF PEACE COMMUNITY  
As noted, the Inter-American Court took an altogether different approach later that year. The 
Peace Community case is instructive for the Inter-American Court’s approach to the group of 
beneficiaries of provisional measures. In his Order for urgent measures on behalf of specific 
members of the Peace Community the President pointed out the more general duty of the States 
Parties, under Article 1(1) ACHR, to respect the rights and freedoms recognised in the Conven-
tion and to guarantee their free and full exercise for every person under their jurisdiction, includ-
ing the inhabitants of the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó. Apart from the persons 
specifically named he expected the State’s protective measures to benefit other people of the same 
Community as well, who may be in a similar situation of vulnerability and risk.296 
During the public hearing of 16 November 2000 the Commission had argued in favour of 
expanding the protection of the Court’s provisional measures from the specific group of benefici-
aries in the President’s Order for urgent measures to all members of the Peace Community. The 
Commission explained its effort to register names of members of the Community in its request for 
provisional measures. This resulted in a list of 193 people,297 but this list was not complete be-
cause ‘the great majority of the members of the Community fear stigmatization and violence 
resulting from such stigmatization, and this is the only reason for which they did not authorize to 
make their names known’.298 The Commission referred to elements allowing for the identification 
of the members of the Community in a collective manner. It first mentioned the geographic ele-
ment: the Community was located in a determined place, in the Municipality of Apartadó, formed 
by 32 surrounding dwellings, such as La Vereda la Unión, where the people identified in the 
President’s Order came from. The other element it mentioned was the fact that belonging to this 
Community implied adherence to a series of norms and bylaws as well as a system of representa-
tion. Its members even identified themselves with an identification card.299 The Commission 
argued that it was suitable to consider the Community in question as a collective entity because 
the fundamental individual rights of each member were at stake, such as the right to life and 
personal integrity.300  
To counter any arguments about the inability of the State to verify whom it needed to pro-
tect, the Commission pointed out that, during the three years in which it maintained its precau-
tionary measures, which had been of a similar nature, the State did not allege ‘having had prob-
lems to identify the people it had to protect’.  
                                                                                                                       
the matter under its purview: the Social and Economic Rights Action Center (Nigeria) and the 
Center for Economic and Social Rights (USA). Such is a demonstration of the usefulness to the 
Commission and individuals of actio popularis, which is wisely allowed under the African 
Charter”. 
296 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 9 October 2000 
(President). 
297 The Court refers to 189 people, but lists 193 persons. 
298 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. 
299 There were also people in the Community who, although not formally identified with this card, 
were living there and were guided by the Community’s principles and wished to become 
members. For the purpose of the provisional measures the Commission indicated that these 
people must be considered as members of the Community as well. 
300 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. The Spanish text is as follows: ‘En el presente caso es conveniente definir a la Comunidad 
de Paz de San José de Apartadó colectivamente, porque se trata de una afectación de derechos 
individuales fundamentales, como la vida y la integridad personal’. 
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“The Commission is convinced that the State understands the collective dimension of the 
problem, knows which people to protect, understands the geographic limits and the element of 
belonging to the Community, as well as the functioning mechanisms”.301 
In November 2000 the Court decided indeed to extend the group of beneficiaries. In its 
considerations, it referred to the State’s report and its arguments during the public hearing. It also 
attached importance to the Commission’s statement that many members of the Community did 
not wish to be identified for fear of reprisals. It differentiated this case from its earlier Order in the 
case of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin. In the latter case it had ‘considered 
indispensable to individualize the people who are in danger of suffering irreparable harm in order 
to provide them with protective measures’. The Peace Community case, on the other hand, had 
special characteristics. 
“Indeed, the Community of Paz de San José de Apartadó, formed according to the Commission 
by about 1200 people, constitutes an organized community located in a determined geographic 
place, whose members can be identified and individualized and who, due to the fact of 
belonging to said community, all its members are in a situation of similar risk of suffering acts 
of aggression against their personal integrity and lives”.302 
Thus the Court considered that it was not only suitable to order provisional measures on behalf of 
the people already protected by the President’s urgent measures of 9 October 2000 but also, for 
the reasons presented in the public hearing ‘to expand them so that they cover all of the members 
of the aforementioned Community’. Consequently, it first ratified the President’s Order ‘in all its 
terms’ and then expanded these measures by ordering the State ‘to extend, forthwith, any meas-
ures as may be necessary to protect the lives and personal integrity of all of the other members of 
the Community of Paz de San José de Apartadó’.303  
Judges Abreu Burelli and García Ramírez more closely discussed the issue of beneficiaries 
in their concurring opinion. They acknowledged that in the majority of cases it is indeed possible 
to identify individually the potential victims of the violation the provisional measure aims to 
protect. Yet there are cases where such precise individualisation proves difficult, at least initially. 
The real and imminent threat might be a threat against a great number of people who find them-
selves in more or less similar circumstances, putting them at risk. In such situations their protec-
tion is necessary even though it is not yet possible to individualise the subjects of the provisional 
protection by name. Such provisional protection, after all, always and by definition is an urgent 
protection.304  
“To delay action until those exposed to that threat of grave and irreparable harm to legally 
protected interests – embodied in rights – can be individually identified would be to run the risk 
that the harm would materialize before the Court could intervene to prevent it, even though it 
had already established that the threat was not only possible but also probable and imminent. 
Thus, a surmountable technicality would prevent the Court from acting swiftly to fulfil its true 
mandate: to use the shield of its jurisdictional power to protect threatened rights. It would be 
                                                 
301 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. 
302 Id., 7th ‘Considering’ clause. 
303 Id., 3rd ‘Decisional’ clause. 
304 Id., Concurring Opinion of Judge Abreu Burelli and García Ramírez. 
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hard to make the case that that kind of judicial restraint was consistent with the Inter-American 
Court’s essential mission of protecting human rights”.305 
They considered the situation similar to that of ‘diffuse interests’: a group of people with various 
backgrounds shares a determined interest, legally relevant, that requires public protection. Yet, 
none of these subjects can be considered holder of a subjective right with regard to the right they 
invoke, nor can they attribute to themselves such entitlement in a way that would exclude the 
other subjects who find themselves in the same situation. In those circumstances anyone of them 
could resort to the relevant legal body and request the adoption of measures that would preserve 
the common interest of the group. In such case one would speak of an actio popularis or class 
action.306 The situation may indeed be similar to the example given by the two judges, but it is 
certainly not the same. After all, each inhabitant of the Community of San José de Apartadó who 
is threatened definitely could be considered the holder of subjective rights. The difference is that 
not all of them have individually claimed this before the Inter-American Court. 
The two judges referred to the Court’s Order in the case of the Haitians and Dominicans of 
Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic in which it considered that it was indispensable to 
individualise the persons at risk and that it would not be feasible to order provisional measures 
without mentioning the names of the beneficiaries (‘de manera innominada’) simply in order to 
protect generically all people who could find themselves in a certain situation or could be affected 
by certain measures because the provisional measures could now protect a group of people with 
various backgrounds, without individualising them in advance. The judges pointed out that the 
Peace Community case went much further. Based on the protective criterion it was a reasonable 
extension of the scope of provisional measures to a larger group of beneficiaries in a way that fit 
in well with their preventive purpose. In its new approach, the Court’s determination whether 
someone belongs to the group of victims who are to be beneficiaries of its provisional measures is 
not based on the knowledge and the precise manifestation of each individual by name, but on 
objective criteria -taking into account their links to the group in question and the risks involved- 
that would permit individualisation of the beneficiaries at the moment of implementation of the 
measures. In other words, the aim is to cover the risk run by all inhabitants of a community and 
not only, as normally is the case, the risk run by some individuals.307  
4.4.4.4 MORE GENERALISED PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
On several occasions since this case the Court has used a more general provisional measure where 
not all the beneficiaries are mentioned by name. As has been noted, this type of provisional meas-
ures may involve ethnic groups, a group of workers or members involved in a peace community 
‘linked by a common geography, which could change, and certain common decisions which were 
the source of the risks to individual and collective interests’.308 Such situations reveal ‘a common-
                                                 
305 Concurring Opinion by Judge García-Ramírez in IACHR Matter of Pueblo Indígena de 
Sarayaku, Order of 6 July 2004, §5. 
306 Concurring Opinion of Judge Abreu Burelli and García Ramírez, Peace Community of San José 
de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 2000.  
307 The two judges also emphasised the need to take into account that, in the circumstances of this 
case, the victims did not want to provide their names because this might make them even more 
vulnerable. Concurring Opinion of Judge Abreu Burelli and García Ramírez, Peace Community 
of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 2000. 
308 Concurring Opinion by Judge García-Ramírez on IACHR Matter of Pueblo Indígena de 
Sarayaku, Order of 6 July 2004, §§8-9. 
 Protection 
651 
ality of situation, which implies, in this case, a commonality of danger’.309 To give a few exam-
ples, when Maria Eugenia Cárdenas and her family were being threatened she was asked to iden-
tify her relatives but she did not want to name them for fear this might actually put them even 
more at risk. The Court then decided just to refer to Ms. Cárdenas ‘and her next of kin’.310 Yet in 
the context of the same case it did point out that ‘in order to ensure an effective protection of the 
next of kin of Francisco García, it is advisable that they should be duly identified before the State 
by the Inter-American Commission’.311 
While most of the beneficiaries of the Court are still individualized, a substantial portion is 
not. In 2006, for instance, 21% of the beneficiaries of the Court’s provisional measures were 
‘natural persons, not individualized, members of a group’ and 80% concerned ‘natural persons 
individualized’.312  
In sum, the Inter-American Commission’s precautionary measures on behalf of human 
rights defenders and others have become more specific and include an obligation of the State to 
consult with the beneficiaries. This specificity was necessary to make effective the precautionary 
measure. At the same time it turned out that, in the interest of the persons who were being threat-
ened, it was sometimes necessary to be less specific about the names of the beneficiaries. While 
in the past, mentioning the names of the persons to be protected in the precautionary measure 
often was a guarantee for their safety and while often this is still the case, in some cases the bene-
ficiaries prefer not to be mentioned by name for fear of pointing attention to themselves in a way 
that would in fact worsen their situation. In other cases the beneficiaries are now less specifically 
listed because they are an entire community or another group, such as everyone visiting the prem-
ises of a certain human rights organisation. 
Indeed, the Commission has pointed out that its precautionary measures can protect ‘either 
one person or an unquantifiable group of persons, often covering entire populations or communi-
ties’.313 
In the first case in which the Inter-American Commission took precautionary measures to 
ensure access to HIV medication the petitioning NGO had requested the Commission to name 
only one of the persons involved and not to disclose the names of the other 26 victims. The 
Commission respected this request and noted in its report that El Salvador was informed of the 
names and that they are on file at the Secretariat of the Commission.314  
                                                 
309 Id., §9. 
310 See e.g. IACHR Alvarez et al. v. Colombia, Order of 13 May 2001, 1st ‘Decisional’ clause. 
311 Id., 8th ‘Considering’ clause. 
312 See IACHR Annual Report 2006, part IV Statistics of the Court, p. 93. See also its statistics for 
2005, referring to 20%, Annual Report 2005, p. 76. For examples other than the matter of the 
Peace Community, see e.g. Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement 
Center, Order of 8 February 2008, 21st ‘Considering’ clause and references therein relating to 
(indigenous) peoples and detainees. In this case the Court noted that ‘the possible beneficiaries 
are identifiable since they are people who are confined or could be admitted as inmates in the 
future’. 
313 CIDH Annual Report, 2001, Chapter III (a), §10 (discussing the Haitian case). In June 2001 the 
Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of nine named persons and ‘other members 
of the Embera Katio indigenous community of Alto Sinú’ who had been abducted from the 
community’s main town and the neighbouring areas. It asked Colombia to take the necessary 
steps to clarify the whereabouts of the persons who had been abducted and to protect their lives 
and persons. On behalf of the other members of that indigenous community, who had not yet 
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and punish those responsible for the attacks against the indigenous community. Annual Report 
2001, §17. 
314 CIDH Jorge Odir Miranda Cortéz et al v. El Salvador, 7 March 2001 (adm.).  
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In Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil (adm. 1997) the petitioners had alleged that a 
death squad formed by large ranchers had been murdering ‘persons involved in or suspected of 
being involved in land occupations in the region’. The Commission also received information 
‘that these persons were alleged to be part of a “list of persons marked for death”, known as the 
“Xinguara list”, drawn up by those large ranchers, and including the names of dozens of per-
sons’.315 The petitioners requested precautionary measures on behalf of everyone on this list. 
Initially the Commission ‘asked the petitioner to provide the name of all the members of the 
“Xinguara list”, so that the Commission could request that the precautionary measures be ex-
tended to all the persons threatened, not only Father Ricardo Rezende’.316 The petitioner provided 
additional information as as to ‘the “Xinguara list”, petitioner reported that the list was found at 
the Fazenda Nazaré and that the local police knew whose names were on the list. Even so, the 
petitioner had not gained access to most of the names of the persons threatened due to the com-
plicity of the police with the criminals’.317 Moreover, ‘the persons against whom the judge of 
Xinguara had issued arrest warrants were free’ and ‘this was due to the irregular acts of the civil-
ian and military police’.318 On this basis the Commission decided to expand its precautionary 
measures to include everyone on the list, without requiring all names.319 
In detention cases the Court has also included all detainees, visitors and employees in its 
protective Orders. It has ordered provisional measures, for instance, in a matter pending before 
the Commission, where ‘the potential beneficiaries are identifiable, as they are persons held in 
prison, who might be held in prison in the future, or who enter the prison either in the course of 
their normal business or occasionally, either as officers or as visitors’.320 In this respect the fact 
that some beneficiaries are subsequently transferred to other detention facilities does not take 
away their status as a beneficiary. The State is still responsible for their custody and they are still 
identifiable.321  
In short, as Cançado Trindade has pointed out, in the last decade provisional measures have 
assumed considerable importance. About 12.000 persons in Latin America and the Caribbean, 
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2006, without regard to the fact that they have been referred to some other penitentiary, since the 
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including the members of whole communities, are covered by the Court’s provisional meas-
ures.322 
4.4.5 Identification and representation 
In its provisional measures in the case of the Communities of the Jiguamiandó and the Curbaradó 
(2003) the Court considered that it was ‘appropriate to order provisional measures of protection 
for the members of the communities composed of the Community Council of the Jiguamiandó 
and the families of the Curbaradó that encompass all the members of the said communities’. It 
noted that ‘it is evident that the communities comprising the Community Council of the 
Jiguamiandó and the families of the Curbaradó, made up of approximately 2,125 persons, forming 
515 families, constitute an organized community, situated in a specific geographical location in 
the municipality of Carmen del Darién, Department of Chocó, whose members can be identified 
and specified and who, because they form part of the said community, are all in a situation of 
equal risk of suffering acts of aggression against their safety and lives, as well as being forcibly 
displaced from their territory, a situation that prevents them from exploiting the natural resources 
necessary for their subsistence’.323 
The subsequent developments in this case show how identification and representation can 
be interrelated. Several years after the initial Order, the representative of the 32 families of Puerto 
Lleras and Pueblo Nuevo of Jiguamiandó river basin, and the representative of the 177 families of 
the Community Council of Curbaradó had rejected and challenged the representation by the NGO 
petitioning this case324 ‘and they requested to be granted the same guarantees provided to other 
displaced groups to access the “humanitarian zones” represented by such organization and direct 
communication with the State to agree on measures to their benefit. In that regard, the State in-
formed the Court that it had received various petitions from those who claim to represent said 
                                                 
322 IACHR Las penitentiarías de Mendoza v. Argentina, Order of 30 March 2006, Individual 
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victims who benefit from the measures is not based on the precise identification and indication of 
each individual by name, but according to objective criteria – based on the linkage of 
membership and the observed risks – which will permit the beneficiaries to be specified when the 
measures are implemented. The intention is to encompass the danger faced by the members of a 
community, not merely a few individuals, as is generally the case. It is also necessary to take into 
account that one of the elements of this case, which could characterize other cases, is that the 
potential victims choose not to provide their names, owing to the very real risk that this 
identification might increase their exposure to the irreparable damage that we are trying to 
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Order corresponding to the Peace Community of San José de Apartadó, is the one that prevails 
today in the Court’s jurisprudence, as can be observed in the measures adopted for the 
Communities of the Jiguamiandó and the Curbaradó. In this case, the measures encompass a 
group of identifiable persons who, because they form part of a community, are in a situation of 
grave risk’. 
324 The Inter-Ecclesiastical Justice and Peace Commission. 
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families in order to have their representation recognized. In this sense, the Court was requested to 
indicate the name of the individual beneficiaries of these provisional measures to allow proper 
implementation thereof’.325  
The Court called a hearing specifically on this issue, and at the end of this hearing it found 
that ‘the universe of individuals who at this time form part of the beneficiary communities cannot 
be accurately identified or established’.326 It held:  
“The criteria submitted by the Commission in its request for provisional measures are indeed 
insufficient for that purpose. Particularly, at this time the geographical standards for the group 
of individuals who allegedly benefit from these provisional measures are not clear enough”.327 
It pointed out that the Commission should specify ‘to the Court what is the universe of individuals 
who benefit from these provisional measures, which were adopted at their request’.328 “To that 
effect, the Commission must indicate specific criteria to determine and identify the beneficiaries 
of these measures as a group”. Meanwhile, however, the existing provisional measures remained 
in force.329 
4.5 Conclusion on beneficiaries and addressees of provisional measures 
In order to truly examine the protection offered by provisional measures it must be clear who is 
included as a beneficiary and whether and how the beneficiaries have been consulted about the 
measures. While it does not appear appropriate to address an order for provisional measures to the 
alleged victim instead of to the State, as the European Court has done in hunger strike cases, it is 
important to make sure that the State’s positions and arguments are duly taken into account. In 
order to uphold the legitimacy of provisional measures it is vital to adhere to principles of proce-
dural fairness. 
Both as to purpose and as to substance the provisional measures should be consistent with 
similar measures already taken in order to increase their credibility and avoid discriminatory 
application vis-à-vis various beneficiaries and addressees. Comparable situations should be 
treated similarly and different situations should be treated differently.  
The criterion of ‘balance of convenience’, used by international adjudicators (in cases not 
involving human rights) and also by some domestic courts, is inappropriate in human rights cases. 
Only if there is evidence of dispute between (potential) beneficiaries about the required substance 
of provisional measures this criterion could play a role. In other words, in the face of irreparable 
harm to persons adjudicators should not balance the rights of the intended beneficiaries with the 
general interest. In urgent cases involving indigenous culture, for instance, the interest of the 
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economic well being of the country as a whole should not play a role in denying provisional 
measures. Arguments about rights of the general population could more appropriately be consid-
ered in reporting procedures (if available) or as arguments at the merits stage.  
As noted in Chapter X, when the right to culture of indigenous peoples is at stake their right 
to self-determination must be taken into account. This right is also relevant in order to determine 
who should be the beneficiaries of provisional measures to protect cultural survival. If alleged 
victims request an adjudicator to use provisional measures in order to protect collective aspects of 
their rights the adjudicator must have prima facie evidence that this will indeed be to the benefit 
of the group involved. The petitioners do not necessarily need to show formal representation of all 
beneficiaries. On the other hand, if the aim is to prevent irreparable harm to an indigenous group 
the alleged victim must be seen to represent the interests of the members of this group. The provi-
sional measures required should not be such as to cause irreparable harm to other indigenous 
groups in the area. Such harm, however, is not likely to result from a request to postpone indus-
trial activities threatening the natural habitat. The fact that the interests of other indigenous groups 
could eventually justify certain infringements of the rights of the victims does not mean that the 
adjudicator could not take provisional measures protecting these rights pending the proceedings. 
In other words, in the face of prima facie evidence of irreparable harm competing interests should 
generally not prevent the use of this type of provisional measures. On the other hand, by arguing 
or implying that other indigenous groups or other members of the same group have differing 
views about the risk of irreparable harm to the natural habitat a State could try to convince the 
adjudicator not to take provisional measures or to withdraw those measures already taken. This 
relates to the question of the evidentiary requirements for the use of provisional measures. Never-
theless, while the adjudicator may wish to balance the interests of different indigenous groups 
with regard to certain lands, normally this would not be necessary at the stage of provisional 
measures exactly because such measures mainly aim at halting certain developments pending the 
proceedings.  
Apart from the question of the interests of the beneficiaries of provisional measures, the 
question has arisen of how to establish their identity. This applies in particular to situations of 
death threats and harassment and mass expulsion. The requirement that the beneficiaries must 
agree with the provisional measures applies particularly in cases in which they are indeed identi-
fied by name. Clearly, if they do not wish such identification it should not be forced upon them. 
Sometimes identifying a person who is being threatened will assist in this person’s protection by 
giving him or her a name and a face.330 In other cases beneficiaries might wish to remain anony-
mous exactly for fear that threats may increase even more if they are publicly identified for their 
involvement in an international procedure. 
Thornberry has noted: 
“Instead of defining beneficiaries and then allocating rights, international law has often 
proceeded the other way round. Rights have been set out and continue to be developed in such a 
way that the contours of the communities appropriating them become clearer”.331 
While the statement was made with respect to rights on the merits in cases involving culture, it 
seems applicable even more to the beneficiaries of provisional measures in such cases. 
The majority of persons referred to as the beneficiaries of provisional measures are to be 
protected against death threats and harassment. In some situations all persons visiting the prem-
ises of an NGO are subject to threats. In such cases the practice of using provisional measures to 
protect all of them is appropriate. If only the members of the organisation working there would be 
granted protection the NGO would not be able to function properly because all other persons 
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visiting the premises to request its assistance, to deliver goods or run errands would still receive 
threats and risk their lives. While they are not identified by name, the beneficiaries of the required 
protective measures are clear to the State.  
Sometimes beneficiaries may live in remote areas or be otherwise difficult to reach. In such 
cases it should not be required to establish written consent of each beneficiary, as long as there 
are indications that they are likely to agree and as long as there are no indications of disagree-
ment.  
Finally, the wider impact of provisional measures deserves attention. A good faith imple-
mentation of the obligations under the human rights treaty warrants a pro-active stance of the 
State to ensure the underlying rationale to a provisional measure is being met. When there are 
indications that this rationale would require a halt, for instance, to the expulsion of others than the 
specific beneficiary as well, measures would be warranted in order to arrange matters domesti-
cally to this effect so that recourse to the international adjudicator by all others similarly situated 
is no longer necessary. 
5 THE RELATION TO CESSATION, ASSURANCES OF NON-REPETITION AND 
REPARATION 
5.1 Introduction 
The petitioner has the right to a procedural remedy and, already pending the proceedings, the 
substantive right to respect for his life and personal integrity. The adjudicator has the authority to 
use provisional measures. The State not only has the duty to provide for effective remedies and 
reparation, but also to prevent human rights violations, pending the proceedings as well as upon 
the conclusion of these proceedings. This obligation to prevent applies in particular to core rights 
such as the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment.332 
This section deals with the relation between the substance of provisional measures and of 
the legal consequences of a failure to comply with obligations under human rights treaties, such 
as cessation, assurances of non-repetition and forms of reparation. 
The underlying argument in the previous chapters, on the various situations in which human 
rights adjudicators have used provisional measures, was that if there were no likelihood of finding 
a violation on the merits, given the applicable substantive law, the use of provisional measures 
pending the case would be inappropriate.333  
It is argued that a similar approach should be taken as well for the relation between the sub-
stance of orders for provisional measures and of orders for reparation or other statements regard-
ing the obligations of the State upon a finding of violation. If the adjudicator is unlikely to order 
certain measures, such as non-refoulement, following such a finding, it makes little sense to order 
                                                 
332 See in general, e.g. Shelton (2005a). See also Wellens (2002) noting that ‘(t)he basic imperative 
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provisional measures to that effect pending the proceedings.334 Thus it is submitted that the exist-
ing and expected case law on cessation, non-repetition and reparation (restitution) is relevant 
when deciding on the use of provisional measures.  
As discussed in Chapter I, it has been pointed out in the context of the ICJ and its predeces-
sor that provisional measures aim to prevent pre-emption of any meaningful reparation by the 
respondent State, such as in situations where pecuniary redress would be inadequate.335 Obviously 
in its judgments the human rights adjudicator must be able to provide the relief requested as well. 
In Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros (1997) the ICJ pointed out that it was ‘mindful that, in the field of 
environmental protection, vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversi-
ble character of damage to the environment and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism 
of reparation of this type of damage’.336  
In human rights cases a similar approach applies, in which the statement could be that in the 
field of human rights vigilance and prevention are required on account of the often irreversible 
and irreparable character of harm to persons and of the limitations inherent in the very mechanism 
of reparation of this type of harm. This section aims to explain why. 
In human rights adjudication the substance of provisional measures shares a striking resem-
blance with that found in friendly settlement agreements, in statements on the obligations of the 
State upon a finding of violation, and in judgments on reparations. The reason may be that they all 
aim at preventing further irreparable harm.  
Sometimes a distinction is made between promotional, reactive and preventive human rights 
mechanisms. Judicial systems are generally seen as reactive in nature. Of course the reparation 
required may be forward looking and in that sense preventive. Yet the provisional measures, as 
taken by the human rights adjudicators, are inherently preventive. Even if they aim at halting 
ongoing rather than new violations they may be partly reactive, but still are predominantly pre-
ventive.  
Indeed provisional measures aim at prevention while reparation aims at redress. Thus, at 
first sight they are relevant before and after the fact, respectively. In reality, however, particularly 
in relation to irreparable harm, an adjudicator may find on the merits that the most appropriate 
form of redress is for this harm not to occur. In its implementation the required measure may be a 
permanent injunction. In that sense both provisional measures and the obligation to prevent upon 
the finding that a violation would otherwise (continue to) occur, as well as forms of reparation are 
relevant before the fact. The substance and ultimate aim are the same: preventing irreparable harm 
to persons. It is their function that is different. A finding on the merits that a certain event must be 
prevented is a determination that not preventing this would constitute a violation resulting in 
irreparable harm to persons. A provisional measure, on the other hand, serves to prevent acts or 
omissions by the State that would make impossible such a finding. If the adjudicator determines 
in its decision on the merits that there is insufficient evidence for such a finding, the State is 
allowed to proceed with its previous course of (in)action. If it does find a violation, true repara-
tion would hardly be available if the irreparable harm to the person has already occurred pending 
the proceedings.  
Thus, alleged victims have the right to a remedy in the sense that they should be able to ini-
tiate a meaningful procedure. The adjudicators may then use provisional measures pending this 
procedure in order to ensure the effectiveness of the procedure. Ensuring this effectiveness means 
                                                 
334 See further the Conclusion to Part II. 
335 See e.g. Dumbault (1932), p. 165. 
336 ICJ Case concerning the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros project (Hungary v. Slovakia), 25 September 
1997, §140. At the same time it did not apply the precautionary principle (see section 4.3.5 of 
Chapter I). Moreover, it did not use provisional measures (which were ruled out by the Parties 
now that they had brought the case before the ICJ by an Agreement excluding the possibility to 
request provisional measures). In addition it did not discuss the issue of ‘ecological necessity’. 
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in particular that a meaningful outcome such as cessation, assurances of non-repetition and spe-
cific forms of reparation must not be made impossible already pending the case.337 
This section first refers to the relevant law and practice of human rights adjudicators regard-
ing the correlation between orders for provisional measures and judgments on the merits and 
reparation. It then refers to the relation between cessation, non-repetition and reparation. Subse-
quently it singles out specific issues – other than halting executions, which will be discussed 
separately – in which continuity between prevention and reparation may be observed. In the 
context of protection against death threats it refers separately to the obligation to investigate, 
prosecute and punish. Finally, based on a discussion of the case law on the death penalty devel-
oped by the HRC and the Inter-American Court, the argument is made that human rights adjudi-
cators should pay particular attention to the relation between provisional measures on the one 
hand and on cessation and reparation on the other. 
5.2 Provisional measures and reparation 
Section 3 discussed the specificity not of reparation but of provisional measures. Obviously, if the 
adjudicator is precise about the protective measures required pending the proceedings, it should 
also, following a finding on the merits, give a precise indication of the expected form of repara-
tion. 
The HRC and, more specifically, the Inter-American Commission and Court have paid par-
ticular attention to the issue of reparations.338 Yet the HRC has done so inconsistently and, at least 
until 2003, without consideration for the relationship between provisional measures and repara-
tion. With its General Comment (2004) on Article 2 ICCPR (the right to an effective remedy) the 
HRC finally acknowledged the relationship between provisional measures and reparation.339 
The European Court has only incidentally referred to forms of reparation other than those 
involving financial compensation or even just the finding of a violation in itself.340 Even in cases 
dealing with extreme violations comparable to those dealt with by the Inter-American Court, the 
European Court has maintained that it ‘will not make consequential orders or declaratory state-
                                                 
337 Where possible this book refers to the term ‘reparation’ when dealing with substantive forms of 
reparation. Nevertheless, some adjudicators use the term ‘remedies’ both for procedural recourse 
and for these substantive forms of reparation. 
338 Lawson (1999) refers to the ‘non-binding’ character of the HRC’s Views and speculates that it is 
this character that may have stimulated it to be very concrete in its recommendations. Yet this 
does not necessarily serve to explain this approach in light of the fact that the Inter-American 
Court does this as well. Moreover, the HRC emphasises the obligation to comply with its 
decisions in good faith, defying the ‘non-binding character’ that has traditionally been ascribed to 
it. See also Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
339 See further sections 3.1 and 5.6 of this Chapter. 
340 E.g. in ECtHR Hentrich v. France, 22 September 1994, §71, the Court considered ‘the best form 
of redress would in principle be to return the land. Failing that, the calculation of pecuniary 
damage must be based on the current market value of the land’. In this case it postponed a 
decision under Article 50. In that decision, of 3 July 1995, the Court simply ordered monetary 
damages, noting that the State had pointed out that it ‘could not, as its national law currently 
stood, take the measure recommended by the Court. Having become part of the private property 
of the State, the “pre-empted” land was subject to the provisions of the Code of State Property 
and it was impracticable to transfer it, let alone without requiring any payment’, §10. See also 
Clooth v. Belgium, 12 September 1991. Generally see e.g. Van Emmerik (1997) and Van 
Kempen (2003). 
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ments in this regard’.341 Yet the text of the ECHR does not force the Court to take such a limited 
approach.342  
The African Commission and the Bosnia Chamber have been more specific in their ap-
proaches. Strangely, Article XI (1(b)) of Annex 6 to the Dayton Accord stipulates that the Bosnia 
Chamber shall determine what steps the respondent Party shall take to remedy a breach, ‘includ-
ing orders to cease and desist, monetary relief (…) and provisional measures’. While this illus-
trates how closely related orders for protective measures pending the proceedings really are to 
such orders as part of judgments on reparation, traditionally the term ‘provisional measures’ is 
reserved for measures required pending the proceedings.343  
Of all applicable human rights treaties the American Convention best reflects the correlation 
between provisional measures and reparation.344 Article 63 ACHR unites the two concepts in one 
provision. Article 63(1) stipulates: 
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of a right or freedom protected by this 
Convention, the Court shall rule that the injured party be ensured the enjoyment of his right or 
freedom that was violated. It shall also rule, if appropriate, that the consequences of the measure 
or situation that constituted the breach of such right or freedom be remedied and that fair 
compensation be paid to the injured party”. 
Article 63(2) provides: 
“In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to 
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has 
under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the 
request of the Commission”. 
The Inter-American Court confirmed this relationship in James and others (2001).345 In fact the 
decisions of the Inter-American Commission and Court show that, throughout a single 
proceeding, positive obligations may be required at various stages (provisional measures, merits 
and reparation). This is due to the underlying purpose that cessation, non-repetition and reparation 
have in common, as discussed in section 5.3. 
                                                 
341 ECtHR Akdivar and others v. Turkey, 1 April 1998 (compensation), §47. 
342 See e.g. Van Emmerik (1997) and Lawson (1999), p. 85.  
343 In the Inter-American system provisional measures are sometimes maintained until after the 
Court’s judgment on the merits, and often even until after its judgment on reparations. In these 
cases the Court points out that the case will only be closed once the judgment on reparations has 
been implemented and there is no complete implementation as long as petitioners or witnesses 
are still being threatened and harassed. See also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
344 Article 27 of the 1998 Protocol on the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights makes a 
similar link, but the 2008 Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights does not. Instead its Article 28 on the jurisdiction of the Court, provides under (h) the 
jurisdiction over disputes relating to ‘the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the 
breach of an international obligation’. In addition, Article 45, entitled ‘Compensation’, but 
referring to a greater range of reparations, stipulates: “Without prejudice to its competence to rule 
on issues of compensation at the request of a party by virtue of paragraph 1(h), of Article 28 of 
the present Statute, the Court may, if it considers that there was a violation of a human or 
peoples’ right, order any appropriate measures in order to remedy the situation, including 
granting fair compensation”. 
345 IACHR James et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, Order of 26 November 2001, 12th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
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5.3 Provisional measures and cessation, non-repetition, reparation: a unison 
of purpose 
The ILC Articles on State Responsibility have laid down secondary rules to be invoked by (in-
jured) States against States that have committed an internationally wrongful act. Such responsibil-
ity is triggered when an act or omission is attributable to the State and constitutes a breach of an 
international obligation of the State, including a human rights obligation. Indeed the underlying 
concepts and principles in the ILC Articles are also relevant to the relation between individuals 
and States, as apparent from the case law developed by the various human rights adjudicators.346 
Thus the Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of 
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International 
Humanitarian Law (2006)347 have been based, where appropriate, on the ILC Articles.348 This 
section deals with the contents of decisions on the merits and reparation. In the next sections the 
parallel with provisional measures is explored. 
Strictly speaking assurances of non-repetition are not individual forms of reparation, but 
constitute more general obligations. Cessation and satisfaction are equally measures more gener-
ally owed, yet they obviously have special significance to the specific victims. These obligations 
arise upon a finding of a violation, but prior to additional statements on reparation.349 This chapter 
takes into account the relation of such obligations with obligations based on provisional measures. 
The substance, for instance, of guarantees of non-repetition may coincide with the protection 
required in provisional measures. 
Part of the general responsibility of States that have committed an internationally wrongful 
act is that they must ‘continue’ to perform the obligation breached (Article 29 ILC Articles on 
State Responsibility, 2001). In practice this means that they must resume performance of the 
obligation. If the internationally wrongful act is continuing, the responsible State is obliged to 
cease it (Article 30 (a) ILC Articles). This is relevant in the context of any continuing human 
rights violation. Sometimes it is necessary pending the proceedings to use provisional measures 
                                                 
346 See e.g. Van Boven Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for 
victims of gross violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Final Report, 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/8, 2 July 1993; revised version E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17, 24 May 1996 and 
E/CN.4/1997/104, 16 January 1997; independent expert to prepare a revised version of the 
Principles and Guidelines, Bassiouni, reports E/CN.4/1999/65 and E/CN.4/2000/62; Shelton 
(2005); De Feyter/Parmentier/Bossuyt/Lemmens (2005); Gumedze (2003); Van Boven (2001b); 
Van Boven (1999); Klein 1999 and Tomuschat (1999). 
347 Basic principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross 
Violations of International Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, GA 
Resolution, 16 December 2005. See also Article 24 jo. 30 & 31 International Convention for the 
Protection of all Persons against Enforced Disappearances and the Declaration of Basic 
Principles of Justice for victims of Crime and Abuse of Power, Adopted by General Assembly 
resolution 40/34, 29 November 1985. 
348 For a different view see Germany’s position that the Basic Principles ‘erroneously sought to 
apply the principles of State responsibility to relationships between States and individuals’. See 
also d’Argent (2005). Yet see Van Boven’s appropriate criticism of the German position, Van 
Boven (2007), pp. 729-730. See further, e.g. Shelton (2005), pp. 28-29. 
349 See also Report of the Independent Expert to update the Set of Principles to combat impunity, 
Orentlicher, E/CN.4/2005/102, 18 February 2005, under D. See in particular footnote 76 at p. 28; 
for the revised text of the Principles see E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, principle 35. 
See also Commission resolution 2005/81. See further Van Boven (2007), p. 735 confirming this 
distinction. Orentlicher also points out that ‘the right to restitution, compensation and 
rehabilitation does not pertain solely to “individual measures”, nor are measures of satisfaction 
appropriate only as “general measures”. 
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exactly in order to make sure that an alleged act that is likely to be internationally wrongful is 
ceased immediately or in order to ensure the continued performance of an obligation, e.g. in the 
context of ongoing detention and access to health care. 
States have the duty to organise their government apparatus so that they are capable of en-
suring full enjoyment of human rights. As a consequence of this obligation they must prevent 
violations. To the extent violations have nevertheless taken place they must use all means at their 
disposal to investigate the facts and punish the perpetrators.350 
The Inter-American Court has often emphasised the positive obligation to investigate death 
threats and harassment and prosecute those responsible. It considers these measures against impu-
nity necessary in three phases of the proceedings: in the judgments on the merits,351 in the judg-
ments on reparations and also as part of its provisional measures.  
In the judgment on the merits this is necessary because the obligation to guarantee and en-
sure the effective exercise of the rights in the ACHR is ‘independent of and different from the 
obligation to make reparation’.352 This means that the State is obliged to investigate the facts and 
punish those responsible even if the victim or his next of kin would decide to waive the measures 
of reparation.353 Otherwise it would fail to comply with its general obligation to ‘ensure the free 
and full exercise’ of the rights under the ACHR.354  
In its judgments on reparations the Court often reiterates the obligation to investigate the 
facts and identify and punish the perpetrators. From its first cases the Court has emphasised the 
importance for the next of kin of the victims of their right to know what happened.355 Equally, 
they have a right to know the identity of the perpetrators. The State had the duty to properly in-
vestigate the facts and punish those responsible.356  
                                                 
350 In general see Independent study on best practices, including recommendations, to assist states in 
strengthening their domestic capacity to combat all aspects of impunity, by Diane Orentlicher, 
E/CN.4/2004/88, 27 February 2004; Updated Set of principles, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 
February 2005 and E/CN.4/2005/102, 18 February 2005. 
351 See e.g. IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, 19 July 1988 discussing the merits: “The State has a legal 
duty to take reasonable steps to prevent human rights violations and to use the means at its 
disposal to carry out a serious investigation of violations committed within its jurisdiction, to 
identify those responsible, to impose the appropriate punishment and to ensure the victim 
adequate compensation”, §174. “The State is obligated to investigate every situation involving a 
violation of the rights protected by the Convention. If the State apparatus acts in such a way that 
the violation goes unpunished and the victim's full enjoyment of such rights is not restored as 
soon as possible, the State has failed to comply with its duty to ensure the free and full exercise 
of those rights to the persons within its jurisdiction. The same is true when the State allows 
private persons or groups to act freely and with impunity to the detriment of the rights recognized 
by the Convention”, §176 and “The duty to investigate facts of this type continues as long as 
there is uncertainty about the fate of the person who has disappeared. Even in the hypothetical 
case that those individually responsible for crimes of this type cannot be legally punished under 
certain circumstances, the State is obligated to use the means at its disposal to inform the relatives 
of the fate of the victims and, if they have been killed, the location of their remains”, §181. 
352 IACHR Garrido and Baigorria, 27 August 1998 (Reparations), §72. 
353 See e.g. IACHR Garrido and Baigorria, 27 August 1998 (reparations), §72.  
354 See e.g. IACHR Bámaca Velásquez, judgment of 25 November 2000 (merits), §129; Garrido and 
Baigorria, judgment of 27 August 1998 (reparations), §73 and Paniagua Morales et al, judgment 
of 8 March 1998, §178. 
355 See e.g. IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, 29 July 1988 (merits), §181; Godínez Cruz, 20 January 
1989 (merits), §191 and Aloeboetoe et al., 10 September 1993 (reparation), §109. 
356 See e.g. IACHR El Amparo, judgment of 14 September 1996 (reparation), §61; Blake, 22 January 
1999 (reparations), §65 and Suárez Rosero, 20 January 1999 (reparations), §§79-80, pointing out 
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The Court has defined impunity as the ‘total lack of investigation, prosecution, capture, trial 
and conviction of those responsible for violations of the rights protected by the American Con-
vention’. In this respect ‘the State has the obligation to use all the legal means at its disposal to 
combat that situation, since impunity fosters chronic recidivism of human rights violations, and 
total defenselessness of victims and their relatives’.357 
State responsibility also entails that the responsible State offers assurances and guarantees 
of non-repetition, that is, ‘if circumstances so require’ (Article 30 (b) ILC Articles). In cases, for 
instance, of continuing harassment of human rights defenders, circumstances may certainly re-
quire the State to offer them such guarantees. In fact, as we have seen, on the merits various 
adjudicators have referred to the obligation to investigate the facts and punish the perpetrators.358 
At the same time the aforementioned Basic Principles eventually did not refer to this when they 
discussed guarantees of non-repetition. Instead they refer to, among others, strengthening the 
independence of the judiciary, ensuring ‘effective civilian control of military and security forces’ 
and one more directly preventive measure, namely ‘Protecting persons in the legal, medical and 
health-care professions, the media and other related professions, and human rights defenders’. In 
addition the Basic Principles note that the measures listed are not exhaustive (‘should include’) 
and that they ‘will also contribute to prevention’.359 
While cessation obviously is a direct consequence of the finding of a violation and is an ob-
ligation that applies collectively as well, the Basic Principles also refer to ‘effective measures 
aimed at the cessation of continuing violations as a form of satisfaction to the victim.360 
In human rights law it appears that not just decisions on provisional measures, but also deci-
sions on the merits and reparation focus on prevention and, ultimately, protection. This is con-
firmed by the Basic Principles, which point out that the obligation to ‘respect, ensure respect for 
and implement’ international human rights law includes the duty to take appropriate measures to 
prevent violations. They add that this obligation includes as well the duty to investigate violations 
and take appropriate action against the perpetrators, provide equal access to justice for alleged 
victims and provide effective remedies to victims, including reparation. In other words, according 
to the Principles the scope of the obligation to respect, ensure respect for and implement human 
rights law encompasses the duty to prevent, investigate, provide a remedy and provide reparation. 
As we will see, in fact these obligations are interrelated.  
In 1993 UN Special Rapporteur Van Boven, appointed to deal with the issue of reparations, 
stressed that gross human rights violations are by their nature irreparable. Any form of reparation 
                                                                                                                       
this is already an obligation on the merits, not just on reparations, referring to its judgment on the 
merits in this case of 12 November 1997, 6th operative paragraph. 
357 IACHR Paniagua Morales et al, judgment of 8 March 1998 (merits), §173. It has also found 
certain amnesty laws to be incompatible with the ACHR and therefore lacking legal effect. 
Barrios Altos v. Peru, judgment of 14 March 2001 (merits). 
358 See e.g. IACHR Asunto de la Cárcel de Urso Branco (Brasil), Resolución de 2 de mayo de 2008, 
25th ‘Considering’ clause, specifically noting that the investigation of the facts and the eventual 
punishment of those responsible is a fundamental measure in order to ensure non-repetition. 
359 Basic Principles, §23. 
360 Basic Principles, §22(a). As noted, in her report Orentlicher correctly distinguishes between 
reparation, satisfaction, cessation and assurances. See e.g. Independent study on best practices, 
including recommendations, to assist states in strengthening their domestic capacity to combat all 
aspects of impunity, by Diane Orentlicher, Updated Set of principles, E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 
February 2005 and E/CN.4/2005/102, 18 February 2005, under D. See in particular footnote 76 at 
p. 28; for the revised text of the Principles see E/CN.4/2005/102/Add.1, 8 February 2005, 
principle 35. See also Van Boven (2007) agreeing with that approach. 
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would inevitably fail to be proportionate to the harm suffered.361 Indeed, prevention of further 
such harm is the most appropriate action required of the State. With regard to the original victim 
this prevention could consist of halting continued harassment or ongoing adverse detention situa-
tions, etc. With regard to those related to persons killed, this could mean preventing more killings 
perpetrated by the same group of persons.362  
The Basic Principles have confirmed the developments in international law specifically 
dealing with the relationship between individuals and States. At the same time they are necessar-
ily more specific in their attention to the needs of individuals rather than States. This is illustrated, 
among others, by the fact that next to the customary restitution and compensation, as laid down 
also in the ILC Articles,363 in the Basic Principles from the outset rehabilitation was named as a 
form of reparation as well.  
The Basic Principles refer to the duty to prevent not just in the section on the scope of the 
obligation to respect and ensure respect for human rights law.364 Also in the context of the treat-
ment of victims they note that ‘appropriate measures should be taken to ensure their safety, physi-
cal and psychological well-being and privacy’.365 In addition, when discussing access to justice 
for victims they refer to the obligation to ‘ensure their safety from intimidation and retaliation, as 
well as that of their families and witnesses, before, during and after judicial, administrative, or 
other proceedings that affect the interests of victims’.366  
The whole point of using provisional measures is that the irreparable harm threatened 
should be prevented. If these measures are subsequently ignored by the State, the adjudicator 
should comment on this in strongly worded terms. It should follow this up by ordering reparation 
to the effect of assuring non-repetition so that at least other persons would not suffer the same 
fate.367 Moreover, if a person has been tortured, the adjudicator should order reparations to the 
effect that the State would arrange for medical and psychological treatment368 and an official 
public apology.369 
                                                 
361 See Study concerning the right to restitution, compensation and rehabilitation for victims of gross 
violations of human rights and fundamental freedoms, Final Report submitted by Theo van 
Boven, Special Rapporteur, E/CN.4/Sub.2/1993/45/8, 2 July 1993, §131. See also Revised set of 
basic principles and guidelines on the right to reparation for victims of gross violations of human 
rights and humanitarian law prepared by Mr. Theo van Boven pursuant to Sub-Commission 
decision 1995/117, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17, 24 May 1996. 
362 In 1998 the then Commission on Human Rights appointed independent expert Bassiouni who 
continued examination of the issue. Bassiouni eventually submitted the Van Boven/Bassouni 
Guidelines to the Commission, which adopted them in 2005. They were subsequently adopted by 
the General Assembly in December 2005. With regard to the obligations of the State the final 
version refers to ‘should’ rather than ‘shall’. Yet the Preamble emphasizes that the Principles and 
Guidelines did not entail new obligations but instead identified ‘mechanisms, modalities, 
procedures and methods for the implementation of existing legal obligations’. Thus it would have 
made sense to use the term ‘shall’, rather than ‘should’ to refer to the existing obligations of 
States. 
363 According to Article 31 ILC Articles the responsible State is obliged to ‘make full reparation for 
the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act’ and restitution, compensation and 
satisfaction are named as forms of reparation (Article 34 ILC Articles). 
364 Basic Principles, §3(a). 
365 Basic Principles, §10. 
366 Basic Principles, §12(b). The operative term used here is ‘should’, but, as noted, shall or must 
would reflect more appropriately the law as developed by the human rights adjudicators. 
367 See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
368 Rehabilitation, Basic Principles, §21, and to the extent costs have already been made, also 
compensation, Basic Principles, §20(e). 
369 Satisfaction, see §22(e). 
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Apart from the traditional remedy of payment of compensation to victims or their family, 
the Inter-American Court also mentions more concrete forms of reparation such as the obligation 
to prevent and investigate human rights violations and to punish perpetrators.370 The obligations 
are often even more precise: to identify the remains of the victims and surrender them to their 
families; to declare domestic proceedings invalid; to order that victims are guaranteed a new trial 
or to take measures to reform domestic legal provisions. Another form of reparation the Court has 
required is to reopen a school, to attach a commemorative plaque to a public building or to name a 
street or a school after the victims.371  
The Inter-American Court has also referred to the obligation to declare domestic proceed-
ings invalid, to order a new trial for the victims or to release someone. More generally it has 
ordered States to take measures to reform domestic legal provisions.372  
In Bámaca Velásquez (2000) the IACHR had found Guatemala responsible for Bámaca’s 
disappearance, torture and death. On the merits the Court stated: “In view of the nature of the 
instant case, although the Court is unable to order that the injured parties should be guaranteed the 
enjoyment of the rights and liberties violated, by means of the restitutio in integrum, it must, 
instead, order the reparation of the consequences of the violation of the rights mentioned and, 
consequently, the establishment of fair compensation. The amounts and form of this will be de-
termined during the reparations stage”.373 
Two important rights of the family members of disappeared persons are the right to the truth 
and respect for the link between the living and the dead.374 With regard to the right to truth Judge 
Cançado Trindade pointed out that in light of the State’s obligation to cease the violations of 
human rights, ensuring this right is in fact ‘essential to the struggle against impunity’ and ‘is 
ineluctably linked to the very realization of justice, and to the guarantee of non-repetition of those 
violations’.375 
A very important obligation the Court has referred to in recent judgments on reparations is 
to locate bodies, to identify the remains of victims and surrender the remains to the families. In 
                                                 
370 To this extent, its approach is similar to that of the HRC, but not to that of the ECtHR, which – so 
far – has been rather conservative in this area. See e.g. Van Emmerik (1997) and Van Kempen 
(2003). See §22, Basic principles on satisfaction, subsection (f) (and Part II, sections 4 and 5 
when dealing with gross violations that constitutes crimes under international law). 
371 See e.g. IACHR Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of 10 September 1993 (reparation); The 
Street Children’ case (Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala), judgment of 26 May 2001 
(reparations). 
372 At the same time it is not always in a position to identify the exact legislative, administrative or 
other measures to be implemented in the internal legislation of a State. In the case of the Street 
Children, for instance, it did emphasise the obligation of the State, at the reparations stage, to 
adopt the necessary legislative or other measures in compliance with Article 2 ACHR, even 
though it had not found a violation of Article 2 in the judgment on the merits. It considered that 
the State must take the necessary measures to adapt its legislation to Article 19 ACHR (rights of 
the child to the measures of protection required by his condition as a minor) in order to ensure 
non-repetition of the violations. The representatives of the victims’ next of kin and the 
Commission had requested the Court to order the State to derogate from the 1979 Minors Code or 
to bring into force the Children and Youth Code adopted by the Guatemalan Congress in 1996 
and the 1997 plan of action for street children. The Court, however, pointed out it could not 
establish the exact nature of the implementation measures. IACHR ‘The Street Children’ case 
(Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala), 26 May 2001 (reparations), §98.  
373 IACHR Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, 25 November 2000, §228. 
374 More closely on the latter see Separate Opinion Cançado Trindade in Bámaca Velásquez, 25 
November 2000 (merits).  
375 IACHR Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, 25 November 2000, Separate Opinion Cançado 
Trindade, §32. 
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the Street Children case (2001) the Court stated that Guatemala should ‘adopt the necessary 
measures to transfer the mortal remains’ of Henry Giovanni Contreras ‘to the place chosen by his 
next of kin, without any cost to them, so as to satisfy the desire of the family to give them appro-
priate burial, according to their religious beliefs and customs’.376 
The ILC Articles refer to the obligation to give satisfaction insofar as the injury caused 
‘cannot be made good by restitution or compensation’. It may ‘consist in an acknowledgment of 
the breach, an expression of regret, a formal apology or another appropriate modality’ (ILC Arti-
cle 37). 
A form of satisfaction mentioned in the Basic Principles is the search for the whereabouts of 
the disappeared and the identities of the children abducted. As discussed in Chapter VI, in disap-
pearance cases provisional measures may be used pending the proceedings. After all when a 
person has recently been disappeared the likelihood of finding this person alive is greater pending 
the proceedings than upon their conclusion. Provisional measures prompting a State to find a 
person alive could thus help ensure the least serious consequences of a breach of State responsi-
bility. The Basic Principles note that even when the victims have already been killed satisfaction 
should still consist of a search for their bodies as well as ‘assistance in the recovery, identification 
and reburial of the bodies in accordance with the expressed or presumed wish of the victims, or 
the cultural practices of the families and communities’.377 Circumstances are feasible in which 
such measures may be required of the State already pending the proceedings, in order to prevent 
further harm to those left behind.  
Among others, in the Street Children case (2001) the Inter-American Court discussed how 
to deal with those harmful effects of the violations that could not be assessed in monetary terms. 
It noted that this may include the suffering and distress caused to the direct victims and their next 
of kin and ‘the impairment of values that are highly significant to them’.378 It was not possible to 
assign a precise monetary equivalent to the harm. Providing compensation could be done in two 
ways. The first would be to nevertheless determine a sum of money to be paid, or the assignment 
of goods or services. A second way would be ‘the execution of acts or works of a public nature or 
repercussion, which have effects such as recovering the memory of the victims, re-establishing 
their reputation, consoling their next of kin or transmitting a message of official condemnation of 
the human rights violations in question and commitment to the efforts to ensure that they do not 
happen again’.379 In other words, these measures could return some sense of dignity to the victims 
and their next of kin as well as constitute a preventive measure of a general nature.380 
                                                 
376 IACHR Street Children case, 26 May 2001 (Reparations), §102. 
377 Basic Principles, §22(c). 
378 IACHR ‘The Street Children’ case (Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala), 26 May 2001 
(reparations), §84. 
379 IACHR ‘The Street Children’ case (Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala), 26 May 2001 
(reparations), §84. 
380 Another example from the same case is the Court’s order to ‘designate an educational center with 
a name allusive to the young victims in this case and to place in this center a plaque’ with their 
names on it. This would ‘contribute to raising awareness in order to avoid the repetition of 
harmful acts such as those that occurred in the instant case and will keep the memory of the 
victims alive’. IACHR Street Children case (Villagrán Morales et al. v. Guatemala), 26 May 
2001 (reparations), §103, referring to the names of victims: Henry Giovanni Contreras, Federico 
Clemente Figueroa Túnchez, Julio Roberto Caal Sandoval, Jovito Josué Juárez Cifuentes and 
Anstraun Aman Villagrán Morales. The Court also reiterated the obligation to investigate, 
identify and punish those responsible (§101). See also Benavides Ceballos, judgment of 19 June 
1998, §§48.5 and 55 and Aloeboetoe et al. case, Judgment of 10 September 1993 (reparations), 
§96. Finally see IACHR Plan de Sánchez massacre case (Guatemala), 19 November 2004 
(reparations), §§110-111. 
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In the Basic Principles the right to the truth and the obligation to prosecute and punish per-
petrators are not mentioned as examples of guarantees of non-repetition. Instead ‘verification of 
the facts and full and public disclosure of the truth’ and ‘judicial and administrative sanctions 
against persons liable for the violations’ are mentioned under ‘satisfaction’.381 Public apologies, 
commemorations and tributes to the victims as well as an official declaration or judicial decision 
‘restoring the dignity, the reputation and the rights of the victim and of persons closely connected 
to the victim’ are such measures of satisfaction.382 When provisional measures ordering States to 
protect persons against death threats are implemented, among others, through an official declara-
tion by the State to the effect that certain people are not enemies of the State and that threats 
against them will be investigated and punished, this could almost be seen as a temporary counter-
part of the aforementioned forms of reparation. 
In other words, making a public apology and providing for public commemorations has a 
dual function as well: on the one hand recognition, satisfaction and rehabilitation and on the other 
hand prevention. Thus, pending the proceedings the State may be required to publicly acknowl-
edge the legitimacy of the activities of human rights defenders, journalists and others under threat. 
In such cases the public statement is meant to prevent specific harm. Indeed, at the stage of provi-
sional measures public apologies or at least public statements condemning rather than condoning 
or supporting threats and harassments would be warranted as well. The public statement required 
at the reparations stage in its presentation simply is more permanent and official rather than tran-
sitory and its purpose is to ensure satisfaction and general, rather than specific, prevention. Each 
stage of the proceedings is aimed both at prevention and at reparation. 
5.4 A continuum of protection 
5.4.1 Introduction 
A few examples are given, from different issue areas, in order to illustrate the continuum between 
the substance of provisional measures on the one hand and cessation, assurances and reparation 
on the other hand. Whether pending the proceedings or upon a finding of a violation on the 
merits, States have the obligation to prevent irreparable harm to persons by taking measures of 
protection that may substantively coincide even though the function of these measures differs 
depending on whether they are required pending the proceedings or upon the finding of a 
violation. 
5.4.2 Halting corporal punishment and the expected obligations on the merits 
As discussed in Chapter IV it appears that all adjudicators, including those that have not been 
faced with requests for provisional measures, have found corporal punishment in violation of the 
prohibition of cruel treatment. As discussed, the HRC and the Inter-American Commission are the 
only adjudicators that have used provisional measures to halt execution of corporal punishment. 
In Osbourne v. Jamaica (2000) the HRC pointed out that the State party was obliged, under Art. 
2(3)(a) ICCPR, to provide the petitioner with an effective remedy and it ‘should compensate him 
for the violation’. It was also obliged to refrain from carrying out the sentence and it ‘should 
ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future by repealing the legislative provisions that 
                                                 
381 It adds in this context that this disclosure should not cause further harm or threaten the safety of 
the victim, the victim’s family, witnesses or persons who have intervened to either assist the 
victim or to prevent the occurrence of further violations. See Basic Principles, §22(a) and (f). 
382 See Basic Principles, §22(d), (e) and (g). 
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allow for corporal punishment’.383 The Committee uses the term ‘obligation’ of the State when it 
speaks of the right to a remedy and the duty to abstain from carrying out the sentence of corporal 
punishment. It uses exhortatory language (‘should’) when it specifies the remedy, although ‘com-
pensation’ still is not very specific. It also uses the term ‘should’ in the context of the obligation 
to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future, but since this is in fact an obligation 
under general international law it may be assumed that the exhortation lies in the second half of 
the sentence: the HRC considers that the best way to ensure that similar violations do not occur in 
the future would be to repeal the legislative provisions allowing corporal punishment. It is note-
worthy that when the HRC published its decision on the merits, the Court of Appeal of Jamaica 
had already determined two years previously that the legislation on corporal punishment was 
unconstitutional.384  
In corporal punishment cases the substance of the provisional measure and of the measures 
required following the finding of a violation partially coincide because both require the State to 
refrain from carrying out the sentence of corporal punishment. The substance of the provisional 
measure, namely that the State should halt its execution, would therefore have an indeterminate 
applicability. What is called provisional is in fact already permanent. In other words, on the basis 
of previous case law we already know before the final determination that the State will be re-
quired to respect the substance of the Committee’s provisional measures beyond the duration of 
the case before the HRC. Thus, because of the unequivocal pre-existing case law on the merits 
this provisional measure is similar to an instant judgment on one particular issue. If the execution 
of a sentence of corporal punishment is indeed impending, the authorities must halt it not only 
pending the case before the HRC, but beyond this period as well.  
The risk of execution of corporal punishment does not have to constitute the main claim. If 
there is a reference to such punishment in the complaint, the HRC can include it in the claims 
proprio motu and if the sentence has not yet been executed the Committee can use provisional 
measures to prevent irreparable harm. After all, it would find a violation of Art.7 ICCPR for any 
sentence of corporal punishment and would point out the State party’s obligation not to carry out 
such a sentence. It would be reasonable to expect the HRC’s proprio motu use of provisional 
measures in any new case similar to that in Matthews (1998).385 Yet it did not do so in Sooklal 
(2001).386 In this case it was not the petitioner who had raised a complaint with regard to the 
corporal punishment imposed on him, but the HRC itself had raised the issue proprio motu. It had 
also pointed out, in its paragraph on reparations, that the State was under an obligation not to 
carry out the sentence. The facts of the case were similar to those of Matthews, but the case law 
had since developed, in particular with regard to reparations. Moreover, the HRC had already 
used provisional measures twice in cases specifically complaining about corporal punishment. 
Nevertheless, the Committee did not use provisional measures proprio motu in Sooklal. The HRC 
could have used provisional measures in this case, because there was a relation with the decision 
                                                 
383 HRC Osbourne v. Jamaica, 15 March 2000. 
384 See also HRC Higginson v. Jamaica, 28 March 2002. The Committee found that the State party 
was ‘under an obligation to provide the author with an effective remedy, including refraining 
from carrying out the sentence of whipping upon the author or providing appropriate 
compensation if the sentence has been carried out’. Once more it noted that Jamaica ‘should 
ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future by repealing the legislative provisions that 
allow for corporal punishment’. 
385 HRC Matthews v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 March 1998. See also Chapter XIV on admissibility 
and jurisdiction. 
386 HRC Boodlal Sooklal v. Trinidad and Tobago, 25 October 2001. 
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on the merits. Provisional measures would not require more than the eventual decision would and 
these measures would ultimately prevent irreparable harm to persons.387 
5.4.3 Halting expulsion and extradition and the expected obligations on the 
merits 
Most human adjudicators have used provisional measures to halt expulsion and extradition, but 
the case law of the HRC provides information on the expected obligations on the merits. In light 
of its previous case law counsel in Judge v. Canada (2003) had not brought a claim based on the 
failure to obtain assurances against the death penalty.388 Nevertheless, after it had declared inad-
missible the original claims the HRC raised this issue proprio motu. Ando disagreed with this 
approach. He considered it ‘illogical’ for the HRC to declare inadmissible the original complaints 
under Articles 6, 7, 10 and 14(5) ICCPR but at the same time to state that the communication 
raised issues under Articles 6, 7 and 2. He felt that a mere reference to ‘the seriousness of these 
questions’ did not suffice and that the HRC should have specified how these ‘apparent contradic-
tions’ were to be solved.389 In fact it is standard practice of the HRC to indicate which provisions 
apply to the issues raised. As in the death penalty cases previously discussed the fact that the 
HRC did introduce this aspect proprio motu may indicate that even if there is no claim of Article 
14 provisional measures could be used, because the HRC itself could find that the complaint 
raises issues under Article 14 and/or Article 6 ICCPR. 
In Ahani (2004) the Committee found that Canada had violated Articles 9(4) and 13 in con-
junction with Article 7, as well as the OP as such, by deporting the petitioner before the Commit-
tee’s determination of his claim and in contravention of its provisional measures. With regard to 
the obligation to provide the petitioner with an effective remedy it pointed out that the State was 
obliged ‘(a) to make reparation to the author if it comes to light that torture was in fact suffered 
subsequent to deportation, and (b) to take such steps as may be appropriate to ensure that the 
author is not, in the future, subjected to torture as a result of the events of his presence in, and 
removal from, the State party’. It also pointed out that Canada was under an obligation ‘to avoid 
similar violations in the future, including by taking appropriate steps to ensure that the Commit-
tee’s requests for interim measures of protection will be respected’.390  
In other words, by its nature the violation of the provisional measure could not be made 
good anymore through full reparation. In this light the HRC points out the obligation to guarantee 
non-repetition of this violation in future cases, as well as, vis-à-vis Ahani, the obligation to take 
those preventive measures that were still possible. These are requirements on the merits, which 
are not specified, but they may include demarches, monitoring and embassy visits. In the event 
that Ahani is indeed tortured, Canada is required to ‘make reparation’. This is not specified either, 
but since return to the pre-existing situation would not be possible, one might imagine something 
                                                 
387 Since most international and regional adjudicators have declared (and those that have not dealt 
with it would be likely to declare) (judicial) corporal punishment a violation of the prohibition of 
cruel treatment there is a clear correlation between the eventual obligations (if sufficient evidence 
is available that the sentence has indeed been pronounced) and the provisional measure. 
388 HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003. For the previous case law see Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 
1993; Chitat Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993 and Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994. 
389 HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003. Ando referred to the Committee’s conclusion in §7.8. In 
fact the Committee noted that ‘the facts before it raised two issues under the Covenant that were 
admissible and should be considered on the merits’. After posing these questions it concluded 
that, ‘given the seriousness of these questions, the parties should be afforded the opportunity to 
comment on them before the Committee expressed its Views on the merits’, §7.8. 
390 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §12. 
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like facilitating his return to Canada, or at least his departure from Iran and his treatment in a 
medical facility specialised in treating torture victims, a public apology and a financial remedy. 
In non-refoulement cases, provisional measures to halt an expulsion or extradition on the 
one hand and a decision on the merits determining that such removal would constitute a violation 
on the other simply build on each other. The permanent injunction would be pointless without the 
interim injunction.  
5.4.4 Health and whereabouts and the expected obligations on the merits 
Claims by or on behalf of persons in detention that are based on violations of the prohibition of 
torture or cruel treatment after trial often relate to continuing violations, meaning that part of the 
remedy should be to put a stop to these violations. In order to prevent irreparable harm ongoing ill 
treatment should be dealt with as soon as possible pending the proceedings.  
In its General Comment on Article 2 the HRC noted that ‘cessation of an ongoing violation 
is an essential element of the right to an effective remedy’.391 Both its early and its more recent 
practice recognize the importance of intervening in such continuing violations pending the pro-
ceedings, when a determination on the merits about the existence of such violations has not yet 
been made. Such provisional measures aim at halting the continuation of acts or omissions that 
(could) constitute a violation. At the same time the HRC also refers to the obligation of States to 
try to repair ‘at the earliest possible opportunity’ any harm already caused. It “takes the view that 
‘the right to an effective remedy may in certain circumstances require States Parties to provide for 
and implement provisional or interim measures to avoid continuing violations and to endeavour to 
repair at the earliest possible opportunity any harm that may have been caused by such viola-
tions’.392 In other words, the State is required to redress possible violations causing irreparable 
harm already pending the proceedings, not only by halting certain actions, but also by repairing 
violations already caused. 
Most ongoing detention cases dealt with by the HRC that show the relationship between the 
informal provisional measure taken pending the proceedings and the remedy eventually recom-
mended are from the early 1980s. In Altesor v. Uruguay (1982) the Committee’s decision on the 
merits also specifically referred to the victim’s health: ‘the State party should also ensure that 
Alberto Altesor receives all necessary medical care’.393 On two previous occasions pending the 
proceedings the HRC had inquired about the health of the victim as well. Indeed the positive 
obligations mentioned in the Committee’s decisions on the merits clearly had their counterpart in 
its request, pending the proceedings, to inform it of the state of health of the alleged victim and/or 
to ensure the necessary medical treatment.394  
                                                 
391 HRC General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, §15. 
392 Id., §19. 
393 HRC Altesor v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982. The HRC found that the victim had been held 
incommunicado for several months and had been denied the right to habeas corpus. The State 
party was under an obligation to provide him with effective remedies, including compensation 
and to take steps to ensure that similar violations did not occur in the future.  
394 See e.g. HRC Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay, 1 April 1982 or Pietraroia v. Uruguay, 27 March 1981. 
In Oxandabarat Scarrone v. Uruguay (1983) the HRC had repeatedly requested the State to 
provide specific information about the alleged victim’s state of health and the medical treatment 
given to him. The State eventually responded to this request with some specific information about 
treatment he received in December 1981 and the general statement that he was kept under 
examination and that his latest general examination (no date provided) found him in good health. 
It also mentioned two specific medications he was receiving. The HRC considered that the 
information before it did not justify a finding of a violation of Article 10(1) with respect to the 
detainee’s state of health. It did find a violation of Article 14. The State was obliged to provide 
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Pending the proceedings in El Megreisi v. Libya (1994) the HRC had enquired about the 
whereabouts and health of the alleged victim. On the merits it found violations of Articles 9, 7 
and 10(1).395 The HRC urged the State party to take effective measures to secure his immediate 
release. Pending the proceedings it had used informal provisional measures that were clearly 
related to the claims on the merits. Situations of incommunicado detention in an unknown loca-
tion often result in irreparable harm such as torture or death. If the State would have indicated his 
whereabouts, would have ensured access to health care and lifted his incommunicado detention 
pending the proceedings, the violations in this respect would have been less serious. Moreover, 
the remedy of release would obviously be impossible after the death of the victim. 
5.4.5 Death threats and harassment and the expected obligations on the  
merits 
The traditionally most important form of reparation, restitutio in integrum, combined with another 
traditional obligation, namely assurances of non-repetition, could be a rationale for using provi-
sional measures pending proceedings in human rights cases, requesting a State to protect persons 
against threats.  
In its decision on the merits the HRC has referred to the duty to investigate and prosecute 
human rights violations.396 In Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia (1995) the HRC found violations 
of Articles 6(1), 7 and 9(1) ICCPR. It determined that the State was ‘under an obligation to pro-
vide the family of Nydia Bautista with an appropriate remedy, which should include damages and 
an appropriate protection of members of N. Bautista’s family from harassment’. It also urged the 
                                                                                                                       
the victim with effective remedies ‘and, in particular, to ensure that he continues to receive all 
necessary medical care and to transmit a copy of these views to him’. This shows that the HRC 
may use informal provisional measures to enquire about the health of an alleged victim pending 
the proceedings, as well as recommend continued access to medical care, but at the same time fail 
to find a violation of the right to humane treatment in Article 10. HRC Oxandabarat Scarrone v. 
Uruguay, 4 November 1983. By note of 31 October 1991 the State party informed the HRC that 
under Article 10 of the amnesty law of 8 March 1985 the petitioner was released on 10 March 
1985. It is also possible that the Committee first requests the State to ensure medical treatment 
pending the proceedings, but in its decision on the merits, finding a violation of Article 10, does 
not specifically refer to the obligation to ensure medical treatment. If it points out that the State is 
under a particular obligation to ensure that the victim is treated with humanity, the obligation to 
ensure medical treatment may be interpreted as implicit in that obligation. HRC Manera Lluberas 
v. Uruguay, 6 April 1984. By note of 31 October 1991 the State party informed the HRC that the 
petitioner was released on 14 March 1985, under the amnesty law of 8 March 1985 (on file with 
the author). 
395 It noted that the petitioner’s brother had been ‘detained incommunicado for more than three 
years, until April 1992, when he was allowed a visit by his wife, and that after that date he has 
again been detained incommunicado and in a secret location’. By being ‘subjected to prolonged 
incommunicado detention in an unknown location’, he was ‘the victim of torture and cruel and 
inhuman treatment’. HRC Mohammed Bashir El-Megreisi (submitted by his brother Youssef El-
Megreisi) v. Libya, 23 March 1994. 
396 Initially it argued that Article 2 ICCPR constituted a general undertaking by States, which 
individuals could not invoke in isolation. See e.g. H.G.B. and S.P. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 3 
November 1989 (inadm.). The right to a remedy arose only after a violation of a Covenant right 
had been established. See e.g. R.A.V.N. et al v. Argentina, 26 March 1990 (inadm.). This 
originally meant that it did not refer to this article when it took preventive measures such as 
indicating provisional measures. Recently, it has indeed recognised the relationship between 
provisional measures and Article 2 ICCPR. General Comment 31 on the nature of the general 
legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant (Article 2), 29 March 2004. 
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State to ‘expedite the criminal proceedings leading to the prompt prosecution and conviction of 
the persons responsible for the abduction, torture and death of Nydia Bautista’. Finally, it re-
minded the State again of its obligation to ensure that similar events would not occur in the fu-
ture.397 
Decisions on the obligation to provide reparation generally include a reference to the obli-
gation to investigate the facts complained of and arrest and try the alleged perpetrator. In the 
Inter-American system, however, the Commission and Court also order States to investigate and 
punish perpetrators as part of their precautionary and provisional measures.398 It is clear that they 
do this because such measures are necessary to prevent further threats and acts of harassment. Yet 
the Court will not consider the effectiveness of those investigations that have been realized nor 
the alleged negligence of the State with regard to these investigations, since it had not yet found a 
violation in this respect.399 
The Inter-American Court has pointed out that ‘the Government has the obligation to pre-
vent violations of human rights and to investigate the events that led to this request for provisional 
measures in order to identify those responsible and punish them appropriately so as to prevent any 
recurrence of the events’.400 This aim of preventing any recurrence explains the emphasis on 
investigation, identification and punishment as necessary ingredients in its Orders for provisional 
measures. Effective measures to investigate the events and, where appropriate, punish the perpe-
trators were ‘a vital aspect’ of the State’s protective duty. It ‘must be assumed by the State as a 
legal duty and not merely as a formality’.401  
Equally, the Commission has noted that the obligation to investigate the threats is part of its 
precautionary measures, in order to ‘investigate the source of the threats in order to put an end to 
the harassment of the persons protected by the precautionary measures’.402 
The recurrence of the obligation in all phases of the proceedings indicates that in order to 
prevent irreparable harm to persons measures against impunity are necessary not only in the 
context of decisions on the merits (the obligation to guarantee the effective exercise of the rights 
in the Convention) and on reparation (the right to reparation), but also as part of provisional 
measures pending the proceedings (to ensure respect for the rights and in order to prevent their 
violation).  
At the provisional measures stage investigation and prosecution are meant to put a stop to 
concrete and continuing threats. In the context of judgments on the merits on the right to life and 
the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment action against impunity (finding the truth and prose-
cuting those responsible) follows directly from the guarantee of non repetition. Article 1(1) 
ACHR requires investigation and prosecution in order to guarantee the right to life and the prohi-
bition of cruel treatment.403 
                                                 
397 HRC Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, 27 October 1995. 
398 See Chapter IX (Threats). 
399 See IACHR Cárcel de Urso Branco (Brasil), Order of 2 May 2008, 26th ‘Considering’ clause. 
See also Asunto de los niños y adolescentes privados de libertad en el “Complexo do Tatuapé” 
de la Fundação CASA (Brasil), Order of 3 July 2007, 16th ‘Considering’ clause. 
400 IACHR Vogt case, Order of 12 April 1996 (President), 6th ‘Considering’ clause, referred to in 
Order of 27 June 1996, 3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
401 IACHR Vogt case, Order of 27 June 1996, 5th and 6th ‘Considering’ clauses. 
402 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §18, precautionary measure of June 2001 on behalf 
of chemistry students who had been declared ‘military targets’ by the paramilitary group 
Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). 
403 See e.g. CIDH Damion Thomas v. Jamaica, 4 April 2001 (merits), §45 (establishing that Article 
1(1) ACHR, obligating the State to ensure the free and full exercise of the rights and freedoms in 
the Convention to all persons subject to its jurisdiction, requires the State ‘to organize the 
governmental apparatus and, in general, all the structures through which public power is 
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Pending the proceedings a provisional measure requiring investigation of death threats and 
harassment, prosecution and punishment of the perpetrators (as has been seen in the Inter-
American system) may serve to prevent further attacks on the life and personal integrity of the 
beneficiary. At the stage of judgments on reparations action against impunity may be required to 
achieve reparation for specific individuals: the right to the truth, restoring some measure of dig-
nity, removing fear and recognition of suffering. In other words, action against impunity at this 
stage aims at recognition, satisfaction and rehabilitation. The action required in all these cases is 
the same: investigation and prosecution. Its purpose in judgments on reparation encompasses 
more. As part of the decision on reparations, such investigation, prosecution and punishment, 
although it serves as a form of satisfaction, dignifying the victims, it may equally be forward 
looking (as a guarantee of non-repetition).404 
Thus for the Inter-American Court the specific order to investigate and punish violations 
has been found both as part of the Court’s judgment and as part of its provisional measures to 
protect persons against death threats and harassment. In the latter case, though, as part of provi-
sional measures the obligation to ‘investigate and prosecute’ solely aims at preventing further 
threats, while the obligation to ‘investigate and prosecute’ as a form of reparation aims not only at 
prevention of further violations but also at assigning some moral satisfaction. 
As noted, the Court has pointed out that the duty to investigate as part of provisional meas-
ures is meant to guarantee the right to life and personal integrity, while it will not consider the 
effectiveness of those investigations that have been realized nor the alleged negligence of the 
State with regard to these investigations, since it had not yet found a violation in this respect.405 In 
other words, in its provisional measures the Court suggests investigation and prosecution as a 
means of protection against death threats pending the proceedings, but evidently it cannot judge 
on this issue as part of its follow up on ongoing provisional measures other than to reassert the 
State’s obligation to protect the beneficiaries and again suggest the measures that should be taken 
in this regard. 
There is also another context in which provisional measures have been used addressing the 
issue of impunity. While in the Inter-American system, the obligation to investigate and prosecute 
has been referred to in provisional measures aimed at protecting persons against death threats and 
harassment, in light of its particular function the CAT has very specifically used provisional 
measures based on the State’s obligation either to extradite or prosecute someone suspected of 
having perpetrated torture.406 
5.4.6 Cultural survival and the expected obligations on the merits 
The provisional measures ordered in the Inter-American system and by the Bosnia Chamber in 
order to ensure the cultural survival of a group appear justified by their general case law on the 
obligations on the merits, including reparation in cultural cases. Upon the finding of a violation, 
the obligations appear to make permanent what was ordered provisionally pending the proceed-
                                                                                                                       
exercised, so that they are capable of juridically ensuring the free and full enjoyment of human 
rights’. Flowing from these obligations ‘are correspondent duties to prevent, investigate and 
punish any violation of the rights recognized in the Convention’. 
404 Yet the official State response to this part of the Orders for provisional measures generally is not 
or insufficiently implemented by the respondent State. See generally Chapter XVII (Official 
responses). 
405 See IACHR Cárcel de Urso Branco (Brasil), Order of 2 May 2008, 26th ‘Considering’ clause. 
See also Asunto de los niños y adolescentes privados de libertad en el “Complexo do Tatuapé” 
de la Fundação CASA (Brasil), Order of 3 July 2007, 16th ‘Considering’ clause. 
406 See Chapter XII (Other situations), section 2.7. 
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ings.407 Obviously this is only possible if the provisional measures are indeed respected. A Bosnia 
Chamber case concerning the site of the Kizlaragina mosque is a case in point. In October 2001 
the Chamber had used provisional measures to prevent the implementation of certain procedural 
decisions that would allocate the site of this mosque, which had been destroyed in 1992, to a 
private contractor for the construction of business premises. Nevertheless business premises had 
meanwhile been constructed. Apparently permission to build these premises ‘was obtained unlaw-
fully and without the prior consent or knowledge of the Islamic Community’.408 Thus, subse-
quently the petitioner sought permission to rebuild the mosque and to remove these business 
premises. Yet the Chamber decided not to order demolition of the business premises and restitu-
tion of one plot adjacent to that of the destroyed mosque.409 It did order the respondent Party to 
ensure that the ownership of the plot where the mosque stood until 1992 ‘shall be legally trans-
ferred to the Islamic community and it shall be permitted to fence in the perimeter of the plot 
without any further obstruction or hindrance’.410 In addition, ‘all temporary facilities (if any re-
main)’ were ordered to be removed and the site was ordered to be cleaned of all refuse.411 
The Chamber pointed out that the present case revealed ‘a particularly serious form of dis-
crimination (…) that seemed ‘to be aimed at humiliating the applicant and thereby disrupting the 
process of return in the Municipality’ in question.412 The Chamber noted ‘the difficulties inherent 
in the determination of an adequate monetary compensation for this kind of violation’. It recalled 
in particular that ‘the business premises were constructed on the site of a Muslim cemetery with-
out exhuming the graves and that a representative of the respondent Party attempted to justify this 
by saying that they were ‘non-functional’ graves and that no one had in fact been buried there for 
50 years’.413 Whichever amount of compensation it would award for non-pecuniary damage, it 
                                                 
407 See Chapter X (Cultural and religious rights). 
408 Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH (Mrkonjić Grad) v. Republika Srpska, 22 December 
2003, §161. In fact the Chamber notes that “It is not known whether the construction of the 
business premises was concluded at this stage. However, by failing to inform the Chamber that 
the construction (…) had already been commenced or concluded, the respondent Party failed to 
implement the order as directed by the Chamber”. Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH 
(Mrkonjić Grad) v. Republika Srpska, §160. The petitioner had requested provisional measures in 
July 2001. 
409 Among others it noted that there was sufficient space on which to reconstruct the mosque. It 
added that it was ‘not in a position to evaluate whether the restoration of the Kizlagarina mosque 
complex as a cultural landmark requires the business premises to be removed’, §168. 
410 Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH (Mrkonjić Grad) v. Republika Srpska, §165. 
411 Id., §164. With regard to the upper part of the mosque site it considered it could not ‘now order 
the respondent party to bear the financial burden’ of the reconstruction of the mosque because its 
competence was limited ratione temporis (the destruction of the Mosque occurred before 14 
December 1995). Neither would it order the respondent party to grant the petitioner a permit to 
reconstruct the mosque, because it had previously concluded that the petitioner had not yet 
exhausted domestic resources in this respect. Yet it did order Republika Srpska ‘to consider any 
future requests by the applicant for reconstruction (…) in good faith and to grant permission 
without unreasonable conditions’. See Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH (Mrkonjić 
Grad) v. Republika Srpska, §163. 
412 Id., §174. 
413 Id., §173. The Chamber concluded that the respondent Party ‘targets the applicant as a religious 
community, because of its religion’. Id., §151. The conduct of the authorities showed ‘utter 
neglect of the religious feelings of the Muslim community that had been burying its dead at the 
cemetery of the mosque compound (…) over the last few centuries’. The organs of the 
respondent Party ‘took no steps at all to exhume the graves prior to permitting the construction of 
business premises on the same plot’. Id., §152. The Chamber found that the authorities in 
Mrkonjić Grad had subjected the petitioner to ‘specifically poor treatment, not only if compared 
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would ‘not fully remedy the applicant’s complaints and return the previous status quo’.414 This 
remark illustrates the importance of provisional measures in order to prevent such a situation.  
The relation between provisional measures and subsequent obligations on the merits and 
reparation appears less straightforward for the HRC than for the Inter-American Commission and 
Court and the Bosnia Chamber, because of a lack of clarity in some of its case law on the mer-
its.415  
The Lubicon Lake Band case (1990) is instructive in this regard.416 In this case the HRC 
confirmed the admissibility of the case just before it found a violation and suggested an unspeci-
fied remedy. The HRC published its final View two years after the interlocutory decision reiterat-
ing its provisional measure. While it devoted 28 pages to the complicated issue of admissibility in 
this case, it used only one page for a discussion of the merits. The HRC stated that both historical 
inequities, ‘to which the State party refers’ and ‘certain more recent developments’ were threaten-
ing the way of life and culture of the Lubicon Lake Band in violation of Article 27. It concluded 
that the ‘State party proposes to rectify the situation by a remedy that the Committee deems ap-
propriate within the meaning of article 2 of the Covenant’.417 It is not clear what was the remedy 
deemed appropriate by the HRC. Apparently it considered sufficient the remedy already proposed 
by the State.  
Chief Ominayak had pointed out that his reason to resort to the HRC had been to request it 
to assist the Band in ‘attempting to convince’ the State that the oil and gas development was 
seriously threatening the existence of the Band and that Canada was responsible for this situation. 
He stated that without the preservation of the status quo a final judgment on the merits would be 
ineffective. The only effective remedy would be to seek an interim injunction. Without it a final 
judgment could never ‘restore the way of life, livelihood and means of subsistence’ of the Band. 
The Committee’s provisional measures could be seen as seeking such an interim injunction. Yet 
because of the lack of precision in the remedy the HRC recommended eventually, the Commit-
                                                                                                                       
to the Serb Orthodox Church, but to the citizenry in general’. It considered the actions of the 
authorities ‘to amount to a clinical attempt to “cleanse” the Mrkonjić Grad area of all traces of 
Muslim presence’. 
414 Id., §174. 
415 In a few cases the HRC initially used provisional measures because cultural survival of the 
indigenous group to which the petitioner belonged might be at stake if the State would continue 
its activities. In relation to the future logging activities in Länsman II the HRC made a remark 
clarifying its test for finding a violation of the petitioners’ right to enjoy their own culture. It 
observed that logging had been approved ‘on a scale which, while resulting in additional work 
and expenses for the authors and other reindeer herdsmen, does not appear to threaten the 
survival of reindeer husbandry’. This indicates that only a threat to the survival of such 
husbandry would result in a denial of the right to culture. This, in turn, may mean that in Art. 27 
cases involving infringements on the natural habitat, on the merits the HRC would only find a 
violation if there was a threat of irreparable harm (or such harm had already occurred), but not if 
harm other than irreparable harm would occur. Indeed, in relation to the collective aspects of 
Article 27 the HRC has only found a violation in cases in which it considered that further actions 
would result in irreparable harm. While in other situations involving other rights (without 
collective aspects) it might find violations of a less serious nature for which it would require 
compensation, thus far it has never done so with regard to collective aspects. 
416 HRC Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990. 
417 Ando expressed some doubts about ‘the categorical statement that recent developments have 
threatened the life of the Lubicon Lake Band and constitute a violation of article 27’, 
emphasising the importance of economic development for the society as a whole. 
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tee’s decision on the merits could not be seen as seeking a permanent or even an interim injunc-
tion.418 
Most scholars qualify as ineffective the role of the HRC in the specific situation of the Lu-
bicon.419 They are generally more positive about its theoretical contribution to the protection of 
indigenous peoples, but with regard to the rights of the victims in question they criticise the 
Committee’s vague formulation of the required remedy.420 Schmidt observes that the Commit-
tee’s rationale was ‘circuitous’.421 Anaya notes that ‘by not providing more guidance on the rem-
edy issue, the committee left it subject to continuing controversy within Canada’s internal proc-
esses in which the Canadian government had the upper hand’. “Thus, however path-breaking the 
committee’s decision in the Lubicon case is in other respects, its effectiveness in that very case 
was undermined”.422 He considers that the Committee’s deferential stance could be explained on 
the basis of the presumption of non-interference. Anaya argues that situations involving ‘indige-
nous peoples facing entrenched historical inequities’ required more active involvement by the 
HRC, also in respect of the appropriate remedies. He suggests that it should offer ‘good offices to 
promote or mediate dialogue toward agreement on remedies’.423  
De Feyter observes that the ‘decisional paragraph of Lubicon Lake Band is extremely short’. 
“One may safely speculate that it is as long as the agreement among the majority of the Commit-
tee members”.424 This is confirmed by Schmidt who refers to the Lubicon Lake Band case as one 
that ‘has been criticised as having fallen victim of the search for consensus’.425 
                                                 
418 The HRC has sometimes been more flexible in its Concluding Observations as part of the State 
reporting procedure. Possibly it feels less inhibited in its review of State reports than in its role of 
adjudicator. In 1999 it recommended ‘that Canada’s policy of requiring extinguishment of 
inherent or aboriginal rights be abolished because it violates Canada’s human rights obligations 
under the ICCPR’. HRC Concluding Observations in relation to Canada, 7 April 1999, §8. It 
urged Canada to take ‘decisive and urgent action’ in order to fully implement the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, instituted by the Canadian 
government. Ibid. In 1996 this Royal Commission had noted that ‘the actual reserve or 
community land base’ of aboriginal people in Canada had shrunk by almost two third since 1867. 
“Aboriginal nations need much more territory to become economically, culturally and politically 
self-sufficient. If they cannot obtain a greater share of the lands and resources in this country, 
their institutions of self-government will fail”. Ibid., quoting the 1996 recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. The Royal Commission also noted that adequate lands 
and resources were necessary and without them ‘they will be pushed to the edge of economic, 
cultural and political extinction’. Final Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
1996, CD-ROM version, record 8380 as cited in Amnesty International, ‘Time is wasting’, April 
2003, p. 6. This general remark seems to apply to the Lubicon case as well and supports the 
reasoning behind the Committee’s use of provisional measures in this case. After all, the HRC 
had noted that it used provisional measures ‘(i)n view of the seriousness of the author’s 
allegations that the Lubicon Lake Band was at the verge of extinction’. HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 
26 March 1990, §29.3. 
419 An exception is De Zayas (2001), p. 113. “It is the author’s conviction, that the negotiations that 
took place during the Committee’s examination of the case ultimately contributed to some very 
interesting proposals and programs by the Canadian Government”. 
420 See Scheinin (2001), p. 166 and Anaya (1996), p. 165. On official responses and follow up in 
general see Chapters XVI and XVII. 
421 Schmidt (1997), p. 340. 
422 Anaya (1996), p. 166. 
423 Ibid. See e.g. Opsahl (1992), p. 427, about the mandate and legal capacity to offer good offices 
and mediate dialogue. 
424 De Feyter (2001), p. 156. De Feyter also notes that the HRC takes with one hand what it gave 
with the other. “Yes, there was a violation of Article 27 ICCPR, given ‘historical inequities and 
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The fact that it declared the case admissible shows it still believed that a decision by a do-
mestic court would be ineffective. However, in its decision on the merits it also seemed to suggest 
a remedy opting for the financial damages offered by the State, together with a certain demarca-
tion of land, both of which the Band had rejected as unacceptable. Moreover the HRC did not 
follow up on its previous provisional measures.426 If it indeed considers that only compensation is 
warranted in cases such as these, and nothing more, its use of provisional measures would be 
questionable.427  
                                                                                                                       
more recent developments’, but No the Band could not stop the corporate exploitation of its 
territories, as long as the Canadian government provided sufficient compensation. The 
compensation already offered by the Canadian government, i.e. the reservation of an area of land 
and an amount of money, was sufficient, regardless of the Band refusal to accept the offer 
(footnote omitted)”. De Feyter (2001), p. 156. 
425 Schmidt (1992), pp. 656-657. He noted about consensual procedures that ‘as it is sufficient for 
one expert to oppose strongly a draft text otherwise acceptable to all the others, the search for 
consensus not only necessitates protracted consultations about a compromise text, it has also 
occasionally resulted in final decisions in which the close observer will find it difficult to follow 
the thread, or the logic of the legal argument’. See also on this issue Evatt (1998), p. 103, noting 
that the ‘need to reach agreement means that the texts of the Committee’s decisions are at times 
truncated and hard to understand’. Huff considers that the decision was positive to the extent that 
it could be interpreted ‘as holding that the hunting and trapping culture of the Lubicon Cree 
constitutes an economic and social activity protected under Article 27’. Thus, ‘environmentally 
based cultures can find some protection under the covenant’. Huff (1999), p. 188. He points out, 
however, that the Committee’s decision ‘approved of the very remedy rejected in 1989 by the 
Lubicon as guaranteeing a future of welfare dependence’. Huff (1999), p. 186. He specified the 
remedy the HRC could have suggested: “Theoretically, the HRC could have recommended that 
Canada take steps to encourage corporate withdrawal from Lubicon land. Such a 
recommendation would have been a strong affirmation of the basic link between degradation of 
the environment and resultant human rights abuses. It would have recognised that the only way to 
remedy such abuses is to restore the environment. However, any practical effect the HRC 
decision may have had was rendered moot by the HRC’s actual recommended remedy: a small 
reserve and monetary resources for infrastructure development. This remedy does not provide for 
any reassertion of significant Lubicon control and thus seems to contemplate a future dependent 
upon federal welfare”. Huff (1999), pp. 188-189. 
426 See Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). See also Chapter X (Culture). 
427 In a letter expressing the Band’s discontent with the Committee’s View Chief Ominayak pointed 
out that the Canadian Government ‘initiated a major anti-Lubicon propaganda campaign 
claiming, among other things, that “the Human Rights Committee found the (take-it-or-leave-it) 
offer which Canada made to the (Lubicon people) is fair and reasonable and would meet any 
obligation Canada has under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”’. Letter of 
19 December 1991 to the HRC, on file with the author. This letter has also been posted on 
<nativenet.uthscsa.edu/archive/nl/9201/0028.html> (consulted on 13 March 2003). The 
sustainability test refers to the requirement of economic sustainability of the traditional way of 
life of indigenous peoples. After discussing this requirement of economic sustainability of the 
traditional way of life Scheinin has pointed out what should be the adequate remedy for a 
violation of Art. 27. He emphasised that it ‘must be the termination of the interference, 
accompanied by a restitution of the conditions of the specific way of life’. Such a remedy ‘should 
be compatible with the object of preserving and developing the specific way of life pursued by 
the community in question’. “The sustainability test requires that the form and modalities of 
compensation or other remedies for a violation of indigenous rights under Article 27 must be 
such as to serve the continued viability of the distinctive culture in question”. He notes that the 
remedy could still ‘partly be in the form of pecuniary compensation in cases where the economic 
hardship caused to the sustainability of the traditional economic activities cannot fully be 
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Thus far, this is the only provisional measure in an indigenous culture case in which the 
HRC later found a violation. It is unfortunate, however, that the protective measures it recom-
mended on the merits do not seem to correspond with the aim of the provisional measures used 
pending the proceedings.  
If the HRC indeed maintains its limited concept of measures required on the merits, taking 
the approach that only compensation is warranted and nothing more, its use of provisional meas-
ures in such cases is questionable.428 There should be a correlation between the measures required 
pending and concluding the procedure. If the HRC would never refer to the obligation to perma-
nently halt certain destructive developments, provisional measures that would require a temporary 
halt to such developments would not be of much use. In fact the provisional measures would then 
go further than the eventual obligations on the merits.429  
Indeed, a form of reparation aimed at restoring the situation as much as possible or at least 
at preventing further degradation would fit in well with the Committee’s present approach to 
reparation as referred to in the 2004 General Comment. It would also justify the type of provi-
sional measure taken pending the proceedings.430 
                                                                                                                       
restituted through measures that seek to restore the natural environment’. Scheinin (2001), p. 171. 
This illustrates the need for provisional measures pending the proceedings, to prevent such harm 
to the natural environment in the first place. 
428 In a letter expressing the Band’s discontent with the Committee’s View Chief Ominayak pointed 
out that the Canadian Government ‘initiated a major anti-Lubicon propaganda campaign 
claiming, among other things, that “the Human Rights Committee found the (take-it-or-leave-it) 
offer which Canada made to the (Lubicon people) is fair and reasonable and would meet any 
obligation Canada has under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights”’. Letter of 
19 December 1991 to the HRC, on file with the author. This letter was also posted on 
<nativenet.uthscsa.edu/archive/nl/9201/0028.html> (consulted on 13 March 2003). 
429 The HRC has sometimes been more flexible in its Concluding Observations as part of the State 
reporting procedure. Possibly it feels less inhibited in its review of State reports than in its role of 
adjudicator. In 1999 it recommended ‘that Canada’s policy of requiring extinguishment of 
inherent or aboriginal rights be abolished because it violates Canada’s human rights obligations 
under the ICCPR’. HRC Concluding Observations in relation to Canada, 7 April 1999, §8. It 
urged Canada to take ‘decisive and urgent action’ in order to fully implement the 
recommendations of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, instituted by the Canadian 
government. Ibid. In 1996 this Royal Commission had noted that ‘the actual reserve or 
community land base’ of aboriginal people in Canada had shrunk by almost two third since 1867. 
“Aboriginal nations need much more territory to become economically, culturally and politically 
self-sufficient. If they cannot obtain a greater share of the lands and resources in this country, 
their institutions of self-government will fail”. Ibid., quoting the 1996 recommendations of the 
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples. The Royal Commission also noted that adequate lands 
and resources were necessary and without them ‘they will be pushed to the edge of economic, 
cultural and political extinction’. Final Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, 
1996, CD-ROM version, record 8380 as cited in Amnesty International, ‘Time is wasting’, April 
2003, p. 6. This general remark seems to apply to the aforementioned Lubicon case as well and 
supports the reasoning behind the Committee’s use of provisional measures in this case. After all, 
the HRC had noted that it used provisional measures ‘(i)n view of the seriousness of the author’s 
allegations that the Lubicon Lake Band was at the verge of extinction’. HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 
26 March 1990, §29.3. 
430 In the other situation in which the HRC clearly found a violation of the right to culture, although 
read into the right to family life and privacy (because of the French declaration to Article 27 
ICCPR) it recommended an ‘appropriate remedy’. In this case, Hopu and Bessert, the Committee 
noted that the State party was required to protect the petitioners’ rights effectively and to ensure 
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5.4.7 Halt interrogation techniques and the expected obligations on the merits 
In Ireland v. UK (1972) the European Commission considered that it could not meet the specific 
request for provisional measures made by Ireland. It did not address an argument raised by this 
State with regard to the right to an adequate remedy. In its original submission, Ireland pointed 
out that in domestic law the only remedy for violations of Article 3 ECHR would be the right to 
claim monetary damages. Such a remedy was insufficient, inadequate, and ineffective.431 In its 
decision on the merits the Commission did find that the combined use of the five techniques in the 
cases before it constituted a practice of inhuman treatment and torture. Given the finding of both 
Commission and Court that these techniques constituted a violation of Article 3432 and in light of 
the evolution in the practice of using provisional measures it may be expected that the present 
Court would in fact use provisional measures to halt continued use of such techniques pending the 
proceedings before it.433 
Certain acts about to be committed are analogous to others that have already been found to 
violate the prohibition of torture or cruel treatment. It is submitted that in such cases the Court 
would be justified in using provisional measures also to halt such actions that it has not previously 
determined to be in violation of Article 3 ECHR. An example would be an interrogation method 
that appears to satisfy the criteria for illegal methods established in previous jurisprudence. 
5.5 Halting executions and the expected obligations on the merits and 
reparations 
5.5.1 Introduction 
When it finds violations, the HRC always refers to the obligation to provide victims with an 
‘effective remedy, including compensation’ and to the obligation ‘to ensure that similar violations 
do not occur in the future’. These forms of reparation are compatible with those under traditional 
international law (e.g. assurances of non-repetition). It also suggests measures such as commuta-
tion (in death penalty cases) or even release. Other possibilities are a retrial respecting the princi-
ples of Article 14 ICCPR, investigation of the killing, torture or disappearance and prosecution of 
those responsible could fall under the traditional restitutio in integrum (restitution in kind), while 
the investigation and prosecution would at the same time also qualify as concrete assurances of 
non-repetition. Sometimes the wording ‘an appropriate remedy, including’ is used, sometimes ‘an 
                                                                                                                       
that similar violations did not occur in the future. Yet it did not specifically point out that this 
meant that the State was required, for instance, to put a stop to the completion of the hotel 
complex.  
431 EComHR Ireland v. UK, 5310/71, Yearbook 23 (1972), p. 100. It noted ‘the only purported 
remedy available to a person subjected to the aforesaid treatment constituting a breach of Art. 3 
of the Convention, within the domestic law of the respondent Government, is, in the case where 
the tort of assault has occurred, the right to claim monetary damages. Such a remedy is not an 
effective remedy, nor is it a sufficient or adequate remedy for the acts referred in this submission 
to the Commission, and constituting breaches of Art. 3 of the Convention. Further, in cases where 
no such tort or assault has occurred not even this purported remedy exists’. 
432 For the ECtHR judgment finding a violation of the prohibition of inhuman and degrading 
treatment see Ireland v. UK, 18 January 1978. The finding of a practice of inhuman and 
degrading treatment was sixteen votes to one, and the finding that it did not constitute a practice 
of torture was thirteen to four. 
433 In addition, of course, the Court’s Art. 3 jurisprudence has evolved as well. See e.g. Selmouni v. 
France, 28 July 1999. 
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appropriate remedy entailing (...)’ When the word ‘including’ is used, this is a minimum and 
more is warranted.  
In Bradshaw v. Barbados (1994) the HRC referred to avoiding ‘irreparable damage to the 
victim of the alleged violation’. This is an indication that the HRC aims to prevent irreparable 
harm to persons and that this harm is related to the alleged violation.434  
In this section the focus is on the Committee’s decision on cessation, assurances and repara-
tion specifically in death penalty cases. Because of the assumption that provisional measures and 
such decisions are substantively interrelated, an examination of decisions by the HRC may shed 
light on the concept of provisional measures. As noted, its decisions on the merits, also indicating 
the remedy necessary to redress the violation, constitute practically the only public sources on its 
use of provisional measures.435 
Pending the proceedings provisional measures aim to prevent the State from creating the 
impossibility of providing a remedy in case a violation will be found. The general legal obliga-
tions undertaken by States parties are closely related to the need to provide effective remedies in 
the event of a breach. In turn, the use of provisional measures in domestic proceedings and by the 
HRC itself is closely related to the right to an effective remedy.  
At the same time, this section discusses how the Committee’s decisions on cessation, assur-
ances and reparation in death penalty cases have not necessarily clarified its attitude towards the 
concept of provisional measures. Yet in 2004 the Committee published a General Comment on 
Article 2 ICCPR, which did confirm the relation between provisional measures and reparation. 
Finally this section refers to the practice developed in this respect in the Inter-American system. 
5.5.2 The rationale of the Committee’s approach until its General Comment 
(2004) 
Given the purpose of provisional measures the most important criterion for using them should not 
be the prima facie evidence of a violation, but the Rapporteur’s expectation of the obligations the 
Committee would refer to or the form of reparation it would recommend if it would find a viola-
tion.  
Initially the situation was clear. In 1989, in the first death penalty case it determined on the 
merits, the HRC found that the petitioners were entitled to a remedy ‘the necessary prerequisite in 
the particular circumstances is the commutation of the sentence’.436 Different from later Views, 
                                                 
434 HRC Peter Bradshaw v. Barbados, 19 July 1994 (inadm.), §§2.9, 2.10, 4.2, 5.3; see also Denzil 
Roberts v. Barbados, 19 July 1994, §2.6, 2.7, 6.3. 
435 See Chapter II (Systems). 
436 HRC Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v. Jamaica, 6 April 1989. It found that the petitioners had been 
unable to appeal to the JCPC in the absence of a written judgment of the Court of Appeal. It also 
found a violation of Article 7 because of the delay of almost twenty hours from the time the stay 
of execution was granted to the time they were removed from their death cell. They were notified 
of the stay of execution only 45 minutes before the execution was originally scheduled. The 
authorities indeed commuted the sentence of Pratt and Morgan following the JCPC decision in 
their case. Ivan Morgan died on 28 April 1995. On this day an inmate sent a letter to the HRC 
informing it that Morgan was found dead in his cell that morning. He pointed out that Morgan 
had suffered a long illness and that he considered an autopsy should be done. He referred to 
stomach pain, an ulcer and ‘insanity’. He questioned why he was in a cell and not in hospital. He 
argued that Morgan died because of Government negligence. If he had been placed under medical 
observation his quick medical deterioration would have been detected. He noted that an autopsy 
could not bring back Morgan’s life, ‘but we can find out if there was negligence on the part of the 
Government in order that such a crisis doesn’t repeat itself on another prisoner’. Letter by an 
inmate in relation to Morgan’s death, 28 April 1995 (on file with the author). The Jamaica 
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the Committee did not imply that only Article 14 violations result in a violation of Article 6. On 
the contrary, it stated that the death penalty ‘should not be imposed in circumstances where there 
have been violations by the State party of any of its obligations under the Covenant’ (emphasis 
added). It also explained that the necessary prerequisite in the particular circumstances was the 
commutation of the sentence. 
Yet subsequently the HRC came to distinguish between death penalty cases involving fair 
trial claims and those without such claims. In death penalty cases where a violation of Article 14 
(fair trial) and hence Article 6 (right to life) was found the HRC normally referred to ‘remedies’ 
ranging from release to commutation.437 But when it found violations of other provisions it did 
not specify, as a prerequisite, that the petitioner should remain alive in order to enjoy the repara-
tion to which he was entitled. 
With regard to Article 14 the case Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago (2002) is particularly 
noteworthy. In this case the petitioner had been executed despite the Committee’s provisional 
measure. The HRC pointed out: 
                                                                                                                       
Council for Human Rights sent several letters to the Commissioner of Corrections, the 
Department of Correctional Services and the Commissioner of Police, requesting copies of the 
medical and autopsy reports. Several newspapers also reported that Morgan may not have been 
admitted in the hospital because of insufficient availability of guards. Letters of 28 April, 4 May 
and 29 May 1995; ‘Dead inmate suffered from depression’, the Jamaica Herald, 3 May 1995; 
‘Why was Morgan not admitted to hospital?-JCHR’, the Daily Observer, 2 May 1995; ‘Morgan 
said ill, depressed before his death’, the Sunday Gleaner, 30 April 1995 and Eulalee Thompson, 
‘Doctors shunning prisons’, the Gleaner, 11 and 12 April 1995 (on file with the author). 
437 ‘In capital punishment cases, the obligation of States parties to observe rigorously all the 
guarantees for a fair trial set out in Art. 14 of the Covenant admits of no exception’. See e.g. HRC 
Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991; Aston Little v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; Raphael Henry 
v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; Leaford Smith v. Jamaica, 31 March 1993 and Lenford Hamilton 
v. Jamaica, 21 March 1994; Garfield and Andrew Peart v. Jamaica, 19 July 1995; Abdool 
Saleem Yasseen and Noel Thomas v. Republic of Guyana, 30 March 1998; Tony Jones v. 
Jamaica, 6 April 1998; Victor Domukovsky, Zaza Tsiklauri, Petre Gelbakhiani and Irakli 
Dokvadze v. Georgia, 6 April 1998; Irving Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 October 1998. The 
case Smith and Stewart v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999 illustrates the distinction the HRC appears to 
make between the need for reparation for a violation of Article 14 and reparation for other 
violations. In the case of Stewart the HRC found a violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) ICCPR, but 
in the case of Smith a violation of Article 14(3)(d). The effective remedy included compensation 
for both of them and release for Smith. Errol Smith and Oval Stewart v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999 
(no provisional measures because their death sentences were already commuted prior to their 
initial communication). See also HRC Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 July 1990. In this 
case the HRC had found violations of Articles 14(3)(d) and 6. Subsequently, he was not released, 
contrary to the recommendation of the HRC in 1990. Instead, in November 1992 his death 
sentence was commuted to life imprisonment with hard labour. He submitted a new case that 
year, on which the HRC decided in 1996. The HRC pointed out that ‘to convey to the author that 
the prerogative of mercy would not be exercised and his early release denied because of his 
human rights complaints reveals a lack of humanity and amounts to treatment that fails to respect 
the author’s dignity, in violation of article 10, paragraph 1’. Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and 
Tobago, 16 July 1996, §§8.2-8.3. In this respect the HRC made a distinction between the specific 
entitlements of the petitioner on the one hand and the State’s treaty obligation to implement its 
earlier View on the other. With regard to this case the petitioner was entitled to an appropriate 
remedy for the violation of Article 10. At the same time the State had a treaty obligation to 
implement its earlier View. In this light the HRC called upon it to release Pinto. As of 1995 the 
HRC introduced new phrases such as ‘consider early release’ or ‘re-trial’ instead of release. 
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“Under article 2, paragraph 3, of the Covenant, Mr. Ashby would have been entitled to an 
effective remedy including, first and foremost, the preservation of his life. Adequate 
compensation must be granted to his surviving family”.438 
Yet in relation to death penalty cases where it found violations of Articles 7 (prohibition of torture 
and cruel treatment), 9 (right to habeas corpus, etc.) and 10 (right to humane treatment) it simply 
noted that ‘an appropriate remedy’ was required without specifying that this implied that the 
petitioner should remain alive.439 Consequently, the State itself would not be inclined to consider 
this a prerequisite. 
It is clear that in Article 14 cases (fair trial) without the provisional measure the required ac-
tion on the merits, ranging from release to commutation, would have been made impossible. This 
explains as well why the HRC used provisional measures in such cases that were later found 
inadmissible or in which it found no violations.440 It explains equally cases where Articles 14 and 
7 were claimed, but where the HRC later found a violation of Article 7 only.441 This case law 
                                                 
438 HRC Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002. See also Chapter XVII (Official 
responses). 
439 In cases in which the HRC found violations of Articles 7 and 10 it simply recommended an 
‘effective remedy’. The same applies to a case involving a finding of a violation of Article 9: 
HRC Peter Grant v. Jamaica, 22 March 1996; Michael Freemantle v. Jamaica, 24 March 2000 
(commuted on an unspecified date) related to a violation of Article 9(3) as well, but in this case 
the HRC had also found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1)). Klein attached an individual opinion. 
He noted in relation to the remedy that the Committee should have expressly spelled out that 
apart from other possible appropriate remedies the petitioner was entitled to compensation 
according to Article 9(5) ICCPR. 
440 Some of the petitioners specifically invoked Article 14 but the HRC eventually did not find a 
violation of that article. See e.g. HRC Willard Collins v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991. See also 
Peter Blaine v. Jamaica, 17 July 1994. In some cases the HRC did specify the remedy to a 
certain extent. In Hylton v. Jamaica (1994) the HRC found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1). At 
the time of the View the victim was awaiting execution. He was also receiving threats. On death 
threats see Chapter IX. The Committee pointed out that Jamaica was under an obligation to take 
effective measures to remedy the violations suffered, including the award of appropriate 
compensation, and ‘to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future’. “In particular, the 
State party is requested to complete the investigations into the threats and the ill-treatment to 
which Mr. Hylton has been subjected, and to punish those who are held to be responsible for his 
treatment”. In other words, in this case the HRC does specify part of the remedy, but this 
specification does not imply that the State should preserve the life of the petitioner in the context 
of the death penalty. The conflicting language about the remedy that is required is worth noting: 
an ‘obligation’ to take effective measures, including an ‘obligation’ to award appropriate 
compensation and an ‘obligation’ to ensure that similar violations do not occur in the future. The 
Committee then specifies these obligations stating that, in particular, and now one would expect 
another obligatory term, the State party is ‘requested’ to complete the investigations and to 
punish those responsible. In other words the State party has an ‘obligation’ to award 
compensation and to ensure non-occurrence of similar violations and, in particular, it is 
‘requested’ to investigate the occurrences and punish those found responsible. In Linton v. 
Jamaica (1992) the HRC found no violation of Article 14(1), but it did find violations of Articles 
7 and 10(1). The State party was urged to take effective steps to investigate the ill treatment of the 
petitioner and to prosecute any persons that could be responsible and to grant the petitioner 
compensation. The HRC did not specify the remedy to include commutation. Again, this meant 
that the State would have the way clear for execution. Carlton Linton v. Jamaica, 22 October 
1992. 
441 See e.g. HRC Dennie Chaplin v. Jamaica, 2 November 1995; Junior Leslie v. Jamaica, 31 July 
1998 (later commuted); Barrington Campbell v. Jamaica, 20 October 1998; Anthony Leehong v. 
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does not explain, however, the use of provisional measures in cases where the petitioners had 
claimed a violation of Articles 7, 9 and/or 10(1) but not of Article 14.442 In such cases it recom-
                                                                                                                       
Jamaica, 13 July 1999; death sentence was reclassified as non-capital in November 1994); 
Michael Freemantle v. Jamaica, 24 March 2000 and Michael Robinson v. Jamaica, 29 March 
2000 (commutation in 1997). In some cases the HRC did declare admissible these Article 14 
claims, although eventually it did not find a violation. See e.g. HRC Ian Chung v. Jamaica, 9 
April 1998. In other words, given the possibility of a finding of a violation of Article 6 (right to 
life) because of a finding of a violation of Article 14 (fair trial), the use of provisional measures 
pending the proceedings was clearly justified. In addition, as the State often subsequently 
commuted the death sentences, the fact that the HRC did not refer to commutation, retrial or 
release does not necessarily imply that it would have failed to do so in cases in which the 
petitioners were still awaiting execution. In one case it seems that the HRC considered Article 14 
proprio motu and decided not to declare it inadmissible ratione materiae to allow the possibility 
of a finding of a violation requiring commutation under its case law. At the same time the 
possibility of such finding seemed remote from the beginning. In Barrett and Sutcliffe v. Jamaica 
(1992) the petitioner only invoked Articles 7 and 10 but the HRC considered that the complaint 
also related to Article 14 ICCPR. The role this inclusion played pending the proceedings before 
the HRC was as follows. The HRC obliquely noted that ‘although counsel only invokes a 
violation of article 7 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, it transpires from 
some of the submissions that they also allege violations of article 14’. In 1989 it declared the 
communications admissible because the pursuit of domestic remedies had been unreasonably 
prolonged. It did not examine the claims ratione materiae for purposes of admissibility. 
Following this, it requested additional information from the State party in relation to the 
allegations under Articles 7 and 10, but not Article 14. On the merits, the HRC considered the 
Article 14 claim and noted that the petitioners had not corroborated the allegations that their 
identification parade was unfair, that the preparations for Barrett’s defence were inadequate and 
that Sutcliffe had been denied access to counsel before his formal indictment. Hence it did not 
find a violation of Article 14 ICCPR, considering that counsel had not put forward any claims 
under that article. HRC Randolph Barrett and Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992 (on 16 
May 1995 his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment). Eventually, the HRC found a 
violation of Articles 7 and 10(1) in respect of the beatings and injuries suffered by one of the 
petitioners. Again this required 'an appropriate remedy' without specification as to commutation. 
With this the HRC removed the obstacle to the execution of the petitioners. This seems strange 
because the petitioner is unlikely to enjoy any remedy upon his execution. In this light the 
wording used seems hardly appropriate. In HRC Balkissoon Soogrim v. Trinidad and Tobago, 8 
April 1993, the petitioner was awaiting execution and the claim included Article 14. Initially, all 
claims were declared admissible, but upon review the HRC limited this to those based on Articles 
7 and 10. Apparently it maintained its provisional measure. Following this, it found violations of 
Articles 7 and 10(1). The petitioner was ‘entitled to a remedy, including appropriate 
compensation’. The View does not refer to the use of provisional measures, but its use appears 
from the file. The petitioner was still awaiting execution at the time of publication of the View. 
Only subsequently his sentence was commuted to life imprisonment. This was done in light of 
the JCPC judgment in Pratt and Morgan (letter of 18 February 1994 by the Permanent Mission, 
on file with the author). 
442 In several cases in which petitioners were still awaiting execution the HRC found violations of 
Articles 7 and 10 for which it simply noted that ‘an appropriate remedy’ was required. It did not 
specify that it was a prerequisite to the enjoyment of any type of reparation not to execute the 
persons involved. In the approach of the State concerned (Jamaica) the fact that the HRC did not 
mention commutation as part of the remedy meant that its View did not block the execution of 
the victims. All the same, pending the proceedings the Committee had used provisional measures 
to halt their execution. In HRC Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica and Ramcharan Bickaroo v. Trinidad 
and Tobago the claim only involved Articles 7 and 10. Nevertheless, in 1993 and 1994 the 
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mends ‘an appropriate remedy’ without specification, which the addressee State may interpret as 
a licence to kill the petitioner. In other words, in such cases the rationale of the use of provisional 
measures must lie elsewhere. It may be that the Committee always uses provisional measures 
when an execution is threatened, without relating this decision to the possible findings of a viola-
tion and without looking at the possible remedy in such cases. This could be argued to be in line 
with its customary statement at the end of its communications (Notes Verbales) to the State refer-
ring to provisional measures, that an ‘expression of its views on interim measures does not imply 
a determination on the merits of the communication’. On the other hand, if the Committee would 
link the provisional measure to the possible remedy, this would still not imply a determination on 
the merits of the communication, since there are also many Article 14 cases where the HRC took 
a provisional measure but eventually did not find a violation.443 
The argument has been made that the HRC uses provisional measures in cases not mention-
ing Article 14 claims because a discussion on this article was raised proprio motu in discussions 
within the Committee but eventually dropped. This discussion was simply not mentioned in the 
decision on the merits.444 This explanation seems strained as this discussion obviously is not part 
of the material before the Special Rapporteur on New Communications taking a decision on the 
use of provisional measures.445 
It seems more likely that some Rapporteurs, especially abolitionists, tended to always use 
provisional measures, even if they did not expect the determination of a violation nor a finding 
that the remedy for a violation would include commutation. They may have decided to take provi-
sional measures automatically in all death penalty cases. 
In my view this would constitute an inappropriate use of this tool. The Special Rapporteur 
faces the choice to decide whether or not provisional measures are warranted given the Commit-
tee’s case law on the State obligations upon a finding of a violation in death penalty cases, or the 
                                                                                                                       
Committee did take provisional measures in these cases. By this time its case law about the 
relationships between violation of Article 14 and commutation or release on the one hand and 
Articles 7 and 10 and an unspecified remedy on the other was already evolving. Given the fact 
that not only the findings, but also the claim involved Arts 7 and 10 alone, it is not clear why the 
HRC took provisional measures. After all, it must have been clear that any eventual remedy 
would not specify that the petitioner should remain alive. See Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 16 July 
1996, (provisional measure of 28 November 1994, death sentence commuted in 1995 by the 
Governor General upon advice of the Jamaican Privy Council; no violation Article 14) and 
Ramcharan Bickaroo v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997 (provisional measure (no date); 
subsequent to his submission of 5 October 1993 his death sentence was commuted to life 
imprisonment by the President of Trinidad and Tobago on 31 December 1993, following the 
judgment of the JCPC of 2 November 1993 in the case of Pratt and Morgan v. Attorney General 
of Jamaica; no violation found). See also HRC A. H. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 October 1990 
(inadm.). 
443 See also Chapter I, section 3.5 discussing prejudgment. 
444 Suggestion by Sir Nigel Rodley, Geneva, April 2003. In this respect HRC Randolph Barrett and 
Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992, discussed in Chapter III (Executions) may serve as an 
example. Indeed the proprio motu inclusion of Article 14 in the initial discussion of Randolph 
Barrett and Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 2 March 1992 justified the use of provisional measures ex 
post, whether this inclusion was intended as such or not. After all in this case the reference to Art. 
14 was published in the decision on the merits. 
445 The Special Rapporteur normally decides to transmit a case and use provisional measures on the 
basis of a case summary prepared by the Secretariat. This summary generally refers to the claims 
introduced by the petitioner. The fact that later in the proceedings members of the Committee, or 
the Rapporteur assigned particularly to that case, decide to introduce Article 14 into the 
discussion proprio motu does not necessarily have a bearing on the Special Rapporteur’s use of 
provisional measures earlier on. 
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likelihood of a change in its case law. Of course it would be tragic if the jurisprudence would 
indeed change and the petitioner who triggered this has already been executed by then. In this 
respect, it seems that the Special Rapporteur usually takes the approach of ‘better be safe than 
sorry’. Nevertheless if he would decide to take provisional measures based on his belief that the 
Committee's jurisprudence should change, in a situation where this is very unlikely, this may not 
be a wise approach. 
In practice the number of cases in which provisional measures were used when there was no 
Article 14 claim is limited, but generally speaking it would not enhance the goodwill of the ad-
dressee State if provisional measures would routinely be used also in cases where in the end the 
Committee does not recommend commutation of the sentence. More importantly, the Commit-
tee’s role should not be to postpone death and prolong suffering until it publishes a finding on the 
merits that will require an unspecified form of reparation, but not commutation. A clear distinc-
tion should be made between taking provisional measures on the one hand and trying to change 
the Human Rights Committee's jurisprudence on the other. Provisional measures should not be 
used as statements in a quest to bring about such changes.446  
Until the HRC is willing to clearly decide that violations of Arts 7 and 10(1) require com-
mutation just as much as violations of Article 14, it is indeed necessary, for purposes of provi-
sional measures, for the petitioner to claim a violation of Article 14. 
The situation would be different if the HRC would either clearly establish that any finding 
of a violation in a death penalty case required an appropriate remedy the prerequisite for which 
would be that the petitioner would be allowed to remain alive.  
In the alternative, it would be different if the HRC would clearly indicate that it uses provi-
sional measures in all death penalty cases in order to guarantee the integrity of the OP by ensuring 
that both parties to the conflict can properly present their claims. After all, it is a plausible argu-
ment that it would never be acceptable to execute someone pending a case because that would 
cause irreparable harm to the proceedings under the OP. Once executed, the possible vindication 
of his rights would be of limited importance to the petitioner. Another purpose of provisional 
measures to halt execution could thus be to serve the interests of the proceedings before the 
Committee. If the petitioner is executed during the course of the proceedings of the Committee it 
would be difficult to properly hear both sides in a balanced examination (audiatur et alteram 
pars). In other words, it would obstruct equality of arms and, therefore, the proper examination of 
the case. If this specific reason for the use of provisional measures applies, however, the HRC 
should make it clear from the outset. In any case this may be easier to argue in cases already 
pending before the Committee rather than in those declared inadmissible but open to review, such 
as A.H. v. Trinidad and Tobago.447 Nevertheless, the HRC could have justified its decision to 
maintain provisional measures with the argument of protecting the integrity of the ICCPR and the 
OP. After all executing petitioners immediately upon exhaustion of domestic remedies would 
prevent them from taking up their right to resort to the OP. This way the State would evade its 
obligations under the Covenant and the OP. Nevertheless, preventing irreparable harm to the 
procedure only seems a rather artificial explanation for the use of provisional measures in a death 
penalty case. 
The most appropriate would be a clear decision on obligations on the merits and reparation 
in death penalty cases. In cases in which a violation of the right to life had been found reparation 
may consist of life as a right or of life as a remedy. Life as a right refers to the ‘continued enjoy-
ment’ of this right. This would be required in the context of a finding of a violation of Article 14 
ICCPR. Life as a form of reparation refers to the specific situation of a person sentenced to death, 
who has been the victim of torture or ill treatment in violation of Articles 7 and 10 ICCPR. In this 
                                                 
446 Of course, if the HRC explicitly uses provisional measures in the interest of the proceedings, it 
does make sense to use them in Articles 7, 9, or 10 cases as well. 
447 HRC A. H. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 October 1990 (inadm.). 
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light it is argued that full rehabilitation requires commutation of the death sentence since enjoy-
ment of other forms of compensation becomes impossible if the person is executed. In other 
words, life is a precondition for the enjoyment of an adequate form of reparation. 
Linked to the idea that life is a precondition to the enjoyment of any remedy, provisional 
measures are essential as well. Such measures halting the execution of a death sentence are crucial 
to ensure the commutation as a form of reparation in these circumstances, whether they preserve a 
right in itself or preserve instead the possibility for reparation for other violations. Without them 
the eventual determination of the case would be deprived of any sense. Obviously a return to the 
previous situation is not possible once the execution has already taken place.  
Thus far the HRC has not taken the above approach to life as a form of – or precondition to 
the enjoyment of any form of – reparation. The case law of the HRC seems to point to the conclu-
sion that only when an execution would result in a new violation, the remedy is commutation or 
release. In other words, the ‘appropriate remedy, including commutation’ is not so much a remedy 
for a past violation, but rather the action required for preventing a new violation (related to this 
past violation). 
Yet pending the proceedings the HRC has used provisional measures even in cases in which 
Article 14 was not claimed, although it knew that if it would find violations the petitioner would 
nevertheless be executed, due to its approach towards reparation in Articles 7 and 10 cases.448 
This means that the use of provisional measures in those cases made little sense because in its 
final decision the Committee would not recommend the State to continue to prevent irreparable 
harm to the person. 
There are, however, indications of a change in the approach of the Committee in that it has 
spoken of commutation in relation to Articles 7 and 10 as well, although in these cases it did not 
refer to an entitlement to the preservation of their life, but simply recommended commutation.449 
The individual opinions of one member of the Committee may be a precursor to a possible change 
in the Committee’s approach on the issue of reparation: ‘when a person has been sentenced to 
death in violation of the Covenant or treated contrary to the provisions of the Covenant while 
awaiting execution, the remedy should include an irreversible decision not to implement the death 
                                                 
448 See e.g. HRC A. H. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 October 1990 (inadm.); Dwayne Hylton v. 
Jamaica, 16 July 1996 and Ramcharan Bickaroo v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997. In A. 
H. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 October 1990 (inadm.) the HRC declared a petition inadmissible 
based on non-exhaustion, with the possibility to deal with it again upon exhaustion. The 
petitioner could request a review of the inadmissibility decision once he had completed domestic 
remedies. However, the claims under Article 14 did not raise prima facie issues under Article 14 
or they were insufficiently substantiated. It decided to maintain the provisional measure pending 
review of admissibility, upon exhaustion of domestic remedies for the Article 10 claim. Yet this 
may be explained by the fact that in 1990 the HRC had not yet determined the type of reparation 
required for ill treatment of persons sentenced to death. Its members may have assumed that the 
prerequisite for any ‘appropriate remedy’ was commutation. In the alternative, its use of 
provisional measures could also mean that it made no connection between provisional and 
remedial measures and simply aimed to prevent, for the time being, irreparable harm to the 
person involved even if its jurisprudence did not allow it to recommend preventing such harm as 
part of its decision on the merits. 
449 See HRC Stephens v. Jamaica, 18 October 1995 (further consideration by Parole Board); 
Nicholas Henry v. Jamaica, 20 October 1998 (consideration for early release). See also Brown v. 
Jamaica, 23 March 1999 and R. S. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2 April 2002 (appropriate remedy for 
violations of Articles 7 and 10(1) were appropriate medical and psychiatric care and 
improvement of conditions of detention in accordance with Article 10 or release. Had the 
petitioner still been under sentence of death, the reference to release may be expected to have 
implied commutation). 
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penalty’.450 The preservation of life was required under the entitlement to an effective remedy 
under Article 2(3) ICCPR.451 
Moreover, in 2004 the HRC acknowledged, in its General Comment on Article 2, that pro-
visional measures and the right to a remedy (including the right to reparation) are related.452 One 
might expect that it will continue in this direction and recommend commutation in relation to 
violations other than those of Article 14. In fact, now that it has acknowledged a relationship 
between provisional measures and the remedy it should consider the preservation of life a prereq-
uisite for the enjoyment of any form of reparation for a violation of the ICCPR. 
5.5.3 HRC General Comment on the right to an effective remedy (Art. 2 
ICCPR) 
In 2004, in its General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, the HRC finally confirmed the relationship 
between the right to ‘an effective remedy’ and the use of provisional measures.453 The fact that 
the HRC has now specifically acknowledged the relation with the eventual form of reparation will 
likely improve its practice of using provisional measures and indicating the obligations required, 
at least in death penalty cases.454 
In its General Comment the Committee noted that the legal obligation of States under Arti-
cle 2(1), the obligation to respect and ensure the rights recognised by the Covenant, is both nega-
                                                 
450 Individual opinion HRC member Scheinin, Deon Mc Taggart v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998. See 
also his individual opinions in Neville Lewis v. Jamaica, 17 July 1997 and Terrence Sahadeo v. 
Guyana, 1 November 2001. 
451 Individual opinion HRC member Scheinin Deon Mc Taggart v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998 and 
Terrence Sahadeo v. Guyana, 1 November 2001. 
452 See the next heading. 
453 HRC General Comment 31 on Article 2 ICCPR: the nature of the general legal obligation 
imposed on States parties to the Covenant, 29 March 2004, §19. In 1977 Committee member 
Opsahl already made a connection with Article 2. During the initial discussion on the Rules of 
Procedure Committee member Movchan (USSR) did not agree with ‘the provisions contained in 
rule 86’ (the Rule on provisional measures) because they went ‘beyond the scope’ of the OP. 
Opsahl responded to this by stating that they should consider the question of provisional 
measures to avoid irreparable harm ‘in the context of the Covenant and the Optional Protocol as a 
whole’. The suggestion that the procedure provided for in Rule 86 was outside the scope of the 
Covenant was ‘unacceptable’ in light of the States parties’ undertaking in Article 2(2) ICCPR. 
Summary records of the meetings of the first session, thirteenth meeting, 29 March 1977 and 
seventeenth meeting, 31 March 1977, Yearbook of the HRC 1977-1978, Vol. I, CCPR/1, pp. 44-
46 and 54. Moreover, in 1996, during the public meeting convened following the execution of 
Glenn Ashby, Committee member Evatt emphasised the obligation of the State to ensure an 
effective remedy for any person whose rights have been violated (Article 2 ICCPR). By 
executing a petitioner, she noted, a State fails to guarantee this right. Committee member Higgins 
equally referred to Article 2(3)(a) and the undertaking by the State to ensure an effective remedy. 
“In the present case, Mr. Ashby had been executed, and the Committee had been prevented from 
determining whether the State party had violated the provisions of the Covenant. Given those two 
facts, the Committee could justifiably conclude on the merits that Mr. Ashby had not had any 
remedy. It was precisely to avoid a situation of that sort that the Committee had adopted rule 86”. 
Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1994, CCPR/C/SR.1352, 
31 July 1996, §§15 and 24. 
454 As discussed in section 4.6.2 its case law until this General Comment was lacking in clarity on 
the relation between the two concepts.  
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tive and positive in nature.455 Under Article 2(2) States must ‘take the necessary steps to give 
effect to the Covenant rights in the domestic order’.456 This ‘provides the overarching framework 
within which the rights specified in the Covenant are to be promoted and protected’.457 Article 
2(3) ICCPR requires that individuals have accessible and effective remedies to vindicate their 
Covenant rights.458 In order to comply with the obligation to provide an effective remedy, an 
obligation ‘central to the efficacy’ of Article 2(3), States must make reparation to victims.459 
Apart from the explicit reparation required by Articles 9(5) and 14(6) ICCPR the HRC ‘considers 
that the Covenant generally entails appropriate compensation’.460 It notes that ‘where appropriate 
reparation can involve restitution, rehabilitation and measures of satisfaction, such as public 
apologies, public memorials, guarantees of non-repetition and changes in relevant laws and prac-
tices, as well as bringing to justice the perpetrators of human rights violations’.461 
Moreover, the obligation of non-repetition is integral to Article 2. Without this the purposes 
of the Covenant would be defeated. This is why the HRC often emphasises, in its decisions on the 
merits, the need to take measures to avoid a recurrence of the violation. This reminder on avoid-
ing a recurrence goes ‘beyond a victim-specific remedy’ and may require changes in the laws of 
practices of the State in question to ensure that a similar violation does not recur with regard to 
other possible victims.462 
Obviously a reservation to the obligation to respect and ensure the rights in the ICCPR on a 
non-discriminatory basis would be unacceptable. Equally it would be unacceptable to indicate, 
through a reservation to Article 2(3) ICCPR, the intent to provide no remedies for human rights 
violations. After all, ‘guarantees such as these are an integral part of the structure of the Covenant 
and underpin its efficacy’.463 
The use of provisional measures by the HRC is based on the right to an effective remedy as 
well. The HRC pointed out that ‘in certain circumstances’ the right to an effective remedy may 
require States parties ‘to provide for and implement provisional or interim measures to avoid 
continuing violations and to endeavour to repair at the earliest possible opportunity any harm that 
may have been caused by such violations’.464 It added that the use of provisional measures in 
domestic proceedings is equally based on the right to an effective remedy. The phrase ‘provide 
for’ provisional measures, used in the General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, seems to refer to 
taking such measures on the basis of domestic law without instigation by the HRC, and the term 
‘implement’ seems to refer to those provisional measures indicated by the HRC. 
In sum, it is argued that a provisional measure cannot go further than the eventual form of 
reparation could. Upon finding a violation the obligation on the merits or form of reparation 
required should continue to prevent irreparable harm to persons. If the eventual obligation signi-
fies less than the preservation of life the provisional measures used pending the proceedings do 
                                                 
455 HRC General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, the nature of the general legal obligation imposed 
on States parties to the Covenant, 29 March 2004, §6 (negative in the sense of ‘refraining from’).  
456 Id., §13. 
457 Id., §5. 
458 Id., §15. 
459 Id., §16. 
460 Ibid. 
461 Ibid. 
462 HRC General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, §17. 
463 See HRC General Comment 24 on reservations to the ICCPR or the Optional Protocols, 4 
November 1994, §§9 and 11, as confirmed in General Comment 31 on Article 2 ICCPR, 29 
March 2004, §5. 
464 HRC General Comment 31 on Article 2 ICCPR: the nature of the general legal obligation 
imposed on States parties to the Covenant, 29 March 2004, §19. 
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not truly prevent irreparable harm to persons. They could only be said to prevent harm to the 
procedure. 
In my view the HRC should follow the course it seems to have set by recommending com-
mutation in all future death penalty cases finding a violation of any of the articles of the ICCPR. 
In fact, this would simply confirm what it already set out in Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica 
(1989).465 This way there would be a relation between the provisional measures and the eventual 
reparation required so that provisional measures would truly serve to protect against irreparable 
harm to persons. 
5.5.4 The Inter-American practice regarding obligations on the merits and 
reparation in death penalty cases 
The Inter-American Commission has been very precise in its motivation of its precautionary 
measures. “It based its request on the fact that if the State were to execute (…) before such an 
assessment, any later decision of the Commission would be ineffective in providing potential 
remedies and that this would cause him irreparable harm”.466 
The motivation used here seems to be implicit in all its requests to stay an execution. This is 
interesting because this statement implies, in my view correctly, that whenever the Commission 
would find a violation, the remedy provided would be ineffective if the State would still be al-
lowed to execute the petitioner. As discussed, the HRC seems to have thought differently, at least 
for a considerable period, as in some cases it recommended ‘an effective remedy, including com-
mutation’ while in other cases it merely recommended ‘an effective remedy’, knowing that in 
such cases the State would proceed with the execution. 
In 2001 the Inter-American Commission clarified its use of precautionary measures by 
pointing out that an execution would make ineffective any eventual decision ‘in terms of future 
compensation and [the prisoner] would suffer irreparable harm’.467 In requesting the Court to 
order provisional measures the Inter-American Commission also argued that ‘the execution of the 
alleged victims prior to the completion of these processes would render any eventual recommen-
dations or judgments moot in terms of the efficacy of potential remedies, such as commutation of 
their death sentences’.468 
In practice, apart from commutation, in some cases the Commission went further in its peti-
tions on the merits, requesting the Court to order a re-trial in accordance with due process or, if 
that were not possible, release.469 It has noted that, to the extent possible, the State must re-
establish ‘the status quo ante which in the present case could be achieved by commuting the 
                                                 
465 HRC Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v. Jamaica, 6 April 1989. 
466 See e.g. CIDH Annual Report 2000, §§45-46. 
467 See e.g. CIDH Arnold Ramlogan, Case P12.355, 22 January 2001; Beemal Ramnarace, Case 
P12.377, 19 April 2001; Takoor Ramcharan, Case P0197/2001, 11 May 2001; Alladin Mohamed, 
Case P0842/2001, 18 December 2001. In Roodal v. Trinidad and Tobago, 10 October 2001 
(adm.) the Commission noted that it used precautionary measures ‘contemporaneously with the 
transmission of the pertinent parts’ of his petition, on 13 November 2000. It noted that this 
request was made on the basis that if the State were to execute him before the Commission had 
had the opportunity to examine his case ‘any eventual decision would be rendered moot in terms 
of available remedies’ and he would suffer irreparable harm. In none of these cases did the State 
respond. CIDH Annual Report 2001, §§52-55. 
468 IACHR Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, 25 November 2004, 3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
469 See e.g. IACHR Benjamin et al., 1 September 2001 (preliminary objections), §14B. 
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complainant’s death sentence and adjusting the domestic law of Trinidad and Tobago accord-
ingly’.470  
While the Commission was still dealing with the cases on the merits it had already re-
quested the Court to order provisional measures. In August 1998 the Court indeed ordered such 
measures to halt their executions.471 In its reports about the cases of the eight persons discussed in 
the Court’s Order of August 1998 the State argued that it had followed due process and that ‘the 
Commission would still have other options available to compensate any violations it finds subse-
quent to an execution’.472 Apparently the State does not subscribe to the traditional approach to 
the right to reparation. This traditional approach has a marked preference for restitutio in inte-
grum. Instead the State believed it could go ahead with an execution pending the proceedings 
before the Commission. It argued that even when the Commission would find that the State had 
violated the Convention – something the Commission had in fact done already in the case Briggs 
– it would be sufficient to award monetary damages or other forms of compensation, following 
the execution. 
In 2002 the Inter-American Court found violations in the death penalty cases that were 
brought before it by the Commission to deal with on the merits473 and it decided on a variety of 
reparations. It referred to its earlier jurisprudence that Article 63(1) ACHR is the codification of a 
rule of customary law constituting ‘one of the fundamental principles of contemporary interna-
tional law on State responsibility’.474 When the State is responsible for an illicit act, it has an 
immediate responsibility for the breach of the international norm involved, ‘together with the 
subsequent duty to make reparations and put an end to the consequences of said violation’.475 It 
emphasised that such reparation required full restitution (restitutio in integrum), whenever possi-
ble, consisting of ‘restoring the situation that existed before the violation occurred’.476 The Court 
also pointed out that a violating State cannot invoke provisions of its domestic law to modify or 
                                                 
470 IACHR Benjamin et al., 1 September 2001 (preliminary objections), §14C. See also IACHR 
Hilaire, Constantine & Benjamin et al., 21 June 2002 (merits & reparations), Operative 
paragraphs 8-11, in particular 11: ‘the State should abstain from executing, in all cases, regardless 
of the results of the new trials’. With regard to the case of Joey Ramiah, who had been executed 
despite the Court’s provisional measure, the Commission noted that this was no longer possible 
and that the consequences of the violations must be remedied by other means. In his case the 
Commission petitioned the Court to order the State to provide adequate compensation to his next 
of kin. 
471 The Commission can request the Court’s intervention in such cases, based on Article 63(2) 
ACHR. See Chapter II (Systems). See further Chapters III (Executions) and XVII (Official 
responses). 
472 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 29 August 1998 (reports of 5 June, 30 June, 29 June, 8 July, 
15 July and 28 July 1998). 
473 Violations of Articles 4(1), 4(2), 4(6), 5(1), 5(2), 7(5), 8, and 25. 
474 IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 
2002, §202. 
475 Ibid., referring to Cantoral Benavides case, Judgment of 3 December 2001 (reparations), §40, 
Cesti Hurtado case, Judgment of 31 May 2001 (reparations), §35, Villagrán Morales et al. 
(‘Street Children’ case), Judgment of 26 May 2001 (reparations), §62. 
476 “When this is not possible, as in the present Case, it is the task of this international Tribunal to 
order the adoption of a series of measures that, in addition to guaranteeing respect for the rights 
violated, ensure that the damage resulting from the infractions is repaired, and order the payment 
of an indemnity as compensation for the harm caused in that case”. IACHR Hilaire, Constantine 
and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 2002, §203, referring to 
Cantoral Benavides case, Judgment of 3 December 2001 (reparations), §41, Durand and Ugarte, 
Judgment of 3 December 2001 (reparations), §25 and Barrios Altos, Judgment of 30 November 
2001 (reparations), §25. 
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ignore altogether its obligation to make reparations. This obligation ‘is regulated in all its aspects 
(scope, nature, modalities, and designation of beneficiaries) by international law’.477 ‘Repara-
tions,’ it noted, ‘consist of those measures necessary to make the effects of the violations commit-
ted disappear’.478  
Following these general remarks about reparation, the Court ordered the State to abstain 
from applying its law dating from 1925 that made the death penalty mandatory for all cases of 
murder irrespective of the individual circumstances.479 It determined that in the cases of the 31 
petitioners that were still alive, the State was to order a retrial applying the new criminal legisla-
tion resulting from the reform of the law of 1925. The Advisory Committee on the Power of 
Pardon was to resubmit the cases of the victims to the executive authority competent to render a 
decision in the mercy procedure. Implementing these obligations, however, was not sufficient. In 
the exercise of the authority conferred upon it by Article 63(1) ACHR it held ‘on the grounds of 
equity, that the State, regardless of the outcome of the new trials (…) and independently of 
whether the new trials are actually carried out, should refrain from executing’ the 31 persons 
involved.480  
                                                 
477 IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 
2002, §203, referring to Cantoral Benavides, Judgment of 3 December 2000 (reparations), §41, 
Cesti Hurtado, Judgment of 30 May 2001 (reparations), §35 and Villagrán Morales et al. (‘Street 
Children’ case), Judgment of 26 May 2001 (reparations), §61. 
478 IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 
2002, §205, referring to Cantoral Benavides, Judgment of 3 December 2000 (reparations), §36, 
Cesti Hurtado, Judgment of 30 May 2001 (reparations), §36 and Villagrán Morales et al. (‘Street 
Children’ case), Judgment of 26 May 2001 (reparations), §63. Another general form of reparation 
was the obligation to improve the conditions of detention. The Court considered it pertinent and 
necessary to direct the State to bring its prison conditions in line with international human rights 
law. IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 
June 2002, §217. 
479 Because of its finding that the way in which the crime of murder was penalised in the Offences 
Against the Person Act was ‘in and of itself’ a violation of the ACHR, the Court held that the 
State should refrain from future application of this Act and, ‘within a reasonable time, bring the 
law into compliance with the American Convention and other international human rights norms, 
in accordance with Article 2, so that the respect and enjoyment of the rights to life, personal 
integrity, a fair trial and due process embodied in the Convention are guaranteed’. The Court was 
indeed very precise in its directions, establishing that ‘the legislative reforms contemplated 
should include the introduction of different categories (criminal classes) of murder, in keeping 
with the wide range of differences in the gravity of the act, so as to take into account the 
particular circumstances of both the crime and the offender’. It also specified that the State 
should introduce a ‘system of graduated levels’ ensuring ‘that the severity of the punishment is 
commensurate with the gravity of the act and the criminal culpability of the accused’. It pointed 
out that this form of reparation was ‘consistent with the position which this Court has taken in the 
past’. IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 
June 2002, §213. 
480 IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 
2002, §215. In his Concurring Opinion Judge de Roux-Rengifo pointed out that while these 31 
persons had not yet been deprived of their lives, Article 4(2) had nevertheless been violated 
because of the application of a domestic law that led to the imposition of the death penalty for 
crimes that do not fall into the category of ‘most serious’. The Court had ‘abstained from 
evaluating the possibility that some of those condemned to death could have committed crimes 
which are considered “most serious,” because the aforementioned law has been applied to all of 
them, and this necessitates, without question, a declaration of a violation of Article 2 of the 
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5.5.5 Conclusion on halting executions and the expected obligations on the 
merits and reparation 
The Inter-American Commission has made explicit its motivation for precautionary measures to 
halt an execution by pointing out that if the State were to execute the petitioner before an assess-
ment on the merits could take place, any later decision of the Commission would be ‘ineffective 
in providing potential remedies and that this would cause him irreparable harm’.481 In addition the 
Inter-American Court has made clear that once a violation has been found, the obligations of the 
State include as a minimum a ‘permanent injunction’ against the execution of the victims.482 
The HRC has been less clear in its case law on this issue. In cases involving a finding of a 
violation of the right to a fair trial (Article 14 ICCPR), and thereby a violation of the right to life 
(Article 6 ICCPR), it always indicates that the State party is under an obligation to provide the 
victim with an effective remedy, ‘including commutation’. Yet in the past, in its decisions on the 
merits, it has failed to refer to the obligation not to execute the victims of violations of the ICCPR 
not involving Article 6. 
An unequivocal statement by the HRC that the pre-requisite of any form of compensation 
for any type of violation of the ICCPR is that the petitioner remains alive, would provide a con-
vincing rationale for the use of provisional measures in all death penalty cases.483 An execution 
would then deprive the petitioner of the most essential form of reparation and would result in 
irreparable harm to persons.  
5.6 Conclusion on the relation of provisional measures to cessation, 
assurances of non-repetition and reparations  
As discussed more closely in the Conclusion to this Part (Part II Purpose) the harm to be pre-
vented pending the proceedings and subsequent to the finding of a violation should be harm to 
persons rather than just harm to the claim.  
                                                                                                                       
Convention’. Concurring Opinion of Judge de Roux-Rengifo, IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and 
Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 2002. By way of reparation for 
immaterial harm, the Court ordered Trinidad to pay the widow of Joey Ramiah $50,000 USD to 
support her in bringing up their son and assist in his education. It also ordered the State to pay his 
mother $10,000 USD. In addition, as reimbursement for the expenses incurred in bringing the 
case before the Court, the State had to pay the representatives of the victims the sum of $13,000 
USD. Furthermore the Court referred to earlier jurisprudence on the general obligations of the 
State under Article 2 ACHR. These obligations include the adoption of measures to suppress laws 
and practices in violation of the Convention and the adoption of laws to effectively protect its 
guarantees. Under customary international law States must introduce the necessary modifications 
to their domestic law to ensure compliance with the obligations assumed under the human rights 
treaties they ratified. This general obligation, laid down in Article 2 ACHR, implies that the 
measures of domestic law must be effective: the principle of effet utile. IACHR Hilaire, 
Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 2002, §213, 
referring to ‘The Last Temptation of Christ’ case (Olmedo Bustos et al.), Judgment of 5 February 
2000, §§85 and 87. 
481 See e.g. CIDH Annual Report 2000, §§45-46. 
482 IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 
2002, §215. 
483 This would then be independent of the question whether an execution would constitute a further 
violation of the right to life in Article 6 ICCPR because of a violation of the right to a fair trial in 
Article 14 ICCPR. 
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In human rights cases provisional measures could be used also to prevent irreparable harm 
to rights collateral to the claim, as long as these rights involve the right to life and the prohibition 
of cruel treatment. This would be the case when the provisional measures are ordered to protect 
the witnesses in a case, rather than the alleged victims. An example of a case of provisional meas-
ures protecting rights collateral to the claim, but involving the alleged victim rather than other 
beneficiaries would be when someone appeals to an adjudicator claiming to be the victim of an 
arbitrary detention, and meanwhile there is reason to fear ill treatment. Pending the determination 
of the issue whether or not this detention is arbitrary, the adjudicator may indicate to the State 
concerned that it should take the provisional measure of preventing, or ending, the alleged ill 
treatment. Here the specific measure requested is not provisional in the sense that such ill treat-
ment may be resumed after determination of the legal question, but it is in the sense that it is a 
form of collateral protection applicable while the case is pending.  
In other situations the claim pending before the international adjudicator relates to the threat 
itself of irreparable harm to life and physical integrity. This is often so in the Inter-American 
cases involving threats to human rights defenders. In such cases the provisional measures may 
still be collateral to the claim if they also aim to protect persons other than the alleged victims. 
The claim itself could also involve something else, but family members of the alleged vic-
tims, witnesses or others are receiving death threats. In such cases persons other than the alleged 
victim(s) involved in the main claim risk irreparable harm. These persons are being threatened 
because they are somehow related to the alleged victim, for instance as family members or co-
workers or as witnesses, judges or counsel in the international or domestic proceedings.484 In 
these cases too the provisional measure should not go further than the eventual form of reparation 
could. The difference is that the eventual remedy is hypothetical in the sense that it relates to 
violations perpetrated against persons other than the alleged victim(s). In other words, the crite-
rion is irreparable harm to persons rather than the link between the object of the complaint and the 
provisional measures. Still, there must be a relationship between what form of reparation the 
adjudicator could have suggested on the merits, had the main claim been about the right to life 
and the prohibition of cruel treatment of these persons. They should be protected against irrepara-
ble harm to their life and personal integrity pending the proceedings in the case of the alleged 
victim, exactly because they are being threatened in relation to that case. In order to obtain an 
eventual (financial) remedy, however, as part of a judgment on the merits, these persons must 
institute their own proceedings. In sum, what the petitioner needs to show, for purposes of provi-
sional measures, is the threat of irreparable harm to persons and the relationship of these persons 
to the alleged victim. The adjudicator needs to take into account also whether the provisional 
measures would go no further than the eventual remedy would have, if the persons involved had 
been the alleged victims.  
Yet being overly strict about the relationship between the main claim and the request for 
provisional measures is inappropriate in the context of irreparable harm to persons. Of course the 
adjudicator could continue to use provisional measures without hinting at the rights involved. It is 
possible that it does not relate its concept of irreparable harm to specific articles of the applicable 
treaty, but uses independent concepts of life, dignity and personal integrity, all part of the under-
lying rationale of protecting the existence of individuals and indigenous peoples. Yet in order to 
enhance transparency and the authority of their provisional measures it would be useful if the 
adjudicators would indicate the rights involved. 
The link between halting an execution pending a case and ordering commutation or a new 
trial as part of the decision on the merits so as to prevent a violation of the right to life is evident. 
With regard to ordering a State to protect a person against threats, the aim of the Court’s authority 
seems to be identical in provisional measures and judgments on the merits and reparations. The 
                                                 
484 See also section 4 on the group of beneficiaries.  
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specific order to investigate and punish violations can also be found both as part of the Court’s 
judgment and as part of its provisional measures. In this case, though, as part of provisional 
measures ‘investigate and prosecute’ solely aim at preventing further threats, while ‘investigate 
and prosecute’ as a form of reparation aims not only at prevention of further violations but also as 
a form of moral satisfaction. Possibly, the drafters of the American Convention had already fore-
seen this, as they put in the same article both the power to order provisional measures and the 
power to order reparation (Article 63 ACHR). The 1998 Protocol to the African Charter, estab-
lishing an African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights, was inspired by this provision and 
equally combines provisional measures and reparation in one provision (Article 27 of the 1998 
Protocol). Unfortunately this direct relationship is lost in the Protocol on the African Court of 
Justice and Human Rights (2008), which refers to reparation in a separate provision. 
Indeed there should be a correlation between the measures required pending and concluding 
the procedure. In the context of the right to culture, for instance, if the HRC would never refer to 
cessation, such as a permanent halt to certain destructive developments, then provisional meas-
ures that would require a temporary halt to such developments would not be of much use. In fact 
the provisional measures would then go further than the eventual action or abstention required.485 
If a violation is indeed found, the subsequent obligations, including reparation, should correspond 
to the provisional measures earlier taken. An obligation aimed at restoring the situation as much 
as possible or at least at preventing further degradation would justify the type of provisional 
measure taken pending the proceedings. 
The State must provide for cessation and assurances of non-repetition, thereby preventing 
irreparable harm to persons that would otherwise constitute a further violation of the human rights 
treaty. It must also provide for exactly the form of reparation indicated in so far as this represents 
the most essential form of reparation (e.g. the prerequisite for the enjoyment of any form of com-
pensation).486 
Provisional measures have several different general purposes. One would be to enable the 
adjudicator to make a determination on the merits that makes sense in light of the human rights 
treaty. This is the case, for instance, when the aim of the claim is to prevent a violation of the 
right to life. This purpose would be applicable in cases where a human rights claim includes 
cessation or a request for restitution in kind such as a retrial in conformity with the right to a fair 
trial. An adjudicator could use provisional measures in all cases to prevent that an impending act 
by the government concerned (or its omission in relation to impending acts by third parties), 
which would result in the death of the petitioner, would make fulfilment of that claim impossible. 
Another aim of a claim could be that the adjudicator would declare that commutation of the death 
penalty would be warranted as a remedy for a past violation, rather than in order to prevent a new 
violation. In both cases (life as a right and life as a remedy) the general purpose of the provisional 
measure is to safeguard a final determination that makes sense in the light of the human rights 
treaty. 
                                                 
485 See e.g. the discussion of HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 1990 in Chapter X (Culture). 
486 If the remedy is more compensatory than aimed at prevention of a further violation, any specific 
directions of the HRC must be considered seriously, but are not necessarily binding. Nevertheless 
the State should not act such as to make impossible the petitioner’s enjoyment of some form of 
compensation. It is argued that this means that at least the precondition must be fulfilled that the 
victim is alive to enjoy the compensation awarded. On the legal status of provisional measures 
see Chapter XVI. 
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6 CONCLUSION: PROTECTING THE BENEFICIARY AGAINST IRREPARABLE 
HARM 
This chapter discussed several issues involving protection. The first three were the type and speci-
ficity of the protective measures and the group of beneficiaries and addressees. The last issue 
involved the link between the protection required as part of provisional measures and the protec-
tion required on the merits (cessation, assurances of non-repetition) and as part of a judgment on 
reparation.  
Human rights adjudicators have all used provisional measures so as to prevent irreparable 
harm to persons pending the proceedings. Yet the protection required in provisional measures 
takes various forms. An element of positive action is present in most provisional measures and 
should be made explicit in cases involving ongoing situations such as adverse detention condi-
tions, recent disappearances and death threats. Protection against death threats involves the right 
to life and protection of personall integrity. They are core rights whose violation causes irrepara-
ble harm to persons. Such violations must therefore be prevented even if this entails that the State 
must take positive measures pending the proceedings. 
Compared to the European and African systems (and the Geneva systems) the Inter-
American system appears to be more responsive to the particular situations it faces. Often provi-
sional measures indicate the required result, such as to refrain from executing a death sentence or 
to protect persons against threats. Sometimes they are also more precise as to how the State 
should achieve this result, or at least they rule out certain activities that do not qualify as compli-
ance. Thus, in the Inter-American system the provisional measures have become increasingly 
specific, partly in light of the experiences of the Commission and Court with certain States. In 
fact they provide insight into the ways States could or must protect persons under their jurisdic-
tion against threats by paramilitary groups or other groups operating with the acquiescence of 
(certain factions of) the army, the police, or other authorities. They show that protection against 
threats means that the State must protect the beneficiaries in the area in which they live and work, 
rather than banishing them to ‘safe areas’, claiming that this would absolve it from taking protec-
tive measures. Providing effective protection against death threats is not divorced from other 
human rights obligations, which means that States must assist internally displaced persons to 
return safely and allow human rights defenders or journalists to continue the activities that had 
triggered the threats in the first place. Generally speaking the States involved do not appear to 
find fault with this approach, possibly also because at the core the provisional measures concern 
the most basic of rights: the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment.  
Similarly to the practice in the Inter-American system it is argued that international adjudi-
cators should also incrementally specify their provisional measures, so as to provide clarity to 
States on what is expected of them, but they should do so even more gradually than the regional 
systems. This gradual approach is warranted exactly because of the less cohesive nature of an 
international as opposed to a regional monitoring system and the diminished possibility of collect-
ing and interpreting information. Another aspect that might play a role is the sensitivity of some 
States and the way these States would base their disagreement with certain provisional measures 
on regional doctrine, or insist on sovereignty over protection of human rights. The discussion on 
subsidiarity (and on the related margin of appreciation in the interpretation of treaty obligations) 
is more important in some systems than in others and plays out differently in each system. Espe-
cially with regard to core rights the provisional measures taken by the other human rights adjudi-
cators could at least give some direction to an adjudicator regarding what the State is expected to 
do or to abstain from doing in order to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
Apart from the type (action or abstention) and specificity of provisional measures, in order 
to truly ensure the protective nature of provisional measures it must be clear who is included as a 
beneficiary, even if not mentioned by name, and whether and how the beneficiaries have been 
consulted about the measures intended to protect them.  
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In the European system the tables have sometimes been turned by addressing the alleged 
victim under the Rule on provisional measures. It does not appear appropriate to address an order 
for provisional measures to the alleged victim instead of to the State.  
Both as to purpose and as to substance the provisional measures should be consistent with 
similar measures already taken in order to increase their credibility and avoid discriminatory 
application vis-à-vis various beneficiaries and addressees. Yet in the face of irreparable harm to 
persons adjudicators should not balance the basic rights of the intended beneficiaries with the 
general interest. At the same time, in order to uphold the legitimacy of provisional measures it is 
vital to adhere to principles of procedural fairness. In this regard it is important to make sure that 
the State’s positions and arguments are duly taken into account.  
In case of a group of beneficiaries, is there a need for the beneficiaries of provisional meas-
ures to be mentioned individually? The practice developed in the Inter-American system of using 
provisional measures to protect the members of a defined community, or people working at hu-
man rights organisations, as well as all other persons visiting the premises is appropriate. While 
they are not identified by name, the beneficiaries of the required protective measures are clear to 
the State.  
Sometimes beneficiaries may live in remote areas or be otherwise difficult to reach. In such 
cases it should not be required to establish written consent of each beneficiary, as long as there 
are indications that they are likely to agree and as long as there are no (subsequent) indications of 
disagreement. While consultation of the beneficiaries proves to be difficult at times, the Inter-
American Commission and Court do appear to strive for it, more than the other adjudicators. 
The wider impact of provisional measures also deserves attention. A good faith implemen-
tation of the obligations under the human rights treaty warrants a pro-active stance of the State to 
ensure the underlying rationale to a provisional measure is being met. This may include general 
measures that protect others in a situation similar to that of the specific beneficiary. 
The final issue discussed in this chapter was the link between the protection required as part 
of provisional measures and the protection required on the merits (cessation, assurances of non-
repetition) and as part of a judgment on reparation. The general purpose of the provisional meas-
ure is to safeguard a final determination that makes sense in the light of the human rights treaty. 
Therefore there should be a correlation between the measures required pending and concluding 
the procedure, in case a violation is indeed found. Without such correlation the question arises 
whether the object of the provisional measure was simply to postpone the suffering until after the 
expected finding. This would be an unsatisfactory approach to the concept of provisional meas-
ures. 
An obligation aimed at restoring the situation as much as possible or at least at preventing 
further degradation would justify the type of provisional measure taken pending the proceedings 
to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
It is argued that this would apply as well to situations in which the alleged victim and the 
beneficiary do not coincide. As noted, persons who are not the alleged victims may still receive 
protection as beneficiaries of provisional measures, for instance because they are receiving threats 
as witnesses in this case. What the petitioner needs to show, for purposes of such provisional 
measures, is the threat of irreparable harm to persons and the relationship of these persons to the 
alleged victim. In order to make sure that the action or abstention required of the State remains 
credible, the petitioner also needs to show that the provisional measures would go no further than 
the eventual remedy would have, if the persons involved had been the alleged victims. Yet in 
order to obtain an eventual (financial) remedy as part of a judgment on the merits, persons other 
than the alleged victims must institute their own proceedings. 
Both in provisional measures and on the merits the ultimate aim is to prevent irreparable 
harm to persons. The substance of the protection required is often similar as well. What is differ-
ent is the function of the protection required: at the provisional measures stage reference is made 
to this protection in order to ensure the possibility of an effective decision on the merits in case a 
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violation is found on the merits. At the merits stage, on the other hand, reference is made to this 
protection because it is indeed necessary in order to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
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 CONCLUSION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
It is not always evident from the case law how the human rights adjudicators perceive the purpose 
of provisional measures. After all, apart from the Inter-American Court and, to some extent, the 
Inter-American Commission, they normally do not motivate their use of these measures. Outside 
of the Inter-American context jurisprudence on why provisional measures were or were not used 
in a given case is hardly available at all. Because the adjudicators do not motivate their provi-
sional measures they are also unclear about the question under which provision they take them.1 If 
they indeed take provisional measures on the basis of a theory, they do not indicate this to the 
State or the petitioners.  
Is their rationale for the use of provisional measures similar to that of the ICJ? To the extent 
that their provisional measures aim to ensure a meaningful outcome of the case before the adjudi-
cator the answer has to be in the affirmative. In death penalty cases, for instance, a meaningful 
outcome of a case is not ensured when one of the parties (i.e. the State party) inflicts irreparable 
harm on either the person of the petitioner, or on the fairness of the procedure.  
Three requirements for the use of provisional measures that have been mentioned in the 
various human rights systems are risk, immediacy and irreparable harm. Of those, irreparable 
harm is indicative of the purpose of provisional measures and were discussed in this Part, while 
immediacy and risk are indicative of urgency and therefore are discussed in Part III, Chapter XV. 
Apart from the European system, all human rights systems specifically refer to the prevention of 
irreparable harm. The European system, on the other hand, provides for a very general rule on 
provisional measures, similar to that in the ICJ Statute, referring to the interests of the parties. 
Different from the ICJ Statute the Rule also mentions, as an alternative, the interests of the 
‘proper conduct’ of the proceedings before it. Yet in practice the ECtHR uses the criterion of 
preventing irreparable harm just like other human rights adjudicators do. 
Only in the Inter-American system there are some specific statements about the purpose of 
provisional measures. In his Order for urgent measures in the Peace Community case, for in-
stance, the President of the Inter-American Court pointed out that in national legal systems the 
purpose of provisional measures generally is to preserve the rights of the parties in a dispute. This 
would guarantee that any future decision on the merits would not be harmed by their actions 
pendente lite. In international human rights law, on the other hand, the purpose of provisional 
measures went beyond this because, next to their essentially preventive character, they effectively 
protect fundamental rights to the extent that they prevent irreparable harm to persons.2 The Court 
repeated this when it confirmed the President’s Order.3 
Apparently the President and the full Court distinguish between the more traditional preven-
tive character of provisional measures on the one hand and the newer protective nature on the 
                                                 
1 They may even consider that provisional measures are not necessarily related to specific rights. 
2 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 9 October 2000 
(President). 
3 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000.  
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other. At the same time this protection takes place in order to prevent ‘irreparable harm’. In other 
words, the main difference seems to relate to the type of obligation. With the term ‘prevention’ 
the President seems to refer to the negative obligation of ‘refraining from action’ and with the 
term ‘protection’ to positive obligations as well. 
From the practice of the various adjudicators other than in the Inter-American system it is 
not always apparent to whom or what the harm is irreparable. The various human rights bodies 
have only haphazardly offered clues as to how they define irreparable harm. Thus, while in most 
complaints it is not so difficult to establish the immediacy (or imminence) of the risk,4 the exami-
nation of the practice of the human rights adjudicators shows that their use of the concept of 
irreparable harm is not always clear.  
One criterion did appear in the case law. This is the requirement that for provisional meas-
ures to be used an act or omission should have irreversible consequences. While this is not further 
explained, examples are easily imaginable. In fact, irreversible means that restitutio in integrum 
would be impossible.  
Moreover, in practice the general attitude of the human rights adjudicators seems to be that 
provisional measures are meant to be exceptional.5 The ECtHR, for instance, has pointed out that 
the grounds on which it applies provisional measures are not set out in the Rules of Court. Instead 
the Court has determined these in its case law. Just like the European Commission did prior to the 
entry into force of Protocol 11 (1998), the Court only applies provisional measures ‘in restricted 
circumstances’ or ‘limited spheres’.6 There must be an imminent risk of irreparable damage. 
“While there is no specific provision in the Convention concerning the domains in which Rule 
39 will apply, requests for its application usually concern the right to life (Article 2), the right 
not to be subjected to torture or inhuman treatment (Article 3) and, exceptionally the right to 
respect for private and family life (Article 8) or other rights guaranteed by the Convention. The 
vast majority of cases in which interim measures have been indicated concern deportation and 
extradition proceedings”.7 
The ECtHR has considered that ‘in the light of the general principles of international law, the law 
of treaties and international case-law, the interpretation of the scope of interim measures cannot 
be dissociated from the proceedings to which they relate or the decision on the merits they seek to 
protect’.8 This statement about the scope of provisional measures is significant. It shows that the 
ECtHR now recognises as well that in the context of such measures procedural and substantive 
law meet. 
In Mamatkulov (2005) the ECtHR observed that ‘the ICJ, the Inter-American Court of Hu-
man Rights, the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture of the United 
Nations, although operating under different treaty provisions to those of the Court, have con-
firmed in their reasoning in recent decisions that the preservation of the asserted rights of the 
parties in the face of the risk of irreparable damage represents an essential objective of interim 
measures in international law. Indeed it can be said that, whatever the legal system in question, 
                                                 
4 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
5 See also Garry (2001), p. 410, discussing the European system: “As the Commission and Court 
have had to rely on the good faith of the Member State in complying with the interim order, they 
have issued them only in extreme cases where there is an ‘apparent real and imminent risk of 
irreparable harm’”. 
6 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, §§103-104. 
7 Id., §104. 
8 Id., §123. 
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the proper administration of justice requires that no irreparable action be taken while proceedings 
are pending’.9 
As noted in the Introduction to this part of the book (Part II), irreparable harm to persons 
may be interpreted in various ways. A distinction could be made between three interrelated types 
of irreparable harm: to the claim, to the procedure and to persons. To prevent harm to the claim 
provisional measures could be taken in a wide range of cases. After all, preventing such harm 
could relate to any claim under the human rights treaty involved, as long as the consequences 
would be irreversible. Provisional measures to prevent harm to the procedure are hardly ever 
taken in isolation. Generally there also is a risk of harm to the claim or to persons.10  
Human rights adjudicators generally take a dynamic approach, acutely aware of the vulner-
able position of the individual vis-à-vis the State. Yet with regard to the range of situations in 
which provisional measures have been taken often their practice seems to be more limited than 
that of international adjudicators not focusing on human rights. This may be due to their exercise 
of adjudicatory caution based on the idea that if the constitutive document instituting an individ-
ual complaint procedure does not explicitly refer to the authority to use provisional measures it 
may be wise to start out using them only in the most serious of circumstances.  
It is argued that in order to make the system of interim protection work it is necessary to 
draw the line somewhere. Part II of this book and in particular this Conclusion, aims to provide a 
conceptual motivation on where to draw the line. This conclusion to Part II addresses the question 
whether provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm involve any type of human rights viola-
tion (harm to the claim only) or only particularly fundamental rights (harm to the claim as well as 
to persons). A related question is whether a provisional measure to prevent harm to the proceed-
ings is ultimately linked to harm to the claim or to harm to persons and whether the protective 
measures required coincide with those that may be required on the merits and reparation. 
2 COMMON CORE AND OUTER LIMITS OF THE CONCEPT 
2.1 Introduction 
This book distinguishes between the wider category of provisional measures to prevent irreversi-
ble harm to the claim or procedure and the more limited category, which forms part of it, of pro-
visional measures to prevent or halt irreparable harm to persons. As discussed below, it is argued 
that the latter provisional measures belong to the common core, while provisional measures that 
do not aim to prevent irreparable harm to persons, but nevertheless do aim to prevent irreversible 
harm to the claim or procedure, are still within the outer limits of the concept. 
All human rights adjudicators have used provisional measures to protect against irreparable 
harm to persons involving the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment. Most 
of them have done so to halt the execution of death sentences, to halt expulsion or extradition in 
the context of non-refoulement and to protect against death threats and harassment. There have 
been several other situations in which provisional measures have been used in one system or 
another. These range from cultural survival and the destruction of a painting to the payment of a 
fine. In the previous chapters an attempt was made to find the rationale for the use of provisional 
measures in all these situations. 
                                                 
9 Id., §124. 
10 See EComHR Ennslin, Baader and Raspe v. FRG, 8 July 1978 (inadm.), §44 for an example of 
provisional measures to preserve the evidence. In that sense they were clearly aimed at 
preventing harm to the procedure. Still, any harm to the procedure would somehow cause harm to 
the rights claimed as well. See also Chapter XII (Other situations), section 2.9. 
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After a more general discussion of the common core of the concept of provisional measures, 
as it relates to the purpose, this section deals with the right to life and the prohibition of cruel 
treatment. It subsequently focuses on two situations in which provisional measures could be used, 
one involving the rights of indigenous peoples and religious minorities and one involving mass 
expulsion and internal displacement. The first situation, about indigenous culture and religious 
minorities, already has an established practice in the Inter-American and African systems, in the 
international Optional Protocol system and in the practice of the Bosnia Chamber.11 The other 
situation relates to provisional measures involving protection against mass expulsion, introduced 
by the Inter-American Commission and Court.12 It is proposed that provisional measures are 
indeed feasible in such situations. The last part of section 2 addresses other situations in which 
provisional measures have been used and attempts to determine the underlying rationale for this 
use. This culminates in a discussion of the outer limits of the concept. 
2.2 Common core: preventing irreparable harm to persons 
2.2.1 Introduction 
It seems that a convergence has taken place in the approaches of adjudicators dealing with compa-
rable obligations, making possible the identification of a common core. This is not surprising 
given the similarities in the object and purpose of the various human rights treaties and their 
emphasis on the imperative character of certain rights. It is suggested that provisional measures 
are based on underlying rationales that are equally similar, although normally not explicitly dis-
cussed by the human rights adjudicators.13  
In some situations provisional measures have not just been used by one regional adjudica-
tor, but also by the HRC, as the only international adjudicator monitoring a general human rights 
treaty. For lack of explanation by the adjudicators themselves about their use of provisional 
measures, assumptions about the rationale of the measures must be made on the basis of the adju-
dicators’ decisions on the merits. If several adjudicators have in common certain reasoning on the 
merits in situations in which they previously used provisional measures, it is assumed that these 
situations have now come to belong to the common core of the concept of provisional measures in 
human rights adjudication. At present the core that the approaches of all adjudicators have in 
common is the protection of persons against irreparable harm to their lives and personal integrity. 
Sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4 also discuss what could be the rationale for the expansions by the various 
adjudicators of the use of provisional measures within the framework of protecting existence 
itself. It suggests two expansions found in one or two systems that would also be feasible in other 
human rights systems. 
Certain principles seem to underlie the practice of all human rights adjudicators with regard 
to provisional measures. In human rights cases involving an individual and a State party, the 
power is concentrated in the State party, triggering obligations of action and abstention. Provi-
sional measures, therefore, should either serve to shield the individual against abuse of power by 
the State resulting in irreparable harm or should serve to invoke the core obligations of the State 
                                                 
11 See Chapter X (Culture).  
12 See Chapter XII (Mass expulsion). 
13 Yet see the opinion recently expressed by Judge Cançado Trindade that the ‘absolute and 
peremptory prohibition in any circumstances whatsoever’, of torture and other atrocities, ‘a 
prohibition of jus cogens – in contemporary international law’ has ‘ a direct bearing on the issue 
of the indication of provisional measures’. ICJ Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute 
or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 28 May 2009, Dissenting Opinion Judge Cançado 
Trindade, §49. 
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to protect individuals against irreparable harm caused by other individuals or entities. Thus, the 
purpose of provisional measures normally is not ‘in the interest of the parties’ in the same way as 
cases before the ICJ, which concern conflicts between States. This is mainly relevant in the face 
of arguments such as ‘balance of convenience’ that are applicable more in relations between equal 
parties. At the same time the practice of the human rights adjudicators with regard to the purpose 
of provisional measures seems to be more limited than that of the ICJ. Indeed, if they would take 
provisional measures in all cases involving irreparable harm to the claim this might diminish the 
importance of provisional measures. It also might lessen the persuasive force of the follow-up by 
adjudicators in cases of non-compliance.14  
One could argue that any harm to the claim in human rights cases results in irreparable harm 
to the victims of human rights violations or to other persons involved. After all, human rights 
violations are, as such, attacks on personal integrity. Such attacks should be prevented if the result 
would be irreversible. In that sense harm to the claim and harm to persons coincide. On the other 
hand, the specific references in the texts of the treaties or rules of procedure to harm to the victim 
or to persons and to ‘irreparable’ rather than ‘irreversible’ harm could refer to a more limited 
category of extreme human rights violations. This would be violations for which reparation by 
financial compensation would be particularly inappropriate, rather than simply irreversible harm 
to all claims.  
Immediacy15 and irreversibility always play a role. In addition, in order to remain authorita-
tive, provisional measures must be taken in exceptional cases only.16 Clearly, provisional meas-
ures should be taken to prevent irreversible situations in the sense that measures that are reversi-
ble cannot be irreparable. If legislation and acts of implementation would have results that could 
indeed be reversed, they do not trigger irreparable harm. Thus, irreversibility is a threshold crite-
rion for the use of provisional measures. At the same time measures that are irreversible are not 
necessarily irreparable. The term ‘irreparable’ connotes a relationship with the concept of repara-
tion. Not only would restitutio in integrum be impossible without provisional measures (irreversi-
bility), but forms of reparation other than restitutio in integrum would be unacceptable. They will 
be manifestly inadequate exactly because the consequences of the violation are so serious as to be 
incapable of being erased. A decision by a State to allow a certain act or omission when the adju-
dicator has indicated that prevention is the only appropriate remedy, constitutes a grave violation 
of international law.17 
Indeed, the references in the applicable text to irreparable harm to the victims of the alleged 
violations, and even more so the references to irreparable harm to persons, combined with the 
exceptional nature of provisional measures, argue for an approach that initially is limited to pre-
serving the most fundamental rights. Violations of rights causing irreparable harm must be pre-
vented since a return to the status quo ante is impossible after the irreversible has taken place, 
while the nature of the harm implies that such violations can never be repaired by forms of repara-
tion other than restitutio in integrum. In human rights cases the relevance of this traditional reason 
for using provisional measures is particularly striking.  
In several systems, including that of the ICCPR, the reference to provisional measures is 
only made in the rules of procedure but not in the constituent text. Although the power to use 
provisional measures is derived from the inherent function of adjudicators, in light of an effective 
                                                 
14 On follow up by the adjudicators see Chapter XVIII. 
15 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
16 See also e.g. Buergenthal (1994), p. 93. 
17 If such violation nevertheless takes place, other measures, including forms of reparation, – 
however inadequate – are still warranted. At least public statements of acknowledgement, 
validation of the victims, investigation and prosecution of the perpetrators and, more generally, 
assurances of non-repetition would help prevent similar violations as well as restore some 
measure of dignity to the survivors. See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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right of individual complaint, they seem to invoke them mainly in the context of rights singled out 
in the treaty for their particularly fundamental nature. Indeed, the references to irreparable harm to 
the victims of the alleged violations in the treaties or rules of procedure, and even more so the 
references to irreparable harm to persons argue for an approach that initially is limited to preserv-
ing the most fundamental rights. This approach is confirmed by the statements by human rights 
adjudicators about the exceptional nature of provisional measures, probably in order to ensure that 
they remain authoritative. They have distinguished certain rights on the basis of their fundamental 
nature and it is in the context of these rights that all human rights adjudicators have used provi-
sional measures.  
Hence, under general international law provisional measures may be taken in a wide range 
of cases. Yet the minimum level approach proposed in this book, with regard to provisional 
measures in human rights cases that are not based on an explicit treaty provision, is based on the 
premise that provisional measures should remain exceptional. In other words, in light of the fact 
that several adjudicatory systems do not include an explicit reference to provisional measures, it is 
proposed that at least in universal systems of adjudication provisional measures should only 
involve rights essential for the very existence of persons and of indigenous peoples.  
Adjudicators have referred to core rights that are so fundamental that States may not make 
reservations because this would be contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty. They have 
also referred to core rights that may not be derogated from even in times of emergency. The pro-
visions on non-derogable rights specifically included in most human rights treaties, or referred to 
in the jurisprudence of the adjudicators, give some indication of the rights recognised for their 
fundamental nature within the relevant treaties.18 Judge of the Inter-American Court Cançado 
Trindade has referred to ‘the formation of a universal nucleus of non-derogable fundamental 
rights’ and a ‘true international regime against torture, forced disappearances of persons, and 
summary, extra-legal and arbitrary executions’.19  
                                                 
18 The ECHR was concluded before the ICCPR and includes the most limited list of non-derogable 
rights. The ACHR, on the other hand, was concluded after the ICCPR and provides a more 
extensive list of such rights. The ACHPR does not include a provision on states of emergency 
with a list of non-derogable rights. Article 15 ECHR refers to the right to life, the prohibition of 
torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, the prohibition of slavery or servitude 
and freedom from ex post facto laws. Article 4 ICCPR refers to the same rights but adds the 
prohibition of imprisonment on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, the right 
to recognition as a person before the law and the freedom of thought, conscience and religion, 
including the right to manifest religion or belief. Except for the prohibition of imprisonment on 
the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation, Article 27 ACHR equally refers to the 
foregoing rights. Moreover, it adds the rights of the family, the right to a name, the rights of the 
child, the right to a nationality, the right to participate in government and ‘the judicial guarantees 
essential for the protection of such rights’. See generally on the human rights dimension of 
hierarchy in international law e.g. Seiderman (2001). See also Orakhelashvili (2006). This book 
does not deal with the prohibition of slavery for lack of practice by the adjudicators of dealing 
with such cases and using provisional measures. In HRC Dissanayake, Mudiyanselage 
Sumanaweera Banda v. Sri Lanka, 22 July 2008, the petitioner had requested provisional 
measures to the effect that he be granted respite from the execution of the sentence of hard 
labour. In March 2005 the Special Rapporteur denied this request ‘on the ground that working in 
a print shop did not appear to come within the terms of article 8, paragraph 3(b)’, §1.2. 
19 IACHR Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, 25 November 2000, Separate Opinion Cançado 
Trindade, §§25 and 26. He concludes: “All this points to the prevalence of the safeguard of the 
non-derogable rights in any circumstances (in times of peace as well as of armed conflict). The 
normative and interpretative convergences between the International Law of Human Rights and 
International Humanitarian Law (…) contribute to place those non-derogable rights, – starting 
with the fundamental right to life itself, – definitively in the domain of jus cogens”, §27. See also 
 Conclusion 
703 
This book draws on the ICCPR in order to determine a minimum level approach. The rights 
recognised under the ICCPR for their particularly fundamental character are also recognised as 
such under the ACHR. The latter treaty is even more extensive in its recognition of non-derogable 
rights than the ICCPR. The African Charter (ACHPR) does not provide for derogation in times of 
emergency.20 While the ECHR is more limited with regard to non-derogable rights than the other 
treaties, all State parties to it have also recognised the ICCPR. Moreover, the ECHR itself recog-
nises in Article 53 that no provision in the treaty will be interpreted to limit fundamental rights 
recognised in any other treaty ratified by the member States. The ICCPR is the treaty most gener-
ally applicable and all State parties to regional human rights treaties, apart from the Comores, 
have also ratified the ICCPR.21 Thus, it makes sense to use the universal system and its approach 
to rights of a particularly fundamental nature as a point of departure.22  
Thus in this book the ICCPR is taken as a model for the discussion of rights recognised for 
their fundamental character. The HRC has stated that while it is not its function to review State 
parties’ conduct under other treaties,23 it does have the competence to take these other interna-
tional obligations into account when it considers whether the ICCPR allows the State to derogate 
from specific provisions.24 In order to clarify the underlying rationale for the use of provisional 
measures by the HRC its General Comments often provide more information than the case law on 
the merits. The Committee considers that provisions representing ‘customary international law 
(and a fortiori when they have the character of peremptory norms) may not be the subject of 
reservations’. While it does not distinguish between the norms of customary law and norms of ius 
cogens it has listed certain rights that may not be subjected to reservations because this would be 
contrary to the object and purpose of the Covenant. In other words, it singles out these norms for 
their particularly fundamental nature. The HRC has called the right to life the ‘most essential’ 
right in the ICCPR25 or, more generally, the ‘most fundamental’ right.26 Moreover, it has referred 
to the right to be free from torture as ‘one of the highest values protected by the Covenant’.27 
                                                                                                                       
CIDH Guantanamo Bay, Precautionary measure of 12 March 2002, p. 3 noting that human rights 
and humanitarian law may complement and reinforce each other ‘sharing as they do a common 
nucleus of non-derogable rights and a common purpose of promoting human life and dignity’. 
See further e.g Van Boven (2006), p. 95. 
20 See e.g. ACHPR Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés v. Chad, October 
1995: “The African Charter, unlike other human rights instruments, does not allow for States 
parties to derogate from their treaty obligations during emergency situations. Thus, even a civil 
war in Chad cannot be used as an excuse by the State violating or permitting violations of rights 
in the African Charter”, §21. On the other hand, the text of the Charter does confront the 
Convention organs with the problem of the so-called claw-back or limitation clauses. Yet the 
Commission has pointed out: “The reasons for possible limitations must be founded in a 
legitimate state interest and the evils of limitations of rights must be strictly proportionate with 
and absolutely necessary for the advantages which are to be obtained. Even more important, a 
limitation may never have as a consequence that the right itself becomes illusory”. Media Rights 
Agenda and Others v. Nigeria, 31 October 1998, §§69-70. Generally see Naldi (2000). 
21 Moreover, the Comores signed the ICCPR in September 2008. 
22 See section 2 of the Introduction.  
23 This is different from the African Court and the Inter-American Commission. Moreover, the 
Inter-American Court can review the conduct of State parties under other treaties as part of its 
advisory function.  
24 See HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, §10. 
25 See e.g. HRC Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §14.1. 
26 See e.g. HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003. 
27 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004. See also e.g. ACHPR Zimbabwean Human 
Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, May 2006, §86 (referring to the right to life as ‘the fulcrum of 
all other rights’). 
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Even if not all rights mentioned in Article 4 ICCPR as non-derogable are argued to have 
been included because of their particularly fundamental nature,28 nevertheless the non-derogable 
rights enumerated in Article 4 ICCPR could be seen ‘partly as recognition of the peremptory 
nature of some fundamental rights ensured in treaty form in the Covenant (e.g., Articles 6 and 
7)’.29 In this respect Article 8 on the prohibition of slavery, slave trade and servitude could be 
added. This right is enumerated as a recognition of its peremptory nature, just as Articles 6 and 7 
on the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture. Thus far, provisional meas-
ures have not yet been used in the context of (modern) slavery, but this would be feasible if a 
State that could be held (partly) responsible has in fact recognised an international individual 
complaint procedure.  
The HRC has pointed out that Article 4(1) ‘requires that no measure derogating from the 
provisions of the Covenant may be inconsistent with the State party’s other obligations under 
international law, particularly the rules of international humanitarian law’. In this respect it also 
refers to Article 5(2) stipulating that the ICCPR cannot be used to justify restrictions upon or 
derogations from fundamental rights recognised in other legal instruments ‘on the pretext that the 
Covenant does not recognise such rights or that it recognises them to a lesser extent’. The HRC is 
competent to take into account a State party’s other international obligations when it considers 
whether a State may derogate from specific provisions of the ICCPR. It notes that States parties 
‘should duly take into account the developments within international law as to human rights 
standards applicable in emergency situations’.30 
                                                 
28 The HRC acknowledges that some articles are mentioned as non-derogable ‘because it can never 
become necessary to derogate from these rights during a state of emergency (e.g., articles 11 and 
18)’. See General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, §11. Article 11 
concerns the prohibition of imprisonment because of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation 
and Article 18 concerns the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Because of the different 
purpose of the non-derogatory character assigned to them they do not qualify as rights to be 
protected by provisional measures to the same extent as the right to life, the prohibition of cruel, 
torture and slavery, made non-derogable in light of their inherent priority character. The two 
remaining non-derogable rights listed in the ICCPR are Article 15, laying down the principle of 
legality in the field of criminal law and Article 16 on the recognition of everyone as a person 
before the law. Equally it cannot become necessary to derogate from these rights during a state of 
emergency, which may be a reason for their inclusion in the list of non-derogable rights. On the 
other hand, Article 15 also seems particularly fundamental in relation to the right to life and Art. 
16 both in relation to the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture. With 
regard to Article 15 the HRC itself indicated this when it mentioned it in the context of the 
discussion of the procedural guarantees necessary to protect the right to life. See General 
Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, §§11 and 15 (obviously referring 
to Article 14 as well). 
29 See HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, §11. 
30 Id., §§9 and 10. Among others it referred to the ILA Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights 
Norms in a State of Emergency, 1984; the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation 
Provisions in the ICCPR, the final report of Despouy, Special Rapporteur of the Sub-Commission 
on human rights and states of emergency, E/CN.4/sub.2/1997/19 and Add.1; the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.2; the Turku (Åbo) Declaration of 
Minimum Humanitarian Standards (1990), E/CN.4/1995/116; and reports of the Secretary 
General to the Commission on Human Rights on fundamental standards of humanity, see e.g. 
E/CN.4/2001/91. The codification of crimes against humanity in the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court is relevant in the interpretation of Article 4 ICCPR. The fact that 
certain human rights violations are defined as such crimes underscores the priority character of 
these rights. The Committee pointed out, among others, that Article 7 of the Rome Statute, on 
crimes against humanity, not only covers practices relating to Articles 6, 7 and 8 ICCPR but also 
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The question arises whether the ICCPR contains other rights of a particularly fundamental 
nature that are not enumerated in Article 4. The HRC has indeed singled out additional rights as 
well. It pointed out that ‘the category of peremptory norms extends beyond the list of non-
derogable provisions’ of Article 4(2) ICCPR. States may not invoke this article as a justification 
for acting in violation of humanitarian law or ius cogens, ‘for instance by taking hostages, by 
imposing collective punishments, through arbitrary deprivations of liberty or by deviating from 
fundamental principles of fair trial, including the presumption of innocence’.31 
The HRC has mentioned some ‘illustrative’ examples of elements of rights not enumerated 
in Article 4(2) on safeguards during times of emergency that still could not be made subject to 
lawful derogation under that article. For instance, the fundamental obligation to provide an effec-
tive remedy for violations of the ICCPR ‘constitutes a treaty obligation inherent in the Covenant 
as a whole’. This obligation should also be respected during states of emergency. This remark 
may be seen as indicative for the importance of the concept of provisional measures as well.32  
In short, the HRC has argued that several of the non-derogable rights enumerated as such in 
the ICCPR, as well as certain other rights that have come to be seen as non-derogable, have been 
distinguished as such because of their particularly fundamental nature. The other adjudicators do 
not contradict this approach or they confirm it. They distinguish similar rights on the basis of their 
particularly fundamental nature: the right to life, the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture, 
slavery and discrimination, certain rights of indigenous peoples and the (procedural) rights neces-
sary to ensure these rights.  
It is suggested that in order to meet the criterion of exceptionality the common core of pro-
visional measures is limited to these rights. It aims at protecting the very existence (in dignity) of 
persons and indigenous peoples. The subsequent subsections on protecting the right to life and 
preventing torture and cruel treatment on the one hand and protecting cultural survival on the 
other discuss this more closely. 
2.2.2 Protecting the right to life and preventing torture and cruel treatment  
Provisional measures to protect the right to life and prevent cruel treatment and torture may be 
illustrated by the following examples. The most obvious situation is that involving the death 
penalty.33 If a petitioner is facing execution the adjudicator uses a provisional measure to halt this. 
Clearly, execution would result in irreparable harm to persons. Another example is the use of 
provisional measures to halt expulsions or extraditions in the context of non-refoulement. If such 
forms of removal relate to a real risk to the life of the alleged victim or of torture or cruel treat-
ment in the receiving or requesting State this would then trigger the responsibility of the sending 
State. Thus pending the proceedings provisional measures are used to prevent irreparable harm.34  
There are other situations as well in which provisional measures have been used to prevent 
irreparable harm to persons: lack of medical attention to detainees, disappearances and incommu-
nicado detention. These situations all relate to personal security. In the case of incommunicado 
detention provisional measures are warranted when there is a risk of irreparable harm to the per-
son in question due to lack of access to court and counsel. After all the right to personal security 
is closely related to the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture. In a way the 
right to personal security, together with the purpose of preventing disappearances, explains the 
                                                                                                                       
those relating to Articles 9, 12, 26 and 27. HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency 
(Article 4), 24 July 2001, §12 (footnote 7). 
31 HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, §11. 
32 See Chapters XIII (Protection) and XVI (Legal status). 
33 See also Harrington (2003), p. 86 pointing out about the HRC that it, ‘by definition’ only uses 
provisional measures ‘when there is a risk of irreparable harm to an individual’s life or limb’. 
34 About assessment of material urgency see Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
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importance of the right to access to court and counsel.35 It is submitted that the few provisional 
measures that have been taken to ensure access to court and counsel may indeed be justified 
because these rights are accessory to the protection against ill-treatment and torture and against 
threats to life. The HRC has referred to the right of all persons deprived of their liberty to be 
treated with humanity and respect for their inherent dignity (Article 10) as expressing a norm of 
general international law not subject to derogation. It noted that this was supported by the close 
connection between Articles 7 and 10 and by the reference to the inherent dignity of the human 
person in the preamble to the ICCPR.36 It also referred to the absolute nature of the prohibition of 
taking hostages, abducting people or unacknowledged detention.37  
The right to personal security comes into play in relation to threats to life and integrity out-
side of the detention context. Not only the right to personal security but also the right to life and 
the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture imply positive obligations. Chapter XIII on the 
protective measures required more closely discussed this aspect of provisional measures.  
On the basis of established jurisprudence on positive obligations in the context of detention, 
arguments based on resource limitations are not accepted. All human rights adjudicators have 
used or could use provisional measures to ensure access to health care in detention. On the other 
hand, sometimes there is a threat of irreparable harm to the health or even the lives of persons not 
in detention, because they have no access to basic services, such as HIV medication. Provisional 
measures to order such access could then assist in halting cruel treatment and preventing deaths. 
In a regional system involving States in circumstances that are more or less similar as well as a 
monitoring system including the possibility of conducting on site visits, negotiations and hear-
ings, an adjudicator may be bolder in taking an incremental approach than in an international 
system. A regional adjudicator could, as the Inter-American Commission has done, at some point 
order a State to make available such services. In an international system, on the other hand, it may 
not yet be feasible to require such a reallocation of resources already pending the proceedings. 
Nevertheless, international adjudicators might indeed intervene pending the proceedings when 
there is evidence of widespread discrimination excluding persons from basic services and thereby 
exacerbating illnesses and even causing deaths, while these services are indeed available for other 
segments of the population. An obvious example is blocking access to food aid to certain ethnic 
groups.38 In such cases (as in others) provisional measures certainly are not a cure-all remedy.39 
                                                 
35 See also Chapter VIII on procedural rights to protect the right to life and prevent cruel treatment 
and torture. 
36 See HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, § 13(a). In the 
three regional systems the right to humane treatment in detention is indeed part of the prohibition 
of inhuman or degrading treatment and torture or is mentioned as part of a provision that, as such, 
is non-derogable (see Article 5(2) ACHR: ‘All persons deprived of their liberty shall be treated 
with respect of the inherent decency of the person’, see also Articles 3 ECHR and 5 ACHPR. 
37 HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, §13(b). 
38 See e.g. HRC General Comment 6 on Article 6 ICCPR, 30 April 1982, §5 on infant mortality and 
the right to life and several reports by UN thematic Rapporteurs of the Commission and sub-
Commission and the current Human Rights Council. In April 2008 the UN Working Group on 
the Optional Protocol International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights adopted 
by consensus a draft for an Optional Protocol to this Covenant and sent it for consideration to the 
Human Rights Council. This draft also includes an Art. 5 on interim measures, which refers to the 
discretion of the supervisory committee to ‘transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent 
consideration a request that the State Party take such interim measures as may be necessary in 
exceptional circumstances to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the 
alleged violations’. If there would be an individual complaint system to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights the adjudicator should certainly be able to use 
provisional measures in relation to discrimination in access to adequate water, food and shelter 
causing irreparable harm. However, given the core content of the right to an adequate standard of 
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Nevertheless, in some situations a very focused and well-motivated provisional measure could 
assist their representatives in their endeavours to change the situation. Still, some situations may 
be so complex and politicised that international adjudicators would prefer not to get involved. We 
have seen this in relation to complaints about nuclear tests before various international adjudica-
tors.  
The prohibition of torture, from which the principle of non-refoulement is derived, is a per-
emptory norm of international law or ius cogens.40 As long as the adjudicator would be likely to 
find a violation on the merits of the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture, irreparable harm to 
persons refers not only to harm to physical integrity, but also to psychological and moral integ-
rity.41 The risk of the latter category of irreparable harm may vary depending on the vulnerability 
of the persons involved. This is also the rationale of, for instance, the rule that minors in detention 
should be separated from (unrelated) adults. Because of the risk of irreparable harm to a minor 
detained together with adults an international adjudicator would be justified in using provisional 
measures ordering a State to detain this minor in a safer environment.42 Similarly, in some situa-
tions an adjudicator could use provisional measures to halt a deportation if the receiving State 
would be unable to provide the requisite care for persons with a serious handicap, life-threatening 
(or even terminal) illnesses or for unaccompanied children. Certain acts or omissions, moreover, 
                                                                                                                       
living (Article 11 ICESCR) and the right to health (Article 12), in specific circumstances the use 
of provisional measures may be warranted to prevent irreparable harm to the life and physical 
integrity of persons, also without obvious indications of discrimination. In such cases petitioners 
should present a prima facie case of misallocation of resources and of policy decisions 
insufficiently taking into account risks of irreparable harm to persons. It is also feasible that the 
adjudicator would use provisional measures on behalf of children who are being denied access to 
primary education. To a certain extent this right is auxiliary to the aforementioned articles just 
like the right of a detainee to access to court and counsel is auxiliary to the right to life and the 
prohibition of cruel treatment. In certain cases respect for these rights could help prevent 
irreparable harm to persons, although the connection in time is more remote. Moreover, for 
children realisation of their right to education is necessary for the full development of their 
personality (see Article 13). See further on these issues the General Comments of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, as authoritative statements regarding the minimum 
norms in the Convention. If the approach would be taken that the implied power to use 
provisional measures is triggered not only to prevent irreparable harm to persons but to prevent 
such harm to all claims (an approach not advocated in this book), for this treaty another example 
would be the use of provisional measures to protect the right to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from one’s own scientific, literary or artistic productions 
(Article 15(1)(c) ICESCR). Of course this applies only if the petitioner could show that a 
violation would be irreversible. 
39 See e.g. Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
40 See e.g. ICTY Prosecutor v. Furundzija, case IT-95-17/I-T, 10 December 1998, 38 ILM 317 
(1999), §§144-154; Prosecutor v. Delacic and Others, case IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998, 
§454; Prosecutor v. Kunarac, cases IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1, §466; ECtHR Case of Al-Adsani 
v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 21 November 2001, §61; HRC General Comment 29 (under 
11); IACHR Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Judgment of 18 August 2000 and Maritza Urrutia v. 
Guatemala, Judgment of 27 November 2003 (‘The absolute prohibition of torture, in all its forms, 
is now part of international jus cogens’, §92); Cartagena Declaration, Conclusion 5, which calls 
the non-refoulement principle itself a rule of ius cogens; see also e.g. O’Boyle (1977) p. 687; 
Burgers/Danelius (1988), p. 12; Verdross/Simma (1984), p. 819; Bassiouni (1996), p. 68; 
Alleweldt (1996), p. 1; Seiderman (2001), p. 275 and Smeulers (2002), p. 87. 
41 Generally on psychological torture see e.g, IACHR Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Judgment of 
27 November 2003, §89. 
42 See Chapter VII (Detention). 
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are more likely to cause irreparable harm in cases involving children exactly because they could 
irreparably harm their development. These acts or omissions could therefore constitute cruel 
treatment even though they would not necessarily be qualified as such if the victims were older 
than eighteen. 
A very serious problem involving the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment is 
that of death threats against witnesses, family members, human rights defenders and others. Inter-
vention against death threats both inside and outside of the detention context would also prevent 
irreparable harm to persons. The Inter-American Commission and Court have used provisional 
measures requesting States to ensure protection many times. The other human rights adjudicators 
have also done so by now. In their case law on the merits all adjudicators have in common an 
underlying principle that States have positive obligations to ensure respect for personal security, 
the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment. Moreover, threats against hu-
man rights defenders, lawyers, journalists and witnesses take place with impunity in all regions of 
the world. Thus, it may be expected that the above adjudicators will increase their use of provi-
sional measures in this respect. The ECtHR as well could respond to threats on an incremental 
basis, starting with a convincing case of a petitioner who is threatened because of his complaint, 
or of threats to witnesses (of an event about which the petitioner complains), preferably involving 
a State that is known for its failure to prevent threats in other cases. At first such intervention 
could even take place informally. It would be an intervention to suggest looking into the situation, 
informing the State of the adjudicator’s awareness and at the same time reminding the State of the 
fact that if it knows about a threat and does nothing about it, it violates the right to security of 
person and often the right to life or the prohibition of cruel treatment as well. All these situations 
involve the right to life or the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture. In such situations the risk 
of irreparable harm to persons should trigger the use of provisional measures. 
2.2.3 Protecting cultural survival 
About the protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities the HRC has noted that there 
were elements that must be respected in all circumstances. It noted that this was reflected not only 
in the prohibition of genocide but also in the inclusion of a non-discrimination clause of Article 
4(1) and in the non-derogable nature of Article 18 ICCPR.43 In addition, in the context of other 
rights, such as the right not to be discriminated against, minority rights must be protected also 
during states of emergency exactly because of their particularly fundamental nature. Related to 
the non-discrimination clause is Article 20 stipulating that State parties cannot invoke a state of 
emergency to justify incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence. The HRC determined that 
this prohibition has a peremptory nature under the ICCPR.44  
Another peremptory right mentioned by the HRC is the protection against forced displace-
ment ‘by expulsion or other coercive means from the area in which the persons concerned are 
lawfully present’. The Committee has pointed out that the Rome Statute of the ICC also confirms 
that such deportation or forcible transfer of population constitutes a crime against humanity.45 As 
a norm recognised by the HRC for its fundamental nature, the use of provisional measures to 
prevent or halt violations of this right could be warranted.  
The right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment clearly necessitate the use 
of provisional measures because violations result in irreparable harm to persons threatening their 
very existence. What about the situation of a group threatened in its very existence, even if the 
lives of the individual members are not threatened? As discussed, several adjudicators have in-
deed used provisional measures in cases involving indigenous culture (Chapter X). If international 
                                                 
43 HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, §13(c). 
44 Id., §13(e). 
45 Id., §13(d). 
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adjudicators should only use provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons, the 
violation of the right claimed would not only have to be irreversible and result in irreparable harm 
to the rights claimed, but it should also be established that such a violation would result in irrepa-
rable harm to the (group of) persons involved. In the face of threats to the natural habitat, one 
question would be that of irreversibility and the assessment of risk.46 Another question would be 
whether there was a risk of irreversible harm to possible claims of individuals as part of a group. 
Finally, the question would have to be dealt with whether this would also result in harm to the 
person’s life and physical integrity, as seems to be the implicit criterion in most provisional 
measures, or whether that criterion has been expanded to encompass irreparable harm to the 
survival of an indigenous group as well.47  
If it would be required to establish that the threats to the natural habitat or otherwise to the 
cultural survival of an indigenous group would cause harm to the person’s life and integrity, it 
would be necessary to specify that personal integrity means not only physical but also mental 
integrity and that this would include sense of identity. Donders has described cultural identity as a 
broad and dynamic concept with both an individual and a collective dimension. She has noted that 
‘the suppression or limitation of the development and expression of cultural identity can make 
people feel alienated, which seriously affects their human dignity’.48 Indeed, in that sense the 
concept of cultural identity is related to that of physical, psychological and moral integrity. Thus 
one could argue that the interest of survival as an indigenous group could be subsumed under an 
expanded interpretation of the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment to include collec-
tive aspects of these rights for members of indigenous groups. Nevertheless, while the concepts 
are clearly related, the prohibition of cruel treatment would lose its independent meaning if it 
included not only the concepts of physical, psychological and moral integrity, but also that of 
cultural integrity (as the counterpart of cultural identity).49 The use of provisional measures in 
cases involving threats to culture should not be subsumed under the limited category of prevent-
ing cruel treatment.  
Given the special position of indigenous peoples, however, adjudicators may consider using 
provisional measures not only in the face of threats to personal integrity and life, but in the face of 
threats to the cultural survival of an indigenous people as well.50 This could mean that they would 
                                                 
46 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
47 Yet another question is what is an indigenous group. It has been suggested that it is very 
problematic to define ‘indigenous peoples’ as a distinctive legal category or ‘a global abstraction 
capable of working across different types of society with intricate identity politics and rapid 
cultural and economic change’. See e.g. Kingsbury (2001), p. 245. See in general about the 
discussion on the definition of minorities and indigenous peoples: Meijknecht (2001), Chapters 
III (in particular pp. 115-118) and IV; Donders (2002), pp 169-171 and pp. 204-205; and 
Thornberry (2002), pp. 33-60. 
48 Donders (2002), pp. 327-328. She noted: “Cultural identity is an important value for communities 
and individuals, since it concerns their belonging, their ‘roots’, way of thinking, feeling and 
acting. Most people consider their cultural identity as essential to their life, and value the choice 
they have made to belong to a certain cultural community because these communities give them 
valuable life options”. 
49 Obviously certain measures involving religious or cultural issues would indeed constitute cruel or 
degrading treatment, such as forcing devout Muslims to eat pork or devout Hindus to eat beef. 
Destruction of the natural habitat or of sites of cultural importance, on the other hand, relates to 
collective rights and is covered by Articles 1 and 27 rather than 7 and 10 ICCPR. 
50 See e.g. ILO Convention 169 affirming, as Anaya (1996), p. 106 puts it, ‘that indigenous peoples 
as groups are entitled to a continuing relationship with lands and natural resources according to 
traditional patterns of use or occupancy’. See e.g. Articles 13(1) and 14(1) of this Convention. 
See also Agenda 21 (Chapter 26) of the UN Conference on Environment and Development, Rio 
de Janeiro, 13 June 1992, A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 3), Annex 2 (1992), Operational Directive 4.20 
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use provisional measures in the context of the right to life, the prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment and of the right to culture. The special position of indigenous peoples and the impor-
tance of collective aspects of the right to culture may be explained by various factors. In domestic 
law land rights have regularly been dealt with on the basis of property rights. Yet it is often diffi-
cult for indigenous peoples to prove ownership and this approach does not take into account 
traditional occupancy. Moreover, domestic law in relation to property often considers financial 
compensation an appropriate remedy for expropriation. In relation to indigenous peoples, how-
ever, an appropriate remedy should take into account their cultural integrity and survival. Their 
very existence may be at stake. In other words, ‘the requirement to provide meaningful redress for 
indigenous land claims implies an obligation on the part of states to provide remedies that include 
for indigenous peoples the option of regaining lands and access to natural resources’.51 Acts 
precluding this option would be irreversible and, in the sense that financial compensation alone 
would not constitute meaningful redress, would be irreparable as well. Pending the proceedings 
provisional measures could prevent such irreparable harm.  
There have been two types of claims about the right to culture in which petitioners have 
asked provisional measures: those relating to threats to the natural habitat and, for instance, reli-
gious sites on the one hand and those relating to exclusion from an indigenous group on the other. 
Only in the first type of cases have adjudicators used provisional measures.52 Given the nature of 
the individual complaint system, technically both types of claims involve the individual right to 
live as members of an indigenous group taking part in indigenous culture. An important aspect of 
the right to culture relates to the dignity of an individual self-identified member of a minority or 
indigenous people as opposed to the rights of the members of the group collectively. This is an 
individual right to respect for this person’s cultural identity. Often this right is materially related 
to the right to equality and non-discrimination. Nevertheless, the consequences of a violation in 
this context normally are not irreversible in the sense that it is possible to reverse a decision to 
exclude a person from a group. While the harm that is done in the meantime can be serious, this 
equally applies to other reversible decisions resulting in a violation of a human rights treaty. 
Detention of a person who later turned out to be innocent is but one example.53  
Hence, rather than to protect the individual aspects of the right to culture in relation to ex-
clusion adjudicators have only used provisional measures to protect the collective aspects, as 
claimed by individual victims. The reason for this is that the irreparable consequences relate 
exactly to the collective and not to the individual aspects of the right to culture.  
The question arises whether and how this use of provisional measures fits one of the types 
of irreparable harm to be prevented. Once the criteria of immediacy and irreversibility are ful-
filled this type of provisional measure may be seen to belong clearly to the broader second cate-
gory of preventing irreversible harm to the rights claimed. It also comes quite close to the cate-
gory of preventing irreparable harm to persons. In this particular context ‘persons’ may refer as 
well to a group or collectivity as such. ‘Survival’ may refer not only to the right to life but also to 
the survival of a culture. After all, indigenous peoples have a special position in substantive inter-
national law, but no satisfactory recourse to implement their rights. If their cultural survival is at 
                                                                                                                       
of the World Bank (1991) and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples adopted 
by the General Assembly in 2007. The rights recognized in the Declaration ‘constitute the 
minimum standards for the survival, dignity and well-being of the indigenous peoples of the 
world’ (Article 43). 
51 Anaya (1996), p. 107. 
52 See Chapter X (Culture). 
53 In some instances arbitrary detention can be so closely related to the risk of torture or 
disappearances that intervention in the form of provisional measures could be warranted, see 
Chapters VIII (Procedural rights) and XII (Other situations). 
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stake this is a convincing reason to take into account the collective aspects of rights claimed by 
members of indigenous groups, through individual complaint systems. 
An example of a very important right for indigenous peoples is the right to self-
determination. If individual complaint systems do not allow claims based directly on this right (as 
is the case with the ICCPR), other rights relevant to indigenous peoples must be read in light of 
the concept of self-determination, emphasising also the collective aspects of these rights. In this 
respect the right to culture (as laid down or implied in human rights treaties) is, as Nowak has put 
it, the individual right to enforcement of the collective right.54 Indeed, procedurally only individu-
als can claim to be the victim of a violation, but substantively the HRC gives priority to the col-
lective aspects of the right to culture.55 This certainly applies to the use of provisional measures in 
cases involving culture. Another reason why adjudicators may be inclined to use provisional 
measures to prevent irreparable harm to indigenous culture, apart from the special position of 
indigenous peoples, is that such measures may at the same time prevent environmental degrada-
tion. The ICJ itself has pointed out that ‘the environment is not an abstraction but represents the 
living space, the quality of life and the very health of human beings, including generations un-
born’.56 The ITLOS, to give an example of an adjudicator specifically dealing with the law of the 
sea, has the authority to use provisional measures to preserve the respective rights of the parties to 
the dispute, but also to prevent serious harm to the marine environment (Article 290 UNCLOS).57 
The human rights adjudicators have sometimes addressed environmental issues in the context of 
the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment or in context of the right to family life, but 
these issues may also play a role in their decision-making in cases involving indigenous culture. 
In light of the right to self-determination and the inability for indigenous groups to other-
wise receive protection against threats to their cultural survival and in light of the principle of 
environmental protection, the criterion of irreparable harm to persons could be extended to in-
clude irreparable harm to indigenous groups. Not only would some threats to the collective as-
pects of the right to culture have irreversible consequences but, given the seriousness of the harm, 
any financial remedy would clearly be inappropriate because the indigenous group would not 
exist as such anymore. The only appropriate remedy would be halting the industrial activities that 
may constitute a violation and putting a stop to violations already determined, that threaten the 
survival of the group. 
The HRC has pointed out that States may not make reservations to the freedom of religion 
or to the right of minorities to enjoy their own culture and profess their own religion.58 As noted it 
has also pointed out that ‘the international protection of the rights of persons belonging to minori-
                                                 
54 See Nowak (1993), p. 499. Nowak pointed this out in the context of Article 27 ICCPR and made 
an analogy with the freedom of religion of Article 18(1). 
55 See Chapter X (Culture). Meijknecht (2001), pp. 131-139, focusing on the ICCPR, raises the 
question whether it is the individual’s, the group’s or the culture’s existence needing protection. 
She notes that Article 27 is basically formulated as a right bestowed upon the individual. She 
considers that ‘the construction as applied in Article 27 suggests that the tension between the 
individual and the collectivity can be avoided by denying a legal status and rights to the 
collectivity, and by attributing rights exclusively to individuals’. The formulation ‘in community 
with other members of their group’, she acknowledges, ‘suggests some sort of compromise 
between the individual and collective approach’, but this, she points out, ‘does not change the 
fact that the rights in question are bestowed upon individuals’. Certainly, from the perspective of 
the international personality of indigenous peoples Article 27 denies legal status to the 
collectivity. In its interpretation of the article, however, the HRC seems to attach rights to 
collectivities at the cost of the individual.  
56 ICJ, Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons, 8 July 1996, §29. 
57 See Chapter I. 
58 HRC General Comment 24 on reservations, 4 November 1994, §8. 
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ties includes elements that must be respected in all circumstances’.59 Provisional measures to 
protect the existence of indigenous peoples have been used in (sub-)regional contexts as well as 
under the ICCPR, the only international complaint system involving a range of human rights. It is 
argued that they could be used in all systems.60 This type of provisional measure can be consid-
ered an expansion of the common core of the concept of provisional measures in human rights 
cases.  
Most provisions in human rights treaties refer to one individual only, although they assume, 
of course, the interaction with other people. Next to the right to culture there are some other rights 
that clearly belong to a group as well as to the individuals making up this group, even though 
under most treaties only individual victims are able to claim these rights.61 These are religious 
rights, the right of peaceful assembly and the right to freedom of association (including the right 
to form and join trade unions). Still, it is mainly with regard to the collective aspects of the right 
to culture that provisional measures could serve a purpose in preventing irreparable harm, exactly 
because what is at stake is the existence itself of an indigenous group and its cultural integrity.  
At present the use of provisional measures to protect collective rights should be limited to 
protecting indigenous culture.62 Violation of the other more or less collective rights normally is 
not irreversible and, even if such a violation would be irreversible, this would not be of a similar 
magnitude as destruction of the natural habitat threatening the existence of an indigenous group. 
Even if State authorities would close a trade union and prohibit its members to form a new one, 
for instance, this action may have long-term pervasive effects but is still reversible. As part of a 
judgment finding a violation the adjudicator may indicate that the trade union should be restored 
and its assets returned. Often, of course, other acts related to the closure of such trade union, 
taking place pending a case, are indeed irreparable. Obvious examples are the murder and ill 
treatment of trade unionists.  
Desecration of a religious site would be different from acts prohibiting the freedom of relig-
ion or peaceful assembly in that this would not only raise the collective aspect of the right but 
such act is not fully reversible either. This situation could fall under both the right to culture and 
the right to religious expression. Possibly, particularly if the treaty involved does not contain a 
provision on the right to culture, or this provision does not apply, petitioners may invoke the right 
to religion and the adjudicator may equally decide to use provisional measures to protect against 
threats to cultural survival that can be shown to be related to the right to religion.  
As noted, acts resulting in violations of individual rights to access, in the face of exclusion, 
normally can be reversed. If there is a threat to the collective aspects of the right to culture, how-
ever, this may often be irreversible because the acts to be halted threaten to encroach on the envi-
                                                 
59 HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, §13(c). 
60 This could be so as long as these systems cover a range of rights including, explicitly or 
implicitly, cultural rights. 
61 An exception is the collective complaint procedure for the European Social Charter. This Charter, 
however, does not include a right to culture nor a possibility for provisional measures. In the 
Inter-American system the petitioners may be the NGOs acting on behalf of victims. They do not 
need to be victims themselves. Nevertheless they have to indicate clearly the group of 
beneficiaries involved. Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on the group of beneficiaries. 
62 Possibly in a specific system the context allows the adjudicator to go further than this. As 
discussed in Chapter X, in the context of the post-conflict situation in Bosnia the provisional 
measures ordered by the Bosnia Chamber under the Dayton Peace Agreement to respect Muslim 
sites, including cemeteries, seem particularly appropriate. They aim to address serious and 
pervasive discrimination relating, moreover, to issues involving respect for religion, for the dead 
and their community as well as to access to religious sites and protection against deletion of a 
suppressed group from the history of the region, all affecting to the core the dignity of the group 
at issue. 
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ronment and, thereby, the natural habitat of certain indigenous peoples. In such cases the first 
question is whether the act would have an irreversible impact on the environment and the second 
whether this would result in irreparable harm to the culture of an indigenous group because this 
group depends on this environment for its culture and livelihood. Other acts might not be related 
to the natural environment but would equally be irreversible as well as irreparable. An example 
would be the destruction and desecration of an ancient burial site or of a work of art essential to 
the culture of an indigenous people.  
Halting the destruction of works of art essential to the culture of an indigenous people may 
at the same time protect cultural heritage in general. An example would be if a State plans to 
allow the destruction of a Maya site. On the other hand, human rights adjudicators cannot use 
provisional measures solely to protect the cultural heritage of mankind if there is no specific link 
between the alleged victim and the culture of an indigenous group.63 In any case, other organisa-
tions, such as UNESCO, would be better suited to deal with situations of large-scale threats to 
cultural heritage. Moreover, even if the States involved have ratified an individual complaint 
procedure and the petition would not constitute actio popularis, such threats often take place 
during civil wars or when there is no central government to be contacted. Even if the adjudicator 
could take into account international humanitarian law it would not be easy to establish state 
responsibility.  
Another situation that conceivably concerns culture is the threat that a painting will be de-
stroyed. Again, except when this painting would be shown to be essential to an indigenous group, 
this would either concern the common heritage of mankind (an example could be a government 
plan to paint over Van Gogh’s Sunflowers) or it would concern freedom of expression. In the first 
case the above comment on the specific link to the alleged victim would apply and in the second 
the victim would be the artist. The result would be irreversible even if a photograph had been 
made of the original painting. Clearly it would cause irreparable harm to the rights claimed (free-
dom of expression). It would also violate the artist’s personal dignity in the broad sense of the 
term. Nevertheless, lacking a specific treaty provision on provisional measures to the contrary, in 
an international human rights system such situation should not trigger the use of provisional 
measures because the category of irreparable harm to survival or personal integrity, in the more 
limited sense, would not apply.64  
2.2.4 Protecting against mass expulsion, internal displacement and forced 
eviction 
The Inter-American Commission and Court have used provisional measures to intervene in a 
situation of mass-expulsion.65 The Bosnia Chamber has sometimes intervened to halt forced 
eviction.66 The question is whether these situations could qualify as part of the common core 
proposed for the use of provisional measures in international human rights adjudication.  
In some contexts provisional measures may indeed assist in alleviating the situation even of 
potentially large groups of people.67 Presently, it is already clear that not only the right to life and 
the prohibition of cruel treatment are rights singled out in each treaty for their exceptional nature, 
but the prohibition of racial discrimination is as well. Moreover, it is one of the few human rights 
                                                 
63 Hypothetically an inter-State complaint would be possible but, thus far, this procedure has been 
used very rarely and only in the European system have provisional measures been used in this 
context. 
64 See further section 2.3 of this Conclusion on provisional measures within the outer limits of the 
concept, but not within the common core. 
65 See Chapter XI (Mass expulsion). 
66 Ibid. 
67 See Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 (beneficiaries). 
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specifically mentioned in the UN Charter and referred to by the ICJ for its character erga omnes.68 
Under Article 4(1) ICCPR derogations may only be justified on condition that they ‘do not in-
volve discrimination solely on the ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin’. 
The HRC has noted that while Article 26 and other rights related to non-discrimination have not 
been listed specifically among the non-derogable provisions in Article 4(2) ICCPR ‘there are 
elements or dimensions of the right to non-discrimination that cannot be derogated from in any 
circumstances’.69 
In this light, international adjudicators might be justified in using provisional measures to 
order the halting of mass expulsion and internal displacement, especially because the victims are 
being expelled or displaced on a discriminatory basis and are often threatened and harassed in the 
process as well. Moreover, there are often children involved and for them the context of mass 
expulsion or displacement may be particularly traumatic.70 Finally, apart from the discrimination 
and the traumatic effects on children, it is also unlikely that large groups of persons, after it is 
determined that they have been arbitrarily expelled, will be allowed to return. The State is less 
likely to allow the return of all persons arbitrarily expelled than just the return of some individu-
als. Thus the issue of irreversibility becomes relevant as well. Mass expulsion (and internal dis-
placement) must be prevented exactly because the causes may be endemic (e.g. based on religious 
or ethnic grounds) and the consequences may be extremely long-lasting for a large group of peo-
ple.  
Given the hardships suffered by the victims of mass or arbitrary expulsion and forced evic-
tion and the interrelatedness between the rights at stake, including the particular impact on the 
basic rights of children, and in light of the special responsibility of the adjudicators involved to 
address the prohibition of discrimination, this type of provisional measure is clearly moving 
towards the common core. There are some cases where the human hardship involved would be 
particularly abrasive and where appropriate redress would be impossible. There are some cases 
where it will be impossible to appropriately redress the situation after the fact, justifying a shift to 
the common core given the seriousness of the harm resulting from the combination of pervasive 
discrimination and mass expulsion or internal displacement. This applies in particular when a 
range of interrelated rights is involved, and especially the rights of children.71 Thus, if the Inter-
American Commission and Court were to expand their practice in this respect and more adjudica-
tors were to start following their lead, together with the precedent of the Bosnia Chamber’s provi-
sional measures in forced eviction cases, this might indeed lead to an expansion of the common 
core. Similarly, it is possible that the human rights adjudicators would determine that certain 
kinds of treatment (such as rounding up persons in vans and dumping them across borders in 
unknown territory without due process or without allowing them to contact their families; or 
refusal to register a birth, and a denial to access primary education as well as a constant threat of 
expulsion) triggered by racist motives, would have such an impact of humiliation that they would 
come down to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment.72 If the case law of the adjudicators were to 
                                                 
68 See e.g. Article 1(3) UN Charter (a purpose of the UN is to achieve international cooperation in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights ‘for all without distinction as to race, sex, 
language or religion’). See also Articles 13(1)(b) and 55(c); and ICJ Barcelona Traction case 
(Belgium v. Spain), second phase, ICJ reports 1970, 3 §§33-34 referring to ‘basic rights of the 
human person’ as obligations erga omnes (concerns of all States), mentioning as examples the 
protection from slavery, racial discrimination and genocide. 
69 See HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency (Article 4), 24 July 2001, §8. 
70 Being in a process of development that may irreparably stunted as a result of the mass eviction. 
71 In many cases persons are also being threatened and harassed, see Chapters IX (Death threats) 
and XIII (Protection). 
72 See e.g. CAT Hajrizi Dzemajl et al. v. Yugoslavia, 21 November 2002 and ECtHR Moldovan et 
al. v. Romania, 12 July 2005, discussed in Chapter XI (Mass expulsion). 
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converge in this respect, provisional measures to halt mass expulsion or forced eviction in such 
circumstances would belong to the common core simply by virtue of preventing such treatment. 
In other words there is an accumulation of reasons (the interrelated rights at stake, the hard-
ship on particularly vulnerable groups, the impact on the rights of groups uprooted and forcibly 
removed across the region, the possible evolution of the case law on racist acts constituting cruel 
treatment) why the common core of provisional measures in international human rights adjudica-
tion may be shifting to include ordering a halt to certain situations of mass expulsion or forced 
eviction. 
Nevertheless, apart from the conceptual issue there is also the practical difficulty that inter-
national adjudicators may not be able to collect sufficient information to assist the potential bene-
ficiaries with provisional measures that are sufficiently focused. Thus, while the use of provi-
sional measures in cases of mass expulsion and internal displacement may be justified norma-
tively, in practice such use of provisional measures does not seem to be immediately possible. If 
at all, in an international system such provisional measures might only be used incrementally on 
the basis of clearly established case law on the merits as well as an ongoing exchange of thoughts 
with the particular State in question and the alleged victims. Regional systems with a monitoring 
presence or at least the capacity of making country visits and organising hearings may have a 
better chance in this respect.73 Nevertheless, rather than using provisional measures directly on 
this issue, international adjudicators may in any case specify their provisional measures taken in 
the context of protection against death threats and harassment by indicating that displaced persons 
should be allowed to return. 
2.3 Outer limits: preventing irreversible harm to the claim or procedure 
It appears from the foregoing that the common core of provisional measures in human rights 
adjudication is the protection of the very existence of persons and groups. Yet it is possible that 
some adjudicators consider that in the context of their own system their protective role implies the 
use of provisional measures in a less limited set of circumstances than only to protect survival and 
physical integrity. If so, it should be possible to identify the rationale of these measures. One 
rationale could be that the use of provisional measures should be extended to prevent irreversible 
harm to the rights claimed and to the eventual forms of reparation rather than to prevent irrepara-
ble harm to persons as discussed above. As noted, this is a broader category preventing all irre-
versible harm. An example would be that of halting the destruction of a work of art as a form of 
freedom of expression. The HRC has used provisional measures once exactly for this purpose.74 
In addition it has used provisional measures in a family life case involving deportation by a State 
of someone who had lived in that State since childhood.75 In this case the HRC argued that the 
consequences of deportation were irreversible. This means that the case fits into the category of 
preventing irreversible harm to the claim. On the other hand, in later cases involving family life 
the HRC noted that, if it would find a violation, it could still order the return of victim. Thus, 
while the likelihood that this would indeed happen seems remote, clearly the situation is not as 
irreversible as irreparable harm to persons (e.g. execution and cruel treatment) or irreparable harm 
to the claim (e.g. the destruction of a work of art). The aim of the provisional measure in this case 
seems to be to prevent ‘undue hardship’ to the person rather than to prevent ‘irreparable harm’ to 
either the person or the claim. An attempt could be made to fit this measure in the third category 
of preventing irreversible harm, namely harm to the procedure. In my view, however, provisional 
                                                 
73 See Introduction and Chapter II. 
74 See Chapter XII (Other situations), section 2.10. 
75 See Chapter XII (Other situations), section 3.2. 
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measures should not be used to prevent irreversible harm to the procedure in all situations, but 
mainly as a collateral purpose in death penalty and non-refoulement cases involving claims relat-
ing to the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment or the right to life. After all, once a person has 
been deported to a State in which there is a fear for his physical integrity and even his life, the 
State has not only hindered the right of individual complaint and the proceedings under the treaty 
in question, but also exposed him to a real risk of violations of the right to life and personal integ-
rity. Both dangers are closely interrelated because the individual complaint procedures were 
initiated to prevent irreparable harm to persons at minimum and to allow the petitioner to present 
evidence and substantiate claims of a real risk of such harm. If he would be returned nevertheless, 
he would not only risk irreparable harm. The return would also hinder the chance of contacting 
him. In fact the chance of completing the proceedings under the relevant treaty in an appropriate 
manner would be even slimmer than in deportation cases involving family life.  
The use of provisional measures to refrain from action causing undue hardship rather than 
irreparable harm seems less appropriate in a universal system, at least until such use has been 
firmly established in more than one regional system. Especially in a universal system lacking 
sufficient cohesion, a more cautious approach may be warranted in which provisional measures 
must remain exceptional, clearly aiming at the prevention of irreparable harm to persons or pro-
cedure. In regional systems, on the other hand, tighter links between States may lead to a higher 
degree of pressure to comply even with provisional measures in less serious situations.  
As discussed in Chapter I, scholars have discerned a so-called ‘humanization’ of interna-
tional law.  
There seems to be a convergence, rather than divergence of jurisprudence on provisional 
measures that ties in with this humanization. This may be explained even if the adjudicators are 
not aware of each other’s jurisprudence, simply by the fact that all the human rights adjudicators 
examined in this book are dealing with similar treaty provisions, for instance on the right to life 
and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment and on the right of individual petition. It could 
also be explained exactly by this awareness of each other’s jurisprudence, sometimes evident 
from conscious cross-referencing of jurisprudence, as was seen in the ECtHR judgment in 
Mamatkulov.76  
At the same time some provisional measures seem typical to a certain region. The most par-
ticular adjudicator dealt with in this book, the Bosnia Human Rights Chamber, may serve as an 
example. The Bosnia Chamber was a hybrid and non-permanent body that may be assumed to 
have been rather specific in its approaches to provisional measures, closely adapting its practice to 
the exigencies of the post-war situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Chamber had to deal 
with the aftermath of a four year war with ethnic cleansing and discriminatory practices that were 
still pervasive after the war. It had to deal with only three addressees (the State of BiH and its 
constituent parts: the Federation of BiH and the Republica Srpska), all from the same geographi-
cal region. The Secretariat of the Chamber was based in the area concerned and the Chamber held 
its sessions there. Although it was a sui generis body rather than a constitutional court, its case 
law clearly is – and should be – more context-specific than that of an international adjudicator 
like the HRC. 
Apart from the Bosnia Chamber as a sui generis adjudicator, on the one hand, and the HRC 
as the international human rights adjudicator operating with regard to the widest range of human 
rights, on the other hand, there are also the regional systems. In the context of the Inter-American 
system it is noteworthy that according to some (former) Judges of the Inter-American Court pro-
visional measures can apply to all rights.77 Moreover, the requirements for precautionary meas-
                                                 
76 About the latter see also Pasqualucci (2005). 
77 See e.g. IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, 
Order of 8 February 2008, Separate Opinion Judge García Ramírez, §12 and Cançado Trindade 
(2003), p. 165, as well as in his Introduction to the third volume of the Court’s provisional 
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ures by the Inter-American Commission are less rigorous and less regulated than those for the 
provisional measures of the Inter-American Court. Until 1999 the Court only acted when personal 
security was involved while the Commission acted upon all the rights of the Convention. The 
Commission’s criterion has always been that there was some urgency, some imminent danger. 
The informal beginnings of the Commission’s practice may explain this.78 In light of the Com-
mission’s other activities, such as taking part in country visits and drafting country reports, more-
over, the Commission has more of a hands-on experience of the actual human rights situations in 
the Americas. This may also explain its more flexible use of precautionary measures.  
Commissioner Juan Mendez had noted that the practice of the Commission with regard to 
precautionary measures started with disappearances, but it was never limited to that. Moreover, 
there was never a time in which the Commission limited itself to taking precautionary measures to 
situations where life and limb were threatened. There have been cases, for instance, in which the 
Commission took precautionary measures when someone was under an arrest warrant and was to 
be detained at any time. Under the new Rules of Procedure the Commission has crystallized its 
practice over a long period of time. Mendez stated that they have made very broad the possibility 
to take precautionary measures. This would be basically in any situation that needs immediate 
attention according to the Commission. Its criterion is that when there is no harm in waiting to 
resolve the issue at the merits stage, then it will not intervene, but otherwise it will.79 According 
to Mendez any right threatened by an immediate violation or irreparable harm may warrant a 
precautionary measure, but it would have to be a right spelled out under the Convention or the 
Declaration. For instance, a threat to the ‘project of life’ by definition deals with a situation that is 
prolonged, such as prolonged administrative detention and, he considers, by definition something 
that is urgent is not very prolonged. Although he finds it difficult to imagine when the ‘project of 
life’ issue would come up in the context of precautionary measures, he notes, there is no reason to 
say it should not. Generally, however, if it would come up this would be at the stage of repara-
tions, not at the stage of provisional measures or even precautionary measures.80 It must be borne 
in mind, though, that provisional measures have in fact been used in ongoing cases, e.g. involving 
detention situations or death threats, meaning it is not necessarily contradictory for the project of 
life to play a role.81  
The criterion that the right must be ‘spelled out’ under the American Convention or the 
Declaration before the Commission may take precautionary measures, paradoxical as it may 
sound, must not be taken literately. After all, the first precautionary measures almost all dealt with 
recent disappearances in which a composite of articles is applicable. Of course it is true that these 
articles, such as the right to life, in themselves are indeed very clearly spelled out under both the 
Convention and the Declaration. In my view it is not entirely impossible to use project of life 
argument in the context of provisional measures, although in the first instance it might sound 
contradictory, as this is a thing that can only take place over a long stretch of time. At the same 
time, if it is clear that certain illegal acts or abstentions result in obstacles to the project of life and 
possible irreparable harm to it, it makes more sense to intervene timely than just to pronounce on 
reparations (including compensation) afterwards. I believe this could also be the case in situations 
                                                                                                                       
measures, §21 and interview by author with President Cançado Trindade, San José, Costa Rica, 
November/December 2001. But see Buergenthal (1994), p. 77 referring to the wording and the 
legislative history of Article 63(2), noting that these ‘ make clear that its sole purpose is to protect 
human beings against the loss of life or extreme physical or mental abuse when there is a very 
strong likelihood that they are in imminent danger and there exists a corresponding urgency for 
protective action’. 
78 Interview by author with Commissioner Juan Mendez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 On the project of life see also Chapter XII (Other situations), section 2.1. 
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where access to a project of life (to even think about embarking on such a project) is blocked.82 In 
other words, in particular cases in which government action can create this access, provisional 
measures might order a government to actually do so. Thus in some specific cases provisional 
measures could indeed be used in economic and social rights cases, especially in relation to chil-
dren. 
Formally the Inter-American Court has continued to adhere to the exceptional nature of 
provisional measures, but it is doubtful whether it has always adhered to this principle in practice. 
If the Court only orders provisional measures in exceptional cases, it is difficult to understand 
why it also does so to protect someone’s good name, especially since an incorrect registration in 
the criminal records can be repaired. It is unlikely that the good name of a journalist will suffer 
irreparable harm from a temporary registration in such records for having published an article. 
The same applies to several of the precautionary measures taken by the Commission in freedom 
of expression cases, possibly with the exception of curtailment of freedom of expression previous 
to, or during, an election period.83 In any case, even when it is possible to establish that these 
rights would be irreversibly harmed without the Commission’s or the Court’s intervention, it 
concerns rights other than the right to life and dignity. If the Commission and the Court empha-
size the factor of urgency rather than that of irreparable harm, this would be an evolutive interpre-
tation of the Convention requiring clear motivation. 
The more adverse the impact of certain measures is likely to be on the well-being of people, 
facing a situation that would be intolerable, the more reason adjudicators have for the use of 
provisional measures pending the proceedings, particularly if the task of the adjudicator specifi-
cally relates to this issue or if the problem in question is endemic in that region.  
The use of provisional measures as taken by just one adjudicator, for instance by the Inter-
American Commission and Court to protect freedom of expression, can often be explained in the 
context of problems occurring in a specific region or because of opportunities arising in that 
region (e.g. a powerful lobby of press agencies, the special respect an adjudicator commands in a 
given State at a given moment, the scope of the provision on provisional measures in the applica-
ble treaty or Rule of Procedure) or simply because they are based on the provisions of a special-
ised treaty (e.g. those of CEDAW or ICAT). Such measures may presently be within the outer 
limits of the concept but beyond the common core because they do not deal with preventing ir-
reparable harm to persons. 
In some cases the provisional measures seem to have been taken in error. The concept of 
provisional measures in human rights adjudication does not allow for the use in situations in 
which a violation could later be repaired through financial measures alone. For instance, using 
provisional measures to postpone payment of a fine is beyond the outer limits of the concept. 
Thus in some situations the use of provisional measures is inappropriate, as they aim to prevent 
harm that would mostly be reversible. An example could be a single action hindering the freedom 
of expression or the independence of the judiciary. Yet in a climate of harassment against journal-
ists or the judiciary, it is no longer possible to speak of reversible harm to the claim. In such a 
context it could be appropriate for regional adjudicators to order provisional measures to prevent 
irreversible harm to the claim. Moreover, such a climate of harassment would probably involve 
death threats and harassment against the personal integrity of the intended beneficiaries as well, 
bringing the provisional measures within the common core of the concept to the extent that they 
aim to protect the life and personal dignity of the person involved, while also specifying that this 
person should be able to continue his or her activities (journalist, judge, witness, human rights 
defender, etc.). 
                                                 
82 Such as in the case of street children, see Chapter XII (Other situations), section 2.1. 
83 See Chapter XII (Other situations), section 3.3. 
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For the time being it may be a bridge too far for a supervisory body to an international 
treaty without a specific treaty provision on provisional measures to expand the use of provisional 
measures to issues other than those involving the survival and physical integrity of persons. This 
does not mean it is impossible conceptually, or that it is not important from the perspective of the 
individuals involved, but just that it may not be very wise from the perspective of expected com-
pliance. Use of provisional measures with regard to any type of irreversible harm to the claim 
would be better suited in a regional or even in a constitutional approach by a hybrid court such as 
the Bosnia Chamber. Yet at some point in the future, once it has been firmly established by re-
gional bodies, the international adjudicator might consider similar expansions.  
3 PROTECTIVE MEASURES, MERITS AND REPARATION 
An element of positive action is present in most provisional measures and should be made explicit 
in cases involving ongoing situations such as adverse detention conditions, recent disappearances 
and death threats. The discussion on subsidiarity plays out differently in each system but, like the 
Inter-American Commission and Court, the other human rights adjudicators should also incre-
mentally specify their provisional measures, so as to provide clarity to States on what is expected 
of them, especially with regard to core rights. This way States have at least some direction of 
what they are expected to do or to abstain from doing in order to prevent irreparable harm to 
persons. 
The European Commission and Court have directed provisional measures to petitioners who 
were on hunger strike to protest against adverse prison conditions, lack of access to medication or 
arbitrary detention. None of the other adjudicators have used provisional measures to the effect 
that petitioners should stop a hunger strike. Here, again, the question arises whether the aim of 
preventing irreparable harm to persons is independent of the claim or related to the claim. If 
related to the claim, it would be inappropriate for the adjudicator to turn around and direct a pro-
visional measure to the petitioner. Nevertheless, this is what the European Commission and Court 
did. In these circumstances they took provisional measures proprio motu directed against the 
petitioner rather than against the State. They took a very traditional approach of using provisional 
measures ‘in the interests of the parties’. They appear to lean towards preventing irreparable harm 
to the procedure. While this clearly agrees with the text of the Rules of Procedure, in a dynamic 
and purposive approach it seems contrary to the Convention to assume that both parties are on 
equal footing. In human rights cases involving an individual and a State party the power is con-
centrated in the latter. Provisional measures, therefore, should serve to shield the threatened indi-
vidual or group against abuse of power by the State or make the State act against abuse of power 
by others.84  
It is argued that the Inter-American practice of using provisional measures not just to pro-
tect persons mentioned by name, but also to protect the members of a defined community, or 
people working at human rights organisations, as well as all other persons visiting the premises is 
indeed appropriate. While they are not identified by name, the beneficiaries of the required pro-
tective measures are clear to the State. Obviously there must be no indications of disagreement by 
beneficiaries with their inclusion in an order for provisional measures. Moreover, provisional 
measures may even protect a larger group than that mentioned in the provisional measures. After 
all a good faith implementation of the obligations under the relevant human rights treaty warrants 
a pro-active stance of the State to ensure that the underlying rationale to a provisional measure is 
being met. 
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Sometimes petitioners may have as their main aim to obtain a provisional measure rather 
than a decision on the merits. In the context of the ICJ this has occasionally been criticised.85 
Even if this tendency may be criticized vis-à-vis States, in human rights cases the situation is 
different, especially if the purpose of the main claim coincides with the purpose of the provisional 
measures, both aiming at preventing irreparable harm to persons. In the practice of the human 
rights adjudicators the use of provisional measures may trigger a State’s attempt to solve the 
issue, sometimes making it possible to strike out the case.  
Also if the purpose of provisional measures is to prevent irreparable harm to persons rather 
than to the claim, when using provisional measures the adjudicator should refer to the rights 
involved. It is possible that some adjudicators have used independent concepts of life, dignity and 
personal integrity without relating the concept of irreparable harm to specific articles of the rele-
vant treaty. In view of the fact, however, that they may have to declare subsequently, on the basis 
of previous case law, that there was no violation, the question arises whether the object of the 
provisional measures was simply to postpone the suffering until after the expected finding. This 
would be an unsatisfactory approach to the concept of provisional measures. After all, if it would 
not be possible to achieve a similar result as part of the merits (and reparation) phase, achieving it 
temporarily, as part of provisional measures, would serve no purpose in the long run. Provisional 
measures should go no further than the eventual obligation could. 
When dealing with a request for provisional measures the Inter-American Court equally 
notes that the case is only before it for the purpose of provisional measures. A decision to order 
such measures, or the President’s decision to request urgent measures, does not imply a decision 
on the merits of the dispute between the petitioners and the State.86 By adopting urgent measures, 
for instance, the President was simply guaranteeing the Court’s ability to exercise faithfully its 
conventional mandate.87 As noted, if in a request by petitioners for provisional measures the facts 
complained of relate to other aspects of the main case, not directly constituting a situation of 
urgency, the adjudicator will declare (this part of) the request for provisional measures inadmissi-
ble. The Inter-American Court has emphasized that it may not examine ‘any arguments other than 
those which are directly and strictly related to situations of extreme gravity and urgency which 
require the adoption of protection measures to avoid irreparable damage to persons. Any other 
arguments or facts may only be examined and determined by the Court when considering the 
merits of contentious cases brought before the Court’.88 
Apart from the usual statement that the decision on provisional measures does not prejudge the 
merits, specific practice of the other adjudicators, such as the HRC, with regard to the approach to 
the issue of prejudgment in the use of provisional measures currently is unavailable. Undoubtedly 
they have considered the issue in their decision-making, but generally they have not publicly 
elaborated on it. 
The remark by Judge Gros, in his dissent to the Order for provisional measures in the Nu-
clear Test (1973) cases, that it is contrary to the nature of interlocutory proceedings if they enable 
the dispute to be disposed of, may already be disputed in the context of the ICJ’s judgments and 
provisional measures.89 At any rate it does not apply to human rights cases. The protective func-
tion of provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons often coincides so much with 
                                                 
85 See Mani (1973), p. 262 and Sztucki (1983), p. 260.  
86 See e.g. IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 
November 2000. 
87 See e.g. IACHR James and others, Orders of 27 May, 29 June, 13 and 22 July 1998, 11 May and 
19 June 1999. 
88 IACHR Matter of Adrián Meléndez-Quijano et al (El Salvador), Order of 26 November 2007, 9th 
‘Considering’ clause, referring to various cases including Matter of Luisiana Ríos et al. 
(Venezuela), Order of 3 July 2007, 9th ‘Considering’ clause. 
89 See Chapter I (ICJ). 
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the protection required if the claim on the merits is granted that these measures cannot be seen 
simply as ‘an accessory element’ of the dispute. This is shown in the practice of several human 
rights adjudicators, for instance because provisional measures caused the State to seek a solution 
and resulted in the withdrawal of cases and in the decision to strike them from the list of pending 
cases. 
The authority to order provisional measures and the authority to order action or abstention 
on the merits, as well as reparations are closely related. In some cases it would be particularly 
unacceptable to await the harm and then award pecuniary damages. Prevention (or putting a halt 
to ongoing violations) would be the only appropriate measure exactly because the harm is irrepa-
rable. Clearly, any form of financial compensation would be insufficient in relation to the harm 
done. In such cases the reason for using provisional measures would be so pressing that States 
would normally feel especially embarrassed to ignore them.  
The link between halting an execution pending the proceedings and ordering commutation 
or a new trial as part of the decision on the merits is evident. With regard to ordering a State to 
protect a person against threats, the aim seems to be identical in provisional measures and on the 
merits. Thus if in the final determination of the case the HRC does not recommend at least the 
preservation of the life of the victim it seems that its provisional measures to prevent harm to 
persons serve little purpose. In other words, the aim of preventing harm to the claim and ensuring 
an adequate remedy is a prerequisite to preventing harm to the person.90 
While the ICJ’s power to use provisional measures normally must maintain its ‘proper sub-
ordination to the main judgment’,91 this is different in cases involving irreparable harm to per-
sons. Clearly, because they aim at preventing such harm they must be in accordance with the pre-
existing jurisprudence on the right to life, the prohibition of cruel treatment, the right to culture of 
indigenous peoples and the prohibition of mass expulsion and internal displacement on ethnic 
grounds.  
At the same time, the protective measures required cannot go further in substance than an 
eventual decision on the merits and reparations would. This means that decisions on provisional 
measures already give an indication on substantive law. The ‘rule’ of non-anticipation by the 
adjudicator (rather than the parties) of the decision on the merits simply is a corollary to the cus-
tomary statement that a decision to take provisional measures does not prejudice the eventual 
legal determination of the main conflict. The requirement not to prejudice the eventual legal 
determination, it is argued, is related to the assessment of risk.92  
Often it is already established that if an adjudicator finds sufficient evidence (on the merits 
stage) it will find a violation. Sometimes, however, the adjudicator has not yet dealt with the 
meaning of a certain provision in the situation at hand, or there are clear indications that it may 
change its case law. On occasion provisional measures have been taken pending the proceedings 
in such cases.93 This might be seen as anticipating the eventual determination. Yet, in light of the 
risk of irreparable harm to persons, in human rights cases such risk of anticipation should not 
                                                 
90 See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
91 Merrills (1995), p. 106. 
92 See further Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
93 See e.g. in corporal punishment cases (Chapter IV) non-refoulement cases involving lack of 
proper care (Chapter V) and in cases involving indigenous culture (Chapter X). See also e.g. the 
use of provisional measures to halt destruction of IVF embryos and the subsequent decision on 
the merits finding that such destruction would not result in a violation of the Convention, Chapter 
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hinder the use of provisional measures.94 What is important is that upon final determination the 
adjudicator is not led by the fact that pending the proceedings provisional measures were taken.95 
Violations of rights causing irreparable harm must be prevented since a return to the status 
quo ante is impossible after the irreversible has taken place (irreversibility), while the nature of 
the harm implies that such violations can never be repaired by financial compensation (irrepara-
bility). In human rights cases the relevance of this traditional reason for using provisional meas-
ures is particularly striking. 
In a case where one party (the State) threatens to execute a death sentence imposed on the 
other party and that party claims that this would violate his right to life, an execution before the 
case is finally determined would amount to an irrevocable anticipation of the adjudicator’s deci-
sion by the State party. This action would make impossible the fulfilment of the requirements 
claimed on the merits. These requirements would have constituted, first and foremost, the preven-
tion of a further violation of the right to life. Next to cases in which there is precedent for the 
measures claimed on the merits, there may also be cases in which case law on the specific remedy 
claimed is not yet available. In some of these cases execution of the petitioner may inflict irrepa-
rable harm as well. In all such situations provisional measures have been used to prevent irrepara-
ble harm to persons.  
A similar approach applies to the prevention of corporal punishment and of refoulement. In-
tervention in cases of disappearances or in detention situations involving lack of access to medical 
treatment equally prevents irreparable harm to persons. At the same time the intervention is justi-
fied by the fact that, once a violation is found, adjudicators have indicated the action or abstention 
required on the merits and recommended forms of reparation corresponding to the protective 
measures required pending the proceedings. Evidently, without the provisional measures there 
could be no appropriate decision on the merits nor form of reparation.  
Adjudicators often deem warranted remedies for violations that have already taken place, in 
addition to those preventing (further) violations. In death penalty cases it would also be an option 
to use provisional measures to halt an execution because the victim could not enjoy the requested 
form of reparation, once executed, even if such reparation in itself does not refer to release or 
commutation, but to an unspecified (and possibly only monetary) remedy. Nevertheless, if the 
case law indicates that a remedy such as commutation is never recommended in relation to certain 
findings, the State itself is unlikely on its own motion to consider life a prerequisite for the en-
joyment of any form of reparation. This already indicates that there are death penalty cases in 
which provisional measures eventually would not help prevent irreparable harm to persons be-
cause a link with the eventual obligations on the merits and reparation is lacking.  
In death penalty cases an adjudicator should not use provisional measures simply to express 
an abolitionist stance in cases where he or she could expect the adjudicator would not recommend 
commutation. Provisional measures used in such circumstances do not truly prevent irreparable 
harm to persons because the eventual measures on the merits will not. Of course there is still a 
rationale to the use of provisional measures in such cases, namely to prevent irreversible harm to 
the procedure. The execution of the petitioner pending the proceedings hinders irreversibly the 
right of individual complaint. Such an execution causes irreversible harm to the fairness of the 
proceedings before the adjudicator and, thereby, the integrity of the individual complaint proce-
dure under the treaty in question. Clearly, when one party in a conflict kills the other party during 
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18 January 1978, as discussed in Chapter VII (Detention), section 2.2. 
95 See also Chapter III (Executions), section 3.2 on prejudgment and see Chapter XV (Immediacy 
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the course of legal proceedings instituted in order to settle their conflict, that party, rather than the 
adjudicator, settles the conflict. Such a course of action, moreover, is not conducive to the princi-
ple of equality of arms. This principle is a prerequisite to any legal proceedings aiming at being 
fair. The HRC, for instance, attaches great importance to it. This is evident both from its refer-
ences to this principle in the examination of cases and from its own emphasis on the importance 
of making all information available to the State and the petitioner, giving both of them the oppor-
tunity to reply to each other’s submissions and deciding the case on the basis of all the informa-
tion before it, often sending reminders to the parties for more information. Execution of the peti-
tioner by the State party is the ultimate example of inequality of arms. This form of irreversible 
harm to the proceedings is so serious that the use of provisional measures to prevent it could be 
justified even if there is no clear link with an eventual requirement on the merits preserving the 
life of the victim. Nevertheless, this approach is less satisfactory from the perspective of logic and 
the right to life than, for instance, in the case law of the HRC, the improvement and specification 
of references to ‘an appropriate remedy’ would be, by including to preservation of the life of the 
victim. The latter would ensure a correlation between the provisional measure and the eventual 
obligations on the merits and forms of reparation. In this approach the provisional measures 
would serve to prevent irreparable harm to persons.  
Even if the purpose of provisional measures is to prevent irreparable harm to persons rather 
than simply irreversible harm to the claim, when using provisional measures the adjudicator 
should indeed refer to the rights involved. It is possible that some adjudicators have used inde-
pendent concepts of life, dignity and personal integrity without relating the concept of irreparable 
harm to specific articles of the relevant treaty. In view of the fact, however, that they may have to 
declare subsequently, on the basis of previous case law, that there was no violation, or that there 
was, but no action or abstention is required to prevent irreparable harm to persons at the merits 
stage, the question arises whether the object of the provisional measures was simply to postpone 
the suffering until after the expected finding. In order to prevent this, provisional measures should 
go no further than what could be required on the merits. If the provisional measures aim to ensure 
that a possible judgment on the merits will not be pre-empted, it should be established that the 
result hoped for, in the judgment on the merits, by the party requesting the provisional measures 
is at least feasible. In other words, if it is not feasible that the adjudicator would determine an 
outcome anywhere close to that hoped by the party requesting the provisional measure, pending 
the proceedings the adjudicator should not use it in the form requested. This simply requires a 
very initial prima facie assessment of feasibility. 
In human rights cases provisional measures could be used also to prevent irreparable harm 
to rights collateral to the claim, if these rights involve the right to life and the prohibition of cruel 
treatment. After all, apart from direct complaints about death threats and harassment the issue of 
threats can also be collateral to the original claim. In such cases other persons than the alleged 
victim(s) involved in the main claim are at risk of irreparable harm. These persons are being 
threatened because they are somehow related to the alleged victim, for instance as family mem-
bers or co-workers or as witnesses, judges or counsel in the international or domestic proceedings. 
In these cases too the provisional measure should not go further than the eventual decision on the 
merits could. The difference is that the latter is hypothetical in the sense that it relates to viola-
tions perpetrated against persons other than the alleged victim(s). In other words, the criterion is 
irreparable harm to persons rather than the link between the object of the complaint and the provi-
sional measures. Still, there must be a relationship between what decision on the merits (preven-
tion, non-repetition, reparation) the adjudicator could have suggested on the merits had the com-
plaint itself been about the death threats. Thus, what the petitioner needs to show, for purposes of 
provisional measures, is the threat of irreparable harm to persons and the relationship of these 
persons to the alleged victim. It is also useful to show that violations have been found in similar 
cases in the past and that the provisional measures would go no further than the eventual decision 
on the merits would have, if the persons involved would have been the alleged victims.  
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In sum, human rights adjudicators should use provisional measures in cases in which they 
consider, prima facie, that the petitioners have shown not only immediacy of the harm and irre-
versibility of the act or omission96 but also the risk of irreparable harm to persons, including in 
ongoing situations. The latter should normally be established by a two-prong test of (1) irrepara-
ble harm to persons and (2) irreversible harm to the rights claimed, including the possibility of 
reparation.  
Only if persons other than the alleged victim(s) are risking irreparable harm the situation is 
different. Then the third type of irreversible harm, harm to the procedure, may play a role as well. 
This is the case when witnesses, counsel or family members of the alleged victim are harassed 
and receive death threats. In such cases there is no need to establish a relationship with the main 
claim. Here the test is (1) irreparable harm to persons and (2) irreversible harm to the integrity of 
the complaint procedure.97 In relation to the purpose of provisional measures this is the core 
common to all international and regional human rights systems. This again illustrates the interre-
lated nature of procedural and substantive aspects of the concept of provisional measures. 
4 CONCLUSION 
Under universal treaties provisional measures are normally reserved for the prevention of irrepa-
rable harm to persons. Such provisional measures are taken in a limited set of circumstances, 
mainly involving claims about the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment. This consti-
tutes the core common to provisional measures used by international adjudicators in human rights 
cases. Sometimes it concerns irreparable harm to the environment if this would result in irrepara-
ble harm to the cultural life or the psychological existence of an indigenous group (or of a perse-
cuted minority). Thus, presently provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons 
relate to ensuring survival of persons (and groups) and personal integrity.  
Adjudicators in human rights cases have taken most provisional measures in relation to the 
right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture. These fundamental rights are con-
sidered non-derogable in all treaties under examination exactly because their violation, even 
during a state of emergency, would defeat the whole purpose of the treaty. The exceptional nature 
of these non-derogable rights is also confirmed by the fact that their violation may constitute a 
crime against humanity. In that sense there is a hierarchy in international human rights law.98  
Even if the treaty in question does not explicitly provide for the use of provisional meas-
ures, the duty to protect against threats to life and personal integrity requires the State to take 
positive measures also pending international proceedings. The right to personal security, the right 
to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture imply positive obligations. In that light, 
rather than abstention alone, provisional measures should imply action as well. An obvious exam-
                                                 
96 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk) and Chapter XIII (Protection: prevention and reparation). 
97 In addition, as noted, preventing irreparable harm to the proceedings (the integrity of the 
complaint procedure) could be seen as a collateral purpose in death penalty and non-refoulement 
cases. The execution of a petitioner, for instance, pending the proceedings causes irreparable 
harm to the fairness of the proceedings before the adjudicator and, thereby, the integrity of the 
individual complaint procedure under the treaty in question.  
98 The HRC has noted that ‘while there is no hierarchy of importance of rights under the Covenant, 
the operation of certain rights may not be suspended, even in times of national emergency’. “This 
underlines the great importance of non-derogable rights”. General Comment 24 on reservations, 4 
November 1994, §10. In this context it refers to peremptory norms and to rules of customary 
international law in general. See also its General Comment 29 on states of emergency, 24 July 
2001. See in general about this issue Seiderman (2001). See also Simma (1995), p. 230.  
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ple is a provisional measure to prevent irreparable harm to persons by protecting them against 
death threats and harassment. 
Irreparable harm to persons refers not only to harm to physical integrity, but also to psycho-
logical and moral integrity, as long as the adjudicator would be likely to find a violation on the 
merits of the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture. Moreover, as noted, the risk of irreparable 
harm may vary depending on the vulnerability of the persons involved. It is submitted that the few 
provisional measures that have been taken to ensure access to court and counsel are equally justi-
fied because in the context in which they were used these rights were accessory to the protection 
against ill treatment and torture and against threats to life.99 
The example of the Inter-American Commission and Court to protect alleged victims, wit-
nesses and other persons against death threats has been followed by most other adjudicators. 
While these have not yet built an extensive practice in this regard, their decision to intervene in 
these circumstances may be explained by the importance attached in all human rights systems to 
preventing irreparable harm to life and physical integrity.100 At some point it may be expected 
that the ECtHR will use provisional measures in situations of death threats and harassment more 
robustly as well.  
The right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment clearly necessitate the use 
of provisional measures because violations result in irreparable harm to persons threatening their 
very existence. Yet there are situations not involving the right to life and the prohibition of cruel 
treatment and torture in which human rights adjudicators have used provisional measures that 
have by now become part of the common core. Adjudicators have considered using provisional 
measures not only in the face of threats to personal integrity and life, but in the face of threats to 
the cultural survival of an indigenous people as well. This may be explained by the special posi-
tion of indigenous peoples and other minorities in a particularly vulnerable position. After all, an 
appropriate obligation on the merits or form of reparation for violations of the right to culture and 
religion should take into account cultural integrity and survival. Financial compensation alone 
would not constitute meaningful redress because the very existence as a people may be at stake. 
Pending the proceedings provisional measures could prevent such irreparable harm, but at present 
their use to protect collective rights has been limited to protecting indigenous culture.101 
Irreparable harm results from the violation of rights crucial to a person’s or a group’s basic 
existence or crucial to a person’s dignity.102 In some contexts provisional measures may assist in 
alleviating the situation even of potentially large groups of people. Combined with pervasive 
discrimination, mass expulsion or internal displacement may indeed be so serious as to constitute 
not just undue hardship, but irreparable harm to the very existence of people. Such harm must be 
prevented rather than only redressed following the mass expulsion or displacement. Mass expul-
sion (and internal displacement) must be prevented exactly because the causes may be endemic 
(e.g. based on religious or ethnic grounds) and the consequences may have extremely long-term 
effects for a large group of people. The protection against forced displacement ‘by expulsion or 
other coercive means from the area in which the persons concerned are lawfully present’ is an-
other norm recognised by the HRC for its fundamental nature.103 The use of provisional measures 
to prevent or halt such violations could be warranted although at the same time international 
                                                 
99 See Chapter VIII (Procedure). 
100 See Chapter IX (Threats). 
101 See Chapter X (Culture). 
102 Of course the terms ‘basic existence’ and dignity as used here, are themselves open to 
interpretation and one may wonder what aspects of the right to ‘live’ are included, apart from the 
right to ‘life’ per se. This includes the very initial discussion in the Inter-American system on the 
concept of ‘project of life’, see Chapter XII (Other situations), section 2.1. 
103 See Chapter XI (Mass expulsion). 
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adjudicators may not be able to collect enough information to assist the potential beneficiaries 
with provisional measures that are sufficiently focused.  
It is argued that particularly in systems not providing for them in the text of the constitutive 
document, provisional measures should remain exceptional.104 If the authority of human rights 
adjudicators to use provisional measures is not based on the constituent document but derived 
from their function (and based on the rules of procedure),105 the importance of preventing irrepa-
rable harm requires that they are limited to situations threatening the very existence of persons. 
They should not be used to prevent human rights violations that ‘simply’ cause undue hardship 
rather than irreparable harm. This is not because this would not be possible conceptually, but 
because it risks devaluating the system, especially if used abruptly and without sufficient explana-
tion and discussion. 
Still the rule that provisional measures are only to be used to prevent irreparable harm to 
persons should be applied with a certain measure of flexibility, taking into account, for instance, 
the developmental rights of children and their ensuing special right for protection. If the benefici-
ary is a young child one might indeed speak of prevention of irreparable harm to persons in some 
cases that would otherwise cause undue hardship short of irreparable harm.106 
In any case in order for provisional measures to remain exceptional any expansion of their 
use should only involve other rights essential for the very existence of persons and indigenous 
peoples. As noted, these rights may coincide with rights recognised for their particular fundamen-
tal nature within the treaty. 
When provisional measures presently belong to the common core the adjudicator may be 
expected to use them, whether the system is regional or international, and whether it is based on 
an explicit treaty provision on provisional measures or not. On the other hand, when provisional 
measure do not belong to the common core adjudicators could still decide to take them, so long as 
their aim and the protection required are not beyond the outer limits of the concept. Whether such 
use of provisional measures is advisable would depend on the context. One relevant factor is the 
international, regional or ‘constitutional’ nature of the complaint system. Regional systems with a 
monitoring presence or at least the capacity of making country visits and organising hearings are 
likely to have a better chance to collect sufficient information and focus the provisional measures 
on the specific needs. This applies even more to the provisional measures of more ‘constitutional’ 
or hybrid adjudicators, such as the Bosnia Chamber. Another relevant factor is whether the adju-
dicator was introduced in order to deal with a range of rights (HRC, CIDH, IACHR, EComHR, 
ECtHR, Bosnia Chamber) or with one issue in particular (CAT, CEDAW, CERD).107 In general, a 
useful approach for all adjudicators would be to expand their use of provisional measures, as 
much as possible, on an incremental basis connected to pre-existing notions and practices.  
 
 
                                                 
104 For a different approach, see e.g. Haeck/Burbano Herrera/Zwaak (2003), pp. 60-61. 
105 See further Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
106 See also Chapter XII (Other situations). 
107 See also Chapter II (Systems). 
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 INTRODUCTION 
Part III examines the consequences that flow from the conclusions drawn in Part II on the com-
mon core and outer limits of provisional measures in relation to their purpose. In other words, has 
the irreparable nature of the harm risked to persons, involving their very existence and personal 
integrity, had an impact on the approach by the adjudicators with regard to other aspects of the 
concept of provisional measures?  
Chapter XIV deals with the relationship of provisional measures in human rights adjudica-
tion with jurisdiction and admissibility on the merits. Chapter XV examines the issue of immedi-
acy or temporal urgency on the one hand and risk or material urgency on the other. Chapter XVI 
is devoted to the legal status of provisional measures.  
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 CHAPTER XIV 
 JURISDICTION AND 
 ADMISSIBILITY 
1 INTRODUCTION 
There has only been one case in which the ICJ used provisional measures because it considered it 
had prima facie jurisdiction on the merits, but in which it subsequently determined – during the 
stage of preliminary objections – that it lacked such jurisdiction.1 In the practice of the human 
rights adjudicators provisional measures have been used more often in cases later declared inad-
missible. It appears that the adjudicators have taken a more flexible approach, taking into account 
the irreparable nature of the harm faced by the petitioners and the inequality between the parties. 
There are even cases in which the HRC has maintained provisional measures beyond declaration 
of inadmissibility. The IACHR, moreover, has used them after having made a finding on the 
merits and reparation.  
This chapter discusses the relevance of the criteria for admissibility and jurisdiction on the 
merits for the decisions of the respective human rights adjudicators on provisional measures.2  
The adjudicator clearly has no competence to use provisional measures if the Addressee 
State has not ratified the individual complaint procedure, because in such cases the adjudicator 
clearly has no jurisdiction. Yet other questions are not that easily answered. What, for instance, is 
the role of reservations to the individual complaint procedure, or of reservations to the rights on 
which the request for provisional measures is based? In the context of provisional measures, have 
human rights adjudicators treated reservations to their jurisdiction on the merits the same way as 
the ICJ has? 
While admissibility and jurisdiction are two distinct concepts, inadmissibility is one factor 
depriving the adjudicator of jurisdiction to deal with a case. In human rights cases the issue of 
prima facie admissibility of the claim is important, including the relationship between the obliga-
tion to exhaust domestic remedies and their suspensive effect. Human rights adjudicators have 
often declared inadmissible cases in which they previously used provisional measures. The ques-
tion arises what is the relationship between provisional measures and inadmissibility in these 
cases. At the same time decisions by adjudicators declaring claims admissible or inadmissible do 
not provide many clues about their approach to expected (lack of) jurisdiction or (in)admissibility 
and the use of provisional measures. In addition, to fully understand the approach of the adjudica-
tors it would be necessary to have a record of cases in which they refused to use provisional 
measures. Such information, however, is not available. Nevertheless, an attempt is made to derive 
information from the admissibility decisions in cases in which adjudicators have used provisional 
measures. The practice of the HRC serves as a point of departure.  
First this chapter refers to jurisdiction and provisional measures, with a focus on the signifi-
cance of reservations for the use of provisional measures and on the use of provisional measures 
beyond inadmissibility or beyond judgments on the merits or reparation (section 2). Following 
                                                 
1 ICJ Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Order of 5 July 1951. See also Chapter I.  
2 This relates to admissibility of the case in order to be able to deal with it on the merits, as distinct 
from the admissibility of the petitioner’s provisional measures request itself. Chapter II referred 
to the competence of the respective human rights adjudicators to use provisional measures. 
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this, it refers to admissibility and provisional measures, focussing on the issue of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies (section 3). 
2 JURISDICTION AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
2.1 Introduction 
When dealing with requests for provisional measures in cases where the State contests the adjudi-
cator’s jurisdiction to deal with the case on the merits, the irreparable nature of the harm faced by 
the petitioners should be taken into account. 
Indeed the human rights adjudicators appear to have done so. This is most clearly the case 
with the Inter-American Court in its practice of ordering provisional measures to protect against 
death threats. In the Peace Community case, for instance, the Court simply referred to the fact that 
Colombia is a State Party and has recognised the competence of the Court. Following this, it 
reproduced the texts of Article 63(2) ACHR and Article 25(1) Rules of Procedure, both on the 
competence to order provisional measures.3 While the Court did not specify why this meant that it 
need to examine jurisdiction on the merits, in their concurring opinion judges Abreu Burelli and 
García Ramírez noted that the text of the Convention itself, in Article 63(2) ACHR, justified the 
Court’s anticipation of its normal jurisdiction, at the request of the Commission, in order to pro-
vide adequate and immediate protection (‘amparo’) to persons. In this light they noted that the 
Convention only requires fulfilment of certain objective conditions for the adoption of provisional 
measures: one being extreme gravity and urgency because of possible harm to fundamental rights 
and the other the imminence of such harm. Article 63(2) does not have other requirements that 
could delay or impede the Court’s decision to take such measures and, thereby, put at grave risk 
the human rights it aims to protect.4 
In some cases other adjudicators also appear to have taken into account the irreparable na-
ture of the harm faced by the petitioners. Before determining whether it had jurisdiction on the 
merits (ratione temporis), for instance, the Bosnia Chamber used provisional measures not to 
interfere with any burials in the Muslim Town Cemetery of Prnjavor carried out by or with the 
authority of the Islamic Community.5  
This section deals with some other cases involving provisional measures and contested ju-
risdiction, in particular involving doubts with regard to the addressee of the provisional measures, 
                                                 
3 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Orders of 24 November 
2000 and 18 June 2002.  
4 IACHR Concurring Opinion of Judges Abreu Burelli and García Ramírez, Peace Community of 
San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Orders for provisional measures, 24 November 2000, §2.  
5 The Chamber subsequently discussed whether it had jurisdiction ratione temporis to examine the 
complaint about discrimination in the enjoyment of the freedom of religion. The domestic 
ordinance providing for the closure of the Cemetery was taken prior to entry into force of the 
Framework Agreement, which does not have retroactive effect. Nevertheless, in this case the 
ordinance formed the legal basis for the decision prohibiting the burial that was taken after the 
entry into force of the Agreement. This decision affected the members of the Islamic Community 
in Prnjavor because it gave rise to a continuing prohibition to bury their dead in the Cemetery. 
The Chamber noted that ‘in considering whether the decisions affecting the applicant were 
discriminatory’ it was relevant to consider the ordinance providing for the closure of the Muslim 
Town Cemetery as well. Bosnia Chamber The Islamic Community in Bosnia and Herzegovina v. 
Republika Srpska, 11 January 2000 (adm. & merits). 
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including the issue of extraterritoriality, reservations, and the use of provisional measures beyond 
inadmissibility or beyond judgments on the merits and reparation. 
Most discussion involves the jurisdiction of adjudicators to deal with cases in the face of 
reservations made by States to substantive or procedural treaty obligations.  
2.2 Addressees and extraterritoriality 
As in the aforementioned case involving interference with burials, in an elections case the Bosnia 
Chamber also ordered provisional measures in a borderline case of prima facie lack of jurisdic-
tion. Yet while this was a serious case, it did not involve irreparable harm to persons in the sense 
of (cultural) survival. In March 1998 the President of the Chamber ordered the State BiH and 
Republika Srpska to secure the ballot papers for the 1997 Elections to the National Assembly of 
the Republika Srpska.6 She also directed the Registrar of the Chamber to transmit copies of the 
decision to the Office of the High Representative and the Organisation of Security and Co-
operation in Europe (OSCE). In fact the OSCE seemed to be the true addressee of the provisional 
measures and the case was later declared inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction ratione personae.7 
When the addressee of an order for provisional measures clearly is not a party to the treaty in-
                                                 
6 These were specified as those ballot papers received in Vienna before 5 December 1997, but 
posted after 24 November 1997. 
7 The complaint related to the fact that the votes of the petitioners were not counted as valid ‘due to 
the failure of the procedures adopted by the OSCE in relation to the administration of out-of-
country voting’ of the Provisional Election Commission (the “PEC”). This Commission was 
established under Article III of Annex 3 to the General Framework Agreement. Previously the 
Ombudsperson had indicated to the respondent parties that it was desirable to ensure that these 
ballots were safeguarded. She had done so on 11 December 1997, under Rule 16 of her Rules of 
Procedure. Later she adopted a report concluding that there had been a violation of Art. 3 of 
Protocol 1 ECHR and that the respondent Parties ‘although not directly involved in the 
organisation of the elections at issue … (were) responsible therefor [sic] under Annex 3 to the 
(General Framework Agreement)’. The fact that the Chamber did use provisional measures may 
indicate that at the stage of provisional measures it does not closely examine its jurisdiction on 
the merits. In its subsequent decision on admissibility the Chamber stated at the outset that ‘any 
actions taken by the OSCE are, as such, outside the competence of the Chamber ratione 
personae’, §36. It then examined whether this applied as well to its actions ‘in pursuance of its 
role under Annex 3’, §36. It pointed out that the actions of neither the High Representative nor 
the International Police Task Force were subject to any review with regard to how they carried 
out their functions under the General Framework Agreement. Equally, ‘the nature of the 
functions carried out by the OSCE under Annex 3, which in substance is the management of 
elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina is not such as to be subject to review, except as specifically 
provided for in Annex 3’, §41. The Agreement did ‘not provide for the intervention of either 
respondent Party in the conduct of the elections’. The Chamber found that a breach of the rights 
of the petitioners under Article 3 of Protocol 1 ECHR (free elections) may have occurred but that 
‘the impugned acts to not come within the responsibility of the respondent Parties’ and were 
outside the competence of the Chamber. It declared the petition inadmissible and considered that 
the order for provisional measures was no longer appropriate and should be withdrawn. Bosnia 
Chamber Adnan Suljanović, Edita Čišić and Asim Lelić v. State BiH and Republika Srpska, 14 
May 1998, (inadm.). See also Bosnia Chamber Srpska Radikalna Stranka v. State BiH, 8 
December 2000 (inadm.), §§12-13 (provisional measures refused, §6). 
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voked, ordering provisional measures would be inappropriate.8 Yet when there are doubts as to 
state responsibility, jurisdiction ratione personae and loci, it would indeed be appropriate to order 
provisional measures, taking the risk of a later finding of a lack of jurisdiction rather than that of 
irreparable harm to persons.  
On occasion issues regarding the jurisdiction of States to deal with cases involving actions 
of their agents extraterritorially have come up at the stage of provisional measures. Given the 
range of counter-terrorism measures applied worldwide, the number of requests for provisional 
measures in this context is likely to increase.  
In the range of precautionary measures taken by the Inter-American Commission on behalf 
of the persons detained by the US at Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), the Commission was able to refer 
to its previous case law on the merits regarding the extraterritorial application of the human rights 
obligations under the American Declaration, as part of the OAS Charter, and under the ACHR.9 
The main criterion is that the detainees are under the ‘authority and control’ of US agents.10 The 
Inter-American Commission was not alone in taking this approach on the merits. The HRC has 
emphasized the responsibility of States for actions of their agents outside of their borders since 
the early 1980s.11 The ICJ has confirmed this case law.12 
In its General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR, dating from 2003, the HRC takes a rather ex-
tensive approach to extraterritorial application. After confirming that Article 2(1) ICCPR requires 
a State party to respect and ensure the rights laid down in the ICCPR ‘to anyone within the power 
or effective control of that State Party, even if not situated within the territory of the State Party’, 
it stated: 
“This principle also applies to those within the power or effective control of the forces of a State 
Party acting outside its territory, regardless of the circumstances in which such power or 
                                                 
8 See e.g. the requests for provisional measures denied by the Bosnia Chamber in Čavić v. B&H, 
18 December 1998 (inadm.), §13 (the request for provisional measures by the petitioner 
concerned invalidation of the decision by the High Representative in B&H, Carlos Westendorp, 
based on the Dayton Peace Agreement and various UN Security Council resolutions, to remove 
the petitioner as a member of the newly elected National Assembly of the Republika Srpska and 
barring him indefinitely from holding further official positions in B&H; the case was 
subsequently declared inadmissible for lack of jurisdiction ratione personae); see also Bosnia 
Chamber Municipal Council of the Municipality South-West Mostar v. the High Representative, 9 
March 2000 (inadm.), §§5-6 (the petitioner had requested the Chamber to order a provisional 
measure annulling the decision of the Acting Head of a regional office of the High Representative 
to instantly replace the Head of a Housing Commission (and subsequently the Head of the 
Municipality itself for failure to carry out this order) for obstructing the return of displaced 
persons; this case was subsequently decaled inadmissible for obvious lack of jurisdiction ratione 
personae). 
9 CIDH Detainees at Guantanamo Bay, precautionary measures of 12 March and 23 July 2002; 18 
March 2003; 29 July 2004 and 28 October 2005. 
10 See e.g., CIDH Coard et al. v. US, 29 September 1999. See further Medina Quiroga (2005), pp. 
12-14. 
11 HRC López Burgos v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981 and Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, 29 July 
1981. 
12 See ICJ Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory 
(Advisory Opinion), 9 July 2004, holding that the ICCPR is applicable in respect of ‘acts done’ 
by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own territory, §§107-113 and Armed 
Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), judgment of 19 December 2005, 
§§178-180 and 216-217.  
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effective control was obtained, such as forces constituting a national contingent of a State Party 
assigned to an international peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operation”.13 
This extensive approach on the merits may mean that the Committee is willing to order provi-
sional measures with regard to any situation claimed to involve such power and control. 
As suggested by Scheinin ‘the correct approach in the ICCPR is based on the universal na-
ture of human rights, irrespective of whether the country where the alleged extraterritorial viola-
tions occur is a party to the ICCPR’.14 Indeed in 2004 the ICJ also considered that the ICCPR was 
‘applicable in respect of acts done by a State in the exercise of its jurisdiction outside its own 
territory’.15 It referred to the object and purpose of the ICCPR, the constant practice of the HRC 
(invoking its case law and quoting from its Concluding Observations) and the travaux of the 
ICCPR.16 
The European Court takes a more cautious approach. Its initial case law17 appeared similar 
to that of the Inter-American Commission and the HRC, but then, in Bankovic, it introduced the 
controversial concept of the ‘espace juridique’ of the ECHR.18 In effect this resulted in excluding 
from monitoring by the ECtHR any action by agents from European States undertaken outside the 
territory of States making up the Council of Europe. Nevertheless, subsequent cases appear to 
argue away this concept.19 In November 2004, for instance, the Court published its judgment in 
Issa v. Turkey (2004), in which it considered that Turkey could be answerable under the Conven-
tion for its actions in Iraq, despite Bankovic.20  
                                                 
13 HRC General Comment 31 on Article 2 ICCPR, the nature of the general legal obligation 
imposed on States parties to the Covenant, 21 April 2004, §10. See also HRC Concluding 
Observations to US report, CCPR/C/USA/CO/3, 15 September 2006 and CAT Concluding 
Observations to US report, CAT/C/USA/CO/2, 25 July 2006. 
14 Scheinin (2004b), p. 77. 
15 ICJ Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, 
Advisory Opinion of 9 July 2004, §111. 
16 Id., §§109-110. See also ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), 
judgment of 19 December 2005, §§179-180 and ICJ Case concerning the application of the 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. 
Russia), Order for provisional measures of 15 October 2008, §109. Article 2 ICAT refers to the 
responsibility of a State ‘in any territory under its jurisdiction’. Article 3 of the Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance stipulates that ‘each State shall take 
effective legislative, administrative, judicial or other measures to prevent and terminate acts of 
enforced disappearance in any territory under its jurisdiction’. The UN Working Group on 
Enforced Disappearances has emphasized that this provision calls for action by States ‘in any 
territory’ under their jurisdiction. E/CN.4/1995/38, 15 January 1996, §49. 
17 ECtHR Cyprus v. Turkey, 10 May 2001 and Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 March 1995. 
18 ECtHR Bankovic et al v. Belgium and 16 other States, 12 December 2001 (inadm.). For a 
criticism see e.g. Lawson (2004), pp. 83-123. For a different perspective see O’Boyle (2004), pp. 
125-139 and Caflisch/Cançado Trindade (2004), p. 36. 
19 In fact the reason for declaring Bankovic inadmissible may have been more the factual situation 
of high altitude bombing rather than the fact that Serbia was not within the ‘legal space’ of the 
Convention.  
20 ECtHR Issa v. Turkey, 16 November 2004; see also, e.g., Ilaşcu and Others v. Moldova and 
Russia, 8 July 2004. It turns out that, after all, in light of the criterion of effective control the 
Court finds important the type of action (e.g. high altitude bombing does not bring the victims 
‘within the jurisdiction’, as opposed to arresting or detaining a person). See e.g. Őcalan v. 
Turkey, 12 May 2005; see also Pad et al. v. Turkey, 28 June 2007 (inadm. for non exhaustion) 
(“Accordingly, a State may be held accountable for violations of the Convention rights and 
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At the time when lawyers requested the Court to order provisional measures on behalf of 
Saddam Hussein, however, the Court had not yet decided these cases. In June 2004 lawyers acting 
on behalf of Saddam Hussein asked the ECtHR ‘to permanently prohibit the United Kingdom 
from facilitating, allowing for, acquiescing in, or in any other form whatsoever effectively par-
ticipating, through an act or omission, in the transfer of the applicant to the custody of the Iraqi 
Interim Government unless and until the Iraqi Interim Government has provided adequate assur-
ances that the applicant will not be subject to the death penalty’.21 They relied on Articles 2 and 3 
ECHR and on Protocols 6 (abolition in times of peace) and 13 (abolition in all circumstances) to 
the Convention, arguing that the UK ‘has an obligation to ensure individuals are not subject to the 
death penalty and therefore not to surrender legal or physical custody of individuals to a country 
or jurisdiction where they would face such consequences and other breaches of the Convention’. 
The ECtHR decided not to grant this request.22 Press agency Reuters, observing that the decision 
was not motivated,23 noted that a spokesperson for the Court had indicated to it that it only takes 
provisional measures if it is convinced that there is a risk of physical harm that is very important, 
irreversible and imminent.24 Obviously in earlier cases the Court already considered the death 
penalty to involve both important and irreversible harm. Thus it is unclear in this case what was 
the exact reason for the European Court not to order provisional measures.25 The fact that it de-
nied the request could be attributed to the fact that, five months before its decision in Issa, it still 
considered that Iraq was not within the ‘espace juridique’ of the ECHR and therefore prima facie 
it had no jurisdiction to order provisional measures. In 2006 it declared the Hussein case inadmis-
sible, not based on an ‘espace juridique’ argument, but because it considered that the US and not 
the UK had control over Saddam Hussein for the purpose of handing him over.26  
The later case of Behrami and Behrami v. France (2007) was not declared inadmissible 
based on an ‘espace juridique’ argument either. The Court did exclude actions undertaken extra-
territorially as part of a collective action and authorized under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
                                                                                                                       
freedoms of persons who are in the territory of another State which does not necessarily fall 
within the legal space of the Contracting States, but who are found to be under the former State’s 
authority and control through its agents operating – whether lawfully or unlawfully – in the latter 
State”, §53) and Isaak et al. v. Turkey, 28 September 2006 (adm.) (‘even if the acts complained 
of took place in the neutral UN buffer zone, the Court considers that the deceased was under the 
authority and/or effective control of the respondent State through its agents’, §2(b) (ii), also 
confirming the HRC and CIDH case law under 2(b) (1), General principles). On Issa see also e.g. 
Leach (2005) and Mole (2005). 
21 ECtHR Press Release 337, ‘European Court of Human Rights rejects requests for interim 
measures by Saddam Hussein’, 30 June 2004.  
22 Ibid. 
23 See also Chapter II, section 8.3. 
24 See Reuters, ‘Conseil de l’Europe: pas de “mesures provisoires” pour Saddam Hussein’, 30 June 
2004 (‘n’impose à un État des «mesures provisoires», en vertu de l’article 39 de son règlement, 
que lorsqu’elle est «convaincu qu’il y a un risque de préjudice physique très important, 
irrémédiable et imminent»’), posted on <www.peinedemort.org> (accessed on 13 August 2004). 
25 See also Chapter V (Expulsion), speculating on the possibility that the ECtHR wrongly assumed 
that the moratorium on the death penalty would not be lifted. In that respect the Court could have 
considered that Hussein was not facing irreversible harm (at least not imminently). In fact the 
moratorium was lifted, and Saddam Hussein was sentenced to death and executed. Political 
reasons may have played some role as well, because of the person involved, or for policy reasons, 
fearing a flood of new submissions regarding extraordinary renditions, although the latter seems 
too cynical, despite the heavy case load the Court is dealing with. 
26 ECtHR Saddam Hussein v. Albania, UK et al., 14 March 2006 (inadm.). 
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reminding States of the best way to act extraterritorially without effective monitoring by the 
European Court.27 
As noted in Chapter V,28 the ECtHR has now used provisional measures vis-à-vis a State 
operating outside the Council of Europe, e.g. to halt transfer of detainees by UK authorities in 
Iraq to the Iraqi authorities.29  
In the face of a practice, developed by several States after the September 11th 2001 terrorist 
attacks, of making use of so-called extraordinary renditions, and the factual activities of States 
outside their own borders, for instance in the context of international organisations, a more coher-
ent approach by the ECtHR towards extraterritorial application of the ECHR to the acts of Coun-
cil of Europe member States, taking into account relevant case law developed by other interna-
tional adjudicators, is indeed particularly warranted.30 This may also be helpful in the Court’s 
treatment of requests for provisional measures ordering States to act or refrain from acting outside 
their borders and in addressing misunderstandings by domestic courts in this respect.31  
                                                 
27 ECtHR Behrami and Behrami v. France, 2 May 2007. Children were playing outside when a 
cluster bomb detonated that had been dropped by NATO during the Kosovo war, leaving one 
child dead and another crippled. Their family complained against France, whose local KFOR 
troops were aware of the cluster bombs, but had not marked the area. The ECtHR declared the 
case inadmissible. The international presence mandated by a binding UN Security Council 
decision has effective control over Kosovo. The UN had ‘ultimate authority and control’ over 
KFOR even though NATO had operational control and in fact the Troop Contributing Nations 
had a great level of autonomy. The ECtHR did not explain why it did not use the criterion of 
‘effective control’ in Article 5 of the 2004 ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of 
International Organisations, but instead introduced a criterion of ‘ultimate’ authority and control. 
In any case it found that the Convention could not be interpreted in a manner that would subject 
the acts and omissions of Contracting Parties to the scrutiny of the Court in this case because that 
could interfere with the fulfillment of the UN’s key mission to secure international peace and 
security. Operations under Chapter VII UN Charter were fundamental to this mission and they 
relied for their effectiveness on support from member States. For a discussion of this case, see 
e.g. Bulterman (2007) and Lawson (2008). Distinguishing this case from the situation in Iraq, see 
e.g. House of Lords R (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 12 December 2007, [2007] 
UKHL 58. 
28 See Chapter V (Non-refoulement), section 3.4. 
29 Provisional measures in case of Faisal al-Saadoon and Khalef Mufdhi v. UK, 30 December 2008 
(by the Acting President of the Fourth Section). A scan of the ECtHR letter to counsel confirming 
its use of provisional measures was posted at <http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2009/ 
01/uk-breaches-provisional-measures.html>; the measure was ignored by the UK in reference to 
a decision of a domestic court. See further Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
30 For an excellent analysis see further Gondek (2005), pp. 349-387 as well as Cerone (2006) and 
Cerna (2006). For a discussion of extraterritorial application of various human rights treaties see 
Coomans/Kamminga (2004). 
31 See e.g. the UK Court of Appeal decision in the above Faisal al-Saadoon and Khalef Mufdhi v. 
UK case: R (Al-Saadoon) v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2009] EWCA Civ 7, appeal 
dismissed on 30 December 2008, motivated and published on 21 January 2009, 
<http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2009/7.html>. 
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2.3 Reservations and denunciation and provisional measures halting 
executions 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Both the HRC and the Inter-American Court have had to deal with the withdrawal of Trinidad and 
Tobago from the OP and the ACHR, respectively. This triggered issues relating to the 
compatibility of reservations, the jurisdiction of the adjudicators ratione temporis and the 
question whether a case that was pending before the Inter-American Commission could already 
be registered (and provisional measures be granted) by the HRC.32 This section deals with the 
case law developed by the HRC and the Inter-American Court in this respect. Their approach is 
set off against that of the ICJ. 
2.3.2 HRC 
In Bethel v. Trinidad and Tobago (1999)33 the petitioner had petitioned the Inter-American 
Commission, ‘in accordance with the guidelines issued by the State party in October 1997, which 
set out a strict timetable to be adhered to by applicants’. The petitioner had instructed his counsel 
to submit the case to the HRC as well, in case his petition to the IACHR would be unsuccessful. 
In May 1998, however, Trinidad denounced the OP. It re-acceded with the following reservation: 
“The Human Rights Committee shall not be competent to receive and consider any 
communications relating to any prisoner who is under sentence of death in respect of any matter 
relating to his prosecution, his detention, his trial, his conviction, his sentence or the carrying 
out of the death sentence on him and any matter connected herewith”.34 
Trinidad issued new ‘instructions’ as well about the time periods that should apply to petitions in 
relation to prisoners sentenced to death between the date of denunciation (26 May 1998) and the 
date on which the denunciation would become effective (26 August 1998). Counsel considered 
that the petitioner would not be able to present a communication to the HRC after 26 August 1998 
when the State’s re-accession to the OP would become effective with a reservation excluding 
death row inmates from the right of petition. By the time the Inter-American Commission would 
adopt its decision the denunciation of the OP by Trinidad and Tobago would have become effec-
tive.35 Yet the petitioner had had a reasonable expectation to pursue his right of access to the HRC 
since October 1997. He claimed that the State party’s denunciation constituted a breach of Article 
1 OP and Article 26 ICCPR. At the same time he requested the HRC to already register the case 
in order to guarantee his right to petition if his application to the Inter-American Commission 
would be rejected.  
According to the State party the petitioner had the choice between submitting an application 
to the IACHR or to the HRC. It argued that splitting petitions between two human rights bodies 
was an abuse of the right of submission. It considered that the HRC ‘should not condone a situa-
                                                 
32 While the latter is an issue involving other grounds for inadmissibility (‘same matter’) discussed 
in section 3, it is so closely linked to the others that it is discussed here. 
33 HRC Christopher Bethel v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 March 1999. 
34 As reproduced in e.g. A/53/40, Chapter I and Christopher Bethel v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 
March 1999, §2.3. 
35 HRC Christopher Bethel v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 March 1999. 
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tion where a petitioner seeks to submit some complaints to the IACHR and reserves others for the 
Committee’.36  
Surprisingly, the HRC considered that the right of access to the HRC is not a right protected 
by the Covenant and declared the case inadmissible. This is puzzling since the HRC could have 
argued proprio motu that the reservation attached to the re-accession violated the object and 
purpose of the individual complaints procedure under the Optional Protocol and the object and 
purpose of the Covenant itself, including the principle of non-discrimination of Article 26.37  
In any case before declaring the case inadmissible the HRC had used provisional measures 
in Bethel. On this issue Pocar and Scheinin attached a concurring opinion. They considered that 
the HRC should have declared the case inadmissible not because the right of access to the HRC is 
not a right protected by the Covenant, but instead for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. They 
referred to the practice of upholding the request for provisional measures cases of non-exhaustion 
in light of the possibility of review. They noted that the Committee’s provisional measures should 
have been upheld and ‘the inadmissibility decision should have been made subject to a possibility 
of review when the obstacle for inadmissibility has been removed’.38 
They pointed out that the HRC had stated its position about the reservation in the Annual 
Report to the effect that it would ‘deal with the validity and legal effect of the reservation by 
Trinidad and Tobago in due course and in the concrete context of such individual cases related to 
the death penalty that have been submitted after 26 August 1998’.39 They emphasised that the 
reservation in question could ‘not be seen to bar, in abstracto, access by the author or any other 
prisoner under the sentence of death, to the Committee in its functions under the Optional Proto-
col’.40 
In their discussion in Bethel Scheinin and Pocar anticipated the Committee’s decision in 
Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago (2002).41 This decision is directly relevant to the question about 
the relationship between the general jurisdiction of the HRC to deal with complaints and its juris-
diction to take provisional measures.42 The Committee considered that the aforementioned reser-
                                                 
36 Id., §6.2. 
37 Later, in HRC Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago (2002), the HRC did so. HRC Rawle Kennedy v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002 (merits) and public admissibility decision of 2 November 
1999, see infra.  
38 Concurring opinion Pocar and Scheinin in HRC Christopher Bethel v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 
March 1999. “This course of action would have made it clear to the author, his counsel and the 
State party that the State party’s withdrawal and re-accession accompanied by reservation, of the 
Optional Protocol, dated 26 May 1998 and effective 26 August 1998, does not constitute an 
obstacle for the future consideration of the author’s case by the Committee”. 
39 Concurring opinion Pocar and Scheinin. In HRC Christopher Bethel v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 
March 1999. 
40 Ibid. This statement is also the only reference to the fact that the Special Rapporteur had used 
provisional measures earlier in the proceedings. In fact his counsel had requested this as part of 
the initial submission and the Rapporteur had transmitted the case and used provisional measures 
on 17 September 1998 (on file with the author). 
41 HRC Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002. 
42 Almost three months after the Committee’s provisional measures in this case the State replied, 
referring to the new reservation attached to its accession to the OP of 26 May 1998. It pointed out 
that the HRC was not competent to consider the petitioner’s communication and it considered 
that the HRC had ‘exceeded its jurisdiction by registering the communication and purporting to 
impose interim measures’. Thus, its ‘actions in respect of this communication were void and of 
no binding effect’, HRC Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002, §4.2. The 
petitioner referred to the general principle of international law that ‘the body to whose 
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vation to the OP could not be deemed compatible with the object and the purpose of the Protocol 
and declared the case admissible despite the fact that it was submitted after Trinidad’s denuncia-
tion became effective.43 Four members dissented because they considered that the communication 
was inadmissible.44 Nevertheless they did agree that it had been within the Committee’s compe-
                                                                                                                       
jurisdiction a purported reservation is addressed decides on the validity and effect of that 
reservation’, HRC Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002, §5. 
43 Because of the importance of the issue the HRC decided to make public this admissibility 
decision. HRC Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, admissibility decision of 2 November 
1999. One member, Henkin (US), attached a concurring opinion simply pointing out that he 
concurred with the result. 
44 The dissenters pointed out the difficulties for the State party, given constitutional restraints. Even 
if the HRC would later find no violation, they noted, the State party may be prevented from 
carrying out the sentence. It is not clear whether this remark applies only to those cases in which 
the HRC has taken provisional measures or whether they already anticipated the later decision, in 
HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) v. the Philippines, 19 
October 2000, that the fact itself that a case is pending before the HRC implies that the State must 
not execute the petitioner. See Chapter XVI on legal status. They also pointed out that if they had 
accepted the majority’s view that the reservation was invalid they ‘would have had to hold that 
Trinidad and Tobago is not a party to the Optional Protocol’. This would, they pointed out, 
equally make the communication inadmissible. Individual opinion Ando, Bhagwati, Klein and 
Kretzmer in HRC Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, admissibility decision of 2 November 
1999, §17. In an individual opinion attached to the final View Ando, Klein and Kretzmer referred 
to their dissenting opinion to the admissibility decision in this case: “Our view was not accepted 
by the Committee, which held that it was competent to consider the communication. We respect 
the Committee’s view as to its competence and so have joined in the consideration on the merits”. 
Individual opinion Ando, Klein and Kretzmer (this time not joined by Bhagwati), HRC Rawle 
Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002. In Xavier Evans v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 
March 2003, Wedgwood, who has been the US member of the HRC subsequent to Henkin’s 
retirement, attached an individual opinion in order to express her view about this issue. She 
dissented to the admissibility of this case, referring to the opinion of Ando, Klein and Kretzmer 
in Kennedy. Wedgwood also considered that ‘the failure of the State party to cooperate with the 
Committee in the examination of the merits in this case and in the earlier case of Kennedy v. 
Trinidad and Tobago may bear some relation to the disregard of this reservation’. While this may 
indeed partially explain the attitude of the State (although the State already failed to co-operate in 
many cases previous to the HRC decision in Kennedy), it seems that Wedgwood considers this 
attitude justified. The petitioner’s death sentence had been commuted in 1994, several years 
before his initial submission of 16 November 1999. According to Wedgwood this did ‘not 
evidently displace the effect of the reservation’. If one considers, like Wedgwood, that the HRC 
should respect State party reservations, even when contrary to object and purpose, it is still not 
evident that the reservation in question would apply to the petitioner. The reservation declared the 
HRC incompetent ‘to receive and consider communications relating to any prisoner who is under 
sentence of death in respect of any matter relating to his prosecution, his detention, his trial, his 
conviction, his sentence or the carrying out of the death sentence on him and any matter 
connected herewith’. This formulation included a large group of persons, but it did not say ‘any 
person who is or was under sentence of death’. After all, Evans was no longer under sentence of 
death when he submitted his complaint. The HRC had previously discussed the issue of 
reservations in a General Comment that had triggered criticism from a few States. HRC General 
Comment 24 on reservations to the ICCPR or the Optional Protocols, 4 November 1994. Clearly, 
under both customary international law and the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties States 
parties are entitled to make reservations, but only if they are not contrary to the object and 
purpose of the treaty in question. This, however, was not the dispute that arose following the 
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tence to register the communication and take provisional measures ‘so as to allow the Committee 
to consider whether the State party’s reservation to the Optional Protocol makes the communica-
tion inadmissible’.45 This, once more, underlines that all Committee members consider that there 
is no need to determine jurisdiction before using provisional measures.  
In R. S. v. Trinidad and Tobago (2002)46 the HRC confirmed its majority View in Kennedy 
that Trinidad’s reservation was incompatible with the objective of the OP and complaints by 
death row inmates were admissible. In other words it was not precluded from considering the 
case. Trinidad has now fully withdrawn from the OP,47 but in cases involving, for instance, Guy-
ana, which has attached the same reservation to its re-accession,48 or Tajikistan, a resumption of 
                                                                                                                       
issuance of the General Comment. Some States made objections relating to the question whether 
supervisory committees to human rights treaties may not only determine whether a reservation is 
contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty they supervise, but also the consequences of such 
a reservation, such as severability. ILC Rapporteur Pellet has also referred to this Comment as 
‘controversial’, Report of the International Law Commission on the work of its 48th session, 2 
May-26 July 1996, §116. See Observations by France, 4 International Human Rights Report 6 
(1997); Observations by the UK 3 International Human Rights Report 262 (2006); Observations 
by the US 3 International Human Rights Report 265 (2006). For an analysis of the discussion see 
e.g. Redgwell (1997), pp. 390-412; Goodman (2002), pp. 531-560; Higgins (2007), p. 747; 
Kamminga (2008), §3.2 and Ziemele (2004) and the contributions therein (see in particular 
Scheinin, pp. 41-58, also explaining, at pp. 50-51, why dissenting opinions generally are less 
complete in their argumentation than the HRC majority view or concurring opinions).  
45 HRC Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, admissibility decision of 2 November 1999, 
dissenting opinion by Ando (Japan), Bhagwati (India), Klein (Germany) and Kretzmer (Israel).  
46 HRC R. S. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2 April 2002. 
47 It withdrew on 27 March 2000. This became effective on 27 June 2000. 
48 Guyana denounced the OP on 5 January 1999 and re-acceded to it on the same date with a 
reservation related to the competence of the Committee to examine death penalty cases. This 
reservation became effective on 5 April 1999. Subsequent to this date the HRC used provisional 
measures several times in order to halt an execution. Yet in these cases the initial submission was 
made before the date on which the reservation became effective and rather than referring to the 
incompatibility of the reservation and its severability, the HRC simply noted that the initial 
submission predated this reservation. See e.g. Hazerat Hussain and Sumintra Singh v. Guyana, 
25 October 2005 (initial submission of 16 March 1999 and provisional measure of 22 April 
1999); Smartt v. Guyana, 6 July 2004 (initial submission on 28 March 1999; provisional measure 
on 28 April 1999); Deolall v. Guyana, 1 November 2004 (initial submission of 5 January 1999; 
provisional measures of 7 February 2000. In §4.5 the Committee explicitly discusses 
admissibility in this respect: “The Committee notes that the communication was submitted prior 
to Guyana's denunciation of the Optional Protocol on 5 January 1999 and its re-accession to it 
with a reservation related to the competence of the Committee to examine death penalty cases. It 
concludes therefore that its jurisdiction is not affected by this denunciation. The Committee can 
find no reasons to consider this communication inadmissible and proceeds to a consideration of 
the merits”); Lawrence Chan v. Guyana, 31 October 2005 (initial submission of 15 September 
1998; provisional measures of 7 February 2000; in her individual opinion Wedgwood considered 
that the HRC had ‘assumed in this matter that it is the date of an author's initial submission of a 
communication, rather than the date of its formal registration and transmission to the state party 
for reply, that is the decisive date for judging admissibility ratione temporis’. After referring to 
some previous case law she notes that ‘(t)hough this is a debatable conclusion, within reasonable 
limits, I am willing to accept the Committee's view’); See also Raymond Persaud and 
Rampersaud v. Guyana, 21 March 2006 (in this case the provisional measures were prior to the 
re-accession with reservation, on 9 April 1998; ‘On 16 or 17 July 1998, warrants of execution 
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the old practice of maintaining provisional measures in the face of non-exhaustion, as suggested 
by Pocar and Scheinin, would seem warranted.49 
2.3.3 IACHR 
As noted, Trinidad also withdrew from the ACHR. The Inter-American Court was faced with two 
issues, the incompatibility of this State’s previous reservations to the ACHR and the applicability 
of the Convention ratione temporis given the withdrawal. 
When this Court orders provisional measures, the State’s recognition of its jurisdiction is 
the first issue it deals with. The first Order of the Inter-American Court for provisional measures 
to halt an execution (June 1998) mentioned that Trinidad and Tobago had been a State Party to 
the ACHR since May 1991 and had accepted the Court’s jurisdiction. In addition it noted that this 
jurisdiction extended to the application of Article 63(2), the article on provisional measures. It 
pointed out that the Court’s jurisdiction as such was based on Article 62(3) ACHR, stipulating 
that it was empowered to hear ‘all cases concerning the interpretation and application’ of the 
provisions of the Convention.50 In its subsequent provisional measures the Court continued to 
refer to the fact that Trinidad had been a State Party from 28 May 1998 until 26 May 1999.51  
Particularly interesting is its decision to order provisional measures requested after Trini-
dad’s denunciation of the Convention became effective. It argued that the denunciation did not 
release the State from its obligations with respect to acts occurring prior to the effective date of 
denunciation. It pointed this out not only in its decision on preliminary objections,52 but also in its 
provisional measures. In an Order for provisional measures issued the day before the denunciation 
became effective the Court stated that ‘pursuant to Article 78(2) of the American Convention, the 
denunciation does not have the effect of releasing the State from its obligations with respect to 
acts occurring prior to the effective date of denunciation which may constitute a violation of the 
said Convention’.53 
                                                                                                                       
were mistakenly issued and read to the authors, because the Office of the President had not been 
notified that interim measures had been granted by the Committee. The warrants were withdrawn 
and the authors subsequently received letters of apology for the mistake’ (§2.2)”. 
49 See also section 3.4 of this Chapter. 
50 IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel, Order of 14 June 1998, 1st ‘Considering’ clause. 
51 See IACHR James et al., Order for provisional measures, 26 November 2001. For other 
references to the fact that Trinidad had accepted the jurisdiction of the Court see e.g. 25 May 
1999, 27 May 1999 and 25 September 1999. Trinidad’s withdrawal of 26 May 1998 became 
effective on 26 May 1999. 
52 See the three IACHR Judgments of 1 September 2001 in the cases of Hilaire, Constantine and 
Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, as discussed infra. 
53 See e.g. IACHR James et al., Order of 27 May 1999, 3rd ‘Considering’ clause. Subsequently the 
Commission noted that it had received two additional petitions on the day before Trinidad’s 
denunciation would become effective. It requested the Court to include the petitioners as new 
beneficiaries in the James et al. Order. It argued that the State’s denunciation of the Convention 
‘should not be considered to affect the jurisdiction of either the Court or the Commission to 
entertain these matters’, §5e. The President and later the Court itself ordered their inclusion in the 
provisional measures, simply noting again that the denunciation did not release the State from its 
obligations with respect to acts that occurred prior to the effective date of denunciation. See 
IACHR James et al., Order of the President for urgent measures, 19 June 1999. The President 
subsequently amplified the provisional measures also with regard to five petitions the 
Commission received between November 2000 and April 2001, in other words after the 
denunciation became effective. In this case the Commission had argued as well that the State’s 
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The Court has clearly stated that Trinidad’s denunciation of the Convention ‘does not affect 
the jurisdiction of either the Court or the Commission to consider the alleged acts, occurring in 
whole or in part, before May 26, 1999, the day in which the State’s denunciation of the Conven-
tion entered into force’.54 This applied even though the petitions were received after that date.55 
Clearly, if the Court is still able to deal with the petition on the merits at a later stage there is no 
doubt either that it can order provisional measures in the meantime.  
An examination of Trinidad’s attitude may shed light on some of the Court’s criteria vis-à-
vis its jurisdiction but also on the State’s insistent strive to free itself from the Court’s supervi-
sion.56 In its follow-up reports Trinidad expressed jurisdictional objections against the Court’s 
Orders for provisional measures. These were the same objections subsequently expressed during 
the preliminary objections phase of the Hilaire, Constantine et al. and Benjamin et al. cases. It 
referred to its reservation to the ACHR with regard to its recognition of the Court’s compulsory 
jurisdiction under Article 62. According to this reservation its recognition was applicable ‘only to 
such extent’ that it was ‘consistent with the relevant sections of the Constitution of the Republic 
of Trinidad and Tobago; and provided that any judgment does not infringe, create or abolish any 
existing rights or duties of any private citizens’.57 
The State claimed that the provisional measures requested by the Commission concerned 
matters falling within its reservation. Thus, it did not recognise the Court’s jurisdiction and con-
sidered the Orders ‘ultra vires and void’.58 Evidently, the Court did not agree as it ratified the 
President’s Order. Apart from the linguistically puzzling matter how a judgment can create exist-
ing rights, the question arises whether Trinidad’s reservation to the provision on the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction is permissible in light of the Convention’s object and purpose. The Court 
did not discuss this issue in its Order for provisional measures but subsequently, in its Judgments 
on preliminary objections, it determined that the State’s declaration (that its recognition is only 
valid to the extent that it is consistent with the relevant sections of Trinidad’s Constitution) can 
lead to numerous interpretations but that it ‘cannot be given a scope that would impede this Tri-
bunal’s ability to judge whether the State had or had not violated a provision of the Convention’.59 
With regard to the second part of Trinidad’s ‘purported restriction’ aimed at limiting the Court’s 
compulsory jurisdiction to judgments that do not ‘infringe, create or abolish any existing rights or 
duties of any private citizen’ it pointed out that, while the precise meaning of this condition was 
unclear, without a doubt it could not be utilized for the purpose of suppressing ‘the jurisdiction of 
the Court to hear and decide an application related to an alleged violation of the State’s conven-
tional obligations’.60 
                                                                                                                       
denunciation ‘should not be considered to affect the jurisdiction of either the Court or the 
Commission to entertain these matters, for the events complained of in the petitions are alleged to 
have occurred in whole or in part prior to May 26, 1999’, IACHR James et al., Order of 26 
November 2001, ‘Having seen’ clause 4a. In reference to the Commission’s statements, the 
President confirmed that ‘pursuant to Article 78(2) of the American Convention, the denunciation 
does not have the effect of releasing the State from its obligations with respect to acts occurring, 
in whole or in part, prior to the effective date of denunciation, which may constitute a violation of 
the said Convention’. IACHR James et al., Order of 26 November 2001, 3rd ‘Considering’ clause. 
54 IACHR James et al., Order of 25 May 1999. 
55 IACHR James et al., Order of 26 November 2001. 
56 See generally on official State responses Chapter XVII. 
57 IACHR James et al., Order of 29 August 1998. See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
58 See IACHR James et al., Order of 25 May 1999 (submission of the State of 19 May 1999). 
59 IACHR Constantine et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 1 September 2001 (Preliminary Objections), 
§77. 
60 Id., §77. 
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According to Trinidad the Convention permits States to accept the Court’s jurisdiction un-
der Article 62 subject to restrictions. It considered that such restriction did not affect the enjoy-
ment of the rights in the Convention. Because its reservation did not deny the exercise of any of 
the rights in the ACHR, it could be considered compatible with its object and purpose. The State 
contended that ‘in accordance with universally recognized principles of International Law, the 
exercise of the jurisdiction by an international court with respect to a State is not a right but a 
privilege only exercisable with the express consent of the State’. In the event that the Court would 
nevertheless declare Trinidad reservation incompatible with the Convention’s object and purpose, 
Trinidad put forward, ‘the effect of such a determination would be to render the State’s declara-
tion accepting the Court’s compulsory jurisdiction null and void ab initio’.61 
“If the ‘reservations’ of the State were, for any reason, considered invalid, it would not mean 
that the State declared its unlimited acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. On 
the contrary, it is clear that the State never intended to accept, in its totality, the jurisdiction of 
the Court. If the ‘reservation’ is invalid, then the declaration was invalid, and the State never 
made a declaration”.62  
The Inter-American Commission, on the other hand, argued that the State’s reservation 
should be considered invalid because it was impossible to determine its exact nature and scope. It 
referred to the UN Human Rights Committee’s statement that reservations to human rights trea-
ties must be specific and transparent. The Commission pointed out that the reservation was not 
permitted because it was contrary to the Convention’s object and purpose as well as to general 
principles of international law. The State’s interpretation limited the ability of the Court to inter-
pret and apply the Convention in cases against Trinidad because it would only be able to apply the 
Convention rights ‘to the extent that such rights are protected in the State’s Constitution’.63 Thus, 
the State’s position ignored the fact that it was the responsibility of the Court and not of the State 
to determine whether domestic laws were consistent with the Convention. The State interpreted 
its declaration in such a way that the Court would be prevented from considering the specific 
aspects of the ‘mandatory death penalty’. Such interpretation ‘would effectively permit the State 
to violate the Convention with respect to the alleged victims in this case’, in contravention of 
Article 29(a) ACHR.64 The Commission underlined the importance of a purposive interpretation 
in human rights cases in which the human rights systems would be strengthened rather than 
weakened. In that light:  
“Severing the impugned term from the State’s declaration of acceptance, instead of annulling 
the declaration in toto, serves to guarantee the fundamental human rights of the alleged victims 
and those of individuals in similar situations who would not otherwise have effective domestic 
remedies of protection”.65 
                                                 
61 Id., §48. 
62 Id., §51. This statement obviously indicates the attitude of Trinidad and Tobago vis-à-vis the 
Court’s provisional measures in this case. See further on the attitudes of addressee States Chapter 
XVII. 
63 Id., §54. 
64 Id., §63. 
65 Id., §66. 
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It suggested that the Court could follow the reasoning of the ECtHR in Loizidou v. Turkey, ‘which 
declared that ratione loci restrictions could be severed from the declaration of acceptance leaving 
intact the acceptance of the optional clauses’.66 
One common feature in the approach of the human rights adjudicators to this issue is their 
emphasis on arguments about the object and purpose of human rights treaties as instruments of 
public order and collective enforcement. In Loizidou, for instance, the ECtHR stated that the 
European Convention is a constitutional instrument of the European public order.67 It noted that 
the Convention comprised ‘more than mere reciprocal engagements between contracting states. It 
creates over and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations, which, 
in the words of the Preamble (of the ECHR) benefit from a collective enforcement’.68 Equally, 
with regard to the ACHR the Inter-American Court has considered that recognition of its binding 
jurisdiction ‘is an ironclad clause to which there can be no limitations except those expressly 
provided for in Article 62(1) of the American Convention. Because the clause is so fundamental 
to the operation of the Convention’s system of protection, it cannot be at the mercy of limitations 
not already stipulated but invoked by States Parties for internal reasons’.69 
“The States Parties to the Convention must guarantee compliance with its provisions and its 
effects (effet utile) within their own domestic laws. This principle applies not only to the 
substantive provisions of human rights treaties (in other words, the clauses on the protected 
rights), but also to the procedural provisions, such as the one concerning recognition of the 
Tribunal’s contentious jurisdiction (footnote omitted). That clause, essential to the efficacy of 
the mechanism of international protection, must be interpreted and applied in such a way that 
the guarantee that it establishes is truly practical and effective, given the special nature of 
human rights treaties (..) and their collective enforcement”.70 
The case law of the human rights adjudicators appears to indicate that once a State has pre-
committed itself to human rights obligations and supervisory mechanisms, it cannot easily move 
backwards anymore. From the moment a State has accepted the Court's compulsory jurisdiction, 
this jurisdiction had become an intrinsic component of the guarantees available to individuals in 
that State.  
The Inter-American Court has pointed out, among others in Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and 
Tobago (2001), that the restrictions included in the instrument of acceptance, in the terms pro-
posed by the State, would lead to a situation where the Court would have the Inter-American 
Convention only as a subsidiary parameter of reference and the Constitution of the State as the 
first parameter. This would result in a fragmentation of the international legal order for the protec-
                                                 
66 Id., §68. 
67 ECtHR Loizidou v. Turkey, judgment of 23 March 1995. See also. e.g. Oellers-Frahm (2001b), 
pp. 82-83. 
68 ECtHR Ireland v. UK, judgment of 18 January 1978, §239. In general on the movement of the 
ECtHr towards an approach that is more conducive to an effective protection of human rights and 
the fact that this also applies to the analysis of the notion of jurisdiction, Cohen-Jonathan (2005c). 
69 IACHR Constitutional Court case (Peru) 24 September 1999 (Competence), §35; Ivcher 
Bronstein, Judgment of 24 September 1999 (Competence), §36; see also Blake v. Guatemala 
(Reparations), Judgment of 22 January 1999, Concurring Opinion of Judge A.A. Cançado 
Trindade, §§23 and 27-28. 
70 IACHR Constitutional Court case (Peru) 24 September 1999 (competence), §36. 
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tion of human rights and make illusory the object and purpose of the Convention.71 This was 
manifestly incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole.72  
It has noted that ‘as with any court or tribunal’ it has the inherent authority to determine the 
scope of its own competence. It emphasised that it ‘must give an interpretation to the declaration 
of the State, as a whole, that is in accordance with the canons and practice of International Law in 
general, and with International Human Rights Law specifically’.73 In this respect the balance 
should be tipped by the law awarding the greatest degree of protection to the human beings under 
its guardianship’.74 This prerogative it could not abdicate, ‘as it is a duty that the American Con-
vention imposes upon it, requiring it to exercise its functions in accordance with Article 62(3) 
thereof’.75 Like the HRC, the ECtHR and Inter-American Commission, it opted for a severability 
approach.76 
With regard to interpretation methods and its jurisdictional role the Inter-American Court 
has noted: 
“Interpreting the Convention in accordance with its object and purpose the Court must act in a 
manner that preserves the integrity of the mechanism provided for in Article 62(1) of the 
Convention. It would be unacceptable to subordinate said mechanism to restrictions that would 
render the system for protection of human rights established in the Convention, and, as a result, 
the Court’s jurisdictional role, inoperative”.77 
It also mentioned its earlier jurisprudence on the principle of effet utile that applied not only to the 
substantive provisions of human rights treaties but to their procedural provisions as well. In that 
light, the provision concerning recognition of the Court’s contentious jurisdiction, a provision 
‘essential to the efficacy of the mechanism of international protection’, was to be ‘interpreted and 
applied in such a way that the guarantee it establishes is truly practical and effective, given the 
special nature of human rights treaties and their collective enforcement’.78 
2.3.4 Distinguishing the ICJ approach to jurisdiction 
It is clear that allegations of lack of competence on the merits do play a role in the considerations 
of adjudicators faced with a request for provisional measures. At the same time it is noteworthy 
that in their determination of prima facie jurisdiction at the stage of provisional measures the 
human rights adjudicators have taken into account the irreparable harm faced by the petitioners. 
The HRC’s provisional measures in Kennedy (1999) provide a clear example. While some of the 
                                                 
71 IACHR Judgment of Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago (competence), 1 September 2001, 
§84. See also the cases Hilaire et al. and Constantine et al. of the same date. 
72 Id., §79. 
73 IACHR Constantine et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 1 September 2001 (Preliminary Objections), 
§70. 
74 Id., §70. 
75 Id., §71. 
76 See also, e.g., IACHR Caesar v. Trinidad & Tobago, 11 March 2005, Concurring Opinion of 
Judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, §§21-46, with a literature overview with regard to reservations 
and stressing the convergence of approaches by the supervisory bodies on the one hand, and the 
fragmentation resulting from the traditional approach based on the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, on the other. 
77 Id., §73. 
78 Id., §74, referring to Constitutional Court case, Judgment of 24 September 1999 (Competence), 
§36 and Ivcher Bronstein case, Judgment of 24 September 1999 (Competence), §37. 
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Committee members dissented as to the jurisdiction of the Committee to deal with the case – 
because they did not believe that incompatible reservations could be severed from the ratification 
–, they specifically pointed out that they did agree with the prior decision to take provisional 
measures.79 
Even if the ICJ is less likely than human rights adjudicators to order provisional measures in 
the face of doubts about its jurisdiction, there are indications that some members of the Court are 
open to the severability approach of the human rights adjudicators, as an appropriate development 
of international law when dealing with fundamental human rights.80 If the ICJ’s approach to this 
issue would be likely to change, it is possible that it would order provisional measures despite 
reservations to compromissory clauses in treaties involving human rights.  
As Judge Cançado Trindade has pointed out, the case law of the Inter-American Court had 
‘discarded an analogy with the permissive practice of the States’ under Art. 36(2) ICJ Statute (the 
optional clause of the ICJ’s compulsory jurisdiction).81 After all, while the optional clauses rec-
ognising the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court and the ECtHR (before Protocol 
11) were inspired on the optional clause of the ICJ, these adjudicators had interpreted the ‘ration-
ale of the application of the optional clause (…) in a fundamentally distinct way’.82 In light of 
their protective function of these human rights courts, he noted, they have taken a human rights 
perspective, where ‘considerations of ordre public’ prevail over the traditional State voluntarism. 
In this context States cannot count on the same level of discretion they have reserved for them-
selves in the traditional context of the purely interstate contentious proceedings.83 After all human 
rights treaties are aimed at ‘the accomplishment of a common goal, superior to the individual 
interests of each Contracting party’.84 In fact, he noted, even at the purely inter-State level the 
optional clause of the compulsory jurisdiction has become dated. The ICJ is now faced with an 
arrangement from the 1920s that became stratified by the decision to copy it from the PCIJ to the 
                                                 
79 HRC Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, admissibility decision of 2 November 1999, dissenting 
opinion by Ando (Japan), Bhagwati (India), Klein (Germany) and Kretzmer (Israel). 
80 See Chapter I (ICJ) and the individual opinion in ICJ Armed Activities on the Territory of the 
Congo (new application: 2002) (Congo v. Rwanda), Judgment on jurisdiction of the Court and 
admissibility of the application of 3 February 2006, Separate Opinion Judges Higgins, 
Kooijmans, Elaraby, Owada and Simma, e.g. §16: “The practice of such bodies is not to be 
viewed as ‘making an exception’ to the law as determined in 1951 by the International Court; we 
take the view that it is rather a development to cover what the Court was never asked at that time, 
and to address new issues that have arisen subsequently”. 
81 IACHR Judgment on preliminary objections in Constantine et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 1 
September 2001, Separate Opinion of judge Cançado Trindade, §3, referring to Constitutional 
Court and Ivcher Bronstein. 
82 Id. §4. 
83 Id., §20. In addition, he noted, States cannot sustain the argument that that which is not prohibited 
is permitted. This approach, he stated, would be equal to the traditional and outdated attitude of 
laissez faire, characteristic of an international legal order fragmented by subjective State 
voluntarism. In legal history such voluntarism inevitably favoured the most powerful. Thus in the 
field of human rights it is the reverse logic that must prevail: what is not permitted is prohibited, 
§24. Cançado Trindade stressed the importance of the nature of the treaty involved when 
considering the meaning and scope of a statement of acceptance of an optional clause laying 
down compulsory jurisdiction. This nature, he wrote, corresponds to the second element forming 
the general rule of interpretation of treaties (Article 31 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties): context, §31. 
84 Id., §4. See also ECtHR Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 March 1995 (preliminary objections), §70, 
referring to a system of collective enforcement of human rights. 
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ICJ Statute, yet international law as such has gradually evolved away from traditional State volun-
tarism.85 He noted that obviously the ‘distorted and incongruous practice’ developed under Article 
36(2) of the ICJ Statute cannot be taken as an example or model to be followed by States parties 
to human rights treaties with regard to the extent of their jurisdictional basis.86  
In this respect the question arises of the relevance to the ICJ of the practice of human rights 
adjudicators to use provisional measures also in the face of objections with regard to their juris-
diction (e.g. based on a State’s reservations). While the ICJ seems to have been inspired by the 
developments in international human rights law that have taken place in the last decades and 
should indeed consult the jurisprudence of human rights adjudicators if it is dealing with requests 
for provisional measures, it is arguable that, given Article 36(2) ICJ Statute, the developments 
with regard to jurisdiction cannot easily be transferred to the jurisprudence of the ICJ. Neverthe-
less, especially with regard to its jurisdiction based on the compromissory clauses in human 
rights-related treaties (such as the legality of reservations to the compromissory clause in the 
Genocide Convention), it could certainly draw inspiration from the developments in human rights 
jurisprudence, away from state voluntarism.87 This would be warranted by the effet utile of these 
treaties.88  
Like the power to decide on contested jurisdiction, the power to use provisional measures 
equally is essential to the efficacy of the system of international protection. The two are interre-
lated and both require an interpretation taking into account the effet utile of the treaty system.89 
For the use of provisional measures the prima facie jurisdiction of the Court is sufficient. 
2.4 The Inter-American Court’s jurisdiction to maintain provisional 
measures in matters that will never be brought to it on the merits 
The Inter-American Court, like the other adjudicators, often points out that its use of provisional 
measures does not imply a prejudgment on the merits, but rather is based on the State’s proce-
dural obligations under the Convention. This remark could be relevant to explain the use of provi-
sional measures in cases with which – at a later stage – the Court will not be able to deal. An 
argument based on the separate jurisdiction of Article 63(2) ACHR could apply to cases that the 
Commission failed to bring before the Court in time for it to deal with them on the merits. The 
Court could be considered to have jurisdiction because the State’s procedural obligations are not 
limited to the proceedings on Preliminary Objections, merits and reparation but are also based on 
the Court’s provisional measures ordered under Article 63(2) ACHR. 
In this respect a particularly striking issue that the Inter-American Court has had to deal 
with was the execution by Trinidad and Tobago of Mr. Briggs. In its Order of 25 May 1999 the 
                                                 
85 IACHR Judgment on preliminary objections in Constantine et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 1 
September 2001, Separate Opinion of judge Cançado Trindade, §13. 
86 Id., §12. 
87 See also Chapter I (ICJ), section 4, under the heading ‘The development of international law and 
Article IX Genocide Convention as a jurisdictional basis for provisional measures’. 
88 On effet utile/the principle of effectiveness see e.g. ECtHR Soering v. UK, 7 July 1989, §87; 
Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 March 1995 (preliminary objections), §70; Mamatkulov v. Turkey, 4 
February 2005 (Grand Chamber), §123; and IACHR Constitutional Court case, September 1999, 
(judgment on competence), §23. These cases make clear that the ECtHR and IACHR also apply 
this principle to the interpretation of standards generally referred to as ‘procedural’. This is not 
surprising as substantive and procedural human rights law cannot be artificially separated, see 
also Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
89 See also Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
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Court decided to maintain the provisional measures ordered on behalf of Mr. Briggs ‘until such 
time as the Court, having previously considered the reports concerning the present status of his 
Case, issues a decision on this matter’.90 The Commission had previously requested the Court to 
order provisional measures on his behalf and the Court had done so. In the meantime, the Com-
mission had issued a final report in his case, but had failed to bring the case itself before the 
Court.91  
In response, Trinidad had argued that the Court had no longer any competence to maintain the 
provisional measures.92  
In the aforementioned Order the Court refuted this argument and maintained the measures. 
It did not specify, however, their duration other than ‘until such time as the Court (…) issues a 
decision on this matter’.93 For lack of explanation in the Order itself, it is necessary to resort to 
the concurring opinions dealing with the issue. Judge Cançado Trindade pointed out that the 
Court only had a few hours to decide on the subject but that, in his understanding, its decision 
contributed to ‘the fulfilment of the object and purpose’ of the ACHR, preserved ‘the integrity of 
the mechanism of supervision’ of the Convention and reflected ‘the juridical nature of the provi-
sional measures of protection, complying with the basic and indispensable requisite of juridical 
security’.94 With regard to the competence of the Court he pointed out that the subject fell under 
its jurisdiction from the moment the Court received the Commission’s initial request for provi-
sional measures.  
“The fact that, subsequent to its request, the Commission came to adopt, in the specific case 
pertaining to Mr. Anthony Briggs, the Reports under Articles 50 and 51, respectively, of the 
                                                 
90 IACHR James et al., Order for provisional measures, 25 May 1999. 
91 The Commission had brought the case, which was then still pending before it, before the Court 
for the purpose of obtaining provisional measures of protection. It had found a violation of 
Article 7(5) ACHR because Trinidad failed to bring the petitioner to trial within a reasonable 
time. Briggs had been in pre-trial detention for three years and three months. The Commission 
recommended the State to compensate him and give consideration to his early release or 
commutation of the sentence. It did not bring this case before the Court to deal with it on the 
merits within the period of three months from the date of the transmittal to the State. Instead, it 
published its opinions and conclusions in this matter. CIDH Anthony Briggs v. Trinidad and 
Tobago, 15 April 1999. (One interesting response by the State was the following: “As regards the 
possible breach of Article 6(6), it is submitted that the punishment to be inflicted on the petitioner 
under the laws of Trinidad and Tobago does not consist of deprivation of liberty, but death by 
hanging. Accordingly, the reform and social readaptation of the petitioner is irrelevant at this 
time”). Later the Commission affirmed its report and made it public (15 April 1999). The next 
day Trinidad rejected the Commission’s recommendations and declared that ‘the law should take 
its course’. IACHR James et al., Order for provisional measures, 25 May 1999, ‘Considering’ 
clause 1(f). 
92 Early February 1999 Trinidad requested the Court to ‘confirm’ that its Order of August 1998 was 
‘discharged in so far as it relates to [him]’. IACHR James et al., Communication of the State of 5 
February 1999 in: Order for provisional measures, 25 May 1999, ‘Considering’ clause 1(d). A 
month later the State requested the Court once more to confirm that its Order for provisional 
measures with regard to Mr. Briggs was now discharged. 
93 Judge De Roux Rengifo attached a concurring opinion to the Order referring to the problem of 
duration but not fully addressing it: he spoke of a ‘reasonable length of time’. IACHR James et 
al., Concurring Opinion of Judge De Roux Rengifo, Order for provisional measures, 25 May 
1999. 
94 Presumably this is a reference to legal certainty for the petitioner, as the vulnerable party in 
human rights adjudication.  
 Chapter XIV 
750 
American Convention, does not mean that the examination of the case is already concluded 
under the inter-American system of protection of human rights”.95 
He pointed out that while the Commission had concluded its examination of the case, the matter 
remained pending under the jurisdiction of the Court, ‘as the supreme organ of interpretation and 
application of the American Convention’.96 This understanding, he wrote, found support in the 
Court’s Order of August 1998 to take all necessary measures to preserve the life and physical 
integrity of, among others, Mr. Briggs, so as ‘not to hinder the processing of their cases before the 
inter-American system’.97 In other words the Court did not refer to the Commission alone, but to 
‘the inter-American system’ as a whole. The case must be pending before the Commission for it 
to be able to request the Court to order provisional measures, but this requirement only applies 
with regard to the moment triggering the Court’s jurisdiction. Once set in motion it ‘cannot be 
affected in any way by the subsequent conduct or action by the parties (in contentious matter), or 
of the requesting State or organ (in advisory matter), or of the Commission as the organ request-
ing provisional measures of protection’.98 
He pointed out that nothing in Article 63(2) ACHR made the consideration of the subject by 
the Court dependent on the proceedings before the Commission. A contrary interpretation would 
make the Court’s power to continue considering a given matter, in which it was competent to 
supervise its own provisional measures, conditional upon the subsequent conduct of the organ 
requesting such measures, in this case the Commission.99 The Court’s inherent power to deter-
mine the extent of its own competence applied to its advisory and contentious jurisdiction as well 
as to its competence to order provisional measures. He reiterated that the Inter-American Court is 
guardian and master of its own jurisdiction and the American Convention has given it an impor-
tant role in the construction of an Inter-American ordre public for the protection of human 
rights.100 
Judge De Roux Rengifo added the following arguments in support of the Court’s decision to 
‘maintain, for at least a reasonable length of time, the provisional measures ordered on behalf of 
Anthony Briggs’.101 Pointing out that the circumstances of the Briggs case were unique, he re-
ferred to the fact that the Commission had already submitted the ‘reports to which articles 50 and 
51 of the American Convention on Human Rights refer’. ‘One would have thought’, he said, ‘that 
provisional measures would have become superfluous once the reports in question were issued’, 
in particular the Article 51 Report. 
“But matters are not so simple. Were the Court to call for the measures to be lifted immediately, 
it would be disregarding the absolutes that follow from a full and balanced interpretation of the 
provisions of chapters VI, VII and VIII of the Pact of San José, which define the structure of the 
inter-American system for the protection of human rights and legislate the membership and 
functions of the organs of that system, which must work in tandem to accomplish the system’s 
                                                 
95 IACHR James et al., Order for provisional measures, 25 May 1999, Concurring Opinion of Judge 
Cançado Trindade, §3. 
96 Id., §4. 
97 Id., §4., referring to the 2nd ‘Decisional’ clause. 
98 Id., §5. 
99 Id., §6. 
100 Id., §§7-8. 
101 IACHR James et al., Order for provisional measures, 25 May 1999, Concurring opinion of Judge 
De Roux Rengifo. 
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purposes. Had it not prolonged the life of the provisional measures, the Court would have been 
disregarding the combined scope of articles 50, 51 and 63(2) of the Convention”.102 
He referred to the Court’s Judgment in the Loayza Tamayo case, holding that if a State ratifies an 
international treaty, especially on human rights, ‘it has the obligation to make every effort to 
apply the recommendation of a protection organ such as the Inter-American Commission’ in 
accordance with the principle of good faith as laid down in Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties.103 This obligation has ‘multiple ramifications’. 
“Clearly the State must take a constructive attitude towards those recommendations, carefully 
and deliberately study the steps and measures it must take to comply with them, find ways to 
sort out any obstacles that might prevent it from taking the measures in question, and apply the 
measures to the fullest should the obstacles prove not to be insurmountable”.104  
In this light ‘the Court could hardly deny the protection of its provisional measures to anyone 
whose rights had been protected by express recommendations of the Inter-American Commission, 
right from the time those recommendations became final’.105 He then proceeded with the 
following argument:  
“When articles 50, 51 and 63.2 are read in combination, it becomes clear that the proper course 
of action is to prolong those measures for a reasonable period, so as to ensure that a timeframe 
can be established during which the State truly makes “every effort to apply the 
recommendations […] of the Inter-American Commission” before any irreparable harm is done 
(which in the instant case means before Anthony Briggs is executed)”.106 
In light of the concurring opinions attached to the Order of the Court it is possible to interpret the 
Court’s order as follows: by maintaining the provisional measures on behalf of Mr. Briggs, the 
Court in fact confirms the Commission’s approach to follow-up (‘seguimiento’) of its cases.107 A 
case is not closed until it has been complied with. In matters in which the Commission requested 
the Court to order provisional measures, these measures continue to apply even when the Com-
mission has published an Article 51 Report and has not sent the case to the Court for considera-
tion on the merits. As long as the case was indeed pending before the Commission at the time it 
requested the Court’s provisional measures, the Court maintains its jurisdiction to continue its 
provisional measures under Article 63(2), despite the fact that the case did not and will not reach 
it for a determination on the merits. Cançado Trindade explained this by pointing out that once the 
Court’s jurisdiction has been established, it cannot be taken away by acts or omissions of others. 
De Roux Rengifo added that the case would still be pending until there had been some form of 
follow-up by the State on the Commission’s recommendations, justifying maintenance of provi-
sional measures. 
A domestic Court believed differently. The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (Lon-
don) considered that the Inter-American Court had no jurisdiction to maintain its provisional 
                                                 
102 Ibid. 
103 IACHR Loayza Tamayo case, Judgment of 17 September 1997, §80. 
104 IACHR Concurring Opinion of Judge De Roux Rengifo, James et al., Order for provisional 
measures, 25 May 1999. See also Chapter XVI (Legal Status). 
105 IACHR James et al., Order for provisional measures, 25 May 1999, Concurring opinion of Judge 
De Roux Rengifo. 
106 Ibid. 
107 See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
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measures on behalf of Mr. Briggs once the Commission had published its Report on the merits in 
his case. The Privy Council expressed its expectation that national courts would give ‘great 
weight to the jurisprudence of the Inter-American Court’. At the same time it would be ‘abdicat-
ing’ its duty if it ‘were to adopt an interpretation of the Convention’, which it considered ‘unten-
able’. In this respect the Judicial Committee considered that the Court had no power to adopt 
provisional measures once the proceedings were complete. “Once the processing of the case was 
complete, the order automatically expired”. The Commission had made its findings of fact and it 
had made ‘recommendations with which the State has not complied, but it is not bound to do so’. 
The Commission had failed to bring the case before the Court and there was ‘no longer any lis’.108 
Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead dissented. He pointed out that by acceding to the Convention the 
State ‘intended to confer benefits on its citizens. The benefits were intended to be real, not illu-
sory. The Inter-American system of human rights was not intended to be a hollow sham or, for 
those under sentence of death, a cruel charade’. He criticised the State’s position that the Inter-
American Court had no jurisdiction to make its Order of May 1999 and emphasised that the juris-
diction of the Inter-American Court ‘is a matter within the sole jurisdiction of that court’. “Thus, 
it is not for the courts of the State parties to the Convention to decide the scope of the Inter-
American Court’s jurisdiction”.109 
During the subsequent proceedings before the Inter-American Court, mainly involving the 
other persons covered in the provisional measures, Trinidad also gave its position on the execu-
tion of Briggs despite the Court’s provisional measures. It pointed out that ‘after the Commission 
decided to publish its Article 51 report, there was no matter pending before the Commission, nor 
any matter pending before the Court, nor any other matter capable of being submitted to the 
Court’. It concluded its argument with the statement that ‘after the Commission so decided, the 
Court had no power to adopt provisional measures. The Court’s purported Order of 25 May 1999 
was made without jurisdiction and, therefore, was null’.110 The Court did not comment any further 
on the issue of its jurisdiction to maintain its provisional measures in these circumstances. It 
simply pointed out that under Article 68(1) ACHR States Parties undertake to comply with the 
judgment of the Court in any case to which they are parties, that they should fully comply with all 
the provisions of the Convention in good faith and that States must refrain from taking action that 
may frustrate restitutio in integrum.111 
Yet on subsequent occasions it has interpreted the phrase ‘case not yet submitted to the 
Court’ in Article 63(2) ACHR ‘to imply, at least, the possibility of bringing the issue that is the 
subject-matter of the provisional measures to the adjudicatory jurisdiction of the Court’.112 
Obviously it is the Court itself that determines its own competence, not a State or a domes-
tic Court. The Court has the inherent power to determine the scope of its own competence (com-
pétence de la compétence/Kompetenz-Kompetenz) both in its Orders and in its decisions on ad-
missibility, merits and reparation. It is not allowed to subordinate the mechanisms foreseen in the 
                                                 
108 JCPC Briggs v Cipriani Baptiste (Commissioner of Prisons) and Others (Trinidad and Tobago) 
[1999] UKPC 45 (28 October 1999). See further Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
109 JCPC Dissenting Opinion by Lord Nicholls of Birkenhead, Briggs v Cipriani Baptiste 
(Commissioner of Prisons) and Others (Trinidad and Tobago) [1999] UKPC 45 (28 October 
1999). 
110 IACHR James et al., Order for provisional measures, 16 August 2000, 13th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
111 Id., 11th ‘Considering’ clause. 
112 See e.g. IACHR Matter of García Uribe et al. (Mexico), Order of 2 February 2006, 3rd 
‘Considering’ clause; Matter of Capital El Rodeo I & El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center 
(Venezuela), 8 February 2008, 5th ‘Considering’ clause and Tyrone Dacosta Cadogan 
(Barbados), Order of the President of 4 November 2008, 4th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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ACHR to restrictions that undermine the function of the tribunal and, for that matter, the protec-
tive system laid down in the Convention.113 
In another context the court has also distinguished between on the one hand the preventive 
nature (‘cautelar’) of provisional measures in international adversarial cases, aimed at the preser-
vation of the proceedings and at the eventual execution of the decisions on the merits, and on the 
other hand the protective nature (‘tutelar’) of its measures.114 This implies a transformation of its 
provisional measures into a ‘true judicial guarantee’ of a preventive nature, ‘since they protect 
human rights inasmuch as they are intended to avoid irreparable harm to persons’.115 It has 
pointed out that ‘in view of the protective nature of the provisional measures the Tribunal may 
order such measures even when there is not exactly an adversarial case in the Inter-American 
system, in situations that, prima facie, may result in a serious and urgent impairment of human 
rights’.116 This means that the Court must make ‘an assessment of the proposed problem, the 
effectiveness of the State measures regarding the described situation and the degree of lack of 
protection in which the people requesting the measures would be if such measures are not 
adopted’. For an appropriate assessment the Court depends for a great deal on the information 
provided by the Commission. Thus it has pointed out that it is essential that the Commission 
‘submits a sufficient ground to comprise the already mentioned criteria and that the State fails to 
show, in a clear and sufficient way, the effectiveness of the specific measures adopted within the 
domestic jurisdiction’.117  
In his separate opinion Judge García Ramírez notes that the distinction between the preven-
tive and the protective nature of the Court’s provisional measures is more a matter of emphasis 
and in each case there is both ‘a protective (protection of human rights) and cautionary (preserva-
tion of the suit at law) purpose’.118 He points out, correctly that also when the Court orders provi-
sional measures in matters that are still before the Commission there is a preventive as well as a 
protective function to these provisional measures. After all, they aim to protect ‘the suit at law 
that eventually will be brought before the Court, as well as the effect of the final decision result-
ing from such case’, but apart from that also simply the proceedings before the Commission itself 
that would become ineffective if faced with violations.119 
                                                 
113 See e.g. IACHR Cases Liliana Ortega et al.; Luisiana Ríos et al.; Luis Uzcátegui; Marta 
Colomina and Liliana Velásquez (Venezuela), Order for provisional measures of 4 May 2004, 8th 
‘Considering’ clause, referring e.g. to Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al., Judgment of 21 
June 2002, §19. 
114 IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and el Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, Order of 8 
February 2008, 7th ‘Considering’ clause (see Spanish text). 
115 See e.g. IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and el Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, 
Order of 8 February 2008, 8th ‘Considering’ clause (paraphrased part is derived from the Spanish 
text rather than the translation).  
116 IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and el Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, Order of 8 
February 2008, 9th ‘Considering’ clause.  
117 Ibid. 
118 IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and el Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, Order of 8 
February 2008, separate opinion Judge García Ramírez, §9 (Spanish text, not the translation). 
119 IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and el Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, Order of 8 
February 2008, separate opinion Judge García Ramírez, §10 (paraphrased text is derived from the 
Spanish text). 
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2.5 Use of provisional measures beyond inadmissibility or beyond 
judgments on the merits and reparation 
The HRC has occasionally maintained provisional measures beyond inadmissibility and CAT has 
done so once too. To start with the latter, in B. M’B. v. Tunisia CAT took provisional measures in 
April 1994 ‘to ensure that no harm is done to the author's family, the alleged victim's family or 
the witnesses and their families’.120 It later declared the case inadmissible because the petitioner 
had not submitted sufficient proof to establish his authority to act on behalf of the victim. At the 
same time it maintained its provisional measures.  
As to the practice of the HRC, in some of its early death penalty cases the HRC maintained 
provisional measures beyond the inadmissibility decision. In the period July 1988 to July 1994 it 
declared many cases inadmissible, but at the same time referred to the possibility of review.121 In 
the meantime it requested the State party not to execute the petitioners before they had had a 
reasonable time, after completing the effective domestic remedies available to them, to request the 
Committee to review the previous decision in their case. In general, in these cases provisional 
measures were used twice, both before deciding on admissibility and as part of the inadmissibility 
decision. Those cases about which the HRC specifically noted that they were open to review dealt 
with exhaustion of local remedies. In such cases the Committee maintained its provisional meas-
ures beyond the inadmissibility decision in order to enable the petitioners to re-submit the case 
upon exhaustion of local remedies.122  
In total, the HRC maintained its provisional measures following inadmissibility declarations 
in twenty cases between July 1988 and July 1994. In several of these cases it requested the State 
                                                 
120 CAT B. M’B. v. Tunisia, 5 May 1994, §5(c). 
121 Under Rule 92(2) of the Rules of Procedure. 
122 In ten cases between July 1988 and July 1990 it maintained the provisional measures by 
explaining that it could review the inadmissibility decision, under Rule 92(2) of its rules of 
procedure, ‘upon receipt of a written request by or on behalf of the author to the effect that the 
reasons for inadmissibility no longer apply’. It requested the State, ‘taking into account the spirit 
and purpose’ of its Rule on provisional measures, ‘not to carry out the death sentence against the 
author, before he has had reasonable time after completing the effective domestic remedies 
available to him to request the Committee to review the present decision’. Five inadmissibility 
decisions of 26 July 1988, one of October 1989 and four of 13 July 1990: HRC O.W. v. Jamaica, 
26 July 1988; C.J. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988; L.C. et al. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988, annex VIII, 
section J (pp. 269-271); L.G. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988; L.S. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988; A.A. v. 
Jamaica, 30 October 1989; L.R. and T.W. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990; D.B. v. Jamaica, 13 July 
1990; C.B. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990 and N.C. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990. Four years later it 
returned to this formulation in the last cases in which it maintained its provisional measures until 
the petitioner would have had reasonable time, after completing the available remedies, to request 
the HRC to review its inadmissibility decision. HRC Denzil Roberts v. Barbados, 19 July 1994 
and Peter Bradshaw v. Barbados, 19 July 1994. Between October 1990 and July 1992 equally 
maintained its provisional measures in these cases but during this period it simply referred to its 
provisional measures without reference to the spirit and purpose of Rule 86. HRC W.W. v. 
Jamaica, 26 October 1990; R.M. v. Jamaica, 26 October 1990; E.B. v. Jamaica, 26 October 
1990; A.H. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 October 1990; D.D. v. Jamaica, 11 April 1991; M.F. v. 
Jamaica, 21 October 1991; M.F. v. Jamaica, 17 July 1992, 335/1988 (not the same author as 
M.F. in 233/1987) and R.W. v. Jamaica, 21 July 1992. Apart from this the formulation was the 
same. 
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to provide the petitioner with the relevant court documents in order to be able to exhaust domestic 
remedies.123 
In three non-exhaustion cases, however, it only pointed out that its decision was open to re-
view, but it did not maintain its provisional measures.124 The first case was when it declared 
inadmissible Guerra and Wallen v. Trinidad and Tobago (1995).125 It deeply regretted that the 
State was ‘not prepared to give the undertaking requested by the Committee’ in its provisional 
measure, ‘apparently because it considers itself bound by the conservatory order issued by the 
Court of Appeal on 29 April 1994’.126 The HRC considered that, in fact, ‘this situation should 
have made it easier for the State party to confirm that there would be no obstacles to acceding to 
the Committee’s request; to do so would, in any event, have been compatible with the State 
party’s international obligations’.127 In view of the fact that the State was not prepared to respect 
the provisional measures taken pending the case,128 the HRC could also have maintained them 
similar to the other non-exhaustion cases.  
Equally, it could have done this in Hylton v. Jamaica (1994).129 In this case the allegations 
under Article 14 related to the availability and the effectiveness of counsel. The claim based on 
Article 14 ICCPR clearly justified the HRC’s use of provisional measures.130 The petitioner had 
pointed out that he was notified of the date of the appeal and of the fact that a new lawyer had 
been assigned to him only two weeks before the hearing for his appeal. He claimed he immedi-
ately wrote to this lawyer ‘explaining that he had never had the opportunity to discuss his case 
with his previous counsel, and that he would like to meet him prior to the hearing; if not, he 
would assume that counsel could not, or would not, represent him on appeal’.131 He did not re-
ceive a reply to his enquiries, but later found out that his appeal was dismissed. The HRC consid-
ered the complaint inadmissible because domestic remedies had not yet been exhausted. Within a 
fortnight after declaring the case inadmissible Hylton’s petition to the JCPC was dismissed. Ap-
parently, the Committee does not allow the petitioner to resubmit his claim in this respect, as it 
has done in earlier cases relating to non-exhaustion.  
The third example is a case in which the HRC concluded that the delay could be attributed 
mainly to the petitioner. The Committee declared the case inadmissible for non-exhaustion but 
did not refer to the possibility of review nor maintained its provisional measures. One might 
conclude from this example that the HRC is unlikely to maintain its provisional measure beyond 
the admissibility declaration if the delay is attributable to the petitioner.132 
Finally, the HRC has also declared cases inadmissible in situations that did not lend them-
selves to review and did not involve the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies either. Obvi-
ously, in such cases it did not maintain its provisional measures. While it declared one case inad-
missible observing that this did not exclude humanitarian measures on behalf of the petitioner, 
                                                 
123 See e.g. HRC L.R. and T.W. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990; D.B. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990; C.B. v. 
Jamaica, 13 July 1990; N.C. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990; W.W. v. Jamaica, 26 October 1990; R.M. 
v. Jamaica, 26 October 1990; E.B. v. Jamaica, 26 October 1990 and D.D. v. Jamaica, 11 April 
1991. 
124 See e.g. HRC C.F. v. Jamaica, 28 July 1992 and Guerra and Wallen v. Trinidad and Tobago, 4 
April 1995 (while Wallen had since died, Guerra was still awaiting execution).  
125 HRC Lincoln Guerra and Brian Wallen v. Trinidad and Tobago, 4 April 1995. 
126 Id., §6.5. 
127 Ibid. 
128 See the discussion in Chapter XVII, section 2.2.2. 
129 HRC Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 8 July 1994. 
130 See Chapter XIII on forms of reparation.  
131 HRC Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 8 July 1994, §2.5. 
132 HRC N.A.J. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1990. 
 Chapter XIV 
756 
such as the commutation of his sentence,133 in the majority of cases it did not add such an obser-
vation.134  
In sum, the HRC maintained its provisional measures beyond the decision declaring a case 
inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies in cases in which court documents were 
missing that were necessary for domestic appeals. Moreover, it did so only for a limited period. In 
1993 the HRC decided, in Collins v. Jamaica,135 that in the absence of a written judgment from 
the Court of Appeal there was no reasonable prospect of success for applications to the JCPC. 
Hence it would no longer declare such cases inadmissible and it could simply maintain its provi-
sional measures as part of its admissibility declaration rather than as part of its inadmissibility 
declaration. 
Five years after it had last maintained provisional measures beyond its inadmissibility deci-
sion two members of the HRC suggested recycling this method of upholding the request for pro-
visional measures given the possibility of review.  
The Dayton Agreement (Article XI, 1(b) of Annex 6) grants the Bosnia Chamber the power 
‘to include an order for provisional measures in its final decision on the merits of a case’. As 
discussed in Chapter II (Systems), at first sight this is a strange provision, because it grants the 
Chamber the power ‘to include an order for provisional measures in its final decision on the mer-
its of a case’. Yet the Chamber seems to have found a way to interpret the provision: “This power 
might be used to regulate the position of the parties before the decision becomes final and bind-
ing, or pending the full implementation of the decision”.136 As noted in Chapter II, it may often be 
useful pending implementation to follow up on the situation of the victims in order to make sure 
that nothing happens that could prevent further implementation.137  
In the Inter-American system the competence of the adjudicator is at issue in a circumstance 
different from that of maintaining provisional measures beyond inadmissibility in order to make 
sure that a petitioner is able to renew his petition upon exhaustion. The Inter-American Commis-
sion and Court often maintain their provisional measures for a long time, but what is remarkable 
is that these measures may be maintained, or ordered for the first time, after a judgment on the 
merits or reparation.138 This is done to protect persons against death threats. In situations in which 
the Inter-American Court specifically orders the maintenance of provisional measures, it usually 
notes that the situation of ‘extreme gravity and urgency’ of the beneficiaries of the provisional 
                                                 
133 See G. J. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 5 November 1991. 
134 A.W. v. Jamaica, 8 November 1989; G.S. v. Jamaica, 8 November 1989; N.A.J. v. Jamaica, 26 
July 1990, (246/1987) (not the same petitioner as N.A.J. in 351/1989); D.S. v. Jamaica, 11 April 
1991, (304/1988) (not the same petitioner as D.S. in 234/1987); D.S. v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991, 
(234/1987/Rev.1) (not the same petitioner as D.S. in 304/1988); N.A.J. v. Jamaica, 6 April 1992, 
(351/1989) (not the same petitioner as N.A.J. in 246/1987); E.E. v. Jamaica, 23 October 1992; 
N.P. v. Jamaica, 5 April 1993; R.M. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1993; Errol Simms v. 
Jamaica, 3 April 1995; Lloyd Rogers v. Jamaica, 4 April 1995 and Christopher Bethel v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, 31 March 1991. 
135 Trevor Collins v. Jamaica, 25 March 1993. 
136 See Bosnia Chamber Annual Report 2000 (under the heading ‘provisional measures’). 
137 The Inter-American Court only considers a case closed once the State has fully implemented it. 
Before such time it may maintain provisional measures, for instance to protect witnesses. See 
also Chapter XVIII on follow-up. 
138 For the Commission’s precautionary measures as part of a decision on the merits see e.g. CIDH 
Rudolph Baptiste v. Grenada, 13 April 2000 (merits), §31. 
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measures is continuing and that this makes ‘it imperative to require the State to maintain the 
provisional measures necessary to preserve their life and physical integrity’.139  
Normally one would assume that provisional measures are provisional exactly because they 
are issued pending a case (pendente lite) and not after the case has been closed. The Inter-
American Court, however, does not consider a case closed until the State has fully implemented 
its judgment on the merits and its judgement on reparations. Meanwhile such cases are still ‘pend-
ing’. This again shows the link between the substance of judgments on reparation, the stage of 
supervision and provisional measures.140 In other words some of the protection offered in the 
Inter-American system in the form of provisional measures, is ordered while the case is not yet 
decided on the merits while other protection is ordered following the finding of a violation. This 
is so because victims or witnesses in the case in which the Court already issued a judgment may 
still be exposed to threats, for instance by paramilitary groups.  
This approach by the Court, not considering a case closed until it has been implemented, 
appears to have been developed in light of the rationale behind the system of protection created 
under the American Convention, in the context of the cases of death threats and harassment that 
the Commission and Court are faced with and of the lack of actual monitoring by the OAS politi-
cal organs. Again the Inter-American Court took into account the irreparable nature of the harm 
faced by the petitioners. 
An example showing an extended duration of provisional measures involves a case that was 
not even pending before the Court. This is the Colotenango case. Since 1994 the Court used 
provisional measures on behalf of Juan Chanay Pablo and others.141 Meanwhile the Commission 
had brokered a friendly settlement in 1997.142 Nevertheless the persons involved were still receiv-
ing death threats, indicating that the case before the Commission was not yet closed, and therefore 
Court’s provisional measures were again maintained in 2001.143  
Yet six year later the Court decided to lift the measures. While doing so it observed that ‘on 
various occasions the State failed to present its reports or did not provide sufficient information, 
making it difficult for the Court to determine the actual circumstances of the beneficiaries of the 
measures ordered. This creates a situation of uncertainty that is incompatible with the preventa-
tive and protective nature of provisional measures’.144 Nevertheless, it pointed out, ‘after 13 years 
of having ordered the provisional measures, the main point of controversy in regards to these 
remains the potential danger to the beneficiaries if the apprehension orders against the former 
patrol officers, who escaped from prison in April 1999, are not enforced. Furthermore, the reports 
from the State as well as the comments from the Commission and the representatives have re-
volved around the investigation into the facts which gave rise to the current provisional measures 
as well as the effectiveness of the implementation of security measures directed towards the bene-
ficiaries, particularly in regards to the frequency in which foot and vehicle patrols have or have 
                                                 
139 See IACHR James et al., Orders for provisional measures, 16 August 2000 and 24 November 
2000. In general, the Commission petitions the Court to order a stay of executions ‘until such 
time as the Commission has had the opportunity to examine end decide these cases pursuant to 
the Convention and the Commission’s Regulations’, James et al., Order of 29 August 1998. At 
other times the Commission specifies this by adding ‘and until the situation of extreme gravity 
and urgency no longer persists in relation to these individuals’. See e.g. James et al., Orders of 27 
May 1999 and 25 September 1999. 
140 See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
141 See Colotenango case (Guatemala), Orders of 22 June 1994 until 5 September 2001.  
142 CIDH Juan Chanay Pablo v. Guatemala, 13 March 1997 (Friendly Settlement). 
143 See IACHR Colotenango case, Order of 5 September 2001. 
144 Id., 8th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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not occurred, in order to protect the boundaries of the community”.145 It considered that the Com-
mission was to monitor this as part of the obligations entered into in the Friendly Settlement 
agreement brokered by it. The Court did observe that removing the provisional measures did not 
mean that the State had complied with its obligations under the ACHR.146  
Thus on the one hand the Court does not consider a case closed until its judgment on repara-
tions has been fully implemented. In this light it has sometimes maintained some of its Orders for 
provisional measures. This use of provisional measures during the stage of monitoring compli-
ance with its judgments is a significant extension of the traditional concept of provisional meas-
ures. On the other hand, more recently it has referred situations that it previously dealt with 
through provisional measures, to its supervision of compliance procedure, issuing orders on 
State’s compliance with its judgments.147 Moreover, in the above Colotenango case, that never 
made it to the Court on the merits, after 13 years it decided to lift the provisional measures and 
refer the petitioners to the Commission for supervision of compliance with the Commission’s 
Report in that case. While doing so it did not say it was changing its approach to its jurisdiction to 
use provisional measures until after a judgment on the merits or reparation. Its recent practice 
simply indicates that, in the absence of concrete and recent information on death threats, it will 
deal with these matters through its procedure on supervision of compliance with judgments in-
stead.148 
While the practice of the Inter-American Court and the HRC is triggered in different legal 
contexts (making sure there is no gap in treaty protection between exhaustion and submitting a 
case; making sure the judgments are fully implemented and meanwhile the petitioners or others 
involved are not receiving death threats), their underlying rationale appears to be the same. The 
irreparable nature of the harm to persons triggered an inventive approach to jurisdiction in par-
ticular, well-defined, circumstances. 
                                                 
145 Id., 11th ‘Considering’ clause. 
146 Id., 14th ‘Considering’ clause. 
147 See e.g. IACHR Case of Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Order of 2 February 
2007 on supervision of compliance, 9th and 12th ‘Considering’ clause.  
148 Yet see Order on supervision of compliance of the IACHR cases Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala 
and Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala and on the request to expand the provisional measures in 
Raxcacó Reyes y otros, 9 May 2008, in which the Court does appear to make a strict division; it 
argues that because Article 62(2) ACHR referred to cases of prima facie urgency while the risk 
of irreparable harm in these cases related to violations that have already been established by 
judgments of the Court that have res iudicata status, the Court did not order provisional measures 
but it ordered the State simply to comply with its judgment, adding specifications and noting that 
it would continue to monitor the situation. This reasoning does not apply, of course, to situations 
where witnesses and others in cases that have already been decided on the merits, or even 
reparations, are still being threatened. See e.g. IACHR Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Order 
of 27 January 2009, declaring Guatemala’s partial compliance with the Judgment on Reparations, 
declaring to keep open its monitoring process until full compliance is achieved and maintaining 
its provisional measures of 11 March 2005 (Provisional Measures and Monitoring Compliance 
with Judgment). 
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3 ADMISSIBILITY AND PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
3.1 Introduction 
Apart from the lack of jurisdiction on the merits there are other reasons for inadmissibility as 
well.149 This section examines whether such inadmissibility criteria hinder the use of provisional 
measures in human rights adjudication. 
When drafting its rules of procedure, the HRC specifically discussed the relation between 
admissibility of the case on the one hand and the use of provisional measures on the other (section 
3.2). The Inter-American Commission sometimes uses provisional measures prior to formally 
opening a case, which indicates the importance it attaches to preventing irreparable harm, but at 
the same time may at times have undermined the stature of the measures (section 3.3). The main 
criterion for admissibility of a case that is relevant in the context of decision-making on the use of 
provisional measures is that of exhaustion of domestic remedies (section 3.4). Other admissibility 
criteria that could be relevant at the stage of provisional measures include the question whether 
the ‘same matter’ is or has been pending before another adjudicator and the question of compati-
bility with the treaty (section 3.5). 
3.2 The HRC’s discussion on the relation between admissibility and 
provisional measures  
While other adjudicators have also dealt with death penalty cases, relevant information with 
regard to the relation between admissibility of the case and the use of provisional measures in 
human rights adjudication is mainly found in the practice of the HRC.  
Article 5(2) OP stipulates that the HRC shall declare a case inadmissible if domestic reme-
dies have not been exhausted or if the same matter is being examined under another procedure of 
international investigation or settlement. 
During the drafting of the rules of procedure in 1977 the issue came up whether it was nec-
essary to determine the admissibility of the case before using provisional measures. The Rules of 
Procedure of CERD, the first treaty body established, stipulate that provisional measures may be 
used after a case has been declared admissible. In its current Rules of Procedure, Rule 94(3) still 
refers to the possibility of provisional measures under the heading ‘method of dealing with admis-
sible communications’.150 Thus far CERD has never used provisional measures. In any case, the 
requirement may be considered an anomaly.151 While the proposal for a rule on provisional meas-
ures by the HRC was probably inspired by the rules of CERD, it became clear during the discus-
sions in 1977 that several members of the HRC did not wish to copy the admissibility requirement 
found in CERD’s Rules of Procedure.152 At the same time the HRC decided to leave open this 
                                                 
149 CAT even explicitly notes in its Annual Reports that it has ‘conceptualized the formal and 
substantive criteria’ applied by its Rapporteur when granting or rejecting requests for provisional 
measures, pointing out that the basic admissibility criteria set out in Article 22 (1)-(5) ICAT must 
be met, although the requirement of exhaustion can be dispensed with in some circumstances (see 
section 3.4 of this Chapter). See e.g. CAT Annual Report A/61/44 (2005/2006), §61. 
150 CERD/C/35/Rev.3, 1 January 1989.  
151 If at one point CERD would consider using provisional measures it may be expected that it will 
adapt its Rules in order to make effective use of such measures. 
152 Sir Vincent Evans (UK) expected that the procedure for determining admissibility would take 
time and he hoped that the rule on provisional measures (then rule 86) ‘would enable the 
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question. Subsequently it did use provisional measures in advance of declaring a case admissible, 
as members like Opsahl and Uribe Vargas had proposed. Uribe Vargas had referred to the pur-
pose of provisional measures, noting that the text of the rule envisaged ‘an exceptional or emer-
gency situation in which irreparable damage to the victim might be involved’.153 It seems that he 
argued from the perspective of preventing irreparable harm to persons.154 In addition, Committee 
member Opsahl had pointed out that Article 5(2) OP ‘did not mean that the Committee should 
ignore such communications but only that it should not consider them on their merits until the 
conditions indicated in that article had been met’.155 In other words, the HRC would be able to use 
provisional measures in advance of its determination of admissibility. His remark may imply that 
he considered it possible for the HRC to maintain provisional measures after declaring a case 
inadmissible.156  
                                                                                                                       
Committee to deal with urgent matters on a priority basis, inasmuch as the possible need for 
interim measures might of itself be grounds for urgency’. Opsahl (Norway) believed that 
provisional measures should not be dependent on an admissibility declaration. He pointed out 
that the second sentence of the proposal (the requirement to inform the State that the provisional 
measure did not imply a determination on the admissibility or substantive validity of the claim) 
already made it clear that provisional measures would not prejudice the determination of 
admissibility or the validity of a communication. Lallah (Mauritius) suggested the replacement of 
the words ‘substantive validity’ with the word ‘merits’. He also suggested the replacement of the 
word ‘necessary’ with ‘desirable’. He noted that ‘(a) peculiar situation might arise in which a 
State received no hearing, and he felt that care should be taken to avoid a situation in which 
views might be expressed without recourse’. It is not fully clear what he meant with this remark, 
because also without hearings, both Parties subsequently have the opportunity to argue for or 
against the continuation of the provisional measures. In the sense the State does have recourse. In 
any case his remark does show that during the drafting of the HRC’s Rules of Procedure the issue 
of hearings already came up in relation to provisional measures. Summary records of the 
meetings of the first session, 13th meeting, 29 March 1977 and 17th meeting, 31 March 1977, 
Yearbook of the HRC 1977-1978, Vol. I, CCPR/1, pp. 44-46 and p. 54. 
153 Ibid.  
154 See Conclusion Part II with the conceptual framework proposed in this book, discussing the 
purpose of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. 
155 Summary records of the meetings of the first session, 13th meeting, 29 March 1977 and 17th 
meeting, 31 March 1977, Yearbook of the HRC 1977-1978, Vol. I, CCPR/1, pp. 44-46 and p. 54.  
156 Opsahl noted that Uribe Vargas (Colombia) ‘had correctly stated the intentions of the Protocol as 
a whole’. According to Uribe Vargas the HRC should view the rule ‘in the light of all the articles 
of the Protocol rather than just article 5’. The text of the rule envisaged ‘an exceptional or 
emergency situation in which irreparable damage to the victim might be involved’. He considered 
that a ‘human rights committee established to guarantee the implementation of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights could not wait for the implementation of a rule of procedure when 
humanitarian questions were involved’. Given the context it can be assumed that he meant the 
ICCPR and not the Universal Declaration. Agreeing after all with Uribe Vargas and Opsahl, 
Ganji (Iran) considered that there was ‘no inconsistency between rule 86 and the Protocol’. In his 
view the conditions in Article 5(2) made it especially important to have a rule dealing with 
emergency situations ‘involving the possibility of irreparable damage’. He had initially expressed 
some reservations with respect to the proposed rule ‘because it might be incompatible with the 
conditions for the consideration of a communication by the Committee’ under Article 5(2) OP. 
Sir Vincent Evans suggested that they could leave open the question whether the HRC ‘might 
indicate the need for interim measures, prior to a determination of admissibility’. For that 
purpose, he proposed to replace the phrase ‘at any time’ with ‘prior to forwarding its final views’. 
Chairman Mavrommatis (Cyprus) suggested an amended text to incorporate this suggestion. 
 
 Jurisdiction and Admissibility 
761 
In any case, from the start the HRC used provisional measures in advance of determining 
the admissibility of the case. By appointing a Special Rapporteur, first on death penalty cases and 
later on New Communications, to take provisional measures between sessions it confirmed that 
there was no need to determine the admissibility of a case.  
In 1986 the HRC used provisional measures for the first time in order to halt an execu-
tion.157 It published this decision.158 The next year it published separately one other provisional 
measure decision as well.159 The texts of these decisions already show a relationship between 
provisional measures and the issue of admissibility. The HRC considered that it needed further 
factual information, in one case from the State, in the other from the petitioner, before it could 
examine the question of the admissibility of the case. It pointed out that it was relying on the 
willingness of the government of the State in question (not identified in the publication) to coop-
erate with it ‘at this early stage in the consideration of the subject-matter’.160 It requested the State 
party, under its Rule on provisional measures (at the time Rule 86), not to carry out the death 
sentence before the HRC had had ‘an opportunity to consider further the question of the admissi-
bility’ of the case. In its request for information from the petitioner it posed nine specific ques-
tions about the conduct of the trial, to be answered under its Rule on the transmission of cases to 
the State. At least one of the questions clearly related to the issue of admissibility.161 
In none of its inadmissibility decisions, in which it initially used provisional measures did it 
say anything about its earlier use of these measures. It simply used them initially and eventually 
declared the case inadmissible. Yet when inadmissibility is already very clear at an early stage the 
HRC apparently does not use provisional measures. This applies in particular to situations in 
which a case is likely to be declared inadmissible for lack of substantiation or failure to bring a 
claim (Article 2 OP and Rule 90(b) of the Rules of Procedure) or even abuse of the right of peti-
tion. Reasons for such inadmissibility include that the case is incompatible with the terms of the 
treaty or clearly based on incorrect interpretations of its provisions or on facts not within the 
scope of the treaty.  
The HRC (as well as CAT) has tried to expedite proceedings by dealing with admissibility 
and merits together rather than consecutively. Initially Jamaica, which has long been the main 
addressee of the provisional measures to halt executions, often contested the Committee’s admis-
sibility decisions, usually for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. The HRC reviewed its deci-
sions, and usually confirmed them. Later, from early 1995 on, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
                                                                                                                       
Summary records of the meetings of the first session, 13th meeting, 29 March 1977 and 17th 
meeting, 31 March 1977, Yearbook of the HRC 1977-1978, Vol. I,CCPR/1, pp. 44-46 and p. 54. 
This amended text, with some minor changes, was eventually included in the HRC’s first Rules 
of Procedure and is still applicable. 
157 HRC X v. S, Rule 86/91 decision of 21 July 1986. From the decision on the merits it appears this 
is Earl Pratt v. Jamaica. 
158 See its Selected Decisions vol. II, under the heading ‘interlocutory decisions’, CCPR/C/OP/2. 
159 HRC X. v. S., Rule 86/91 decision of 13 November 1987. The HRC later declared the 
communication inadmissible for non-exhaustion of local remedies, C.J. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988 
(inadm.), but maintained the provisional measure. 
160 HRC X. v. S., Rule 86/91 decision of 13 November 1987. 
161 It dealt with the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies. This was the question whether the 
authorities had offered the petitioner legal aid during his trial and appeal and whether legal aid 
was now available for petitioning for leave to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (JCPC). Legal aid indeed became one of the main issues in the cases before the HRC 
during the next few years. The other questions posed also were relevant to the issue of 
admissibility, to the extent that the answers could clarify compatibility with the provisions of the 
Covenant. 
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changed their attitude towards the proceedings before the HRC. Rather than arguing against ad-
missibility and failing to submit comments on the merits, in fact they immediately commented on 
the merits and requested a joint examination on admissibility and merits in order to expedite the 
procedure. This way these States could go ahead with an execution before a specific deadline 
would be triggered that had been set by the domestic case law (developed by the JCPC) on the 
death row phenomenon causing a violation of the Constitution’s prohibition of cruel treatment. 
Otherwise this deadline would prevent these States permanently from executing the petitioner.162 
3.3 Provisional measures and opening a case in the Inter-American system 
Until May 2001 the Inter-American Commission often used precautionary measures separately 
from the main case. Some of them were taken independent of a specific case pending before it. If 
the situation was not solved, the Commission could formally open a case.163 In August 1997, for 
instance, the Inter-American Commission requested Paraguay to inform it about the implementa-
tion of the precautionary measures it took to protect the lives of two attorneys and a judge who 
were involved in the case of Napoleon Ortigoza pending before it. The Commission explicitly 
mentioned that it took precautionary measures ‘without opening a specific case’.164 This example, 
however, was remarkable because the Commission normally did not explicitly note that it did not 
yet open a case. Moreover, the threats seemed to have been made in relation to a case already 
pending before the Commission. It would therefore have been possible to treat the precautionary 
measures as part of the Napoleon Ortigoza case until such time when the Commission would 
                                                 
162 Following this change the HRC often decided to consider admissibility and merits together in 
cases in which the State party had explicitly waived its right to invoke non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies and had addressed the merits of the communication. See e.g. HRC Conroy 
Levy v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998 and Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998. It 
would recall Article 4(2) OP, stipulating that the State shall submit its written observations on the 
merits of a communication within six months of the transmittal of the communication. This 
period may be shortened in the interests of justice, if the State party so wishes. See e.g. HRC 
Clement Francis v. Jamaica, 25 July 1995; Errol Johnson v. Jamaica, 22 March 1996; Michael 
Adams v. Jamaica, 30 October 1996; Anthony McLeod v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998; Tony Jones 
v. Jamaica, 6 April 1998 and Errol Smith and Oval Stewart v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999. In some 
cases the HRC decided nevertheless to issue a separate admissibility decision, since the 
information before it was not sufficient to enable it to adopt a decision on the merits. See e.g. 
HRC Clive Johnson v. Jamaica, 20 October 1998 and Samuel Thomas v. Jamaica (in this case 
the petitioner had objected to the joint consideration of admissibility and merits because the State 
party had failed to address all the issues raised in the complaint). In other cases it decided to deal 
with admissibility and merits together despite the request of the petitioner not to do so, ‘(a)s both 
parties have had the full opportunity to comment on each other’s merits submissions’. See e.g. 
HRC Desmond Taylor v. Jamaica, 2 April 1998. In HRC Peter Blaine v. Jamaica, 17 July 1997. 
Scheinin disagreed with such a decision because he considered that the petitioner had not been 
given the opportunity to comment on the merits. As stipulated in (then) Rule 91(2) of the rules of 
procedure the situation is now as follows. The HRC examines admissibility and merits together in 
order to expedite the procedure under the OP. Only in exceptional cases the Committee, the 
Working Group or the Special Rapporteur on New Communications will initially request the 
State only to respond to the issue of admissibility. 
163 It did so when, prima facie, petitions met the procedural requirements for processing. See e.g. 
CIDH Annual Report 2000, Chapter III.B (Statistics) under c. 
164 CIDH Annual Report 1997, Chapter III(a). 
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open a new case. Obviously this would require precautionary measures on behalf of certain bene-
ficiaries initially to be taken in the context of one and subsequently in that of another case.  
In cases involving the death penalty, the Inter-American Commission developed the prac-
tice of always opening a case and assigning a case number immediately upon receipt of a submis-
sion requesting precautionary measures to halt an impending execution. This differed from other 
matters pending before it where it would also take precautionary measures before actually open-
ing a case and assigning a communication number. 
As of May 2001, Rules 26 to 30 of the new Rules of Procedure govern the requirements for 
opening a case. The Commission processes, through its Executive Secretariat, the petitions that 
contain all the information required under Rule 28. The Commission provides a form for present-
ing petitions on human rights violations. It is prepared by its Executive Secretariat and is aimed at 
assisting victims, their families, civil society organisations and others in presenting a petition. In 
its instructions accompanying this form the Executive Secretariat points out:  
“In cases where the life or physical integrity of a person or group of persons is in imminent 
danger despite having approached appropriate domestic authorities, you may submit the 
pertinent information to the Commission even if information concerning the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies is not currently available”.165 
With its new Rules of Procedure (2000) the Inter-American Commission aims at integrating the 
examination of individual complaints under both the ACHR and the Declaration. It must now 
issue a formal admissibility decision in all petitions transferred to the State. Previously an admis-
sibility declaration was not necessary.166 At present, only in exceptional circumstances the Com-
mission may open a case but defer its treatment of admissibility until the debate and decisions on 
the merits.167 Upon the adoption of the admissibility report168 the Commission shall register the 
petition as a case and initiate procedures on the merits.169 Admissibility requirements are now 
more specifically listed and this applies to time limits as well.  
In other systems it is not necessary to declare a case admissible before ordering provisional 
measures. The only requirement is prima facie admissibility. It is not clear, however, what the 
Inter-American Court will do in extremely urgent cases because the new Rules seem to require 
the Commission to declare a case admissible before it can appeal to the Court to order provisional 
measures. Of course the requirement to declare a case admissible before using precautionary 
measures does not apply when the situation is so urgent that irreparable harm would otherwise 
result. Similarly there may be cases where the issue of admissibility is very intricate and the 
Commission needs the view of both parties before it can decide on it. Meanwhile it should be able 
to use provisional measures. 
                                                 
165 Form for presenting petitions on human rights violations, <http://www.cidh.org/Basicos/English/ 
Basic24.Petition%20Form.htm> (consulted 8 February 2008). 
166 See on this issue Gómez (2001). 
167 Article 37(3) CIDH Rules of Procedure. 
168 Upon a decision based on Article 37(3) of the CIDH Rules of Procedure. 
169 Article 37(2) CIDH Rules of Procedure. 
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3.4 Exhaustion of domestic remedies 
3.4.1 Introduction 
Sometimes States have argued that provisional measures are not appropriate because domestic 
resources have not yet been exhausted.170 Indeed the requirement of exhaustion of local reme-
dies171 may be relevant in the choice to take or maintain provisional measures. The HRC has 
stated that the mere affirmation by the State party that a remedy exists is not sufficient for it to 
consider it an effective remedy that needs to be exhausted for purposes of the OP. According to 
its consistent jurisprudence only those domestic remedies that are effective and available must be 
exhausted.172 
The Inter-American Court had already noted in 1989 that: 
“Thus, when certain exceptions to the rule of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies are invoked, 
such as the ineffectiveness of such remedies or the lack of due process of law, not only is it 
contended that the victim is under no obligation to pursue such remedies, but, indirectly, the 
State in question is also charged with a new violation of the obligations assumed under the 
Convention. Thus, the question of domestic remedies is closely tied to the merits of the case”.173 
This section first discusses the requirement of exhaustion in the context of death threats, the right 
of habeas corpus and patterns of violations, then in the context of non-refoulement and more 
generally in light of the absence of legal aid in the domestic proceedings. Subsequently it deals 
with the approach of the HRC to exhaustion in death penalty cases, as well as the availability of a 
                                                 
170 The following case before the CIDH serves as an example. In December 1997 Peru sent a 
response to precautionary measures that had been addressed to it on behalf of members of a 
human rights organisation and of petitioners who were threatened in a case (case 11.811) pending 
before the Commission. Peru stated that an investigation into the ‘presumed threats noted in the 
request for precautionary measures’ was already underway before the petitioners filed a case with 
the Commission. It believed it ‘inappropriate and inadmissible’ for the Commission to take 
precautionary measures ‘that would duplicate in most cases the processing of personal guarantees 
that petitioners have been seeking in the domestic courts’. CIDH Annual Report 1997, Chapter 
III(a), under ‘Peru’. Adjudicators have also refused to take provisional measures in cases 
subsequently declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion, see e.g. CAT L.Z.B. on her own behalf 
and on behalf of her daughter J.F.Z. v. Canada, 8 November 2007 (inadm.). 
171 On this requirement in general international law, see e.g. Second report on diplomatic protection, 
by ILC Special Rapporteur John Dugard, A/CN.4/514, 28 February 2001 (among others noting 
that the distinction between primary and secondary rules has served its purpose in the field of 
state responsibility, ‘it is a distinction that cannot be too strictly maintained in a study on 
exhaustion of local remedies in the context of diplomatic protection, as the concept of denial of 
justice is intimately connected with the exhaustion of remedies rule’.This rule may be seen ‘both 
as a secondary rule, excusing recourse to further remedies (…) or as a primary rule giving rise to 
international responsibility’, §10). 
172 See e.g. HRC Clive Smart v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 July 1998. 
173 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment of 26 June 1987, §91. As Buergenthal (1994), p. 76 has 
pointed out with regard to the Inter-American Court, ‘(t)he fact that a case at some stage of the 
proceedings be determined by the Court to be inadmissible will not affect its power to grant 
provisional measures so long as it has jurisdiction over the parties. If that were not so, it would 
make no sense whatsoever to authorize the Court to issuew provisional measure sin cases not yet 
referred to it which, at stat stage, would ipso facto be inadmissible under Article 61(2) of the 
Convention’. 
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written judgment for the decision by the HRC to maintain provisional measures beyond 
admissibility. Finally this section notes the approach of the HRC in cases involving threats to 
indigenous culture. 
3.4.2 Exhaustion and threats 
Death threats may also make domestic remedies unavailable and ineffective. In Neptune v. Trini-
dad and Tobago (1996), for instance, in March 1995 the HRC declared admissible a claim about 
degrading conditions of detention ‘in the absence of information from the State party about effec-
tive domestic remedies available to the author and noting the author’s claim that he had been 
threatened with death for making complaints’.174 The latter claim was not further discussed. Sev-
eral years previously, in December 1992, the HRC had used provisional measures in this case. It 
did so to halt the execution of the death sentence against the petitioner, not to put a stop to the 
death threats.175 
A decision to declare a case inadmissible could also have repercussions for the persons who 
have appeared as witnesses. This triggers the question of what happens to the local investigators, 
and others who are not themselves the petitioners, when a case has been declared inadmissible 
while previously the Inter-American Court had used provisional measures on their behalf. Pre-
sumably, in a situation like this, the Inter-American Commission would have to open a new case 
specifically dealing with threats against witnesses or human rights defenders involved in the case 
at the local level and immediately request the Court to take provisional measures. 
3.4.3 Habeas corpus and patterns of violations 
The Inter-American Commission has found that swift action is necessary to ensure the effective-
ness of the remedy of habeas corpus. There is no need to exhaust petitions for habeas corpus if 
they are ‘powerless to compel the authorities’ (a reference to the Court’s jurisprudence in the 
Honduran cases)176 to ‘ensure proper protection within a reasonable period of time in order to 
                                                 
174 HRC Clyde Neptune v. Trinidad and Tobago, 16 July 1996, §4.4. 
175 See also Chapter IV on detention situations and death threats and harassment. Zwaak/Haeck 
(2008), p. 128, have suggested, appropriately, that in the context of severe acts of intimidation 
apparently aimed at deterring recourse to available domestic remedies, the European Court ‘could 
consider waving the requirement of exhaustion of internal remedies systematically, until the 
situation in the region has improved’. 
176 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Judgment of 28 July 1988, §§66-68; Godínez Cruz, Judgment of 
20 January 1989, §§69-71; Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, Judgment of 15 March 1989, §§91-
93 (“A remedy must also be effective – that is, capable of producing the result for which it was 
designed. Procedural requirements can make the remedy of habeas corpus ineffective: if it is 
powerless to compel the authorities; if it presents a danger to those who invoke it; or if it is not 
impartially applied. On the other hand, contrary to the Commission's argument, the mere fact that 
a domestic remedy does not produce a result favorable to the petitioner does not in and of itself 
demonstrate the inexistence or exhaustion of all effective domestic remedies. For example, the 
petitioner may not have invoked the appropriate remedy in a timely fashion. It is a different 
matter, however, when it is shown that remedies are denied for trivial reasons or without an 
examination of the merits, or if there is proof of the existence of a practice or policy ordered or 
tolerated by the government, the effect of which is to impede certain persons from invoking 
internal remedies that would normally be available to others. In such cases, resort to those 
remedies becomes a senseless formality. The exceptions of Article 46 (2) would be fully 
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prevent the consummation or worsening of the human rights violation that was the object of the 
complaint’.177 It has equally applied an exception to the rule of exhaustion of local remedies 
because ‘amparo’ proceedings had ‘not proven effective in responding to the claims of alleged 
violations of human rights’.178 
                                                                                                                       
applicable in those situations and would discharge the obligation to exhaust internal remedies 
since they cannot fulfill their objective in that case”). 
177 CIDH Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §65. As evident already from the 
Honduran cases, the issue of disappearance is relevant as well in the context of exhaustion. The 
following case is puzzling in its failure to use precautionary measures. In June 1990 CEJIL and 
CEAPAZ petitioned the Commission on behalf of Mr. Ramos Diego who had disappeared in 
Peru the previous month. In such case it could have been useful to take precautionary measures as 
the disappearance was recent. The Commission, however, rejected this petition for failure to 
exhaust domestic remedies. It is not clear whether the petitioners also had requested the 
Commission to take precautionary measures in order to be able to locate the disappeared person. 
In July 1992 CEJIL presented a new complaint and strongly urged the Commission to open a 
case. Clearly, at this time the disappearance was no longer recent and a precautionary measure 
would have been futile. The complaint is mentioned in CEJIL case docket 1997. Mr. Ramos had 
disappeared on 7 May 1990. It was more than two years later, in July 1992, that the Commission 
opened his case. It subsequently decided to process six disappearance cases together. These cases 
related to the same region and period, ‘were attributed to soldiers, and followed a pattern of 
behavior indicating a State policy’. The other cases were opened between one month after the 
disappearance and two years afterwards. The Commission referred to the Court’s holding that 
‘the proper remedy in the case of the forced disappearance of persons would ordinarily be habeas 
corpus, since those cases require urgent action by the authorities’. IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, 
21 July 1988 §65; Caballero Delgado and Santana, 21 January 1994 (Preliminary Objections), 
§64. Habeas corpus is ‘the normal means of finding a person presumably detained by the 
authorities, of ascertaining whether he is legally detained and, given the case, of obtaining his 
liberty’. IACHR Caballero Delgado and Santana, 21 January 1994 (Preliminary Objections), 
§67. The Commission further referred to the Court’s ruling that domestic remedies ‘must be 
capable of producing the results for which they were intended’. Velásquez Rodríguez, 21 July 
1988, §68. The Commission found that, during the period in question, ‘there existed in Peru a 
practice or policy of disappearances, ordered or tolerated by various Government authorities’. 
This ‘practice rendered writs of habeas corpus completely ineffective in cases of disappearances’. 
Thus, it was not necessary to attempt this or any other remedy. The exceptions mentioned in 
Article 46(2) ACHR were fully applicable. CIDH Juan de la Cruz Núňez Santana et al. v. Peru, 
13 April 1999, §57. In this light the Commission’s earlier decision to declare the case of Samuel 
Ramos Diego inadmissible is surprising, especially since the applicable case law of the Court 
predates this decision. At the time the disappearance was very recent and precautionary measures 
by the Commission could have served some purpose. As noted, it is not clear whether the 
Commission took such measures before it rejected the petition. In one of the other six cases the 
Commission processed the case within a month of the disappearance. It is possible that it took 
precautionary measures, but the report on the merits does not provide information in this respect. 
More generally on effective remedies by the Inter-American Court see e.g. Medina Quiroga 
(2005), pp. 372-380. 
178 See e.g. CIDH Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. v. El Salvador, Report 29/01, 7 March 2001, 
§§40-41 (‘Almost two years have elapsed since the petition was filed and no final decision has 
been handed down by the Salvadoran Supreme Court’) and §42 (‘that in this case, after almost 
two years, a final ruling has not been handed down regarding the claim of the petitioners in El 
Salvador, and has determined that an unjustified delay has occurred in terms of domestic 
remedies’). An example of an issue that was not brought before the Commission exactly because 
the local NGO, together with CEJIL had been able to resolve the urgent situation is that of the 
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In the case of the ‘unlawful combatants’ detained by the US at Guantanamo Bay after 9/11 
the CIDH took precautionary measures for the first time early 2002, when the beneficiaries had 
been detained incommunicado and without charge for several months. Several years later the US 
argued that there were ‘avenues of potential domestic relief’ available, which were ‘effective and 
timely’.179 Thus, it concluded, the case was inadmissible for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.  
“Nevertheless, in a spirit of cooperation, the United States has to date made six numerous 
lengthy and detailed submission to the Commission and attended every scheduled hearing in 
this matter. At this point, while into the fourth year of this proceeding, the United States intends 
to defer further formal participation until the international law requirement of exhaustion of 
domestic remedies has been fulfilled”.180 
However, the CIDH observed that nearly half of the detainees had not been granted effective 
access to counsel. It considered that the urgent situation continued to exist and had been exacer-
bated. It maintained its precautionary measures.181 
The African Commission has taken an approach that is similar to that of the Inter-American 
Commission. In situations of gross human rights violations, local remedies (Article 56(5) 
ACHPR) need not be exhausted. It has even been pointed out that given the absence of effective 
juridical procedures, in many cases this has resulted in the ‘Commission somehow becoming the 
court of first instance in many of the claims that have come before it, thus negating the whole 
essence of the local remedies rule’.182 Thus, it ‘has been able, only at the stage of admissibility, to 
expose realities of the human rights situations in what have hitherto been Africa’s foremost dicta-
torial regimes’.183 In two arbitrary deportation cases, in which it had equally used provisional 
measures, the African Commission noted that because of the deportation the petitioner had been 
prevented from exhausting domestic remedies. It declared the case admissible.184 In the face of 
imminent irreparable harm it is likely that the Commission will continue to use provisional meas-
ures and subsequently find that the domestic remedies are ineffective. 
Another situation in which provisional measures have been used while domestic remedies 
were not yet exhausted, is in the context of extreme detention conditions or lack of medical treat-
                                                                                                                       
village El Hornito in the state of Zulia in Venezuela. For more than 15 years the state 
petrochemical company ‘El Tablazo’ had disposed chemical waste in the lake on the edge of 
which this village was located. This resulted in a contamination of the town and a diminished air 
quality. This, in turn, affected the health conditions of the inhabitants. PROVEA, Physicians for 
Human Rights and CEJIL were trying to relocate them, to obtain guaranteed medical attention 
and redress for the harm suffered. Action at the local level achieved improvement in their 
situation, CEJIL case docket 1997 (on file with the author) 
179 CIDH Guantanamo Bay, Response of the US government of 19 October 2005, pp. 12-13, 
available at <www.ccr-ny.org> (consulted 20 September 2006). 
180 Ibid. 
181 See CIDH Guantanamo Bay case, precautionary measures of 23 July 2002, 18 March 2003, 29 
July 2004 and 28 October 2005. CIDH Resolution 1/06 in Press Release 27/06, ‘Inter-American 
Commission urges to close Guantanamo without delay’, 28 July 2006, available at 
<http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2006/27.06eng.htm> (consulted 6 October 2006). 
See further Chapter VIII (Ensuring procedural rights) and XVIII (Follow-up). 
182 Onoria (2003), p. 29. 
183 Ibid. 
184 See ACHPR Amnesty International (on behalf of William Banda and John Chinula) v. Zambia, 
212/98, 5 May 1999. See also Modise v. Botswana decided in 1997. See also Chapter XI (Mass 
or arbitrary expulsion). 
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ment. The ECtHR, for instance, has used provisional measures and also ‘put a question to the 
parties asking whether there existed within the Georgian prison system an administrative practice 
consisting of keeping detainees in unsatisfactory conditions, an/or a structural problem underlying 
the lack of medical treatment in prison. Were this to be the case, the applicant would be exempted 
from the requirement laid down by Article 35§1 to exhaust domestic remedies for the purposes of 
his complaints under article 3 of the Convention’.185 
3.4.4 Exhaustion and suspensive effect in non-refoulement cases  
When there is a risk of irreparable harm, in order for a case to be declared admissible there is no 
need to exhaust domestic remedies without suspensive effect. CAT has been particularly clear on 
this with regard to the protection against refoulement in Article 3 ICAT.186 
At the same time, when domestic remedies clearly do not appear to have been exhausted 
wile their effectiveness has not been challenged, CAT refuses requests for provisional meas-
ures.187 In the European system the approach is similar. Petitioners before the ECtHR must pro-
vide copies of all domestic decisions exactly because for provisional measures to be used domes-
tic proceedings must be exhausted. Yet an exception is made when the domestic proceedings do 
not have suspensive effect. In such cases the Court can indeed use provisional measures.188 
                                                 
185 ECtHR Ghvaladze v. Georgia, 42047/06, provisional measures (‘to admit the petitioner to a 
hospital setting where he could receive the appropriate care’) and communicated, Case Law 
Information Note 100, 30 September 2007, p. 10. 
186 See e.g. CAT Josu Arkauz Arana v. France, 9 November 1999 (an appeal against the ministerial 
deportation order issued in respect of the complainant on 13 January 1997 would not have been 
effective or even possible, since it would not have had a suspensive effect and the deportation 
measure was enforced immediately following notification thereof, leaving the person concerned 
no time to seek a remedy. The Committee therefore found that article 22, paragraph 5 (b), did not 
preclude it from declaring the communication admissible’, §6.1); Iratxe Sorzábal Díaz v. France, 
3 May 2005 (an appeal against the ministerial deportation order issued in respect of the 
complainant on 31 August 1999 but served on the very day of her expulsion, at the same time as 
the order indicating the country of destination, would not have been effective or even possible, 
since the deportation measure was enforced immediately following notification thereof, leaving 
the person concerned no time to seek a remedy, §6.1); and Nadeem Ahmad Dar v. Norway, 11 
May 2007 (the remedies suggested by the State party as effective remedies to be exhausted did 
not have suspensive effect and the complainant might face irreparable harm if returned to 
Pakistan and provisional measures were used; petitioner was nevertheless deported to Pakistan, 
which constituted a violation of Article 22 (individual complaint); this breach was remedied by 
granting a residence permit for three years upon return to Norway and the issue whether the 
deportation constituted a violation of Article 3 ICAT had become moot because the petitioner had 
been able to return to Norway). See also its Annual Reports, e.g. A/61/44, §61. The HRC has 
taken a similar approach. See e.g. HRC Simalae Toala et al. v. New Zealand, 2 November 2000, 
(“It was not apparent to the Committee that any remedies that might still be available to the 
authors would be effective to prevent their deportation”, §6.4). See also HRC Jagjit Singh 
Bhullar v. Canada, 31 October 2006 (inadm.) (provisional measures were used pending the 
proceedings). See also Ominayak v. Canada, 26 March 1990. 
187 See e.g. CAT L.Z.B. and her daughter J.F.Z. v. Canada, 8 November 2007 (inadm.). 
188 When a petitioner complains that his removal would expose him to treatment contrary to Article 
3 ECHR a remedy that does not suspend execution of his expulsion order is not ‘effective’ within 
the meaning of Article 35(1) ECHR and does not have to be used. See e.g. ECtHR Sultani c. 
France, 20 September 2007 (provisional measures of 20 December 2005 and 5 January 2006) 
(see §50: “Par ailleurs, lorsqu’un individu se plaint de ce que son renvoi l’exposerait à un 
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Moreover, the ECtHR has explicitly confirmed that an effective remedy in expulsion cases 
must include suspensive effect. Lack of such effect results in a violation of Article 13, sometimes 
combined with Article 3 ECHR.189 Obviously, prior to an admissibility decision involving a 
                                                                                                                       
traitement contraire à l’article 3 de la Convention, les recours sans effet suspensif ne peuvent 
être considérés comme efficaces au sens de l’article 35 §1 de la Convention (voir mutadis 
mutandis et parmi beaucoup d’autres X. c. Allemagne, no 7216/75, décision de la Commission du 
20 mai 1976, Décisions et rapports (DR) 5, p. 137; M. c. France, no 10078/82, décision de la 
Commission du 13 décembre 1984, DR 41, p. 103)”). For the practice of the former Commission 
see e.g. EComHR Barir and Amuur et al. v. France, 18 October 1993, noting that already in the 
1980s it had pointed out that petitioners claiming that their expulsion would expose them to a 
grave danger couild not be expected to exhaust domestic remedise without suspensive 
effect)partly struck from the list. Its provisional measures were of 27 March 1992. Other 
examples are EComHR A. v. France, 27 February 1991 (inadm.), p. 335; Z. v. The Netherlands, 
14 May 1984 and L. v. France, 10 December 1984 (no provisional measures). In B. v. France, 22 
January 1987 (inadm.). the Commission initially used provisional measures but later concluded 
that the petitioner did have a national remedy. He could bring an application before the Conseil 
d’État to set aside the extradition order. It observed ‘that an application of this kind may be 
accompanied by an application for a stay of execution which, although it does not in itself have 
suspensive effect, is intended to ensure that the administrative court will very speedily conduct an 
initial examination of the extradition order and, if appropriate, order a stay of execution’. It 
pointed out that the general practice, as indicated by the Government, was that it refrained from 
implementing the order until the Conseil d’État has considered the petition. In Becker v. 
Denmark (1976) the (former) European Commission had used provisional measures to delay the 
repatriation of a large group of Vietnamese children. Subsequently there was discussion about 
whether or not domestic remedies had been exhausted. The State had acknowledged that the 
available remedy had no suspensive effect, see Becker v. Denmark, 3 October 1975 (inadm.), 
Yearbook XIX, p. 228. Thus, the Commission considered that it would not be an effective 
remedy, see p. 233. See also Denmark, Norway, Sweden and The Netherlands v. Greece (First 
Greek case), 24 January 1968, pp. 770-774 with an interesting discussion on admissibility, 
administrative practice and effective and sufficient remedies.  
189 See e.g. ECtHR Sultani v. France, 20 September 2007, §50; Gebremedhin v. France, 16 April 
2007, §58; Conka v. Belgium, 5 February 2002, §83 and Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, §50. See 
also Guideline 5 of the Committee of Ministers “twenty guidelines on forced return”, 4 May 2005 
(“1. In the removal order, or in the process leading to the removal order, the subject of the 
removal order shall be afforded an effective remedy before a competent authority or body 
composed of members who are impartial and who enjoy safeguards of independence. The 
competent authority or body shall have the power to review the removal order, including the 
possibility of temporarily suspending its execution. 2. The remedy shall offer the required 
procedural guarantees and present the following characteristics: – the time-limits for exercising 
the remedy shall not be unreasonably short; – the remedy shall be accessible, which implies in 
particular that, where the subject of the removal order does not have sufficient means to pay for 
necessary legal assistance, he/she should be given it free of charge, in accordance with the 
relevant national rules regarding legal aid; – where the returnee claims that the removal will 
result in a violation of his or her human rights as set out in guideline 2.1, the remedy shall 
provide rigorous scrutiny of such a claim. 3. The exercise of the remedy should have a suspensive 
effect when the returnee has an arguable claim that he or she would be subjected to treatment 
contrary to his or her human rights as set out in guideline 2.1. [real risk of being executed, or 
exposed to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; real risk of being killed or 
subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment by non-state actors, if the authorities of the state of 
return, parties or organisations controlling the state or a substantial part of the territory of the 
state, including international organisations, are unable or unwilling to provide appropriate and 
 
 Chapter XIV 
770 
State’s argument of non-exhaustion of non-suspensive remedies, the human rights adjudicator 
may use provisional measures.190 
Moreover, in the European system the practice has developed of informing the Court ahead 
of time of a request for provisional measures, including the submission of all relevant informa-
tion, so that the Court may order provisional measures immediately upon exhaustion. The Euro-
pean Court (and previously the Commission) may sometimes itself anticipate exhaustion of do-
mestic remedies by taking provisional measures that are conditional on such exhaustion. It has 
done so on some occasions when there would be insufficient time for the petitioner to request 
provisional measures to prevent expulsion or extradition immediately upon exhaustion of domes-
tic remedies.191 
In K.C. v. Canada (inadm. 1992) counsel had requested the HRC to use provisional meas-
ures because extradition of the petitioner to the US ‘would deprive the Committee of its jurisdic-
tion to consider the communication, and the author to properly pursue his communication’.192 The 
HRC did use them, but later it declared the complaint inadmissible because of non-exhaustion of 
domestic remedies. It also specifically set aside the provisional measures earlier indicated. In this 
respect the inadmissibility decision in this extradition case differs from the aforementioned death 
penalty cases against Jamaica in which the HRC maintained provisional measures beyond the 
inadmissibility decision, pending exhaustion of local remedies and pending a renewed application 
to the Committee. The Committee did point out that the petitioner could bring the issue again 
after exhausting local remedies. The petitioner did this in Cox v. Canada (1994). It was able to do 
                                                                                                                       
effective protection; other situations which would, under international law or national legislation, 
justify the granting of international protection])”. 
190 In CIDH Cheryl Monica Joseph v. Canada, 6 October 1993, the petitioners had unsuccessfully 
requested the Inter-American Commission to take precautionary measures. They had requested 
these measures ‘in order to avoid irreparable damage to Mrs. Joseph, that she be granted 
temporary permission to remain in Canada, and that the deportation order be stayed’, §II, 2. 
Later, the Commission declared the case inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
It considered she could have used a domestic procedure that had suspensive effect, but did not do 
so within the deadline. If there had been special reasons for not having done so in time, a later 
application would have been possible. She would also have had the right to counsel to represent 
her in this ‘application for leave’ to start proceedings against the removal order. While declaring 
the case inadmissible, the Commission, ‘bearing in the mind the humanitarian aspects’ of the 
case, invited Canada ‘to give favourable consideration to the possibility of permitting Mrs. 
Joseph to remain in Canada until the completion of the court actions brought in connection with 
the estate of her late husband’, §31. The Commission did not explain its refusal to take 
precautionary measures but it may have considered, already at this stage, that the petitioner could 
have used domestic remedies that would have had suspensive effect. This would suggest that the 
Commission takes into account prima facie admissibility in its use of precautionary measures. It 
is also possible, however, that the Commission simply considered that the petitioner’s removal to 
Trinidad prima facie would not cause irreparable harm to her life and physical integrity. The 
Commission’s exhortative remark (‘give favourable consideration’) when it declared the case 
itself inadmissible reminds one of certain statements by the Committee on the Elimination of 
Racial Discrimination. See e.g. CERD Lacko v. Slovakia, 9 August 2001, although this was not 
in the context of provisional measures. See also HRC Hendriks v. the Netherlands, 27 July 1988.  
191 See e.g. EComHR Yeung Yuk Leung v. Portugal, 27 November 1995. See further Norgaard/ 
Krüger (1988), p. 115, equally referring to the possibility of conditional request by the (then) 
European Commission under Rule 36 (provisional measures), pending the decision of the 
domestic authorities or courts. 
192 HRC K.C. v. Canada, 29 July 1992 (inadm.), §2.5. 
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so as the State had not extradited him in the meantime.193 In this case counsel explained why he 
chose to submit the case and apply for provisional measures prior to discontinuing the domestic 
appeal:  
“This move was taken because I presumed that a discontinuance of the appeal might result in 
the immediate extradition of Mr. Cox. It was more prudent to seize the Committee first, and 
then discontinue the appeal, and I think this precaution was a wise one, because Mr. Cox is still 
in Canada”.194 
This strategy of counsel seems to be a response to Canada’s actions in the previous extradition 
cases Kindler and Ng who were both extradited immediately upon the final decision of the domes-
tic court and despite the Committee’s provisional measures.195  
The Committee’s use of provisional measures in E.G. v. Canada (disc. 1997) shows that it 
aims to take provisional measures that have the potential to be effective.196 While domestic reme-
dies had not yet been exhausted, counsel had pointed out that the State had extradited fugitives 
‘within minutes or hours of a judgement by the Supreme Court of Canada, allowing no time for 
defendants to pursue any domestic or international remedies aimed at obtaining a stay’. For this 
reason, counsel noted, it was ‘imperative’ that the HRC would address the issue of provisional 
measures in advance of the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada on the application for leave 
to appeal. “(F)ailure to consider the issue of interim measures prior to the Supreme Court of 
Canada decision will in effect render applicant’s recourse to the Human Rights Committee com-
pletely illusory and ineffective”.197 She recalled that the HRC used provisional measures subse-
quent to the decision of the Supreme Court in the abovementioned cases Kindler and Ng. Yet, 
Canada extradited these petitioners within a few hours of the judgment.198 Later, in Judge v. 
Canada (2003) the HRC did not have the chance to order provisional measures.199 In Bakhtiyari 
family v. Australia (2003) the Special Rapporteur, in May 2002, adjusted his request to halt the 
deportation of the children and their mother ‘to be conditional on an adverse decision on the 
application by the High Court’. In other words, if still necessary the provisional measures would 
apply immediately upon exhaustion of domestic remedies. Later, when the Committee considered 
the admissibility of the case, it responded to the State’s argument of non-exhaustion by referring 
to its practice to decide on this question ‘at the point of the consideration of the communication, 
not least for the reason that a communication in respect of which domestic remedies had been 
                                                 
193 HRC Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994. 
194 Id., §8.1. 
195 See Chapter XVII on the official responses of Addressee States. See also Chapter XV on 
assessment of temporal urgency.  
196 HRC E.G. v. Canada, 17 November 1997 (disc.); 738/1997; initial submission 5 January 1997 
(received 7 January 1997), provisional measures of 17 January 1997; withdrawal of provisional 
measures on 28 April 1997; petitioner’s request to withdraw the case of 26 May 1997; on 17 
November 1997 the HRC informed the petitioner that it had discontinued the case (on file with 
the author). 
197 HRC E.G. v. Canada, 17 November 1997 (disc./on file with the author). 
198 Initial submission of 5 January 1997 in HRC E.G. v. Canada (on file with the author). See also 
Chapter XV on prompt decision-making and assessment of temporal urgency, discussing the 
requirement of immediacy. 
199 HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003. See Chapter XV on prompt decision-making and 
assessment of temporal urgency. 
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exhausted after submission could be immediately resubmitted to the Committee if declared inad-
missible for that reason’.200 
Sometimes the State’s non-exhaustion arguments are rather disingenuous. In Olaechea Ca-
huas v. Spain (2006) the petitioner was extradited despite a provisional measure ordered by the 
ECtHR. The State had argued that the case was inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies. The Court dismissed this argument as the domestic recourse suggested by the State did 
not have suspensive effect. In other words the recourse suggested was incapable of halting the 
extradition, as became clear by the extradition. Thus it could not be regarded as an effective rem-
edy.201 Indeed it was rather ironic for the State to argue non-exhaustion while it had itself extra-
dited the petitioner in violation of the Court’s provisional measures.202 
In Weiss v. Austria (2003) the State party had extradited the petitioner in contravention of 
the HRC’s provisional measures and subsequently argued that he had not exhausted domestic 
remedies. The Committee pointed out that it takes provisional measures because of the possibility 
of irreparable harm to the victim.  
“In such cases, a remedy which is said to subsist after the event which the interim measures 
sought to prevent occurred is by definition ineffective, as the irreparable harm cannot be 
reversed by a subsequent finding in the author’s favour by the domestic remedies considering 
the case. In such cases there remain no effective remedies to be exhausted after the event sought 
to be prevented by the request for interim measures takes place; specifically, no appropriate 
remedy is available to the author now detained in the United States should the State party’s 
domestic courts decide in his favour in the proceedings still pending after his extradition”.203 
It is not surprising that adjudicators have expressed themselves emphatically on a State’s 
argument of non-exhaustion after it has deported the petitioner despite a provisional measure. 
CAT has pointed out that ‘when it called for interim measures of protection such as those that 
would prevent the complainant from being deported to Algeria, it did so because it considered 
that there was a risk of irreparable harm. In such cases, a remedy which remains pending after the 
action which interim measures are intended to prevent has taken place is, by definition, pointless 
because the irreparable harm cannot be averted if the domestic remedy subsequently yields a 
decision favourable to the complainant: there is no longer any effective remedy to exhaust after 
the action which interim measures were intended to prevent has taken place. In the present case, 
the Committee felt no appropriate remedy was available to the complainant now he had been 
deported to Algeria, even if the domestic courts in the State party were to rule in his favour at the 
conclusion of proceedings which were still under way after the extradition’.204 In such case for the 
                                                 
200 HRC Bakhtiyari family v. Australia, 29 October 2003, §8.2. It observed that the proceedings 
brought in the High Court had meanwhile been adversely concluded. 
201 ECtHR Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, Judgment of 10 August 2006 (5th Section), §35. 
202 See also Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa et al. v. BH and Fed.BH, 3 September 2002 (adm. and 
merits), §152 (the domestic appeal of petitioner Lahmar was still pending and the Chamber noted 
that the execution of the decision to expel him should have been stayed. “The argument made by 
Bosnia and Herzegovina hence appears not to apply to him as the applicant has exhausted all 
possible remedies”).  
203 HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §8.2. 
204 CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §7.7. In this case the petitioner was deported to 
Algeria on a flight to Algiers on 30 September 2002 and had been missing since, §2.7. CAT also 
noted that the State party had enforced the order for the deportation of the complainant to Algeria 
after communicating its comments on the admissibility of the complaint, §7.5. See also CAT Adel 
Tebourski v. France, 1 May 2007. 
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State the consequence of ignoring the adjudicator’s provisional measures is that the case is 
declared admissible because exhaustion is no longer effective. It noted: 
“The essential purpose of the appeal was to prevent the deportation of the complainant to 
Algeria. In this specific case, enforcing the deportation order rendered the appeal irrelevant by 
vitiating its intended effect: it was inconceivable that, if the appeal went in the complainant's 
favour, he would be repatriated to France. In the circumstances, in the Committee's view, the 
appeal was so intrinsically linked to the purpose of preventing deportation, and hence to the 
suspension of the deportation order, that it could not be considered an effective remedy if the 
deportation order was enforced before the appeal concluded”.205 
In other words: returning the petitioner despite the provisional measures ‘and before the admissi-
bility of the complaint had been considered made the remedies available to the complainant in 
France pointless, and the complaint was accordingly admissible’.206 
Only when a petitioner in a non-refoulement case has not yet been deported, the addressee 
State can properly prevent him from exposure to irreparable harm to his life or personal integrity 
in the receiving State. Once the petitioner has been deported the addressee State can only use 
diplomatic means to gain access to this person in detention and monitor his treatment in order to 
remedy to some extent, the wrong done.207 Strictly speaking the question whether exhaustion of 
domestic remedies is required when the petitioner has already been deported, is unrelated to the 
(earlier) question of provisional measures. Nevertheless, the statements on the illusory nature of 
such domestic remedies are relevant exactly because they illustrate the need for respect for provi-
sional measures.  
One other issue with regard to non-refoulement involves the consequence of compliance by 
a State with a provisional measure for the admissibility of a case. Such compliance does not 
automatically deprive a petitioner of his or her victim status.208 In other words, a State cannot just 
argue that a case is inadmissible because it has complied with a provisional measure. Otherwise it 
could subsequently be tempted to quickly expel the person in question as there is no longer a case 
pending before the Court. 
3.4.5 Absence of legal aid 
In 1990 the Inter-American Court issued an Advisory Opinion on the issue of the exhaustion of 
domestic remedies (Article 46(2) ACHR). It found, in reference to the language of Article 46(2) 
                                                 
205 CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §7.8. 
206 Id., §7.9. 
207 See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
208 See e.g. ECtHR Gebremedhin v. France, 16 April 2007, noting in §56 that ‘a decision or measure 
favourable to the applicant is not in principle sufficient to deprive him of his status as a victim 
unless the national authorities have acknowledged, either expressly or in substance, and then 
afforded redress for, the alleged breach of the Convention. It is quite clear in the instant case that 
those conditions have not been met in relation to the complaint under Articles 13 and 3 taken 
together. The fact that the applicant was not removed to Eritrea and was eventually able to enter 
France to lodge an asylum application appears to have been due to his not being issued with a 
laissez-passer by the Eritrean embassy and then to the application by the Court of Rule 39. 
Furthermore, the Court observes in this regard that the administrative authorisation to enter the 
country and the safe conduct issued on 20 July 2005, and also the decision of the Conseil d'Etat 
of 11 August 2005, referred expressly to Rule 39 and to the interim measure taken in accordance 
with that provision’. 
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jo. Articles 1(1), 24 and 8 ACHR, that ‘if it can be shown that an indigent needs legal counsel to 
effectively protect a right which the Convention guarantees and his indigency prevents him from 
obtaining such counsel, he does not have to exhaust the relevant domestic remedies’.209 In addi-
tion, ‘where an individual requires legal representation and a generalized fear in the legal com-
munity prevents him from obtaining such representation, the exception set out in Article 46(2)(b) 
is fully applicable and the individual is exempted from the requirement to exhaust domestic 
remedies’.210 It stated that under Article 46(1) ACHR ‘and in accordance with general principles 
of international law’, it was for the State asserting non-exhaustion of domestic remedies to prove 
that such remedies in fact existed and that they had not been exhausted.211  
In the African system there is an even greater problem with regard to access to legal aid, but 
in light of the fact – in the absence of a victim requirement – that most petitioners are NGOs, the 
African Commission has not considered this to excuse non-exhaustion.212 
The HRC has dealt with the availability of legal aid as well, in particular for constitutional 
motions by death row inmates. In its considerations of this issue it also took into account the 
length of proceedings. It pointed out that ‘in capital punishment cases, legal aid should not only 
be made available; it should also enable counsel to prepare his client’s defence in circumstances 
that can ensure justice’.213 With regard to Jamaica, the Addressee in most early death penalty 
cases dealt with by the HRC, the absence of legal aid could excuse non-exhaustion of local reme-
                                                 
209 IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-1190 on Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies 
(Article 46(1), 46(2) and 46(2)(b) ACHR), 10 August 1990, §31. 
210 Id., §35. 
211 It is only ‘once a State Party has shown the existence of domestic remedies for the enforcement 
of a particular right guaranteed by the Convention’ that the burden of proof shifts to the 
complainant, who must then demonstrate that the exceptions provided for in Article 46(2) are 
applicable, whether as a result of indigency or because of a generalized fear to take the case 
among the legal community or any other applicable circumstance. Of course, it must also be 
shown that the rights in question are guaranteed in the Convention and that legal representation is 
necessary to assert or enjoy those rights’. See IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-1190 on Exceptions 
to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Article 46(1), 46(2) and 46(2)(b) ACHR), 10 August 
1990, §41. The Inter-American Commission has stressed the importance of access to legal 
representation for asylum seekers. In its Special Report on Canada (2000) it noted: ‘(g)iven the 
nature of the refugee determination process and the interests at stake for the claimant, it is 
obviously in his or her interest to be represented by competent legal counsel’. Not only in 
reference to its own doctrine on the exhaustion of domestic remedies, in which it had addressed 
the question of when legal aid must be provided, but also in reference to the right of access to 
judicial protection under Article XVIII American Declaration, it pointed out that legal aid is 
required ‘in order to effectively vindicate a fundamental protected right under the American 
Declaration or the Constitution or laws of the country concerned’. According to the Commission 
this flowed from the rights to equal protection of the law but even more ‘from the principle that 
rights must be implemented in ways that give them proper effect’. It summarised the issue as 
follows: “States have an obligation to make the right to judicial protection effective. Distinctions 
in the availability or coverage of legal aid provided by the provinces which have the effect of 
depriving claimants requiring such services to ensure their access to judicial protection of 
fundamental rights necessary [sic] implicate the responsibility of the State”. CIDH Canada 
Report 2000, §127. 
212 See e.g. ACHPR Africa Legal Aid v. the Gambia, 11 May 2000. Yet there is no victim 
requirement in the Inter-American system either. In general the African Commission does take a 
wide interpretation of Article 56(5) ACHPR. On exhaustion see, e.g., Udombana (2003), pp. 1-
37. 
213 See e.g. HRC Willard Collins v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991. 
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dies not only for constitutional motions to the Supreme (Constitutional) Court, but also for the 
appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) in London, the ultimate domestic 
appeal at the time.214  
In the period between 1989 and 1991 the HRC was awaiting clarification of the domestic 
situation in Jamaica and had not yet firmly determined whether a constitutional motion, following 
the rejection by the JCPC of a petition for leave to appeal, was an effective remedy for purposes 
of exhaustion. The State party failed to respond to requests for clarifications about constitutional 
motions before the Supreme (Constitutional) Court.215 Some death row inmates requested their 
counsel to withdraw their communication to the HRC and file a constitutional motion instead, 
possibly on the assumption that a favourable HRC decision would not mean that the State would 
release them, while a constitutional motion would. They may have assumed it was necessary to 
withdraw their complaint and first seek such a motion.216  
Later the domestic situation was clarified and the HRC also established its own position on 
the issue. It determined that the considerations governing the application of Article 5 (2)(b) OP 
are the impact of the length of judicial proceedings and the availability of legal aid. There is no 
need to exhaust domestic remedies that have been unreasonably prolonged,217 nor to complete 
                                                 
214 See e.g. HRC Robinson LaVende v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997. In this case the HRC 
not only declared the case admissible but also found violations of Article 14(3)(d) and 14(5) 
ICCPR because of the denial of legal aid for an appeal to the JCPC. 
215 Section 25(2) of the Constitution of Jamaica stipulates that the Supreme (Constitutional) Court 
shall not deal with such motions if it believes that other means of redress have been available. 
216 Information obtained at Secretariat in Geneva, October 1998. In the case of Carlton Reid v. 
Jamaica, 20 July 1990, the HRC not only discussed the prospect of success but also already 
discussed the availability of legal aid for constitutional motions. In a number of interlocutory 
decisions the HRC had requested the State party to clarify whether the Supreme (Constitutional) 
Court had had the opportunity to determine a question that had long been unclear. This was the 
question whether an appeal to the Court of Appeal and the JCPC constituted ‘adequate means of 
redress’ within the meaning of Section 25(2) of the Constitution of Jamaica. The State party had 
replied that the Supreme Court had not yet done so. Given this reply the HRC declared the case 
admissible: “Taking into account the State party’s clarification, together with the absence of legal 
aid for filing a motion in the Constitutional Court and the unwillingness of Jamaican counsel to 
act in this regard without remuneration, the Committee finds that recourse to the Constitutional 
Court under Section 25 of the Jamaican Constitution is not a remedy available to the author with 
in the meaning of Art. 5, paragraph 2(b), of the Optional Protocol”. It clarified this by referring to 
the State’s acknowledgment that the Supreme Court had not yet determined whether an appeal to 
the Court of Appeal and the JCPC constituted adequate means of redress under the Jamaican 
Constitution, thereby blocking recourse to the Supreme Court. The HRC added another reason 
why recourse to the Constitutional Court was not an available remedy under the OP: the absence 
of legal aid for filing such a motion and the unwillingness of Jamaican counsel to act pro deo. See 
also Michael Sawyers and Michael and Desmond McClean v. Jamaica, 11 April 1991 and Clifton 
Wright v. Jamaica, 27 July 1992. In this case Jamaica had challenged the HRC’s admissibility 
findings by stating that its reasoning reflected a ‘grave misunderstanding’ of the relevant 
Jamaican law. It referred to its earlier statement that ‘the decision of the Committee would render 
meaningless and nugatory the hard earned constitutional rights of Jamaicans (...) by the failure to 
distinguish between the right to appeal against the verdict and sentence of the Court in a criminal 
case, and the ‘brand new rights’ to apply for constitutional redress granted in 1962’. 
217 See e.g. HRC Raphael Henry v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; Aston Little v. Jamaica, 1 
November 1991; Leroy Simmonds v. Jamaica, 23 October 1992; Randolph Barrett and Clyde 
Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992; Clifton Wright v. Jamaica, 27 July 1992; Carlton Linton v. 
Jamaica, 22 October 1992 and Lenford Hamilton v. Jamaica, 21 March 1994. 
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constitutional motions if the petitioner is indigent but the State is unwilling or unable to provide 
legal aid for filing these motions.218 
3.4.6 Exhaustion, availability of a written judgment and maintaining provi-
sional measures beyond inadmissibility 
As noted in section 2.5, the HRC developed a most remarkable practice with its decisions to 
maintain provisional measures to halt an execution not until, but beyond its inadmissibility deci-
sion. In the early 1990s the HRC declared inadmissible several petitions because ‘while express-
ing concern about the unavailability, so far, of relevant court documents in the case’ it did not 
consider that a petition to the JCPC would be ‘a priori ineffective’. In other words, it expected the 
petitioners to exhaust this remedy before resorting to the HRC.219 Yet the Committee maintained 
its provisional measures beyond the inadmissibility declaration.220 The only exception was a case 
in which it considered that the delays could be attributed mainly to the petitioner. In its inadmissi-
bility decision to that case it did not mention the possibility that the decision could be reviewed 
upon exhaustion of effective domestic remedies.221 
In Trevor Collins v. Jamaica (1993)222 the HRC finally determined that, in the absence of a 
written judgment it should declare a complaint admissible. It noted that domestic counsel could 
objectively have assumed that any petition for leave to appeal to the JCPC would have failed on 
account of the unavailability of a written judgment from the Court of Appeal. Thus, such petition 
                                                 
218 See e.g. HRC Willard Collins v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; Raphael Henry v. Jamaica, 1 
November 1991; Aston Little v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; Leroy Simmonds v. Jamaica, 23 
October 1992; Randolph Barrett and Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992; Clifton Wright 
v. Jamaica, 27 July 1992; Carlton Linton v. Jamaica, 22 October 1992; Lenford Hamilton v. 
Jamaica, 21 March 1994; Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 8 July 1994; Anthony Currie v. Jamaica, 
29 March 1994 and Clive Smart v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 July 1998. 
219 See e.g. HRC E.B. v. Jamaica, 26 October 1990; A.A. v. Jamaica, 30 October 1989 and R.M. v. 
Jamaica, 26 October 1990. Previously, during the last two sessions of 1989 and the first session 
of 1990 the HRC declared certain petitions admissible because the petitioner’s counsel had been 
unable to obtain copies of the reasoned judgment of the Court of Appeal. Without such judgment 
a petition for special leave to appeal to the JCPC would objectively have no prospect of success. 
Irvine Reynolds v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991 (eventually the HRC found no violations for lack of 
sufficient evidence); see also Barrett and Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992 (determining that, 
in the absence of legal aid and bearing in mind the delay, recourse to the Supreme 
(Constitutional) Court was not required; declaring the case admissible, but finding, after 
examination of the evidence, that the Court of Appeal ‘rapidly produced its written judgment and 
that the ensuing delay in petitioning the Judicial Committee is largely attributable to the authors’; 
it did find violations of Articles 7 and 10(1)); M.F. v. Jamaica, 21 October 1991 (on 15 March 
1990 the HRC declared the case admissible under Article 14 because in the practice of the JCPC 
all petitions unsupported by the relevant court documents had been dismissed; this is why the 
HRC considered ‘that if a petition for leave to appeal was to be considered an available and 
effective remedy, it had to be supported by the judgment from which leave to appeal was 
sought’). Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991 (also a violation of Article 14(3)(c) and 14(5) 
because of the absence of a written judgment by the Court of Appeal); Trevor Collins v. Jamaica, 
25 March 1993 (also a violation of Article 14(3)(c) and 14(5) because of the absence of a written 
judgment by the Court of Appeal). 
220 See e.g. HRC A.H. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 October 1990; M.F. v. Jamaica, 17 July 1992, 
and Peter Bradshaw v. Barbados, 19 July 1994. 
221 HRC N.A.J v. Jamaica, 26 July 1990. 
222 HRC Trevor Collins v. Jamaica, 25 March 1993. 
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would not have had a real prospect of success. It was true that the Judicial Committee had heard 
several petitions concerning Jamaica in the absence of a written judgment of the Court of Appeal, 
but, on the basis of the information available to the Committee, all of these petitions were dis-
missed because of the absence of such a judgment. Thus it would henceforth declare such com-
plaint admissible. On the merits the HRC determined that the absence of a written judgment by 
the Court of Appeal constituted a violation of Article 14(3)(c) and 14(5) ICCPR. 
Thus it was during the years preceding its eventual determination that the unavailability of a 
written judgment by the court of appeal would in fact excuse non-exhaustion of domestic reme-
dies that the HRC developed a practice of maintaining provisional measures beyond inadmissibil-
ity. During these years it used provisional measures both prior to a determination of admissibility, 
and subsequent to a determination of inadmissibility. It did so in order to prevent irreparable harm 
to persons. Once the Committee’s case law was clarified with regard to the unavailability of a 
written judgment by the domestic court, provisional measures would be used in advance of a 
determination about the effectiveness of domestic remedies, but no longer beyond a declaration of 
inadmissibility. 
3.4.7 Exhaustion in death penalty cases not relating to the availability of a 
written judgment 
The HRC has considered that a petition to the Governor General for a stay of execution is not a 
domestic remedy that should be exhausted under the OP.223 This situation is different with regard 
to a petition to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC). In Guerra and Wallen v. 
Trinidad and Tobago (1995)224 the Committee had first used provisional measures and then de-
clared the case inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, because a petition for leave 
                                                 
223 HRC Trevor Ellis v. Jamaica, 28 July 1992. The State had argued that the complaint was 
inadmissible because the petitioner had not exhausted domestic remedies. It noted that the 
petitioner ‘has petitioned the Governor General for a stay of execution’. It also noted that the 
JCPC had recommended to the Governor General to grant a stay of execution ‘pending the 
outcome of the representations made on his behalf’. Counsel had pointed out that the State failed 
to indicate whether the Governor General had indeed adopted the JCPC’s recommendation of a 
stay. It was not clear whether a stay of execution was indeed in force. Counsel also submitted that 
he had not yet received a reply to his petition to the Governor General, requesting a stay of 
execution pending the outcome of several similar cases before the JCPC. 
224 HRC Lincoln Guerra and Brian Wallen v. Trinidad and Tobago. The situation in this case was as 
follows. An earlier petition for special leave to appeal to the JCPC had been dismissed a few days 
previously. The initial submission was of 25 March 1994, the day of their planned execution. The 
Special Rapporteur took provisional measures a month later. In its first submission, 23 June 
1994, the State argued that the petitions were inadmissible because the petitioners had also 
submitted their case to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (nr. 11279). On 10 
November 1994 counsel informed the HRC, including documentary evidence, that Mr. Guerra 
had withdrawn his case before the Inter-American Commission, as it was under consideration by 
the HRC. By submission of 23 June 1994 and 7 September 1994 the State argued non-exhaustion 
of domestic remedies. In the latter submission it referred to the JCPC’s conservatory order of 25 
July 1994. Counsel responded that the State’s argument was inconsistent with its clearly 
manifested intention to execute the petitioners ‘on merely 17 hours’ notice, within three days 
after the confirmation of their conviction, irrespective of their desire to make representations to 
the Mercy Committee for commutation of their death sentences, to apply to the courts of Trinidad 
for relief staying their execution and to apply to the Human Rights Committee’. 
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to appeal before the JCPC was still pending and the JCPC had ordered a stay of execution.225 It 
declared the case inadmissible but pointed out that this decision could be reviewed upon exhaus-
tion. Yet it did not maintain the provisional measures, as it had done in cases involving unavail-
ability of legal documents.226 This seems to indicate that it is only when non-exhaustion could be 
attributed to the State’s failure to make available legal documents that it maintains its provisional 
measures beyond its inadmissibility declaration. Nevertheless, in this case the HRC could have 
maintained its provisional measures as an indication to the State that it should not execute the 
death sentence of the petitioner immediately upon exhaustion when there is still a possibility of 
review by the HRC upon exhaustion.  
After the State had issued an execution warrant the petitioners had submitted the case to the 
HRC and the JCPC as well as to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. This shows 
that in urgent cases petitioners may resort to various international and domestic bodies. In my 
view this does not necessarily conflict with rules on exhaustion of local remedies, on the one 
hand, and on non-submission of the ‘same matter’ to different international bodies, on the other 
hand,227 as long as this is only done at the early stages of the proceedings, in order to prevent 
irreparable harm to persons.  
In the context of Bethel v. Trinidad and Tobago (1999)228 the State referred to the rules on 
exhaustion and subsidiarity. Among others, it pointed out that domestic remedies had not been 
pursued and exhausted. The appeal was pending before the Court of Appeal and the remedies 
available could include ‘the power to quash his sentence or to order a retrial’. In its reasoning the 
State brought up the subsidiarity principle.  
“The competence of the Committee is subsidiary to that of the domestic legal system of the 
state. For the Committee to be seized of this case while legal proceedings are continuing before 
the domestic courts of the State party is a direct challenge to the balanced relationship between 
the international protection of human rights and the domestic jurisdiction of States parties”.229 
Yet the State did not explain how the obligation to exhaust of domestic remedies without suspen-
sive effect would satisfy the subsidiarity criterion. After all, the whole point is that international 
organisations and adjudicators may not interfere in situations that can adequately be dealt with at 
                                                 
225 One of the petitioners in this case (Wallen) had died four months after the initial submission and 
one month after the provisional measure. Counsel argued that the State’s determination to 
execute the other petitioner (Guerra), ‘irrespective of undetermined violations of the author’s 
constitutional rights or rights under the Covenant’, was ‘demonstrated by the events surrounding 
the execution of Glenn Ashby in July 1994’ (see also Chapter XVI (Legal status) and Chapter 
XVII (Official State responses)) after his case had been submitted to the HRC. The HRC 
concluded, however, that a petition to the JCPC could not be considered ineffective in this case, 
meaning that domestic remedies had not yet been exhausted. This had not prevented it from using 
provisional measures initially. 
226 See section 2.4 of this Chapter. 
227 For a case brought first to the Inter-American Commission and then to the HRC, see e.g. HRC 
Clifton Wright v. Jamaica, 27 July 1992, §2.8. The case had been submitted to the CIDH on 13 
February 1984, registered as no. 9260, hearing of 24 March 1988 and resolution 29/88 of 14 
September 1988. On 4 November 1988 Jamaica challenged this resolution. Two months later the 
case was submitted to the HRC. 
228 HRC Christopher Bethel v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 March 1999. Provisional measures of 17 
September 1998 (on file with the author). 
229 Further submission of the Government of Trinidad and Tobago of 9 February 1999 in the case of 
Bethel (830/1998) (on file with the author). 
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the level of the State. The State should have the first opportunity to remedy alleged violations. 
Yet if a State would have the ultimate say on what constitutes adequacy this would not reflect 
subsidiarity, but rather absolute national sovereignty.230 
The relationship between provisional measures and exhaustion of domestic remedies is il-
lustrated in Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago (2002).231 According to the State the petitioner had not 
exhausted available domestic remedies for his right to life claim (Article 6 ICCPR). Counsel 
responded that since the petitioner ‘was executed unlawfully while he was pursuing judicial reme-
dies, the State party is estopped from claiming that further remedies remained to be exhausted’.232 
In light of the State’s disrespect for its provisional measures, the HRC declared admissible the 
complaint under Article 6. It was not necessary for counsel first to exhaust domestic remedies in 
respect of her claim that her client was arbitrarily deprived of his life. It observed the following 
about this issue:  
“[I]t was to prevent ‘irreparable harm’ to Mr. Ashby that the Committee’s Special Rapporteur 
issued, on 13 July 1994, a request of a stay of execution pursuant to rule 86 of the rules of 
procedure; this request was intended to allow Mr. Ashby to complete pending judicial remedies 
and to enable the Committee to determine the admissibility of Mr. Ashby’s communication”.233 
In the context of its admissibility decision the HRC specifically referred to the prevention of 
irreparable harm to Ashby, in other words, irreparable harm to a person. At the same time it re-
ferred to the aim of enabling it to determine admissibility. In this respect it noted that the provi-
sional measure was to ensure and reinforce the suspensive effect of the domestic remedies that 
were still being pursued.234 
The Inter-American Commission has included the issue of exhaustion of domestic remedies 
in its arguments to convince the Inter-American Court to take provisional measures on behalf of 
alleged victims who had been sentenced to death. It pointed out that the alleged victims had not 
been able to effectively challenge the compatibility of their death sentences with the rights under 
the Convention. In other words, effective domestic remedies did not appear to be available.235 The 
Court itself, though, has not dealt with this issue in the context of halting executions.  
The African Commission has been faced with non-exhaustion arguments with regard to per-
sons who had already been executed. In the Ken Saro-Wiwa case it noted that in ‘light of the fact 
that the subjects of the communications are now deceased, it is evident that no domestic remedy 
can give the complainants the satisfaction they seek’.236 Indeed this is particularly so because the 
Commission had used provisional measures that had been ignored. Only when the complaint 
would have been made by family members subsequent rather than prior to the execution, it should 
have been examined first whether effective domestic remedies were available.237 
                                                 
230 On subsidiarity see also Carozza (2003). See further Chapter XVII on the official responses by 
addressee States. 
231 HRC Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002. 
232 Id., §7.4. 
233 Id., §5.7. 
234 Following the HRC’s decision on admissibility the State repeated its argument that proceedings 
were still pending before the domestic courts in relation to Mr. Ashby’s execution. See also 
Chapter XVII on the official responses by Addressee States. 
235 See IACHR James et al., Order of the President for urgent measures, 19 June 1999. 
236 ACHPR Ken Saro-Wiwa v. Nigeria, October 1998, §77. 
237 See also the above discussion, under the heading ‘Exhaustion and suspensive effect in non-
refoulement cases’, on the disingenuous arguments by some States in non-refoulement cases. 
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3.4.8 Suspensive effect and cultural survival 
In Sara et al. v. Finland (1994) the HRC had initially used provisional measures to help ensure 
cultural survival.238 The case shows that the Committee’s provisional measures in cases involving 
cultural survival no longer apply once the HRC considers domestic remedies have not yet been 
exhausted. In this case the HRC, which had previously used provisional measures, took the oppor-
tunity to expand on its earlier admissibility findings in light of the State’s argument that the peti-
tioners could still avail themselves of local remedies in respect of road construction activities in 
the residual area.239 It declared the case inadmissible. Different from certain death penalty 
cases,240 this also terminated the provisional measure.  
The case of the Lubicon Lake Band (1990), submitted by Chief Ominayak, shows the rela-
tionship between provisional measures, exhaustion of domestic remedies and the question 
whether such remedies have suspensive effect.241 The HRC confirmed that if domestic remedies 
are delayed and have no suspensive effect they cannot prevent irreparable harm. The petitioner 
claimed that Government officials and representatives of energy corporations were using the 
domestic political and legal process ‘to thwart and delay the Band’s actions until, ultimately, the 
Band becomes incapable of pursuing them, because industrial development at the current rate in 
the area, accompanied by the destruction of the environmental and economic base of the Band, 
would make it impossible for the Band to survive as a people for many more years’.242 Since 1975 
the Lubicon had already taken various actions domestically to assert title over their lands and 
prevent oil and gas developments destroying their cultural and economic basis. These actions 
included a request for a ‘caveat’, a declaratory judgement and an interim injunction.243 More than 
                                                 
238 See Conclusion Part II. 
239 HRC Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.). It noted that Article 27 ICCPR had seldom 
been invoked before the local courts, while the Finnish judicial authorities, on the other hand, had 
become increasingly aware of the domestic relevance of international human rights standards. In 
this light the doubts of the petitioners about the readiness of domestic courts to deal with claims 
based on Article 27 ICCPR did not justify their failure to resort to domestic remedies. It did not 
consider that a recent judgment of the Supreme Administrative Tribunal should be seen as a 
negative precedent for the adjudication of the case just because it made no reference to Article 
27. 
240 See section 2.4 of this Chapter. 
241 HRC Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990. 
242 See HRC Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990, §3.2. 
243 Chief Ominayak explained that, in 1975, the Band filed a request for a ‘caveat’ with the 
appropriate authorities, ‘which would give notice to all parties dealing with the caveated land of 
their assertion of their aboriginal title’. A year later the Attorney General of Alberta requested a 
postponement of the case pending resolution of a similar case and the provincial Supreme Court 
granted this application. In 1977, however, an amendment to the Land Title Act was passed, 
introduced by the Attorney General, precluding the filing of caveats. This amendment was made 
retroactive to January 1975, predating the caveat filed on behalf of the Lubicon Lake Band. As a 
result, the Supreme Court’s hearings were dismissed as moot. In 1980 members of the Band 
requested a declaratory judgment of the Federal Court of Canada for the protection of the rights 
to their land and the use of the natural resources. This Court dismissed the claim against the 
provincial government and all energy corporations except Petro-Canada. The claim against this 
one energy corporation and against the federal government still stood. In 1982 the Band 
requested an interim injunction ‘to halt development in the area until issues raised by the Band’s 
land and natural resource claims were settled’. The petitioner noted that the main purpose of the 
injunction was to prevent the provincial government of Alberta and the oil companies ‘from 
further destroying the traditional hunting and trapping territory of the Lubicon people’. The 
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a year after initial submission and more than two months after the Supreme Court of Canada 
refused leave to appeal, Canada responded to the petitioner’s submission before the HRC and 
argued that the legal actions in the federal and provincial court were still pending. It explained 
that the Band’s request for an interim injunction had been dismissed on the basis of previous 
jurisprudence in which the following criteria had been set out for the use of such injunctions: the 
issue is serious, without the injunction irreparable harm will be suffered prior to trial and, finally, 
‘the balance of convenience between the parties favours relief to the applicant’.244 The dispute 
was mainly about whether the Band ‘could be adequately compensated in damages if it was ulti-
mately successful at trial’. The petitioner explained his reason to resort to the HRC as follows: 
“The Lubicon Lake Band is not requesting a territorial rights decision. Rather, the Band 
requests only that the Human Rights Committee assist it in attempting to convince the 
government of Canada that: (a) The Band’s existence is seriously threatened by the oil and gas 
development that has been allowed to proceed unchecked on their traditional hunting grounds 
and in complete disregard for the human community inhabiting the area; (b) Canada is 
responsible for the current state of affairs and for co-operating in their resolution in accordance 
with article 1 of the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights”.245 
He argued that the only effective remedy in this case was to seek an interim injunction. He noted 
that ‘without the preservation of the status quo, a final judgment on the merits, even if favourable 
to the Band, would be rendered ineffectual’.246 
“[A]ny final judgement recognizing aboriginal rights, or alternatively treaty rights, [could] 
never restore the way of life, livelihood and means of subsistence of the Band”.247 
In reference to its established case law that only effective and available remedies must be ex-
hausted, the HRC found that there were no effective remedies still available to the Band.248 It was 
only at this time, in 1987, that the HRC also used provisional measures to avoid irreparable harm. 
It did so in light of the seriousness of the claim that the Band was on the verge of extinction.249 
The fact that the HRC declared the case admissible shows that it did not consider the do-
mestic remedies effective in saving or restoring the ‘cultural livelihood’ of the Band. It confirmed 
this following the State’s request for a review.250 This may mean that at the time it still assumed 
                                                                                                                       
provincial court, however, ‘did not render its decision for almost two years, during which time oil 
and gas development continued, along with rapid destruction of the Band’s economic base’. It 
eventually denied the request. They appealed this decision to the Court of Appeal of Alberta, 
which dismissed it more than a year later. Finally, the Band requested leave to appeal from the 
judgment of the Alberta Court of Appeal, but the Supreme Court of Canada refused this in March 
1985. 
244 See Supreme Court of Canada Erickson v. Wiggins Adjustments Ltd. (1980) 6 W.R.R. 188. 
245 HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 1990, §12. 
246 Id., §13.2. 
247 Id., §13.2. 
248 Id., §13.2. 
249 See Chapter X on protecting cultural survival of indigenous peoples.  
250 Wennergren submitted an individual opinion considering the communication inadmissible 
because of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. “To my mind, it is not compatible with 
international law that an international instance consider issues which, concurrently, are pending 
before a national court”. He did not specifically discuss the availability of domestic remedies 
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that its decision on the merits, if it would find a violation, would at least suggest an effective 
remedy.251 In light of the absence of suspensive effect of the domestic proceedings, the use of 
provisional measures was appropriate.252 However, they would have been more functional had 
they been taken earlier in the proceedings.253 The Committee’s decision only to use provisional 
measures in this case once it declared it admissible, may be explained by the fact that in 1987 it 
did not yet have an extensive practice with regard to provisional measures, let alone with regard 
to their use to protect of cultural survival of indigenous peoples. 
3.4.9 Conclusion 
In sum, the above cases indicate that human rights adjudicators have determined that for the same 
reason there is no need to fully determine admissibility for the use of provisional measures, there 
is no need to exhaust domestic remedies that do not have suspensive effect. This reason is the 
overriding aim of protecting persons against irreparable harm in death penalty, non-refoulement 
and cultural survival cases. 
Given the fact that for the use of provisional measures what is required is, at most, prima 
facie admissibility, it is obvious that they may be used when domestic remedies clearly have been 
determined as ineffective in previous cases. In addition provisional measures are sometimes even 
used when those domestic remedies that could be effective are not yet exhausted, but might be at 
any moment.254 
3.5 Provisional measures and the likelihood of inadmissibility for reasons 
other than non-exhaustion 
3.5.1 Introduction 
To what extent does possible inadmissibility for reasons other than non-exhaustion play a role in 
the decision of the human rights adjudicator to take provisional measures?255 This section first 
refers to the fact that many claims are declared inadmissible as manifestly unfounded and some as 
an abuse of process. Then it deals with inadmissibility because the same matter has already been 
                                                                                                                       
with suspensive effect, nor the Committee’s previous case law on the effectiveness of domestic 
remedies. 
251 See further on this case Chapter X (Culture) and Chapter XIII, section 5 on beneficiaries and 
section 4 on forms of reparation. 
252 They made little sense, however, in light of the remedy suggested immediately upon upholding 
the admissibility decision. This remedy did not amount to much, as is discussed in Chapter XIII 
on the relationship between provisional measures and reparation.  
253 See also Chapter XV on immediacy and risk.  
254 See also Chapter II (the sections on promptness in the various systems). 
255 The HRC, for instance, has regularly declared cases inadmissible for incompatibility with the 
ICCPR. It has also dealt with arguments that petitions were inadmissible as an abuse of the right 
of submission, for instance in light of consecutive claims by the same petitioner. In addition it has 
declared cases inadmissible as they cannot claim to be a ‘victim’ of a violation. Cases involving 
Article 6 (right to life) and risks to health of environmental pollution are often considered to 
constitute actio popularis and are declared inadmissible as the petitioners cannot show they are or 
will be victims themselves in the foreseeable future. In such cases the HRC has decided not to 
use provisional measures. See also Chapter XII (Other situations) and Chapter XV (Immediacy 
and risk). 
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dealt with by another international adjudicator (‘same matter’). Finally it refers to the Bosnia 
Chamber’s discussion of its jurisdiction ratione termporis under the Dayton Peace Agreement.  
3.5.2 Manifestly unfounded or an abuse of process? 
Many cases are declared inadmissible as manifestly unfounded. In death penalty cases provisional 
measures have nevertheless been used. An example of an inadmissibility decision for reasons 
other than non-exhaustion is R.M. v. Trinidad and Tobago (1993).256 The HRC declared inadmis-
sible many claims in relation to Art. 14(1), especially when they involve claims of inadequate 
evaluation of the evidence or inadequate jury instructions by the trial judge.257  
In Hylton v. Jamaica (1996) the State had argued that the communication was inadmissible 
as an abuse of the right of submission (Article 3 OP).258 The Committee stated that although the 
petitioner should display due diligence in the presentation of claims, and although ‘it is conceiv-
able that the sequential introduction, in the course of consideration of a case, of claims which 
could have been formulated at the time of the initial submission may constitute an abuse of proc-
ess, this does not apply if the petitioner of a case whose examination is concluded subsequently 
raises new claims which he could not have raised in the context of the previous complaint. In the 
Committee’s opinion, issues of res judicata do not arise in the latter hypothesis’.259 The ‘death 
row phenomenon’-claim brought in the second case was not at issue in the first case. 
                                                 
256 HRC R.M. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1993 (submission of 16 July 1989; provisional 
measure of 29 January 1990; transmission of 13 August 1991; inadmissible (evaluation of the 
evidence and jury instructions generally for the domestic courts; insufficient evidence of 
inadequate time and facilities) (on file with the author). According to the cover page the Special 
Rapporteur used Rule 91 (on transmission of cases) only, but in fact the previous Rapporteur had 
already used Rule 86 (provisional measures). The HRC later declared this case inadmissible for 
failure to substantiate and lack of jurisdiction ratione materiae. The State party had raised no 
objections to the admissibility of the claim. The only matter that remained pending in court was a 
constitutional motion, filed in July 1986, seeking a ‘declaration that should an order for the 
execution be made’, the petitioner ‘must be given five days notice’. The State added that it had 
given assurances not to execute R.M. pending the determination of the motion, although it 
pointed out that the motion itself was ‘unnecessary’ because the question had already been solved 
in the affirmative in another case.  
257 The HRC never intended to function as a so-called ‘fourth instance’ and in two early 
inadmissibility decisions (1989) it pointed out that it was for the appellate courts of States parties 
to evaluate facts and evidence. It was beyond the scope of application of Article 14 for the HRC 
to review generalised claims of bias or specific jury instructions. Chanet attached individual 
opinions to these decisions, considering that in this formulation the HRC seemed to take away 
too much from its task of monitoring compliance with Article 14 (fair trial). HRC A.W. v. 
Jamaica, 8 November 1989 and G.S. v. Jamaica, 8 November 1989. Chanet noted that while it 
was within the competence of national courts to assess the fairness of the conditions in which a 
trial takes place, this competence could not exclude that of the HRC in the implementation of the 
ICCPR. The HRC modified its formulation during the next session in March 1990. Since then the 
expression has been: “It is not in principle for the Committee to review specific instructions to 
the jury by a judge in a trial by jury, unless it can be ascertained that the instructions to the jury 
were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice”. See e.g. HRC D.F. v. Jamaica, 26 
March 1990 (not a death penalty case; no provisional measures). 
258 HRC Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 16 July 1996. 
259 Id., §6.3. 
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“Given that he had been detained on death row for slightly over two years when he submitted 
his initial complaint, he could not have argued with any reasonable prospect of success that the 
length of his detention on death row was, at that time, contrary to articles 7 and 10 paragraph 
1”.260 
In October 1994, when he submitted his second case, his factual situation had changed. 
“In these circumstances, the present complaint does not amount to an abuse of process; nor does 
the Committee consider that it ‘unnecessarily prolongs’ the judicial process, as the claim at 
issue in the present communication has never been adjudicated”.261 
Thus, the communication was declared admissible in so far as it concerned the length of detention 
on death row. The HRC later dismissed the claim on the merits.262 In this type of consecutive 
claim the use of provisional measures would be justifiable. This would be different with regard to 
a clear case of abuse of process.263  
3.5.3 Same matter 
In some cases the petitioner first petitions to a regional and subsequently to an international adju-
dicator. In Wright v. Jamaica (1992) the HRC declared a case admissible because it was no 
longer under examination by the Inter-American Commission.264 Just like the IACHR the HRC 
found that the State had violated the fundamental right to a fair trial.265  
In the first expulsion case dealt with by the HRC (1978) it did draw the petitioner’s atten-
tion to the State party’s observation that the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights was 
examining the ‘same matter’. It decided ‘that it should be explained to the petitioner that this is 
not a decision on the admissibility of his communication,’ but it used provisional measures.266 
This again shows that the HRC is rather safe than sorry initially.  
                                                 
260 Id., §6.4. 
261 Ibid. 
262 Thus far it has virtually always dismissed claims relating to the death row phenomenon either on 
the merits or already in the admissibility phase. See for two possible exceptions the discussion of 
the death row phenomenon in Chapter III (Halting executions).  
263 The question arises what would be the use of taking provisional measures to halt an execution 
pending the case in relation to a death row phenomenon claim alone, if the HRC is intent on 
maintaining its present approach towards such claims. 
264 HRC Clifton Wright v. Jamaica, 27 July 1992, §2.8. The case had been submitted to the CIDH on 
13 February 1984, registered as no. 9260, hearing of 24 March 1988 and resolution 29/88 of 14 
September 1988. On 4 November 1988 Jamaica challenged this resolution. Two months later the 
case was submitted to the HRC. 
265 It had declared that ‘since the conviction and sentence are undermined by the record in this case, 
and that the appeals process did not permit for a correction, the Government of Jamaica has 
violated the petitioner’s fundamental rights’ under Article 25 ACHR. This is a rare case in which 
the HRC found a violation of Article 14(1) for a denial of justice. See Chapter XV on assessment 
of risk. 
266 HRC O.E. v. S., 26 July 1978. On 27 October 1978 the HRC decided to discontinue consideration 
of the case. A few weeks previously the petitioner had requested this in light of the submission of 
the same matter to the Inter-American Commission. O.E. v. S., 27 October 1978. See also e.g. 
HRC Alzery v. Sweden, 25 October 2006. Yet see also CAT A.R.A. v. Switzerland, 30 April 2007 
(inadm.). The case was declared inadmissible for dealing with the same matteras one before the 
ECtHR. Previously a request for provisional measures had been denied. 
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Related to the issue of consecutive claims before the same adjudicator, is the issue of the 
same matter brought before a different adjudicator. Uruguay had contested the admissibility of 
several early detention cases before the HRC arguing that the ‘same matter’ was pending before 
the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. It appears that any prima facie inadmissibility 
on this ground did not prevent the HRC from inquiring about the health of the alleged victims. A 
combination of the urgency involved and the fact that the petitioners could easily remedy any 
possible inadmissibility by withdrawing the complaint before the Inter-American Commission in 
advance of any decision by the HRC, could explain this approach. 
It is unlikely that the HRC already considered the possible inadmissibility in Sendic v. Uru-
guay (1981)267 when it transmitted the case to the State and requested information on the state of 
health of Mr. Sendic. After all, it was only after Uruguay contested the admissibility of the case 
that the Committee checked with the Secretariat of the Inter-American Commission whether the 
‘same matter’ might already be pending before that Commission. Upon inquiry the Secretariat of 
the Inter-American Commission explained that a third party had submitted the case to which the 
State referred.268  
By contrast, when the HRC enquired about the health of the alleged victims in Lafuente 
Penarrieta et al. v. Bolivia (1987)269 it had already ascertained that the Inter-American Commis-
sion had not registered the same matter. Still, this may be attributed to the fact that, at the time, 
the HRC could only decide on (informal) provisional measures during sessions, as there was no 
Special Rapporteur yet.270 In Polay Campos v. Peru (1997)271 the HRC used informal provisional 
measures only when it declared the case admissible. By that time it had contacted the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights to find out whether the same matter was already pend-
ing before another international adjudicator. The Inter-American Commission had registered a 
case272 on behalf of Polay Campos but it had no plans to prepare a Report on it within the next 12 
months. In this light the HRC considered it was not precluded from considering the case before it. 
Nevertheless, the reason the Committee did not use (informal) provisional measures before it 
decided on admissibility is probably due to an oversight rather than based on the view that admis-
sibility must be determined before provisional measures could be used.273  
3.5.4 Dayton and jurisdiction ratione temporis 
The Dayton Peace Agreement entered into force on 14 December 1995. The Bosnia Chamber 
does not have jurisdiction ratione temporis over violations prior to that date. It declared admissi-
ble several cases involving violations originating before that date but continuing until afterwards. 
In Islamic Community in BiH v. Republika Srpska (Muslim Town Cemetery in Prnjavor), for 
instance, the Chamber first established that the violation was ongoing and it had jurisdiction 
ratione temporis and subsequently took the view that it was ‘not necessary to assess whether at 
                                                 
267 HRC Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. Uruguay, 28 October 1981. 
268 Later the petitioner also sent the Committee a copy of the request by this third party to the Com-
mission to discontinue the case before it ‘so as to remove any procedural uncertainties’ about the 
HRC’s competence to deal with the case. 
269 HRC Lafuente Penarrieta, Rodriguez Candia, Ruiz Caceres and Toro Dorado v. Bolivia, 2 
November 1987. 
270 See Chapter XV on prompt decision-making and assessment of temporal urgency. 
271 HRC Polay Campos (submitted by his wife Espinoza de Polay) v. Peru, 6 November 1997. 
272 Case 11.048. 
273 It was Committee member Prado Vallejo (Ecuador) who suggested the use of such provisional 
measures in July 1996, just before the adoption of the admissibility decision. Letter of Prado 
Vallejo to the Geneva Secretariat, 2 July 1996 (on file with the author).  
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the time when the alleged violation began, a remedy effective in theory and practice would have 
been available to the applicant’. It was satisfied that the remedy indicated by the respondent Party 
was ‘currently not available’ and had not been available since the entry into force of the Agree-
ment.274  
In Matanović (1997) Nowak pointed out that the fact that most missing persons in Bosnia 
and Herzegovina disappeared before the entry into force of the Dayton Peace Agreement did not 
preclude it from considering such cases ‘if there is presumptive evidence that they were still held 
in detention’ after the entry into force. He referred to Article 17 (1) of the UN Declaration on the 
Protection of All Persons from enforced Disappearance stipulating that ‘as long as the perpetra-
tors continue to conceal the fate and the whereabouts of persons who have disappeared and these 
facts remain unclarified’ the act of enforced disappearance constitutes a ‘continuing offence’.275 
The Chamber has pointed out that ‘evidence of detention prior of the entry into force of the 
Agreement may well be relevant to the question whether the person concerned has been in cus-
tody since’.276 The weight to be attached to such evidence varies with the circumstances, ‘includ-
ing the length of time which has elapsed since the person concerned was last shown to have been 
in custody’. Normally ‘it would be essential that there should be some other evidence (even cir-
cumstantial or presumptive evidence), pointing to the detention having continued after the 
Agreement came into force, before the Chamber could conclude that the Agreement had been 
violated’.277 While doubts on jurisdiction ratione temporis may not be an obstacle to the use of 
provisional measures, at the same time it is clear that it is more likely that disappeared persons 
will return alive if provisional measures are taken shortly after the disappearance.278 
3.6 Admissibility criteria and the two kinds of provisional measures in the 
new Convention against Disappearances 
In urgent cases the supervisory committee that will be instituted under the International Conven-
tion for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance279 may use either provisional 
measures proper, with regard to States that have recognized the individual complaint procedure 
under Article 31,280 or an alternative type of provisional measure, based on Article 30. This article 
introduces the possibility for the Committee to intervene upon a request ‘by relatives of the disap-
peared person or their legal representatives, their counsel or any person authorized by them, as 
well as by any other person having a legitimate interest’ that ‘a disappeared person should be 
                                                 
274 Bosnia Chamber Islamic Community in BiH v. Republika Srpska (Muslim Town Cemetery in 
Prnjavor), 11 January 2000, §93. 
275 Bosnia Chamber Josip, Božana and Tomislav Matanović v. Republika Srpska, 6 August 1997 
(merits), concurring opinion Manfred Nowak, §7. 
276 Bosnia Chamber Grgić v. Republika Srpska, 5 August 1997, §18. 
277 See Bosnia Chamber Grgić v. Republika Srpska, 5 August 1997, §18 and Matanović v. Republika 
Srpska, 6 August 1997, §32. 
278 See also Chapter VI (Locating and protecting disappeared persons). 
279 Adopted in 2006, but not yet entered into force. 
280 Article 31 provides for an optional individual complaint procedure. Its section 4 stipulates: “4. At 
any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits has been 
reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent consideration a 
request that the State Party will take such interim measures as may be necessary to avoid possible 
irreparable damage to the victims of the alleged violation. Where the Committee exercises its 
discretion, this does not imply a determination on admissibility or on the merits of the 
communication”. 
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sought and found’. In fact when it considers that a range of procedural requirements is met, it 
‘shall request the State Party concerned to provide it with information on the situation of the 
persons sought, within a time limit set by the Committee’. It appears to be a very circumscribed 
treaty based ‘urgent action’. The procedural requirements are stricter than those applied by the 
other adjudicators. The reason for including the list of procedural requirements (exhaustion etc.) 
that are generally relevant mainly for declaring a case admissible, and not already at the state of 
provisional measures, may be that the States wished to circumscribe the new power of the treaty 
body introduced in this treaty. After all it can intervene also with regard to States that have not 
recognized the individual complaint procedure. Nevertheless these requirements are mentioned in 
the context of the Committee’s obligation to intervene (‘shall’). The Committee could argue that 
it still has the discretionary power to intervene also in other cases, especially in circumstances in 
which all other adjudicators, as well as the UN special procedures, consider this warranted.  
In any case this strict approach should not be read into Article 31(4) on provisional meas-
ures proper. Such interpretation would be a retreat from the practice of the other treaty bodies and 
contrary to the object and purpose of the treaty, including the reference to ‘admissibility’ in the 
sentence in Article 31(4) noting that the use of provisional measures, based on a discretionary 
power, ‘does not imply a determination on admissibility or on the merits of the communication’. 
Like in the other systems, only when inadmissibility or lack of jurisdiction is evident, provisional 
measures should be refused.  
4 CONCLUSION 
What is the standard for assuming the competence to use provisional measures in light of the 
likelihood of jurisdiction on the merits? The rules discussed in Chapter I on traditional interna-
tional law seem to apply in human rights cases as well, but in those cases the adjudicator appears 
more flexible, not requiring prima facie admissibility. Rather, only if the case were prima facie 
inadmissible an adjudicator would have no competence to use provisional measures.281 In other 
words there is no need to determine admissibility and jurisdiction on the merits other than at very 
first glance.  
If the State has not ratified the individual complaint procedure, the adjudicator clearly has 
no jurisdiction on the merits and therefore no competence to use provisional measures. In other 
cases, for purposes of provisional measures, the adjudicator is normally assumed to be competent 
to deal with the case. Generally speaking the human rights adjudicators are not reticent on this 
issue. The HRC and the Inter-American Court have used provisional measures in cases involving 
disputed recognition of their authority. They reserved determination of a dispute, e.g. on the 
significance of certain reservations, to the phase of preliminary objections or admissibility. One 
case by the HRC involving a dispute about its competence to deal with complaints despite the 
reservations by the State concerned serves as an example. In that case those members disagreeing 
with the majority’s position that it had such jurisdiction still emphasised that the HRC had never-
theless acted legitimately in using provisional measures.282 More than the ICJ, human rights 
adjudicators have confirmed the principle that there is no need to finally establish their jurisdic-
tion before using provisional measures.  
                                                 
281 The only exception is Rule 94(4) of the CERD Rules of Procedure, discussing the possibility of 
using provisional measures only with regard to ‘admissible communications’. 
282 See individual opinion Ando, Bhagwati, Klein and Kretzmer in HRC Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad 
and Tobago, admissibility decision of 2 November 1999. 
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One example in which this principle also applies, or should apply, is in the context of the 
extraterritorial application of human rights treaties. Most adjudicators, including the ICJ, have 
recognized that States may have obligations under human rights treaties with regard to acts (and 
sometimes omissions) by their agents outside of the national borders. Some human rights adjudi-
cators have already been faced with requests for provisional measures in this context and this may 
increasingly be the case in the future. While the case law is yet to fully crystallize, the adjudica-
tors should not shrink from using provisional measures, if otherwise warranted, simply because 
they might later declare themselves incompetent to deal with such an ‘extraterritorial’ petition. 
As to the duration of provisional measures, human rights adjudicators sometimes indicate 
that they apply until a given date, until ‘further notice’ or until a decision on admissibility has 
been made. In those cases, if there would still be urgency, they will extend the provisional meas-
ures just before expiry of the previous date, or upon declaring the case admissible. At other times 
they note that the provisional measures apply ‘pending the case’, meaning throughout the pro-
ceedings. One remarkable practice of the HRC has been to maintain its provisional measures 
upon declaring the case inadmissible. It did so in death penalty cases where the inadmissibility 
declaration related to non-exhaustion and was open to review. In its decision it reminded the 
State, under its Rule on provisional measures, not to execute the petitioner in the period between 
exhaustion and a renewed petition to the HRC. Thus if it declares a death penalty case inadmissi-
ble for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, it may maintain provisional measures to cover the 
period between inadmissibility and the resubmission of the case following exhaustion. If the State 
would execute the petitioner before he would have a chance to renew his submission, this would 
in fact pre-empt the use provisional measures.283 In such cases it operates from the perspective 
that the case is still pending. This shows the importance the HRC attaches to the protective func-
tion of its provisional measures to protect against irreparable harm. As compared to the ICJ it 
seems to have developed a sui generis approach to jurisdiction for purposes of provisional meas-
ures, based on this protective function. If irreparable harm could otherwise take place it is indeed 
appropriate for adjudicators dealing with human rights cases to maintain their provisional meas-
ures in cases susceptible to review. 
The Inter-American Court has determined that, if necessary, its provisional measures re-
main applicable even beyond its judgment on reparations because it considers cases closed only 
once they are fully implemented. Therefore it appears to view its jurisdiction as extending until 
that moment. In a similar vein, the HRC has sometimes followed up its decision on the merits, 
urgently communicating to the State, in the face of an execution date, that at the very least its 
findings of a violation meant that the death sentence should not be executed.284  
With regard to general international law the argument has been made that because provi-
sional measures primarily serve the legal interests of those requesting them, ‘the principle of 
equality of parties before justice requires that the balance be restored by restraint in the practice of 
granting interim protection and by allowing the benefit of doubt to serve the respondent’.285 Ob-
viously this argument does not apply in cases involving risk of irreparable harm to persons. In 
such cases it is clearly not necessary nor warranted, in light of the urgency concerned, to wait 
                                                 
283 See also the discussion in Chapter XVI (Legal status) on the case law of the HRC to the effect 
that a good faith application of the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol means that States are to halt 
executions once they are informed that a petition has been brought before the HRC, in other 
words, already before the HRC has taken provisional measures. 
284 In fact this is a follow-up to its final View, finding a violation of Article 14 and, therefore, Article 
6 ICCPR. On the official responses of States and the follow up of provisional measures see 
Chapters XVII and XVIII. 
285 Sztucki (1983), pp. 258-259. 
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until jurisdiction and admissibility are fully determined before using provisional measures.286 
Within the conceptual framework proposed in this book, and consonant with the practice of the 
HRC and Inter-American Court, it is suggested that if the State has withdrawn from the individual 
complaint procedure and different interpretations are possible about the competence (e.g. ratione 
temporis) of the adjudicator to still deal with the case, this should be examined as part of the 
decision on preliminary objections or admissibility and not already at the stage of provisional 
measures. As noted by the ICJ in its Order in the Nuclear Test cases (1973) it should be sufficient 
that there is no a priori lack of jurisdiction.287 As noted, in light of the principle of effective pro-
tection against irreparable harm to persons288 in human rights adjudication there should be no 
need to determine prima facie admissibility. Only if the case were prima facie inadmissible an 
adjudicator would have no competence to use provisional measures. In such cases it could be 
worthwhile for UN treaty body adjudicators to forward to other appropriate UN bodies or special 
mechanisms urgent cases for which they have no prima facie jurisdiction. In the alternative they 
could inform the petitioners about other possibilities. 
From the analysis of the wider issue of admissibility (not just involving jurisdiction on the 
merits) in cases in which provisional measures were used, it is clear that at the stage of provi-
sional measures there is no need for full evidence about admissibility. This appears from the fact 
that the human rights adjudicators use provisional measures before they declare cases 
(in)admissible. Yet the case law does not explicitly say whether some measure of prima facie 
evidence for admissibility is required for the use of provisional measures. It would not be unrea-
sonable for them to require, in a flexible manner, that the case is not prima facie inadmissible, as 
the ICJ does. 
In urgent cases petitioners may resort to various international and domestic adjudicators at 
the same time. This does not necessarily conflict with rules on exhaustion of local remedies on the 
one hand and non-submission of the ‘same matter’ to different international adjudicators on the 
other hand, as long as this is done only at the early stages of the proceedings, in order to prevent 
irreparable harm to the persons involved. Subsequently the petitioner needs to withdraw one of 
the petitions. This means that the other case will not result in inadmissibility and therefore does 
not affect the possibility to use provisional measures. 
If the applicable remedies have no suspensive effect, exhaustion of domestic remedies is not 
necessary before granting provisional measures. In decisions on admissibility human rights adju-
dicators have made clear that domestic remedies must only be exhausted to the extent that they 
have suspensive effect. If they do not have such effect, resort is warranted to an international 
adjudicator who can also use provisional measures before determining that the domestic remedies 
indeed lack suspensive effect. After all, it is exactly in situations in which the domestic remedies 
do not prevent irreparable harm, that provisional measures are warranted. In this approach the 
international adjudicator would equally have competence to use provisional measures if the do-
mestic proceedings are theoretically capable of halting certain measures, in other words, have 
suspensive effect, but not in practice – for instance because of a domestic theory of ‘balance of 
convenience’, whereby the interest of the petitioner is balanced with those of the State (or ‘the 
general interest’). As noted, this balancing is inappropriate in relation to those rights singled out 
in the human rights treaties for their fundamental nature, not allowing for derogation even in 
times of emergency.289 With such domestic approaches remedies may not have suspensive effect 
in practice and the use of provisional measures may be warranted. This is not contrary to the text 
                                                 
286 In this respect Rule 94(3) of the CERD Rules of Procedure is an anomaly. 
287 ICJ Nuclear Tests case (New Zealand v. France), Order of 22 June 1973. 
288 See Conclusion Part II and Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
289 See Chapter XIII, section 4 on the beneficiaries of provisional measures.  
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of the respective provisions on exhaustion, while it corresponds with the principle of effective 
protection of persons against irreparable harm.290 In addition, if a complaint is submitted to more 
than one international adjudicator, provisional measures could initially be requested by the peti-
tioner and used by both adjudicators. The petitioner should subsequently indicate which claim he 
maintains. Any provisional measures used by the other adjudicator should then be withdrawn. In 
some instances, if the case would later be declared inadmissible, the petitioner could bring a 
renewed claim to the other adjudicator.291 
In general, human rights adjudicators, like other international adjudicators, consider provi-
sional measures terminated upon inadmissibility declaration or final judgment.  
Yet they often deal with extreme situations of threats to life and physical integrity. In some 
cases this warrants an approach to jurisdiction and admissibility that is different from that taken 
by other adjudicators, dealing with non-human rights cases.  
Even without formally maintaining or taking provisional measures, if there is still a threat 
following final determination, the follow-up proceeding could specifically indicate that the case 
would only be closed once resolved.292 At minimum, the adjudicator should commit actively to 
follow up the final decision not only through regular follow-up proceedings but also through 
emergency proceedings and press releases. In exceptional cases it could also decide proprio motu 
to ask the petitioner whether she wishes to re-institute a case and take new provisional measures. 
A final option would be to ‘maintain’ the provisional measures formally. This last option would 
be feasible after an adjudicator has built up a considerable practice of using provisional measures 
aiming to protect witnesses, human rights defenders and others against death threats and harass-
ment, as is the case in the Inter-American system. Provisional measures could then become a tool 
to some extent operating independently from the main proceedings. Thus far, the Inter-American 
system, which is the only system maintaining provisional measures even beyond the judgments 
on the merits or reparations, is also a system that includes a provision on provisional measures in 
the treaty itself. Different from systems where the authority to use provisional measures is im-
plied, this explicit presence may justify such ‘free-standing’ provisional measures. Such measures 
protect against irreparable harm to persons by treating a case as pending so long as it has not yet 
been implemented. On the other hand, if the authority is implicit the irreparable harm to persons 
must be linked to the case on the merits, either because of irreparable harm to the claim or be-
cause of irreparable harm to the procedure. In any case, whether the authority to order provisional 
measures is implicit or explicit, awareness of the irreparable nature of the harm has been reflected 
in the case law of the human rights adjudicators. 
                                                 
290 See Conclusion Part II on the purpose of preventing irreparable harm to persons and Chapter XVI 
on legal status. 
291 This depends on whether the system allows it and the State concerned has not made a reservation 
to this option. 
292 See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
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 CHAPTER XV 
 IMMEDIACY AND RISK 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Just like the ICJ human rights adjudicators will abstain from using provisional measures if there is 
no urgency. This applies to both the immediacy, or imminence, of the risk (temporal urgency) and 
to the likelihood of the risk (material urgency).1 This Chapter will discuss both imminence and 
the likelihood of risk. 
The ICJ has pointed out that ‘imminence’ is synonymous with ‘immediacy’ or ‘proximity’ 
and goes ‘far beyond’ the concept of ‘possibility’.2 This does not exclude ‘that a “peril” in the 
long term might be held to be “imminent” as soon as it is established, at the relevant point in time, 
that the realisation of that peril, however far off it might be, is not thereby any less certain and 
inevitable’.3 Yet in Pulp mills on the river Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), it denied Argentina’s 
request for provisional measures (2006), among others, for lack of imminence, because ‘the threat 
of any pollution is not imminent as the mills are not expected to be operational’ before the sum-
mer of 2007 and that of 2008, respectively.4 
In cases not involving the environment imminence sometimes is easier to pinpoint. When 
the ICJ ordered provisional measures to halt the execution of the death penalty in Avena (2003) it 
did not do so on behalf of all 52 Mexican nationals on death row in the US, but just on behalf of 
three of them for whom an execution date was imminent because they had exhausted domestic 
remedies.5  
The other aspect of urgency involves the likelihood of risk. Adjudicators do apply some 
evidentiary requirements for showing risk at the stage of provisional measures. In addition the 
manner in which they assess the evidence is important for the question whether they will use such 
measures. The manner in which they assess this evidence has an impact on the timing of provi-
sional measures as well. As seen in Chapter II, this timing, in turn, partly determines the impact 
the provisional measure will eventually have.  
                                                 
1 The importance of the value to be protected was discussed in Part II on the purpose of provisional 
measures. As noted in Chapter I the phrase ‘temporal urgency’ or ‘urgency in the temporal sense’ 
is taken from Judge Treves (ITLOS) who distinguishes between the ‘temporal dimension of the 
requirement of urgency’ and the ‘qualitative dimension’. See ITLOS Separate Opinion of judge 
Treves in the Southern Bluefin Tuna cases, Order of 27 August 1999. 
2 ICJ Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia), Judgment of 25 September 1997, §54 (no 
provisional measures because of an agreement between the parties).  
3 ICJ Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia), judgment of 25 September 1997, §54.  
4 ICJ Pulp mills on the river Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Order of 13 July 2006 (denying 
provisional measures, among others because ‘the threat of any pollution is not imminent as the 
mills are not expected to be operational before August 2007 (Orion mill) and June 2008 (CMB 
mill), §75.  
5 ICJ Avena and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003, Avena and 
other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Judgment of 31 March 2004), §21. On the issue of 
exhaustion see also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
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At the stage of provisional measures the adjudicators do not indicate their criteria for as-
sessment of risk. Clarifying their approach with regard to evidentiary requirements on the merits 
is the first step to understanding their approach towards the risk required for the use of provi-
sional measures. Very often decisions on the merits in human rights cases turn on evidentiary 
requirements rather than the legal interpretation of the scope of substantive rights. This applies in 
particular to cases involving the death penalty, expulsion and extradition and threats to indigenous 
culture and it is relevant as well in the context of requests for provisional measures. Addressee 
States often contest provisional measures exactly on factual issues, for instance denying the exis-
tence of a ‘real risk’. 
Adjudicators indeed try to assess risk before they use provisional measures. Without this the 
credibility and persuasive force of such measures would be limited. Yet do the adjudicators take 
into account the inequality between the parties and the irreparable nature of the harm faced by the 
petitioners? Similar to the link between the importance attached to preventing irreparable harm 
and the issue of jurisdiction and admissibility, discussed in the previous chapter, there appears to 
be a link between this importance and the issues of temporal urgency and risk. 
This chapter first addresses the issue of temporal urgency (section 2). Then it refers to 
statements on evidentiary requirements found in decisions on the merits, paying attention to some 
of the pitfalls in the case law of the human rights adjudicators. It is assumed that deciding whether 
provisional measures are warranted depends on the available information on likelihood of risk at 
that stage (section 3). It also examines criteria suggested in the context of the precautionary prin-
ciple to see whether they could be of use to understand assessment of risk in human rights cases 
(section 4). 
2 ASSESSMENT OF TEMPORAL URGENCY 
2.1 Introduction 
Before human right adjudicators decide to use provisional measures they generally determine 
whether the material risk, discussed in the next section, is imminent.6 Do the human rights 
adjudicators take an approach to temporal urgency that is as strict as that of the ICJ in its refusal 
to order provisional measures in Pulp Mills? Or have they taken a more flexible approach, taking 
into account the irreparable nature of the harm faced by the petitioners and the inequality between 
the parties?7 
2.2 Immediacy in death penalty cases 
Provisional measures to halt an execution only serve a purpose when they are used prior to an 
execution date. They should preferably be known to the relevant authorities well in advance of 
                                                 
6 See also Van Boven (2006), p. 99. 
7 They did take such a flexible approach with regard to jurisdiction and admissibility, discussed in 
Chapter XIV. It is important to keep in mind as well that Pulp Mills may have depended more on 
doubts on the irreparable nature of the harm, which was the other reason for the Court’s refusal to 
order provisional measures. See Chapter I on ICJ and ITLOS, as well as Conclusion Part II, on 
the Purpose of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. 
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this date. After all, a busy prison phone could result in an execution for someone who just re-
ceived clemency.8 
Attitudes have differed within the HRC about the need to use provisional measures if the 
execution is not imminent.9 Some members have considered provisional measures should be used 
in such cases as well, simply as a matter of principle.10 
In the submission to the HRC in Yasseen and Thomas v. Republic of Guyana (1998),11 
counsel noted that the petitioners could not be expected to wait until their final claim had been 
heard before resorting to the HRC. Given the nature of the situation, ‘the authors will be pursuing 
all legal procedures until the very last minute.’ If they would wait until their final claim would 
have been heard they would have to wait ‘until a moment dangerously close to their execution 
before invoking their rights under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’. 
                                                 
8 NRC Handelsblad, ‘executie wegens drukke telefoon’, 26 June 1999 (reporting about the failed 
attempt of the President of the Philippines to cancel an execution, because the telephone lines of 
the prison were busy). In relation to halting corporal punishment one of the provisional measures 
decisions was taken within eleven days and the other within a year. In Osbourne v. Jamaica, 15 
March 2000, the complaint was submitted on 12 June 1997 (the case file mentions 6 June which 
would mean 17 rather than 11 days) and it appears from the files in Geneva that the HRC used 
provisional measures on 23 June 1997. In Higginson v. Jamaica, 28 March 2002, the initial 
submission was on 20 January 1997 while the Special Rapporteur only transmitted its provisional 
measures decision to the State on 14 January 1998, almost a year later. While the Committee 
published its View in Matthews v. Trinidad and Tobago, the first case dealing with corporal 
punishment, on 31 March 1998, and its first use of provisional measures to halt corporal 
punishment dates from 23 June 1997 (on behalf of Osbourne) and its second dates from 14 
January 1998 (on behalf of Higginson), it is unlikely that it already used provisional measures in 
Matthews. His complaint was of 11 October 1993 and the Committee declared it admissible, also 
with regard to the corporal punishment issue, two years later. Indeed the file does not indicate the 
use of provisional measures. 
9 While before 1989 the full Committee decided to use provisional measures on behalf of all 
petitioners awaiting execution, the first two Special Rapporteurs on New Communications 
decided to intervene only in the face of an execution date. There was a decrease in the use of 
provisional measures by the HRC from 1989 until early 1993. This could to some extent be 
explained by a different attitude of the Committee towards the immediacy of the threat. In many 
cases the HRC does not indicate the date on which it used provisional measures. 
10 See e.g. interview by author with Special Rapporteur Scheinin, Geneva, April 2003. See the 
discussion of transparency or obscurity in Chapter II (Systems). While its promptness is unclear 
in these cases (at least on the basis of publicly available information), the discussion in the View 
may still provide some information relevant to the issue of urgency and exhaustion of local 
remedies.  
11 HRC Abdool Saleem Yasseen and Noel Thomas v. Republic of Guyana, 30 March 1998. On 1 
February 1996 a warrant of execution was read to them. The next day they submitted the case to 
the HRC. That week the HRC used provisional measures and it sent reminders twice (on file with 
the author). “On Thursday 1 February 1996 at 3:00 p.m., warrants were read to the authors for 
their execution at 8:00 a.m. on Monday 5 February 1996. The normal practice is for warrants to 
be read on a Thursday for the execution to take place the following Tuesday. The authors’ 
families were informed of the execution through an anonymous telephone call at 10:00 p.m. on 
Thursday 1 February”. An application for a stay of execution was heard on Saturday 3 February 
1996 and a conservatory Order was requested to allow a hearing to take place. This conservatory 
order was denied but an appeal against this denial was granted to the full Court of Appeal. At this 
point a seven-day stay of execution was granted. Yasseen and Thomas were informed on 7 
February that the Court of Appeal would hear the merits of their case the next day. 
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Counsel considered it highly unlikely that the particular domestic proceeding (a conservatory 
motion) would succeed. Yet he did not wish to refrain from taking all possible courses of action 
in the domestic courts. The HRC did use provisional measures in this case.12 
Sometimes the Rapporteur may decide not to use provisional measures immediately, exactly 
because some domestic proceedings are still pending, meaning both that there is no immediate 
risk of execution and that proceeding with the case before the HRC could result in having to 
declare the case inadmissible.13 
There are also some cases in which the Rapporteur waited with the use of provisional meas-
ures until an execution date was imminent. These cases do indicate the approach of some Rappor-
teurs and the importance they attached to fulfilling the criterion of temporal urgency in using 
provisional measures.14 
                                                 
12 See Chapter XIV on the relationship with admissibility. 
13 In HRC Junior Leslie v. Jamaica (564/1993) the initial submission was of 9 October 1993. 
Transmission under Rule 91 was on 3 December 1993. Yet the Special Rapporteur only used 
provisional measures on 8 February 1995. It appears from the case file that the Rapporteur may 
have decided to postpone use of provisional measures until she would receive information that 
the petitioner was formally classified as a capital offender under a review procedure. By 
submission of 3 February 1995 counsel informed the HRC that their client’s appeal against his 
classification as a capital offender would be heard on 13 February 1995. “We understand that if 
that appeal fails (and the Court of Appeal has already given a preliminary indication that it will) 
then Mr Leslie is in real and immediate danger of a Warrant of Execution being issued and it 
being carried out before the Committee can consider Mr Leslie’s communication on issues of 
admissibility or on the merits”. In that context counsel requested the HRC to take provisional 
measures. Five days later and five days before the abovementioned hearing, the HRC sent a note 
verbale to the minister of foreign affairs (with a copy to the Permanent Mission) to that effect (on 
file with the author). In some cases it is clear why the HRC did not use provisional measures. In 
HRC Errol Smith and Oval Stewart v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999 (transmitted under Rule 91 on 15 
November 1995), for instance, the petitioners’ death sentences were already commuted, not only 
before registration of the case but also before submission. In other cases the HRC only registered 
the complaint several months after initial submission when the death sentences had already been 
commuted. See e.g. HRC Desmond Amore v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999. In this case provisional 
measures were not used, but it is not clear from the View or the case file why not. On 17 January 
1995 counsel did request provisional measures (on file with the author). Four months later the 
State commuted the death sentence and only subsequently the HRC transmitted the case to the 
State. This means that when the Secretariat made the case summary the petitioner was still 
awaiting execution. See also McCordie Morrison v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998. The petitioner 
submitted the case, including an Art. 14 claim, in November 1994, before commutation of his 
sentence (on file with the author). See also Adams v. Jamaica, 30 October 1996.  
14 See e.g. HRC McCordie Morrison v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998. The initial submission was of 
25 November 1994, but the Rapporteur did not use provisional measures in this case, and she 
transmitted the case a year after initial submission. The fact that the claim included Art. 14 but 
that the Rapporteur nevertheless did not use provisional measures must mean that she had a 
reason unrelated to preservation of the eventual form of reparation. She may have considered that 
execution was not imminent. See also Victor Francis v. Jamaica, 24 March 1993. This is an 
unclear case. The Working Group transmitted the complaint in October 1988, but while the claim 
included Article 14(3)(c) and (5) the HRC did not use provisional measures. Death penalty cases 
in which the HRC did not use provisional measures may also clarify the Committee’s approach. 
It appears, however, that there is almost no information available about such cases. In HRC V.B. 
v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1993 (inadm.), initially it seemed provisional measures were not 
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Yet this seems to have changed. After all, following Piandiong et al. v. the Philippines 
(2000) States must be aware that they cannot execute a person after they have been informed of a 
submission to the HRC.15 In other words, they cannot quickly execute a petitioner in an attempt to 
avoid a specific request by the Committee to halt the execution pending the proceedings. This 
means that for future cases States must take into account that the obligation to halt the execution 
pending the proceedings is triggered once they are informed of the submission of the case rather 
than once the case is formally registered. It also means that, once a case is pending before the 
HRC, in death penalty cases a specific request for provisional measures is not necessary (although 
still desirable as a clear statement by the HRC) because the irreversible nature of capital punish-
ment in itself requires the State to halt an execution. 
The HRC has continued to use provisional measures in these cases. Once, prior to Pian-
diong, it even used them in advance of the pronouncement of a death sentence rather than in 
advance of the execution itself. In Domukovsky and three others v. Georgia (1998)16 the HRC 
used provisional measures when it was not yet clear whether a death sentence would be imposed 
or not. The case is interesting because the person concerned, Domukovsky, had not yet been 
sentenced to death when the HRC used provisional measures. Four days later he was sentenced to 
fourteen years imprisonment. It is the first example of the use of provisional measures already 
where a death sentence is threatened (‘to defer the execution of an eventual death sentence’) 
rather than only in cases where someone has already been sentenced to death.17 The decision to 
take provisional measures at this stage may relate to the abolitionist stance of the Rapporteur in 
question and simply be a statement of principle. It is also possible that she assessed that there was 
indeed a real risk of imposition of the death penalty that would, in itself, result in irreparable harm 
                                                                                                                       
used, but if appears from the files that they were in effect used on 25 August 1992 (initial 
submission of 28 November 1991). 
15 HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by Alexander 
Padilla and Ricardo III Sunga) v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000. See also Anton Bondarenko 
and Natalia Schedko (submitted by the latter on behalf of her deceased son and herself) v. 
Belarus, 3 April 2003 and Igor Lyashkovich and Mariya Staselovich (submitted by the latter on 
behalf of her deceased son and herself) v. Belarus, 3 April 2003. 
16 HRC Victor Domukovsky, Zaza Tsiklauri, Petre Gelbakhiani and Irakli Dokvadze v. Georgia, 6 
April 1998. 
17 The HRC used provisional measures on 2 March 1995 on behalf of Domukovsky (only Rule 91 
for Tsiklauri). Note verbale transmitting the case and using provisional measures, 2 March 1995. 
See also fax of 2 March 1995 to Head of State Shevardnadze accompanying the two notes 
verbales addressed to his government transmitting the cases of Domukovsky and Tsiklauri and 
noting the provisional measures ‘to defer the execution of an eventual death sentence against Mr. 
Domukovsky, for the period during which the Committee is examining his communication’. On 
behalf of the other two petitioners the Special Rapporteur took provisional measures a few days 
after they had been sentenced to death. A separate admissibility decision was made on 5 July 
1996. It again referred to provisional measures in relation to Dokvadze and Gelbakhiani. The 
State party was requested not to carry out the death sentence against them while their 
communication was under consideration by the Committee (on file with the author). 
Domukovsky claimed that he and a co-defendant, Gelbakhiani, were kidnapped from Azerbaijan 
and illegally arrested in April 1993. Domukovsky was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment on 6 
March 1995. Gelbakhiani was sentenced to death on 6 March 1995. Dokvadze was arrested on 3 
September 1992 and sentenced to death on 6 March 1995. Tsiklauri claimed he was arrested 
without a warrant on 7 August 1992 and that a warrant was shown to him only a year later. He 
was sentenced to five years imprisonment on 6 March 1995. By decree of the President of 
Georgia of 25 July 1997 54 persons were pardoned and their death sentences were replaced by 
twenty years imprisonment. Gelbakhiani and Dokvadze were among these 54 persons. 
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even if not executed, e.g. because it was likely to be based on an unfair trial. In the alternative, 
she could have assessed that there was a real risk that execution would follow soon after imposi-
tion of the death penalty. The file shows that the latter may be the case.  
All Special Rapporteurs of the HRC have dealt with requests for assistance by death row 
inmates or with information to the effect that their execution is impending as requests to use 
provisional measures on their behalf, even if they did not explicitly ask for provisional measures. 
In 2003 Special Rapporteur Scheinin indicated that in Eastern European cases he had also 
used provisional measures already at this stage, although the Committee might not use them in 
cases involving States that always have long delays.18 At the same time provisional measures 
have been used in relation to Zambia, which de facto has not executed death row prisoners for a 
long time. 
It seems that two factors play a role: the urgency on the one hand and on the other the prin-
ciple that the State should at least be informed of the Committee’s position that persons sentenced 
to death and awaiting execution must not be executed pending the proceedings before it. Once a 
case gets so far as to be registered, the Rapporteur believes it would be ‘strange’ not to indicate 
the Committee’s position on this point.19  
The President of the Inter-American Court has also ordered urgent measures in cases in 
which the precise execution dates were not known, but the executions were planned on an un-
specified date the next month.20 In the case of Baptiste the President ordered urgent measures the 
day after he received the Commission’s application, despite the fact that a warrant of execution 
had not yet been issued.21 Concern about the State’s internal instructions in death penalty cases 
may explain this sense of urgency.22 In its Order in Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados the Court 
decided to maintain its provisional measures despite the fact that the execution ceased to be im-
minent because of a temporary stay of execution by the High Court of Barbados.23 In other words, 
the Inter-American Court and the HRC have used provisional measures not just in the face of an 
execution date, but already earlier in the proceedings. This betrays a more flexible approach than 
that taken by the ICJ, indeed taking into account the inequality between the parties and the irrepa-
rable nature of the harm that would be faced once the risk would become immediate. 
2.3 Immediacy in expulsion and extradition cases 
More than in death penalty cases, in non-refoulement cases the HRC has insisted on the immedi-
acy of the risk. On occasion it has focussed on formal lack of immediacy rather than practical 
immediacy. In fact the lack of imminence was more apparent than real. Domestic legislation was 
                                                 
18 Interview by author with Special Rapporteur Scheinin, Geneva, April 2003. 
19 Id. 
20 IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 29 August 1998. 
21 Id. (Reference to the Commission’s observations of 2, 17 and 30 July 1998). 
22 There were indications that an execution day was impending because the six month period set 
forth under the State’s internal Instructions for Death Penalty Applications expired on 16 July 
and the State may give very short notice of an impending execution, even as little as five days. It 
appears from the Court’s summary of the Commission’s observations with regard to its requests 
to amplify the Order with new beneficiaries that it considered the short time frame of only five to 
seven days between the issuance and reading of an execution warrant and the execution as an 
impediment to the Court’s ability to issue effective provisional measures. It is also possible to 
explain the swiftness in this case, or the lack thereof in others, in light of the situation at the 
Secretariat at a given time and by its communication channel with the President. 
23 IACHR Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, Order of 25 November 2004. 
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such that in practice the petitioner could be expelled at very short notice and might not have 
sufficient time to petition the HRC again upon receipt of information about the date and time of 
removal.24  
In E.G. v. Canada (disc. 1997)25 counsel submitted the case before exhaustion of domestic 
remedies by referring to the fact that in other cases26 extradition took place ‘literally within min-
utes’ of the Supreme Court’s ruling and pointed out that the State should not attempt to deny an 
effective remedy before the HRC.  
“If the Canadian Government is prepared to commit itself to allow a reasonable period of time 
subsequent to an unfavourable decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in petitioner’s case, we 
will admit that the application is premature”.27 
The next year this argument returned, again with regard to Canada. In a family life case – in 
which the HRC did not use provisional measures – counsel made an argument involving the 
assessment of temporal urgency. In J.P.A.F. v. Canada (disc. 1998)28 counsel mentioned the 
manner in which the Immigration Department removed another petitioner ‘without any advance 
notice’.29 She referred to the publicity surrounding deportation of ‘foreign criminals’ and noted 
that, in this light, she fully expected that her client would be removed from Canada as soon as the 
Immigration Appeal Division had rendered a negative decision, ‘likely on only a few hours notice 
to him, and no advance notice to us as his counsel’. She pointed out that domestic proceedings 
that could be taken subsequently would have no suspensive effect.30 She noted that she was not 
sure whether the Committee could respond to prevent removal before it takes place and that it 
appeared that it would take some time for a decision on provisional measures to be made. Hence, 
she requested the HRC to consider the request now ‘so that in the event the appeal is denied, your 
office may be in a position to act immediately, if Rule 86 measures can be invoked’. She re-
quested the HRC to use provisional measures immediately upon her notification to it that her 
client’s appeal had been denied.31 This is in fact comparable to the approach taken by the 
                                                 
24 HRC Hamid Reza Taghi Khadje v. the Netherlands, 31 October 2006 (inadm.) (very formally 
concluding that ‘no order has in fact been made for his forcible return to Iran. It is not an 
inevitable consequence of a failed application for asylum that a deportation will take place’, §6.3, 
without taking into account the practice of expelling upon very short notice). Apparently no 
provisional measures were used pending the proceedings. This case is different from S.B. v. the 
Netherlands, 30 March 2005 (nadm.) as in that case the petitioner did not expect to be expelled, 
§6.2. 
25 HRC E.G. v. Canada (738/1997). Initial submission 5 January 1997 (received 7 January 1997), 
provisional measures of 17 January 1997; withdrawal of these measures on 28 April 1997; 
petitioner’s request to withdraw the case itself of 26 May 1997. On 17 November 1997 the HRC 
informed the petitioner that it had discontinued the case (on file with the author). 
26 HRC Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993 and Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993. 
27 Letter by the petitioner in HRC E.G. v. Canada (738/1997), 21 April 199, disc. on 17 November 
1997 (on file with the author). 
28 HRC J.P.A.F. v. Canada (disc. 1998), 620/1995 (on file with the author). 
29 This was a reference to HRC Canepa v. Canada, 3 April 1997. 
30 This was the case in particular because apparently they could not use the Committee’s 
admissibility decision in Stewart to ‘attempt to establish a serious constitutional issue on the 
matter of family separation’. The decision on the merits in Stewart had not yet been published at 
the time. See further Chapter XII (Other situations). 
31 Submission of 12 July 1994 in HRC J.P.A.F. v. Canada (disc. 1998) (620/1995) (on file with the 
author). Counsel in A.B. v. Canada (disc. 1998) referred to the HRC’s expression of concern 
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ECtHR.32 In other cases involving a threat of immediate refoulement upon exhaustion, the HRC 
has now used conditional provisional measures before remedies were fully exhausted.33  
The Committee decided not to use provisional measures in J.C.A. v. Costa Rica (disc. 
2000),34 probably because of the (lack of) immediacy of the risk.35 There was no decision yet 
about a deportation, let alone a deportation date.36 
                                                                                                                       
during the 42nd session about expulsion of aliens in Canada and the lack of suspensive effect of 
appeals against expulsion or deportation orders. She requested the HRC to take its decision on the 
use of provisional measures prior to 1 November 1994, which was the date on which the 
petitioner was scheduled to be deported. In fact she noted that the deportation was scheduled for 
17:45 and also provided the address, telephone and fax numbers of the immigration officer 
responsible for his removal. Submissions of 25 and 26 October 1994 on behalf of A.B. v. Canada 
(622/1995) (on file with the author). 
32 In situations where the implementation of an expulsion order is expected immediately upon a 
decision by domestic court of last instance, petitioners should ask the ECtHR to anticipate on a 
possible negative decision and prepare a provisional measure in advance. This applies in 
particular if there is a risk of immediate expulsion after business hours, during the weekend or 
during French holidays, when there is limited or no presence of relevant staff in Strasbourg. In 
such cases it would be too late to approach the Court in Strasbourg only upon exhaustion of 
domestic remedies. 
33 See e.g. HRC Steven Romans v. Canada, 9 July 2004 or D. and E. and their two children v. 
Australia, 11 July 2006 (in the latter case requesting the State, on 12 February 2002, to ‘provide 
information to the Committee, on an urgent basis, of whether the authors are under a real risk of 
deportation while their communication is being considered by the Committee’, adding that it 
trusts the State ‘will not deport the authors before the Committee has received such information 
and had an opportunity to consider whether the request for interim measures should be granted’, 
§1.2). This could be seen as a more ‘procedural’ and temporary provisional measure, in fact 
explicitly asking the State to provide more information and to halt an expulsion until it provides 
the Rapporteur with information that no irreparable harm would result. 
34 HRC J.C.A. v. Costa Rica (725/1996), initial submission 26 October 1996, discontinued at 69th 
session in July 2000 (on file with the author).  
35 This is an example of a case that was later discontinued. Counsel had requested provisional 
measures in October 1996, in order to halt the Basque petitioner’s return to Spain. The 
representatives of three NGOs submitted a letter to the HRC supporting the request for 
provisional measures. They referred to the risk to the life and physical and psychological integrity 
of the petitioner, in particular when considering the use of torture and violence in Spain against 
persons suspected of links with the ETA. The Rapporteur transmitted the case to the State 
without using provisional measures. Subsequently counsel repeated his request for provisional 
measures. Again the Special Rapporteur decided that they were not necessary. In this case the 
State had contested the admissibility of the complaint. Among others, it pointed out that it aimed 
to prevent ‘a hypothetical and eventual expulsion’ and was brought before the Committee with 
the obvious intention that it would use provisional measures. Until then, there had been no 
decision of the competent authorities to expel him. The petitioner, noted the State, hoped that the 
HRC would use provisional measures to prevent an eventual decision to expel him. The State 
argued that the submission constituted an abuse of the right of petition. It pointed out that the 
petitioner referred to a hypothetical decision and that he asked the Committee to substitute its 
own actions for those of the Costa Rican authorities. This way the petitioner wished to make sure 
in advance that the domestic legal bodies would not be able to decree an eventual expulsion. In 
September 2000 the HRC informed his counsel that it had decided to discontinue its 
consideration of the case for lack of information. HRC J.C.A. v. Costa Rica (725/1996), disc. 
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2.4 Immediacy of the risk in cases involving death threats 
The Chipoco case is an example of a failed request by the Inter-American Commission to the 
Inter-American Court to order provisional measures.37 One may argue that the alleged threat was 
not imminent because the intended beneficiary was in the US at the time. Chipoco originally was 
a human rights defender from Peru. He spent several years in the US and during that time he took 
part in litigation by Human Rights Watch against Peru within the Inter-American human rights 
system.38 When he was about to return to Peru, the Fujimori government issued a black list of 
persons accused of denigrating the honour of the nation by litigating cases before the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights. In fact, however, the judiciary was not acting upon this list and 
no warrant had yet been issued for his arrest. In any case, upon his return he ran for Congress and 
won a seat and the Government did not dare to jail him. 
Nevertheless, even without a specific (execution or expulsion) date, the situation is immi-
nent once there is evidence of recent threats.39 
2.5 Immediacy in cases involving indigenous culture 
More difficult to pinpoint is the urgency in cases involving threats to indigenous culture. This 
applies both to temporal urgency, as discussed here, and to risk, as discussed in the next section. 
When does the HRC consider a risk involving indigenous culture to be imminent? What is 
the role of suspensive effect in domestic proceedings? A case involving culture hinting at the 
immediacy of the threat is Sara et al. v. Finland (inadm. 1994).40 The HRC declared part of the 
claim inadmissible because the petitioners had not yet been affected by an administrative measure 
                                                                                                                       
2000 (on file with the author). It is not clear why the petitioner did not resort to the Inter-
American Commission in Washington D.C. It may be that counsel expected the HRC to be more 
forthcoming in its use of provisional measures, but in that case he was disappointed. 
36 In HRC Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada, 28 March 2003 (inadm.) the HRC apparently did not use 
provisional measures either. It appears from a note in the file that the petitioner did not seem to 
be under immediate threat of deportation and counsel did not request the use of provisional 
measures. In Samira Karker on behalf of her husband Salah Karker v. France, 26 October 2000, 
it is not evident from the text of the View why the HRC used provisional measures. This 
expulsion did not appear to be imminent. The HRC used provisional measures half a year after 
the initial submission of 18 September 1998. It appears from the case file that the provisional 
measure was to halt his expulsion to Tunisia pending the examination of the case. In other words, 
the Rapporteur decided to use this provisional measure just in case his expulsion would become 
imminent after all. 
37 IACHR Chipoco (Peru), Order of 27 January 1993 (denying a request for provisional measures). 
38 Carlos Chipoco accompanied the Commission to Court hearings, e.g. as an advisor in the IACHR 
Neira Alegria case (Peru), Judgment of 19 February 1995. 
39 IACHR Evidence of threats must include examples of recent occurrences, see e.g. Miguel Castro 
Castro Prison (Peru), Order of 29 January 2008 (denying a request for provisional measures), 5th 
‘Considering’ clause. (denying the provisional measures requested by the petitioners- a request 
not supported by the Commission – because the facts complained of were not recent and there 
was no evidence of a persisting situation endangering the life or personal integrity of the intended 
beneficiaries and therefore the requirement of ‘urgency’ was not met, also referring to the Court’s 
previous denial of a request of 30 January 2007) 
40 HRC Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.) (initial submission of 18 December 1990, 
Rule 91 of 12 February 1991, Rule 86 probably on 9 July 1991 together with initial admissibility 
decision).  
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implementing the disputed legislation. At the same time it found a causal link between the con-
tinuation of road construction in a certain area and the entry into force of this legislation. It de-
clared the claim admissible in this respect.41 At this point it also used provisional measures.42 Yet 
later it set aside its provisional measures as well as its admissibility decision and declared the case 
inadmissible because it considered there was no imminent threat.43 When the petitioners submit-
ted their new complaint the activities had already taken place.44  
In Länsman I the request for provisional measures to halt the quarrying of stone in tradi-
tional herding areas failed.45 The HRC considered that the use of provisional would be premature 
but that the petitioners retained the right to repeat their request.46 
                                                 
41 In HRC Sara et al. v. Finland (inadm. 1994) the petitioners feared that the Central Forestry 
Board would ‘approve the continuation of road construction or logging by the summer of 1991, 
or at the latest by early 1992, around the road under construction and therefore within the 
confines of their herding areas’. According to the State the petitioners had failed to demonstrate 
how their concerns about irreparable harm ‘purportedly resulting from logging in the area 
designated by them’ would translate into actual violations of their rights. It considered ‘they are 
merely afraid of what might occur in the future’. “While they might legitimately fear for the 
future of the Sami culture, the ‘desired feeling of certainty is not as such protected under the 
Covenant. There must be a concrete executive decision or measure taken under the Wilderness 
Act’, before anyone may claim to be the victim of a violation of his Covenant rights”. The HRC 
observed that the complaint related both to ‘expected logging and road construction activities 
within the Hammastunturi Wilderness and ongoing road construction activities in the residual 
area located outside the wilderness’. With regard to the expected activities it considered the claim 
inadmissible because the petitioners had not yet been affected by an administrative measure 
implementing the Act. 
42 This was the second time the Committee used provisional measures to halt actions affecting the 
natural habitat. The first time was in the Lubicon Lake Band case, because the domestic appeal 
still pending was without suspensive effect. HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 1990. See also 
Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility and section 4 of this Chapter (On material urgency). 
43 HRC Sara v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.). It did so after receipt of information about a 
delay until the finalisation of the implementation plan for the disputed activities. The HRC 
referred to counsel’s comment that the petitioners were expecting a delay until 1996 for the 
finalisation of the Central Forestry Board’s implementation plan and understood this ‘as an 
indication that no further activities in the Hammastunturi Wilderness and the residual area will be 
undertaken by the State party while the authors may pursue further domestic remedies’. In other 
words, the HRC assumed no immediate threat. The provisional measure was applicable from July 
1991 until the inadmissibility decision. It seems that the HRC implicitly reminds the State that it 
should not undertake further activities while the petitioners are pursuing domestic remedies. After 
all, an expected delay of activities until finalisation of an implementation plan is not the same as 
a commitment to suspend activities until domestic remedies have been undertaken and certainly 
not until the petitioners have been enabled to submit a new complaint to the HRC. The HRC took 
this as an indication that the State party would not undertake further activities while the 
petitioners were pursuing domestic remedies. If the HRC had expected the State to take this 
reminder seriously, it was let down. 
44 The State did in fact undertake further activities. Two of the petitioners submitted a new 
complaint to the HRC more than three years later, in November 1997. See Anni Äärelä and Jouni 
Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 24 October 2001. In that case the HRC did not use provisional measures 
because the events complained of had already occurred. 
45 HRC Ilmari Länsman v. Finland (Länsman I), 26 October 1994. 
46 In another case the request may have been too late, because the acts to be prevented had already 
proceeded and a request by the HRC – pending the proceedings before it – for the State to return 
 
 Immediacy and Risk 
801 
The Committee considered that the claims under Article 27 had been sufficiently substanti-
ated for purposes of admissibility, but it agreed with the State that the use of provisional measures 
would be premature at this stage.47 It pointed out that ‘the authors retained the right to address 
another request under rule 86 to the Committee if there were reasonably justified concerns that 
quarrying might resume’.48 The file shows that the petitioners submitted a renewed request for 
provisional measures in February 1993.49 As this failed, six months later the petitioners submitted 
                                                                                                                       
to the status quo ante would be too far reaching in the circumstances (viz. Vakoumé et al. v. 
France, 31 October 2000 (inadm.)). This first case, Ilmari Länsman v. Finland (Länsman I), 26 
October 1994, involving the areas of Angeli and Inari, was initially submitted in June 1992 by 75 
members of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee and members of the local community of 
Angeli. They were all reindeer breeders of Sami origin challenging the decision of the Central 
Forestry Board to sign a contract with a private company. This contract would allow quarrying of 
stone in an area covering ten hectares on the flank of the mountain Etelä-Riutusvaara. They 
argued that this contract would ‘not only allow the private company to extract stone but also to 
transport it right through the complex system of reindeer fences to the Angeli-Inari road’. They 
pointed out that the ownership of lands traditionally used by the Samis was disputed between the 
State and the Sami community. While they conceded that the economic value of the stone to be 
quarried was considerable, they emphasised that the village of Angeli was ‘the only remaining 
area in Finland with a homogenous and solid Sami population’ and that the ‘quarrying and 
transport of anorthocite would disturb their reindeer herding activities and the complex system of 
reindeer fences determined by the natural environment’. They also observed that the mountain 
was a sacred place of the old Sami religion. Together with the initial submission they requested 
the HRC to adopt provisional measures, as they feared that further quarrying was imminent. The 
petitioners had seen the precedents of the Lubicon Lake Band, with provisional measures in July 
1987 and Sara with provisional measures in July 1991. See the discussion in §4.2 of the View. 
The State party had submitted that the request for provisional measures by the petitioners was 
‘clearly premature’ because only test quarrying had been carried out on the contested site. 
47 In fact, in the initial submission the petitioners had pointed out that the private company ‘may be 
unwilling or even financially incapable to make the investments necessary for starting the actual 
quarrying as long as it does not have a permanent contract with the land owner’. They pointed out 
that the present contract only allowed for extraction of stone until the end of 1993. “The authors 
would hope that the Central Forest Board, being an governmental body, does not make a new 
contract before the Human Rights Committee has had a possibility to consider their 
communication under the Optional Protocol”. Petitioners’ submission of 10 June 1992 (on file 
with the author). 
48 See §6.3 of the View. In the View the HRC specifically discussed the petitioners’ request for 
provisional measures. It noted the State’s argument that interim protection under Rule 86 ‘would 
be premature, as only limited test quarrying in the area of Mount Etelä-Riutusvaara has been 
carried out’ and it explained its decision not to use provisional measures ‘at this juncture’. It 
appears from the Committee’s admissibility decision that the Special Rapporteur transmitted the 
case under Rule 91 two months after initial submission, on 25 August 1992. See Admissibility 
decision of 14 October 1993, CCPR/C/49/D/511/1992, 3 November 1993 (on file with the 
author). In the View it did not address further their statement that even the limited test quarrying 
carried out already had left ‘considerable marks’. The petitioners had alleged that, because of 
climatic conditions the marks would remain in the landscape for hundreds of years. They also 
reiterated that the location of the quarry and the road leading up to it were crucial to the activities 
of the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee. 
49 They pointed out that the government’s contention that no actual quarrying had taken place since 
the initial submission was incorrect. On an unspecified date in the summer of 1992 the actual 
quarrying had started and by early September 1992 ‘the company had taken some 30 cubic 
metres (approximately 100.000 kilograms) of stone from the quarry and transported it through the 
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a request for urgent consideration at the October session in order to determine the admissibility of 
their claim. They explained why they considered the case urgent, referring to ‘the fact that the 
provisional land lease contract for the quarrying company expires at the end of this year and 
negotiations on a longer land lease contract are at present going on’.50 It is clear that the petition-
ers resorted to a request for urgent consideration of the case because their requests for provisional 
measures had failed. Apart from being the only case in which the HRC motivated its refusal to 
use provisional measures, Länsman I is also the predecessor of the cases Länsman II and III. In 
those cases the HRC did use provisional measures.51 
3 THE LIKELIHOOD OF RISK 
3.1 Introduction 
The use of provisional measures does not imply a determination on the merits.52 In Weiss v. Aus-
tria (2003) the HRC determined that a decision to take provisional measures does not constitute 
an ‘examination’ of the case. This already indicates that at this stage the assessment of risk should 
be considerably less strict that the evidentiary requirements on the merits.53 
                                                                                                                       
reindeer herding area of the authors’. They noted that the present contract was valid only until the 
end of 1993 and they requested the HRC to recommend, under Rule 86, that the government 
‘firstly, take appropriate measures to at least temporarily prevent the company from further 
quarrying within the year 1993, and, secondly, refrain as the landowner from concluding a new 
contract on land lease with the company as long as the communication is pending before the 
Committee’. Petitioners’ submission of 5 February 1993 (on file with the author). 
50 In his submission of 31 August 1994 counsel for the petitioners pointed out that the State party 
had indeed confirmed that the lease contract was valid until the end of 1993. “This implies that 
no contractual obligations would be breached if the Human Rights Committee were to find that 
any further quarrying would be unacceptable in the light of article 27”. HRC Ilmari Länsman v. 
Finland, 26 October 1994, §8.2. “After a new contract is made, the private company in question 
intends to make considerable investments, including road construction. The authors remind the 
Committee of the fact that also in the Government submission of 27 October 1992 a position was 
taken that no urgency was involved as long as there was only a provisional land lease contract”. 
Petitioners’ submission of 16 August 1993 (on file with the author). 
51 HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 30 October 1996 (Länsman II) (initial submission of 28 
August 1995, provisional measures of 15 November 1995); decision of 14 March 1996 to set 
aside its provisional measures (together with admissibility declaration). With regard to the 
immediacy of the threat in Länsman II the petitioners noted that the Central Forestry Board had 
started its activities late October 1994. While the Supreme Court put a stop to this in November 
1994, it withdrew the injunction in June 1995. The petitioners noted, moreover, that a 
representative of the Central Forestry Board had ‘recently’ stated that logging and road 
construction would resume before the winter, in October or November 1995 and was therefore 
imminent. In November 1995 the Rapporteur used provisional measures. On the three Länsman 
cases, see Chapter X (Culture). 
52 HRC Lloyd Reece v. Jamaica, admissibility decision of 30 March 1989, CCPR/C/35/D/247/1987, 
3 April 1989 (on file with the author). This remark, which has now become customary, was not 
yet made in the Committee’s earlier decisions.  
53 HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, § 3.7. In this case the State claimed that the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had already dealt with the same matter and referred to 
its reservation to the OP. The HRC noted that Austria’s reservation to Article 5(2)(a) OP 
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Like the ICJ and ITLOS, with regard to the assessment of the likelihood of risk for the use 
of provisional measures the human rights adjudicators have not developed clear criteria, but a 
common denominator seems to be that of ‘prima facie’ evidence. This cannot be defined in the 
abstract. It depends on the circumstances of the case and the context of the legal system.  
Using provisional measures may sometimes be a matter of acting first and asking later. This 
means adjudicators could withdraw or adapt a provisional measure taken on the basis of the re-
sponses and new information provided by both parties. Still, it seems reasonable to assume that 
cases that would be inadmissible at face value, or in relation to claims (factual situations and 
interpretation of rights) for which previous case law has never found a violation, would not war-
rant a provisional measure.  
In order to examine how assessment of risk at the stage of provisional measures differs from 
that at the stage of decisions on the merits, this chapter discusses the practice of the HRC with 
regard to the death penalty, non-refoulement, health in detention and indigenous culture. In addi-
tion some observations are made from the perspective of CAT and the ECtHR with regard to 
expulsion and extradition cases and some about death threats from the perspective of the Inter-
American system. 
Have the human rights adjudicators indeed taken an approach to assessment of the likeli-
hood of risk for the use of provisional measures that is more flexible than that of the ICJ and 
ITLOS, taking into account the irreparable nature of the harm faced by the petitioners and the 
inequality between the parties? 
3.2 The practice of the human rights adjudicators 
3.2.1 Introduction 
In this section the practice of the adjudicators with regard to assessment of risk for purposes of 
provisional measures is discussed by way of examples of situations in which provisional measures 
have been used. In case of corporal punishment, for instance, the petitioner need bring no more 
evidence for the decision on the merits than the fact that he has been sentenced to corporal pun-
ishment and that this sentence has not yet been executed. In most other situations the evidentiary 
requirements on the merits are much more difficult to meet or an argument must still be made that 
certain acts or omission indeed constitute a violation, which has already been confirmed in the 
case of corporal punishment.54 
                                                                                                                       
involved claims submitted to the European Commission on Human Rights. The ECtHR had taken 
provisional measures but had never examined the case. It had accepted withdrawal before it had 
even considered the case for admissibility. “Assuming arguendo that the reservation does operate 
in respect of complaints received, in place of the former European Commission, by the European 
Court of Human Rights, the Committee refers to its jurisprudence that where the European Court 
has gone beyond making a procedural or technical decision on admissibility, and has made an 
assessment of the merits on the case, then the complaint has been ‘examined’ within the terms of 
the Optional Protocol, or, in this case, the State party’s reservation”. See §8.3. The HRC referred 
to Linderholm v. Croatia, 23 July 1999 (inadm.). In order to accept withdrawal the ECtHR 
simply needs to decide that this would not be contrary to ordre publique. The HRC considered 
that ‘a decision that a case is not of sufficient importance to continue its examination after an 
applicant’s action to withdraw the complaint, does not amount to a real assessment of its 
substance’. In other words, the complaint had not been ‘examined’ by the ECtHR and Austria’s 
reservation did not preclude the HRC from considering the claims. 
54 See Chapter IV (Halting corporal punishment). 
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The subsequent sections are presented by type of situation in which the HRC has used pro-
visional measures: death penalty; non-refoulement; detention; death threats; cultural survival and 
nuclear tests. To the extent that this further clarifies assessment of risk, references are made to the 
practice of the other adjudicators as well. Before discussing these situations, first the contours are 
sketched of assessment of risk for the use of provisional measures.  
3.2.2 Sketching the contours of the assessment of risk for the use of provi-
sional measures 
The contours of the assessment of risk for the use of provisional measures may be sketched in 
relation to the general approach of the adjudicator to the evidentiary requirements on the merits of 
cases. The term ‘evidentiary requirements’ is used here to refer to the criteria to be met in order to 
prove a case as well as to the standard and burden of proof. These issues are interrelated and 
normally adjudicators do not clearly distinguish between them. Apart from the issue of eviden-
tiary requirements there is also the issue of how the adjudicators evaluate this evidence: the stan-
dard of review.55 
Thus far academic research has not distinguished between evidentiary requirements during 
various stages of the proceedings on the merits, at the stage of decision-making on jurisdiction 
and admissibility and at the stage of decision-making on provisional measures. It is suggested that 
while it may not be possible to indicate the precise requirements for these different stages of 
international adjudication, the significance of these stages warrants specific attention. The strictest 
requirements can be found exactly in relation to the merits. In relation to admissibility the eviden-
tiary requirements are less strict and, given the limited time available for decision-making as well 
as the serious nature of the harm risked, in relation to provisional measures the adjudicator should 
be very lenient. 
With regard to the serious nature of the harm risked the adjudicators have also acknowl-
edged that the level of scrutiny of State acts and omissions must be higher in those cases involv-
ing the most extreme violations. The practice of the ECtHR, which is generally more restrictive in 
this respect than that of the other human rights adjudicators,56 serves as an example. While in 
Bazorkina v. Russia (2006) this Court noted it was ‘sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role’ 
and recognised ‘that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, 
where this is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case’, it pointed out 
that: “Nonetheless, where allegations are made under Articles 2 and 3 of the Convention the 
Court must apply a particularly thorough scrutiny (…) even if certain domestic proceedings and 
investigations have already taken place’.57  
As to the relation between the alleged facts and the rights explicitly claimed, the ECtHR has 
noted that it is ‘master of the characterisation to be given in law to the facts of the case’. It has 
‘considered of its own motion complaints under Articles or paragraphs not relied on by those 
appearing before it and even under a provision in respect of which the Commission had declared 
the complaint to be inadmissible while declaring it admissible under a different one. A complaint 
is characterised by the facts alleged in it and not merely by the legal grounds or arguments relied 
on’.58 In particular it has pointed out: “In the light of the importance of the protection afforded by 
Article 2, the Court must subject deprivations of life to the most careful scrutiny, taking into 
                                                 
55 This book uses the phrases standard of review as well as level of scrutiny. 
56 See e.g. Chapter VI (Locating and protecting disappeared persons). 
57 ECtHR Bazorkina v. Russia, 27 July 2006 (1st section) §107. 
58 ECtHR Akdeniz v. Turkey, 31 May 2005, §88. 
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considerations not only the actions of State agents but also all the surrounding circumstances”.59 
While these remarks were made as part of the assessment on the merits, the argument of the im-
portance of the protection afforded equally applies at the provisional measures stage. 
The ECtHR examines Article 3 ECHR cases proprio motu, given the absolute nature of the 
protection offered by that article and in light of the supervisory nature of its task as an interna-
tional human rights court.60 If the State does not respond sufficiently, the HRC will equally exam-
ine the complaint proprio motu. It may use sources of information not provided by the parties,61 
but in practice it hardly ever does so. Even when reading additional claims in the facts as alleged 
by the petitioners, the human rights adjudicators have often interpreted their mandates to be 
strictly limited to the examination of the submissions by the parties.62 Yet it is submitted that at 
the stage of provisional measures all adjudicators should be able to take into account information 
derived from publicly available reports by authorities such as UN Special Rapporteurs or by 
reputable NGOs. Subsequently they must of course ensure that both parties are able to react to 
this information.63  
The adjudicators take a flexible approach as to the types of evidence that must be brought 
by the individual petitioner and if the State party does not respond satisfactorily or not at all the 
adjudicators may draw negative inferences and take into account circumstantial evidence.64 After 
all the State has the duty to cooperate with the adjudicator within the individual complaint proce-
dure established in the respective human rights treaties.65 Obviously the duty to cooperate is even 
stronger in situations where the adjudicator depends on information provided by the Parties and 
cannot conduct in situ investigations and hearings, as is the case with, for instance, the HRC.  
Yet before ordering provisional measures there is often insufficient time to consult the 
State. Given the serious nature of the harm risked the adjudicators may already take into account 
circumstantial evidence and negative inferences even though the State has not yet had a chance to 
cooperate in this particular case. The negative inferences are then based on previous dealings of 
the adjudicator with the same State. After the first use of provisional measures the State may 
provide information prompting the adjudicator to withdraw them.  
                                                 
59 Id., §95. 
60 See ECtHR Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, §136: “In respect of materials obtained 
proprio motu, the Court considers that, given the absolute nature of the protection afforded by 
Article 3, it must be satisfied that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State 
is adequate and sufficiently supported by domestic materials as well as by materials originating 
from other reliable and objective sources such as, for instance, other Contracting or non-
Contracting States, agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental 
organisations. In its supervisory task under Article 19 of the Convention, it would be too narrow 
an approach under Article 3 in cases concerning aliens facing expulsion or extradition if the 
Court, as an international human rights court, were only to take into account materials made 
available by the domestic authorities of the Contracting State concerned, without comparing these 
with materials from other reliable and objective sources”. See also e.g. Ryabikin v. Russia, 19 
June 2008, §111. 
61 See Zwart (1994), p. 12. 
62 See also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
63 CEDAW does mention, in Rule 72(2), that it may receive information from UN organisations and 
bodies through the Secretariat of the Office of the High Commissioner, so long as both parties are 
offered the opportunity to react to this information. 
64 See e.g. Pasqualucci (2003), pp. 208-210, discussing the Inter-American Court’s use of 
presumptions and circumstantial evidence. 
65 See e.g. IACHR Rules of Procedure (2001), Article 44. See in general on the duty to cooperate 
e.g. Medina Quiroga (2005), pp. 26-27. 
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The State generally has the monopoly of power vis-à-vis the individual. In addition it usu-
ally also has a monopoly on information, especially in the context of disappearances and torture.66 
Exactly given this unequal situation between the two, both as to the consequences and in light of 
the possibility to obtain evidence, on the merits the standard of proof in cases between unequal 
parties should be higher if the initial burden is on the State (e.g. in a criminal trial). It should be 
lower if the initial burden is on the individual (e.g. in disappearance or torture cases claiming state 
responsibility). In the latter case the burden shifts from the individual to the State once the indi-
vidual has made a prima facie case. After all the individual claims human rights violations of a 
very serious nature often involving the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment while 
the consequences for the State if a violation is found would simply involve refraining from acting, 
providing access, releasing a person, providing compensation, etc. Moreover, the State is able to 
retrieve and make disappear information and evidence and therefore is in a much stronger posi-
tion than the individual claiming a human rights violation. In cases involving claims of disappear-
ances, ill treatment in detention, or the risk of cruel treatment or torture in a third State the impor-
tance attached to the prohibition of torture and ill-treatment in itself warrants particular scrutiny 
of the behaviour of the State. 
In particular the HRC and the Inter-American Commission and Court have acknowledged 
the importance of the factual inequality between the parties and the difference in the conse-
quences of finding or not finding a violation on the merits for the petitioner and the State. These 
factors are all relevant already at the stage of provisional measures. 
The standard phrase of the HRC is that the burden of proof ‘cannot rest on the author of the 
communication alone, especially considering that the author and the State party do not always 
have equal access to the evidence and that frequently the State party alone has access to relevant 
information’. It then continues with: “It is implicit in article 4(2) of the Optional Protocol that the 
State party has the duty to investigate in good faith all allegations of the violation of the Covenant 
made against it and its authorities, and to furnish to the Committee the information available to 
it”.67 The Inter-American Court has explicitly confirmed this approach.68  
The Inter-American Commission’s doctrine and the Court’s jurisprudence both establish 
that, different from criminal cases, in a situation where one of the parties in a conflict has a mo-
nopoly of power and a consequent monopoly on information, the burden of proof shifts to that 
party (the State). The situation of an individual petitioner in detention is particularly illustrative. 
As the Commission has noted, inmates are ‘defenceless and under the absolute control and in the 
exclusive custody of the State’.69 It bases itself on the principle established by the Court that the 
silence of the State or ‘elusive or ambiguous answers on its part’ may be interpreted ‘as an ac-
knowledgement of the truth of allegations made, so long as the contrary is not indicated by the 
record or is not compelled as a matter of law’.70 The Commission may note, for instance, that in a 
given case ‘the State’s silence and the lack of diligence in defending itself aside, the evidence still 
tends to corroborate many of the facts alleged’.71 It may also point out that the State has supplied 
no evidence refuting the petitioners’ allegations, or that the information it has supplied is incom-
plete and confined to generalities.72  
                                                 
66 See also e.g. ICJ Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania), 9 April 1949. 
67 See e.g. HRC Bleier v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982, §13.3. 
68 See IACHR Bámaca Velásquez (Guatemala), Judgment of 25 November 2000, §153, quoting 
Hiber Conteris (submitted by Ilda Thomas on behalf of her brother) v. Uruguay, 17 July 1985, 
§§182-186. 
69 See e.g. CIDH Minors in Detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §95. 
70 See e.g. IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez case, Judgment of 29 July 1988, §138. 
71 CIDH Minors in Detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §96. 
72 See e.g. CIDH Minors in Detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §92. 
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In urgent actions by UN Special Rapporteurs the procedure is not accusatory but humanitar-
ian and the Rapporteur simply requests the State to take action in case the allegations are true. 
The Inter-American Commission and the African Commission’s function seems to be in between 
that of a Special Rapporteur and that of a Court or the UN treaty bodies.73  
Aside from this shift in burden of proof, the Commission also expects a certain standard of 
proof to be met. It has not defined this standard but it requires, first of all, that petitioners substan-
tiate their claims.74 Indications for risk include that the information should be sufficiently specific 
and concrete with regard to the petitioner as well as information about the general human rights 
situation in the State in question.75 
Evidence used by the Commission normally includes materials provided by the State and 
the petitioner, statements taken from witnesses or obtained from documents, records or official 
publications. It may also include the information collected during an on-site investigation. The 
Commission has found, with the Court, that press clippings cannot be regarded as documentary 
evidence per se. On the other hand it has referred to the Court’s statement that ‘many of them 
contain public and well-known facts which, as such, do not require proof; other are of evidentiary 
value as has been recognized in international jurisprudence in so far as they reproduce public 
statements, especially those of high-ranking members (…) of the Government, or even of the 
Supreme Court of Honduras’.76  
The Commission considers that press articles have some evidentiary value ‘to the extent 
that they can be used to draw consistent and undisputed conclusions about facts that were public 
and well known at the time they occurred. These clippings, furthermore, serve to corroborate the 
evidence submitted with the statements of testimony, and in many cases serve to compensate for 
the silence and evasive responses of the State which, by themselves, would have been sufficient 
grounds to presume the alleged facts to be true’.77 
Ironically, with regard to allegations of future facts in another State all adjudicators show 
deference to the sending State even in cases involving allegations of a real risk of torture in the 
receiving State. Further, if the claim involves torture or ill treatment that has already taken place 
the adjudicators seem to make a difference between cases involving violations that are alleged to 
have taken place in pre-trial detention and allegations following conviction. In the latter case there 
usually is no testimony in Court about the violation, which means that the international adjudica-
tor cannot consult a trial transcript. In such case the international adjudicator shows less deference 
to the State’s submissions. On the other hand, if the alleged ill treatment or torture took place 
during pre-trial detention the adjudicators normally assume that counsel should have brought it up 
during the trial and if he did, but the court dismissed it, they will normally defer to the decision by 
the domestic court. 
                                                 
73 In this respect the function of the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention seems to be similar to 
that of the Inter-American Commission in that it specifically makes use of an accusatory 
procedure. It is a thematic mechanism that uses a procedure to deal with individual complaints 
that more closely resembles a judicial procedure than that employed by the other thematic 
mechanisms. 
74 See also Pasqualucci (2003), p. 213 discussing the flexible approach to the standard of proof 
taken by the Inter-American Court, depending on the violation to be proved. 
75 This criterion is also used by UN Special Rapporteurs.  
76 CIDH Minors in Detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §184, referring to IACHR Velásquez 
Rodríguez case, judgment of 29 July 1988, §146. The Court took judicial notice of those facts 
reported in newspaper clippings that, while they did not constitute documentary evidence, 
nevertheless contained ‘public and well-known facts which, as such, do not require proof’. 
77 CIDH Minors in Detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999, §185. 
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The standard of review depends on the importance accorded to the right. In particularly 
striking situations involving the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment, international 
adjudicators should apply, to borrow a term from American constitutional law, ‘strict scrutiny’. 
In Ahani v. Canada (2004) the HRC observed that ‘where one of the highest values pro-
tected by the Covenant, namely the right to be free from torture, is at stake, the closest scrutiny 
should be applied to the fairness of the procedure to determine whether an individual is at a sub-
stantial risk of torture’.78 It emphasised that its provisional measures in this case had highlighted 
this risk. 
This type of cases, in which on the merits the adjudicator uses (or should use) the strictest 
level of scrutiny, coincides with the type of cases in which provisional measures may be war-
ranted as well.79 In the face of the serious and irreparable nature of the harm risked by the peti-
tioner, the strict approach must be vis-à-vis the State rather than vis-à-vis the petitioner. In other 
words, in particular at the stage of provisional measures the nature of the harm risked and the 
inequality between the parties should be reflected in the manner in which the likelihood of risk is 
assessed. The question is whether this is indeed the case. 
3.2.3 Death penalty cases and assessment of risk 
3.2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
This section deals with the evidentiary requirements of the HRC for finding a violation of Article 
14 ICCPR and their relevance to its decision on provisional measures.80 After all it has been 
pointed out that: 
“In all capital punishment cases considered by the Committee in which the complainant had 
substantiated his allegations in such a way as to warrant a thorough examination of his case, the 
Committee, through its Special Rapporteur for New Communications, requested the State party 
not to execute the petitioner while his case was under consideration by the Committee”.81 
The question arises whether the HRC has indeed used provisional measures in all such cases. 
One factor that confirms this statement is the fact that at times HRC Special Rapporteurs 
have used provisional measures even when they considered that there was insufficient informa-
tion from the petitioner for purposes of transmitting the case to the State.82 This indicates that 
                                                 
78 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §10.6. 
79 See Conclusion Part II on the purpose of provisional measures. 
80 Case law on the death penalty is discussed in Chapters III (Halting executions) and XIII (On the 
relationship with forms of reparation). 
81 Ando (Japan), the Chairman of the HRC, Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad and 
Tobago, 26 July 1994 (public meeting held in response to the execution of Glenn Ashby), 
CCPR/C/SR/1352, 31 July 1996, §3.  
82 Normally Rapporteurs use provisional measures at the same time they transmit the case to the 
State. Sometimes, however, a Rapporteur initially considered there was insufficient information 
from the petitioner for purposes of transmitting the case to the State. She would send a Note 
Verbale to the State only on the basis of the Rule on provisional measures, without mentioning 
the Rule on the transmittal of cases. Instead, she would request the petitioner, not the State, to 
provide more information. Rapporteurs have done this on several occasions in which there was an 
immediate risk of execution. See e.g. HRC Collins v. Jamaica (356/1989), provisional measures 
of 25 May 1989; G.S. v. Jamaica (369/1989), provisional measures of 15 September 1989; 
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there is no strict assessment of risk for the use of provisional measures. Still, if there were no risk 
at all the HRC probably would not use them.83 What is clearly problematic, moreover, is that the 
HRC very often is not in a position to thoroughly assess certain claims on the merits and conse-
quently does not find a violation. Any executions may then go ahead as planned. Before discuss-
ing the suitability of using provisional measures in cases involving such claims, the next subsec-
tions first illustrate the HRC’s case law on the merits on these claims. 
3.2.3.2 RIGHT TO COUNSEL  
The quality of counsel in the domestic proceedings is of crucial importance for defendants in 
capital cases. Counsel before the HRC often notes that 'the legal aid given by the State party is at 
such a meagre level that it is most often inexperienced counsel who take death row cases’. 
‘(B)ecause of the level of remuneration counsel will almost inevitably reduce the time he spends 
in preparation of the case’.84 The criteria developed by the HRC for ineffective legal assistance on 
                                                                                                                       
Lennon Stephens v. Jamaica (373/1989), provisional measures of 15 September 1989 and R.M. v. 
Trinidad and Tobago (384/1989), provisional measures of 29 January 1990 (all by Rapporteur 
Higgins). See also Denzil Robberts v. Barbados (504/1992), provisional measures of 2 July 1992 
(by Rapporteur Lallah) and Zephiniah Hamilton v. Jamaica (616/1995), provisional measures of 
31 January 1995 (by Rapporteur Chanet). On 24 July 1991 the Committee adopted revised terms 
of reference for the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on New Communications. This included 
‘to issue rule 86 requests, whether coupled with a request under rule 91 or not’ and ‘to inform the 
Committee at each session on action taken under rules 86 and 91’. Annex X, Mandate of the 
Special Rapporteur on New Communications, revised terms of reference adopted at the 1087th 
meeting, 24 July 1991, A/46/40, 10 October 1991, in: Official Records of the Human Rights 
Committee 1990/1991, Vol. II, CCPR/10/Add. 1. As noted, at the time Rule 86 was the Rule on 
provisional measures and Art. 91 was the Rule on the transmittal of cases to the State. 
83 From spring 1987 until summer 1988 (five sessions) the HRC would register all complaints 
involving the death penalty. Information obtained at Secretariat, Geneva, October 1998. Some of 
these cases offered very little information at the time of registration. During the first seven 
sessions dealing with death penalty cases (from early 1987 until March 1989) the HRC registered 
more than sixty communications involving the death penalty in Jamaica. This research uncovered 
more than fifty cases in which the HRC used provisional measures to halt an execution during 
this period. In the other 16 cases the HRC may not have used them because the death sentence 
was already commuted. It is also possible that they were used, but not mentioned, or that they 
were used in cases that were later discontinued. By contrast to the large number of death penalty 
cases registered during the first three years, between April 1989 and January 1991 the newly 
appointed Special Rapporteur for New Communications only registered 18 such cases. 
Information obtained at Secretariat, Geneva, October 1998. In this period the HRC took a more 
cautious approach to the registration of complaints containing little information. Before 
registering them the Rapporteur asked the Secretariat to request additional information, for 
instance when it was unclear what steps were taken to exhaust domestic remedies or when the 
submission did not yet seem to make a prima facie case under the ICCPR. Hence, the Rapporteur 
did not yet authorise the Secretariat to transmit the case to the State under Rule 91 (current Rule 
97). She did, on the other hand, authorise it to transmit some cases solely for the purpose of 
provisional measures. HRC G.S. v. Jamaica, 369/1989, provisional measures of 15 September 
1989; Lennon Stephens v. Jamaica, 373/1989, provisional measures of 15 September 1989 and 
R.M. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 384/1989, provisional measures of 29 January 1990. 
84 HRC Peter Blaine v. Jamaica, 17 July 1994. Counsel from the London law firm Allan & Overy 
in Lewis v. Jamaica, also of 17 July 1997, used the same argument. Peter Blaine and Neville 
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appeal include: the petitioner was not informed beforehand on who would represent him at the 
appeal; he was not informed of the date of the hearing; or counsel for the petitioner did not argue 
the appeal on his behalf without consulting him.85 
Nevertheless, the HRC usually cannot address the problems arising from poor quality of 
counsel. The HRC considers that the State party cannot be held accountable for alleged errors 
made by a defence lawyer ‘unless it was or should have been manifest to the judge that the law-
yer’s behaviour was incompatible with the interests of justice’.86 It appears, however, that the fact 
                                                                                                                       
Lewis were co-defendants. Blaine’s lawyer was David Stewart of S.J. Berwin and Co. In Anthony 
Finn v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998. The State party had observed that, in relation to the allegation of 
the violation of Article 14 (3)(b), ‘it is unfair to hold the State party accountable for the 
professional conduct of legal aid counsel’. However, it is the State that appoints counsel to cases 
and that is responsible for very low remuneration. It is interesting that the State uses the term 
‘unfair’ in a situation where it seems evident that many petitioners were sentenced to death, at 
least partly, due to the inadequacy of their defence at trial. Usually, this inadequacy can no longer 
be remedied at a later stage. For the HRC this is part of ‘counsel’s professional judgment’ except 
in a case where counsel’s behaviour has been such as to be ‘incompatible with the interests of 
justice’. 
85 See e.g., HRC Neville Lewis v. Jamaica, 17 July 1997. States must take measures to ensure that 
counsel, once assigned, provides effective representation in the interests of justice. This includes 
consulting with, and informing, the accused if he intends to withdraw an appeal or to argue 
before the appellate instance that the appeal has no merit. See e.g. HRC Trevor Collins v. 
Jamaica, 25 March 1993; Lloyd Grant v. Jamaica, 31 March 1994; George Graham and Arthur 
Morrison v. Jamaica, 25 March 1996 and Silbert Daley v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998. See also 
Spronken (2001), pp. 447-449. With regard to the right to appeal the HRC is not in a position to 
question counsel’s professional judgment itself that there was no merit to such an appeal. 
86 See e.g., HRC Beresford Whyte v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998. An example of a questionable attitude 
by counsel that the HRC was unable to address can be found in Clive Smart v. Trinidad and 
Tobago, 29 July 1998. The petitioner had claimed that counsel had failed to properly consult with 
him in the case before the Court of Appeal. She had not pursued two of the grounds of appeal 
prepared by a different counsel, had not given the petitioner any explanations and denied him the 
possibility of clarifying the matter. The State party had contended that there was no merit to this 
allegation. It submitted an affidavit from the petitioner’s counsel in Trinidad and Tobago. 
Subsequently (at the time of the HRC View) this counsel was sitting on the High Court of 
Trinidad and Tobago. The latter stated that she ‘reviewed all the grounds and adopted and 
incorporated those with which the law and I were in agreement’. She ‘did not explain this 
decision to Mr. Smart since these were matters exclusively with the purview of an Attorney-at-
law. Mr. Smart could make no useful input in respect of such matters’. While the HRC may have 
been correct in concluding that there had been no violation of Article 14(3)(b) ICCPR, the case 
does serve as an illustration of the wide range of behaviour that still falls within ‘professional 
judgment’. The Committee does not consider itself in a position to ascertain ‘whether the alleged 
failure of the representatives to call witnesses who might have corroborated the authors’ 
testimonies was a matter of professional judgment or of negligence’. HRC Michael Sawyers and 
Michael and Desmond McClean v. Jamaica, 11 April 1991. See also Byron Young v. Jamaica, 4 
November 1997 and Earl Pratt and Ivan Morgan v. Jamaica, 6 April 1989. It is not explicit in 
distinguishing between the accountability of States parties in relation to privately retained and 
assigned counsel but, apparently, it does attach importance to distinguishing between the two. In 
that respect, it has considered relevant the fact that counsel was initially privately retained. In 
Michael Sawyers and Michael and Desmond McClean v. Jamaica, 11 April 1991, for instance, it 
noted that privately retained counsel had represented all three petitioners during trial and the 
same privately retained counsel had represented two of them on appeal. It also noted that a 
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that on the merits the HRC is unlikely to find violations in this respect has not hindered the use of 
provisional measures pending the proceedings. 
The HRC tolerates many choices with possibly disadvantageous effects for the petitioner as 
falling within counsel’s professional judgment.87 If counsel made allegations during the trial, and 
protested occasionally, the HRC normally assumes that the domestic court has properly dealt with 
the claim.88 At the same time, if counsel did not protest during trial, this was his professional 
judgment. 
                                                                                                                       
different counsel represented Mr. Sawyers. This counsel withdrew before the appeal was 
concluded. It then noted, between brackets, that instead a legal aid lawyer, a Queen’s counsel, 
was appointed. “Any shortcomings regarding time for consultation and preparation of the defence 
cannot, therefore, be attributed to the State party”. It is not clear whether the period when Mr. 
Sawyers had a legal aid lawyer had any significance. See also Abduali Ismatovich Kurbanov 
(submitted by his mother Safarmo Kurbanova) v. Tajikistan, 6 November 2003. 
87 For finding a violation of Article 14(3)(b) (adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence) there 
must always be a request for an adjournment that was then disallowed by the judge. Generally, 
the HRC analyses the material before it to find out whether either the petitioner or his counsel 
complained to the trial judge that the time or facilities were inadequate. If they did not do so the 
inadequate time and facilities could not be attributed to the State. Alternatively the petitioner 
must prove that counsel’s decisions could not have been based on the exercise of his professional 
judgment. Sometimes the HRC points out that it could not ascertain whether the domestic court 
‘actually denied counsel adequate time for the preparation of the defence’ or whether defence 
counsel’s failure to call witnesses on behalf of the petitioner was a matter of counsel’s 
professional judgment or the result of intimidation. See e.g. HRC Raphael Henry v. Jamaica, 1 
November 1991 and Delroy Prince v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992. Normally the HRC considers the 
choices of counsel to remain within the confines of his professional judgment. Thus, when it 
seems to have been counsel, and not the State party, who has obstructed the preparation of the 
defence, it finds no violation of Article 14(3)(b). See e.g. HRC Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 
23 March 1999 and Alrick Thomas v. Jamaica, 31 March 1992. 
88 The principle of equality of arms is laid down in Article 14(3)(e), although not in express terms. 
It also underlies other aspects of Article 14. One of the issues discussed under this principle is the 
examination of witnesses. The HRC does not easily find violations in this respect. On this issue 
too it generally has faith in counsel’s professional judgment. It has determined that Article 
14(3)(e) ‘protects the equality of arms between the prosecution and the defence in the 
examination of witnesses, but does not prevent the defence from waiving or not exercising its 
entitlement to cross-examine a prosecution witness during the trial hearing’. HRC Glenmore 
Compass v. Jamaica, 19 October 1993. In the absence of material disclosing whether the 
petitioner or his counsel complained to the trial judge that potential defence witnesses were 
subjected to intimidation, the HRC has considered it is ‘not in a position to ascertain whether the 
failure of the defence to call witnesses on the author’s behalf was a matter of counsel’s 
professional judgment or the result of intimidation’. HRC Delroy Prince v. Jamaica 30 March 
1992. Only occasionally it has found a violation of Article 14(3)(e). See e.g.HRC Garfield Peart 
and Andrew Peart v. Jamaica, 19 July 1995; Lloyd Grant v. Jamaica, 31 March 1994 and 
Anthony McLeod v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998. Claims often relate to counsel’s failure to follow 
instructions, failure to request additional time to prepare the defence, failure to call alibi 
witnesses or general inexperience and related situations impacting on the principle of equality of 
arms. In such cases the HRC generally finds no indication that counsel’s acts or omissions were 
not made in the exercise of his professional judgment. The State party normally is not responsible 
for the actions of counsel. 
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3.2.3.3 DISPUTES ABOUT FACTS AND EVIDENCE 
It is also very difficult for petitioners to prove violations based on disputes about facts and evi-
dence or claims about inadequacy of counsel. They are often facing very serious situations, with 
fatal consequences, that the HRC nevertheless cannot always address on the merits. The Commit-
tee is not a fourth instance of appeal and it normally dismisses such claims.89 Again the question 
arises what is the function of provisional measures used in such cases. 
The Committee often simply is not in a position to deal with issues arising from problematic 
jury behaviour and other matters of factual evidence.90 As long as the judge has brought certain 
                                                 
89 See e.g. HRC Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 July 1990 (after a discussion on the 
merits); subsequently it dismissed these claims already in the admissibility phase; Anthony Finn 
v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998; Raphael Henry v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991 and Beresford Whyte v. 
Jamaica, 27 July 1998. In his individual opinion in McTaggart v. Jamaica (1998) Committee 
member Scheinin discussed the dilemma of how the HRC should deal with the lack of coopera-
tion by some States. HRC Deon Mc Taggart v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998. In this case the peti-
tioner had submitted substantive documentation but the State had submitted only a reply of a few 
pages. The HRC declared inadmissible the petitioner’s Art. 14(1) claim. The Committee’s di-
lemma, according to Scheinin, was a result of the failure by the State to respond. In such case the 
Committee must choose either to find violations of the Covenant on the basis of the petitioner’s 
allegations or examine ‘the extensive documentation submitted on behalf of the author in order to 
make an autonomous investigation of the merits of each allegation’. He argued that ‘[b]oth of 
these approaches are untenable and bear the risk of errors which, in death penalty cases, may be 
lethal in the literal meaning of the term’. “The only alternative to these two approaches would be 
to request additional information and clarifications from the parties, an option the Committee is 
unwilling to take both because of its extremely scarce resources and because of the fully justified 
aim of expeditious handling of death penalty cases”. He drew attention to an important issue for 
adjudication: the impact of the manner in which the facts are presented on the actual determina-
tion of a case. The narrative presented by the Committee ‘appears coherent but represents only a 
reconstruction of what might have happened at the scene of the crime’. After discussing the reli-
ability of the trial testimony by the only witness who identified the petitioner, he pointed out that 
‘[i]t is obvious to me that the trial testimony by David Morris is unreliable and that the Commit-
tee should not have altered the ‘narrative’ of the events in order to add coherence to the case of 
the prosecution’. He agreed that it was for the domestic appeals courts to review jury instructions 
by the judge and the conduct of the trial, but his argument here was that the prerequisites of a fair 
trial had been denied. HRC Deon Mc Taggart v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998.  
90 See e.g. HRC Byron Young v. Jamaica, 4 November 1997. See also the case of co-defendant 
Samuel Thomas v. Jamaica, 31 March 1999. The third co-defendant was Hixford Morrison, see 
Hixford Morrison v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998. Counsel had argued that irregularities in the course 
of the jury deliberations constituted a violation of Article 14. Two jurors had come forward with 
sworn affidavits stating that only three of twelve jurors found the man guilty, but it was getting 
late and the jury foreman was pressuring them so they told him just to do what he wanted. It was 
argued that the judge had had a responsibility in this because he had pressured for a unanimous 
verdict and had sent the jury back several times. In Young HRC member Bhagwati apparently 
questioned the reliability of the affidavits in question, because of the immoral character of these 
two jurors. It is equally possible that these jurors came forward now because they had the courage 
to admit that they had acted under pressure, while the other jurors who did not come forward 
have erased this from their memories. The fact still remains of course, as Bhagwati pointed out, 
that ‘jurors cannot be required to disclose which way they voted in the verdict. There is an 
obligation of confidentiality upon them. The State could not have therefore enquired from the 
other jurors as to what was their verdict’. In Thomas Solari Yrigoyen dissented, taking a position 
quite different from that of Bhagwati expressed two years previously. He noted that it is the State 
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issues, such as medical evidence, to the attention of the jury, the fact that the jury chooses to 
ignore this does not constitute a violation of the right to a fair trial. Neither does the short time the 
jury takes for deliberations (such as seventeen minutes).91 
The HRC usually does not sustain complaints about the jury instructions and the attitude of 
the judge, especially when counsel failed to object during the trial.92 In one case the petitioner had 
claimed, among others, that the trial judge fundamentally erred in directing the jury that it was 
‘safer and better’ to convict on the basis of circumstantial evidence. Still, the HRC considered that 
the material before the Committee did not show that the jury instructions were clearly arbitrary or 
amounted to a denial of justice.93 It is generally beyond the Committee’s competence to evaluate 
jury instructions. It normally declares these claims inadmissible.94 It makes an exception, how-
ever, vis-à-vis claims that these instructions were clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of 
justice or that the judge manifestly violated his obligation of impartiality.95 In such cases, the 
Committee examines the claim in order to find out whether the jury instructions were indeed 
                                                                                                                       
party’s responsibility to provide for competent, independent and impartial courts of justice 
established by law to produce a determination of any criminal charge, in accordance with Article 
14. He considered that the sworn statements of the two jury members, which were not rebutted by 
the State party, showed that the foreman acted irregularly by pressuring the members of the jury 
to deliver a unanimous verdict when nine of them believed that the petitioner was not guilty and 
only three believed the opposite. The change made in the announcement of the verdict showed 
that the petitioner did not enjoy the due process accorded by Art. 14 to defendants in criminal 
cases. “This circumstance is particularly serious in view of the fact that the verdict announced as 
having been reached by the jury amounts to a death sentence for the convicted person”. 
91 See e.g., HRC Leaford Smith v. Jamaica, 31 March 1993 and Beresford Whyte v. Jamaica, 27 
July 1998. 
92 HRC Willard Collins v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991 (Chanet, Herndl, Aguilar Urbina and 
Wennergren would have found a violation of Article 14(1) because of bias of the judge). 
93 HRC Everton Morrison v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998 and Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 3 
November 1998. See also Trevor Bennett v. Jamaica, 25 March 1999. In this case the Committee 
referred to the Court of Appeal’s review of the judge’s instructions, while it had previously noted, 
under “the facts as submitted by the author” that the Court of Appeal of Jamaica had refused the 
application for leave to appeal. A refusal of an application for leave to appeal, presumably, is not 
the same as the review of the appeal itself. If this review did not take place, it is not clear how the 
Committee could have noted it. 
94 See e.g. HRC R.M. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1993 (inadm.). Like the HRC the Inter-
American Commission considers that it is generally for the domestic courts to review the factual 
evidence in a given case. In Sankofa v. US, however, it found that the treatment of identification 
and ballistic evidence amounted to a denial of justice contrary to the fair trial and due process 
standards of the American Declaration. CIDH Shaka Sankofa (Gary Graham) v. US, 29 
December 2003, §§42-49. 
95 See e.g., HRC Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 July 1990; Carlton Reid v. Jamaica, 20 
July 1990; Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991; Michael Sawyers and Michael and Desmond 
McClean v. Jamaica, 11 April 1991; Aston Little v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; Raphael Henry 
v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991; Glenford Campbell v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992; Clifton Wright v. 
Jamaica, 27 July 1992 (an unusual case in which the HRC found a violation of Article 14(1) for a 
denial of justice); George Graham and Arthur Morrison v. Jamaica, 25 March 1996; Clifford 
McLawrence v. Jamaica, 18 July 1997; Byron Young v. Jamaica, 4 November 1997; Deon Mc 
Taggart v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998; Anthony McLeod v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998; Anthony Finn 
v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998; Beresford Whyte v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998; Dole Chadee et al v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, 29 July 1998; Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999; Samuel 
Thomas v. Jamaica, 31 March 1999 and Mohammed Ajaz and Amir Jamil v. Korea,13 July 1999. 
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clearly arbitrary or did indeed amount to a denial of justice or in order to find whether it was 
indeed demonstrated that the judge manifestly violated his obligation of impartiality.96 The HRC 
takes into account information derived not just directly from the facts as stated by either the peti-
tioners or the State party but also from the domestic court’s judgments and the trial transcript.97 
Sometimes the result is favourable to the petitioner,98 but often to the State, because of the Com-
mittee’s reliance on the facts and evidence as established domestically. The HRC may acknowl-
edge that the allegations and the trial transcript suggest deficiencies in the evidence, but normally 
it does not consider that this amounts to arbitrariness or a violation of the obligation of impartial-
ity.99 It usually concludes, on the basis of the trial transcripts, that the conduct of the trial or the 
                                                 
96 See, e.g., HRC Carlton Reid v. Jamaica, 20 July 1990. The HRC also found violations of Art. 
14(1) in cases against Guyana and Tajikistan. In Lallman Mulai and Bharatraj Mulai (submitted 
by their sister Rookmin Mulai) v. Republic of Guyana, 20 July 2004, for instance, it noted that it 
was ‘not in the position to establish that the performance and the conclusions reached by the jury 
and the foreman in fact reflected partiality and bias’ against both petitioners. It appeared that the 
Court of Appeal did deal with the issue of possible rights. Nevertheless, the court ‘did not address 
that part of the grounds of appeal that related to’ the right before the courts, ‘on the strength of 
which the defence might have moved for the trial to be aborted’. In Abduali Ismatovich Kurbanov 
(submitted by his mother Safarmo Kurbanova) v. Tajikistan, 6 November 2003. it found a 
violation because the State had not provided ‘any explanation as to why the trial was conducted, 
at first instance, by the Military Chamber of the Supreme Court’. ‘In the absence of any 
information by the State party to justify a trial before a military court’ the trial and death sentence 
of the petitioner’s son, who was a civilian, did not meet the requirements of Article 14(1). In 
Gaibullodzhon Ilyasovich Saidov (submitted by his wife Barno Saidova) v. Tajikistan, 8 July 
2004 the HRC noted the petitioner’s claim that her husband’s right to a fair trial was violated, 
among others ‘by the fact that the judge conducted the trial in a biased manner and refused even 
to consider the revocation of the confessions made by Mr. Saidov during the investigation’. ‘No 
explanation was provided by the State party for the reasons of that situation’. Thus, ‘on the 
strength of the material before it’, it found a violation of Article 14(1). With regard to these 
confessions it is noteworthy that the HRC found that due weight must be given to the claim that 
the confession had been extracted under torture, since the State had failed to either indicate how 
the court had investigated these allegations or to provide copies of any medical reports. The 
Committee found violations of Articles 7 and 14(3)(g) because his conviction was based on a 
confession obtained under duress. Finally, in Bakhrom Khomidov (submitted by his mother 
Saodat Khomidova) v. Tajikistan, 29 July 2004 it found violations of Article 14(1) and (3)(e) and 
(g). In the absence of any pertinent information by the State party it found that the court did not 
fulfil its obligation of impartiality and independence. Moreover, the judge denied the request by 
counsel to call witnesses and to have his client examined by a doctor. 
97 See e.g. HRC Anthony Finn v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998. See also Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 3 
November 1998.  
98 For an example see HRC Collin Smartt (submitted by his mother Daphne Smartt) v. Republic of 
Guyana, 6 July 2004. In this case the HRC noted proprio motu, when it was considering the 
admissibility of the case, ‘that the trial documents submitted by the author reveal that her son was 
not represented by counsel during the committal hearings’. It also noted with concern ‘that, 
despite three reminders addressed to it, the State party has failed to comment on the 
communication’. The petitioner was not represented by counsel in her petition to the HRC.  
99 See e.g. HRC Anthony McLeod v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998. It does not automatically find a 
violation if the State party does not contest the claim. It considers the material before it in order 
to ascertain whether the petitioner has sufficiently substantiated his allegation. If the prosecutor, 
for instance, successfully challenged the claim in court, the HRC finds itself unable to conclude a 
violation of Articles 7 and 14(3)(g). See e.g., Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991 and Glenford 
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judge’s instructions to the jury were not ‘clearly arbitrary’ and did not amount to a denial of 
justice, or it concludes that the judge had not manifestly violated his obligation of impartiality.100  
Maybe if the State plays it procedurally correct at the domestic and international level, there 
is simply not much international bodies can do about claims of improper jury instructions and 
similar issues. It would mainly be the NGOs and media that could achieve change if court cases 
systematically result in irreparable harm to individuals or groups. They could investigate and 
                                                                                                                       
Campbell v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992. Another example is when the judge had examined the 
claim at the trial during a voir dire and found it lacking in substance. See e.g., Errol Johnson v. 
Jamaica, 22 March 1996. See also the individual opinions of Solari Irigoyen and Scheinin in 
Terrence Sahadeo (submitted by his sister Margaret Paul) v. Republic of Guyana, 1 November 
2001. Scheinin noted that it appeared from ‘the incomplete materials submitted to the Committee 
that when presenting the evidence related to the credibility of Mr. Sahadeo’s testimony that he 
signed the confession statement under ill treatment, the presiding judge used language that was 
prejudicial to the defendant. For instance, he referred to Mr. Sahadeo’s colour of skin as basis for 
an inference that ill treatment would have left marks that would have been visible in the medical 
inspection that took place afterwards, in addition to the bruise on the toe that was recorded. As 
the court, consequently, did not address the issue of the possible coercion and ill treatment in a 
proper way in a case that led to the imposition of capital punishment, I find that there has been a 
violation of articles 7 and 14 of the Covenant’. Moreover, ‘the mere fact that no allegation of 
torture was made in the domestic appeal proceedings can not as such be held against the alleged 
victim if it is proposed, (…) that such an allegation was in fact made during the actual trial but 
was neither recorded nor acted upon’. In such case due weight must be given to the allegations, in 
light of the details given by the petitioner, the unavailability of a trial transcript and the absence 
of any further explanations from the State party. HRC Abduali Ismatovich Kurbanov (submitted 
by his mother Safarmo Kurbanova) v. Tajikistan, 6 November 2003. 
100 Even in a case in which the State initially failed to make available the trial transcripts and 
domestic judgments and later only provided copies of English translations of these judgments, 
but not the originals nor the trial transcripts, the HRC did not shift the burden of proof to the 
State. HRC Mohammed Ajaz and Amir Jamil v. Korea, 13 July 1999. In reply to the Committee’s 
request for the trial transcripts and the judgments in the case, Korea stated that it maintained as a 
rule “[t]hat it is not allowed to peruse, photocopy and transmit the records of closed cases in 
order to protect the safety of victims and witnesses and the repute of defendants”. Later the State 
party did provide copies of English translations of the courts’ judgments. Apparently the originals 
were not provided, nor the file transcripts. From these translations, the Committee concluded that 
it appeared, among others, “that the District Court considered the voluntariness of the statements 
made by the defendants, but that in the light of the testimonies it found no sustainable reason to 
doubt the voluntariness of the statements”. Thus, the Committee noted that the applicants’ claims 
that the evidence to convict them was insufficient, that they had been tortured in order to force 
them to confess, and that mistakes occurred in the translations of their statements, were examined 
by the court of first instance and the court of appeal. Both Courts rejected their claims. The 
Committee reiterated that it was not for the Committee, but for the courts of States parties, to 
evaluate the facts and evidence in a specific case, unless it could be ascertained that the 
evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. It did regret that the State 
party did not provide a copy of the trial transcript, for this had prevented the Committee from 
examining fully the conduct of the trial. However, after consideration of the judgments of the 
District Court and the High Court, and in particular their evaluation of the claims subsequently 
made to the Committee, the Committee did not find that those evaluations were arbitrary or 
amounted to a denial of justice or that the authors had raised before the Committee any issues 
beyond those so evaluated by the domestic courts. The Committee concluded that none of the 
articles of the ICCPR had been violated. 
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report on the question whether there is true equality of arms and whether courts are sufficiently 
informed and aware of certain issues and not just go through the motions.  
Yet the HRC and the Inter-American Commission did not just use provisional measures in 
cases that, already at that stage, clearly appeared to be arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. 
Many provisional measures used in cases that included claims of an unfair trial in violation of 
Article 14 ICCPR, but in which the HRC did not find a violation of this article, have performed 
no function relating to the claim on the merits other than postponing the execution for the sake of 
postponement.101 In these cases the Committee found that the facts before it did not disclose any 
violation of the provisions of the Covenant, that there was insufficient evidence of a violation or 
that the claim dealt with facts and evidence in a particular case and it was not for the Committee 
to evaluate these.102 In other cases the HRC did find violations, but not of Article 14. At the time 
of submission, it made sense to use provisional measures, as there was a possibility the Commit-
tee would conclude a violation of Art. 14 meaning that the remedy would be commutation.103 
In my view the type of violation claimed is more significant for a decision to use provisional 
measures than the extent of the evidence available at the stage of provisional measures. What 
should be the most important criterion for using provisional measures is the Rapporteur’s expecta-
                                                 
101 In a few of these cases the death sentence had already been commuted, but in others the 
petitioners were still awaiting execution. After the finding of no violation the State can execute 
the petitioner as planned. 
102 HRC Michael Sawyers and Michael and Desmond McClean v. Jamaica (provisional measures in 
pre-Rapporteur period); Irvine Reynolds v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991 (idem). The HRC concluded 
that there was no violation of Art. 14 ‘after considering those parts of the judge’s instructions that 
were made available to it’. It seems that in this case the State was rewarded for general 
unresponsiveness and for providing an incomplete trial transcript; Dole Chadee et al v. Trinidad 
and Tobago, 29 July 1998. Scheinin’s dissent related to both the prison conditions and the 
fairness of the trial. The partial dissent of Klein and Kretzmer related to the quality of the water 
provided in jail. Pocar, who had been the Special Rapporteur deciding on the provisional measure 
was not present in July 1998 when the Committee decided the case. Dante Piandiong, Jesus 
Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by Alexander Padilla and Ricardo III Sunga) 
v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000. Three persons had been executed while the case was still 
pending, despite a provisional measure. See Chapter XVII for a discussion of the State party’s 
official responses towards these provisional measures and the response by the HRC. It did point 
out that the substance of the claim appeared to raise important questions. One of these was 
‘whether or not the crime for which they were convicted was a most serious crime as stipulated 
by article 6(2). Another was ‘whether the re-introduction of the death penalty in the Philippines is 
in compliance with the State party’s obligations under article 6(1) (2) and (6) of the Covenant’. It 
considered, however, that it was not in a position to address the issues in this case because neither 
counsel nor the State had made submissions in this respect. Apparently this was different from 
the situation in which it considered issues proprio motu. In short, it could not make a finding of a 
violation of any of the articles of the ICCPR. At the same time it reiterated its conclusion that ‘the 
State committed a grave breach of its obligations under the Protocol by putting the alleged 
victims to death before the Committee had concluded its consideration of the Communication’. 
Evatt and Medina Quiroga dissented on the issue of fair trial, considering that the alleged defects 
in the identification parade left serious questions about the fairness of the trial. Chanet considered 
that the accused should have been provided with a lawyer during the line-up identification. As 
this was not done, the HRC should have found violations of Articles 14(3)(b) and (d) and 6. 
Scheinin, finally, considered that the State should have provided legal assistance during the 6-8 
months of pre-trial detention.  
103 See Chapter XIII on the relationship with forms of reparation. 
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tion of the remedy the Committee would recommend if it would find a violation.104 The HRC 
takes seriously its subsidiary role in the system of human rights protection. It assumes that the 
domestic courts ‘have got it right’. Despite the difficulty of proving violations of Art. 14 there is 
always a remote possibility that the HRC will find a denial of justice or clear arbitrariness in the 
court’s or jury’s handling of the facts and evidence or in the judge’s instructions to the jury.  
In its case law the HRC has not clarified what are the criteria to assess the risk for the use of 
provisional measures. It would be virtually impossible for the petitioner to provide information 
indicating, for instance, a violation of Article 14 ICCPR amounting to a denial of justice, already 
when he requests the HRC to take provisional measures halting an execution. More than some 
prima facie evidence of a claim should not be required. 
As the HRC has not indicated that it requires a certain level of evidence before it would use 
provisional measures to halt an execution, the Rapporteur correctly uses provisional measures 
also in all cases involving claims of a violation of Article 14. Given the difficulty in establishing 
such a violation, combined with the importance of the right to life, it would be unreasonable to 
require the petitioner to already do so at the stage of provisional measures. Hence, if there is a 
possibility that the HRC finds a violation, even if remote, the HRC, in my view, is justified in its 
use of provisional measures to halt an execution.105 
3.2.4 Non-refoulement cases and assessment of risk 
3.2.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
Internationally, both the HRC and CAT have dealt with cases involving claims that the expulsion 
or extradition of the petition would result in a violation of the principle of non-refoulement. In 
addition, the European system has dealt with the issue of non-refoulement very often as well. An 
important factor in their case law has been that of the evidentiary requirements for a ‘real risk’ on 
the merits.106 
Certain States, such as Australia and Canada, have put pressure on the individual complaint 
systems of the ICCPR and the Convention against Torture.107 At times the supervisory Commit-
tees to both treaties may have felt inclined to take a rather limited approach, certainly to the evi-
dentiary requirements on the merits,108 but also to the use of provisional measures. They may use 
them more sparingly and in fewer situations than legally might be possible. This is relevant in the 
context of the type of cases in which provisional measures are used, but particularly in the context 
of the assessment of evidence.  
This section first deals with the assessment of risk by CAT and the HRC. It also examines 
the approach to assessment of risk in the European system. It singles out the issue of the evidence 
required for lifting provisional measures and the issue of diplomatic assurances. 
                                                 
104 See Chapter III (Halting executions) and Chapter XIII (Protection) on the relationship with 
reparation. 
105 This depends of course on the obligations on the merits and forms of reparation required by it, as 
discussed in Chapter XIII (Protection). 
106 See in general on this issue e.g. Battjes (2006). 
107 Interview of author with HRC Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin, Maastricht 20 September 
2002. 
108 CAT has recalled ‘that it is normally for the complainant to present an arguable case and that the 
risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory and suspicion’. C.A.R.M. 
v. Canada, 18 May 2007, §8.10; M.Z. v. Sweden, 12 May 2006, §9.3; M.A.K. v. Germany, 12 
May 2004, §13.5; and S.L. v. Sweden, 11 May 2001, §6.3. 
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3.2.4.2 ASSESSMENT OF RISK BY CAT 
In 1997 CAT devoted a General Comment on its assessment of risk on the merits. It noted that 
‘the burden is upon the author to present an arguable case’ of a violation of Art. 3 on the merits. 
This means that ‘there must be a factual basis for the author’s position sufficient to require a 
response from the State party’.109 The ‘risk of torture must be assessed on grounds that go beyond 
mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly prob-
able’.110 The petitioner must show ‘substantial grounds’ for his or her belief to be in danger of 
being tortured and this danger must be ‘personal and present’.111 Pertinent information would 
include, and the Committee has noted that this list is non-exhaustive, evidence of a consistent 
pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights; the fact that the petitioner has been 
‘tortured or maltreated by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public 
official or other person acting in an official capacity’ in the (recent) past; any medical or other 
independent evidence to support a claim by the petitioner in this respect. CAT would also con-
sider as pertinent information to the effect that the situation has since changed; that the petitioner 
has ‘engaged in political or other activity within or outside the State concerned which would 
appear to make him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in danger of torture 
were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited to the State in question’; ‘any evidence as to the 
credibility of the author and any relevant factual inconsistencies in the petitioner’s claim.112 These 
criteria all appear relevant already at the stage of provisional measures.  
In its General Comment CAT noted that ‘Bearing in mind that the Committee against Tor-
ture is not an appellate, a quasi-judicial or an administrative body, but rather a monitoring body 
created by the States parties themselves with declaratory powers only, it follows that: (a) Consid-
erable weight will be given, in exercising the Committee’s jurisdiction pursuant to article 3 of the 
Convention, to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned; but (b) The 
Committee is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22, para-
graph 4, of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circum-
stances in every case”.113 
‘Complete accuracy’ cannot be expected from victims of torture. Contradictory submissions 
presented by the petitioner do not necessarily make a complaint unfounded, particularly when it 
has been shown that the petition suffers form a post traumatic stress syndrome.114 Yet a complaint 
involving risk of violation of Article 3 should be detailed sufficiently or there should be sufficient 
circumstantial evidence for a shift in the burden of proof.115 
                                                 
109 CAT General Comment 1 of 21 November 1997 on Communications concerning the return of a 
person to a State where there may be grounds he would be subjected to torture (Article 3 in the 
context of Article 22), §5. 
110 Id., §6. 
111 Id., §7. 
112 Id., §8. 
113 Id., §9. See also Bruin (1998), pp. 145-150. A more recent example is C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, 
17 November 2006. 
114 See e.g. CAT Alan v. Switzerland, 28 May 1996 and Tala v. Sweden, 15 November 1996. See 
also, more recently, V.L. v. Switzerland, 20 November 2006. 
115 This also includes plausible explanations for and the story of the petitioner’s flight, e.g. S.P.A. v. 
Canada, 7 November 2006, §7.5 (“the Committee deems that the complainant has not submitted 
sufficient details or corroborating evidence to shift the burden of proof. In particular, she has not 
adduced satisfactory evidence or details relating to her detention or escape from detention. 
Further, she has failed to provide plausible explanations for her failure or inability to provide 
certain details which would have been of relevance to buttress her case, such as her stay for over 
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At the admissibility stage the petitioner already must provide evidence indicating that the 
petition is not manifestly unfounded.116 On the merits the risk faced by the petition must be ‘fore-
seeable, real and personal’.117 It is normally for the petitioner ‘to present an arguable case’. The 
risk of torture ‘must be assessed on grounds that go beyond mere theory and suspicion’. The risk 
does not need to meet the test of ‘highly probable’, but the petitioner must provide ‘sufficiently 
reliable evidence’ which would ‘justify a shift of the burden of proof to the State party’.118 
After the first few years dealing with individual complaints CAT became rather strict in its 
interpretation of what constitutes ‘personal risk’, although more recently it appears at times to 
return to a more critical approach to the arguments of the State.119 
CAT has ‘conceptualized the formal and substantive criteria applied by the Rapporteur for 
new complaints and interim measures in granting or rejecting requests for interim measures of 
protection’.120 In this respect it has noted that for the Rapporteur to use provisional measures a 
petition ‘must have a substantial likelihood of success on the merits for it to be concluded that the 
alleged victim would suffer irreparable harm in the event of his or her deportation’.121 This state-
ment refers both to evidentiary requirements and to the applicable substantive law.122  
                                                                                                                       
three months in Kermanshah and the names of those who helped her to escape. Finally, the 
Committee deems that she has failed to provide plausible explanations for her subsequent journey 
through seven countries, including some asylum countries, prior to finally claiming refugee status 
in Canada”). 
116 See e.g. CAT I.A.O. v. Sweden, 6 May 1998 (inadm.: no ‘substantial grounds’). 
117 See e.g. CAT A.R. v. The Netherlands, 21 November 2003, §7.3 and S.S. and S.A. v. the 
Netherlands, 11 May 2001 (no violation). 
118 See e.g. CAT M.A.K. v. Germany, 12 May 2004, §13.5. CAT is not always consistent in its 
phrasing, see e.g. Gamal El Rgeig v. Switserland, 15 November 2006 and JV 2006, 160 annotated 
by Spijkerboer. 
119 In the period covered by its Annual Report 2000 it discussed nine cases involving non-
refoulement claims. In one case it found a violation. In the other cases it did not. Five times 
because it considered there were no ‘substantial grounds’; twice because it considered that the 
risk was limited given the considerable time that had passed; once because the petitioner, who 
had been expelled pending the proceedings before CAT, in practice was not tortured upon return 
and once because the complaint was not convincing. In the period covered by its Annual Report 
2005 it found violations in four of the nine non-refoulement cases. In the period covered by its 
Annual Report 2006, on the merits CAT dealt with the issue of non-refoulement nine times. On 
one occasion it did find a violation of Article 3 but in the other cases it did not. In its Annual 
Report 2007 (covering the Fall 2006 and Spring 2007 sessions), in 12 non-refoulement cases it 
found no violation and in seven cases it did find a violation. Its more critical approach is reflected 
in particular in its discussion of diplomatic assurances, see infra. 
120 See CAT Annual Report 2005, §135; Annual Report 2006, §61; Annual Report 2007, §70. 
121 Ibid. 
122 As to the relevance of the latter, see Chapter V (Non-refoulement). Since CAT adapted its 
practice with regard to provisional measures there was an expectation that more petitioners would 
resort to the HRC in expulsion cases. Interview by author with HRC Special Rapporteur Martin 
Scheinin, Maastricht 20 September 2002. By April 2003, however, there was no evidence of this 
yet. Interview by author with HRC Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin, Geneva, April 2003. Of 
the 33 Views referred to in its Annual Report 2006, A/61/44, 1 November 2006, discussing the 
follow up on CAT’s findings of violations ‘up to the thirty-fourth session’, 21 related to Article 3 
(non-refoulement). In 20 of the 21 cases provisional measures were used pending the 
proceedings. In the one case in which they were not, the removal had taken place before the 
petitioner could apply to CAT (Agiza v. Sweden). Until 2003 it took provisional measures more 
than 80 times. These approximate numbers in themselves also indicate that CAT is considerably 
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CAT is considerably less strict in its use of provisional measures than it is on the merits. 
Given the absence of consistent publication of information on the use of provisional measures, 
including statistics, it is difficult to assess to what extent their use decreased upon the Commit-
tee’s adoption of guidelines as to the use of provisional measures. In fact it must be kept in mind 
that both before and after the adoption of these guidelines, there have been occasions on which it 
refused to take provisional measures in non-refoulement cases, but at the same time it has contin-
ued to use them in the majority of cases.123 
3.2.4.3 ASSESSMENT OF RISK BY THE HRC 
The HRC has not discussed the evidence required on the merits, let alone that required at the 
stage of provisional measures, to the same extent as CAT. Yet it has also dealt with the issue of 
non-refoulement in expulsion and extradition cases. In fact the question which test to apply to 
establish real risk is one of the main questions arising on the merits in non-refoulement cases 
under the ICCPR. This question may be expected to play a role as well at the provisional meas-
ures stage.124 
As discussed in the context of the evidence required for the use of provisional measures to 
halt the execution of the death penalty, in the practice of the HRC we see that the Rapporteur 
transmits the case to the State once there is a certain amount of evidence and, possibly, once there 
are some questions to be posed to the State. It is also at this stage that the Rapporteur normally 
                                                                                                                       
less strict in its use of provisional measures than it is on the merits. Yet since the introduction of a 
Rapporteur to deal with requests for provisional measures, the latter would ask the secretariat to 
make a quick assessment on the substance of the complaint and whether there was prima facie 
evidence of risk. Reportedly, this resulted in the use of provisional measures in a lower 
percentage of cases. About 60 to 70 % according to an estimate made at the secretariat in Geneva 
in October 2003. 
123 See e.g. the following cases in which provisional measures were used, but in which subsequently 
no violation was found for failure to substantiate: CAT E.R.K and Y.K. v. Sweden 30 April 2007; 
T.A. v. Sweden, 22 November 2007; Z.K. v. Sweden, 9 May 2008 and R.K. et al. v. Sweden, 16 
May 2008. In one case in which no violation was found on the merits the Rapporteur decided not 
to use provisional measures (decision of 30 January 2007): M.X. v. Switzerland, 7 May 2008, 
§1.2. Another case, in which provisional measures were used, was subsequently declared 
inadmissible as the claim did not ‘rise to the basic level of substantiation required for purposes of 
admissibility’, see K.A. v. Sweden, 16 November 2007 (inadm.) §7.2. In this case the Rapporteur 
added that his request for provisional measures, of 24 November 2006, was made on the basis of 
the information contained in the petitioner’s submissions and could be reviewed at the request of 
the State in light of information and comments from the State and the petitioner, §1.5. Following 
this request, on 5 December 2006, the Swedish Migration Board decided to stay the enforcement 
of the expulsion orders, §1.6. On official responses see Chapter XVII. 
124 As in the other systems, provisional measures have been used in cases in which subsequently no 
violation was found on the merits, or in cases that were later declared inadmissible as 
insufficiently substantiated. See e.g. HRC Daljit Singh v. Canada, 30 March 2006 (inadm.). In 
this case the Rapporteur had initially used a qualified provisional measure on 5 November 2004, 
requesting the State not to deport the petitioner ‘before it provides the Committee with 
information as to whether it intends to remove’ him to India, and before providing the Committee 
with its observations on the communication. Following a request for clarification the Committee 
requested the State, on 9 November 2004, ‘not to deport Mr. Daljit Singh to India before the State 
party has made its observations either on admissibility or the merits of the author’s allegations 
and the Committee has acknowledged receipt’. §1.2. 
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uses provisional measures, although there are exceptions. There have been instances in which the 
Rapporteur used provisional measures before he or she ordered the Secretariat to transmit the 
petitioner’s submission to the State for comment. In other words, while the HRC generally seems 
to use the same criterion for prima facie evidence for decisions to transmit the case and for deci-
sions to use provisional measures, there are situations in which material and temporal urgency 
warrant the use of provisional measures even though the Rapporteur considers that insufficient 
information is available to transmit the case to the State. 
From the perspective of non-refoulement the main difference between extradition and other 
forms of removal is that it is easier for the alleged victim to show that his extradition is likely to 
expose him to torture or ill treatment than his expulsion, exactly because in cases of extradition it 
is certain he faces detention upon return. This applies even more to the situation in which he is 
facing a punishment in the requesting country that would violate the obligations of the sending 
country.125 
The HRC's first expulsion case, dating from 1978, gives some indication of the assessment 
of risk at the stage of provisional measures. It used provisional measures and decided to inform 
the petitioner that unless he provided the information requested, within certain time limits, the 
HRC might conclude that he no longer wished it to continue consideration of the case.126 Obvi-
ously if this failure to provide further information could result in a discontinuation of the case, it 
could also result in withdrawal of the provisional measures.  
In extradition cases the HRC decided that a test of 'necessary and foreseeable' consequences 
of the removal to the petitioner was to be applied in its decisions on the merits.127 However, this 
                                                 
125 In connection with a possibly conflicting obligation under an extradition treaty, invoked by 
Canada, the HRC stated: “A State party to the Covenant is required to ensure that it carries out all 
its other legal commitments in a manner consistent with the Covenant”. HRC Kindler v. Canada, 
30 July 1993, §13.1. See in general about this issue Smeulers (2002), pp. 11-73.  
126 HRC O.E. v. S., 26 July 1978. 
127 See e.g. HRC Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §6.2. It pointed out that the State’s duty under 
Article 2 ICCPR ‘would be negated by the handing over of a person to another State (whether a 
State party to the Covenant or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant is certain or is the 
very purpose of the handing over’. As an example, the HRC mentioned that the State party would 
violate the ICCPR ‘if it handed over a person to another State in circumstances in which it was 
foreseeable that torture would take place’. Given the example, it seems that certainty is not 
required but rather foreseeability. Accordingly, the ‘foreseeability of the consequence would 
mean that there was a present violation by the State party, even though the consequence would 
not occur until later on’. With regard to the assessment of risk the HRC recalled the following: 
“(a) California had sought the author’s extradition on charges which, if proven, carry the death 
penalty; (b) the United States requested Ng’s extradition on those capital charges; (c) the 
extradition warrant documents the existence of a prima facie case against the author; (d) United 
States prosecutors involved in the case have stated that they would ask for the death penalty to be 
imposed; and (e) the state of California, when intervening before the Supreme Court of Canada 
did not disavow the prosecutors’ position”. Ng v. Canada, §13.5. Committee member Aguilar 
Urbina briefly referred to the State’s argument that the petitioner could not be considered a victim 
because the allegations were derived from assumptions about ‘possible future events, which may 
not materialise and which are dependent on the law and actions of the United States’. He pointed 
out that the ‘foreseeability’ of a future event referred to the question ‘whether, according to 
common sense, it may happen, in the absence of exceptional events that prevent it from 
occurring’. At the same time ‘necessity’ referred to future events that ‘will inevitably occur, 
unless exceptional events prevent it from happening’. He agreed with the views of the majority, 
finding that the petitioner ‘would necessarily and foreseeably be executed’. Ng v. Canada, 
dissenting opinion Aguilar Urbina, §5. On the issue of necessary and foreseeable consequences 
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test may be too difficult to meet for petitioners even in extradition cases. In addition, the HRC 
takes a narrow view of what is 'necessary and foreseeable' and has pointed out that it is not a 
fourth instance of appeal, meaning that it is not within its competence to review sentences of 
domestic courts.128 Generally it does not consider itself competent to review facts and evidence 
already decided on by domestic courts. This leads exception if the petitioner can show arbitrari-
ness or a ‘denial of justice’.129 
Of course there are cases where a finding of a risk in an extradition case would appear self-
evident given the type of information available at that stage, also with a test of 'necessary and 
foreseeable'. When the prosecutor is seeking the death penalty this indicates a real risk in itself.130 
In light of the practice in the US, the fact that accomplices did not receive the death penalty gives 
no indication about the fate of the petitioner. Such results depend on the quality of the defence, on 
what the prosecutor has invested in the domestic case, as well as other circumstances. Obviously 
in such cases provisional measures have been used.131 
E.G. v. Canada (disc. 1997)132 is relevant with regard to assessing risk in the context of the 
credibility of assurances against the death penalty at the stage of the merits as well as provisional 
measures. At the time the HRC did not consider that Canada was under an obligation to request 
assurances of the US that the death penalty would not be sought, but in this case Canada appar-
ently did request them. Counsel for the petitioner referred to a report from a Florida newspaper 
about another person who had been extradited from Canada ‘under essentially the same circum-
stances’.133 In that case Florida prosecutors had given assurances that the death penalty would not 
be imposed, but once he was extradited they suggested they were not bound by this undertaking. 
‘Given the ambivalence of Florida prosecutors’ about such undertakings, he noted, there was a 
real risk that the petitioner would be exposed to the death penalty by electrocution. Moreover, he 
pointed out that the federal government gave no assurances against the death penalty.134 Initially 
                                                                                                                       
Committee member Lallah has considered that it was sufficient that the offence for which the 
petitioner faced trial in the US in principle carried the death penalty. He was thus facing a charge 
placing his life in jeopardy. The fact that one petitioner had already been tried and sentenced to 
death when the HRC adopted its Views, while another had not, made no material defence. Cox v. 
Canada, 31 October 1994, dissenting opinion Lallah. See also Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993. 
128 HRC Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §15.2. 
129 See e.g. HRC Agabekova v. Uzbekistan, 16 March 2007. For exceptional (death penalty) cases in 
which it did dispute the approach by the domestic court see e.g. Clifton Wright v. Jamaica, 27 
July 1992; Mulai v. Guyana, 20 July 2004 and several cases against Tajikistan, e.g. Khomidova 
(on behalf of her son Khomidov) v. Tajikistan, 29 July 2004. 
130 The group of persons protected under Article 6 ICCPR would otherwise be extremely limited. 
Only people like Kindler who have already been sentenced to death and have somehow been able 
to escape from the US to another State would run a ‘real risk’ of the death penalty upon 
extradition to the US. 
131 See e.g. the aforementioned HRC cases Kindler, Ng and Cox v. Canada. 
132 HRC E.G. v. Canada, 738/1997, disc. 17 November 1997; initial submission 5 January 1997, 
received 7 January 1997 with newspaper clipping of the Orlando sentinel of 18 September 1996, 
provisional measures of 17 January 1997; discontinued November 1997, including withdrawal of 
provisional measures (on file with the author). 
133 Ibid. 
134 HRC E.G. v. Canada, 738/1997, disc. 17 November 1997, “While it is true that your petitioner is 
not now charged with a capital offence, this can change simply by increasing the quantity of 
marijuana in the charge. There is nothing in international extradition law to confirm that this 
would violate the rule of specialty and extradition treaties, such as the Canada-US treaty, which 
affirm this rule”. While the petitioner was reassured by a comment in the Canadian response 
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the HRC used provisional measures,135 but it appears from the file that the State party was keen 
on their withdrawal and the Rapporteur decided that there was no need to maintain them. He had 
made his decision ‘after careful consideration and upon reflection’ and ‘on the basis of the assur-
ances obtained by the Canadian Government from United States authorities, to the effect that the 
death penalty will not be sought against and imposed on’ the petitioner.136 
Sometimes a risk of the death penalty has also played a role in expulsion cases. In G.T. v. 
Australia (1997)137 the petitioner feared he would be arrested upon return to Malaysia and tried 
for a drug-related crime that carried the death penalty. Pending the proceedings the HRC used 
provisional measures, but on the merits it found that the death penalty was not a foreseeable and 
necessary consequence of G.T.’s deportation.138 Thus Australia was free to expel T. Effectively, 
                                                                                                                       
stating that ‘in other words, Canada is not prepared to consent to the imposition of the death 
penalty’, he noted nevertheless that the signals sent to him directly were far less encouraging. He 
referred to the Minister’s decision of October 1994 that a request for assurances was not 
necessary and a letter of November 1994 in which Senior Counsel for the Minister ‘felt it 
necessary’ to ‘reaffirm that Canada did not seek any formal assurances under Article 6 of the 
Treaty in this case’. The petitioner, on the other hand, sought binding assurances by both federal 
and State authorities that the death penalty would not be imposed. “As things stand, although 
there is an undertaking from the Florida prosecutor, it does not bind the United States 
Government because it has not been sought under Article 6 of the treaty. Furthermore, there is no 
undertaking with respect to the federal charges”. Finally, counsel explained that his client 
‘strongly resents the suggestions of abusive behaviour’. Thus, his client had instructed him to 
inform both the HRC and the Canadian Government that if the Minister would provide credible 
assurances against the death penalty the petitioner would formally renounce all remedies within 
Canada and accept his extradition to the US. 
135 On 17 January 1997. 
136 HRC Note verbale by the Special Rapporteur to the Permanent Mission of Canada in E.G. v. 
Canada (738/1997), 28 April 1997 (on file with the author). In the letter sent by the Secretariat to 
counsel it was noted that the Rapporteur was ‘satisfied that the Government of Canada has 
obtained the appropriate assurances from the United States authorities, both at the Federal and at 
the State level’. Letter by the Secretariat to the petitioner’s counsel, 28 April 1997 (on file with 
the author). In May 1997 the petitioner withdrew his communication before the HRC. “The 
answers provided by Canada in response to the communication have helped to clarify his legal 
situation and he feels that the assurances are now sufficient that the death penalty will not be 
imposed’. Letter by counsel to the HRC, 26 May 1997; In November 1997 the HRC decided to 
discontinue examination of the case, letter by the Secretariat to counsel informing about the 
decision, taken at the 61st session, to discontinue the case, 17 November 1997 (on file with the 
author). 
137 HRC Mrs. G.T. v. Australia, 4 November 1997. 
138 The State had considered that the HRC should use the ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence 
test’ also for expulsion cases. It noted that the Committee’s ‘necessary and foreseeable 
consequence test’ was stricter than the ‘real chance test’ used by domestic courts and that it 
placed a higher evidential burden on the petitioner than the test of ‘well-founded fear of 
persecution’ under the Refugee Convention. The petitioner was required to demonstrate that a 
prospective violation could be foreseen and was inevitable and that there was a clear causal link 
between the decision of the expelling State and a future violation by the receiving State. See HRC 
Mrs. G.T. v. Australia, 4 November 1997, §5.8 and the submission by the State on the 
admissibility and merits in this case, May 1997, submitted on 3 June 1997 (on file with the 
author). In effect, in this approach the petitioner would hardly ever be able to show such 
consequence other than in extradition cases. The State argued, moreover, that there was no real 
risk of prosecution of the petitioner in Malaysia and, in the alternative, there was insufficient 
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the provisional measure came to an end with its decision on the merits. This case not only indi-
cates that evidentiary requirements on the merits are very strict,139 but also that for the use of 
provisional measures the requirements for assessment of risk are not. It is clear that while the 
HRC considered there was insufficient evidence to find a violation, there was sufficient evidence 
for it to use provisional measures.140 
                                                                                                                       
evidence that, if prosecuted and convicted, he would be subjected to caning or an ‘unreasonable 
period of detention on death row’. It is clear that it based its reasoning on Kindler v. Canada and 
also ignored the fact that, different from Canada, Australia is a party to the Second OP (on the 
abolition of the death penalty). It referred to information received from its Mission in Kuala 
Lumpur and noted ‘it is the considered view of our interlocutors that there is nothing notably 
inhumane or unusually harsh about the conditions of those placed in Malaysia’s death row’. The 
petitioner submitted that her husband’s family had made inquiries and found that his name was 
placed on the Malaysian computers for arrest. See §6.6 of the View. Moreover, he had been 
convicted of importing 240 gram of heroine into Australia and it may be assumed that he had this 
‘under his control’ when he left Malaysia. Malaysia carries the mandatory death penalty in such 
circumstance. 
139 Three members dissented and argued that in this case there was a real risk that the alleged victim 
would be subjected to the death penalty. They argued that, different from A.R.J. v. Australia 
(1997), in this case Malaysia would apply its law, under which the death penalty is mandatory. In 
fact, this difference meant that Australia had the burden to ‘refute the assumption that Malaysian 
law will be applied’ rather than that the petitioner had to prove an intention of the Malaysian 
authorities to prosecute her husband. In that respect they noted that they ‘cannot ascribe much 
weight to the oral confirmation of the Royal Malaysian Police (…) that they do not institute 
criminal proceedings for trafficking in drugs against a person returned to Malaysia’. They pointed 
out that even if Malaysia would not prosecute the petitioner’s husband for acts for which he had 
already been convicted in Australia, it could still prosecute him for possession of drugs in 
Malaysia or for exporting drugs from Malaysia. “As these acts carry a mandatory death sentence 
under Malaysian law something stronger than a vague oral confirmation is required to refute the 
assumption that the Malaysian authorities will indeed enforce their law”. The dissenters pointed 
out that, contrary to the positive evidence Australia had provided in the other case, to the effect 
that persons in a similar situation had not been charged in Iran, it had only presented negative 
evidence in this case, to the effect that it knew of no cases of executions of persons in similar 
circumstances. They considered this evidence to be ‘insufficient to refute the assumption that 
Malaysian law will be applied in T’.s case’. They equally considered insufficient the oral 
confirmation of the Royal Malaysian Police. For that reason they were ‘forced to conclude that 
there is a real risk that T. will face a death sentence if he is deported to Malaysia’, in violation of 
the State’s obligation to ensure his right to life under Article 6 ICCPR. Mrs. G.T. v. Australia, 4 
November 1997. Dissent by Klein and Kretzmer. Scheinin agreed. He also considered that the 
HRC should have taken a separate decision declaring the case admissible and requesting 
comments on the merits, at least in relation to Articles 17 and 23. He pointed out that the 
petitioner had not specified which Covenant articles she invoked, which meant that the merger of 
admissibility and merits gave Australia the possibility to determine the substantive issues. In his 
view, the communication raised ‘more issues under the Covenant than those to which the State 
party replied’. In particular, the State had ‘failed to address the issue of whether the reasons 
justifying the deportation of a person who has fully served his criminal sentence and who has 
already been able to re-establish his family life are weighty enough to legitimize the adverse 
consequences for the family life of the person and his closest ones’. 
140 A related question is whether this test is a factual test, for instance whether or not the death 
penalty is a necessary and foreseeable consequence of an extradition or expulsion, or already a 
test whether or not there has been a violation of the Covenant. Herndl obviously focuses on the 
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In Judge v. Canada (2003) the HRC overturned its case law on extradition without assur-
ances against the death penalty.141 Before 2003 it considered that Canada was allowed to extradite 
without such assurances. In Judge the petitioner had been deported before the HRC could use 
provisional measures, but its decision on the merits to the effect that assurances against the death 
penalty must be provided before a petitioner may be extradited, provides a firm basis for the use 
of provisional measures in new cases.142 To request provisional measures in order to halt an ex-
tradition, petitioners only need to show either that the State did not request assurances or that the 
assurances provided by the requesting State are insufficient. The expulsion case A.A.T. v. Hun-
gary (disc. 1994) illustrates that the HRC does expect a certain level of information before it takes 
provisional measures. In this case it only took them after having received additional informa-
tion.143 In the expulsion case A.R.J. v. Australia (1997)144 the HRC did use provisional measures, 
but subsequently, drawing on the information and arguments provided by the State,145 it resorted 
to the definition of a ‘real risk’ it had used earlier in extradition cases (rather than expulsion 
cases). It considered that such a risk existed when a violation of rights under the Covenant would 
be a ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’ of the deportation.146 Accordingly, it found no 
violation, allowing the petitioner’s return to Iran. 
Ahani v. Canada (2004) specifically dealt with the information available to the petitioner in 
the domestic expulsion proceedings. The original complaint stated that the ‘discretion of the 
Minister of Immigration in directing a person’s return to a country may be affected by considera-
tions adverse to human rights concerns, including negative media coverage of a case’.147 The 
petitioner added that the Minister’s role in the expulsion process was ‘neither independent nor 
impartial’ and that instead a tribunal should make such a decision.148 He noted that he could not 
rebut the Minister’s submissions as he was unaware of their contents. “The absence of any rea-
                                                                                                                       
question whether or not the death penalty will be imposed rather than whether or not this would 
result in a violation. Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994, dissenting opinion Herndl, §§6-8. 
141 HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003.  
142 It may have been influenced by the changed attitude of the Canadian Supreme Court, 
emphasising aspects relating to the judicial system and wrongful convictions in the requesting 
State. 
143 HRC A.A.T. v. Hungary, 543/1993 (disc. 1994). The initial communication was of 10 August 
1992. Early September 1992 the Secretariat contacted the Special Rapporteur. Later that month 
the Special Rapporteur requested some additional information. In January 1993 the Secretariat 
informed the petitioner that the case could now soon be brought to the attention of the Special 
Rapporteur, but some additional information was still necessary about exhaustion of domestic 
remedies and contact information for his lawyers (so that they could provide a complete file). 
Eventually, following some informal interventions, the Rapporteur used provisional measures on 
2 June 1993.  
144 HRC A.R.J. v. Australia, 28 July 1997. The HRC used provisional measures on 3 April 1996. 
145 The State party, submitting its comments six months after the HRC used provisional measures, 
argued that the petitioner could not pass the ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’ test in this 
case. A retrial for drug trafficking offences upon expulsion was not ‘certain’ nor ‘the purpose’ of 
returning him to Iran.  
146 It is puzzling that the HRC only refers to Art. 6 and not to the Second Optional Protocol, to which 
Australia is a party. For the use of the ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’ criterion see also 
e.g. HRC Dawood Khan v. Canada, 25 July 2006, §5.4. 
147 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §3.1. 
148 Ibid. See also Smeulers (2002). 
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sons provided in the decision makes judicial review of the decision against the submissions made 
to the Minister impossible”.149 
‘Recalling its own limited role in the assessment of facts and evidence’ the HRC did not 
discern ‘any elements of bad faith, abuse of power or other arbitrariness’ on the domestic court 
record. It also observed that the ICCPR ‘does not, as of right, provide for a right of appeal beyond 
criminal cases’.150 On the other hand, with respect to the subsequent decision by the Minister that 
Ahani could be deported the HRC did find violations of the ICCPR. It observed that ‘where one 
of the highest values protected by the Covenant, namely the right to be free from torture, is at 
stake, the closest scrutiny should be applied to the fairness of the procedure to determine whether 
an individual is at a substantial risk of torture’. It emphasised that its provisional measures in this 
case had highlighted this risk.151 
The Committee pointed out that the Canadian Supreme Court had held in Suresh152 that the 
process of the Minister’s determination of the risk and the balancing with national security 
grounds ‘was faulty for unfairness’ because the individual in question ‘had not been provided 
with the full materials on which the Minister based his or her decision and an opportunity to 
                                                 
149 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §3.2. With regard to the expulsion process 
followed by the State party counsel noted that the initial security certification was made by two 
Ministers without any input from the petitioner. The Federal Court hearing only determined 
whether the Ministers’ assessment was reasonable and the Crown evidence was put forward ‘in 
camera and ex parte, without being tested by the court or supported by witnesses’. She argued 
that ‘the conclusion of a national security threat, which was subsequently balanced at the removal 
stage by one elected official (a Minister) against the risk of harm, was reached by an unfair 
process’. She pointed out that Canadian security agencies had destroyed their evidence and 
provided only summaries and that the evidence ‘could have been tested as is the case before the 
Security Intelligence Review Committee, where an independent counsel, cleared on security 
grounds could call witnesses and cross-examine in secret hearing’. She noted that the basis of the 
Supreme Court’s decision was that the petitioner ‘had not made out a prima facie risk of torture’ 
but that ‘the entire premise of a fair process is that an accurate determination of precisely this 
question can be made’. Instead, the petitioner only received ‘a post-decision judicial review on 
whether it was “reasonable” to so conclude’. She pointed out that this was ‘an inappropriately 
low standard for a decision that could result in torture or loss of life’. See §§6.2-6.4. She argued 
that the State was ‘in error’ with regard to both of its alleged claims ‘that (i) he is not at risk of 
torture, and (ii) even if he were, he may be expelled on the grounds of threat to national security’, 
§3.5. She pointed out that Iran had been monitoring his case and that the details of cooperation 
and the (confidential) information he provided to the Canadian authorities, and his resistance to 
deportation could ‘very likely constitute treason in Iran’, §3.6. With regard to the risk to Ahani 
she noted that the press had extensively referred to him as a defector and that the Government of 
Iran was fully aware of the nature of his case. The Supreme Court of Canada had decided that the 
decision of the minister in Ahani was ‘largely fact-based’. “The inquiry into whether Ahani faces 
a substantial risk of torture involves considerations of the human rights record of the home state, 
the personal risk faced by the claimant, any assurances that the claimant will not be tortured and 
their worth and, in that respect, the ability of the home state to control its own security forces, and 
more. Such issues are largely outside the realm of expertise of reviewing courts and possess a 
negligible legal dimension. Considerable deference is therefore required”. Supreme Court of 
Canada Ahani v. Canada, 208 D.L.R. (4th) 57, 2002 SCC 2, §17. See also Macklin (2002) 
discussing the court’s deferential stance. 
150 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §10.5. 
151 Id., §10.6. 
152 Supreme Court of Canada Ahani v. Canada, 208 D.L.R. (4th) 57, 2002 SCC 2. 
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comment in writing thereon’ and further because this decision was not reasoned.153 The Commit-
tee considered that the decision by the State not to provide Ahani with the procedural protections 
deemed necessary in the domestic Suresh case, because Ahani ‘had not made out a prima facie 
risk of harm’, failed to meet the requisite standard of fairness. It observed that the argument was 
circuitous in that the petitioner ‘may have been able to make out the necessary level of risk if in 
fact he had been allowed to submit reasons on the risk of torture faced by him in the event of 
removal’.154 It found a violation of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 7 ICCPR for the failure 
to provide the petitioner with ‘the procedural protections afforded to the plaintiff in Suresh on the 
basis that he had not made out a risk of harm’. After all in Article 13 the State is obliged to allow 
the petitioner to submit reasons against his removal and to have his ‘submissions reviewed by a 
competent authority, entailing a possibility to comment on the material presented to that author-
ity’.155 Here risk assessment at the stage of provisional measures was subsequently confirmed on 
the merits.156  
                                                 
153 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §10.6. 
154 Ibid. 
155 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §10.8 (Ando dissenting). The HRC considered 
that because Article 13 ‘speaks directly to the situation in the present case and incorporates 
notions of due process also reflected in article 14 of the Covenant’, it would be ‘inappropriate in 
terms of the scheme of the Covenant to apply the broader and general provisions of article 14 
directly’. See §10.9. In HRC Byahuranga v. Denmark, 1 November 2004 the HRC took note of 
the petitioner’s ‘detailed account as to why he fears to be subjected to ill-treatment at the hands of 
the Ugandan authorities’ and it concluded that he ‘made out a prima facie case of such a risk’, 
§11.2. It noted that the State party sought to ‘refute the alleged risk of treatment contrary to 
article 7 merely by referring to the outcome of the assessment made by its own authorities, 
instead of commenting the author's fairly detailed account on why such a risk in his opinion 
exists’, §11.3. In the light of the State party's ‘failure to provide substantive arguments’ in order 
‘to rebut the author's allegations’, the HRC found that due weight must be given to his detailed 
account of the existence of a risk of treatment contrary to Article 7. Id., §11.4. Wedgwood and 
Yalden attached a dissenting opinion pointing out that if the Committee had wished to have the 
petitioner’s full immigration file ‘or any other documents within it, it could easily have asked the 
State party’. “Denmark has been wholly cooperative with the Committee while this complaint 
was pending, holding in abeyance the author's deportation at the Committee's request, and 
releasing him on parole to his family”. They pointed out that ‘(a)t a minimum, the Committee 
should have given the State party an opportunity to provide any additional documents it wished to 
inspect’. 
156 See also, e.g. HRC Blanca Lilia Londoño Soto, Oscar Alberto Teran Cano, Maria Hercilia Cano 
Bedoya, Lina Marcela Teran Londoño, and Lilia Andrea Teran Londoño v. Australia, 1 April 
2008 (inadm.), in which the Special Rapporteur denied the petitioners’ request for provisional 
measures on 20 September 2005 and subsequently the Committee declared the Article 7 claim 
inadmissible for failure to sufficiently substantiate. In this respect the Committee noted the 
finding by the Refugee Review Tribunal that a real risk could not be established for lack of 
credibility of the petitioners. In addition the Committee noted that the petitioners had not 
demonstated the existence of a real risk of being deprived of their life or exposed to torture or 
cruel treatment. 
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3.2.4.4 ASSESSMENT OF RISK IN THE EUROPEAN SYSTEM 
Much has been written on the assessment of risk in judgments on the merits by the ECtHR in the 
context of refoulement.157 In N. v. Finland (2005), for instance, the Court interviewed the peti-
tioner and witnesses on a fact-finding mission. Eventually it found that the petitioner’s return to 
Congo (DRC) would violate Article 3.158 As to the general credibility of a petitioner’s statements 
the Court has observed, in Said v. the Netherlands (2005), that firstly, the statements in this case 
had been ‘consistent’, and, secondly, that he had submitted ‘persuasive argument to rebut the 
Government's claim that his account lacked credibility’.159 In Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands 
(2007) the Court found that the Netherlands could not ensure the safety of a Somali national. 
Among others, the Dutch government had no way to monitor his treatment upon return.160 
The Court applies a ‘rigorous examination’, in which the petitioner, as the Court put it in 
Saadi v. Italy (2008), must ‘adduce evidence capable of proving’ substantial grounds for a real 
risk of violation of Article 3 through removal. What is interesting is that in it uses the phrase 
‘capable of proving’ rather than ‘proving’.161 Once the petitioner has provided such evidence, the 
burden shifts to the State. When does the State have the obligation to take away any doubt? In 
other words: when has the petitioner offered evidence capable of proving that his removal would 
violate Article 3? According to Spijkerboer this comes down to the ‘arguability’ criterion used by 
the Court in the context of admissibility and in its case law on Article 13.162 
In cases of suspected terrorists or convicted criminals, States have sometimes argued that 
‘the examination of possible irreparable harm should be a rigorous one, particularly when the 
individual concerned was found to represent a threat.163 Yet obviously when there is a real risk, 
this cannot become less real simply because the person at risk is a convicted criminal or a sus-
pected terrorist. 
                                                 
157 Often referring to the early case ECtHR Vilvarajah et al v. UK, 30 October 1991. 
158 ECtHR N. v. Finland, 6 July 2005. 
159 ECtHR Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, §51. In addition, in her concurring opinion Judge 
Thomassen noted that ‘a conclusion that an asylum-seeker's account is not credible should (...) be 
based on a thorough investigation of the facts and be accompanied by adequate reasoning’. She 
pointed out that this obligation flows directly from Articles 2 and 3 ECHR. She would ‘draw a 
parallel with other procedural aspects which, under the Court's case-law, can be derived from 
these provisions, such as the obligation to conduct an effective investigation into a homicide or 
into a credible assertion that someone has been subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3’. 
160 ECtHR Salah Sheekh v. Netherlands, 11 January 2007, §§46 and 143. See also, e.g., Terlouw 
(2007); Vermeulen (2007); Woltjer (2007). 
161 ECtHR Saadi v. Italy, 23 February 2008 (Grand Chamber), §129 (this phrasing may have been 
inspired by that of the domestic court in this case, see §18). See also e.g. Ryabikin v. Russia, 19 
June 2008, §112, repeating the phrase ‘capable of proving’, referring to N. v. Finland, 26 July 
2007, §167, which does not yet use this phrase. 
162 Spijkerboer (2008), p. 1015, also noting that this would be in line with ECtHR Sheekh, 11 
January 2007, §136, with the fact that it will collect evidence proprio motu if doubts arise as to 
the accuracy of the information provided by the State and with the argumentation used by the 
Court in Mamatkulov for the obligations of States under the right of individual complaint to 
respect the Court’s provisional measures (maintain status quo; ensure the object of the complaint; 
prevent irreparable harm). These are all phrases that are linked to the idea that once the Court is 
dealing with a serious case, a rigorous examination is warranted and meanwhile the petitioner 
may not be removed. 
163 See e.g. CAT T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000, §§8.5 and 8.3. See also Chapter XVII (Official 
responses). 
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NA. v. UK (2008) relates to various aspects of establishing risk on the merits that are al-
ready relevant also at the stage of provisional measures. One is the Court’s practice of assessing 
the evidence ex nunc if the petitioner has not yet been removed. In other words, in such cases ‘the 
relevant time will be that of the proceedings before the Court’.164 “A full and ex nunc assessment 
is called for as the situation in a country of destination may change in the course of time. Even 
though the historical position is of interest in so far as it may shed light on the current situation 
and its likely evolution, it is the present conditions which are decisive and it is therefore necessary 
to take into account information that has come to light after the final decision taken by the domes-
tic authorities”.165 
The Court has acknowledged circumstances at which risk may be established by providing 
evidence of group persecution as such without having to show further special distinguishing 
features. It has noted that it ‘has never excluded the possibility that a general situation of violence 
in a country of destination will be of a sufficient level of intensity as to entail that any removal to 
it would necessarily breach Article 3 of the Convention’. Yet it ‘would adopt such an approach 
only in the most extreme cases of general violence, where there was a real risk of ill-treatment 
simply by virtue of an individual being exposed to such violence on return’.166 It has pointed out:  
“Exceptionally, however, in cases where an applicant alleges that he or she is a member of a 
group systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the Court has considered that the 
protection of Article 3 of the Convention enters into play when the applicant establishes that 
there are serious reasons to believe in the existence of the practice in question and his or her 
membership of the group concerned (…).167 In those circumstances, the Court will not then 
insist that the applicant show the existence of further special distinguishing features if to do so 
would render illusory the protection offered by Article 3. This will be determined in light of the 
applicant’s account and the information on the situation in the country of destination in respect 
of the group in question”.168 
Thus  
“The Court may take account of the general situation of violence in a country when determining 
whether it should or should not insist on further special distinguishing features. It considers that 
it is appropriate for it to do so if that general situation makes it more likely that the authorities 
(or any persons or group of persons where the danger emanates from them) will systematically 
ill-treat the group in question”.169 
In addition the Court has considered that ‘due regard should also be given to the possibility that a 
number of individual factors may not, when considered separately, constitute a real risk; but when 
taken cumulatively and when considered in a situation of general violence and heightened secu-
rity, the same factors may give rise to a real risk’.170 If the general situation in a country or region, 
                                                 
164 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §112. On this case see Terlouw (2008). See also Saadi v. Italy, 
23 February 2008 (Grand Chamber), §133. 
165 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §112 also referring to Salah Sheekh, 11 January 2007, §136. 
166 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §115. 
167 Here the Court refers to Saadi v. Italy, 23 February 2008 (Grand Chamber), §132. 
168 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §116 referring to Salah Sheekh, 11 January 2007, §148. 
169 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §117, among others referring to Salah Sheekh, 11 January 
2007, §148 and Saadi v. Italy, 23 February 2008 (Grand Chamber), §§132 and 143. See also 
Ryabikin v. Russia, 19 June 2008, §114. 
170 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §130. 
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systematic violence against certain groups and cumulative individual factors may be determina-
tive on the merits, this clearly is the case at the stage of provisional measures.  
The domestic courts normally are positioned closer to the situation and seem better placed 
to assess personal risk. This is different with regard to the issue of the consistent pattern. On this 
issue international adjudicators are probably better placed than the State (and its courts) in those 
situations where the State predominantly bases itself on embassy reports, especially when domes-
tic courts defer to the minister. In fact, while on the merits the risk must be personal, at the stage 
of provisional measures it may be argued that the consistent pattern is crucial and only when the 
State can show that there is no specific risk to the petitioner, a provisional measure may be with-
drawn.171 
Important is also the ongoing discussion on the standard of proof. As submitted previously, 
the use of a standard of proof ‘beyond a reasonable doubt’ is inappropriate outside of the context 
of criminal law.172 It is necessary to establish criminal culpability, but, as Judge Bonello ex-
pressed it in one of his dissenting opinions, ‘in other fields of judicial enquiry, the standard of 
proof should be proportionate to the aim which the search for truth pursues: the highest degree of 
certainty, in criminal matters; a workable degree of probability in others’.173 Thus, the ECtHR is 
obliged to establish ‘(1) on whom the law places the burden of proof, (2) whether any legal pre-
sumptions militate in favour of one of the opposing accounts, and (3) “on a balance of probabili-
ties”, which of the conflicting versions appears to be more plausible and credible. Proof “beyond 
reasonable doubt” can, in my view, only claim a spurious standing in ‘civil’ litigation, like the 
adversarial proceedings before this Court. In fact, to the best of my knowledge, the Court is the 
only tribunal in Europe that requires proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in non criminal matters’.174 
Expecting those who claim to be victims of torture to prove their allegations “beyond rea-
sonable doubt” places on them a burden that is as impossible to meet as it is unfair to request. 
Independent observers are not, to my knowledge, usually invited to witness the rack, nor is a 
transcript of proceedings in triplicate handed over at the end of each session of torture; its victims 
cower alone in oppressive and painful solitude, while the team of interrogators has almost unlim-
ited means at its disposal to deny the happening of, or their participation in, the gruesome pag-
eant. The solitary victim’s complaint is almost invariably confronted with the negation ‘corrobo-
rated’ by many”.175 
In NA v. UK (2008) the Court also discussed the use of materials, at the merits stage, to es-
tablish risk. This discussion may also shed light on the materials it takes into account at the stage 
of provisional measures, although it may be expected it is less strict there, having less time to 
await, examine and compare all materials. It noted that it has often attached importance to the 
information in recent reports by independent human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International, 
or governmental sources including the US State Department.176 Criteria for the assessment of 
such materials include the ‘independence, reliability and objectivity’ of the source. Thus ‘the 
authority and reputation of the author, the seriousness of the investigations by means of which 
they were compiled, the consistency of their conclusions and their corroboration by other sources 
                                                 
171 See also the ECtHR approach in regard to the petitions by Somalians in the Netherlands e.g. in 
Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 (beneficiaries). 
172 See also Chapter VI (Disappearances). 
173 ECtHR Sevtap Veznedaroğlu v. Turkey, 11 April 2000, individual partly dissenting opinion Judge 
Bonello, §12. 
174 Id., §13. 
175 Id., §14. 
176 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §119 referring to Saadi v. Italy, 23 February 2008 (Grand 
Chamber), §131. 
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are all relevant considerations’.177 The Court also takes into account whether the author of the 
material has been present in the country in question and what were its reporting capacities. In that 
respect is observed that States ‘through their diplomatic missions and their ability to gather in-
formation, will often be able to provide material which may be highly relevant to the Court's 
assessment of the case before it’ and this applies a fortiori to UN agencies ‘particularly given their 
direct access to the authorities of the country of destination as well as their ability to carry out on-
site inspections and assessments in a manner which States and non-governmental organisations 
may not be able to do’.178 
The question arises how the Court’s assessment of risk in judgments on the merits has im-
pacted on its approach to the evidence required for the use of provisional measures. This involves 
both the types of evidence and the manner in which evidence is being weighed. Time permitting, 
the President or Acting President of the ECtHR could request more research before taking a deci-
sion on the use of provisional measures.179 Yet time does not often permit. What then does the 
Court do in the face of the imminent removal of a petitioner and claims of irreparable harm to 
persons? It has used provisional measures in many cases in which it later found no violation, or 
which it declared inadmissible.180 On the other hand, it uses provisional measures in a minority of 
the situations in which petitioners have requested them. 
How did the European Commission on Human Rights deal with evidentiary requirements in 
urgent non-refoulement cases? In Lynas v. Switzerland (1976) it already emphasised that it only 
made use of provisional measures ‘in urgent and exceptional circumstances where it appeared at 
first sight that steps entailing irreversible consequences were about to be taken’.181 In this case it 
had taken such measures, but subsequently it declared the case inadmissible as manifestly ill-
founded. It did not consider that the ‘uncorroborated declarations constitute satisfactory prima 
facie evidence’.182 This implies that the Commission did see prima facie evidence for taking 
provisional measures. Subsequently, when deciding on admissibility, it reconsidered its view 
about prima facie evidence and concluded that it was not there. 
In the European system a petitioner must show a risk of a violation of the ECHR which 
prima facie would cause irreparable harm. Both the risk of a violation of the Convention and the 
prima facie risk of irreparable harm that this violation would cause must be shown on a lower 
threshold. The petitioner must indicate a ‘probability’ of such violation and of the irreparable 
harm it would cause.183  
Indeed, a substantial number of cases in which provisional measures were used are subse-
quently declared inadmissible. This in itself may indicate that the Commission and Court do apply 
a lower threshold at the provisional measures stage.184  
                                                 
177 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §120 referring to Saadi v. Italy, 23 February 2008 (Grand 
Chamber), §143. 
178 ECtHR NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, §121. 
179 Nørgaard (1994), p. 281. 
180 For a recent case, see e.g. ECtHR Nnyanzi v. UK, 8 April 2008 (provisional measures of 10 July 
2006 and granted priority under Rule 41 on 11 July 2006). 
181 EComHR Lynas v. Switzerland, 6 October 1976 (inadm.), p. 160. 
182 Id., p. 165. 
183 See Garry (2001), p. 410 referring to her interview with Judge Pellonpää, section IV, Strasbourg 
28 June 2000. 
184 See also Garry (2001), p. 410. Buquicchio-de Boer (1998), pp. 229-236 pointed out that 55 
percent of all cases in which the Commission ordered provisional measures ‘were eventually 
declared inadmissible’. As Nørgaard (1994), who was President of the Commission from 1981 
until 1995, has noted the President of the Court or Commission examines the credibility of the 
request for provisional measures. In this respect the presentation, at this stage, of information 
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The former European Commission also often refused to take provisional measures, referring 
to the short decision-making period and lack of adequate information to meet the threshold test of 
risk under Article 3 ECHR. The Commission did not wish to cause the delay of a ‘legitimate’ 
deportation.185 In some cases it did decide to depart from its usual time-table and expedite the 
case.186 The present Court has also done so under Rule 41 of its Rules of Court. 
The Commission and Court have also informed a State that they were considering using 
provisional measures in cases in which such an approach on its own would already bring about 
the desired result. These could be called informal provisional measures. The Commission also 
used informal provisional measures when its Rules of procedure did not yet contain a formal rule 
on provisional measures.187  
Invoking Rule 41 on expediting the proceedings, on the other hand, seems more of an in-
termediate approach to urgency taken if the Court is not willing to use provisional measures but 
nevertheless considers that there is some urgency involved. The cases involving complaints by 
terminally ill petitioners about past violations serve as an example. The Commission and Court 
were not asked to intervene in an ongoing situation, but they decided to accelerate examination of 
the case so that there would be a decision by the Commission or a judgment by the Court before 
the death of the petitioner.188  
According to Buquicchio-de Boer, the Commission and Court take into account ‘all the cir-
cumstances’ of the case, including ‘foreseeable consequences’ given the country conditions and 
the ‘personal circumstances’ of the petitioner.189 She also notes that certain allegations have been 
considered ‘insufficient to demonstrate risk of a clear violation of Article 3’. As examples she 
mentions the ‘mere belonging to a minority group or opposition movement in the country of 
destination’ and the ‘risk of criminal prosecution for refusal to undertake military service or de-
sertion’.190 Yet judge Pellonpää, member of the Court since 1999, noted in 2000 that at the stage 
of provisional measures a lower threshold of proof is required and the petitioner does not need 
‘solid evidence of a direct personal link; general background documents from Amnesty Interna-
tional or UNHCR may at times be sufficient’.191 
What the Convention organs have considered a prima facie case for the use of provisional 
measures is a prior decision by the Government or the UNHCR to grant the petitioner refugee 
status. Reasons why the Commission or Court decided not to use provisional measures may be a 
‘lack of specific background evidence corroborating the specific claim’ or ‘general lack of credi-
bility in the request’.192 Garry also mentions a change of conditions in the receiving or requesting 
State that may equally ‘have weight in the decision’ not to take provisional measures. Moreover, 
‘illegal stay in a Member State and failure to pursue rigorously some kind of residence status is 
another factor’. “Commission of crimes in a Member State and especially recidivism may have 
negative bearing”.193 This of course is unrelated to the risk of irreparable harm. In other words, it 
should not, as such, be a factor in the assessment of risk. 
                                                                                                                       
documenting county conditions or, for instance, medical evidence has played a role in the 
decision to use provisional measures, p. 284. 
185 For references see e.g. Nørgaard (1994), p. 287. 
186 See Rules 27 and 28 of the Commission’s Rules of Procedure.  
187 See Chapter II (Systems). 
188 Ibid. 
189 Buquicchio-de Boer (1998), p. 231. See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 (beneficiaries). 
190 Buquicchio-de Boer (1998), p. 233. 
191 See Garry (2001), p. 411, interview with Judge Pellonpää, section IV, Strasbourg 28 June 2000. 
192 See Garry (2001), p. 411. 
193 Garry (2001), p. 412. As discussed in Chapter II unfortunately most adjudicators do not 
specifically indicate their criteria for using provisional measures. The reference to Garry is made 
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The President of the Section follows a ‘checklist’ for the use of provisional measures, ‘look-
ing at such criteria as: grounds of fear; evidence submitted; Convention issue or Article invoked; 
reasons for leaving home country; whether applicant applied for political asylum and decision 
made as to it; date of arrival in Member State; decisions by the Member State administrative or 
judicial bodies on expulsion/extradition of the petitioner; availability of any other domestic au-
thority to stop the impending expulsion/extradition; suspensive effect of domestic remedies; 
government assurances given by the state to be expelled or deported to; and involvement of 
UNHCR and decisions made by that body’.194  
While some of these criteria relate to the purpose of provisional measures (Convention issue 
or Article invoked)195 or the relevance of admissibility (exhaustion of domestic remedies and 
supensive effect),196 or immediacy of the risk,197 most of them indeed relate to the assessment of 
risk. 
What is clear is that the Court is not just sparse in its use of provisional measures in that, 
rather than in a range of situations, it uses them predominantly in non-refoulement cases, but also 
in that it grants only a small percentage of requests for provisional measures in these non-
refoulement cases. It is only in a very small number of non-refoulement cases that the ECtHR 
orders provisional measures. The Registrar of the Court indicated in a Press Release at the end of 
2007 that during that year alone the Court had received 1,060 requests for provisional measures, 
but it had only granted such request in 252 cases.198 
While several refusals may be based on frivolous claims involving rights in the context of 
which the Court has never used provisional measures, to the extent that they relate to non-
refoulement claims, the refusal to take provisional measures must be based on an absence of risk. 
In a concurring opinion Judge Zupančič noted that a provisional measures should be ordered once 
there is ‘a shadow of a doubt’. Then the burden shifts to the State.199 Given the risk faced by the 
petitioner it is difficult to disagree with this statement. Yet in light of the fact that most provi-
sional measures requested and most of them granted involve non-refoulement cases, it appears 
that the Court is rather stricter. 
3.2.4.5 THE INTER-AMERICAN COURT AND MASS EXPULSION 
The Inter-American Court thus far has not dealt with the issue of non-refoulement. It has dealt 
with the issue of assessment of risk in the context of a mass expulsion case. It makes a clear dis-
                                                                                                                       
because this author drafted a report at the European Court during a two month visit in 2000. 
During this time she was able to consult with one of the judges and several staff members of the 
Court. It may be assumed that her remarks about reasons for not taking provisional measures are 
inspired by conversations with these persons. 
194 Garry (2001), p. 414. 
195 See Part II (Purpose). 
196 See the discussion on exhaustion in Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
197 See section 2 of this Chapter on temporal urgency. 
198 Press release issued by the Registrar, ‘Inappropriate use of interim measures procedure’, 21 
December 2007. See also Minutes of Meeting between Court and organisations representing 
applicants and/or intervening as third parties, 10 April 2006, p. 6, in which it was indicated that in 
2005 it only used provisional measures in 49 cases, while it had received requests for such 
measures in 453 cases. 
199 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, concurring opinion Judge Zupančič. 
Spijkerboer (2008), p. 1015 agrees, although he considers that the criterion ‘shadow of a doubt’ 
may be rather too light. 
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tinction between the proof required for admissibility and merits and the prima facie evidence 
necessary for taking provisional measures. The Haitian case illustrates the problems the Inter-
American Commission faces when persons find themselves in adverse circumstances in remote 
areas at the border between two States. If the Commission is unable to contact the victims, it may 
be unable to convince the Court to take provisional measures.200  
In reference to the hearing it held on the Inter-American Commission’s request for provi-
sional measures in the Haitian case the Court pointed out that (at that stage) a State policy of 
deportations and mass expulsions in violation of the Convention had not been proven, but that the 
testimonies had enabled it to establish a ‘prima facie assumption of the occurrence of cases where 
individuals are subject to abuse’.201 The President of the Court considered that ‘the standard of 
prima facie appreciation of a case and the application of presumptions in face of the needs for 
protection have prompted this Court to order provisional measures at different times’.202 
                                                 
200 Particularly if the Court takes the approach that the group of beneficiaries needs to be clearly 
identifiable, see also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on beneficiaries. 
201 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order of 18 
August 2000, 5th ‘Considering’ clause. The next month, with regard to five of the seven persons 
specifically identified by the Commission, the Court’s President found sufficient prima facie 
evidence of a situation of extreme gravity and urgency as to the rights to life, personal integrity, 
special protection for children in the family, and to residence and movement, 4th ‘Considering’ 
clause. With regard to the other two persons it postponed their inclusion as beneficiaries, in light 
of the diverging statements of the Commission and the State about their situation. It required the 
Commission to ‘urgently report in detail’ about their situation while it ordered the State to 
investigate their situation, apparently with less urgency. The Commission explained that one of 
these two persons was not living in his own community for fear of being deported again without 
being given the chance to prove his Dominican nationality. He was also afraid for his life because 
of his complaint to the Commission. Regarding the other person about whom the State had 
protested that he had not been registered as deported, the Commission noted again that the State 
did not keep adequate record of its deportations. Based on this information the President ordered 
the Dominican Republic to refrain from deporting or expelling one of them and to allow the 
immediate return of the other, making it possible for him to meet with his son. President IACHR 
Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Decision on urgent 
measures, 14 September 2000, ‘Decisional’ clauses 1-3. 
202 President IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, 
Decision on urgent measures, 14 September 2000. The Court’s English translation of the original 
Order in Spanish speaks of circulation, in a literal translation of ‘circulación’. In the official 
English version of Article 22 ACHR this is obviously referred to as ‘freedom of movement’. Two 
months later the Court confirmed the President’s expansion of the provisional measure to include 
these two persons. Once again it considered that the information submitted by the Commission 
showed prima facie a situation of extreme gravity and urgency with regard to ‘the rights to life, to 
humane treatment, to the special protection of the child by its family, and to the freedom of 
movement and residence of the beneficiaries of these measures’. IACHR Haitians and 
Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order for provisional measures, 26 
May 2001. The Court decided not to order provisional measures on behalf of members of 
‘bateyes’ that were not known by name. See Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on beneficiaries. 
It did include a statement about the necessity of obtaining additional information on the situation 
of the members of bordering communities or ‘bateyes’ whose inhabitants, according to the 
information provided at the public hearing, were subjected to forced repatriations, deportations or 
expulsions. IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, 
Order of 18 August 2000. 
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Another interesting aspect of this case is the discussion on the witnesses to be summoned to 
the hearings of the Court dealing with the Commission’s request for provisional measures. The 
Court’s first Order responding to the Commission’s request for provisional measures to halt arbi-
trary expulsion in the Haitian case was itself not a provisional measure, but it dealt with the Do-
minican Republic’s objections against the Commission’s offer of expert witnesses for the hearing 
that would be held on the provisional measures requested.203 The State had objected that one of 
them was the Director of an organisation that had been the main source of information for the 
petitioners and the Commission. It pointed out that she had appeared as a petitioner in another 
case pending before the Commission and that she was known as an activist on behalf of Haitian 
immigrants. The Commission had proposed these expert witnesses so that they could provide 
information on the frequency, form and consequences of the expulsions and deportations. This 
would ‘furnish the Court with elements of special informative value to acquire a better under-
standing of the context within which the request for provisional measures has been made’.204 The 
Court considered that the purpose of the testimonies of the two witnesses proposed by the Com-
mission ‘bears no relationship to technical or specialized items with respect to which this Tribunal 
would request the opinion of experts’.205 It noted, however, that Art. 44 (1) of its Rules provides 
that it may ‘obtain, on its own motion, any evidence it considers helpful. In particular, it may hear 
as a witness, expert witness, or in any other capacity, any person whose evidence, statement or 
opinion it deems to be relevant’.206 Judging from the information provided by the Commission as 
well as the State, both persons had worked with the alleged victims and had directly perceived the 
circumstances in which they were living. For this reason, the Court ordered them to appear before 
it in their capacity as witnesses. The Court pointed out that ‘the fact that a person has a direct 
interest in the outcome of a proceeding or may have taken part as a petitioner in a case before the 
Commission, is not a cause for hindrance to deposing before this Court which, in practice, has 
even admitted statements from the victim and her or his relatives’.207 The Court also ordered the 
Dominican Republic to ‘facilitate the exit from and entry into its territory’ of these witnesses. It 
noted that the Commission, as the party requesting the production of the evidence, was to pay the 
costs involved.208 
                                                 
203 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order on the 
summoning of witnesses, 7 August 2000. 
204 Id., ‘Having seen’ clause 5b. The State also objected to the other expert witness proposed, stating 
he was, among others, a founding member of another organisation that had acted on behalf of 
these immigrants. Thus, it argued, they were no independent technical advisors or experts who 
could ‘offer totally objective and impartial information and opinions’. It referred to Article 49 of 
the Court’s Rules of Procedure (old) and Article 19 of the Court’s Statute, ‘Having seen’ clause 
6c. 
205 Id., 2nd ‘Considering’ clause. 
206 Id., 3rd ‘Considering’ clause. 
207 The Court referred here to various cases where it had done so: Loayza-Tamayo Case. Judgment 
of 17 September 1997; Castillo-Páez Case. Judgment of 3 November 1997; Suárez-Rosero Case. 
Judgment of 12 November 1997; Blake Case, Judgment of 24 January 1998; Paniagua-Morales 
et al., Judgment of 8 March 1998; Villagrán-Morales et al., Judgment of 19 November 1999.  
208 The Court referred to Article 45 of its Rules of Procedure (old). This is an interesting situation 
because, in fact, the Commission had requested them as expert witnesses but the Court ordered 
them to appear as witnesses ‘on its own motion’. See further Chapter IX (Threats) on subsequent 
threats against these witnesses and Order for provisional measures on their behalf. 
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3.2.4.6 DIPLOMATIC ASSURANCES AND LIFTING PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
Adjudicators may extend or withdraw their provisional measures.209 Particularly relevant in the 
context of evidentiary requirements in non-refoulement cases is CAT’s approach to the possibility 
of lifting its provisional measures. With the introduction of Article 108(6) of its Rules of Proce-
dure it has formalized the general possibility to lift provisional measures. The Special Rapporteur 
for new complaints and interim measures has also developed ‘working methods’ regarding the 
withdrawal of provisional measures. “Where the circumstances suggest that a request for interim 
measures may be reviewed before the consideration of the merits, a standard sentence is added to 
the request, stating that the request is made on the basis of the information contained in the com-
plainant’s submission and may be reviewed, at the initiative of the State party, in the light of the 
information and comments received from the State party and any further comments, if any, from 
the complainant”.210 CAT has noted that some States parties ‘have adopted the practice of sys-
tematically requesting the Rapporteur to withdraw his request for interim measures of protection’. 
Yet the Rapporteur ‘has taken the position that such requests need only be addressed if based on 
new information which was not available to him when he took his initial decision on interim 
measures’.211 
In its Annual Reports CAT has also expressed its awareness of the concern by ‘a number of 
States parties’ that it has used provisional measures ‘in too large a number of cases, especially 
where the complainant’s deportation is alleged to be imminent, and that there are insufficient 
factual elements to warrant a request for interim measures’. It has noted that ‘it takes such expres-
sions of concern seriously and is prepared to discuss them with the States parties concerned’. “In 
this regard it wishes to point out, that in many cases, requests for interim measures are lifted by 
the Special Rapporteur, on the basis of pertinent State party information”.212 On several occasions 
CAT has indeed lifted its provisional measures. In C.A.R.M. v. Canada (2007), for instance, it had 
used provisional measures in June 2006 and the State had immediately informed it of its compli-
ance. Three months later the State requested the Committee to lift its provisional measures and 
within a month the special Rapporteur decided to ‘suspend’ them.213 
In recent years both the HRC and CAT have stressed that diplomatic assurances as such do 
not remove the risk of refoulement.214 UN experts have equally expressed themselves negatively 
about the use of such assurances.215  
                                                 
209 See e.g. HRC Youni E. Länsman e.a. v. Finland, 30 October 1996. 
210 See e.g. CAT Annual Report 2006, §60. 
211 See e.g. Annual Report 2006, §60. The first time Germany ever received a request for provisional 
measures by CAT it immediately requested their withdrawal; See e.g. CAT M.A.K. v. Germany, 
12 May 2004, §13.5. The provisional measures was of 11 September 2002 and the motion by 
Germany to withdraw the provisional measures of 11 November 2002; the Rapporteur decided 
not to withdraw them, §1.3. 
212 See CAT Annual Report 2006, §62 and Annual Report 2007, §71. 
213 CAT C.A.R.M. v. Canada, 18 May 2007, §1.3. On the merits CAT found no violation of Article 3 
(insufficient substantiation). 
214 See e.g. HRC Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, 25 October 2006 and CAT Ahmed Hussein Mustafa 
Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005. See further Van Boven’s annotation (2006) of Agiza, 
critically discussing the issue of diplomatic assurances. In this case the Committee considered it 
appropriate to observe that its decision reflected a number of facts that ‘were not available to it 
when it considered the largely analogous complaint’ of Hanan Attia v. Sweden, 17 November 
2003, ‘where, in particular, it expressed itself satisfied with the assurances provided’, §13.5. CAT 
confirmed its critical stance on assurances in Pelit v. Azerbaijan: “While a certain degree of post-
expulsion monitoring of the complainant's situation took place, the State party has not supplied 
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By contrast, the European Commission and Court appear to have been more willing to ac-
cept diplomatic assurances, but the case law in this respect generally is less recent. Altun v. Ger-
many (1984) warrants special attention as an early case dealt with under the ECHR indicating the 
approach of the former European Commission towards assurances by requesting States in the 
context of extradition and the impact such assurances may have on its decision to maintain provi-
sional measures.216 The Commission initially took provisional measures but, following a request 
by Germany, it decided not to maintain them.217 
The petitioner, Cemal Altun, had been partly brought up by his elder brother Ahmat Altun. 
His brother was politically active and, at the time of submission, lived in France with a status of 
political refugee. The petitioner himself also became politically active and left Turkey after pro-
ceedings were instituted against him as one of the founders of a banned student party. He re-
quested political asylum in Germany in 1981. The next year Turkey requested his extradition, 
initially for incitement to the murder of a Minister, later on charges of harbouring criminals and 
suppression of evidence in connection with this murder. In February 1983, following court deci-
sions authorizing this, the German Government decided to extradite him. In 1983 Altun petitioned 
the European Commission, which took provisional measures and subsequently it declared the case 
                                                                                                                       
the assurances to the Committee in order for the Committee to perform its own independent 
assessment of their satisfactoriness or otherwise (see its approach in Agiza v. Sweden), nor did the 
State party detail with sufficient specificity the monitoring undertaken and the steps taken to 
ensure that it both was, in fact and in the complainant's perception, objective, impartial and 
sufficiently trustworthy. In these circumstances, and given that the State party had extradited the 
complainant notwithstanding that it had initially agreed to comply with the Committee's request 
for interim measures, the Committee considers that the manner in which the State party handled 
the complainant's case amounts to a breach of her rights under article 3 of the Convention”, Pelit 
v. Azerbaijan, 1 May 2007, §11. 
215 See e.g. Special Rapporteur against Torture (Theo van Boven), A/59/324, 1 September 2004, §40 
and Special Rapporteur against Torture (Manfred Nowak), E/CN.4/2006/6, 23 December 2005, 
§§28-33 (pointing out that diplomatic assurances are not legally binding; ‘ (i)t is therefore unclear 
why States that violate binding obligations under treaty and customary international law should 
comply with non-binding assurances’; moreover it is the question whether the authority providing 
the assurances has the power to enforce them; post-return monitoring mechanisms are no 
guarantee against torture; the individual has no recourse is the assurances are violated; normally 
they do not contain any sanctions in case of violation; both sending and receiving State have a 
common interest in denying that returned persons were subjected to torture; if independent 
organisations have been identified to undertake monitoring functions under the return agreement, 
these may experience undue political pressure, especially where one is funded by either the 
sending or the receiving State; in sum, he argued. ‘ diplomatic assurances with regard to torture 
are nothing but attempts to circumvent the absolute prohibition of torture and refoulement’); see 
also UN Independent Expert on counterterrorism and human rights (Martin Scheinin), 
E/CN.4/2006/98, 28 December 2005, §56(b); Human Rights Watch, “Empty promises”, 
diplomatic assurances no safeguard against torture, 14 April 2004 and Human Rights Watch, Still 
at risk: diplomatic assurances no safeguard against torture, April 2005 (Vol. 17, No. 3(D). See 
further Smeulers/De Vries (2003). 
216 The importance attached by the Commission to the fact that the State of return had recognized the 
individual complaint system under the ECHR must be kept in mind. 
217 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 3 May 1983 (adm.), §8, p. 
228. 
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admissible.218 It could not ‘rule out immediately the possibility of a violation’ of Art. 3. Thus, it 
had to determine whether there was a ‘certain risk of prosecution for political reasons which could 
lead to an unjustified or disproportionate sentence being passed on the applicant, and, as a result, 
inhuman treatment’.219 At this stage of the proceedings it was ‘not possible to rule out with suffi-
cient certainty the danger that the criminal proceedings instituted against the applicant have been 
falsely inspired’.220 Subsequently the Turkish Embassy assured the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
that Turkey would respect the principle of specialty in the event of an extradition. In a message to 
the Turkish government Germany pointed out that ‘assurances that in the event of the applicant’s 
extradition a representative of the German Embassy in Ankara could visit the applicant without 
supervision at frequent intervals, could be useful for proceedings before the Commission and 
would be taken into consideration when reaching a decision on the enforcement of the extradition 
order’.221 In July Turkey informed Germany ‘that it had decided to apply the relevant regulations 
to enable a representative of the German Embassy in Ankara to visit the applicant in the event of 
his extradition’.222 
Meanwhile domestically a decision was made on the request for asylum.223 It was decided 
that because of circumstances occurring after his departure from Turkey he could not now be 
required to return to his country. The media had widely reported his case – even, contrary to 
normal practice, quoting his full name.224 The Turkish authorities were aware of this.225 
In July of 1983 Germany sent the Commission a memorial requesting it to cancel its provi-
sional measures ‘on the ground that the Turkish Government had given the Government of the 
Federal Republic an assurance that in the event of the applicant’s extradition, the principle of 
speciality would be observed and that a representative of the German Embassy in Ankara could 
visit the applicant in prison’. Thus, Germany considered that it had done everything necessary to 
ensure that the petitioner would not be exposed to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Conven-
tion upon his extradition to Turkey. Germany considered that the visits by an Embassy representa-
tive it had promised to arrange would guarantee the petitioner the possibility to pursue his appli-
cation before the Commission. Its embassy would be able to verify the petitioner’s state of health, 
                                                 
218 It also directed provisional measures to Altun himself so that he would not abscond upon release. 
Id., §8, p. 229. He did not and reported to the police station upon request. There he was detained 
once more. See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 (beneficiaries and addressees). 
219 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 3 May 1983 (adm.), §8, p. 
233. 
220 The risk of pressure being used upon him incompatible with Article 3 could not be ruled out. 
EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 3 May 1983 (adm.), §10, p. 
233. 
221 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 
§9, p. 4. About the official responses by addressee States with regard to provisional measures see 
Chapter XVII. 
222 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 
§9, p. 4. 
223 In June 1983 the Bundesamt für die Anerkennung ausländischer Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for 
the Recognition of Foreign Refugees) indeed decided to grant him political asylum.  
224 The petitioner himself took no direct part in this publicity. 
225 7 March 1984 (struck out), §10, p. 5. “The measures that the petitioner must expect in Turkey 
could at the very least be termed political prosecution. As a result the Federal Office was 
convinced that in the event of his return to Turkey the petitioner would very probably be the 
subject of a prosecution relating to the right of asylum (asylhebliche Verfolgung)”. Id., §18, p. 9. 
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and discuss any questions of fact or law relating to his application with him. “The fact that the 
Embassy representative could attend the hearing before the court was an additional guarantee”.226 
In fact, according to Germany ‘there was no need in principle to request specific undertak-
ings’ since ‘the Federal Republic and Turkey are Contracting Parties to the European Convention 
on Extradition’. It pointed out that it had nevertheless obtained additional guarantees on compli-
ance with the specialty rule, ‘at the request of the Commission’. Germany reiterated that ‘the fact 
that the right to asylum was granted did not have a direct bearing on extradition proceedings’. 
Moreover, it considered that pending interstate cases against Turkey did not prevent extradition 
either because these cases concerned the internal situation in Turkey ‘and not automatically the 
situation of a presumed criminal under the particular protection of the requested State’.227 
In response the petitioner considered that the assurances mentioned by the Government 
were insufficient. “In the past, information given by the ministry of Foreign Affairs concerning 
the situation in Turkey had been criticised as being contradictory. He referred to a question raised 
in the Bundestag and to judgments by the administrative Courts and the Federal Constitutional 
Court”.228 The Commission subsequently decided not to maintain its provisional measures, taking 
into account the undertaking given by the German Government ‘based on assurances given by 
Turkey, which were intended to safeguard the applicant’s position after his extradition to Tur-
key’.229 
“When informing the parties of this decision the Commission noted that it was based on the idea 
that the discussions envisaged between a representative of the German Embassy in Ankara and 
the applicant in prison would take place in the absence of third parties. The Commission 
requested the Government to inform it about the possible execution of the extradition and, in 
this event, to keep it informed of the applicant’s situation as regards his conditions of detention 
and criminal proceedings”.230 
In August 1983 the petitioner attended a domestic court hearing, which was due to resume on 30 
August 1983. On that day the petitioner had been led into the courtroom by the guard. After his 
handcuffs had been taken off he was seated beside his lawyer and an interpreter, awaiting the 
entrance of court personnel. Mr Altun then ‘rushed over towards an open window and threw 
himself out. Having fallen from the sixth floor where the courtroom was situated, he died shortly 
afterwards in an ambulance sent to the spot’.231 
                                                 
226 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 
§18, p. 9. 
227 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 
§24, p. 12. 
228 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 
§19. 
229 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 
§20. 
230 Ibid. 
231 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 
§10, p. 4. The Commission noted that it was informed by counsel and government representatives 
on that same day that the petitioner had committed suicide, ‘although proceedings relating to his 
request for asylum were still pending and further discussions between the Federal Ministry of 
Justice and the applicant’s lawyer concerning extradition were in progress’. Germany had pointed 
out that the petitioner’s lawyer must have been assured that his client would not be extradited 
before he had been able to travel to Turkey in order to consult the criminal files against his client. 
The Government assumed that the lawyer notified the petitioner of this proposed plan. 
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The petitioner’s brother, Ahmed Altun, then instructed counsel to ask the Commission to 
pursue the proceedings.232 He believed continuation of the proceedings was necessary because 
there was a risk that similar cases might occur, given the formal extradition relations with Tur-
key.233 Nevertheless the Commission decided to strike out the case, finding that the decision to 
extradite the petitioner had lapsed and ‘the particular nature’ of the complaint could not be trans-
ferred to the heirs. It considered that ‘the grounds relied on by the applicant’s brother to pursue 
the application in his own name have no direct relation to the subject of the application’. Thus, the 
Commission considered that the petitioner’s brother, ‘who was not associated with the application 
instituting the proceedings’, ‘cannot now in the circumstances of the case claim to have a suffi-
cient legitimate interest to justify proceeding with an examination of the application on his be-
half’.234 
As one of the reasons for striking out the case following the death of the petitioner the 
Commission pointed out that the administrative practice of torture and ill-treatment would also be 
addressed in the pending inter-state applications on the administrative practice of torture in Turk-
ish prisons.235 This suggests that the Commission did not subscribe to Germany’s view that the 
aforementioned inter-state proceedings were not relevant for the determination of the risks facing 
the petitioner. Indeed, the State’s argument is surprising. The petitioner would have been extra-
dited into exactly that ‘internal situation’ in Turkey that was the subject of these interstate cases 
against Turkey. Interstate cases do not discuss the ‘internal situation’, but the internal human 
rights situation. People live in this ‘internal situation’. In deciding extradition cases it would be 
especially important, given such internal situation, to examine the particular situation of a ‘pre-
sumed criminal’. 
Yet by deciding to withdraw its provisional measures the Commission apparently attached 
more importance to the assurances by Turkey than to the fact that the petitioner had been granted 
asylum in Germany. Germany’s argument that the granting of asylum ‘did not have a direct bear-
ing’ on the extradition proceedings seems rather insufficient. Asylum is granted when the authori-
ties find that there is a well founded fear of persecution. Hence it is not safe for that person to 
return to his/her country. In their decision they have taken into account the criminal proceedings 
against him. These proceedings may in fact even have been one of the reasons for believing him 
to be in danger and granting him asylum. Although, strictly speaking, the decisions are made by 
different organs with their own responsibilities, surely the fact that someone has been granted 
asylum has a relevant ‘bearing’ on his extradition proceedings.  
The domestic decision to grant asylum apparently played no role in the Commission’s deci-
sion. While it is true that domestic proceedings (with regard to arranging a consultation of the 
case file against the petitioner in Turkey) were still pending, in my view the fact that the peti-
tioner was so desperate about his extradition to Turkey (which he apparently still expected) that 
                                                 
232 In the admissibility decision it was stated that as a child the petitioner was partly brought up by 
his elder brother Ahmed Altun, after the death of their father; in the report striking out the case it 
was mentioned that the brother decided to pursue the proceedings after consulting his parents in 
Turkey, 3 May 1983 (adm.), §23, p. 10. 
233 ‘Furthermore, the applicant’s family had an interest in counteracting the false information and 
defamation in the Turkish press following the applicant’s death’. 
234 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 
§31, p. 14. 
235 EComHR Cemal Kemal Altun v. The Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 
§32, p. 15. Indeed, the Commission declared admissible the inter-State case France, Norway, 
Denmark, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Turkey, 6 December 1983 (adm.) (relating to the 
allegation that during the period 12 September 1980 to 1 July 1982 there was an administrative 
practice of torture or ill-treatment of prisoners in Turkey). 
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he jumped out of a window of the courthouse would have been cause to maintain the case on the 
Commission’s roll. It could be argued that the deceased petitioner’s claims were indeed transfer-
able to his older brother, with whom he had been very close since childhood, in light of the ex-
press wish of his brother to continue the case as well as the need to further investigate the Com-
mission’s own decision-making with regard to assurances and provisional measures. 
Subsequently, in Chahal (1996) the European Court expressed some caution with regard to 
diplomatic assurances. It considered that in the circumstances of that case the State providing the 
assurances was indeed in good faith but that it did not have sufficient control over the members of 
the security forces responsible for torture in police custody. Thus, return of the petitioner to that 
State would be in violation of Art.3 ECHR. Pending the case it had also used provisional meas-
ures.236 
Yet in for instance Shamayev (2005), the ECtHR withdrew its provisional measures upon 
receipt of information provided by the addressee State (Georgia) of some assurances by the re-
ceiving State (Russia) with regard to the treatment of the petitioner(s). 
“The Court decided that, in the light of the undertakings given by the Russian authorities, which 
included guarantees of unhindered access for the applicants to appropriate medical treatment, 
legal advice and the Court itself, the Rule 39 interim measure could be lifted. The Russian 
authorities had further undertaken that the applicants would not face capital punishment and that 
their health and safety would be protected”.237 
The Court had actively sought information both from the State requesting extradition of the peti-
tioners (Russia) and from the State planning to extradite them to the requesting State (Georgia), as 
both were members of the Council of Europe.  
What is remarkable is that already at the stage of provisional measures the European Court 
let itself be convinced by Russia. It is mainly when provisional measures are initially taken that 
the standard of proof is lower. Subsequently, once the addressee State has been able to cast doubt 
on the risk claimed, the burden is on the petitioner to convince the Court to maintain its provi-
sional measures. Yet in this case the Court could have ordered new provisional measures on its 
own motion. It could have appealed to Russia to report to the Court on the treatment and health of 
the suspects that had already been extradited to Russia.238 
On the merits the European Court noted that subsequent to their extradition to Russia, the 
petitioners were unable to stay in touch with their representatives in the case before the Court.239 
The weight the Court had attached to the assurances by Russia resulted in the withdrawal of the 
provisional measures and in the extradition. Subsequently the collection of evidence was seriously 
                                                 
236 ECtHR Chahal v. UK, 15 November 1996. 
237 ECtHR press release of 26 November 2002 in the case Shamayev and 12 Others v. Georgia and 
Russia, which was at that point still ongoing. 
238 See further Rieter (2003b). 
239 Their representatives were unable to visit them despite an express indication by the Court that 
this should be made possible. ECtHR (Second Section) Chamaïev et autres c. Géorgie et Russie, 
12 April 2005, §476. The Court itself had not been allowed to pay a research visit (under Article 
38 §1a) either. The Court noted that this refusal by Russia could not be attributed to Georgia. It 
concluded that it had insufficient information to examine on the merits the claims against Russia, 
which had hindered the collection of evidence. ECtHR (Second Section) Chamaïev et autres c. 
Géorgie et Russie, 12 April 2005, §477. 
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hindered, but it does not appear that the Court was willing to take this into account in its judgment 
on the merits.240 
In Mamatkulov (2004) the extradition took place despite the Court’s provisional measures 
and the examination of evidence was on the merits was seriously hindered. Counsel before the 
ECtHR did not even have access to the petitioners upon their extraction to Uzbekistan. Here it 
does not appear that the Court was willing to take into account the fact that Turkey had ignored its 
provisional measures.241 Again it appears to rely on assurances. At the same time the Court noted 
that a provisional measure ‘means more often than not that the Court does not yet have before it 
all the relevant evidence it requires to determine whether there is a real risk of treatment pro-
scribed by Article 3 in the country of destination’.242 This statement does indicate that at the stage 
of provisional measures a much lower level of evidence is necessary for the assessment of risk at 
the merits stage. 
Possibly the European Court will come to realize, as the UN bodies and experts did before 
it, that diplomatic assurances are simply unreliable in the context of allegations of torture and 
human rights adjudicators should not easily rely on them when deciding on the use or mainte-
nance of provisional measures.243 
3.2.5 Health in detention and assessment of risk 
The monopoly of information by the State is particularly relevant with regard to treatment in 
detention. The HRC may often be able to consult the trial transcripts even if the State in question 
itself does not provide any information about the claim.244 Adjudicators such as the HRC nor-
mally defers to the approach of the domestic court as found in these transcripts. 
Similarly, for complaints about detention situations there is a difference between claims of 
pre-trial ill treatment and claims of ill treatment of persons already convicted. Dealing with claims 
                                                 
240 Russia had reacted very strongly to the initial provisional measures and the relation between 
Russia and the Court became very strained. Currently it is still blocking the entry into force of the 
Protocol aimed at streamlining the Court proceedings, although this may be related also to the 
subsequent Chechnya cases and the fact that the Court is associated with the decision-making by 
the Council of Europe political bodies. See also Chapter XVII (Official State responses) and 
XVIII (Follow-up). 
241 See further Rieter (2003a) on the previous judgment by the first chamber and Rieter (2005b) on 
the Grand Chamber judgment. On the question how much importance adjudicators should attach 
on the merits to their decision that, at the stage of provisional measures, there was a real risk, 
when the State subsequently ignored the provisional measures, see also Chapter XVIII (Follow-
up). 
242 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §69. 
243 See also e.g. Letsas (2003), p. 536. For a more critical approach by the Court see e.g. ECtHR 
Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, §§147-148 pointing out that diplomatic assurances are not in 
themselves sufficient to ensure adequate protection where reliable sources have reported practices 
resorted to or tolerated by the authorities that are manifestly contrary to the principles of the 
Convention. See also Ryabikin v. Russia, 19 June 2008, §119 confirming this and, in this case, 
questioning the assurances from the Prosecutor General of Turkmenistan invoked by Russia. First 
of all, ‘no copy of that letter has been submitted to the Court’. ‘In any event, even accepting that 
such assurances were given’, the Court noted that the reports it had previously cited pointed out 
that ‘the authorities of Turkmenistan systematically refused access by international observers to 
the country, and in particular places of detention. In such circumstances the Court is bound to 
question the value of the assurances that the applicant would not be subjected to torture, given 
that there appears to be no objective means of monitoring their fulfilment”. 
244 As seen in section 3.2 with regard to the right to fair trial and death penalty cases. 
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of pre-trial ill treatment, the HRC leans more towards the information contained in national court 
documents, as these claims supposedly have been dealt with during the trial. Once convicted, on 
the other hand, usually there are no national court documents on treatment in detention. The 
detainee often has fewer possibilities for an investigation of ill treatment, threats, lack of medical 
treatment or adverse prison conditions in general. If in such cases the petitioner has made very 
precise allegations relating to incidents, ‘[d]ue weight’ should be given to his allegations, ‘in the 
absence of any refutation by the State party’.245 It is in such cases that the HrC has also used 
provisional measures. 
Vasilskis v. Uruguay (1983) illustrates the risk for detainees of talking to representatives of 
international organisations.246 The petitioner referred to the treatment of some of the prisoners 
following the visit of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General, Mr. Rivas Posada, 
in January 1982. According to the testimony of the mother of one of the prisoners, they were 
beaten with clubs, items of their personal property were confiscated and their food was thrown on 
the floor.247 The HRC has inquired about the health and whereabouts of political detainees on 
several occasions.248  
In Maleki v. Italy (1999) the petitioner’s son, who represented him before the HRC, had 
complained that his father had a heart condition for which he was not receiving adequate treat-
ment.249 In this case the HRC did not use (informal) provisional measures, possibly because it 
never considered the issue or otherwise because there was no history of failure to provide medical 
treatment by the State in question.250 The State party subsequently submitted ‘a comprehensive 
file’ ‘showing that Mr. Maleki’s medical condition was being closely monitored’.251 
While it is in the nature of provisional measures that the risk of irreparable harm must be 
assessed on an urgent basis, requiring a lower standard of proof, it is evident from the Uruguayan 
cases discussed in Chapter VII, relating to political detainees, that in the 1970s and 80s the HRC 
was unwilling to use formal provisional measures to intervene in ongoing violations. 
                                                 
245 HRC Michael Freemantle v. Jamaica, 24 March 2000. 
246 HRC Vasilskis v. Uruguay, 31 March 1983. 
247 This case equally indicates the HRC’s approach towards the burden of proof. In its decision on 
the merits it regretted that it had not received any of the documents requested in its admissibility 
decision, including copies of the existing medical reports. This indicates a relationship between 
the Committee’s request for information pending the proceedings and the standard and burden of 
proof it requires for the final determination of the case. With regard to the alleged victim’s health, 
it pointed out that ‘the author’s precise allegations, which include allegations that her treatment in 
prison has contributed to her ill-health called for more detailed submissions from the State party’. 
In reference to earlier case law it pointed out that the burden of proof ‘cannot rest alone on the 
author of the communication, especially considering that the author and the State party do not 
always have equal access to the evidence and that frequently the State party alone has access to 
relevant information’. It pointed out that the State party should have furnished the medical reports 
under Article 4(2) OP and found violations of Articles 7 and 10(1). 
248 See Chapter VII (Health in detention). 
249 HRC Ali Maleki v. Italy, 15 July 1999. 
250 The petitioner was a 65-year-old Iranian citizen serving a ten-year prison sentence in Italy for 
drug trafficking. Prior to the initial submission the petitioner had been on a hunger strike to 
obtain a review of his conviction. The HRC transmitted the case under Rule 91 more than three 
months after initial submission. 
251 In August 1997 the HRC decided separately on admissibility. While it declared the case 
admissible it considered that the complaint about lack of medical treatment was insufficiently 
substantiated. In its View it found a violation of Article 14(1) requiring ‘his immediate release or 
re-trial in his presence’. 
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The fact that it did not use provisional measures in the face of serious concerns about the 
health of political detainees may relate to the lack of practice during the initial stages of the 
Committee’s existence rather than to the fact that the violations were ongoing and not simply 
‘imminent’. On the other hand, during the 1990s and beyond 2000 Rapporteurs equally have used 
a different type of provisional measure in ongoing cases.252 Scheinin noted that the previous 
Rapporteur, Pocar, initiated the practice of using informal provisional measures, which he called 
‘quasi-interim measures’ where the Rapporteur hints at provisional measures but does not for-
mally invoke them. Instead his Note Verbale transmitting the case to the State simply contains a 
normal Rule 91 (current Rule 97) request for information, but in the last sentence the Rapporteur 
invites the State Party to provide information on the health of the petitioner.253 In fact this is 
similar to the earlier cases involving Uruguay. Scheinin points out that his cautious approach to 
provisional measures would not prevent him from using them formally, also in health cases. 
Apparently, the choice between formal and informal measures was determined by the evidence 
available. As he put it, when there was only an allegation of a threat to the health of a prisoner, he 
would opt for a ‘quasi-interim measure’ rather than a formal provisional measure under Rule 86 
(current Rule 92).254 
In December 1992 the President of the Inter-American Court decided not to take urgent 
measures in the Peruvian Prisons cases.255 He noted that the Commission itself had taken precau-
tionary measures and also noted the accompanying documentation, but then he pointed out that 
‘some of those measures cannot properly be considered precautionary and provisional measures’ 
within the meaning of Article 63(2) ACHR, ‘given that they refer to the Government's authoriza-
tion for the Commission to carry out on-site visits to several Peruvian prisons’. He considered that 
this situation was regulated by Articles 48(2) ACHR and 44(2) of the Commission's Regulations 
instead. This required the prior consent of the Government, which had not yet been granted, and 
                                                 
252 See also Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, discussed in Chapter IV, section 2.3, subheading 
extradition and the risk of life imprisonment. 
253 Interview of author with HRC Special Rapporteur Martin Scheinin, Maastricht 20 September 
2002. 
254 Id. 
255 The petition of the Inter-American Commission for provisional measures by the Court in the 
Peruvian Prisons case (Miguel Castro Castro and Santa Mónica in Lima, Cristo Rey in Ica and 
Yanamayo in Puno) was based on Peru’s failure to comply with its precautionary measures of 
August 1992 on behalf of ‘those persons deprived of their liberty for allegedly committing 
terrorist acts’. The Commission noted that there was ‘credible evidence of a grave situation in the 
Peruvian prisons’ posing ‘an immediate danger to the right to integrity of the person of those 
accused and sentenced for terrorism because of the poor conditions in which they are 
imprisoned’. It had received information that there was a ‘high incidence of diseases’, loss of 
weight, overcrowding, isolation, and psychological and emotional problems among male and 
female prisoners in the prisons concerned. When the prisoners were transferred to those prisons, 
some of which were ‘in very cold zones’, they were ‘mistreated, insulted, humiliated’, some of 
them were wounded and only had their summer clothing. The prisoners could not receive visits 
by their relatives and the International Committee of the Red Cross was not authorized to inspect 
the prisons. The Commission pointed out that all of this lent ‘a grave and urgent nature to the 
situation described’. Subsequently, early December 1992, the Secretariat of the Commission sent 
additional documentation to the Court containing a complaint. The Commission noted that ‘a 
situation may be developing which could result in the violation of the rights of the women 
prisoners in the Santa Mónica Prison of Chorrillos, and if true, would increase the seriousness 
and urgency of the situation being considered by the Members of the Court’. IACHR Peruvian 
Prisons case, Resolution of the President of 14 December 1992, 6th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
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which could ‘not be remedied by measures ordered by the President’.256 The President then 
pointed out: “Insofar as the Commission's request that the Government be asked to take the neces-
sary provisional measures to stop the mistreatment and to provide medical assistance to the in-
mates of those prisons, the Commission does not provide any evidence regarding the truth of the 
allegations, which would probably depend on the observations the Commission might make in the 
visits it wants to carry out in those prisons, or other means of proof, which have not yet been 
submitted”. The President considered it more appropriate for the full Court to decide on the use of 
the provisional measures requested.257 In plenary session the Court decided not to order provi-
sional measures. It pointed out that the case concerned a matter not yet before the Court, but still 
pending before the Commission. The latter had ‘not submitted information to the Court sufficient 
to support’ the adoption of provisional measures. This would have required the Commission ‘to 
have gathered preliminary evidence to support a presumption of the truth of the allegations and of 
a situation whose seriousness and urgency could cause irreparable harm to persons’. Thus the 
Court considered it inappropriate ‘at this time’ to adopt the provisional measures requested by the 
Commission.258 As Buergenthal has put it, this resulted in a Catch-22 situation since Peru did not 
allow the Commission to visit the detention centers, which would be necessary in order to collect 
the evidence required by the Court.259 He points out that it can be argued ‘that in situations where 
a Government obstructs all legitimate efforts by the Commission to gather evidence relating to 
allegations of violations of the right to life or physical or metal integrity, the Court might be 
justified in holding the Commission to a burden of proof that is less stringent than might be the 
case ordinarily’.260 The Court should have granted a hearing. Without a hearing, ‘and given the 
pressure of time, the Commission will often find difficult to make the strongest case possible for 
provisional measures’.261 
Fact-finding missions require the permission of the State concerned. Such missions have in-
deed been conducted in a context that would not just assist the adjudicator in its assessment on the 
merits, but already pending the proceedings with regard to requests for provisional measures. In 
September 2004, for instance, a delegation of judges of the ECtHR conducted a fact-finding 
mission in Turkey regarding petitions by about 50 detainees claiming to have developed Wer-
                                                 
256 IACHR Peruvian Prisons case, Resolution of the President of 14 December 1992, 5th 
‘Considering’ clause. 
257 Id., 6th ‘Considering’ clause. 
258 IACHR Peruvian Prisons case, Order of 27 January 1993, 2nd and 3rd ‘Whereas’ clause. 
259 Buergenthal (1994), p. 80 pointing out that ‘to qualify for the Article 63(2) remedy’, the 
Commission ‘needed to obtain at least some credible evidence about conditions in these prisons, 
but it could get that evidence only by means of an investigation which the Government of Peru 
refused to permit in the proceedings pending before the Commission’. “Moreover, while the 
Commission might have been able to gather the requisite evidence from witnesses and other 
sources, it no doubt feared that the long time needed to accomplish this result would greatly 
increase the probable threat to the lives of the inmates of those prisons”. See further e.g. CIDH 
Hugo Juarez Cruzat et al. (Miguel Castro Castro Prison) v. Peru, 5 March 2001 and CIDH 
Polay Campos v. Peru, 10 March 2000 (inadm.). The Court has since dealt with the Miguel 
Castro Castro Prison case on the merits as well, Judgment of 25 November 2006 (referring the 
provisional measures denied in 1993, §13 and those denied by the President on 3 May 2006, 
§§67-68).  
260 Buergenthal (1994), p. 81. He refers to the Court’s approach on the merits in Velasquez, 29 July 
1988 and in Godinez Cruz, 20 January 1989 and points out that ‘of necessity’ this approach 
‘presupposes the existence of at least some evidence to support the Commission’s contentions 
concerning the need for provisional measures’. 
261 Buergenthal (1994), p. 91. 
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nicke-Korsakoff syndrome in 2001.262 They argued that their continued detention would be a 
violation of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR given their state of health.263 The Court also nominated three 
medical experts to examine the petitioners.264 
3.2.6 Death threats and assessment of risk  
3.2.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
As it is mainly in the Inter-American system that provisional measures have been used to protect 
against death threats, this section sets out with a more general discussion of the evidentiary 
requirements applied in this system at the stage of provisional measures. The Inter-American 
Commission has often taken precautionary measures prior to requesting the Court’s intervention. 
Hence, those matters reaching the Court are examples of cases where the Commission considered 
its own precautionary measures ineffective.265 As part of its considerations the Court usually 
refers to the fact that the State failed to respond to the Commission’s precautionary measures.266 
Indeed the Court considers that when the Commission’s precautionary measures were ineffective 
and other threats have taken place since, this triggers a presumption that provisional measures are 
necessary.267 This relates to both risk and immediacy.268 
3.2.6.2 EVIDENTIARY REQUIREMENTS FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN THE 
INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 
When it orders provisional measures the Inter-American Court explicitly uses a ‘prima facie’ 
norm. When it decides to use provisional measures it generally points out that the Commission’s 
                                                 
262 This is described by the Court as a ‘brain disorder involving loss of specific brain functions 
caused by thiamine (B1) deficiency’. 
263 See ECtHR Balyemez v. Turkey, 32495/03 and 52 other cases. 
264 Press release ECtHR 412, ‘Fact-finding mission to Turkey in hunger-strike cases’, 6 September 
2004, referring to this case and ‘52 other cases’. A report by the Human Rights Foundation of 
Turkey, September 2004, notes that the ECtHR delegation examined 54 prisoners at the hospital 
of Istanbul University. The report specifically named petitioners Yanick, Gençay, Balyemez, 
Kör, Kuruçay, Gürbüz, Uyan, Yildiz and Hun. With regard to Balyemez it noted that the Court 
had already taken provisional measures on 5 February 2004 to halt his re-imprisonment. See also 
provisional measures not to re-imprison in the cases of Hun Kuruçay, Gürbüz, Uyan and Yildiz, 
all following the fact-finding mission of September 2004, Report Human Rights Foundation of 
Turkey, <www.tihv.org.tr/report/2004_09/septprison.html>, §4.1. See also Chapter VII 
(Detention), section 2.5.4 (Protecting detainees on a hunger strike) and Chapter XIII (Protection), 
section 4.2 on beneficiaries and addressees (under the heading ‘the petitioner as addressee’). 
265 They are examples because the Commission does not always resort to the Court for provisional 
measures in such cases. Moreover, in other cases the Commission might not even try its own 
precautionary measures and immediately resorts to the Court. 
266 See, e.g. IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order for provisional measures, 
14 June 1998, James et al. cases, Order of the President for urgent measures, 25 October 2001 
and Order for provisional measures, 26 November 2001. 
267 Pasqualucci (2003), p. 297. 
268 See e.g. IACHR Digna Ochoa et al. (Mexico), Order of 17 November 1999, 6th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
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presentations in the case in question ‘reveal prima facie a situation of extreme gravity and ur-
gency, rendering it necessary to avoid irreparable damage to the right to life and physical integ-
rity’.269 Apart from the phrase ‘prima facie’ the rest of the sentence is derived directly from Arti-
cle 63(2) ACHR on the use of provisional measures.270 
While the Inter-American Court is explicit in its use of a prima facie norm for the evidence 
required for the use of provisional measures, it nevertheless is not very clear about the evidentiary 
standard used at this stage. The same applies for the Inter-American Commission and its precau-
tionary measures. In its new Rules of Procedure the Commission deleted the odd reference in the 
                                                 
269 See e.g. IACHR Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, Order of 25 November 2004, 8th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
270 The first time he took urgent measures to halt executions, the President pointed out that the 
Commission had informed him that it had not yet had the opportunity to examine the complaints. 
‘Consequently’, he noted ‘the situation as described by the Commission in its request constitutes 
a prima facie case of extreme gravity and urgency which could result in irreparable damage to 
persons’. The term ‘consequently’ is not immediately clear as a link to his previous statement that 
the Commission had not had the opportunity to examine the complaints. The Spanish version also 
uses the term ‘en consecuencia’. Together, however, with his preceding statement that Trinidad’s 
failure to respond to the Commission’s precautionary measures was ‘an exceptional 
circumstance’, his remark makes more sense. The State’s failure to respond to these 
precautionary measures may indicate its intent to proceed with the executions. Prima facie this 
constitutes a situation of extreme gravity and urgency, which ‘could result’ in irreparable harm. 
IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order of the President for urgent 
measures, 27 May 1998. See also James et al. case, Orders of the President for urgent measures, 
29 June, 13 and 22 July 1998.The criterion of prima facie evidence is important for proving both 
the imminence and the risk of irreparable harm. The Court is clearer in its Order of June 1998 in 
its approach to evidentiary requirements for provisional measures by indicating that it was on the 
basis of the information presented by the Commission and the State that it could conclude that a 
situation of extreme gravity and urgency existed. IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel 
cases, Order for provisional measures, 14 June 1998.It pointed out that, although the Commission 
had not completed its consideration of the cases, it had advised the Court that ‘[i]n each case the 
petitioner made a prima facie case alleging that the State violated one or more Articles of the 
American Convention to the detriment of the defendant’. There are two differences between the 
formulation of the Court and that of the President. In the first place, the Court refers to the 
Commission’s view that the petitioner made a prima facie case of violations of one or more 
articles of the ACHR. This indicates that while in a case of urgency it is not necessary to 
determine the case on the merits before ordering provisional measures, there must be prima facie 
evidence of such violations. This means that the evidentiary requirements not only relate to the 
threat of irreparable harm as such but that in this situation the Commission believes that the Court 
expects some links with the merits of the case. Different from the Court, the President speaks of a 
prima facie case of extreme gravity without reference to the merits or to the Commission’s 
allegations. In its Order of August 1998 the Court referred to the Commission’s statement that it 
had opened a case after having ‘established that the petitioners had presented elements sufficient 
to meet the requirements of the Convention and its regulations’. The Court also referred to the 
Commission’s statements during the public hearing of the previous day. These statements 
‘demonstrated the urgency of the situations of the alleged victims, all of whom are still under 
imminent sentence of death and, therefore, at continued risk of irreparable damage’. Moreover, 
the Court noted the State’s refusal to take part in this hearing. ACHR James et al. cases, Order 
for provisional measures, 16 August 2000. 
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old Regulations to ‘in cases where the denounced facts are true’.271 At the stage of precautionary 
measures it would indeed be difficult to expect anything more than prima facie credibility of the 
facts. In addition this would prejudge the merits of the case.272 It seems that apart from showing 
prima facie evidence of a threat of irreparable harm the petitioner must show the existence, prima 
facie, of an issue under the American Convention (or the American Declaration). Yet obviously 
he need not show definitely, at that stage, that the denounced facts are ‘true’. After all, at the 
subsequent admissibility stage the Commission ‘must conduct a prima facie assessment to deter-
mine whether the complaint demonstrates an apparent or potential violation of a right protected 
by the Convention. This is a summary analysis, which does not imply any prejudgment as to the 
merits of the dispute’.273 
The Inter-American Commission’s experience with the various country situations, visiting 
them and preparing country reports continues to provide contextual information that seems to play 
a role in the Commission’s decision making on precautionary measures as well. 
From the perspective of the Commission the Court is seen as more legalistic, while the 
Commission itself is considered a more flexible organ. The Commission takes into account the 
track record of a human rights organisation bringing a claim. Some organisations may give unre-
liable information or tend to exaggerate. The information provided by a human rights organisation 
that is known to be credible and rigorous in terms of its fact-finding and other activities, even if 
brief, receives serious consideration by the Commission. Generally the Commission prefers to 
first ask information from the State to find out whether the situation cannot be resolved infor-
mally. Only if that is not possible it makes an independent determination on the basis of the evi-
dence and continues dealing with the case. If the Commission receives very little information on 
an urgent human rights situation, it also takes into account its general knowledge about the human 
rights situation in that particular country or area as well as the general attitude of that State. 
As noted, sometimes the Inter-American Court has refused to take provisional measures due 
to lack of information. Commissioner Goldman believes that the Court has emphasized the aspect 
of lack of information too much, possibly in a misplaced deference to the European system. He 
argues that this lies partly in the different experiences and functions of the Commission and 
Court, as well as their members. Members of the Court have tended to be constitutional lawyers, 
experts in criminal procedure, people who had been on the bench in their own country, while 
members of the Commission tend to have a more practical human rights experience. He considers 
the Commission to be the barometer of what is ‘going on’ in society. It is the Commission that 
starts receiving the complaints, the calls, the faxes and the e-mails.274  
This section gives some examples of cases involving death threats that may provide some 
indications as to the approach of the Court with regard to evidentiary requirements. 
In August 1991 the Court ratified its President’s provisional measures in the Chunimá case. 
The ‘possibility for injury’ was imminent and called for immediate action by the Court because 
five people had already been killed and the judges that issued the arrest warrants for the suspects 
had received death threats and were in hiding.275  
                                                 
271 See Article 29(2) of CIDH former Regulations (dating from 1987). Article 25(1) of the CIDH 
2001 Rules of Procedure simply uses the criterion ‘whenever necessary according to the 
information available’. 
272 See also Pasqualucci (1993), p. 803 and Pasqualucci (2003), p. 296. 
273 See CIDH Teodoro Cabrera García and Rodolfo Montiel Flores v. Mexico, 27 February 2004 
(adm.), §47. 
274 Interview by the author with Commissioner Robert Goldman, American University, Washington 
College of Law, 26 September 2001. 
275 Pasqualucci (2003), p. 302. 
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Yet the Court set out certain requirements that must be met before the Court can adopt pro-
visional measures at the request of the Commission. It pointed out that the reference to ‘in cases 
where the denounced facts are true’ in Article 29(2) of the Commission’s old Regulations was 
‘not a question of fully determining the truth of the facts; rather, the Commission must have 
reasonable basis for assuming them to be true’.276 It found, however, that the Commission had not 
fulfilled this requirement because its request ‘merely transcribes the facts reported by the peti-
tioner’.277 The Court also referred to the acknowledgement by Guatemala of an ‘internal armed 
conflict’. “Such a blanket acknowledgement does not imply acceptance that the facts denounced 
are true; however, it does lead to the presumption that a situation exists which could bring about 
irreparable damage to persons”.278 
The Court referred to the wording in Article 63(2), indicating ‘that we are dealing here with 
an extraordinary instrument, one which becomes necessary in exceptional circumstances’.279 
It also pointed out that the request for provisional measures referred to a case ‘not yet sub-
mitted to the Court’. This meant ‘that the Court lacks information regarding the facts and circum-
stances surrounding the case, which information must be at the disposal of the Commission. The 
latter must, consequently, transmit such information together with the corresponding petition, in 
order to provide the Court with the facts necessary to enable it to arrive at a decision’.280 Despite 
its critical remarks the Court considered that provisional measures were warranted. In fact the 
measures taken on behalf of the persons listed in the President's previous order281 were to be 
extended, a position, the Court noted, ‘with which the Government concurred at the hearing’.282 
The Order remained into effect until December 1991.283 Subsequently the Commission re-
established its own precautionary measures.284  
                                                 
276 IACHR Chunimá (Guatemala), Order of 1 August 1991, §6a. 
277 Ibid. 
278 Ibid. 
279 IACHR Chunimá (Guatemala), Order of 1 August 1991, §6b. 
280 Id., §7. See also IACHR Colotenango (Guatemala), Order of 1 February 1996, where the Court 
hoped the Commission would bring the case itself to the Court, rather than just its request for a 
prolongation or expansion of provisional measures, stating it ‘is incumbent on the Commission to 
take all necessary steps to examine the possibility of submitting to the jurisdiction of the Court 
any case in which circumstances of extreme gravity and urgency persist for a prolonged period of 
time, since the Court is not in possession of sufficient direct knowledge of the facts and of the 
surrounding circumstances to permit it to come to the most appropriate decision’, 5th 
‘Considering’ clause. See also e.g. IACHR Millacura Llaipén y otros (Argentina), Order of the 
President of 21 June 2006. 
281 IACHR Chunimá (Guatemala), President’s Order for urgent measures of 15 July 1991. In this 
case the Court stressed the importance of distinguishing between the provisional measures the 
Court can adopt under Article 63(2) of the Convention and ‘the emergency measures that Article 
23 (4) of the Rules empowers the President to order the parties in the interim, so as to permit any 
decision that the Court may eventually take to have the appropriate effect; in other words, so that 
the Court may not find itself facing a fait accompli’. IACHR Chunimá (Guatemala), Order of 1 
August 1991, §5. 
282 IACHR Chunimá (Guatemala), Order of 1 August 1991, §8. See also Buergenthal (1994), p. 79 
noting that the Court did so ‘because the additional facts brought to its attention by the 
Government at the public hearing strengthened the Commission’s allegations’. 
283 IACHR Chunimá (Guatemala), Order of 1 August 1991, 1st ‘Resolving’ clause. 
284 CIDH Annual Report 1991, Chapter IVb. CEJIL notes that in an unprecedented decision, in 
March 1993, some of the perpetrators of the persecution were convicted and sentenced to prison 
terms. CEJIL case docket 1997 (in file with the author). 
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As noted, in its Orders for provisional measures in cases not yet pending before it the Court 
often refers to the fact that the Commission previously used precautionary measures to no avail. 
An example is the case of Father Vogt. He was threatened in relation to his pastoral work. Before 
the Court was in session its President ordered ‘urgent measures’ in April 1996 based, among 
others, on the consideration that the Commission had taken precautionary measures on three 
occasions and that these had not had the required effect. This had become ‘a special circumstance 
making it incumbent on the President of the Court to request urgent measures’.285 He noted in his 
order for urgent measures of April 1996 that ‘the background information presented in this case’ 
effectively constituted ‘a prima facie case of urgent and grave danger to Father Daniel Vogt’s life 
and the integrity of his person’.286 By its Order of 27 June 1996 the Court confirmed the Presi-
dent’s Order ‘finding it to be consistent with the law and the merits of the proceedings’.287 In later 
cases the Court simply ratifies orders of the President without such statement. In 1997 the Court 
lifted its provisional measures in the Vogt case because the threats and harassment had diminished 
considerably as a result of the provisional measures.288 
In August 1999 the Commission requested Colombia to protect the lives and personal integ-
rity of a spokesman for Cartagena del Chairá in the region of Caquetá. It was alleged that a high-
ranking official of the National Army of Colombia had publicly identified him as a spokesman for 
the guerrillas. Apparently he had been harassed and received threatening telephone calls ‘of the 
type that usually precedes criminal attacks’.289 
In his decision to order urgent measures in the Peace Community case (2000) the President 
of the Court, Judge Cançado Trindade, considered that the ‘records produced by the Commission 
in its request demonstrate prima facie a situation of extreme seriousness and urgency as to the 
rights to life and personal integrity’ of 193 persons.290 The Court used a similar phrase but with-
out referring to prima facie evidence: ‘the Commission has described a situation of extreme seri-
ousness and urgency that conforms to the basis under Article 63(2) of the American Convention’ 
with regard to these named persons.291 
The President had noted that the Commission had already taken precautionary measures but 
that these had not been able to stop the serious and continuous violence perpetrated against mem-
bers of the Community.292 During the hearing of November 2000 the Commission again referred 
to the precautionary measures it had used in 1997, in light of more than 40 summary executions 
and forced disappearances. It emphasised that almost three years later the Community was still 
under continuous threat and without adequate protection by the government. The last months the 
violence had increased. 
                                                 
285 IACHR Vogt case, Order of 27 June 1996, Compendium 1987-1996, p. 160.  
286 Ibid. 
287 Id., p. 172.  
288 IACHR Vogt case, Order of 11 November 1997. Another example is the Court’s decision to lift 
the provisional measures on behalf of four persons in the Carpio Nicolle case, Order of 19 June 
1998 (case 1011-97). It continued them on behalf of two family members of Carpio Nicolle. 
Subsequently others were again added in the list of beneficiaries. At the end of 2008 the State 
again requested the Court to lift the provisional measures. See Order of the President of 18 
November 2008 ordering a hearing for the beginning of 2009. 
289 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter 3.C.1, §21. 
290 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of the President for 
urgent measures, 9 October 2000, 4th ‘Considering’ clause. 
291 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000, 4th ‘Considering’ clause. 
292 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of the President for 
urgent measures, 9 October 2000, 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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“In spite of the active accompaniment of organizations such as the Peace Brigades, the interest 
of the foreign diplomatic representations in Colombia, and the Office of the High Commissioner 
of the United Nations, and, even, the actions of the Vice-presidency of the Republic, the 
members of the Community of Paz continue to be ‘prisoners of violence’ specially from 
paramilitary groups, and they remain to be without the effective protection of the State’s 
agents”.293 
The Court ratified the President’s Order and expanded it to include all members of the Commu-
nity.294 They were subsequently maintained and expanded several times.295 
The Court has dismissed requests for provisional measures ‘on grounds of inadmissibility’ 
because it considered it ‘not possible to determine, on a prima facie basis, that the persons listed 
by the representative (…) are in a situation of extreme gravity and urgency, or that their lives and 
personal integrity are threatened and at serious risk’.296 After all, it pointed out, ‘provisional 
measures may be ordered as long as the background data submitted to the Court provide prima 
facie evidence that there exists a situation of extreme gravity and urgency and that irreparable 
damage to persons is imminent’.297 
3.2.6.3 DENYING REQUESTS FOR PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
The Inter-American Court has pointed out that ‘in a request for provisional measures it is not 
possible to consider arguments pertaining to issues other than those which relate strictly to the 
extreme gravity and urgency, and the necessity to avoid irreparable damage to persons’.298 
Otherwise the provisional measures would conflict with the notion of non-anticipation. Hence the 
Court has sometimes considered that a request by petitioners for provisional measures did ‘not 
refer to a situation of extreme gravity and urgency warranting the adoption of provisional 
                                                 
293 See IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000, ‘Having seen’ clause 9b. 
294 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. The Court pointed out that, because of the seriousness of the situation, it gave a detailed 
description of the facts stated in the Commission’s report. It noted that the State did not dispute 
the facts as described by the Commission, that it had examined the facts and circumstances that 
served as the basis for the President’s Order for urgent measures and ratified this decision 
because it found it to be in conformity with the law and the merits of the records. See IACHR 
Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 2000, 15th 
‘Considering’ clause. The Spanish text speaks of ‘por encontrarla ajustada a derecho y al mérito 
de los autos’. 
295 See e.g. IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of the 
President for urgent measures, 9 October 2000, Orders for provisional measures, 24 November 
2000 and 18 June 2002.  
296 IACHR Case of Bueno-Alves (Argentina), Order of 2 February 2007 (denying request for 
provisional measures), 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
297 IACHR Case of Bueno-Alves (Argentina), Order of 2 February 2007 (denying request for 
provisional measures), 4th ‘Considering’ clause, referring to various cases including Case of the 
19 Tradesmen, Order of 4 July 2006, 5th ‘Considering’ clause. 
298 IACHR Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Order denying provisional measures 
of 29 January 2008, 10th ‘Considering’ clause. See also Matter of James et al. (Trinidad and 
Tobago), Order of 20 August 1998, 6th ‘Considering’ clause; Matter of “Globovisión” Television 
Station (Venezuela), Order of 29 January 2008, 10th ‘Considering’ clause and Matter of Luisiana 
Ríos et al. (Venezuela), Order of 3 July 2007, 9th ‘Considering’ clause. 
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measures to avoid irreparable damage to persons pursuant to Article 63(2) of the American 
Convention on Human Rights’.299 It explained that it would consider the implications of the facts 
reported to it ‘if appropriate, at the stage, still pending, of oversight of compliance’ with its 
judgment in the case in question.300 
3.2.6.4 LIFTING PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN CASES OF DEATH THREATS 
Petitioners consult with the beneficiaries of precautionary measures and may report to the Com-
mission that the situation ‘no longer requires the application of urgent measures’. If the Commis-
sion decides to lift then it often observes that it will continue watching over the situation closely 
and will seek to apply these measures once again if circumstances warrant it.301  
The Court has also lifted its provisional measures when it considers that a reasonable time 
had elapsed since the beneficiary had received any threats or intimidation.302 In Alemán Lacayo 
(1996) the Court ordered provisional measures, noting “That in the instant case, independently of 
the fact that the merits of the matter are under consideration by the Commission, publicity in both 
the national and international Press, the death of one of Dr. Alemán-Lacayo's bodyguards, and the 
injuries sustained by others in his entourage, have invested the events on which the Commission 
bases its request for provisional measures with a high degree of notoriety and credibility”.303 
Subsequently, the Court heeded to the Commission’s request to lift the provisional measures. The 
Commission had noted that “[T]he Nicaraguan people voted on October 20, 1996, to elect its 
Government. At that election Dr. Arnoldo Alemán-Lacayo was elected President of the Republic 
and is to assume the country’s highest office today. As a consequence, the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights considers that the provisional measures duly ordered by the Honorable 
Court attained its main purpose”.304 It considered that ‘the instant case, in view of Mr. Alemán’s 
election as President of Nicaragua and, taking the Commission’s request into account, the situa-
tion of “extreme gravity and urgency” which prompted the adoption of the provisional measures 
has ceased to exist, in itself making them no longer necessary’.305 In fact ‘as the beneficiary of the 
measures is today President of the Republic of Nicaragua, it is inappropriate for an international 
body to adopt provisional measures to be instituted by a government on behalf of its own Head of 
State’.306 
In May 1997 the Commission indicated to the Court that there was no information that the 
physical integrity of two beneficiaries of the Court’s provisional measures in the Caballero 
                                                 
299 IACHR Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Order denying provisional measures 
of 29 January 2008, 11th ‘Considering’ clause. 
300 IACHR Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Order denying provisional measures 
of 29 January 2008, 12th ‘Considering’ clause. See also Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison 
v. Peru, Order of 30 January 2007 (denying a request for provisional measures). See also Miguel 
Castro-Castro Prison, Judgment of 25 November 2006. 
301 See e.g. IACHR Serech and Saquic, Order of 19 September 1997, 4th and 6th ‘Having seen’ 
clause for a similar statement in the context of cases in which the Court lifted its Order for 
provisional measures. 
302 See e.g. IACHR matter of Gallardo Rodríguez (Mexico), 11 July 2007. 
303 IACHR Alemán Lacayo (Nicaragua), Order of 2 February 1996, §7. 
304 IACHR Alemán Lacayo (Nicaragua), Order of 6 February 1997, 4th ‘Having seen’ clause 
(referring to the Commission’s brief of 10 January 1997). 
305 IACHR Alemán Lacayo (Nicaragua), Order of 6 February 1997, 2nd ‘Considering’ clause. 
306 IACHR Alemán Lacayo (Nicaragua), Order of 6 February 1997, 3rd ‘Considering’ clause. On the 
beneficiaries of provisional measures see also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4. 
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Delgado and Santana case continued to be threatened. It pointed out that the personal circum-
stances of these two persons had fundamentally changed and that one of them was even working 
as an official in the Administrative Security Department of Colombia. In this light, it was reason-
able to lift the provisional measures on their behalf. In June 1999 the Court indeed decided to lift 
the provisional measures it had ordered for those two persons. It also decided to maintain its 
provisional measures ordered on behalf of the other three beneficiaries in this case.307 
In Clemente Teherán (2000) the Commission and the State suggested that the Court would 
lift its provisional measures because the Commission had been unable to get in touch with the 
indigenous community that had initially reported the violations. At the same time the Commission 
suggested that the lack of contact was due to fear on the part of the petitioners. The Court refused 
to lift its provisional measures, arguing that it had not been provided with ‘sufficient reasons to 
indicate that the ‘situation of extreme gravity and urgency’ has ceased’.308 It has been suggested 
that this decision ‘may be frustrating to the Commission, which has limited resources for verify-
ing the situations of petitioners’, but is positive ‘in that it may serve to minimize State attempts at 
intimidating petitioners to the Inter-American system to abandoning their petitions’.309 
In January 1995 the Inter-American Commission had requested Mexico to take precaution-
ary measures on behalf of the Director of the Miguel Agustin Pro Juarez Human Rights Centre 
(Centro Pro), an attorney and the Technical Director of the National Network of Human Rights 
Organisations ‘Todos los derechos para todos’.310 If the threats against Centro Pro indeed sub-
sided, this was only temporarily. In September 1999 Centro Pro (PRODH) received three enve-
lopes containing threats against the director and staff of the Centre. On 9 August 1999 unknown 
persons kidnapped Digna Ochoa, the Centre’s attorney. Her kidnappers had taken certain personal 
items from her including her personal calling cards. One of these cards was later found in one of 
the envelopes the Centre received containing further threats against them. The Commission de-
cided to take precautionary measures and requested Mexico to adopt specific measures to protect 
the lives and physical integrity of Digna Ochoa, the Director of Centro Pro and its members. On 
21 September 1999 Mexico informed the Commission that its National Human Rights Commis-
sion (CNDH) had taken steps to protect the beneficiaries of the precautionary measures. It also 
noted that the Office of the Attorney General of the Federal District had initiated preliminary 
investigations of the threats and the kidnapping. Furthermore, it referred to the fact that the Hu-
                                                 
307 IACHR Caballero-Delgado and Santana (Colombia), Order of 3 June 1999. Several years later 
the State argued that certain remaining provisional measures should be lifted, ‘since: i) they have 
been in force for more than 13 years, and in fact provisional measures should be exceptional in 
nature; ii) there is no evidence of new threats; iii) domestic law provides for effective 
mechanisms to protect a person who acts as trade union leader, as in the case of María Nodelia 
Parra and a person detained in a penitentiary, as in the case of Gonzalo Arias-Alturo’. Caballero-
Delgado and Santana (Colombia), Order of 6 February 2008, 8th ‘Having seen’ clause. Yet the 
Court decided to maintain the provisional measures. It pointed out that it appreciated ‘the 
information provided by the State in the sense that certain protection measures set forth in the 
domestic legislation could benefit both petitioners’. It considered that ‘the State should address in 
its next report the domestic protection mechanisms that would apply to both beneficiaries. 
Particularly, the Court is keen on knowing the specific domestic protection measures that could 
be adopted regarding both beneficiaries; such measures would guarantee a protection level 
similar to that enjoyed by the beneficiaries of provisional measures contemplated herein’. IACHR 
Caballero-Delgado and Santana (Colombia), Order of 6 February 2008, 13th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
308 IACHR Clemente Teherán et al. (Guatemala), Order of 12 August 2000, 7th ‘Considering’ clause. 
309 Pasqualucci (2003), p. 316. See also Chapter IX (Threats). 
310 CIDH Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1997, Chapter II, section 4a. 
 Chapter XV 
854 
man Rights Commission of the Federal District had intervened as well. The Commission notes in 
its Annual Report of 1999 that the petitioners reported another serious attack against Digna Ochoa 
that took place within the time period the Commission had set for receiving comments. On 11 
November 1999, upon receipt of this information, the Commission decided to request the Inter-
American Court to take provisional measures.311 Provisional measures on behalf of Digna Ochoa 
remained in place for almost two years. In August 2001 they were lifted at the request of Mexico 
and without the opposition of the Commission. The State had argued that it was ‘an abuse of 
provisional measures to use them as a de facto substitute for prosecuting a case that should have 
sufficient merit to be heard before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’.312 It was reported 
that Digna Ochoa and her colleagues considered that violence against them ‘could not happen in 
present day Mexico’.313 Tragically two months later Digna Ochoa was murdered. Immediately the 
President of the Court ordered new provisional measures on behalf of her colleagues and family. 
A hearing took place discussing the circumstances, including the earlier decision to lift the provi-
sional measures, after which the Court confirmed the President’s measures.314 
                                                 
311 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III C.1, §44. 
312 IACHR Digna Ochoa et al. (Mexico), Order of 28 August 2001, 3rd ‘Having seen’ clause. 
313 IACHR Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center et al. (Mexico), Order of 30 November 
2001, 8th ‘having seen’ clause. 
314 The Court refers to the statements, made at the hearing of 26 November 2001, by the 
Commission and the State with regard to the previous request to lift the provisional measures. 
“The statement of one of the Commission’s assistants on the factors that she had taken into 
account when she had agreed that the provisional measures ordered in favor of Digna Ochoa and 
others should be lifted: “When we took the decision to request that the measures should be lifted, 
we took various factors into consideration. The first was that the Attorney General had closed the 
investigation; according to the petitioners, this ended the possibility of terminating the impunity 
in this series of threats and harassment, at that time. I believe that [it is necessary to express a] 
public mea culpa; we underestimated the sword of Damocles that impunity represented for the 
physical safety of all of us, […] the members of the PRODH Center, who agreed that the 
measures should be lifted, because there was no point in continuing to insist on investigations 
when the State was not undertaking them and refused to continue with them. The lawyer, Digna 
Ochoa, manifested her frustration with the ineffectiveness of the administration of justice and 
also, to a certain extent, her confidence that […] acts [such as her homicide] could not happen in 
present day Mexico. I therefore believe that, in these circumstances, we, the representatives of the 
victims, and the victims themselves made an error in our calculations; we did not believe that 
impunity was a sword of Damocles and this error led to fatal consequences for ourselves and for 
our colleagues. We made a mistake owing to our frustration in the face of the response of the 
administration of justice and of the State of Mexico itself”, IACHR Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez 
Human Rights Center et al. (Mexico), Order of 30 November 2001, 8th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
“The statement of the State’s representative on the factors that had been taken into consideration 
in order to request that the provisional measures ordered in favor of Digna Ochoa y Plácido and 
others should be lifted: “the following factors were taken into consideration in the decision to 
request the lifting of the precautionary measures. First, the absence of complaints of threats by 
Digna Ochoa or the Miguel Agustín Pro Juárez Human Rights Center. The fact that, for several 
months, she had not had police protection, when she went to the United States and then returned 
[...] and there were no complaints or threats, which [...] led us to believe that the climate of 
intimidation and harassment had ceased. Lastly, the issue of the investigation, and in this case, I 
am referring to the investigation of the Office of the Attorney General: […] the response of the 
Office of the Attorney General was always that there were no elements to continue with the 
investigation [...]. But, in any case, we felt that the measures had achieved their purpose. 
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3.2.7 Cultural survival and assessment of risk 
On occasion the HRC has dealt with the issue of cultural survival. It appears that the threshold for 
a violation of Article 27 ICCPR is very high and the difference between provisional measures and 
the eventual finding on the merits can be found in the assessment of risk. The merits and the 
provisional measures coincide in the sense that the evaluation by the Rapporteur before provi-
sional measures are used is a miniature of the analysis preceding a decision on the merits. Thus 
far, the HRC seems to consider that only when the cultural survival of the group is at stake it 
would find a violation.315 
The HRC practice with regard to provisional measures to protect cultural survival serves to 
illustrate how the difficulties in assessing the evidence have an impact not just on the decisions on 
the merits but also on the use of provisional measures. It also shows that the Committee is less 
inclined to consider on the merits that certain acts would result in irreparable harm to cultural 
survival. While sometimes it did use provisional measures pending the proceedings, it did so in a 
manner that was much feebler. It acted much less swiftly and with more circumscription, almost 
anticipating their subsequent decision to withdraw them.316 If the adjudicator initially refuses to 
take provisional measures the petitioner may still be able to convince it at a later stage with new 
arguments and evidence of risk.317 
The stricter assessment of the evidence may have been based purely on the type of (conflict-
ing) evidence available. Yet it is also possible that while the HRC has recognized in principle that 
certain measures may result in irreparable harm to cultural survival, in practice it attaches less 
importance to preventing this type of harm than to preventing irreparable harm to the life and 
personal integrity of individuals.318 
The excessive length of the proceedings in the case involving the Lubicon Lake Band 
(1990) has been explained elsewhere.319 Yet, assuming that for the use of provisional measures an 
exhaustive and definitive examination of the evidence is not necessary, the fact that the HRC used 
provisional measures so late in the proceedings remains puzzling.320 
Domestically the Band’s requests for an interim injunction, a caveat and a declaratory 
judgment had failed. The domestic court cases clarified the concept of irreparable harm used by 
                                                                                                                       
Unfortunately, we were mistaken also and we agree with the petitioners that, this time, we cannot 
allow these facts to happen again, so we have implemented all the measures of protection 
requested of us. Consequently, we have set up a permanent dialogue with the petitioners, with the 
human rights defenders and, therefore, we submit ourselves to the Court, the Commission and to 
public opinion in everything related to these provisional measures”, 10th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
315 See Chapter IX (Culture). 
316 See Chapter IX (Culture) and Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 (group of beneficiaries). 
317 Sometimes, however, provisional measures are too late by that time, or in any case less effective 
in preventing irreparable harm. 
318 See Part II on the common core and outer limits of the concept of provisional measures. It 
appears that while ensuring cultural survival, while now belonging to the common core, 
nevertheless is not considered as important as ensuring the right to life and personal integrity. 
319 Schmidt (1992), pp. 651-652 has noted that ‘the final decision was adopted on the basis of a total 
of 78 documents, fact sheets and conference room papers submitted by the parties or prepared by 
the Secretariat, as well as decisions adopted by the Committee’. He observes that the entirely 
written procedure, without oral hearings or independent fact-finding, had caused ‘considerable 
delays in the consideration of many factually or legally complex communications, since the treaty 
body concerned was forced to engage in time-consuming exchanges of correspondence with 
either of the parties before disposing of the necessary information enabling it to adopt a decision’. 
320 See also Chapter II (Systems), discussing prompt intervention. 
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Canadian courts and the manner in which the evidence was assessed. They employed the criterion 
of ‘balance of convenience’. The Court of Appeal of Alberta considered that interim relief might 
be warranted if the defendants were attempting to force members of the Band from their dwell-
ings, or to deny them ‘access to traditional burial grounds or other special places, or to hunting 
and trapping areas’. The petitioner argued that the Band had, in fact, ‘alleged denial of access to 
all of these areas, supporting its allegations with photographs of damage and with several uncon-
tested affidavits’.321 
Thus, the dispute turned on an assessment of the evidence, which was linked to the court’s 
approach to the concept of irreparable harm. The petitioner referred to the definition of irreparable 
injury by the Court of Appeal, which is an injury for which fair and reasonable redress in a court 
of law is not possible. To refuse an injunction to prevent such irreparable injury would be a ‘de-
nial of justice’.322 Yet in this case the domestic court did not consider that the balance of conven-
ience favoured relief to the Band. It considered that the Band would suffer no irreparable harm if 
resource development continued fully.323 
According to the State this meant that interim injunctions were only used if the issue was 
serious, if without the injunction irreparable harm would be suffered and if the balance of conven-
ience between the parties favoured relief to the applicant. It suggested that the HRC should take 
the same approach.324  
As the domestic appeals that were still pending were without suspensive effect, their non-
exhaustion was no obstacle to admissibility before the HRC. Moreover, the adjudicator could use 
provisional measures before finally determining the admissibility of a claim.325 However, the 
HRC took three years and five months to determine that the case was admissible and only then it 
took provisional measures. At that stage the HRC did assess the evidence for irreparable harm 
differently from the domestic court and used provisional measures. It did so in light of the seri-
ousness of the claim that the Band was on the verge of extinction.  
It would have been preferable had it made the assessment earlier in the proceedings. How-
ever, this was the first time the HRC used provisional measures in a case not involving irreparable 
harm to the life or personal integrity of individuals. At the time the HRC may not have been 
confident about the appropriateness of their use in the context of threats to the cultural survival of 
a group. Or possibly the case was so complex that its urgency escaped the attention of the Com-
mittee. 
Sara et al. v. Finland (inadm. 1994) equally illustrates the difficulty of dealing with cases 
on an urgent basis when the evidence is conflicting.326 The Committee used provisional measures 
                                                 
321 See HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 1990, §3.7. Ominayak submitted that the Band ‘clearly 
met this test by demonstrating, with uncontested evidence, injury to their livelihood, to their 
subsistence economy, to their culture and their way of life as a social and political entity’.  
322 HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 1990, §3.8. 
323 Like the lower court, the Court of Appeal of Alberta did consider that the Band’s ‘claim of 
aboriginal title to the land presented a serious question of law to be decided at trial,’ but that, 
nevertheless, the Band would ‘suffer no irreparable harm if resource development continued fully 
and that the balance of convenience, therefore, favoured denial of the injunction’. Chief 
Ominayak stated that the provincial government and the oil companies attempted to convince the 
Court that the Band had ‘no right to any possession of any sort in any part of the subject lands, 
which, logically, included even their homes’. HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 1990, §3.7. 
324 HRC Lubicon Lake Band, 26 March 1990, §§5.3, 5.7 and 21.3. 
325 See also Chapter XIV on admissibility. 
326 HRC Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.). The State had contended that the envisaged 
forestry operations, consisting merely of silvicultural logging, were in fact expected to contribute 
to the natural development of the forest. It referred to a report for the Ministry of Agriculture and 
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only when it initially declared the case admissible. This was seven months after initial submis-
sion.327 By contrast, if it had been a death penalty or expulsion case it would probably have used 
provisional measures prior to declaring the case admissible.328 Eventually it declared the case 
inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and did not address the qualitative argu-
ment of the petitioner.329 While clearly the problem of conflicting evidence plays a role in the 
Committee’s late use of provisional measures, it may also simply attach less importance to pre-
venting irreparable harm to cultural survival than to life or personal integrity.  
In the case following up the situation in Sara, the case of Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi v. 
Finland (2001), the HRC did not use provisional measures because the events complained of had 
already taken place.330 On the merits it found no violation because it was ‘unable to conclude’ 
                                                                                                                       
Forestry by a professor of a Finnish university stating that ‘no single forest or land use can on its 
own fulfil the income and welfare needs of the population’ and schemes of multiple use were 
necessary. This advice seems not to relate to the environmental impact of this type of logging. 
Instead it is an economic assessment. It also noted that the petitioners could not be considered as 
‘victims’ of a violation of the Covenant. It pointed out that the rationale of the Wilderness Act 
was in fact to enhance protection of the Sami culture and traditional nature based means of 
livelihood. The petitioners submitted the reports of two experts ‘according to which (a) under 
certain conditions reindeer are highly dependent on lichen growing on trees; (b) lichen growing 
on the ground are a primary winter forage for reindeer; (c) old forests are superior to young ones 
as herding areas; and (d) logging negatively affects nature based methods of reindeer herding’.  
327 It had transmitted the case in February 1991, two months after initial submission, but at that time 
it did not yet use provisional measures. Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.). 
328 See Conclusion Part II (on the purpose of provisional measures). 
329 The petitioners criticized the State’s remark that practicing intensive reindeer husbandry was not 
incompatible with intensive logging. They noted that this only applied to the modern forms of 
reindeer herding using artificial feeding, while they used traditional methods for which the old 
forests in the area were essential. They gave the following example: “The winter 1991-1992 
demonstrated how relatively warm winters may threaten traditional herding methods. As a result 
of alternating periods of temperatures of above and below 0 degree centigrade the snow was, in 
many parts of Finnish Lapland, covered by a hard layer of ice that prevented the reindeer from 
getting their nutrition from the ground. In some areas without old forests carrying lichen on their 
branches, reindeer have been dying from hunger. In this situation, the herding area designated in 
the communication has been very valuable to the authors”. Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 
(inadm.), §7.9. 
330 HRC Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 24 October 2001. The petitioners had argued about an 
area that was the last remaining natural wilderness for the Lappi Herdsmen’s Committee and that 
for the Sallivaara Herdsmen’s Committee formed ‘one third of its best winter herding areas and is 
essential for the survival of reindeer in extreme climatic conditions’. Again they argued about the 
impact on the environment. They pointed out that snow and rainfalls were common in this area 
and the winter season was approximately one month longer than in other areas. “The climate has 
a direct impact on the area’s environment, in particular the trees (birch and spruce), whose 
growth is slow; the trees in turn encourage the growth of the two types of lichen that constitute 
the winter diets for reindeer”. They emphasised that ‘even partial logging would render the area 
inhospitable for reindeer breeding for at least a century and possibly irrevocably, since the 
destruction of the trees would lead to an extension of the marsh, with the resulting change of the 
nutrition balance of the soil’. They also submitted that the ‘silvicultural methods of logging (i.e. 
environmentally sensitive cutting of forest areas) advocated by the authorities for some parts of 
the wilderness areas used by the authors would cause possibly irreversible damage to reindeer 
herding, as the age structure of the forest and the conditions for the lichen growth would change’. 
They spoke of the strategic significance of certain lands and pointed out that other activities in 
 
 Chapter XV 
858 
whether the logging of trees in the area at issue rose to the threshold it had established earlier, 
namely whether the interference by the State party was so substantial as to fail to properly protect 
the right the right of the petitioners to enjoy their culture.331 
In Länsman II (1996) the HRC initially used provisional measures, but later set them aside 
without explaining why.332 On the merits the HRC had to determine whether the logging that had 
already taken place, as well as the logging that had been approved for the future, was ‘of such 
proportions as to deny the authors the right to enjoy their culture’ in the area in question. The 
ensuing discussion turned on evidentiary matters about the consultation process and the impact of 
logging plans on the one hand and the Committee’s deference to the interpretation of domestic 
courts on the other. Again, the HRC determined that it was ‘unable to conclude that the activities 
carried out as well as approved constitute a denial of the authors’ right to enjoy their own culture’. 
It pointed out that this was the result of a careful consideration of the material placed before it by 
the parties and that it had duly noted ‘that the parties do not agree on the long-term impact of the 
logging activities already carried out and planned’.333  
It then deferred to these courts’ interpretation of Article 27 in noting that it was ‘not in a po-
sition to conclude, on the evidence before it, that the impact of logging plans would be such as to 
amount to a denial of the authors’ rights under article 27 or that the finding of the Court of Appeal 
affirmed by the Supreme Court, misinterpreted and/or misapplied article 27 of the Covenant in the 
light of the facts before it’.334 In other words, according to the Committee the logging activities 
did not appear to threaten the survival of reindeer husbandry.335 
                                                                                                                       
the area, ‘including large-scale gold-mining, other mineral mining, large-scale tourism, and the 
operation of a radar station’, had limited the possibilities for herding. 
331 The test the HRC applied was whether interference by the State party in reindeer husbandry, as 
an essential element of Sami culture, was so substantial that the State had failed to properly 
protect the right of the petitioners to enjoy their culture. The Committee considered that the 
requirement of consultation had been fulfilled. The State had indicated that, as required by the 
Committee’s decision in Jouni Länsman, the plans had been developed in consultation with 
reindeer owners. Apart from finding that the requirement of consultation had been fulfilled, the 
HRC also referred to the partly conflicting expert evidence, which the District Court had assessed 
differently from the appellate court. It considered that ‘it does not have sufficient information 
before it in order to be able to draw independent conclusions on the factual importance of the area 
to husbandry and the long-term impact on the sustainability of husbandry, and the consequences 
under article 27 of the Covenant’, HRC Äärelä and Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 24 October 2001, 
§7.6. 
332 HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 30 October 1996. The HRC simply noted the State 
party’s argument that the request for interim measures of protection should be set aside. Hence, 
from the publicly available information it is not clear on what basis it made this decision. See 
also Chapter X (Culture). 
333 See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on the group of beneficiaries, discussing 
consultation and representation in cases involving indigenous peoples.  
334 See also Schmidt (1997), p. 338.  
335 The State party had indeed solicited deference by the HRC. It had recalled that the claims had 
been thoroughly examined by the domestic courts. These courts had had before them extensive 
documentation and Article 27 had been taken into account as well. It submitted that ‘the national 
judge is far better positioned than an international instance to examine the case in all of its 
aspects’. In this case the petitioners had used an argument loosely based on the precautionary 
principle, although they did not use this terminology. See Chapter I, section 5.3.3 and section 4 of 
this Chapter. They submitted that if the government invoked ‘the argument that the effects of 
selective cutting are milder than in the case of clear felling, the only conclusion should be that all 
further logging in the area in question should be postponed until objective and scientific findings 
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It considered that, on the basis of the available information, the fact that such traditional 
reindeer husbandry was an activity of low economic profitability was not ‘a result of the encour-
agement of other economic activities by the State party in area in question, but of other, external, 
economic factors’.336 In light of its deference to the State party’s arguments and the assessment by 
the domestic courts of the risks involved, on the merits the Committee could not confirm its ear-
lier assessment of the risks that had resulted in the decision to take provisional measures and it 
found no violation.337  
The petitioners noted that the State should support its argument for continuing the logging 
of trees by objective and scientific findings showing that the forest in the area already logged had 
indeed recovered. Their argument relies on the precautionary principle.338 
The HRC did indicate that the cumulative effect of certain infringements could eventually 
constitute a violation of Article 27.339 In other words, the question arises at what point one can 
speak of irreparable harm and use provisional measures. This question applies particularly when 
the HRC takes a quantitative approach.340 If it would take a qualitative approach it would some-
times be easier to find that there was a threat of irreparable harm. 
This could be so in case of prima facie evidence of threats to an area of religious or cultural 
significance. Establishing the qualitative importance of a certain area (however small) for tradi-
tional livelihood would still require specific evidence of the importance of that piece of land to 
maintain traditional livelihood. Tree logging or oil drilling or other actions could result in irrepa-
rable harm also if it involved only a small part of the traditional lands, if these parts are qualita-
tively essential for the collective as well as individual right to culture. 
By contrast, the quantitative approach involves (incremental) threats to such a large area 
that this would equally make impossible cultural survival. In other words, depending on the ap-
                                                                                                                       
show that the forest in the area already logged-the Pyhäjärvi area-has recovered’. See §9.2. The 
petitioners had emphasised the fact that the past and future logging would exacerbate an already 
difficult situation. It appears from their submission of 28 August 1995 that they argued that ‘the 
situation of the Sami in Finland, and in the Angeli area in particular, is very difficult already 
before any new interference with their way of life’. Because of this a threshold approach such as 
that used by the domestic courts would be inappropriate. The domestic courts had ruled that a 
certain ‘threshold’ was to be met before adverse effects on traditional minority activities would 
amount to a ‘denial’ of Article 27 (on file with the author). 
336 See HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 30 October 1996, §10.6. 
337 See also HRC Jarle Jonassen and members of the Riast/Hylling reindeer herding district v. 
Norway, 25 October 2002 (inadm.). The HRC considered that the application of domestic 
remedies had not been unreasonably prolonged because ‘the period of time it has taken for the 
authors to obtain a remedy, may not be gauged from the time the Samis have litigated grazing 
rights, but from the time the authors themselves have sought a remedy’ (§8.8). This shows again 
an emphasis on the individual right rather than its collective aspects. Committee members 
Henkin, Scheinin and Solari Yrigoyen dissented, considering, among others, that instituting 
expropriation proceedings to secure reindeer herding rights was not at all an effective remedy, 
that the proceedings were already unreasonably prolonged and that the petitioners would be 
subjected to legal sanctions if they continued to herd their reindeer in certain traditional areas, 
while the expropriation proceedings could not address this problem. 
338 See HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 30 October 1996, §9.2. The relevance of the 
precautionary principle to human rights law is discussed later in this Chapter, in section 4. For a 
discussion on the precautionary principle in general, see Chapter I, section 5.3.3. 
339 On this substantive issue see further Chapter IX (Culture), section 3, under the heading ‘Land 
rights and collective aspects of the right to culture’. 
340 Here evidentiary and substantive law issues again are clearly interrelated. 
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proach the petitioners would have to prove either that the specific area is of strategic importance 
to their culture or that the past and future infringements combined would result in a denial of the 
right to culture. The Committee’s recognition of the cumulative effect of certain infringements 
should also take into account qualitative aspects to the right to land, next to the quantitative as-
pects.  
The quantitative approach to culture currently taken by the HRC may sometimes give 
precedence to collective rights over individual rights.341 Indeed, apart from the quantitative versus 
qualitative approach, there is also the tension between the collective dimension of the right to 
culture in Article 27 and the fact that it is an individual right. As discussed in Chapter X, the 
Committee’s use of provisional measures is generally triggered by its awareness of the collective 
dimension of the right. An individual’s ‘cultural survival’ is considered less important.342 At the 
same time the quantitative approach may conflict with the collective right to culture as well ex-
actly because a purely quantitative approach ignores the qualitative aspects of the right to land as 
part of the right to culture. 
The way the HRC deals on the merits with the question whether certain developments 
would result in a denial of the right to culture is also relevant for its use of provisional measures 
pending the proceedings. Accepting that the cumulative effect of certain (industrial) develop-
ments may be an infringement of the right to culture, raises the question at what moment this 
infringement is triggered. The evidentiary requirements depend in part on the Committee’s an-
swer to questions such as whether only the extent of the measures or also the specific area that is 
at risk determines the risk of irreparable harm (i.e. the quantitative versus qualitative approach), 
and whether only the collective right is examined or also the individual right to culture. When a 
qualitative and individual rights approach is taken, risk of irreparable harm is assumed sooner 
than when a quantitative and collective approach is taken. In this respect the choice of evidentiary 
requirements appears based also on the importance attached to the right.343 
Either the contested measures encroach upon the culture of an indigenous people so much 
that its survival is at stake or they encroach upon it to a lesser extent. In the first situation this 
would warrant provisional measures pending the proceedings and, in case of an eventual finding 
of a violation, a precise indication about the expected form of reparation. In the latter case, how-
ever, there may still be a violation (although the HRC has not yet found so), but provisional 
measures are simply not warranted and an appropriate form of financial compensation or, if pos-
sible, a return to the previous situation might be sufficient.344 
3.2.8 Nuclear tests and assessment of risk  
In Bordes and Temeharo v. France (1996) the petitioners claimed that the authorities had not 
been able to show that the underground nuclear tests did not constitute a danger to the health of 
the inhabitants of the South Pacific and to the environment.345 They requested the HRC to use 
                                                 
341 Without the French declaration the HRC would likely have found a violation of Article 27 in 
Hopu. This would have been an example of a finding of a qualitative rather than quantitative 
encroachment of the right to culture. 
342 Again see the discussion on the substantive issue of irreparable harm in Chapter X and 
Conclusion Part II. 
343 On preventing irreparable harm to cultural survival see Chapter X (Culture) and Conclusion Part 
II. 
344 In general on the relation to reparation see Chapter XIII (Protection).  
345 HRC Vaihere Bordes and John Temeharo v. France, 22 July 1996. See also Chapter XII (Other 
situations). Between September 1995 and early 1996 the French authorities carried out six 
underground nuclear tests. The State provided a detailed description of the geology of Mururoa 
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provisional measures and ask France ‘not to carry out any nuclear tests until an independent 
international commission had found that the tests were indeed without risks and did not violate 
any of the rights protected under the Covenant’.346 Without calling it such, this seems an appeal to 
the HRC to take into account the precautionary principle in its use of provisional measures.347 The 
HRC decided not to grant the protection requested.348 Subsequently it declared the case 
inadmissible because it was not satisfied that the petitioners could claim to be victims within the 
meaning of Article 1 OP. About the claim that the tests ‘will further deteriorate the geological 
structure of the atolls on which the tests are carried out, further fissurate the limestone caps of the 
atolls, etc., and thereby increase the likelihood of an accident of catastrophic proportions’349 it 
noted that ‘this contention is highly controversial even in concerned scientific circles; it is not 
possible for the Committee to ascertain its validity or correctness’.350 In other words, it did not 
                                                                                                                       
and of the techniques developed to conduct the tests. Among others, it argued that the level of 
radioactivity at Mururoa, following earlier underground tests in the 1970s, was now identical to 
that at other islands and atolls in the South Pacific and less than that measured in, for instance, 
metropolitan France, where the emissions resulting from the nuclear accident in Chernobyl, 
Ukraine (1985) were still clearly measurable. About the risk to the food chain it pointed out that 
‘all serious scientific studies on the environmental effects of underground nuclear tests have 
concluded that whatever radioactive elements reach the surface of the lagoon at Mururoa or 
Fangataufa, are subsequently diluted by the ocean to levels which are perfectly innocuous for the 
marine fauna and flora and, a fortiori, for human beings’. HRC Vaihere Bordes and John 
Temeharo v. France, 22 July 1996, §§3.2-3.5. The State also noted that, in the past, it had granted 
access to the testing area to several independent commissions of inquiry and that the Lawrence 
Livermore laboratory (California) and the International Laboratory of Marine Radioactivity in 
Monaco had confirmed that the monitoring of environmental effects had been serious and of high 
quality, §§3.2-3.5. The State argued that the petitioners should have requested compensation 
from the competent authorities ‘as the authors essentially invoke the potential risks which the 
tests entail for the health and the environment’. It is not clear from the State’s submission why a 
request for compensation should be considered a satisfactory alternative in the face of such 
potential risks. Finally, it argued that the claim was inadmissible ratione materiae. It considered 
that Article 6 ICCPR ‘only applies in the event of a real and immediate threat to the right to life, 
which presents itself with some degree of certainty’. Equally, Article 17 related to a real and 
effective interference with private or family life and not to ‘the risk of a purely hypothetical 
interference’, §3.9. Counsel for the petitioners responded that the risk of adverse effects of the 
tests already carried out since the initial submission to the HRC was real and serious. She 
deplored the absence of independent investigation into the impact of the tests already concluded 
and those that were still programmed. She criticised the lack of transparency in the actions of the 
French authorities and also noted that even the reports invoked by the State party itself contained 
passages cautioning about the real danger of escape of radioactive particles from the underground 
shafts, with the consequent contamination of the atmosphere. Counsel further referred to a report 
by Médecins sans Frontières, from July 1995, criticising the absence of medical supervision of 
the population of French Polynesia in the aftermath of the earlier nuclear tests, §§4.1-4.2. 
346 HRC Vaihere Bordes and John Temeharo v. France, 22 July 1996, §2.3. 
347 On the precautionary principle see section 4 of this Chapter. 
348 It discussed the issue during both the 54th and the 55th sessions. HRC Vaihere Bordes and John 
Temeharo v. France, 22 July 1996, §§1-2.3. 
349 HRC Vaihere Bordes and John Temeharo v. France, 22 July 1996, §5.6. 
350 Ibid. 
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apply the precautionary principle.351 In the European system provisional measures have been 
refused in similar circumstances.352 
4 THE RELEVANCE OF THE PREVENTIVE AND PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH 
4.1 Introduction 
With regard to the assessment of risk for the use of provisional measures the human rights adjudi-
cators have not developed clear criteria. Nevertheless, a common denominator seems to be that of 
‘prima facie’ evidence. This cannot be defined in the abstract. It depends on the circumstances of 
the case and the context of the legal system. The question arises whether the discussion on the 
preventive and precautionary principle or approach in international environmental law (and EU 
health law) can be of some assistance in this respect. The precautionary principle is not to be 
confused with the precautionary measures taken by the Inter-American Commission. The latter 
are simply provisional measures by another name. The preventive and precautionary principles 
were discussed in Chapter I in the context of the practice of the ICJ and ITLOS.353 
In light of the value attached to what is being protected it may be possible to draw an anal-
ogy with the precautionary principle or approach with regard to assessment of risk. The umbrella 
principle ‘better be safe than sorry’, often referred to in the context of the precautionary approach, 
is particularly applicable in human rights cases. This warrants a preliminary rather than a full 
assessment of all available evidence. Yet thus far human rights adjudicators do not seem to have 
used the precautionary principle in the strict sense.354 
                                                 
351 Nevertheless, it wished to reiterate its observation in its General Comment on the right to life that 
‘it is evident that the designing, testing, manufacture, possession and deployment of nuclear 
weapons are among the greatest threats to the right to life which confront mankind today’. Id., 
§5.9. 
352 EComHR Tauira et al. v. France, 4 December 1995 (inadm.). 
353 See Chapter I (ICJ), section 5.3.3. 
354 See e.g. the argument of counsel in the aforementioned HRC case involving Sami lands and 
cultural rights. See also counsel’s invocation of the principle in Brun v. France, 18 October 2006 
(inadm.), §3.2. The HRC declared the case inadmissible considering that the petitioner could not 
be considered a victim as the facts did not show an actual or imminent threat of violation of his 
right to life and his light to privacy, family and home. See also e.g. ECtHR Balmer-Schafroth et 
al. v. Switzerland, 27 June 1997. The Court found that the petitioners had not established ‘a direct 
link between the operating conditions of the power station which were contested by them and 
their right to protection of their physical integrity, as they failed to show that the operation of 
Mühleberg power station exposed them personally to a danger that was not only serious but also 
specific and, above all, imminent. In the absence of such a finding, the effects on the population 
of the measures which the Federal Council could have ordered to be taken in the instant case 
therefore remained hypothetical. Consequently, neither the dangers nor the remedies were 
established with a degree of probability that made the outcome of the proceedings directly 
decisive within the meaning of the Court's case-law for the right relied on by the applicants. In 
the Court's view, the connection between the Federal Council's decision and the right invoked by 
the applicants was too tenuous and remote’, §40. The dissenting opinion by Judge Pettiti, joined 
by Mr Gölcüklü, Mr Walsh, Mr Russo, Mr Valticos, Mr Lopes Rocha and Mr Jambrek, criticized 
the Court’s failure to find a violation of Article 6 ECHR. The Opinion noted that the ‘majority 
appear to have ignored the whole trend of international institutions and public international law 
towards protecting persons and heritage, as evident in European Union and Council of Europe 
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As noted in Chapter I the preventive principle applies when a causal relationship can al-
ready be established between the act or omission and serious or irreparable harm and when the 
probability of the risk can be established either quantitatively or qualitatively. The difference with 
the precautionary principle is that uncontroversial scientific evidence is available. Depending on 
the value attached to a certain right even evidence of a slight risk could be sufficient to trigger the 
preventive principle and halt the act or remedy the omission. The preventive approach certainly 
applies to decisions to take provisional measures in human rights cases if these aim at preventing 
irreparable harm to persons and the survival of indigenous groups. As discussed in the Conclusion 
to Part II certain rights are so fundamental that balancing them with other interests is not allowed 
under the human rights treaties. The evidentiary requirements for triggering a shift in the burden 
of proof are generally considered to be less strict in relation to risks of irreparable harm to such 
fundamental rights than in other cases. The preventive principle clearly applies to human right 
cases because provisional measures aim to prevent human rights violations rather than redress 
them. The remark of Judge Treves, in the context of the law of the sea (rather than human rights 
law), that ‘a precautionary approach seems to me inherent in the very notion of provisional meas-
ures’ can be understood in this sense. He noted that it was ‘not by chance that in some languages 
the very concept of “caution” can be found in the terms used to designate provisional measures: 
for instance, in Italian, misure cautelari, in Portuguese, medidas cautelares, in Spanish, medidas 
cautelares or medidas precautorias’.355 
This section briefly refers to the relationship between provisional measures and the preven-
tive and precautionary principle or approach. It discusses why the precautionary approach is more 
relevant in human rights cases than the precautionary principle. It deals with existing criteria for 
the use of the precautionary principle that could also be useful in the precautionary approach 
warranted in human rights cases.  
4.2 The relationship between provisional measures and the preventive and 
precautionary approach 
Both in environmental law and in human rights law the adjudicator has to assess risks. The adju-
dicator has to ‘cope with uncertainty’ in the sense that he has to ‘reach decisions even if the avail-
able information is not entirely conclusive’.356 The human rights approach, just like the approach 
under environmental law, emphasises prevention. In human rights cases risk assessment takes 
place mainly in relation to complaints by petitioners claiming that they run a ‘real risk’ of being 
ill treated or executed upon expulsion and extradition on the one hand and complaints about 
irreparable harm to indigenous culture on the other. With regard to non-refoulement it is a ques-
tion of how a person will be treated by the authorities of a third State in the foreseeable future. 
                                                                                                                       
instruments on the environment, the Rio agreements, UNESCO instruments, the development of 
the precautionary principle [references omitted] and the principle of conservation of the common 
heritage (…).Where the protection of persons in the context of the environment and installations 
posing a threat to human safety is concerned, all States must adhere to those principles’. Judge 
Pettiti concluded that, together with his colleagues in the minority, he ‘would have preferred it to 
be the judgment of the European Court that caused international law for the protection of the 
individual to progress in this field by reinforcing the “precautionary principle” and full judicial 
remedies to protect the rights of individuals against the imprudence of authorities’. 
355 Separate opinion of Judge Treves, ITLOS, Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand v. Japan; 
Australia v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999, §9. 
356 Kamminga (1996), p. 171. 
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This is an area of fact-finding in which an adjudicator may feel more at ease than if the dispute 
relates to scientific facts.  
Some scientific evidence relates to past facts and other to future facts or predictions. With 
regard to the latter the preventive and precautionary principles may sometimes be relevant. In all 
cases involving scientific evidence adjudicators have to assess and balance the authority and 
credibility of the evidence and the independence of the experts.  
The precautionary principle as originally developed in the context of environmental law re-
lates to the duty of States to take precautionary measures in the face of risks when scientific evi-
dence is lacking or conflicting. It does not as such refer to the authority of international adjudica-
tors to decide on precautionary measures. Given the difference between the roles of States and 
adjudicators different criteria may apply for the use of the precautionary principle by States and a 
precautionary approach taken by adjudicators. 
It may be assumed that the use by an adjudicator of the precautionary principle as a ration-
ale for the decision to take provisional measures or as a rationale for finding a violation on the 
merits is less far reaching than the State’s discretion to take precaution based on the precautionary 
principle.  
The principle is more established in the context of preventing serious harm to the environ-
ment in the face of scientific uncertainty than in the context of preventing health hazards. Yet if 
faced with a situation of scientific uncertainty the precautionary principle could be relevant to the 
adjudicator, whether or not it is dictated by a rule of customary international law.357 It is submit-
ted that an international adjudicator should not be prevented, by lack of full scientific certainty, 
from imposing provisional measures to halt certain industrial developments threatening cultural 
survival or to take measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons. Moreover, apart from the 
direct application of the precautionary principle when deciding on the use of provisional meas-
ures, some of the criteria that have been developed for the use of the precautionary principle could 
also be helpful for the use of provisional measures in situations not involving scientific evidence. 
Clearly, a precautionary or preventive approach underlies the use of provisional measures. 
Yet the precautionary principle (in a strict sense) in my view is not ‘inherent in the very notion of 
provisional measures’, at least not in human rights cases. In those cases at the merits stage the 
criterion applied for establishing future facts normally is that of ‘real’ risk rather than an ‘uncer-
tain’, ‘hypothetical’ or ‘negligible’ risk. Thus, at the merits stage it is necessary to establish 
(qualitatively) the likelihood of irreparable harm, meaning that the adjudicators do not apply the 
precautionary principle in the strictest sense. At that stage the threshold is much higher exactly 
because of the role of the adjudicator, which is different from that of the State. States may decide 
to take precautionary measures if there is conclusive evidence of a very small risk to human or 
plant health only. In the face of a very small risk the international adjudicator is unlikely to find a 
violation in its decision on the merits. Nevertheless, its lowering of the standard at the provisional 
measures stage, not requiring conclusive evidence (of a real risk), clearly is based on a precau-
tionary approach.  
On the other hand, there are cases in which the precautionary principle could apply as 
such.358 
Counsel, in cases pending before the HRC, has sometimes referred to this principle. They 
argued that lack of full scientific certainty about (the level of) environmental degradation could 
not be used as an excuse for allowing exploitation of natural resources.359  
                                                 
357 See Chapter I, section 6.3.3. 
358 See e.g. Cançado Trindade (1992) and Kamminga (1996) discussing the responsiveness of human 
rights mechanisms to risk and uncertainty. 
359 See e.g. HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 30 October 1996, §9.2. 
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Disputes of fact in which the precautionary principle could be relevant may relate to health 
risks, threatening irreparable harm to the right to life. In such cases the dispute could concern 
medical evidence about the impact on health. They could also relate to environmental risks, 
threatening cultural survival. The disputes may then concern evidence based on environmental 
sciences about the risk of environmental degradation. With regard to the next step of showing the 
impact on cultural rights and the way of life of certain groups this could involve depositions and 
testimonies by the people involved, e.g. indigenous peoples themselves, possibly reinforced by 
testimonies by anthropologists etc. about the impact of the level of environmental degradation on 
the traditional way of life and the possibility to maintain a culturally acceptable livelihood.  
It could be argued that in human rights cases dealing with a lack of scientific certainty 
(normally involving environmental harm) adjudicators could apply the precautionary principle as 
an argument reinforcing the general principle that irreparable harm to persons must be prevented. 
After all it may not be possible to show the effects of certain actions or omissions immediately. 
The actions or omissions may relate to the environment or to long-term health effects. 
Given the nature of the risk (to life or cultural survival) and the required level of protection 
under the human rights treaty, it seems particularly warranted, in the face of scientific uncertainty, 
to resort to the precautionary principle in the determination of provisional measures. Scientists 
may make conflicting predictions about the risk of irreparable harm to the environment or to 
people’s health. Apart from the fact that this does not relate to the foreseeable future but to long-
term effects, this type of scientific evidence is even more difficult to assess than that of the risk of 
ill treatment in a third State. In this respect the precautionary principle may be used as an argu-
ment to require certain action to be postponed pending full scientific evidence or, instead, to 
require the State to act to prevent (further) environmental degradation and risk to health. If human 
rights adjudicators make use of this principle provisional measures are the practical tools for 
requiring States to postpone certain industrial activities until more scientific information is avail-
able to determine the risk to the environment (or to determine health hazards).  
4.3 Criteria for the precautionary approach in human rights cases 
In the context of WTO and EU law and policy the question has arisen whether, and if so how, the 
precautionary principle also applies in relation to the safety of food and feed and the protection of 
consumer health. In this context the European Commission has published a Communication. It 
considers that the precautionary principle applies not just to protect the environment, but also to 
protect consumer’s health.  
As no clear criteria are available as of yet on the use of provisional measures by human 
rights adjudicators, let alone on the use of the precautionary principle, it may be useful to examine 
the aforementioned policy document published in the context of the system of the European Un-
ion to see whether some of the criteria for the use of the precautionary principle mentioned could 
be relevant in the context of human rights adjudication as well. After all, the rationale for both is a 
precautionary approach. As discussed, the precautionary principle itself does not necessarily 
apply in the context of human rights adjudication, but the reasons for the use of the precautionary 
principle and for the use of provisional measures in human rights cases are often similar.360 
                                                 
360 The criteria of the somewhat controversial Commission Communication have been developed 
specifically in relation to the safety of food and feed. The use of the precautionary principle in 
this context triggers disputes about protectionism and the impact on import and export. Yet it is 
one of the few official documents discussing criteria relevant in the application of the 
precautionary principle. It could be relevant, to some extent, to the discussion of provisional 
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Even if the European Court of Justice normally simply accepts the State’s view that precau-
tion was necessary, the aforementioned Communication does provide some insight in the EU 
Commission’s theoretical approach to the principle. Obviously the criteria are not applicable in 
exactly the same way in human rights cases. First of all protectionism is not a central issue here. 
Different from the situation in which States invoke the precautionary principle against import of 
goods, in human rights cases there is little risk that recourse to the precautionary principle by 
petitioners (and ultimately the adjudicator) is a disguised form of protectionism. In these cases 
individuals invoke it against a State to prevent human rights violations that could cause irrepara-
ble harm to life or cultural survival.  
Moreover, the main criterion for the use of provisional measures is stricter than that often 
used for recourse to the precautionary principle. The latter principle is invoked in the face of 
scientific uncertainty about serious or long lasting damage. Provisional measures in human rights 
cases normally aim to prevent irreparable harm only, rather than all serious or long lasting dam-
age. On the other hand, provisional measures are also used in cases where there is no scientific 
uncertainty, constituting a range of cases that is much more extensive than that in which the pre-
cautionary principle applies.  
Despite the differences, in situations involving the uses of the precautionary principle, is-
sues often arise that could be relevant in the discussion on the use of provisional measures as 
well. Indeed some of the criteria the European Commission mentions in its Communication also 
have relevance in decision-making on provisional measures in human rights cases.  
These are the criteria suggested by the Commission: measures based on the precautionary 
principle should, among others, be ‘proportional to the chosen level of protection’; non-
discriminatory; ‘consistent with similar measures already taken’; ‘based on an examination of the 
potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action’; ‘subject to review in the light of new 
scientific data’ and ‘capable of assigning responsibility for producing the scientific evidence 
necessary for a more comprehensive risk assessment’.361  
In a precautionary approach State decisions for the protection of health or the environment 
normally are not based on such risks alone but also on other risks that must be balanced. Balanc-
ing also takes place with regard to the advantages and disadvantages of ‘taking the risk’. These 
advantages and disadvantages are related to social values and often also to legal obligations. In 
such cases an essential step to take is to assess whether there is a hierarchy in values and legal 
obligations. In relation to rights of such a fundamental nature as the right to life and the prohibi-
tion of cruel treatment the level of uncertainty of the risk may be quite high while still justifying 
the use of provisional measures. Moreover, with regard to those rights, balancing with other 
interests is inappropriate. 
Equally, one could argue that if indigenous peoples can make credible that serious harm to 
the environment would cause irreparable harm to their cultural survival, the level of protection 
                                                                                                                       
measures in human rights adjudication. In its Communication the European Commission noted 
that the decision to invoke the precautionary principle is ‘a decision exercised where scientific 
information is insufficient, inconclusive or uncertain and where there are indications that the 
possible effects on the environment, or human, animal or plant health may be potentially 
dangerous and inconsistent with the chosen level of protection’.360 The Communication provides 
some criteria, but stresses that ‘it is for the decision-makers and ultimately the courts to flesh out 
the principle’. Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission 
on the precautionary principle, 2 February 2000, COM (2000) 1, p. 10. 
361 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the 
precautionary principle, 2 February 2000, COM (2000) 1, pp. 18-20. For a commentary on these 
criteria see e.g. Wibisana (2008), discussing as questionable the distinction made between 
scientific risk assessment and non-scientific risk management, pp. 126-130. 
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required by the human rights treaties does not allow for balancing with other interests.362 The 
chosen level of protection should necessarily be higher in human rights cases involving a real risk 
of irreparable harm to persons (including harm to cultural survival). Hence, while in these cases 
the proportionality criterion does apply as well, it applies in an adapted manner. The criterion 
would be as follows: provisional measures (including those taken on the basis of the precaution-
ary principle) should not accomplish more than necessary to prevent the irreparable harm. In other 
words while the obligation to prevent irreparable harm to persons comes first the adjudicator must 
allow the addressee State to implement its obligations in a way that is least invasive to its other 
vital interests.363  
Consideration of the potential benefits and costs of action or lack of action could be relevant 
for determining the type of measure required, for instance, a positive or a negative obligation.364 
Moreover, provisional measures should be consistent with similar measures already taken in order 
to increase their credibility and avoid discriminatory application vis-à-vis beneficiaries and ad-
dressees. Comparable situations should be treated similarly and different situations should be 
treated differently.365  
Inequality of arms or lack of scientific evidence may warrant a shift in the burden both on 
the merits and at the provisional measures stage. The provisional measures by the various human 
rights adjudicators have always been subject to review and clearly such review should also take 
into account relevant new scientific data. This could result in a withdrawal of provisional meas-
ures. Yet it is proposed that in human rights cases the general rule should be that very early in the 
proceedings the State proposing to allow a certain (industrial) development has the burden to 
prove that this would not cause irreparable harm to the cultural survival of indigenous groups. 
This rule would then also apply in the face of scientific uncertainty. In other words, different from 
the general rule applied by human rights adjudicators that on the merits the likelihood of irrepara-
ble harm must be established, in human rights cases involving the environment (mainly in relation 
to cultural survival, but also with regard to health risks) the precautionary principle should apply.  
According to its Communication the Commission noted that ‘the appropriate response in a 
given situation’ is ‘the result of a political decision, a function of the risk level that is “accept-
able” to the society on which the risk is imposed’.366 To a certain extent the acceptable level of 
risk in human rights cases is determined already through adherence to human rights treaties. The 
adjudicators monitoring the compliance of States with their obligations under these treaties have 
the responsibility to decide whether or not to use provisional measures and whether or not to be 
guided by the precautionary principle. Nonetheless, the European Commission’s emphasis on the 
level ‘acceptable’ to ‘the society on which the risk is imposed’ may be relevant in human rights 
adjudication as well to the extent that the subjective element, the views of indigenous peoples 
themselves on the risk to their cultural survival, should be included as a factor in an adjudicator’s 
decision to invoke the precautionary principle.367  
                                                 
362 See Conclusion Part II of this book, discussing the issue of cultural survival.  
363 See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4.2 on the rights of the addressee of provisional 
measures. 
364 See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
365 See also Chapter II, section 8.2 on publication and motivation of provisional measures. 
366 Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the 
precautionary principle, 2 February 2000, COM (2000) 1, p. 16. 
367 See also Chapter X (Culture) and Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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5 CONCLUSION 
5.1 Assessment of temporal urgency  
Before human right adjudicators decide to use provisional measures they generally determine 
whether the material risk is imminent. For the most part this approach is similar to that of the ICJ. 
If there is no immediate risk a provisional measure is premature.  
In certain death penalty cases an exception has been made to the requirement of immediacy. 
With regard to some States the adjudicator may have the experience that once a person has been 
sentenced to death an execution follows soon after exhaustion of domestic remedies. In such cases 
the promptness requirement is more important than the requirement that a provisional measure is 
not taken prematurely. This applies similarly to deportation cases. Yet adjudicators sometimes 
have used provisional measures in death penalty case with no imminent risk of execution, maybe 
simply to express moral condemnation or because provisional measures are automatically used in 
all death penalty cases, which generally involve imminent execution dates.  
Some adjudicators have also indicated, and this is a useful development given the risk of ir-
reparable harm to persons, that once the State has been informed of a submission involving ir-
reparable harm to life or physical integrity it must refrain from acting to cause such harm even 
when the adjudicator has not yet had a chance to use provisional measures. 
5.2 Assessment of risk 
5.2.1 Introduction 
While the practice of the adjudicators examined for this book is not straightforward it does appear 
that on the merits they all use the standard of ‘real risk’. For purposes of admissibility many 
adjudicators look at prima facie evidence ratione materiae. 
At the provisional measures stage, however, there must simply be prima facie evidence with 
regard to that part of the claim involving a risk of irreparable harm to persons. The term prima 
facie must be interpreted in light of the urgency of the situation. At the admissibility stage the 
adjudicator should not already determine whether there is sufficient evidence to find a violation. 
He can declare the case inadmissible if there is clearly a lack of substantiation and evidence of 
inadmissibility ratione materiae. Because there is no particular urgency involved at this stage, the 
requirement of prima facie evidence is stricter than at the stage of provisional measures. At the 
admissibility stage there must be sufficient evidence at first sight (prima facie). At the provisional 
measures stage there must be sufficient evidence at first – and urgent – glimpse. Hence, at the 
stage of provisional measures the addressee State may already be ‘required to answer’, by ur-
gently preventing irreparable harm, at a lower level of prima facie evidence (prima prima facie). 
Given the purpose of provisional measures, discussed in the Conclusion to Part II, the risk 
claimed must be shown to relate to irreparable harm to persons or to indigenous culture. This 
means that there is no need to assess the evidence in relation to claims involving other rights. At 
this stage only the aspects of the claim relating to irreparable harm need to be substantiated, not 
other parts of the claim unrelated to such harm. If the main claim relates to irreparable harm to 
persons, this claim must be sufficiently substantiated for purposes of provisional measures. If the 
alleged risk of irreparable harm to persons is collateral to the claim it is not necessary to substan-
tiate the main claim for purposes of provisional measures. It is only necessary to provide informa-
tion on the risk of irreparable harm to life or personal integrity. If at the admissibility stage the 
beneficiary is still in need of protection, next to the evidence for purposes of admissibility, the 
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petitioner should again show prima facie evidence of irreparable harm in order to convince the 
adjudicator to maintain provisional measures. 
For each human rights system it is important to determine whether the adjudicator is limited 
to using evidence submitted by the parties or, on the other hand, has wide fact-finding powers. 
Nevertheless, whatever these powers, the rule of the burden of persuasion always applies.368 As in 
general international law, in the field of human rights legal presumptions may cause a shift in this 
burden. One source of a legal presumption is the principle of effective human rights protection, 
taking into account that the consequences of a finding normally are more far reaching for the 
individual petitioner than for the respondent State. Another applicable principle is that of equality 
of arms and the need to take into account the difficulty for the individual petitioner of obtaining 
and presenting direct evidence of human rights violations by the State. This principle is related to 
the duty (of both parties) to cooperate with the adjudicator during the proceedings. Finally the 
principle of preventing irreparable harm to persons applies, as well as the related precautionary 
principle (in case of conflicting or insufficient scientific evidence) on environmental degradation. 
These principles combined may not only cause an early shift of the burden on the merits,369 but 
may also justify, at the provisional measures stage, a rather low standard of proof to be met by the 
person requesting such measures of protection against irreparable harm.  
States have sometimes argued that rights and interests should be balanced, invoking princi-
ples such as ‘balance of convenience’. However, this principle should apply in relations between 
equal parties and is therefore more suitable to be applied in proceedings not involving a threat to 
the very existence of a person or to indigenous peoples. 
5.2.2 Assessment of risk: right to life and prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment  
While domestic systems may choose to apply the preventive or protective principle any time there 
is sufficient evidence to establish some risk (even if negligible), this is not the case for interna-
tional adjudicators dealing with expulsion and extradition cases. Given the fact that no adjudicator 
grants all requests for provisional measures by all petitioners claiming a real risk of irreparable 
harm, it is assumed that the likelihood of the risk must be determined at least to some extent. In 
fact the criterion most often surfacing is that of ‘real risk’. Because provisional measures are only 
used in very serious situations involving threats of irreparable harm to persons and because quick 
decision-making is required, it would be sufficient if petitioners were to make a credible case of 
the possibility of such harm. In this respect prima facie evidence of a real risk means a quick 
assessment of the then available evidence, at face value, finding indications of such a real risk. At 
the merits stage the adjudicator could then determine whether the risk was indeed real. 
                                                 
368 Kokott (1998), pp. 155-156. 
369 See e.g. ICJ Corfu Channel case (Albania v. UK), 9 April 1949; HRC Bleier v. Uruguay, 29 
March 1982, §13.3 and ECtHR Salman v. Turkey, Judgment of 27 June 2000, §100 (noting that 
the Court has generally applied the standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’, referring to 
Ireland v. UK, 18 January 1978, §161 but that ‘such proof may follow from the coexistence of 
sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presumptions of 
fact’. It then specifically addressed the monopoly by the State: “Where the events of an issue lie 
wholly, or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, as in the case of 
persons within their control in custody, strong presumptions of fact will arise in respect of 
injuries and death occurring during such detention. Indeed, the burden of proof may be regarded 
as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation”); see also 
Avşar v. Turkey, Judgment of 10 July 2001, §392 repeating the second part of the statement, 
relating to the monopoly of information by the State.  
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If the likelihood of the risk is already clearly negligible at the provisional measures stage or 
cannot be determined at all, provisional measures are not used. The latter situation, in which the 
probability cannot be determined at all or only at a very low level shows that, while the preven-
tive principle does apply to some extent, the precautionary principle does not.  
As noted, it is possible that the standard in relation to past facts differs from that in relation 
to future facts. Provisional measures only relate to ongoing situations and future facts and the risk 
of irreparable harm. Nevertheless, often proof of past facts (torture, ill treatment and threats) plays 
a role in establishing risk. This may relate to risks in the addressee State itself, such as disappear-
ance, death threats and harassment or ill-treatment in detention. Often there is concrete evidence 
in such cases. For instance, in detention situations medical evidence may be important.  
Claims based on the principle of non-refoulement may require a different type of evidence. 
Human rights adjudicators that have dealt with this issue have referred to ‘substantial grounds’ of 
a ‘real (and personal) risk’. They have interpreted the requirement of a ‘real risk’ either strictly 
(the violation would be a ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’ of the extradition or expulsion) 
or more leniently (the violation would be ‘more than a mere possibility’). 
In expulsion and extradition cases the standard of proof relates to the question of the likeli-
hood of the risk triggering the responsibility of the sending State. On the merits there are several 
factors most adjudicators have referred to as playing a role in determining whether there is a real 
risk. First of all, the petitioner should personally be at risk. A clear indication of risk is previous 
torture or ill treatment of the petitioner in the State to which he would be returned. While not 
decisive in itself, a consistent pattern of human rights violations in this State is a relevant factor 
taken into account by most adjudicators to determine personal risk. Harassment of family or 
friends in the receiving State and political activities by the petitioner either in the receiving State 
or in the sending State may also play a role. Different from the merits stage, at the stage of provi-
sional measures a consistent pattern of human rights violations in the receiving or the requesting 
State often is considered sufficient in itself. 
The European Court has sometimes attached importance to the fact that the requesting or 
receiving State has ratified human rights treaties, especially if these include individual complaint 
proceedings. The argument is that such States must be presumed to be safe and, if not, the re-
turned person could always appeal to an international adjudicator. The other human rights adjudi-
cators do not seem to increase the burden on the petitioner for showing a real risk just because the 
receiving State is a party to human rights conventions. Their approach is more appropriate given 
that practice shows that the possibility of individual complaint does not always prevent irrepara-
ble harm.370 
In the past the Committee against Torture appropriately pointed out that if a petitioner has 
submitted credible evidence that he has been tortured, inconsistencies and contradictory elements 
in his submissions claiming a real risk of renewed torture or ill treatment upon return should not 
immediately result in a negative assessment of the risk. As discussed, however, CAT subse-
quently took a rather restrictive approach, for an extended period hardly ever finding violations in 
non-refoulement cases. 
While in some cases human rights adjudicators may also take into account the general inter-
est, the text of the treaty provision in question should specifically allow this. In the context of 
non-refoulement it is important to note that the treaty provisions on the prohibition of torture and 
ill treatment in the various regional and international treaties do not allow for this, exactly be-
cause this prohibition is absolute. In the determination of whether the petitioner runs a real risk of 
ill treatment or torture the adjudicator should not allow any balancing with other interests. The 
standard of proof of a real risk should not be heightened for one specific case simply for policy 
                                                 
370 See e.g. Smeulers/De Vries (2003). 
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reasons, for instance taking into account the fact that the petitioner is a suspected criminal (or 
terrorist) and the victims in the requesting State have a right to see him prosecuted there or the 
sending States wishes to protect its inhabitants.371 In relation to the right to life and the prohibition 
of torture or ill treatment, which have been accorded a higher status in international proceedings, 
this type of balancing is inappropriate in both the main case and at the stage of provisional meas-
ures.372  
Different from cases involving the impact on the environment and health the evidence relat-
ing to a real risk in cases about refoulement does not have to be ‘scientific’ but can be more tradi-
tional. In cases involving scientific evidence if a decision-maker cannot pinpoint the probability 
of a risk of irreparable harm, in the sense of cause and magnitude, he may still take temporary 
measures on the basis of the precautionary principle. In human rights cases, on the other hand, 
adjudicators normally apply the same criteria at both stages (merits and provisional measures), 
indicating the degree of probability required on the merits. Whatever information is available at 
the provisional measures stage is quickly examined to determine whether such provisional meas-
ures are warranted. The difference between the assessment of risk when deciding about the use of 
provisional measures and the assessment of the risk at the merits stage is simply a matter of de-
gree in the standard of proof and evaluation.  
In short, if in expulsion cases nothing can be said about the risk (negligible, small, real or 
clear and convincing) at the merits stage, not even qualitatively, no violation will be found. The 
same is relevant when the risk is considered to be small or negligible. This means that the precau-
tionary principle does not apply. On the merits the question is whether there is a real risk. At the 
provisional measures stage it is whether there is sufficient indication of such a real risk. At the 
same time the evidentiary standard should certainly be relaxed in non-refoulement cases. In that 
sense an analogy with the precautionary approach could be made. At the stage of provisional 
measures it should not be necessary to already show personal risk, as long as there is persuasive 
evidence of a consistent pattern of gross human rights violations.  
5.2.3 Assessment of risk: irreparable harm to indigenous culture 
In one field the precautionary principle should indeed apply: that of indigenous culture. Different 
from non-refoulement cases, in some other cases, such as those involving the natural habitat, there 
may be conflicting scientific evidence of risk. The adjudicator should use provisional measures if 
there is some (non-negligible) indication of risk. Adjudicators should be able to consider the use 
of provisional measures even if the probability of environmental damage (threatening cultural 
survival) cannot be determined or if the evidence is conflicting. Cases of threats to cultural sur-
vival relate to conflicting scientific evidence (about causality and probability) exactly because of 
the argument of the risk of harm to the environment. In my view the international adjudicator 
could then take into account the precautionary principle, at least in its decision on provisional 
measures.  
Thus, if there is uncertainty because of conflicting evidence (some of which is pointing to a 
real risk) or if there is inconclusive evidence the precautionary approach, as generally understood 
under international environmental law, could play a role.  
                                                 
371 See e.g. ECtHR Chahal v. UK, 15 November 1996 and Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008 (Grand 
Chamber). See further e.g. Smeulers (2002), pp. 130-133 and p. 167; Van den Wyngaert (1990), 
p. 765; Vermeulen (1989), p. 239 and (1990), p. 331. 
372 Also for courts with a general jurisdiction (not limited to human rights), the prohibition of torture 
and cruel treatment should outweigh other rights or interests. See e.g. Hoge Raad (Dutch 
Supreme Court) 30 March 1990 RvdW 1990, 76, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991, no. 249 
(Short case). 
 Chapter XV 
872 
Discussing the case law of the HRC Scheinin has distinguished between a quantitative and 
strategic approach to infringements on the right to culture. He emphasized the ‘strategic (qualita-
tive) importance of the specific forest lands in question’ (italics in the original). If the adjudicator 
would only assess the industrial developments on a quantitative scale this would not do full jus-
tice to some cases brought by indigenous peoples. Still, the quantitative approach is important as 
well because it recognises that incremental developments with regard to land use could have the 
effect of eroding the economic basis for an indigenous community’s ‘traditional or otherwise 
typical means of livelihood’.373 
The qualitative-quantitative distinction is more generally applicable to cases involving cul-
tural rights, also in the context of regional systems. It could equally be relevant to the use of 
provisional measures. The assessment of risk is different depending on whether the approach 
taken is qualitative or quantitative. Applying Scheinin’s distinction between qualitative and quan-
titative infringements on the right to culture to the concept of provisional measures, it can be 
established that for both types of infringement prima facie evidence is required of threats to an 
area of religious or cultural significance, but in a qualitative approach the actual threat may be 
easier to prove because the moment triggering irreparable harm is easier to pinpoint than it is in 
an incremental approach.  
Establishing the qualitative importance of a certain area (however small) for traditional live-
lihood would also require specific evidence of the importance of that piece of land to maintain 
traditional livelihood. In a qualitative approach to irreparable harm an adjudicator would look at 
the impact of industrial developments on sites of particular cultural importance. This would be 
less difficult to establish in relation to specific religious or cultural sites or objects than with 
regard to land and traditional livelihood where it would have to relate, for instance, to specific 
types of vegetation necessary for maintaining traditional livelihood.  
The quantitative approach involves an examination of a progressive encroachment on tradi-
tional lands. In other words it involves incremental threats to such a large area that this would 
equally make impossible cultural survival.374 In that case the questions arise (1) whether the 
environmental harm would be serious and long lasting375 and (2) at what point one can speak of 
irreparable harm to indigenous culture and use provisional measures. In other words, at what 
point do State activities (or does State inaction) trigger irreparability? 
The available practice shows that the HRC thus far has not opted for a qualitative ap-
proach.376  
Even if the situation would be reversible in the long run, it could destroy cultural survival in 
the meantime. It would be possible to show the impact on the culture of an indigenous group by 
                                                 
373 Scheinin (2001), pp. 170-171. 
374 See also the separate opinion of Judge Treves in ITLOS Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New 
Zealand v. Japan, Australia v. Japan), Order for provisional measures of 27 August 1999. In his 
opinion he discussed incremental threats, which he called the ‘qualitative urgency’ requirement. 
He considered that this urgency concerned halting ‘a trend towards a collapse of the southern 
bluefin tuna stock’. He noted: “Each step in such deterioration can be seen as ‘serious harm’ 
because of its cumulative effects towards the collapse of the stock. There is no controversy that 
such deterioration has been going on for years. However, as there is scientific uncertainty as to 
whether the situation of the stock has recently improved, the Tribunal must assess the urgency of 
the prescription of its measures in the light of prudence and caution”. 
375 This is a criterion derived from ITLOS. In my view the criterion is more appropriate than that of 
irreparable harm to the environment, exactly because the scientific evidence issues trigger the 
precautionary approach. Only as part of the next step, linking the serious environmental 
degradation to harm to indigenous culture, the criterion of irreparable harm is applicable again.  
376 See the discussion in Chapter X (Culture). 
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statements of members of the group (and complemented by anthropological expertise). In order to 
assess the harm to the environment itself, however, scientific evidence about the probability of the 
risk could play a role.377 In this light it is argued that if there is uncertainty about the risk, there is 
a lower burden of proof to show a prima facie case before the burden shifts to the State to show 
that certain industrial developments will not result in irreparable harm to the environment and 
consequently to indigenous culture.  
In the discussion about the precautionary principle reference is often made to risk assess-
ment. In particular there is disagreement about the level of assessment that must have taken place 
before a decision-maker may invoke the precautionary principle as well as about the level of the 
risk assessment that must take place following the use of the precautionary principle. The re-
quirements of notification and consultation are important for an appropriate use of the precaution-
ary principle in environmental law, but also in environmental impact assessment by for instance 
the Inspection Panels instituted by the World Bank. These requirements also appear to have their 
counterparts in the jurisprudence of human rights adjudicators in relation to indigenous peoples. 
They may indeed come to play a role in the use of provisional measures.  
The distinction between the qualitative and the quantitative approach to infringements on 
human rights, as discussed by Scheinin, clearly is important in the context of risk assessment. 
International public authorities not specifically dealing with human rights, such as the European 
Commission of the EU, seem to have acknowledged that risk assessment may also be based (par-
tially) on qualitative rather than quantitative information.378 
It is suggested that in certain circumstances adjudicators could take provisional measures 
immediately. This would be so if the petitioners of a complaint can show that the exploitation or 
economic developments are about to take place and could result in irreparable harm and there is 
some indication that those persons directly affected have not been consulted and/or the State has 
not performed an environmental impact assessment, taking into account cultural integrity and 
sustainability. Provisional measures could aim at halting such industrial development until the 
adjudicator considers that an appropriate environmental impact assessment has taken place, dur-
ing which the indigenous groups affected have been consulted properly. Inspired by successful 
national agreements between indigenous peoples and State and provincial authorities on environ-
mental impact assessment, the approach by the HRC may broker better results for the indigenous 
communities concerned than the approach taken thus far. The adjudicator may then be more 
informed and its decisions more practically relevant. This approach may be possible even through 
long-distance paper proceedings, although clearly it would be easier to realise in a regional sys-
tem making use of on-site visits and hearings.  
Of course, if the impact assessment in itself was appropriate but the State ignored any re-
sults favourable to the indigenous peoples, this may be a ground for the use of provisional meas-
ures as well. Hence, this approach requires a more in-depth analysis of what constitutes appropri-
ate consultation. Without this, the adjudicator would not be able to deal with all cases in which 
                                                 
377 This issue is discussed in section 4.2.2 on the precautionary principle. 
378 According to the European Commission the concept of risk assessment in the SPS Agreement 
‘leaves leeway for interpretation for what could be used as a basis for the precautionary 
approach’. It considers that the risk assessment on which a temporary measure is based ‘may 
include non-quantifiable data of a factual or qualitative nature and is not uniquely confined to 
purely quantitative scientific data’. It has noted that the Appellate Body of the WTO had 
confirmed this in the Growth Hormones case. In this case it ‘rejected the panel’s initial 
interpretation that the risk had to be quantitative and had to establish a minimum degree of risk’. 
Commission of the European Communities, Communication from the Commission on the 
precautionary principle, 2 February 2000, COM (2000) 1, p. 12.  
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consultation of the indigenous peoples and environmental impact assessments are little more than 
window dressing. 
5.2.4 Conclusion on the assessment of risk at the stage of provisional measures 
5.2.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In the practice of the human rights adjudicators there is indeed a link between the importance 
attached to preventing irreparable harm and the issue of temporal urgency.379 While conceptually 
a similar link would be expected between the importance attached to preventing irreparable harm 
on the one hand and assessment of risk on the other, in practice this does not always appear to be 
the case. 
For provisional measures in human rights cases the risk to be prevented generally relates to 
irreparable harm to the life or physical integrity of persons and the cultural survival of indigenous 
groups. When the alleged risk is imminent quick action is to be preferred over lengthy delibera-
tion about the existence of such risk. In cases where there is friction between lack of information 
and urgency, the standard of proof may have to be lowered. Given the overriding importance of 
protecting the very existence of people(s)380 this applies to the assessment of risk in human rights 
cases even more than it does to such assessment in other cases.381 Yet in practice it seems that the 
human rights adjudicators sometimes take a rather restrictive approach in their use of provisional 
measures.  
Looking at the specific situations in which provisional measures have been used in human 
rights cases it is evident that they related to future (or ongoing) facts. Nevertheless the level of 
evidence available may differ considerably. In some cases of ongoing harm very concrete evi-
dence is available already at the stage of provisional measures to show the risk of irreparable 
harm. In other cases, involving future harm, the adjudicators have to determine at this stage 
whether there is a ‘real risk’.  
In all these cases the factors to be taken into account in the decision on the merits coincide 
with those relevant for an assessment at the stage of provisional measures. The difference lies in 
the difficulty of proving future facts. In non-refoulement cases involving claims of a risk to life or 
physical integrity in the receiving or requesting State if someone would be removed to that State, 
the facts necessary for a risk assessment are often difficult to obtain and are insufficient in them-
selves: a combination of those facts is usually required.  
At the admissibility stage the standard of evidence to be shown by the petitioner is lower 
than at the merits stage. Among others, there must be prima facie evidence of admissibility ra-
tione materiae. On the premise that provisional measures may be used in advance of the admissi-
bility declaration the level of evidence required is again lower than that required at the admissibil-
ity stage. In other words, the petitioner must be able to show evidence of risk of irreparable harm 
at very first sight (prima prima facie). 
Some examples illustrate the various situations in which petitioners have requested the use 
of provisional measures. With regard to requests for provisional measures to protect persons 
whose life is threatened concrete evidence of recent threats and harassment could be provided. In 
the eventual decision on the merits of claims involving death threats and harassment the evidence 
that must be provided is similar, but more definitive.  
                                                 
379 For a similar conclusion with regard to jurisdiction and admissibility see Chapter XIV. 
380 See Conclusion Part II. 
381 See Chapter I (ICJ and ITLOS). 
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A situation in which the adjudicators have to attach great importance to circumstantial evi-
dence is that of enforced disappearances.382 In this case as well the factors taken into account on 
the merits are equally important in the assessment for the use of provisional measures. With re-
gard to provisional measures, however, the adjudicator will additionally take into account the 
question whether the alleged disappearance is sufficiently recent to make the use of provisional 
measures worthwhile. 
For provisional measures to put a stop to ongoing ill-treatment or ensure access to medical 
treatment in detention concrete evidence concerning ill-treatment may be provided as well. Again 
similar criteria of what has to be proved at the merits stage must be met.383 In relation to requests 
for provisional measures to halt corporal punishment or the execution of a death sentence it is 
even possible to provide very concrete evidence of material risk.384  
In contrast, in expulsion or extradition cases the claims of irreparable harm are more uncer-
tain because they deal with future facts. The criterion to be met on the merits is that there is a real 
risk of such harm. Here the risk assessment for decision-making on provisional measures equally 
coincides with the assessment of ‘real risk’ at the merits stage. Specific factors that may be rele-
vant in this respect are the general human rights situation in the receiving State and, if available at 
the stage of provisional measures, evidence that petitioners have been ill treated in the receiving 
State, that they belong to a specific (ethnic) group that is being targeted, that they had been politi-
cally active (in the opposition) in the receiving State (or had subsequently been vocal about their 
State of origin in the sending State).  
Particularly in urgent cases, all adjudicators should be able to consult and take into account 
information derived from publicly available reports by authorities such as UN Special Rappor-
teurs or by reputable NGOs, even when the parties did not provide it. 
5.2.4.2 STANDARD OF PROOF AND SHIFTING THE BURDEN 
The question arises to what extent evidence of real risk and prima facie evidence of such risk 
differ or, more generally speaking, whether and how the standard of proof on the merits could be 
relevant already in the assessment of risk of irreparable harm pending the proceedings. 
The contours of the assessment of risk for the use of provisional measures may be sketched 
in relation to the various stages of decision-making. The strictest requirements can be found 
exactly in relation to the merits. In relation to admissibility the evidentiary requirements are less 
strict and in relation to provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons the adjudica-
tor should be very lenient.  
In the various situations the type of evidence necessary to show a real risk is similar at the 
merits and provisional measures stages. Thus the type of evidence required on the merits coin-
cides with that required for provisional measures. It is only the standard of proof that is lower at 
the stage of provisional measures. 
At the provisional measures stage there must be sufficient evidence at first – and urgent – 
glimpse. Hence, at the stage of provisional measures the respondent may already be ‘required to 
answer’, by urgently preventing irreparable harm, at a lower level of prima facie evidence. 
A full assessment of the evidence at the merits stage must be stricter than an assessment of 
risk at the stage of provisional measures. The latter concerns a prima facie assessment only. 
Moreover, this assessment concerns those claims alone that relate to irreparable harm. Hence, the 
                                                 
382 See Chapter VI. 
383 Probably at the merits stage additional evidentiary criteria must be met as well. 
384 Obviously a conviction and execution date equally provide evidence of temporal urgency. 
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assessment of the evidence pending the case for the purpose of provisional measures does not 
prejudice the eventual determination of the case. 
Of course in all situations referred to (disappearances, threats, treatment in detention, expul-
sion) the State is in a position to cover up or withhold information. In general this warrants a 
lowering of the standard of proof required for the petitioner before the burden shifts to the State. 
Yet the question arises whether the issue of burden of proof is relevant already at the provisional 
measures stage. In this respect there is a difference between the provisional measures that are 
taken for the first time in a given case and those that are taken subsequently. Initially, when an 
adjudicator has to decide urgently on the use of provisional measures, this is often on the basis of 
an urgent evaluation of the credibility and sufficiency of the information provided by the peti-
tioner alone. Yet when the adjudicator takes a provisional measure and subsequently is called 
upon to confirm, adapt or withdraw this measure, the burden of proof does play a role similar to 
that at the merits stage. If the State provides information to the effect that the petitioner is not (or 
no longer) facing irreparable harm, the petitioner wishing a continuation of the provisional meas-
ures, must bring evidence to convince the adjudicator that such continuation is necessary despite 
the information provided by the State.  
5.2.4.3 SCRUTINY AND THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE  
In decisions on the merits the level of scrutiny applied by the adjudicator to the State’s act or 
omission that is claimed to cause irreparable harm depends on the importance accorded to the 
right. The strictest level of scrutiny applies in the same type of cases, invoking particularly fun-
damental rights, in which provisional measures may also be warranted. In a similar vein the evi-
dentiary requirements for triggering a shift in the burden of proof from the petitioner to the State 
are generally considered to be less strict in relation to risks of irreparable harm to such fundamen-
tal rights than in other cases. 
One source of legal presumption in treaty interpretation is the principle of effective human 
rights protection, taking into account that the consequences of a finding normally are more far 
reaching for the individual petitioner than for the respondent State. Of course the principle of 
preventing irreparable harm to persons applies.385 Moreover, in case of conflicting or insufficient 
scientific evidence the related precautionary principle is relevant.  
It is clear that the premise for using provisional measures in human rights cases is similar to 
the premise on which both the preventive and the precautionary principle are based: better be safe 
than sorry in the assessment of the risk involved. Thus, some discussion of these principles was 
thought necessary to assist the argument about the assessment of risk and the use of provisional 
measures. Normally adjudicators can simply deal with risks the traditional way, not involving 
scientific evidence. In expulsion or extradition cases the causality between the removal and ir-
reparable harm in the receiving State is not as difficult to establish as is the causality between 
certain acts or omissions and harm to the environment. It is in the latter situation that the precau-
tionary principle is applicable. 
The precautionary principle (in the strict sense) in my view is not inherent in the very no-
tion of provisional measures, at least not in human rights cases, because in those cases the crite-
rion applied for establishing future facts normally is that of ‘real risk’. This shows that it is neces-
sary to establish (qualitatively) the likelihood of irreparable harm, meaning that the adjudicators 
do not apply the precautionary principle. Indeed, provisional measures are used in a wider range 
of cases, not just those involving lack of scientific evidence.  
                                                 
385 See Conclusion Part II. 
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On the other hand, there are cases in which the principle could apply. Scientists may make 
conflicting predictions about the risk of irreparable harm to the environment or to health. The 
precautionary principle may be used as an argument to require certain action to be postponed 
pending full scientific evidence or, instead, to require the State to act to prevent (further) envi-
ronmental degradation and risk to health. If human rights adjudicators make use of this principle 
provisional measures are the practical tools for requiring States to postpone certain industrial 
activities until more scientific information is available to determine the risk to the environment 
(or to determine health hazards). 
Given the nature of the risk (to life or cultural survival) and the required level of protection 
under the human rights treaty, it seems particularly warranted, in the face of scientific uncertainty, 
to resort to the precautionary principle in the determination of provisional measures.  
An international adjudicator should be able to examine whether a State is using lack of full 
scientific certainty of harm as a reason for allowing certain industrial developments or for post-
poning taking measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons. It could be argued that in human 
rights cases dealing with a lack of scientific certainty (normally involving environmental harm) 
adjudicators could apply the precautionary principle as an argument reinforcing the general prin-
ciple that irreparable harm to persons must be prevented even if the effect of certain actions or 
omissions will not be shown immediately but relate to the environment or long-term health ef-
fects. Different from States invoking the precautionary principle against import of goods, in such 
cases there is no risk that recourse to the precautionary principle by petitioners (and ultimately the 
adjudicator) is a disguised form of protectionism. In these cases individuals invoke it against a 
State to prevent human rights violations that could cause irreparable harm to life or cultural sur-
vival.  
The main criterion for the use of provisional measures is stricter than that often used for re-
course to the precautionary principle. The precautionary principle is invoked in the face of scien-
tific uncertainty about serious or long lasting damage, while provisional measures in human rights 
cases normally aim to prevent immediate and irreparable harm only, rather than all serious or long 
lasting damage. At the same time, provisional measures clearly are used also in cases where there 
is no scientific uncertainty, constituting a range of cases that is much more extensive than that in 
which the precautionary principle applies. Nevertheless, despite the differences, in situations 
involving the use of the precautionary principle issues often arise that could be relevant in the 
discussion on the use of provisional measures as well.  
With regard to scientific data the general rule should indeed be that the State proposing to 
allow, for instance, a certain industrial development has the burden to prove that this would not 
cause irreparable harm to the cultural survival of indigenous groups. This rule would then also 
apply in the face of scientific uncertainty. In other words, different from the general rule applied 
by human rights adjudicators that the likelihood of irreparable harm must be established, in hu-
man rights cases involving the environment (mainly in relation to cultural survival, but also with 
regard to health risks) the precautionary principle should apply. This means that the precautionary 
principle triggers a shift in the burden of proof from the party alleging irreparable harm to the 
respondent party. 
The chosen level of protection, both at the stage of provisional measures and on the merits, 
should necessarily be higher in human rights cases involving a real risk of irreparable harm to 
persons (including harm to cultural survival). To a certain extent the acceptable level of risk in 
human rights cases is determined already through adherence to human rights treaties. The adjudi-
cators monitoring State compliance with their obligations under these treaties have the responsi-
bility to decide whether or not to use provisional measures and whether or not to invoke the pre-
cautionary principle.  
As discussed the precautionary principle applies only in the context of doubtful scientific 
evidence. Yet the preventive principle applies in any case. Thus, conceptually one could argue 
that in the context of preventing irreparable harm to persons the human rights adjudicators should 
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apply the preventive principle very strictly, already in the face of some slight risk of irreparable 
harm. Yet in practice they have applied the criterion of ‘real risk’ both on the merits and, to some 
extent, already at the stage of provisional measures. Thus, a hypothetical or slight risk is insuffi-
cient. This practice, which has manifested itself most clearly in the context of the case law on 
non-refoulement, may be explained by the awareness by the adjudicators of the fact that using 
provisional measures in all cases involving claims of a risk of irreparable harm upon expulsion, 
would make these measures less exceptional and authoritative in the eyes of the States. 
5.2.4.4 RISK AND NON-ANTICIPATION 
Provisional measures show that adjudicators believe the matter to be so urgent that measures 
should be taken, although they have not yet been able to evaluate all the evidence and arguments 
in relation to the main claim. The adjudicator simply tried to assess, on an urgent basis and when 
the case was pending, all the information available at that point of the risk of irreparable harm to 
the person involved.  
In my view the requirement that provisional measures must not prejudice the eventual legal 
determination is related to the assessment of risk.386 If provisional measures are taken this does 
not mean a violation will eventually be found. This is so exactly because pending the case the 
adjudicator takes decisions on the basis of urgency, without being able to examine fully the evi-
dence in relation to the main claim. 
If the adjudicator did not use provisional measures, eventually it can still find a violation of, 
for instance, the right to life. If it did use provisional measures it can still declare the case inad-
missible or find no violations. With regard to the evidence, in other words, the decision on provi-
sional measures does not predetermine the decision on the merits.387 
                                                 
386 Chapter I discussed the issue of prejudgment and the provisional measures by the ICJ. Chapter II 
briefly dealt with the approach to this issue by human rights adjudicators. 
387 The decision-making on provisional measures, being separate from that on admissibility and 
merits, has rightly been considered not to be part of the ‘examination’ of the case. See e.g. HRC 
Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003. If the case is discontinued or struck out (depending on the 
terminology used by the adjudicator) before consideration of admissibility, it is considered not to 
have been examined. Another international adjudicator may then deal with it also if a State has 
precluded examination of cases previously ‘examined’ by other international adjudicators. See 
also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and Admissibility). 
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What is important is that upon final determination the adjudicator is not led by the fact that 
provisional measures were taken pending the proceedings. After all, a full assessment of the 
evidence at the merits stage must be stricter than an assessment of risk at the provisional measures 
stage. The latter concerns a prima facie assessment only. Moreover, this assessment concerns 
those claims alone that relate to irreparable harm.388 
                                                 
388 This should also be reflected in the motivation of provisional measures that this book argues for, 
see e.g. Chapter II (Systems). 
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 CHAPTER XVI 
 THE LEGAL STATUS OF PROVISIONAL 
 MEASURES IN HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In its LaGrand judgment (2001) the ICJ finally determined that its provisional measures were 
legally binding. While the power to ‘indicate’ them is included in the ICJ Statute, neither the ICJ 
nor its predecessor, dealing with a similar text, had previously clarified the legal status of these 
measures. As has been noted, the arguments of ICJ Judges Ajibola and Weeramantry, made years 
previously,1 in favour of the binding nature of the measures ordered, were indeed ‘particularly 
persuasive especially in cases where such orders involve matters of life or death such as prevent-
ing genocide or stopping expulsions as such acts will obviously cause irreparable damage to the 
parties and affect the outcome of the case on the merits’.2 Yet in 2001, when the Court finally 
clarified the legal status of its provisional measures, it noted that they are legally binding in all 
cases. In other words its provisional measures are obligatory always, not just when they involve 
matters of life and death.3  
While interpreting Article 41 ICJ Statute the ICJ in fact discussed a principle that has been 
accepted universally. 
This chapter deals with the question whether the provisional measures used by human rights 
adjudicators are legally binding not only when the treaty refers to the authority to use them, but 
also when the treaty provisions establishing the individual complaint system do not explicitly 
refer to provisional measures. The latter is the case with regard to the provisional measures by the 
three regional human rights Commissions, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and 
three of the four UN supervisory bodies that have dealt with individual petitions. 
It is only since 2005 that the ECtHR has developed case law recognizing the binding nature 
of its provisional measures. The other human rights adjudicators had stressed the binding nature 
of provisional measures already long before 2005.4 Yet some States have disputed this. Section 2 
deals with the relevant treaty provisions or Rules of Procedure on provisional measures and the 
development of the case law by the adjudicators with regard to the binding nature of these meas-
ures. Section 3 discusses whether principles of treaty interpretation and general principles of law 
underlie the practice of the adjudicators, related to the awareness by the adjudicators of the irrepa-
rable nature of the harm at issue. 
                                                 
1 In their individual opinions to the Order on Bosnia’s second request for provisional measures in 
the Genocide Convention case, Order of 13 September 1993. See Chapter I, section 6 on the legal 
status of provisional measures by the ICJ and ITLOS. 
2 Garry (2001), p. 406. 
3 See Chapter I. 
4 This is discussed in section 2 of the Chapter. 
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2 THE PRACTICE OF THE ADJUDICATORS WITH REGARD TO THE LEGAL 
STATUS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
2.1 Introduction 
This section discusses the practice developed by the human rights adjudicators with regard to the 
legal status of provisional measures. Next to arguments that may be specific to the treaty system 
in question, the adjudicators have used arguments that appear to be based more on general princi-
ples of law and interpretation.5 
Sometimes States have made the argument that provisional measures by the HRC are not 
legally binding because, in their view, the decisions of the HRC on the merits are not legally 
binding either. As this book does not concern the legal status of decisions on the merits, it does 
not analyse this issue in detail, but section 2.2 briefly addresses the argument.6  
The remainder of the section focuses on the relevant case law involving the legal status of 
provisional measures, also in the absence of a specific treaty provision on this issue. Section 2.3 
refers to the treaties that include a reference to provisional measures and discusses the case law of 
the Inter-American Court. Section 2.4 deals with the treaty systems in which a reference to provi-
sional measures is found in the Rules of Procedure of the adjudicators, but not explicitly in the 
treaty text.  
In their approach to the legal status of provisional measures do the adjudicators take into 
account the inequality between the parties and the irreparable nature of the harm faced by the 
petitioners? 
2.2 The legal status of decisions on the merits by the HRC and its relevance 
to the legal status of the Committee’s provisional measures 
The UN individual complaint systems have followed the approach of ICERD, the first UN human 
rights treaty introducing an individual complaint procedure, of referring to decisions on the merits 
                                                 
5 This is further discussed in section 3 of the Chapter 
6 See e.g. HRC Anthony Currie v. Jamaica, 29 March 1994; on 22 June 1995 the State responded 
to the Committee’s Views, informing the Special Rapporteur on the follow-up on Views that it 
had sent them to the Jamaican Privy Council, which had decided ‘that in the circumstances of the 
case it is unable to make a recommendation for release’. The letter did not mention whether the 
death sentence would at least be commuted. The State gave its view about the legal status of the 
Committee’s decisions on the merits. “While it is clear that the Protocol does not impose any 
legal obligation on State Parties to implement the Views of the Committee, the Ministry has 
always acknowledged that there is a duty to give serious consideration to those Views; 
accordingly, the Views of the Committee have always been submitted to the Privy Council, 
which is established by the Jamaican Constitution to make recommendations to the Governor 
General on the exercise of the prerogative of mercy. The Ministry wishes to assure the 
Committee of its intention to continue to deal in good faith with the Views of the Committee” (on 
file with the author). See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). States have made similar 
arguments with regard to the other UN adjudicators and with regard to the former European 
Commission, the Inter-American and African Commission, but these are not discussed separately 
here. 
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as ‘views’. The status of decisions on the merits by the regional Commissions have not been 
referred to as ‘judgments’ either.7  
This section singles out for discussion the complaint system under the ICCPR, as the inter-
national human rights system discussing the widest range of rights.  
During the drafting process of the HRC’s Rules of Procedure Committee member Ganji 
(Iran) noted that ‘(a) request for interim measures would constitute very strong action on the part 
of the Committee, considering that ultimately all the Committee could do in connection with a 
case was to forward its views to the State and the individual concerned’.8  
When the ICCPR and the Protocol were codified in 1966, the highest obtainable was a su-
pervisory committee whose decisions would be called ‘Views’.9 Nevertheless, given the Commit-
                                                 
7 In this respect a brief reminder with regard to the Inter-American Commission may also be 
useful, especially relating to its decisions on the merits based on the American Declaration. See 
Chapter II. The CIDH has invoked the Declaration vis-à-vis OAS member States, who have 
international obligations under the OAS Charter. Based on Article 20 of the Statute of the Inter-
American Commission of Human Rights, approved by the OAS General Assembly in October 
1979, this Commission monitors compliance with the American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man for those States that have not yet ratified the ACHR. The Inter-American 
Commission’s competence to take action and examine individual complaints with respect to 
member States of the OAS that are not party to the ACHR is based on the OAS Charter and on 
the practice established by the Commission. The General Assembly’s adoption of the Statute of 
the Commission has confirmed this practice. In an Advisory Opinion of 1989, the Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights has held that the American Declaration has become a source of 
international obligations for all member States of the OAS. See IACHR Advisory Opinion OC-
10/89, Interpretation of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man within the 
Framework of Article 64 of the American Convention of Human Rights, 14 July 1989, Ser. A. 
No. 10 (1989), §§35-45. See also Separate Opinion Cançado Trindade in Blake v. Guatemala, 
judgment of 24 January 1998, §§35 and 36 and, for instance, CIDH Maya indigenous 
Communities v. Belize (2004), 12 October 2004, in which the CIDH specified that all OAS 
members have obligations under the Declaration and are answerable the Commission 
independent of their ratification of the ACHR. See also e.g. CIDH James Terry Roach and Jay 
Pinkerton v. US, 22 September 1987, §§46-49 and Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 27 December 
2002, §96. See further Tittemore (2006), pp. 382-283. 
8 HRC Summary records of the meetings of the first session, 13th meeting, 29 March 1977 and 17th 
meeting, 31 March 1977, Yearbook of the HRC 1977-1978, Vol. I, CCPR/1 pp. 44-46 and p. 54.  
9 Article 5 OP stipulates, among others, that the HRC shall consider communications in the light of 
all written information made available to it by the parties, after the individual has exhausted the 
available domestic remedies. Article 5(4) provides that it ‘shall forward its views to the State 
Party concerned and to the individual’. Originally these Views were not intended to be binding. 
The Committee itself initially appeared to take this approach until 1988. It seems the majority of 
the Committee agreed with, or did not notice the statement in the Report that its ‘decisions on the 
merits are non-binding recommendations’, Annual Report 1988, A/43/40, 28 September 1988, 
§645. This old approach towards the function of the HRC and the status of its decisions seems to 
have found its way even in the third publication of its Selected Decisions (2002). Whole 
paragraphs of the introduction have been copied from earlier versions. Of course this third 
volume only covers the period between July 1988 and July 1990. HRC Selected Decisions of the 
Human Rights Committee under the Optional Protocol, Volume 3 (July 1988-July 1990), 
CCPR/C/OP/3, p. 8. In 1993 the HRC noted that ‘the absence of an explicit provision in the 
Optional Protocol on enforcement may be considered a major shortcoming in the implementation 
machinery established by the Covenant’. In this context it still noted that its Views were ‘in the 
nature of recommendations on the basis of which States parties should endeavour to settle the 
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tee’s function and the developments since 1966, its Views have acquired legal authority and, and 
to some extent can now be regarded as legally binding. Indeed, it is evident from the Committee’s 
practice with regard to follow-up that it expects its Views to be complied with.10 Also interesting 
                                                                                                                       
case in question’. It did point out that States adhere to the OP on a voluntary basis and that ‘it is 
reasonably assumed that they would accept and implement the Committee’s recommendations’. 
Report of the HRC to the General Assembly, A/48/40 (Part I), 7 October 1993, Annex X 
‘Documents submitted to the Human Rights Committee on the World Conference on Human 
Rights’ under B (Follow-up on Views), §2. Various scholars have taken this approach as well. 
See e.g. McGoldrick (1994), pp. 202-204 and Tomuschat (2003), p. 181. Naldi considers that the 
Views ‘do not formally have the binding force of a ruling of a court of law but rather a persuasive 
quasi-legal authority’. Yet he adds that ‘an expectation of compliance’ nevertheless appears to 
‘have been engendered where the Committee finds a violation of the Covenant’. Naldi (2004), p. 
446. Moreover, it has been argued that the ‘opinions on the merits by the treaty bodies are 
increasingly considered as authoritative expressions and interpretations of the law and 
accordingly complied with by the large majority of States Parties’. Thus these opinions may 
assume ‘the nature of binding decisions’. “This also applies to the measures States Parties are 
expected to take as a matter of good faith cooperation in the framework of the treaty protection 
system’. Van Boven (1995), p. 97. See also e.g. Boerefijn (1999b) and Castan/Joseph/Schultz 
(2004). In its General Comment 33 (2008) the Committee itself appears rather cautious when it 
comes down to describing its function, but it does stress the obligations of States to comply. 
“While the function of the Human Rights Committee in considering individual communications 
is not, as such, that of a judicial body, the views issued by the Committee under the Optional 
Protocol exhibit some important characteristics of a judicial decision. They are arrived at in a 
judicial spirit, including the impartiality and independence of Committee members, the 
considered interpretation of the language of the Covenant, and the determinative character of the 
decisions”. HRC General Comment 33, CCPR/C/GC/33, 5 November 2008 (Advance unedited 
version), §11. The Committee’s views are an authoritative determination of the State’s 
obligations under the OP and the Covenant and they ‘derive their character, and the importance 
which attaches to them, from the integral role of the Committee under both the Covenant and the 
Optional Protocol’, §13. The character of the Committee’s views ‘is further determined by the 
obligation of States parties to act in good faith, both in their participation in the procedures under 
the Optional Protocol and in relation to the Covenant itself. A duty to cooperate with the 
Committee arises from an application of the principle of good faith to the observance of all treaty 
obligations’, §15. On the legal status of the findings of the African Commission see e.g. 
Viljoen/Louw (2004), pp. 1-22; Gumedze (2003), pp. 142-143. 
10 On follow-up to provisional measures see Chapter XVIII. Since 1990 the HRC requests the State, 
as part of its decision on the merits, to inform it of what action it has taken with regard to the 
Committee’s finding of a violation. It points out that States that have ratified the OP have 
recognised the competence of the HRC to determine whether or not there has been a violation of 
the ICCPR. Moreover, under Article 2 ICCPR States have ‘undertaken to ensure’ to all 
individuals within their territory and subject to the jurisdiction the rights recognised in the 
Covenant. They have undertaken to provide an effective and enforceable remedy in case a 
violation has been established. See e.g. HRC Roger Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003. Its wish 
to receive, within 90 days, information about the measures taken to give effect to its Views 
equally indicates that the HRC now takes the approach that States are bound to respect its 
decisions on the merits. It was in 1990 that the HRC created the mandate of a Special Rapporteur 
for follow-up on Views to monitor the compliance of States parties with its Views. See A/45/40, 
Vol. II, Annex XI. See also De Zayas (1991) and Schmidt (1992). The HRC further amended its 
guidelines for the preparation of State party reports under Article 40 ICCPR. In these reports 
States should provide information on follow-up as well. This information should be provided in 
addition to the responses as part of the follow-up procedure itself. See Consolidated Guidelines 
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in the context of its authority to use provisional measures, the HRC has referred to the statement 
by the International Court of Justice ‘that even in the absence of specific enabling powers, an 
international instance, may act in ways not specifically forbidden, so as to ensure the attainment 
of its purposes’.11 
The HRC is not a court, but rather a Committee supervising the ICCPR. Yet States parties 
are bound to respect the treaties they ratify, in this case the OP and the ICCPR. Despite the mis-
guiding name (‘Views’) given to its decisions at the time, in practice they concern judicial deci-
sions determining a legal conflict, by a competent and independent body of experts.12 
                                                                                                                       
for State Reports under the ICCPR, adopted July 1999 and amended October 2000, 
CCPR/C/66/GUI/Rev. 2, 26 February 2001, Guideline F1. See CCPR/C/5/Rev. 2, 28 April 1995, 
§5 for the earlier document, with amendments of July 1990, July 1991 and April 1995 (found on 
<www.pch.gc.ca>, consulted on 21 October 2004). More closely on follow up see Boerefijn 
(1999), pp. 101-112 and Ghandhi (1998), pp. 343-353. 
11 ICJ Certain Expenses (of the United Nations), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962, pp. 150-167 as 
referred to in Report of the HRC to the General Assembly, A/48/40 (Part I), 7 October 1993, 
Annex X ‘Documents submitted to the Human Rights Committee on the World Conference on 
Human Rights’ under B (Follow-up on Views), §5. During the spring session of 1993 the HRC 
decided that the information on its follow-up activities ‘should in principle be made public’, in 
the interest of the victims and because this could ‘serve to enhance the authority of the Views and 
provide an incentive for States parties to implement them’. For the decision to make the follow-
up activities public see CCPR/C/SR.1227/Add. 1. In April 1993 the Chairpersons of the UN 
human rights treaty bodies also proposed that ‘views and recommendations expressed by the 
treaty bodies in relation to individual communications should be fully respected’. 
A/CONF.157/PC/62/Add.15, p. 8. The Committee noted that another desirable step would be to 
call upon States to accept the decisions of the treaty bodies on the merits as binding. It proposed a 
new paragraph to be added to Article 5 OP to the effect that ‘States Parties undertake to comply 
with the Committee’s Views under the Optional Protocol’, see Report of the HRC to the General 
Assembly, A/48/40 (Part I), 7 October 1993, Annex X ‘Documents submitted to the Human 
Rights Committee on the World Conference on Human Rights’ under B (Follow-up on Views), 
§15. It also suggested to give the Special Rapporteurs on the follow-up of Views a fact-finding 
mandate (§16), to effectively utilise the tool of publicity (it noted that this could be done by 
including a chapter on follow-up in the Annual Reports of the respective Committees, §17, but 
did not mention press releases). Moreover, it suggested to extend some form of technical 
assistance (§18) and, finally, emphasised that the implementation of the follow-up mandate 
required ‘appropriate human and material resources’ (§19). In 1994 the Committee adopted a 
new Rule to its Rules of Procedure to the effect that the Special Rapporteur may ‘make such 
contacts and take such action as appropriate for the due performance of the follow-up mandate’. 
It also decided to give publicity to its follow-up activities rather than deal with it confidentially, 
as it had done previously. Since that time it includes a discussion of follow-up activities and lists 
States that have not provided follow-up information. See also Klerk (2000), pp. 149-159. See 
Rule 101 for the HRC Special Rapporteur on Follow-up on Views. Since 2002 CAT also has a 
Rapporteur for Follow-up of decisions on complaints (Rule 114). See also CAT’s Rule 112(5). 
See further CERD Rule 95, of 15 August 2005, §§6-7. The Rules of Procedure of CEDAW 
provide for the possibility of instituting a special rapporteur or working group (Rule 73), but 
currently the Committee appoints members each session in order to follow up specific Views. 
12 See also Harrington (2003), p. 65 noting that because of the personal standing of its members 
‘and their judicial qualities of impartiality, objectivity and restraint’ the decisions of the HRC 
‘acquire persuasive authority’. The HRC decides cases ‘in an adjudicative fashion, providing 
both the state and the individual complainant with an opportunity to fully present their case’ and 
‘later makes a reasoned ruling on the issues in the complaint’. While she considers that the 
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Such individual complaint procedure, as recognised by the State, must indeed serve a func-
tion. Considering the Committee’s Views as mere exhortatory remarks would deprive the right of 
individual complaint of any meaning.13 Instead, a State party must comply in good faith with its 
obligations under the OP and under the ICCPR itself and respect the Committee’s decisions.  
When domestic courts of States that have ratified the ICCPR are dealing with provisions of 
this treaty, either because the domestic legal system gives them direct effect or because they 
inform the meaning of domestic legal concepts, they must take into account the decisions and 
comments of the HRC as the most authoritative interpretation of ICCPR-law.14 In addition, State 
parties to the Optional Protocol have voluntarily recognised the right of individual complaint of 
everyone under their jurisdiction. By having accepted the individual complaint procedure States 
have recognised the HRC as the adjudicator in a legal conflict between a State and an individual. 
The obligation of good faith compliance with this procedure implies that the State is internation-
ally bound to respect the contents of the View. State parties have the legal obligation to imple-
ment these Views and to redress the violations found by the Committee.15 The Committee’s 
Views are legal decisions determining a concrete legal conflict. Indeed the practice of the HRC 
indicates that it considers States legally bound to respect and implement its Views.16 
                                                                                                                       
Committee’s Views ‘are not legally binding in the literal sense’, she notes that this ‘does not 
mean that they are without legal consequences’. “If the Committee, as the body competent to do 
so by the terms of the ICCPR, has found a violation, then under article 2 of the ICCPR the state 
has a legal obligation to provide an effective remedy for that violation”. The above is not to say 
that members of the HRC have always shown impartiality, but indeed the HRC is generally well 
respected. 
13 In HRC C. v. Australia, 28 October 2002, §7.3 the HRC considered that the complaint of the 
petitioner was admissible because those administrative remedies that had not been exhausted 
could ‘not be described as ones which would, in terms of the Optional Protocol, be effective. The 
reason for this was the Committee’s observation that any decision of the Common Wealth 
Ombudsman and the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (HREOC) ‘would only 
have had recommendatory rather than binding effect, by which the Executive would, at its 
discretion, have been free to disregard’. With this statement the HRC also implies that its own 
decisions under the Optional Protocol are themselves something more than recommendations.  
14 See also e.g. HRC General Comment 33, CCPR/C/GC/33, 5 November 2008 (Advance unedited 
version), §12. 
15 Under international law, such redress includes the obligation to provide the victim of the 
violation with an effective remedy. This is also an explicit obligation under the ICCPR, where 
Article 2(3)(a) provides that each State party undertakes to ensure that any person whose rights or 
freedoms are violated shall have an effective remedy. See General Comment 31 on the nature of 
the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to the Covenant (Article 2), 29 March 
2004. Moreover, the State party to the OP is under an obligation to ensure that similar violations 
do not occur in the future. In other words, this is the obligation, under international law, of non-
repetition of an act declared to have been in violation of an international rule. See also Chapter 
XIII (Protection). 
16 As part of its Views finding violations it normally points out that, pursuant to Article 2 ICCPR, 
the State party has undertaken to ensure to all individuals within its territory or subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognised in the Covenant. The State has undertaken as well to provide an 
effective and enforceable remedy in case a violation has been established. The HRC also wishes 
to receive from the State party, within 90 days, information about the measures taken to give 
effect to the Committee’s Views. The Committee also requests the State to publish its Views. See 
e.g. HRC Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002; Silbert Daley v. Jamaica, 31 
July 1998, and Anthony McLeod v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998. In relation to cases that were 
submitted after Jamaica’s denunciation of the OP but before this denunciation became effective, 
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State parties are under an obligation to implement the Views of the Committee, in the sense 
that they cannot ignore the HRC’s determination. At the same time, such violation determined by 
the Committee creates an entitlement on the part of the victim to an ‘effective remedy’. State 
parties have a certain amount of discretion in deciding the type of reparation or the amount of 
compensation in cases that do not involve either a continued violation of the Covenant or the 
threat of a (further) violation of the Covenant.17 
In human rights adjudication the substance of provisional measures, of friendly settlement 
agreements, of statements regarding the obligations of the State upon a finding of violation and of 
judgments on reparations often share a remarkable resemblance.18 This may be explained by the 
fact that while their function is different, their ultimate aim is the same: preventing irreparable 
harm to persons.19  
It is submitted that States at minimum have direct obligations based on the Committee’s 
Views when preventing irreparable harm is the aim of the reparation. Even if some other forms of 
reparation mentioned in the Committee’s decisions on the merits are indeed mere suggestions, the 
obligation to prevent (further) violations, as determined by the Committee, must be respected at 
minimum.20 Without this one cannot speak of good faith compliance with the treaty. In order to 
ensure that this irreparable harm to persons does not occur already pending the proceedings re-
spect for provisional measures belongs to the minimum of what is required of States parties hav-
ing recognised the individual complaint system.21  
                                                                                                                       
on 23 January 1998, the HRC customarily noted that in accordance with Article 12(2) of the OP 
Jamaica was subjected to its continuing jurisdiction. The HRC has stressed that its monitoring 
role is an ‘essential element in the design of the Covenant, which is also directed to securing the 
enjoyment of the rights’. Thus, reservations purporting to evade this role are incompatible with 
the object and purpose of the ICCPR. “The Committee’s role under the Covenant, whether under 
article 40 or under the Optional Protocols, necessarily entails interpreting the provisions of the 
Covenant and the development of a jurisprudence. Accordingly, a reservation that rejects the 
Committee’s competence to interpret the requirements of any provisions of the Covenant would 
also be contrary to the object and purpose of that treaty”. See General Comment 24 on 
reservations to the ICCPR or the Optional Protocols, 4 November 1994, §11. In its General 
Comment on Article 2 (2004) the HRC pointed out that States parties are required to give effect 
to the obligations under the ICCPR in good faith, pursuant to ‘the principle articulated in’ Art. 26 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). Equally, under Article 27 VCLT (‘may not 
invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty’) the 
obligations of the ICCPR in general and of Art. 2 in particular are binding on every State party as 
a whole. All branches of Government as well as ‘other public or governmental authorities’ may 
be in a position to engage the responsibility of the State party. While it is usually the executive 
branch that represents the State party internationally, this branch cannot relieve the State from 
responsibility for actions carried out by other branches of government. The General Comment 
also reminds States with a federal structure of the terms of Article 50 ICCPR, stipulating that the 
provisions of this treaty ‘shall extend to all parts of federal States without any limitations or 
exceptions’. HRC General Comment No. 31 on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed 
on States parties to the Covenant (Article 2), 29 March 2004, §§3-4. 
17 See e.g. HRC Beresford Whyte v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998. 
18 See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
19 See also Conclusion Part II. 
20 See Chapter XIII (Protection). 
21 See also Harrington (2003), arguing that even if Views are not legally binding, provisional 
measures are. See also Letsas (2003), p. 537. See further Tomuschat (2003), p. 181, referring to 
the HRC reasoning to the effect that States are bound to comply with its provisional measures as 
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2.3 Systems referring to provisional measures in the treaty text 
2.3.1 Introduction 
This section first refers to the relevant treaty texts specifically dealing with provisional measures 
and then deals with some pertinent case law by the Inter-American Court indicating that this 
Court would consider its provisional measures binding even without an explicit reference to its 
authority to use them in the treaty text.22 
2.3.2 The treaty texts on provisional measures 
Different from the other – older – international human rights treaties with an active individual 
complaint system,23 Article 5 of the OP to the Women’s Convention explicitly refers to the power 
to take provisional measures. Yet the text of this provision still is rather weak, only referring to a 
‘request that the State party take such interim measures as may be necessary to avoid possible 
irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged violation’.24 Article 31 of the new 
International Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance25 pro-
vides for an optional individual complaint procedure that includes a similar text.26 
                                                                                                                       
‘indeed sensible’. He notes that it could be argued that its provisional measures could have ‘no 
higher degree of authoritativeness than the final result of a proceeding, which the OP-CCPR 
classifies as ‘views’ (Article 5(4), a term which according to general linguistic usage as well as 
according to current legal terminology designates an act which is not binding’, yet on the other 
hand ‘a proceeding which has been instituted and in which the respondent state is obligated to 
cooperate in good faith, loses its very raison d’être if that state during the course of the 
proceedings takes measures which settle the matter once and for all, making the subject matter 
moot’. In this respect he considers that, apart from preserving the alleged rights of the alleged 
victim, the provisional measures serve to preserve ‘in the first place, the integrity of the 
procedure’. He adds that ‘from a teleological viewpoint [the reasoning of the HRC] is persuasive. 
It is further buttressed by the case law of the ICJ” and, p. 182: ‘it should not be overlooked that a 
powerful argument supporting the argumentation eventually chosen was the concern by the ICJ 
that legal relief cannot be provided in the form of half-hearted measures. This consideration 
applies also, and perhaps even a fortiori, to individual complaint procedures. More than states, 
which generally have other means at their disposal to defend their rights, individuals may be in 
dire need of a pronouncement of one of the relevant expert bodies in order to preserve the 
enjoyment of right that allow a life of physical integrity and dignity”. 
22 Section 2.3.2 also refers to the treaty texts including a provision on provisional measures, but 
section 2.3.3 only discusses the case law of the Inter-American Court in this respect, as the other 
adjudicators have not discussed the issue separately. 
23 See section 2.4 of this Chapter. 
24 “1. At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits has 
been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent 
consideration a request that the State Party take such interim measures as may be necessary to 
avoid possible irreparable damage to the victim or victims of the alleged violation. 2. Where the 
Committee exercises its discretion under paragraph 1 of the present article, this does not imply a 
determination on admissibility or on the merits of the communication”. 
25 Adopted 20 December 2006, not yet entered into force (by December 2008: 71 signatories and 
one ratification (Albania)). 
26 “4. At any time after the receipt of a communication and before a determination on the merits has 
been reached, the Committee may transmit to the State Party concerned for its urgent 
consideration a request that the State Party will take such interim measures as may be necessary 
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The Inter-American and African Courts and the Bosnia Chamber do have the explicit power 
to order provisional measures. Article 63(2) ACHR deals with provisional measures to prevent 
irreparable harm to persons: 
“In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to 
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in the matters it 
has under consideration. With respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the 
request of the Commission”. 
It appears from the last sentence that the Commission may request the Court to act with respect to 
a case not yet submitted to the Court.27 Obviously the Commission cannot do this in relation to 
States that have not ratified the ACHR or States that have ratified the Convention but have not 
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.28 
Buergenthal notes that Article 68(1), which in the English text refers to the undertaking to 
comply with the Court’s judgments, in the other authentic languages refers to the more inclusive 
term decision and that in fact neither the language nor the legislative history of the Convention is 
opposed to the conclusion that provisional measures are legally binding. Moreover, and here he 
points out something that is relevant as well with regard to the other human rights systems, the 
purpose of Article 63(2) ACHR ‘would appear to require that these decisions be deemed to be 
obligatory’. Given the function of the provisional measures to apply in exceptional circumstances 
in order to avoid irreparable harm to persons, and given the fact that the Convention is a human 
                                                                                                                       
to avoid possible irreparable damage to the victims of the alleged violation. Where the 
Committee exercises its discretion, this does not imply a determination on admissibility or on the 
merits of the communication”. One of the innovative aspects of this treaty is that in urgent cases 
the supervisory Committee to this treaty may address even States parties that have not recognized 
the individual complaint procedure under Article 31. Article 30 introduces the possibility for the 
Committee to intervene upon a request ‘by relatives of the disappeared person or their legal 
representatives, their counsel or any person authorized by them, as well as by any other person 
having a legitimate interest’ that ‘a disappeared person should be sought and found’. In fact when 
it considers that a range of procedural requirements is met, it ‘shall request the State Party 
concerned to provide it with information on the situation of the persons sought, within a time 
limit set by the Committee’. On the procedural requirements see Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and 
admissibility). 
27 The Statute of the Commission provides in Article 19 (c) that the Commission shall have the 
power ‘to request the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to take such provisional measures 
as it considers appropriate in serious and urgent cases which have not yet been submitted to it for 
consideration, whenever this becomes necessary to prevent irreparable injury to persons’, Statute 
of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, approved by Resolution N1 447 taken by 
the General Assembly of the OAS at its ninth regular session, held in La Paz, Bolivia, October 
1997. 
28 The last sentence (‘a case not yet submitted’) could also be interpreted to imply that the 
Commission may only request provisional measures if it will later bring the case before the Court 
on the merits as well. On the other hand, the inclusion of the word ‘yet’ may also simply 
distinguish between cases already pending before the Court and those still pending before the 
Commission, without implying anything more than an assumption that, at a later stage, the latter 
will be submitted to the Court as well. In any case, the word does not justify lifting a provisional 
measure when the Commission has not yet submitted a case to the Court within a certain time 
frame. See also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility) and Chapter XVI (Official 
responses). 
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rights treaty, ‘it is difficult to support the proposition that Article 63(2) decisions should not be 
legally binding’.29 
Cançado Trindade refers to the ‘autonomous legal framework of provisional measures of 
protection’ in which the Inter-American Court’s provisional measures, in light of their conven-
tional force, constitute an autonomous legal remedy.30 
Article 27(2) of the Protocol to the African Charter establishing the African Court on Hu-
man and Peoples’ Rights provides for this Court’s duty to order provisional measures.31 In the 
text of the Protocol there is no arrangement similar to that in Article 63(2) ACHR whereby the 
African Commission would request the Court’s provisional measures in cases that can be brought 
before the Court but at that time are still pending before the Commission.32 Article 35 of the 
Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (2008), merging the 
aforementioned Court with the African Court of Justice, equally includes an explicit power to 
order provisional measures. 
The Bosnia Chamber, finally, active between 1995 and 2003, under Article X (1) of Annex 
6 to the Dayton Peace Agreement also had the explicit power to order provisional measures.33 
2.3.3 The case law of the Inter-American Court 
In its first order for provisional measures in Velásquez Rodríguez, in 1988, the Inter-American 
Court referred to Article 63(2) ACHR as the legal basis for its Order, as well as to Article 23(5) of 
its Rules of Procedure which provides that it may take provisional measures ex officio at any time. 
In this context the Court also noted the obligation of States Parties under Article 1(1) ACHR to 
respect and ensure the rights contained in the Convention.  
                                                 
29 Buergenthal (1994), pp. 86-87. 
30 See IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" 
Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, individual opinion 
Judge Cançado Trindade, §§24-25. See also IACHR Matter of Eloísa Barrios et al. (Venezuela), 
Orders of 25 June 25 and 22 September 2005, Concurring Opinions Judge Cançado Trindade. 
31 “In cases of extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable harm to 
persons, the Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems necessary”. 
32 See Articles 2 and 8 Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. 
33 “The Chamber shall have the power to order provisional measures, to appoint experts, and to 
compel the production of witnesses and evidence”. Article VIII, 2(f) on the jurisdiction of the 
Chamber stipulates: “Applications which entail requests for provisional measures shall be 
reviewed as a matter of priority in order to determine (1) whether they should be accepted and, if 
so (2) whether high priority for the scheduling of proceedings on the provisional measures 
request is warranted”. See also Article XI (Decisions): “1. Following the conclusion of the 
proceedings, the Chamber shall promptly issue a decision, which shall address: (a) Whether the 
facts found indicate a breach by the Party concerned of its obligations under this Agreement; and 
if so (b) what steps shall be taken by the Party to remedy such breach, including orders to cease 
and desist, monetary relief (including pecuniary and non-pecuniary injuries), and provisional 
measures”. And Article XII (Rules and Regulations) “The Chamber shall promulgate such rules 
and regulations, consistent with this Agreement, as may be necessary to carry out its functions, 
including provisions for preliminary hearings, expedited decisions on provisional measures, 
decisions by panels of the Chamber, and review of decisions made by any such panels”. See also 
Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §185 and D.K. v. Republika Srpska, 2 November 1999, §§33-37. 
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“The States Parties therefore are required to adopt such measures as are necessary to preserve 
the life and ensure the personal safety of those whose rights might be endangered, or the more 
so if these threats are linked to their participation in proceeding bearing upon the protection of 
human rights”.34 
With this the Court seems to imply that even without a provision on provisional measures in the 
Convention, States have the obligation to comply with the Court’s Orders simply on the basis of 
their human rights obligations in the Convention. As Buergenthal has noted, ‘the Court expressly 
recognized the existence of inherent powers without, however, spelling them out in any detail’.35 
In its next Order in this case the Court again referred to the basis of its authority to Order 
provisional measures. Here it did not only refer to Articles 63(2) ACHR and 23 of its Rules of 
Procedure but also to Articles 33 (on the competence of the Commission and Court) and 62(3) 
ACHR (the Court’s jurisdiction regarding all cases of interpretation and application of the ACHR 
submitted to it), Articles 1 and 2 of the Court’s Statute (on the nature and jurisdiction of the 
Court)36 and ‘the judicial character of the Court and the powers derived therefrom’.37 
The reference to its judicial character clearly is a more general argument based on the prin-
ciple that the ability to order provisional measures is simply part of the adjudicatory function.38  
In reference to Article 1(1) ACHR the Court has often pointed out the State’s responsibility 
to adopt security measures to protect everyone under its jurisdiction. In the Peace Community 
case the State must do so for all members of the Peace Community.39 
In their concurring opinion attached to the Court’s first Order in the Peace Community case, 
two of the Judges pointed out that provisional measures as laid down in Article 63(2) ACHR are a 
fundamental part of the effective protection (‘tutela’) of human rights.40 They referred to Articles 
1(1) and 2 ACHR and emphasised the latter’s reference to the duty to adopt other measures nec-
                                                 
34 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi/Solís Corrales and Godínez Cruz cases, Order of 15 
January 1988, 3rd ‘Whereas’ clause. 
35 Buergenthal (1994), p. 83. 
36 Article 1 (Nature and Legal Organization): ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights is an 
autonomous judicial institution whose purpose is the application and interpretation of the 
American Convention on Human Rights. The Court exercises its functions in accordance with the 
provisions of the aforementioned Convention and the present Statute’. Article 2 (Jurisdiction): 
‘The Court shall exercise adjudicatory and advisory jurisdiction: 1. Its adjudicatory jurisdiction 
shall be governed by the provisions of Articles 61, 62 and 63 of the Convention, and 2. Its 
advisory jurisdiction shall be governed by the provisions of Article 64 of the Convention’. 
37 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi/Solís Corrales and Godínez Cruz cases Order of 19 
January 1988, 1st ‘Considering’ clause. 
38 See e.g. Buergenthal (1994), pp. 83-84. 
39 The Court continued to note that this duty becomes even more evident with regard to persons 
involved in proceedings before the supervisory organs of the ACHR. IACHR Peace Community 
of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional measures, 24 November 2000, 
with references to Digna Ochoa y Plácido et al., Order for provisional measures, 17 November 
1999; Constitutional Court case, Order for provisional measures, 14 August 2000. 
40 See IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order for provisional 
measures, 24 November 2000, Concurring Opinion of Judge Abreu Burelli and García Ramírez. 
They wrote that, apart from the considerations based on the progressive interpretation of Article 
63(2) ACHR, the State had the broad duty in each case to respect the rights and freedoms 
recognised in the Convention. This duty justified actions on the part of the authorities on the one 
hand and legitimate expectations of individuals on the other. 
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essary to give effect to the rights in the Convention. Such measures should include urgent protec-
tive measures.41 
The Court’s position on state responsibility is that the State is responsible to adopt effective 
safety measures to protect all the persons who are subject to its jurisdiction and that this obliga-
tion is even more evident in relation to those who are involved in proceedings before the supervi-
sory organs of the American Convention.42 
In Orders to halt an execution the IACHR considers that ‘if the State were to execute the al-
leged victims, this would lead to an irreparable situation, as well as constitute conduct incompati-
ble with the object and purpose of the Convention’.43 
The Court has emphasised that the principles of effectiveness and good faith are also appli-
cable in the implementation of its provisional measures.44 In its Orders for provisional measures 
in James et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago the Court determined that States ‘must fully comply in 
good faith (pacta sunt servanda) with all of the provisions of the Convention, including those 
relative to the operation of the two supervisory organs of the American Convention; and, that in 
view of the Convention’s fundamental objective of guaranteeing the effective protection of hu-
man rights (Articles 1(1), 2, 51 and 63(2)), States Parties must refrain from taking actions that 
may frustrate the restitutio in integrum of the rights of the alleged victims’.45 This provides a 
rationale for arguing that States are legally bound to respect the precautionary measures of the 
Commission as well. 
The Court has also added to the equation Article 51 ACHR, on the findings and recommen-
dations of the Commission. In its first Order for provisional measures to halt executions, for 
instance, it pointed out: 
“That States Parties must respect the provisions of the American Convention in good faith 
(pacta sunt servanda), including those that facilitate proceedings before the protective bodies of 
the Inter-American system and ensure the fulfilment of the goals of those provisions. In view of 
this, and of the Convention’s fundamental objective of guaranteeing the effective protection of 
                                                 
41 Concurring Opinion of Judge Abreu Burelli and García Ramírez, IACHR Peace Community of 
San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 2000. 
42 See e.g. IACHR case of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, 
Order for provisional measures, 26 May 2001. 
43 See e.g. IACHR James et al. Order of 26 November 2001, 12th ‘Considering’ clause; Raxcacó et 
al, 30 August 2004, 9th ‘Considering’ clause; Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, 25 November 2004, 
9th ‘Considering’ clause; see also the Court’s judgment in this case, 20 November 2007, §113; 
sometimes the phrasing is somewhat more cautious (‘as well as possibly constitute conduct 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention’), Tyrone Dacosta Cadogan 
(Barbados), Order of the President of 4 November 2008, 10th ‘Considering’ clause.  
44 See e.g. IACHR James et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Order of 26 September 2001, 10th 
‘Considering’ clause. It already stated this in early cases, see e.g. Caballero-Delgado and 
Santana (Colombia), Order of 6 February 2008, 15th’ ‘Considering’ clause: “That pursuant to 
Article 63(2) of the Convention, the State has a duty to adopt such provisional measures as this 
Court may order, insofar as the basic principle of the International Responsibility of States, 
supported by international case law, provides that States must fulfill their treaty obligations in 
good faith (pacta sunt servanda)”. 
45 IACHR James et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Order of 21 May 1999, 9th ‘Considering’ clause. 
See also Chapter XIII on the relationship with reparation.  
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human rights (Articles 51 and 63(2)), States Parties must not take any action that will frustrate 
the restitutio in integrum of the rights of the alleged victims”.46 
It confirmed this in its later Orders, in which it not only referred to Articles 51 and 63(2) but also 
to Articles 1(1) and 2, as laying down obligations related to the fundamental objective of guaran-
teeing the effective protection of human rights.47  
The Court has also stressed that in light of the obligations under Article 1(1) ACHR, the 
State is ‘especially bound to guarantee the rights of persons in a risk situation and must advance 
the investigations necessary to establish the facts and, if it be the case, to punish those responsi-
ble’, all of this ‘regardless of the existence of specific provisional measures’.48 
In the context of provisional measures the Court has drawn attention to Article 68(1) ACHR 
as well, with the undertaking of the States Parties ‘to comply with the judgment of the Court in 
any case to which they are parties’.49 In addition the Court has referred to Article 29 ACHR pro-
viding that no provision shall be interpreted as permitting the suppression of the enjoyment or 
exercise of the rights recognised in the Convention or their restriction to a greater extent than 
provided for in the Convention. Following this, the Court would point out: 
“That, should the State execute the alleged victims, it would create an irremediable situation and 
this conduct would be incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention by 
disavowing the authority of the Commission and adversely affecting the very essence of the 
Inter-American system”.50 
Clearly, the rationale for provisional measures is important to understand their legal status. In this 
respect the Court’s reference to restitutio in integrum in its death penalty cases is very relevant.51  
In his Concurring Opinion to the Order of 25 May 1999, judge Cançado Trindade noted that 
considerations of ordre public underlie the ‘exercise of the advisory and contentious functions of 
the Tribunal in general’, and extend themselves ‘to the provisional measures of protection in 
particular’. He emphasised that these have a mandatory character: – ‘ordered as they are by an 
international tribunal like the Inter-American Court’.52 In light of his remarks about ordre public 
and the effective protection of human rights, all provisional measures arguably have a mandatory 
character, not just those by Courts but also those by the regional Commissions and the Geneva 
Committees. 
                                                 
46 IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order for provisional measures, 14 June 
1998. 
47 See e.g. IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 29 August 1998, 25 May 
1999, 27 May 1999, 25 September 1999, 16 August 2000, 24 November 2000 and 26 November 
2001. 
48 IACHR Álvarez et al. (Colombia), Order of 8 February 2008. 
49 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 16 August 2000 and 24 November 2000. 
50 IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order of 14 June 1998. Similar 
statements, always in combination with the reference to Article 29, can be found in later Orders, 
e.g. 19 August 1998, 25 and 27 May and 25 September 1999. The President’s Order for urgent 
measures of 26 November 2001 refers to Article 29, ‘an irremediable situation’ and 
‘incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention’ but it does not proceed with ‘by 
disavowing the authority of the Commission and adversely affecting the very essence of the 
Inter-American system’. 
51 See further Chapter XIII (Protection). 
52 IACHR James et al. case, Order of 25 May 1999, Concurring Opinion of A.A. Cançado Trindade. 
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In Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados the Inter-American Court referred to ‘the well-established 
principles regarding international state responsibility, whereby States are required to comply in 
good faith with their treaty obligations (pacta sunt servanda)’. In this light ‘urgent measures 
ordered by the President of this Tribunal by virtue of the provisions of Article 63(2) of the Con-
vention have an obligatory character. Consequently, Barbados is under the obligation to keep this 
Tribunal informed regarding the actions it has taken to comply with the Order of the President. 
The provision of such information is essential in order to permit the Court to evaluate the State’s 
degree of compliance with the said Order’.53 
The Court responded to the executions of Anthony Briggs and Joey Ramiah by pointing out 
that the State had a duty to preserve their life and physical integrity pursuant to its Orders for 
provisional measures. It referred to Article 68(1) ACHR, which provides that States Parties shall 
undertake to comply with the Court’s judgment in any case to which they are parties. As usual, it 
pointed out that States ‘should fully comply in good faith (pacta sunt servanda) with all of the 
provisions of the Convention, including those relative to the operation of the two supervisory 
organs of the American Convention’. It also pointed out that ‘in view of the Convention’s funda-
mental objective of guaranteeing the effective protection of human rights’ (Articles 1(1), 2, 51 
and 63(2)) ‘States Parties must refrain from taking actions that may frustrate the restitutio in 
integrum of the rights of the alleged victims’.54 This shows the Court’s view that the power to 
order legally binding provisional measures simply answers to the fundamental objective of guar-
anteeing the effective protection of human rights, even irrespective of a specific reference to 
provisional measures in the treaty itself.  
2.4 Systems referring to provisional measures solely in the Rules of 
Procedure 
2.4.1 Introduction 
This section first deals with the relevant rules in the Rules of Procedure laid down by the human 
rights adjudicators adjudicating complaints based on treaties that do not explicitly refer to the 
authority to use provisional measures. Then it deals with the pertinent case law on the legal status 
of provisional measures developed by these adjudicators. 
                                                 
53 IACHR Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, 25 November 2004, §6. In the context of provisional 
measures ordered vis-à-vis Venezuela, the Court also pointed out that while this State is not a 
party to the VCLT, the international obligation of pacta sunt servanda is binding on it as a rule of 
customary international law. With regard to the Court’s provisional measures the addressee States 
must take all necessary measures to effectively protect the beneficiaries, in conformity with the 
Court’s instructions. This includes the obligation periodically to inform the Court of the 
implementation measures taken. IACHR Liliana Ortega et al.; Luisiana Ríos et al.; Luis 
Uzcátegui; Marta Colomina and Liliana Velásquez (Venezuela), Order of 4 May 2004, 7th 
‘Considering’ clause. See also e.g. IACHR Matter of Liliana Ortega et al. (Venezuela), Order of 
14 June 2005, 13th ‘Considering’ clause. See further Chapter XVII (Official State responses). 
54 IACHR James et al. case, Order for provisional measures, 25 September 1999. See also its 
Orders of 14 June and 29 August 1998, 25 and 27 May 1999, 16 August, 24 November 2000 and 
26 November 2001. In the latter the Court noted that States Parties should refrain from taking 
actions that ‘may cause irreparable harm to persons by reason of the gravity of the possible 
consequences of said acts’ rather than from actions that ‘may frustrate the restitutio in integrum 
of the rights of the alleged victims’. 
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2.4.2 Rules of Procedure on provisional measures 
Two of the three UN human rights adjudicators that have used provisional measures have done so 
on the basis of their own Rules of Procedure. The Optional Protocol establishing the right of 
individual complaint about violations of the ICCPR, for instance, does not contain a specific 
reference to provisional measures. Instead, the HRC has included a rule on such measures in its 
Rules of Procedure. Its current Rule 92 (previously Rule 86) stipulates:  
“The Committee may, prior to forwarding its Views on the communication to the State Party 
concerned, inform that State of its view as to whether provisional measures may be desirable to 
avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation. In doing so, the Committee shall 
inform the State Party concerned that such expression of its views on provisional measures does 
not imply a determination on the merits on the communication”.55 
Tomuschat has pointed out that ‘it is remarkable that the Committee, notwithstanding the difficult 
political context within which it was working, was eventually able to hammer out an agreed 
formula by consensus’. He described this political context as follows:  
“A school of strict constructionists-mostly members from Eastern European countries-was 
opposed in that debate to a school of broad constructionists-mainly made up of members from 
Western Europe-who emphasized the need to take into account object and purpose of the 
Protocol as an instrument to secure effective procedural protection to individual rights”.56 
                                                 
55 In 1977, during the deliberations on the Rules of Procedure, Tomuschat (Federal Republic of 
Germany) noted that it was ‘clear that the power of any group established by the Committee 
would be limited to making recommendations’. Summary records of the meetings of the first 
session, 13th meeting, 29 March 1977 and 17th meeting, 31 March 1977, Yearbook of the HRC 
1977-1978, Vol. I, CCPR/1 pp. 44-46 and p. 54. Espersen (Denmark) noted ‘it was a commonly 
accepted notion that bodies had such implied powers as were necessary to enable them to perform 
their functions in a reasonable manner’. This required a ‘stronger formulation of rule 86’. Thus, 
he proposed to replace the words ‘request the State Party concerned to take interim measures’ by 
the words ‘forward to the State Party concerned its views as to whether interim measures might 
be necessary’. Espersen explained that ‘(s)uch a change would be in conformity with the letter 
and spirit of the protocol and would ensure that the Committee would have the impact it was 
intended to have’. It is possible that the other members agreed with this change because the 
expression ‘forward to the State party concerned its Views as to whether interim measures might 
be necessary’ is sufficiently vague to be interpreted as both weaker and stronger than the 
previously proposed term ‘request’. Tomuschat wrote, almost two decades later, that ‘(t)he 
compromise finally reached consisted in attenuating the language of the Rule, in particular 
replacing the word ‘request’ by a more flexible phrase attuned to the formulation of Article 5(4)’. 
Tomuschat (1995), p. 625. The only change the Committee made to this part of the provision, at a 
later stage, was the replacement of the word ‘necessary’ by the word ‘desirable’, as suggested by 
Lallah (Mauritius). Summary records of the meetings of the first session, 13th meeting, 29 March 
1977 and 17th meeting, 31 March 1977, Yearbook of the HRC 1977-1978, Vol. I, CCPR/1 pp. 44-
46 and p. 54. 
56 Tomuschat (1995), p. 625. Nine Eastern European States were involved in the ICCPR system 
from the early stages, but none of them had recognised the individual complaint procedure. In 
1988 Hungary was the first Eastern European country to ratify the OP. Between 1991 and 2002 
more than 20 former communist States became a party to the OP. Four of the first members of the 
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Rule 92 of its Rules of Procedure (previously Rule 86) refers to the HRC’s authority to use provi-
sional measures.57 Rule 108 of CAT’s Rules of Procedure refers to the latter’s authority in this 
respect.58 
The European Commission on Human Rights was the first international adjudicator that re-
sorted to provisional measures as part of the contentious proceedings pending before it. As dis-
cussed in Chapter II, in 1957 the former European Commission used informal provisional meas-
ures for the first time, urgently requesting the UK not to execute Nicolaos Sampson until the 
Commission had been fully informed of the circumstances of the case. The Commission stated it 
had decided to make this request in order to prevent “any irreparable act”.59 Yet in two less seri-
ous cases, decided in 1958 and 1963, the Commission refused to take provisional measures, con-
sidering that the Convention did not give it the competence to order them.60 In 1964 it again took 
                                                                                                                       
HRC nevertheless came from Eastern Europe. Apart from them five members came from 
Western Europe and Canada, three from Latin America and six from other regions.  
57 “The Committee may, prior to forwarding its Views on the communication to the State party 
concerned, inform that State of its Views as to whether interim measures may be desirable to 
avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation. In doing so, the Committee shall 
inform the State party concerned that such expression of its Views on interim measures does not 
imply a determination on the merits of the communication”. 
58 “1. At any time after the receipt of a complaint, the Committee, a working group, or the 
Rapporteur(s) for new complaints and interim measures may transmit to the State party 
concerned, for its urgent consideration, a request that it take such interim measures as the 
Committee considers necessary to avoid irreparable damage to the victim or victims of alleged 
violations. 2. Where the Committee, the Working Group, or Rapporteur(s) request(s) interim 
measures under this rule, the request shall not imply a determination of the admissibility or the 
merits of the complaint. The State party shall be so informed upon transmittal. 3. Where a request 
for interim measures is made by the Working Group or Rapporteur(s) under the present rule, the 
Working Group or Rapporteur(s) should inform the Committee members of the nature of the 
request and the complaint to which the request relates at the next regular session of the 
Committee. 4. The Secretary-General shall maintain a list of such requests for interim measures. 
5. The Rapporteur for new complaints and interim measures shall also monitor compliance with 
the Committee’s requests for interim measures”. CERD was the first UN treaty body introducing 
provisional measures in its Rules of Procedure. Its Rule 94(3), which has never been used, is 
phrased as follows: “In the course of its consideration, the Committee may inform the State party 
of its views on the desirability, because of urgency, of taking interim measures to avoid possible 
irreparable damage to the person or persons who claim to be victim(s) of the alleged violation. In 
doing so, the Committee shall inform the State party concerned that such expression of its views 
on interim measures does not prejudge either its final opinion on the merits of the communication 
or its eventual suggestions and recommendation”. 
59 See EComHR Application of the ECHR to the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. United Kingdom), 
Article 31 report of the Commission, No. 176/56, 26 September 1958, p. 24. This request was 
respected, see further Chapter III (Executions). 
60 EComHR X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 22 March 1958 (“Whereas the Convention does 
not contain any such obligations binding upon the High Contracting Parties as invoked by the 
Applicant; whereas, moreover, the Convention does not contain any provision giving the 
Commission competence to order provisional measures; whereas it therefore appears that the 
application is in this respect incompatible with the provisions of the Convention; whereas it 
should, in pursuance of Article 27, paragraph 2, of the Convention, accordingly be rejected”) and 
X. and Y. v. Belgium, 18 December 1963 (‘whereas the fact that the Commission is dealing with a 
case does not have suspensive effect and the Commission is not empowered to order protective 
measures (see the decision on the admissibility of Application No. 297/57, Volume II, page 213); 
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informal provisional measures, this time to halt an extradition.61 Since that time an informal prac-
tice developed in which the Commission requested – and obtained – the cooperation of Govern-
ments in urgent cases pending before the Commission involving extradition or expulsion. In 1974 
the Commission decided to formalize its practice of using provisional measures by including a 
provision on provisional measures in its Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure.62 In 1982 the Court did 
as well. Presently the authority to use provisional measures can be found in Rule 39 of the Court’s 
Rules of Procedure.63 
As noted, the ACHR explicitly authorizes the Inter-American Court to order provisional 
measures and it assigns the Inter-American Commission a task in this respect as well. In Article 
25 of its Rules of Procedure the Inter-American Commission has introduced a reference to its 
authority to order its own precautionary measures as well. Vis-à-vis those States that have recog-
nized the Inter-American Court it uses this mechanism when it considers it needs the flexibility of 
a swift and incremental approach before resorting to the Court. Vis-à-vis those States that have 
not recognized the Court, or have not even ratified the ACHR, the Commission’s precautionary 
measures are the only mechanism to prevent irreparable harm pending the proceedings before the 
Commission based on its function of adjudicating petitions under the OAS Charter (as well as 
under the ACHR for those States that have ratified it, but did not recognize the Court).  
The African Charter, finally, does not contain a specific article on provisional measures ei-
ther. The African Commission has referred to its authority to do so in Rule 111 of its Rules of 
Procedure.64 As noted, the Protocol introducing the African Court does refer to provisional meas-
ures. 
                                                                                                                       
whereas, far from obliging national courts to wait for the Commission to complete its work 
before they complete theirs, the Convention, in principle, provides for the opposite solution 
(Article 26) and assigns a mainly subsidiary role to the collective guarantee machinery set up by 
it’). 
61 EComHR X v. Austria and Yugoslavia, 30 June 1964 (inadm.); provisional measure on 14 
February 1964. See also S.B. v. FRG, 19 December 1969 (struck off), provisional measure on 7 
January 1965 and 24 April 1965. 
62 Article 36 ECHR (pre-Protocol 11) stating that the Commission shall draw up its own rules of 
procedure. It did so on 13 December 1974. In its 1993 Rules of Procedure, Rule 36 was phrased 
as follows: “The Commission, or when it is not in session, the President may indicate to the 
parties any interim measure the adoption of which seems desirable in the interest of the parties or 
the proper conduct of the proceedings before it”. Revised version as adopted by the Commission 
on 12 February and 6 May 1993 and entered into force on 28 June 1993.  
63 “1. The Chamber or, where appropriate, its President may, at the request of a party or of any 
other person concerned, or of its own motion, indicate to the parties any interim measure which it 
considers should be adopted in the interests of the parties or of the proper conduct of the 
proceedings before it. 2. Notice of these measures shall be given to the Committee of Ministers. 
3. The Chamber may request information from the parties on any matter connected with the 
implementation of any interim measure it has indicated”. 
64 “1. Before making its final views know to the Assembly on the communication [sic], the 
Commission may inform the State party concerned of its views on the appropriateness of taking 
provisional measures to avoid irreparable damage being caused to the victim of the alleged 
violation. In so doing, the Commission shall inform the State party that the expression on its 
views on the adoption of those provisional measures does not imply a decision on the substance 
of the communication. 2. The Commission, or when it is not in session, the Chairman, in 
consultation with other members of the Commission, may indicate to the parties any interim 
measure, the adoption of which seems desirable in the interest of the parties or the proper conduct 
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2.4.3 Pertinent case law on the legal status of provisional measures 
2.4.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The adjudicators supervising treaties without an express reference to provisional measures in the 
treaty text consider respect for these measures as a necessary corollary to the obligations under 
the treaties.  
This section deals with the approaches of the various human rights adjudicators in this re-
spect. 
2.4.3.2 HRC ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF ITS PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
Some States have argued that the Committee’s provisional measures are not legally binding be-
cause no such specific reference was made in the text of the OP, because the text of the Rule on 
provisional measures contains exhortatory language (‘desirable’) or, as noted, because they con-
sider decisions on the merits to be non- binding as well.  
On the other hand, the HRC itself has referred to the obligations under the ICCPR and the 
OP condemning executions, expulsion and extradition in contravention of its provisional meas-
ures. Apart from this it has always emphasised certain obligations of States with regard to the 
complaint proceedings.65 Audiatur et alteram pars includes hearing and informing each party. 
Procedural equality (Article 14) applies also in cases pending before the HRC under the OP and 
not only in domestic cases. Lack of procedural equality may be said to cause irreparable harm to 
the proceedings before the Committee. 
Certain general obligations and consequences became apparent early on in the activities of 
the HRC with regard to cases of political detainees and their health and whereabouts. The ability 
of detainees to communicate directly with the Committee is a prerequisite for the effective appli-
                                                                                                                       
of the proceedings before it. 3. In case of urgency when the Commission is not in session, the 
Chairman in consultation with other members of the Commission, may take any necessary action 
on behalf of the Commission. As soon as the Commission is again in session, the Chairman shall 
report to it on any action taken”. Rules of Procedure of 6 October 1995 (<www.achpr.org>). 
Previously this was Rule 109, Rules of Procedure, 1 February 1988, see Murray/Evans (2001), p. 
161. 
65 It is the Committee that should set the deadlines for the proceedings, not the parties themselves. It 
is equally for the Committee to decide on the admissibility of a case, not for the Addressee State. 
The HRC always emphasises that it is implicit in Article 4(2) OP that a State party make 
available all the information at its disposal. Pending the proceedings Addressee States have 
several obligations under the OP. Their recognition of the OP implies that they must heed to the 
procedural orders of the HRC, such as answering questions, sending requested documentation or 
investigating claims. They must respect the procedure as set by the Committee, including 
deadlines and admissibility decisions. If they do not, they shall suffer the consequences, as the 
Committee may decide that due weight must be given to the petitioner’s claims in the absence of 
information from the State party. Of course, the petitioner must also respect the procedure as set 
by the Committee and similarly suffer the consequences for not doing so. In this light it is self-
evident that States are also expected to postpone action if the Committee considers that this 
action would result in irreparable harm. As the case may be, States may also have to take action 
to prevent third parties from causing irreparable harm to the alleged victim or to the proceedings 
before the Committee, if the Committee so indicates. 
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cation of the OP. Governments have no right to create obstacles to this communication. Such 
obstacles would, in many cases, render meaningless the individual complaint procedure.66 This 
approach by the HRC is important for the procedural position of the parties.  
The whereabouts of the person concerned should be known and he or she should be able to 
communicate with the HRC freely without fear for repercussions. The State’s obligation under 
Article 4(2) OP includes providing information on the state of health of detainees. States that fail 
to provide information and clarifications, seriously hamper the HRC in discharging its responsi-
bilities under the OP.67 
States must make available administrative mechanisms ‘to give effect to the general obliga-
tion to investigate allegations of violations promptly, thoroughly and effectively through inde-
pendent and impartial bodies’. After all, a ‘failure by a State Party to investigate allegations of 
violations could in and of itself give rise to a separate breach of the Covenant’.68 
It has been on the occasion of executions of death sentences in defiance of its provisional 
measures that the HRC has expressed itself most strongly on the rationale of provisional measures 
and their legal status.69 Over the years it has taken a stronger position on non-compliance.70 It 
now condemns such executions as incompatible with the obligation to respect the Covenant in 
good faith and with the right of individual communication under the OP. 
In Piandiong (2000) the HRC referred to the preamble and Article 1 OP and noted that the 
undertaking to co-operate with the Committee in good faith was implicit in a State’s adherence to 
the OP. It pointed out that denying its provisional measures was incompatible with the obligations 
of the State not to hinder the Committee’s task of examining the communication and determining 
the case on the merits under Article 5(1) and (4). The HRC pointed out that provisional measures 
are essential to the Committee’s role under the OP.71 The Committee’s reference to the obligation 
of States not to frustrate it in its consideration of a case may be classified as an obligation not to 
harm the procedure. Its reference to the obligation not to prevent it to express its Views may be 
classified as an obligation not to cause irreparable harm to the claim either. In other words, the 
HRC seems to allude to both rationales for the use of provisional measures.72 
                                                 
66 See e.g. HRC Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. Uruguay, 28 October 
1981. 
67 See e.g. HRC Dave Marais v. Madagascar, 24 March 1984. 
68 HRC General Comment on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties to 
the Covenant (Article 2 ICCPR), 21 April 2004, §15. See further Chapter XIII (Protection). 
69 In the vast majority of death penalty cases States have respected the Committee’s provisional 
measures. On these measures see Chapter III. See further Chapter XVII (Official State 
responses). 
70 See also Harrington (2003), p. 69 referring to a ‘movement towards recognizing the binding 
nature of interim measures requests’ as ‘reflected’ in the jurisprudence of the HRC. She notes 
that the Committee ‘has taken an increasingly stronger stance’ and ‘what were once seen as mere 
“failures to cooperate” are now viewed as violations of a state’s very obligations under the 
ICCPR regime’. 
71 Already HRC Peter Bradshaw v. Barbados, 19 July 1994 (inadm.), §§2.9, 2.10, 4.2, 5.3; see also 
Denzil Roberts v. Barbados, 19 July 1994, §§2.6, 2.7, 6.3 the HRC established that the State 
party had accepted the legal obligation to make the provisions of the Covenant effective. It was 
under an obligation to adopt appropriate measures to give legal effect to the Committee’s 
interpretation on the merits, but also to its provisional measures to avoid irreparable harm ‘to the 
victim of the alleged violation’ pending the proceedings. Further on the position of the HRC prior 
to 2000 see Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
72 On these rationales, see Conclusion Part II. 
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The executions rendered examination by the HRC moot and the expression of its Views 
‘nugatory and futile’. Flouting its provisional measures, ‘especially by irreversible measures such 
as the execution of the alleged victim’ undermined the protection of Covenant rights under the 
OP.73 This means that the Committee emphasises the importance of provisional measures for the 
prevention of ‘irreversible measures’. Nevertheless, it found no violations of specific articles of 
the Covenant, only of the State’s legal obligations under the OP. It referred to Article 1 OP and to 
the object and purpose of the OP in general.  
In Piandiong the HRC also pointed out that even when the HRC has not (yet) acted under 
Rule 86 the State’s obligation to co-operate with the HRC in good faith forbids the State party to 
execute the petitioners.74 In other words, in death penalty cases the State party breaches its obliga-
tions under the OP when it executes an alleged victim while the petitioner had informed it that he 
had submitted a case to the HRC. In subsequent Views in relation to Sierra Leone and Trinidad 
and Tobago the HRC confirmed this approach. At the merits stage in Ashby v. Trinidad and To-
bago (2002) it noted:  
“The behaviour of the State party represents a shocking failure to demonstrate even the most 
elementary good faith required of a State party to the Covenant and the Optional Protocol”.75 
The State had breached its obligations under the OP ‘by proceeding to execute Mr. Ashby before 
the Committee could conclude its examination of the communication, and the formulation of its 
Views’. It found it ‘particularly inexcusable’ that the State had done so after the Committee’s use 
of provisional measures.76  
When States have failed to comply with its provisional measures, the HRC reserves a sepa-
rate section of its decision on the merits to deal on this issue. These sections have had headings 
such as ‘State party's failure to respect the Committee's request for interim measures under rule 
86’,77 ‘Breach of the Optional Protocol’78 or ‘Non respect of the Committee's request for interim 
measures’.79  
Not only in death penalty but also in expulsion and extradition cases the HRC has found 
that States are bound to respect its provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm. It equally 
found States in breach of the Optional Protocol as well as of Article 2 ICCPR on the right to the 
                                                 
73 See HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by 
Alexander Padilla and Ricardo III Sunga) v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000, §§5.1-5.4. See 
also, e.g., Mansaraj et al., Gborie et al. and Sesay et al. v. Sierra Leone, 16 July 2001 and Glenn 
Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002. See further press release, ‘Human Rights 
Committee deplores the execution of six individuals in Uzbekistan’, 24 July 2003. The petitioners 
who were executed were Muzaffar Mirzaev (case 1170/2003), Shukrat Andasbaev (case 
1166/2003), Ulugbek Ashov (case 1165/2003), Ilkhon Babadzhanov and Maksud Ismailov (case 
1162/2003), and Azamat Uteev (case 1150/2003). Furthermore see Barno Saidova v. Tajikistan, 
8 July 2004. 
74 HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by Alexander 
Padilla and Ricardo III Sunga) v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000. 
75 HRC Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002, §10.9. 
76 Id., §10.10. 
77 See HRC Barno Saidova v. Tajikistan, 8 July 2004, §§4.1-4.4 and Maryam Khalilova on behalf 
of her son Validzhon Alievich Khalilov v. Tajikistan, 30 March 2005, §§4.1-4.4. 
78 HRC Davlatbibi Shukurova on behalf of her husband Dovud and his brother Sherali Nazriev v. 
Tajikistan, 16 March 2006, §§6.1.-6.4. 
79 HRC Roza Uteeva on behalf of her brother Azamat Uteev v. Uzbekistan, 26 October 2007, §§5.1-
5.3. See also Shevkkhie Tulyaganova v. Uzbekistan, 20 July 2007, §§6.1-6.3. 
 The Legal Status of Provisional Measures in Human Rights Adjudication 
901 
effective remedy.80 In Ahani v. Canada (2004) the HRC pointed out that action by a State party 
giving rise to a risk of irreparable harm, ‘as indicated a priori by the Committee’s request for 
interim measures, must be scrutinized in the strictest light’.81 The Committee’s Rules of Proce-
dure have been adopted in conformity with Article 39 ICCPR and its provisional measures, taken 
pursuant to Rule 86, are ‘essential’ to its role under the OP. “Flouting of the Rule, especially by 
irreversible measures such as the execution of the alleged victim or his/her deportation from a 
State party to face torture or death in another country, undermines the protection of Covenant 
rights through the Optional Protocol”.82  
Strangely, the word ‘especially’ seems to imply that it could also use provisional measures 
to halt measures that are not irreversible. On the other hand, it specifically refers to provisional 
measures to halt executions or to such measures to halt expulsion in non-refoulement cases. Such 
measures in fact aim to halt not only that which is irreversible, but that which is irreparable as 
well.  
In 2004 the Committee confirmed its approach to the obligation under the OP to respect its 
provisional measures in its General Comment on Article 2 ICCPR. It noted that failure to imple-
ment its provisional measures ‘should be regarded as incompatible with the obligation to respect 
in good faith the Covenant, in particular its article 2 and the right of individual communication 
under the Optional Protocol’.83 It explicitly refers to the obligation to respect its provisional 
measures based on Article 2 of the Covenant rather than based only on the Covenant rights 
through the right of individual communication.84 
It pointed out that provisional measures may be required in certain circumstances because 
of the right to an effective remedy. In such cases States parties must ‘provide for and implement 
provisional or interim measures to avoid continuing violations and to endeavour to repair at the 
earliest possible opportunity any harm that may have been caused by such violations’.85 
                                                 
80 See HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §7.2. See also the arguments of counsel in 
§§6.3 and 6.4. Some members of the Committee may consider that in extradition and expulsion 
cases when provisional measures have been ignored it should look at whether irreparable harm 
indeed followed. In other words, they may belong to the ‘after the fact’-school, to which the 
ECtHR adheres as well. If they believe that for finding a violation they have to take into account 
what comes later, they may wish to consider this in the determination of the gravity of certain 
decisions by States to ignore provisional measures. While it may be justified to take into account 
the most recent situation in cases in which the petitioner has not yet been expelled, it seems 
inappropriate to do so to justify the fact that the State has ignored the Committee’s provisional 
measures. 
81 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §8.1. 
82 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §§8.1 and 8.2. See also Alzery v. Sweden, 25 
October 2006, §11.11. 
83 HRC General Comment 31 on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties 
to the Covenant (Article 2), 29 March 2004. It confirmed this in 2008 in its General Comment on 
the OP. “Failure to implement such interim or provisional measures is incompatible with the 
obligation to respect in good faith the procedure of individual communication established under 
the Optional Protocol”. HRC General Comment 33, CCPR/C/GC/33, 5 November 2008 
(Advance unedited version), §19. 
84 See Chapter XIII (Protection) the relationship between provisional measures, the rights claimed 
and the eventual form of reparation. For a confirmation of its approach see also HRC Barno 
Saidova v. Tajikistan, 8 July 2004. 
85 HRC General Comment No. 31 on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States 
parties to the Covenant (Article 2), 29 March 2004, §§19, 17 and 12. It referred to ‘the 
provisional measures indicated by the Committee in cases under the Optional Protocol with a 
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Authorities other than the HRC have also stressed that States should comply with the Com-
mittee’s provisional measures. The UN Rapporteur against Torture, for instance, did so in 2003 
and 200486 and the Deputy UN High Commissioner for Human Rights equally urged respect for 
the Committee’s provisional measures (2003). He emphasised the importance of respecting ‘in-
terim measures of protection ordered by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’.87 With regard to execu-
tions of death sentences in violation of the provisional measures by the HRC he spoke of a ‘grave 
breach’ of the obligations under both the ICCPR and the OP.88  
While the case law of the HRC on the obligation to respect its provisional measures to halt 
irreparable harm seems to be firmly established, this fact has not yet found its way in much of the 
general literature on the HRC, most of which was published before Piandiong (2002) and before 
the General Comment on Article 2 (2004).89 
‘The traditional view’, it has been noted, ‘based on a strict legalistic interpretation that con-
sidered procedural rules as non-binding, no longer seems adequate’. In this respect ‘the Commit-
tee has demonstrated leadership’ and ‘its approach has since been adopted in the jurisprudence of 
other international human rights organs’.90 The Committee’s approach indeed is consistent with 
the dynamic treaty interpretation that human rights adjudicators now generally adhere to.91 The 
                                                                                                                       
view to avoiding irreparable harm pending the Committee’s consideration of a case’. Again, it 
did not specify whether it meant irreparable harm to persons, the claim or the procedure.  
86 See e.g. UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, mission to Uzbekistan of November-December 2002, 
E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2. See also official statement by the Special Rapporteur on Torture, 13 
September 2004, referring to the ‘interim measures ordered by the Committee and urgent appeals 
dispatched by United Nations monitoring mechanisms regarding persons whose life and physical 
integrity may be at risk of imminent and irreparable harm’.  
87 Press release Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand 
Ramcharan, ‘Deputy Human Rights Chief ends visit to Uzbekistan with call for implementation 
of official commitments’, 14 March 2003.  
88 See e.g. press release Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand Ramcharan, 
‘Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights asks Uzbek government not to carry out death 
sentences in cases under international appeal’, 4 July 2003 and ‘Acting High Commissioner for 
Human Rights deeply concerned at executions in Uzbekistan’, 25 July 2003.  
89 McGoldrick (1994), p. 128 considered that they are ‘non-binding as a matter of law and depend 
totally on the cooperation and good faith of the State party concerned’. Robertson and Merrills 
(1996) noted that although they ‘are not binding, they have a moral force’, p. 57. Ghandhi (1998) 
wrote that ‘it is clear that the Committee’s view on the desirability of interim measures is not 
binding on the State Party concerned’, p. 58. Castan/Joseph/Schultz (2004) do pay attention to the 
most recent case law, as do Harrington (2003) and Naldi (2004). Harrington considers that while 
the Views are not binding, the provisional measures are because the individual complaint system 
would otherwise be ‘rendered meaningless’. “By acceding to the Optional Protocol, Canada 
granted individual litigants the right to petition and ultimately to receive a non-binding view from 
the Human Rights Committee. Notwithstanding any concerns one might have about the inherent 
weaknesses of a non-binding view, Canada is therefore acting in bad faith with respect to its 
treaty commitments when it engages in acts that have the effect of preventing or frustrating the 
consideration of a communication by the Committee and rendering the outcome nugatory”. In 
this context Harrington notes that ‘it must be acknowledged that many international instruments 
adopt language with a diplomatic flavour to avoid offence to the susceptibilities of states,’ 
Harrington (2003), pp. 86 and p. 68 respectively. 
90 Naldi (2004), p. 454. 
91 As provisional measures are central to the Committee’s protective function, its ‘reasoned 
justification for its conclusion, commensurate with the “dynamic and evolutive” approach 
appropriate to human rights treaties, must be considered correct, if only on the utilitarian ground 
 
 The Legal Status of Provisional Measures in Human Rights Adjudication 
903 
approach of the HRC towards the legal status of its provisional measures is in accordance with the 
purpose of the OP and the aim of effective protection of the rights in the ICCPR. 
2.4.3.3 THE ATTITUDE OF THE ADJUDICATORS TO FRUSTRATION OF THE RIGHT 
OF PETITION THROUGH PRE-EMPTION OF THE POSSIBILITY TO REQUEST 
PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
As noted, in the context of the death penalty the HRC has pointed out that the obligation of good 
faith application of the Covenant and in particular of the right to an effective remedy (Article 2 
ICCPR) presumes that a State postpones an execution once it knows (or should reasonably be 
expected to know) that the petitioner has brought a petition before the HRC, and not only once the 
HRC has been able to inform the State of its decision to take provisional measures.92 It is incom-
patible with the obligations under the OP when the State undertakes action hindering or frustrat-
ing the examination of a complaint and rendering futile any subsequent decision on the merits. 
Such State commits a grave breach of the right of individual petition. This breach is even more 
serious when this occurs contrary to a provisional measure.93  
If the State preempts the possibility of invoking Article 22 ICAT and of requesting the 
Committee to take provisional measures, by expelling the petitioner without giving him a reason-
able opportunity to resort to the Committee, before execution of a final decision, this in itself 
constitutes a breach of the obligations under Article 22 ICAT.94 
Apart from the HRC, also CAT and the ECtHR have dealt with situations in which the State 
pre-empted the possibility for the petitioner to resort to the individual petition systems recognized 
by States under international treaties. They have stressed that the obligation not to do so applies as 
well in the context of non-refoulement. The petitioner should have a reasonable opportunity of 
sending a complaint to the Committee or ECtHR before the final decision of domestic authorities 
is being executed.95 
2.4.3.4 CAT ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF ITS PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
According to CAT ratification of the treaty and recognition of the right of individual petition 
require a good faith cooperation with the Committee. Respecting its provisional measures is 
essential for the protection of the beneficiary against irreparable harm. Such harm would deprive 
the further proceedings of any sense.96  
                                                                                                                       
of seeking to ensure maximum protection for people at risk’. Naldi (2004), p. 454, referring to 
ECtHR Wemhoff v. Germany, 27 June 1968 and IACHR, Advisory Opinion, Compulsory 
membership of journalist association, 13 November 1985. 
92 HRC Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002; Shukurova v. Tajikistan, 17 March 2006, 
Sultanova v. Uzbekistan, 30 March 2006; Uteeva v. Uzbekistan, 26 October 2007. 
93 See CAT Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005 and ECtHR Al-Moayad v. Germany, 20 February 2007, 
§125 (acts or omissions aimed to prevent the Court from ordering provisional measures or from 
timely informing the government of such measures, could be in violation of Article 34 ECHR). 
94 CAT Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, §13.9. 
95 As noted, this relates to e.g. CAT Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005; HRC Shukurova v. Tajikistan, 
17 March 2006; Sultanova v. Uzbekistan, 30 March 2006; Uteeva v. Uzbekistan, 26 October 
2007; ECtHR Al-Moayad v. Germany, 20 February 2007. 
96 CAT Nûňez Chipana v. Venezuela, 16 December 1998 and T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000. 
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In T.P.S. v. Canada Canada ignored a provisional measure. It considered that a request for 
provisional measures was ‘a recommendation to a State to take certain measures, not an order’. 
“Support for this proposition may be found not only in the word employed (‘request’) in rule 108, 
paragraph 9 but also in the European Court of Human Rights decision in Cruz Varas and others v. 
Sweden’.97 CAT responded by expressing deep concern about Canada’s deportation of the peti-
tioner to India despite the Committee’s provisional measures. It pointed out that Canada had 
ratified the Convention against Torture and had voluntarily accepted the Committee’s competence 
to consider individual communications (Article 22). It had undertaken to cooperate with it in good 
faith in applying the procedure. “Compliance with the provisional measures called for by the 
Committee in cases it considers reasonable is essential in order to protect the person in question 
from irreparable harm, which could, moreover nullify the end result of the proceedings before the 
Committee”.98 
CAT has subsequently reinforced this approach.99 The use of provisional measures is 'vital 
to the role entrusted to the Committee' under Article 22 ICAT. 'Failure to respect that provision, 
in particular through such irreparable action as deporting an alleged victim, undermined protec-
tion of the rights enshrined in the Convention’.100 
Moreover the petitioner is 'entitled to rely’ on its provisional measures.101 The expulsion of 
the petitioner ‘in the face of the Committee's request for interim measures nullified the effective 
exercise of the right to complaint conferred by article 22, and has rendered the Committee's final 
decision on the merits futile and devoid of object’.102  
In Agiza v. Sweden (2005) CAT referred to the procedural assessment of the substantive 
right not to be subjected to refoulement. It held that the principle of non-refoulement in Article 3 
ICAT should be understood to encompass a remedy to prevent its breach.103 It added that in the 
                                                 
97 CAT T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000, §8.2. On ECtHR Cruz Varas and its subsequent overturn 
see infra. 
98 CAT T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000, §15.6. According to Committee member Camara (Senegal) 
the Committee’s authority to request provisional measures is a ‘logical attribute’ of its 
competence based on Art. 22. Ignoring the Committee’s provisional measures ‘renders Article 22 
meaningless’. 
99 By recognizing the right of individual complaint ‘States parties implicitly undertook to cooperate 
with the Committee in good faith by providing it with the means to examine the complaints 
submitted’. CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §6.1. 
100 CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §6.2. In Brada v. France (2005) CAT observed 
that a domestic appeal was still pending at the time of the expulsion. It added: ‘(e)ven more 
decisively’ the Committee had indicated provisional measures to stay his execution ‘until it had 
had an opportunity to examine the merits of the case, the Committee having established, through 
its Special Rapporteur on Interim Measures, that in the present case the complainant had 
established an arguable risk of irreparable harm’. CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, 
§13.3. On assessment of risk see Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
101 CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §13.3. 
102 Id., §13.4. See also Elif Pelit v. Azerbaijan, 1 May 2007, §10.2. In Brada In this case it did not 
find a violation of Article 22 ICAT alone. The State ignored he fact that a domestic case was still 
pending, it ignored CAT’s provisional measures and it argued that the subsequent judgment of 
the Court of Appeal could not be regarded as ‘clearly arbitrary or tantamount to a denial of 
justice’. CAT noted the finding of the Court of Appeal that the expulsion occurred in breach of 
Article 3 ECHR and agreed that this finding could not be regarded as ‘clearly arbitrary or 
tantamount to a denial of justice’. It concluded that the expulsion was in breach of Article 3 
ICAT. CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §13.6. 
103 CAT Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, §13.6. See on this case also 
Van Boven (2006), pp. 746-758. 
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context of non-refoulement the right to an effective remedy requires ‘an opportunity for effective, 
independent and impartial review of the decision to expel or remove, once that decision is made, 
when there is a plausible allegation that article 3 issues arise’.104  
CAT will find a breach of Article 22 based on a conception of ‘effective exercise’ of the 
right of individual petition that encompasses more than just access to the Committee. In Agiza it 
pointed out, once more, that by making the declaration under Article 22 ICAT the State ‘under-
took to confer upon persons within its jurisdiction the right to invoke the complaints jurisdiction 
of the Committee. That jurisdiction included the power to indicate interim measures, if necessary, 
to stay the removal and preserve the subject matter of the case pending final decision’. It added 
that in order ‘for this exercise of the right of complaint to be meaningful rather than illusory’, the 
‘individual must have a reasonable period of time before execution of a final decision to consider 
whether and, if so, in fact, seize the Committee under its article 22 jurisdiction’.105 In Dar v. 
Norway (2007) CAT noted that Article 18 ICAT ‘vests it with competence to establish its own 
rules of procedure, which become inseparable from the Convention to the extent they do not 
contradict it’. Its Rule 108 on provisional measures was ‘specifically intended to give meaning 
and scope to articles 3 and 22 of the Convention, which otherwise would only offer asylum-
seekers invoking a serious risk of torture a merely theoretical protection. By failing to respect the 
request for interim measures made to it, and to inform the Committee of the deportation of the 
complainant, the State party committed a breach of its obligations of cooperating in good faith 
with the Committee, under article 22 of the Convention’.106 While in this case it did not find a 
procedural violation of Article 3 ICAT, in Tebourski v. France (2007) it did find a violation of 
both Article 22 and Article 3 ICAT. In this case it explicitly linked the right of petition in Article 
22 to the substantive rights in Article 3 ICAT. It noted that ‘article 3 of the Convention offers 
absolute protection to anyone in the territory of a State party which has made the declaration 
under article 22’.107 By expelling the petitioner to Tunisia ‘under the conditions in which it did 
and for the reasons adduced, thereby presenting the Committee with a fait accompli, the State 
party not only failed to demonstrate the good faith required of any party to a treaty, but also failed 
to meet its obligations under articles 3 and 22 of the Convention’.108 In short, CAT has confirmed 
that disrespect for provisional measures negates the effective exercise of the right of petition.109 
2.4.3.5 INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF ITS PRECAU-
TIONARY MEASURES  
In March 2005 the CIDH issued a resolution in which it emphasized the international obligation 
of OAS member States to comply with its precautionary measures.110 In its case law the Commis-
                                                 
104 CAT Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, §13.7. The Committee 
added: ‘that its previous jurisprudence has been consistent with this view of the requirements of 
article 3, having found an inability to contest an expulsion decision before an independent 
authority, in that case the courts, to be relevant to a finding of a violation of article 3’. 
105 CAT Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, §13.9. 
106 CAT Nadeem Ahmad Dar v. Norway, 11 May 2007, §16.3. See also Tebourski v. France, 1 May 
2007, §8.6. 
107 CAT Tebourski v. France, 1 May 2007, §8.4. 
108 CAT Tebourski v. France, 1 May 2007, §8.7. 
109 CAT Brada v. France, 17 May 2005; Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005; Singh Sogi v. Canada, 16 
November 2007; Pelit v. Azerbaijan, 1 May 2007. 
110 CIDH Resolution 1/05, 8 March 2005, §1. 
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sion equally stressed that States must comply with its precautionary measures in light of the fun-
damental role played by these measures in maintaining the effectiveness of the Commission’s 
mandate. It does so in particular in death penalty cases. 
In Beazley v. US (2003), for instance, it reiterated that ‘its ability to effectively investigate 
and determine capital cases has frequently been undermined when states have scheduled and 
carried out the execution of condemned persons, despite the fact that those individuals have pro-
ceedings pending before the Commission’.111 It pointed out that it uses precautionary measures 
exactly in order to prevent ‘this unacceptable situation’. It emphasized that ‘OAS member states, 
by creating the Commission and mandating it through the OAS Charter and its Statute to promote 
the observance and protection of human rights of the American peoples, have implicitly under-
taken to implement measures of this nature where they are essential to preserving that man-
date’.112 
In its Order for provisional measures in James et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago the Inter-
American Court has pointed out, based on the principles of effectiveness and good faith, that 
States were to respect not only its Orders for provisional measures but also the Commission’s 
precautionary measures.113  
The competence of the Inter-American Commission to adopt precautionary measures, as 
laid down in its rules of procedure, is also based on Articles 33 and 41 ACHR. Article 33 refers to 
the Commission as one of the competent bodies to monitor compliance with the obligations of 
States parties to the Convention. Article 41 establishes that the Commission may, in the exercise 
of its function to defend human rights, formulate recommendations for member States to adopt 
measures for the protection of human rights in the same way as measures applied to further the 
obligation to respect such rights.114 
In the Vogt case the Court considered that ‘in particular, the Commission has the obligation 
in every case to take measures to guarantee the life and physical integrity of all persons whose 
rights may be violated’.115 Whether this means that it should always immediately request the 
Court to order provisional measures in cases that can go to the Court and should reserve its pre-
cautionary measures for cases that cannot, is not specified. Yet in the past the Court has assumed 
that the Commission initially takes precautionary measures in all urgent cases.116  
                                                 
111 CIDH Napoleon Beazley v. US, 29 December 2003, §51. 
112 “As the Commission has emphasized on numerous occasions, it is beyond question that the 
failure of an OAS member state to preserve a condemned prisoner's life pending review of his or 
her complaint undermines the efficacy of the Commission's process, deprives condemned persons 
of their right to petition in the inter-American human rights system, and results in serious and 
irreparable harm to those individuals. For these reasons, the Commission has determined that a 
member state disregards its fundamental human rights obligations under the OAS Charter and 
related instruments when it fails to implement precautionary measures issued by the Commission 
in these circumstances”. CIDH Napoleon Beazley v. US, 29 December 2003, §52, referring to 
Juan Raul Garza v. United States, §117 and Fifth Report on the Situation of Human Rights in 
Guatemala, 6 April 2001, §§71-72. 
113 IACHR James et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Order of 26 September 2001. 
114 See also CEJIL, La Competencia de la CIDH, comunicado del Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho 
Internacional (CEJIL), in: La Nacion, 5 April 2001, <www.nacion.com> (consulted 2 April 
2002). 
115 IACHR Vogt case, Order of 27 June 1996. 
116 Judge Cançado Trindade argues that the Commission should always refer requests for provisional 
measures to the Court, without first using its own precautionary measures. He considers that the 
latter ‘lack conventional force’. IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião 
Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, 
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The Commission uses terminology such as ‘requests’ and its Reports include recommenda-
tions. Still, State parties to the American Convention are bound not to violate the rights it contains 
and have accepted the Commission’s role in monitoring this. In any case, the fact that the Com-
mission issues recommendations as to how to remedy a violation, does not detract from the bind-
ing character of its precautionary measures. After all there are situations where the Commission is 
the ultimate interpreter of a State’s obligations within the OAS system. It is argued that as part of 
the latter function, as it is the only adjudicator interpreting and determining a State’s obligations 
under the OAS Charter, its precautionary measures must be respected. Otherwise the individual 
complaint system developed by the Commission under the OAS Statute and American Declara-
tion, as confirmed by the OAS political bodies, would be deprived of effectiveness exactly in the 
most pressing cases.117 The Commission does not distinguish the precautionary measures under 
the Convention from those made as part of the adjudicatory function assigned to it by the OAS 
States under the OAS Charter, monitoring compliance with the American Declaration. Indeed it 
would appear artificial to argue that in the former case they are not legally binding and in the 
latter they are. Moreover, with regard to its function under the Convention, where the Commis-
sion may also request the Court to order provisional measures, if it indeed does so, but before the 
Court’s staff in Costa Rica and the Court itself or its President has had the opportunity to deal 
with this request, the Commission’s precautionary measures are also binding by virtue of the 
binding nature of the Court’s provisional measures themselves. After all the State may not quickly 
pre-empt any decision by the Court to order provisional measures by taking irreversible action, in 
the face of the Commission’s decision to use precautionary measures and request the Court’s 
provisional measures. Finally, if the Commission fails to request the Court’s provisional measures 
and continues to use its own precautionary measures in a case in which it the State concerned has 
recognized the competence of the Court to deal with cases, this deserves criticism, but it does not 
absolve the State from complying in good faith with its obligations under the ACHR, an obliga-
tion brought to its attention specifically by the use of precautionary measures.  
                                                                                                                       
Separate Opinion Judge Cançado Trindade, §30. At the same time he argues for the Court’s 
power to order provisional measures in matters still pending before the Commission when the 
petitioners, rather than the Commission, request them, in such cases where the Commission does 
not motivate its denial. Such situation ‘legitimizes the potential victims, as subjects of 
international human rights law, to resort to the Court to seek the granting of these provisional 
measures; otherwise, there could be a denial of justice at the international level’, ibid. Yet it is 
submitted here that all human rights adjudicators have the inherent power to order provisional 
measures that are legally binding, unless this is explicitly excluded in their constituent document. 
The latter is the case with regard to dealing with requests for provisional measures by petitioners 
rather than the Commission in matters still pending before that Commission. While the 
Commission indeed must motivate its decisions and must make sure that individuals have access 
to the highest level of decision-making available within the system, this is unrelated to the lack of 
explicit conventional basis of its own precautionary measures. Moreover, as argued in this 
chapter, the absence of an explicit conventional basis does not mean that its precautionary 
measures, which are after all the only options in cases involving States that have not recognized 
the competence of the Court, are not legally binding. 
117 See also e.g. Pasqualucci (2005), p. 25. 
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2.4.3.6 AFRICAN COMMISSION ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF ITS PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES 
The African Commission has pointed out that it was one of its functions to assist States in the 
implementation of their obligations under the ACHPR. After the execution of Ken Saro-Wiwa the 
Commission found that Nigeria had violated its obligations under Article 1 ACHPR by ‘ignoring 
its obligations to institute provisional measures’. This article stipulates:  
“The Member States of the Organisation of African Unity parties to the present Charter shall 
recognise the right, duties and freedoms enshrined in this Charter and shall undertake to adopt 
legislative or other measures to give effect to them”. 
The Commission strongly condemned the execution:  
“To have carried out the execution in the face to pleas to the contrary by the Commission and 
world opinion is something which we pray will never happen again. That it is a violation of the 
Charter is an understatement”.118 
2.4.3.7 EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF ITS PROVISIONAL 
MEASURES 
In Mamatkulov (2005) the ECtHR Grand Chamber pointed out with regard to the practice of the 
former Commission: “Even before the provisions regulating the question of interim measures 
came into force, the Commission had not hesitated to ask respondent Governments for a stay of 
execution of measures liable to make the application pending before it devoid of purpose”.119 
Later the Commission formally included a rule in its Rules of Procedure. Two old cases have 
some significance to the discussion on the legal status of provisional measures. 
In October 1971 the Commission gave precedence to a complaint against eviction. Al-
though it did not use provisional measures the ensuing domestic discussion about the obligation 
of States to enable the Commission to operate effectively is interesting for understanding the legal 
status of provisional measures. In the domestic proceedings counsel argued that the eviction of the 
petitioner should be postponed pending the proceedings before the Commission. He submitted 
that the eviction would render the Commission’s decision ineffective from the outset. In February 
1972 the district court determined that the execution of its eviction order of April 1971 should be 
suspended until December 1972, provided that the petitioner paid compensation to the owner of 
the house for the use of the house and the settlement of arrears. It considered that Germany was 
required, under then Article 28, ‘to furnish to the Commission all necessary facilities for the 
effective conduct of the investigation’.120 The domestic court also considered ‘of decisive influ-
ence’ that the Commission ‘must not be prevented by accomplished facts from investigating the 
                                                 
118 IACHPR International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project and Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-
wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, published in 7 International Human Rights 
Reports 274 (2000), §115.  
119 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §106. 
120 EComHR Raupp v. FRG, 5207/71, Decision of 1 June 1972, Collection of Decisions 42, May 
1973; X v. FRG, 5207/71, 13 December 1971, Collection of Decisions 39, June 1972, p. 92: 
Decision of the District Court of Würzburg of 4 February 1972 (translation by the Council of 
Europe). 
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application’.121 It noted that ‘compulsory eviction, and the possible consequences thereof with 
regard to the debtor’s state of health, would render it impossible for the European Commission of 
Human Rights, thereby faced with accomplished facts, to fulfil the tasks incumbent on it under 
Article 28 of the Convention’.122 
In the first Greek case, in which it had used provisional measures, the European Commis-
sion pointed out that it ‘was established under Article 19 of the Convention with the task to en-
sure, together with the Court, the observance of the engagements undertaken by the High Con-
tracting Parties in the Convention’.123 
The main cases in which the Commission had to deal with the legal status of provisional 
measures were those of Mansi and Cruz Varas. It argued that they were legally binding, but the 
ECtHR subsequently found that they were not. This situation continued for more than ten years 
until the judgment of the first section and later the Grand Chamber in the case Mamatkulov. 
Mr. Cruz Varas, faced with an expulsion order, had petitioned the European Commission on 
Human Rights, claiming his expulsion by Sweden to Chile, at the time still under General Pino-
chet, would result in the breach of certain articles of the European Convention, most importantly 
the prohibition of torture, or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment (Article 3 ECHR). 
The Commission had used provisional measures, under Rule 36 of its Rules of Procedure, to stay 
the expulsion until the Convention organs had had a chance to examine the issue. Mr. Cruz Varas 
was forced to return to Chile notwithstanding this provisional measure. 
As the Court put it, Sweden was the first ECHR Contracting State which chose not to re-
spect a provisional measure.124 In the Commission’s view Sweden’s behaviour was contrary to 
                                                 
121 EComHR Raupp v. FRG, 5207/71, Decision of 1 June 1972, Collection of Decisions 42, May 
1973; X v. FRG, 5207/71, 13 December 1971, Collection of Decisions 39, June 1972, p. 93: “The 
European Convention on Human Rights and the Rules of Procedure of the European Commission 
of Human Rights do not, like Art. 572(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure, make provision for a 
temporary order granting a stay of execution of the disputed decision. However, Art. 572(2) of 
the Code of Civil Procedure is applicable mutatis mutandis; the principle underlying this 
provision, namely that the decision of a higher authority must not be anticipated, applies equally 
in respect of an individual application to the European Commission of Human Rights. The 
Federal Republic of Germany did not oppose the application mutatis mutandis of Art. 572(2) of 
the Code of Civil Procedure, for the reason that such application mutatis mutandis would, in the 
result, meet the obligation imposed upon the Federal Republic of Germany under Art. 25(1), in 
fine of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”. 
122 Subsequently the Commission declared the case inadmissible for abuse of the right of petition. It 
noted that without good reason the petitioner had failed to comply with the terms of the stay of 
execution of the eviction order. It observed that her failure to pay compensation was ‘not only 
contrary to repeated assurances previously given by her in the present proceedings; it also 
disregards the decision of the District Court which was taken under Art. 28(a) in fine of the 
Convention in order to facilitate the Commission’s investigation of the present case’. Thus, it 
could only conclude that the petitioner was ‘taking advantage of the proceedings before the 
Commission in order to evade her obligation under domestic law to pay compensation for the use 
of the house concerned’, p. 90. It referred to the description by Senior Judge Spies of the District 
Court of Würzburg: ‘she clearly believed that, because of the state of her health, she could live in 
someone else’s house without paying compensation’, p. 93. 
123 EComHR First Greek case, Denmark, Norway, Sweden and the Netherlands v. Greece, 3321-
3323/67 and 3344/67, 24 January 1968. 
124 ECtHR Case of Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, Judgment of 20 March 1991, §121. This is not 
entirely correct. There had been a handful of cases in which there had been problems before, see 
e.g. EComHR Lynas v. Sweden, 6 October 1976 and S.I.G. v. the Netherlands, 10 October 1985 
(inadm.). Non-compliance sometimes related to the timing of the provisional measure. For a case 
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the spirit of the Convention, and to Article 25(1), now Article 34 ECHR, on the right of individual 
petition in particular. The Court, however, decided that States parties were not bound by the 
Commission’s provisional measures, because no provision in the Convention itself dealt specifi-
cally with the issue, and neither Article 25, nor other rules of law could be interpreted as such. 
The State had argued that the right of petition had so far been interpreted as exclusively 
procedural and the Commission’s interpretation that it protected petitioners from irreparable harm 
‘found no support in the wording of the provision or in legal writing’.125 
The European Commission on Human Rights, by a 12-1 vote, concluded that Cruz Varas’ 
expulsion resulted in a violation of the right of petition. It did not, however, regard the undertak-
ing under that article to imply a general duty to suspend measures domestically or not to enforce 
domestic decisions in all cases where an individual had lodged an application with the Commis-
sion. There could, nevertheless, be special circumstances where the enforcement of a national 
decision could indeed be in conflict with the effective exercise of the right to petition. In the 
Commission’s opinion this was particularly the case when the enforcement of such a national 
decision would result in serious and irreparable damage to the petitioner and when the Commis-
sion had used provisional measures indicating that it was desirable not to enforce that decision.126 
On the one hand, the Commission stated, an applicant is entitled, to the ‘effective exercise’ of his 
right to petition to the Commission, meaning that the Contracting State shall not prevent the 
Commission from making an effective examination of the application, and, on the other hand, an 
applicant claiming a violation of Article 3 (prohibition of torture and cruel or degrading treatment 
or punishment) is entitled to an effective examination of whether the intended extradition or 
expulsion would indeed be a violation of that article. In these circumstances provisional measures 
serve the purpose, as the Commission puts it, ‘of enabling the Commission, and subsequently the 
Court or Committee of Ministers, to examine effectively an application and to ensure the effec-
tiveness of the safeguard provided by Article 3’.127 The deportation, in this case, was contrary to 
the spirit of the Convention and incompatible the right of petition.128 
The question could be raised whether the Court would have decided the way it did, had the 
petitioner, upon return to Chile, indeed been tortured, disappeared or executed. This happened to 
a Jordanian who was expelled by Sweden and who was tortured upon return in Jordan. In this 
case a friendly settlement was reached.129  
                                                                                                                       
on non-compliance, if one can say so relating to a very early case, dating from before the 
introduction of a rule on provisional measures in the Commission’s rules of procedure, X. v. 
Austria and Yugoslavia, 30 June 1964 (inadm.), where on 10 March 1964 a group of three 
members of the Commission had informally requested Austria not to return a person to 
Yugoslavia. After this request failed and the person was extradited, a phone call was made to the 
Permanent Delegation to inquire about the situation and subsequently, in plenary session, the 
Commission decided to give precedence to the case and to request details on the extradition. 
125 ECtHR Case of Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, Judgment of 20 March 1991, §92. 
126 Id., §118. 
127 Id., §120. 
128 Id., §122. 
129 EComHR Mansi v. Sweden, 9 March 1990 (friendly settlement). In this case, like in the case 
Cruz Varas, a provisional measure was used. The case was introduced and registered on 19 
October 1989. On that same day the President of the Commission, in accordance with Rule 36, 
decided to indicate that it was ‘desirable in the interest of the parties and the proper conduct of 
the proceedings before the Commission not to deport the applicant to Jordan until the 
Commission had had an opportunity to examine the application at its forthcoming session from 6 
to 10 November 1989’. The petitioner was nevertheless expelled to Jordan on 21 October 1989. 
See admissibility decision of 7 December 1990. When the Commission heard this, it decided to 
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After Mansi’s expulsion, contrary to the Commission’s provisional measures, Mr Mansi had 
met with a representative of Amnesty International and a representative of the Swedish embassy 
at Amman. These reported he had been tortured and had required hospitalization. 
The Commission considered that Sweden’s failure to comply with the provisional measures 
of the Commission raised the question whether there had been a violation of Article 25 (1) ECHR 
(the present Article 34) in conjunction with Article 1 ‘in view of the special nature of the alleged 
violation of Article 3 of the Convention’. This question involved issues that, in the Commission’s 
view, justified further examination.130 In January 1990 the petitioner returned to Sweden. He 
reached a friendly settlement with the State.131 Consequently the case was struck out and only in 
the other case in which Sweden ignored the Commission’s provisional measures a decision on the 
merits was reached. That case was subsequently brought before the Court. 
2.4.3.8 ECTHR ON THE LEGAL STATUS OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
In the aforementioned Cruz Varas case, different from the Commission, the Court, by a narrow 
majority, found that States parties to the ECHR were not legally bound to respect provisional 
measures.132 This judgment not only drew a strong dissenting opinion, but also many critical 
commentaries.133 At the same time States, even from other continents, have referred to this case to 
justify non-compliance with provisional measures.134 Years later, in an admissibility decision in 
Conka (2001) the Court’s Third Section simply confirmed Cruz Varas without further discus-
sion.135  
Yet in Mamatkulov first the Court's First Section (2003) and later the Grand Chamber 
(2005) found that under Article 34 ECHR States are obliged to respect its provisional measures.136 
In subsequent cases it explicitly stated that its provisional measures are legally binding.137 
                                                                                                                       
take another provisional measure, namely that the Government of Sweden ‘take measures which 
will enable the applicant to return to Sweden as soon as possible’. Eventually, the question 
whether the expulsion was in violation of the Articles 3 and 25 remained unresolved, since a 
friendly settlement was reached. Friendly settlement Report adopted by the Commission on 9 
March 1990, pursuant to Article 28(2) ECHR.  
130 EComHR Mansi v. Sweden, 7 December 1989 (adm.), ‘The Law’ (2), 5th paragraph. 
131 EComHR Mansi v. Sweden, 9 March 1990 (friendly settlement). 
132 ECtHR Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 20 March 1991. 
133 MacDonald, for instance, argued that ‘(p)arties who submit to the jurisdiction of a court have the 
implied obligation not to act in such a way as to render the judgment of the court meaningless’. 
MacDonald (1992), p. 730. See further, e.g. the strongly critical comments by Cohen-Jonathan 
(1991), pp. 205-209 and Oellers-Frahm (1991), pp. 197-199. 
134 See e.g. CAT T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000, §8.2. 
135 ECtHR Conka v. Belgium, 13 March 2001 (adm.), §11. 
136 See Judgment of the First Section, 6 February 2003. Its finding on Article 34 had been made by 
six votes to one (with Türmen, the Turkish judge, dissenting). Turkey had requested the case to 
be referred to the Grand Chamber in April 2003 and a panel of the Grand Chamber decided to 
accept this request in May 2003. The composition of the Grand Chamber (17 members) was 
determined according to the provisions of Article 27(2) and (3) ECHR and Rule 24 of the Rules 
of Court. Mr. Türmen was the only member of the Chamber also participating in the Grand 
Chamber decision. 
137 ECtHR Aoulmi v. France, 17 January 2006, §112. See also Rieter (2007) and the discussion 
below. 
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While in Mamatkulov it only found a violation of Article 34 ECHR (effective exercise of 
the right of application), the Court did make a link with the ‘core rights’ under the Convention. It 
noted that ‘there is plausibly asserted to be a risk of irreparable damage to the enjoyment by the 
applicant of one of the core rights under the Convention’. In such cases ‘the object of an interim 
measure is to maintain the status quo pending the Court’s determination of the justification for the 
measure’. The provisional measure ‘goes to the substance of the Convention complaint’, ‘being 
intended to ensure the continued existence’ of the subject matter. The petitioner seeks the ‘preser-
vation of the asserted Convention right before irreparable damage is done to it’. Thus, the ECtHR 
concluded that the provisional measure is sought by the petitioner and granted by the Court ‘in 
order to facilitate the “effective exercise” of the right of individual petition under Article 34 of the 
Convention in the sense of preserving the subject-matter of the application when that is judged to 
be risk of irreparable damage through the acts or omissions of the respondent State’.138  
2.4.4 The status of provisional measures: Mamatkulov singled out 
2.4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
The aforementioned Mamatkulov judgment of the Grand Chamber is discussed from three 
interrelated perspectives: the methods of treaty interpretation, the case law of other adjudicators 
and the issue of general principles of law. Finally the Court’s reasoning for the reversal of Cruz 
Varas (1991) is analysed.  
2.4.4.2 MAMATKULOV AND TREATY INTERPRETATION 
In its interpretation of Article 34 the ECtHR set out with a reference to the case Loizidou (1995):  
“The Court has previously stated that the provision concerning the right of individual 
application (Article 34, formerly Article 25 of the Convention before Protocol No. 11 came into 
force) is one of the fundamental guarantees of the effectiveness of the Convention system of 
human-rights protection. In interpreting such a key provision, the Court must have regard to the 
special character of the Convention as a treaty for the collective enforcement of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms. Unlike international treaties of the classic type, the Convention 
comprises more than mere reciprocal engagements between Contracting States. It creates, over 
and above a network of mutual, bilateral undertakings, objective obligations which, in the words 
of the Preamble, benefit from a ‘collective enforcement’”.139 
                                                 
138 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §108. While 
there is no specific provision in the Convention concerning the domains in which Rule 39 will 
apply, requests for its application usually concern the right to life (Article 2), the right not to be 
subjected to torture or inhuman treatment (Article 3) and, exceptionally the right to respect for 
private and family life (Article 8) or other rights guaranteed by the Convention. The vast majority 
of cases in which interim measures have been indicated concern deportation and extradition 
proceedings”. ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, 
§104. 
139 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §100, referring 
to Loizidou v. Turkey, 23 March 1995 (preliminary objections), §70. 
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It referred to the object and purpose of the Convention ‘as an instrument for the protection of 
individual human rights’. This required an interpretation and application of its provisions ‘so as to 
make its safeguards practical and effective’.140 It reiterated that the undertaking not to hinder the 
effective exercise of the right of individual petition ‘precludes any interference with the individ-
ual’s right to present and pursue his complaint before the Court effectively’. In that context it is 
‘of the utmost importance for the effective operation of the system of individual application insti-
tuted under Article 34 that applicants or potential applicants should be able to communicate freely 
with the Court without being subjected to any form of pressure from the authorities to withdraw 
or modify their complaints’. This ‘pressure’ included ‘not only direct coercion and flagrant acts of 
intimidation against actual or potential applicants, members of their family or their legal represen-
tatives, but also other improper indirect acts or contacts designed to dissuade or discourage appli-
cants from pursuing a Convention remedy’.141  
The Court found that the obligation set out in Article 34 required the Contracting States ‘to 
refrain not only from exerting pressure on applicants, but also from any act or omission which, by 
destroying or removing the subject-matter of an application, would make it pointless or otherwise 
prevent the Court from considering it under its normal procedure’.142 Its next step was to examine 
whether the extradition hindered the effective exercise of the petitioner’s right of application. The 
Court noted that the petitioners had ‘plausibly asserted’ that there was a risk of irreparable harm 
to ‘one of the core rights under the Convention’. In such cases ‘the object of an interim measure is 
to maintain the status quo pending the Court’s determination of the justification for the measure’. 
The Grand Chamber found that it ‘was prevented from properly assessing whether the applicants 
were exposed to a real risk of ill-treatment and, if so, from ensuring in this respect a “practical 
and effective” implementation of the Conventions safeguards, as required by its object and pur-
pose’.143  
The Court noted that under the Convention system provisional measures, ‘as they have con-
sistently been applied in practice’ equally ‘play a vital role in avoiding irreversible situations that 
would prevent the Court from properly examining the application and, where appropriate, secur-
ing to the applicant the practical and effective benefit of the Convention rights asserted’.  
“Accordingly, in these conditions a failure by a respondent State to comply with interim 
measures will undermine the effectiveness of the right of individual application guaranteed by 
Article 34 and the State’s formal undertaking in Article 1 to protect the rights and freedoms set 
forth in the Convention”.144 
The Court’s provisional measures ‘permit it not only to carry out an effective examination of the 
application but also to ensure that the protection afforded to the applicant by the Convention is 
                                                 
140 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §101, adding 
that any interpretation had to be consistent with ‘the general spirit of the Convention, an 
instrument designed to maintain and promote the ideals and values of a democratic society’, see 
Soering v. UK, 7 July 1989, §87 and, mutatis mutandis, Klass and others v. Germany, 6 
September 1978, §34. 
141 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, § 102, referring 
to Akdivar and others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, §105; Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, 
§105; Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, § 159 and Petra v. Romania, 23 September 1998, §43.  
142 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, § 102, referring 
to Akdivar and others v. Turkey, 16 September 1996, §105; Aksoy v. Turkey, 18 December 1996, 
§105; Kurt v. Turkey, 25 May 1998, § 159 and Petra v. Romania, 23 September 1998, §43.  
143 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §108. 
144 Id., §125. 
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effective’.145 Moreover, its provisional measures enable the Committee of Ministers to supervise 
the execution of the final judgment and thus the Addressee State ‘to discharge its obligation to 
comply with the final judgment of the Court, which is legally binding by virtue of Article 46 of 
the Convention’.146 In other words, provisional measures ‘must be examined in the light of the 
obligations which are imposed on the Contracting States by Articles 1, 34 and 46 of the Conven-
tion’.147 
In this case ‘the applicants were hindered in the effective exercise of their right of individ-
ual application guaranteed by Article 34 of the Convention, which the applicants’ extradition 
rendered nugatory’.148 The previous Section Judgment in Mamatkulov also used the word nuga-
tory in the same context,149 a term earlier utilised by the HRC with relation to the importance of 
respecting its provisional measures.150 The Grand Chamber found a violation of Article 34 by 14 
votes to three.151 
Judge Cabral Barreto (Portugal) concurred in finding a violation of Article 34 ECHR but he 
would have wished to maintain Cruz Varas.152 He considered that only ‘if a refusal to comply 
with a request for interim measures has hindered the exercise of the right to application, the con-
clusion must be that there has been a violation of the obligations arising under Article 34 of the 
Convention’. This would be different if the applicant has nevertheless been able to exercise the 
right of petition effectively and the Court has been able to properly examine the case. He men-
tioned detention cases in particular. In such cases, he noted, ‘a person is suffering from an illness 
in conditions which may come within Article 3 of the Convention and are so bad as to justify 
interim measures being taken to bring the situation to an end’. He pointed out: “In such cases, the 
procedural aspects do not come into play”. 
“While the government’s failure to comply with the Court’s request may entail a finding of a 
violation, even an aggravated violation, of Article 3, it will not give rise to a violation of Article 
34 as the applicant has exercised his right of application and the Court duly examined the 
complaint”. 
In his view provisional measures may be taken in detention cases, but these would not be legally 
binding because the procedural aspects of Article 34 do not come into play.153 
                                                 
145 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §§125 and 126. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Ibid. 
148 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §127. 
149 ECtHR (First section) Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, 6 February 2003, §109. 
150 HRC Piandiong v. Philippines, 19 October 2000, §5.2. 
151 Wildhaber, President (Switzerland), Rozakis, Vice-President (Greece), Costa, Vice-President 
(France), Bratza, Section President (UK), Bonello, (Malta), Palm (Sweden), Tulkens (Belgium), 
Vajić (Croatia), Hedigan (Ireland), Pellonpää (Finland), Tsatsa-Nikolovska (FRYM), Baka 
(Hungary) and Pavlovschi (Moldova); Cabral Barreto concurring; Caflisch (Switzerland), 
Türmen (Turkey) and Kovler (Russia) dissenting. 
152 He disagreed with the reasoning behind this finding of a violation of Article 34. He did not 
consider that such finding should result automatically any time a State would ignore the Court’s 
provisional measures. He considered that the Court was prevented from according binding force 
to provisional measures and imposing on the States obligations that they had always declined to 
accept. Concurring Opinion Judge Cabral Barreto, ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and 
Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004. 
153 Another example he gave is when a Contracting State extradites a petitioner to a death penalty 
State despite the Court’s provisional measures. He considered that in such cases the person 
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Judges Caflisch (Switzerland), Türmen (Turkey) and Kovler (Russia) dissented with regard 
to the legal status of the Court’s provisional measures. Their main conclusion was that the matter 
was one of legislation rather than judicial action.  
“As neither the constitutive instrument of this court nor general international law allows for 
holding that interim measures must be complied with by States, the Court cannot decide the 
contrary and, thereby, impose a new obligation on States Parties. To conclude that this Court is 
empowered, de lege lata, to issue binding provisional measures is ultra vires. Such a power may 
appear desirable; but it is up to the Contracting Parties to supply it”.154  
They noted that while the Court’s decision was ambiguous, not referring directly to the legal 
consequences of provisional measures under Rule 39, ‘it can be deduced from paragraph 128 of 
the Judgment that the majority wishes to attribute binding effect to such measures’. They pointed 
out that the judgment based the mandatory nature of provisional measures ‘essentially’ on Article 
34 and asserted that this article could not serve as a basis for holding that the Court’s provisional 
measures are binding.  
“There certainly are cases where the Court has all the elements to examine the applicant’s 
complaint despite non-compliance; and there are also cases where the Court applies Rule 39 to 
the applicant (for instance, in cases of hunger strike) and not to the government”.155 
Moreover, even if the Court could not properly examine the applicant’s complaint because of 
non-compliance with provisional measures, the dissenters would not find a violation of Article 
34.156 
The dissenters noted, first of all, that the text does not refer to provisional measures. Sec-
ondly, they saw ‘little reason’ to rely heavily on the object and purpose of the treaty, as the Court 
had done by invoking the ‘living instrument’ doctrine. They pointed out that in Cruz Varas the 
Court had not even expressly invoked the teleological method. They added that ‘nothing much 
has changed between the time at which that judgment was made and now’. They considered that: 
‘binding interim measures were as desirable then as they are today yet they cannot be justified 
without an enabling provision in the Convention, the Court’s constitutive instrument’.157  
The dissenters noted that the Court’s judgment in Cruz Varas referred to the fact that a pro-
vision similar to Article 41 ICJ Statute was not included in the Convention despite proposals to 
                                                                                                                       
extradited is able to present his complaint before the ECtHR ‘in better conditions’ because he has 
a lawyer in the State to which he has been extradited. Concurring Opinion Judge Cabral Barreto, 
ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004. He put it as 
follows: “However, the fact that the applicant was represented by a lawyer who worked in the 
requesting State meant had [sic] permitted useful contact between the applicant and his lawyer 
and, in a way, helped the applicant to present his complaint in better conditions”. 
154 Joint partly Dissenting Opinion judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §25. 
155 On this issue see Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on addressees and beneficiaries. 
156 Joint partly Dissenting Opinion judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §2. 
157 Ibid. 
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that effect.158 This circumstance was ‘certainly not favourable to reading a power to issue binding 
provisional measures into the Convention’.159 
Resorting to the analysis in Cruz Varas they referred to ‘early unsuccessful attempts of 
Convention organs at adopting recommendations in the matter’.160 They considered that there was 
no agreement of the parties regarding the interpretation of the Convention on the issue, as re-
quired by Article 31(3) (b) VCLT.161  
The dissenters in Mamatkulov referred to the practice of the ECtHR itself: ‘[i]n the present 
case the Court itself considered its interim measures to be optional’. “This is evident from the 
wording of Rule 39, which uses the words ‘indicate’ and ‘should be adopted’, as well as from the 
text of the letter of 18 March 1999 addressed to Turkey, the respondent State”.162 
Finally they pointed out that the Judgment did not address the question whether the Court 
also considered legally binding its provisional measures in Inter-State cases:  
“[I]f the binding character of interim measures could be derived from the necessity of giving 
full effect to the right of individual application enshrined in Article 34 of the Convention, what 
would the situation in inter-State cases be? Would measures indicated in such cases continue to 
be optional? Or would they be considered binding, by analogy, to give the fullest effect possible 
to Article 33 (inter-State cases) of the Convention?”163 
2.4.4.3 EVALUATION OF THE COURT’S TREATY INTERPRETATION 
Judge Cabral Barreto seems to take a rather limited and technical approach to Article 34, not 
taking into account the individual complaint system as such. After all there are more situations 
than those involving refoulement in which certain violations are impending or ongoing. If a hu-
man rights case is pending before it the adjudicator must be able to effectively intervene to pre-
vent irreparable harm to the petitioners. Without this there cannot be an effective system of litiga-
                                                 
158 ECtHR Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, §95. 
159 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, Joint partly 
dissenting opinion judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, §17.  
160 Id., §18, referring to Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, §96. 
161 They referred to the proposals of the European Commission on Human Rights (DH-PR (94) 2 
and DH-PR (94) 4, 31 January 1994), the Court and the Swiss Delegation to include an article on 
legally binding provisional measures in Protocol 11, proposals that were rejected by the 
Government experts. They noted that the Committee of Ministers had subsequently also ignored 
a similar proposal by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography. They referred to 
Draft Report AS/PR (1997) 2 by the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Demography, 
revised on 19 February 1997. “This can only mean that the widespread acceptance of the practice 
in question rests on courtesy, cooperation and convenience, but not an agreed interpretation”. 
ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, Joint partly 
dissenting opinion judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, §19. They added that the Committee of 
Ministers had not ‘seen fit to suggest the introduction of binding provisional measures in Draft 
Protocol No. 14’. “Again this must have been so because there was no agreement on making such 
measures compulsory and not because the Committee thought it superfluous to do anything on 
the assumption that provisional measures were binding”. Ibid. 
162 The dissenters quoted from this letter, emphasising the words ‘indiquer’ and ‘souhaitable’. 
ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, Joint partly 
dissenting opinion judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, §20. 
163 Id., §7. 
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tion securing the protection of human rights. In fact, the Grand Chamber itself makes a link to the 
claims and reparation that Cabral Barreto overlooks. 
The Court’s practice of using provisional measures in the context of Article 3 has been ex-
tensive.164 The Court seems to indicate that its provisional measures to maintain the status quo 
pending the proceedings are essential for the effective exercise of the right of petition only in 
cases involving ‘core rights’ and it has specified these as the right to life (Article 2) and the pro-
hibition of torture and cruel treatment (Article 3). 
Indeed, ignoring provisional measures may not only result in a violation of Article 34, but 
in a violation of the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treatment, which have been referred 
to by the Court as ‘core rights’. It would be ironic if the Court’s provisional measures to prevent 
irreparable harm to claims involving such core rights would not be binding because the link with 
the right of petition would be less obvious.165 
Thus, while under general international law the object of provisional measures may relate to 
the maintenance of the status quo in general, the ECtHR did specifically refer to risk of irrepara-
ble harm to one of the ‘core rights’ under the ECHR.166 In other words, it made a link with the 
importance of the rights claimed. It may be assumed that it did so exactly because it wished to 
confirm the obligatory nature of those provisional measures it had used thus far. Article 15 ECHR 
distinguishes certain rights as non-derogable, including the prohibition of torture and cruel treat-
ment.  
The Court has been established ‘to ensure the observance of the engagements undertaken by 
the High Contracting Parties’ (Article 19 ECHR). In order to perform this function properly, also 
in light of the Preamble (e.g. ‘securing the universal and effective recognition and observance’ of 
the rights in the Convention) the Court necessarily has the authority, pending adjudication, to 
order contracting parties to prevent irreparable harm to the life and personal integrity of individu-
als within their jurisdiction. This preventive authority is implied by its function of ensuring the 
observance of the human rights obligations undertaken by the States.  
Under Rule 39 it could also use provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to any 
other claim under the ECHR as well, not involving the right to life and the prohibition of torture 
or cruel treatment. While ignoring such provisional measures would hinder the right of petition as 
well, the risks involved would be less serious. Thus far the Court has on the whole abstained from 
using provisional measures that are entirely unrelated to non-derogable rights.167 Indeed, as noted, 
it has stressed its practice of interpreting Rule 39 narrowly, (almost) only using provisional meas-
ures in the context of Articles 2 and 3 ECHR, referring to these rights as ‘core rights’. Thus the 
Court is unlikely to argue that only those provisional measures are legally binding that would 
hinder the right of petition in the limited sense of access to the Court. 
                                                 
164 In particular in non-refoulement cases.  
165 While not explicitly, by the mere fact of having been taken the Court’s provisional measures of 
September 2008 in the inter-State case of Georgia v. Russia, confirm this. After all, these 
measures cannot be linked to the right of individual complaint, but they clearly involve core 
rights. ECtHR Press release issued by the Registrar, ‘European Court of Human Rights grants 
request for interim measures’, 12 August 2008. 
166 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §108. 
167 EComHR Ennslin, Baader and Raspe v. FRG, 8 July 1978 (inadm.) related to preventing 
irreparable harm to the procedure in the sense of preserving evidence but in the context of an 
Article 3 claim. The first provisional measure in the Öcalan case concerned access to counsel, but 
in the context of a death penalty case. Admittedly, private and family life and interference with 
property rights do not directly relate to non-derogable rights. Nevertheless, these cases seem to be 
an exception to the rule. See further Chapter XII (Other situations). 
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The dissenters saw ‘little reason’ to rely heavily on the object and purpose of the treaty and 
on the Court’s ‘living instrument’ doctrine. Yet, they did not clarify how this issue differed from 
others in which the living instrument doctrine did apply. They only pointed out that the matter 
was not invoked in Cruz Varas. As noted, Cruz Varas was a close decision and following that 
judgment the Court often invoked both the living instrument approach and that of effet utile. In 
addition the Court has observed the attitudes of other adjudicators affirming the binding nature of 
provisional measures equally based on interpretations involving effet utile.  
With regard to the dissenters’ reliance on the wording of the provisional measures taken by 
the Court in Mamatkulov, it must be noted that this is not an approach intended by the words used 
in this particular case. It is customary to phrase letters to respondent States this way, maybe for 
diplomatic reasons, although it would indeed be desirable to adapt its wording.168  
In my view the arguments of the Court must extend to inter-State cases. Admittedly, Article 
33 ECHR does not specifically include the undertaking not to hinder the effective exercise of the 
right of High Contracting Parties to refer alleged breaches of the Convention to the Court. Never-
theless, the undertaking by the Contracting Parties to secure the right to life and the prohibition of 
torture and inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment to everyone within their jurisdiction, 
together with the Court’s task to adjudicate inter-State cases, argues in favour of the Court’s 
implicit authority to order provisional measures that are indeed legally binding. 
2.4.4.4 REFERENCE TO OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEMS 
The overview of relevant international law and practice provided in the Mamatkulov Grand 
Chamber judgment is almost identical to that in the earlier judgment by the first section. With 
regard to human rights petition systems in which the constitutive document does not explicitly 
refer to the power to order provisional measures it discussed the Rule on provisional measures 
adopted by the HRC as well as its decisions that flouting these measures undermines the protec-
tion of Covenant rights through the OP. It quoted extensively from the HRC decision in Pian-
diong (2000). The Grand Chamber also referred to the relevant rule adopted by the Committee 
against Torture and the latter’s decisions that non-compliance could nullify the end result of the 
proceedings before it. After having discussed these two universal systems of human rights protec-
tion, it referred to the ICJ’s interpretation of the obligations under Article 41 ICJ Statute, quoting 
extensively from the LaGrand case (2001). Finally, it referred to the relevant Rule of the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights and the provision in the American Convention on the 
power of the Court to order provisional measures, noting that in James et al. v. Trinidad and 
Tobago the Inter-American Court determined that States must refrain from taking actions that 
may frustrate the restitutio in integrum of the rights of the alleged victims (1999).169 The Court 
                                                 
168 In a report to the General Assembly the Special Rapporteur listed recommendations to States 
with regard to combating torture. The following remark may be useful in this respect. He pointed 
out that ‘(s)ince these recommendations are presented in the language of recommendations, the 
word ‘should’ is consistently used’. He stressed, however, that ‘it must be understood that 
whenever these recommendations are directly based on obligations contained in legal 
instruments, the wording of these recommendations in no way detracts from these obligations”. 
The reference of the dissenters to the use of Rule 39 vis-à-vis the petitioner is interesting, as it 
illustrates the problems involved in this practice, as discussed in Chapter XIII (Protection), 
section 4 on the Addressees of provisional measures. Can the petitioner be found in violation of 
the Convention? Can the Court refuse to intervene to prevent irreparable harm until the petitioner 
respects the proceedings? Would continuing a hunger strike constitute contempt of court? 
169 See Chapter XIII (Protection) about the relationship with reparation. 
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did not mention the African Commission’s Statement following the execution of Ken Saro-
wiwa.170  
With regard to human rights petition systems in which the constitutive document does ex-
plicitly refer to the power to order provisional measures, the Grand Chamber referred to decisions 
of the Inter-American Court and the ICJ, but not to the provisions in the Optional Protocol to 
CEDAW and the Protocol establishing the African Court of Human Rights authorising the CE-
DAW Committee and the African Court, respectively, to use provisional measures.  
The Court acknowledged that it had previously considered that it could not infer the power 
to order legally binding provisional measures from Article 34 ECHR or from other sources.171 
Then it pointed out that this time it would also have regard to ‘general principles of international 
law and the view expressed on this subject by other international bodies’ since its decision in 
Cruz Varas.172 ‘[I]n that connection’ it reiterated that the ECHR should be interpreted in light of 
the rules set out in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). It referred to Art. 
31(3)(c) VCLT stipulating that account must be taken of ‘any relevant rules of international law 
applicable in the relations between the parties’. It must ‘determine the responsibility of the States 
in accordance with the principles of international law governing this sphere, while taking into 
account the special nature of the Convention as an instrument of human rights protection’.173 
“Thus, the Convention must be interpreted so far as possible consistently with the other principles 
of international law of which it forms a part”.174 
It noted that in international legal disputes ‘the purpose of interim measures is to preserve 
the parties’ rights, thus enabling the body hearing the dispute to give effect to the consequences 
which a finding of responsibility following adversarial process will entail’.175 The Court exten-
sively referred to decisions by other international adjudicators emphasising the importance of 
provisional measures to ensure the effectiveness of their decision on the merits.  
It first noted that different rules apply for each adjudicator and then referred to the case law 
of the HRC, CAT, the Inter-American Court and the ICJ. 
In its LaGrand judgment the ICJ referred to ‘the basic function of judicial settlement of in-
ternational disputes by binding decisions’.176 Apart from the terms of Article 41 ICJ Statute (on 
provisional measures) when read in their context, it followed from the object and purpose of that 
Statute ‘that the power to indicate provisional measures entails that such measures should be 
binding, inasmuch as the power in question is based on the necessity, when the circumstances call 
for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final 
judgment of the Court’.177 
The dissenters did not mention the jurisprudence of the HRC and CAT. They simply noted 
that the earlier case law of the ECtHR did not allow ‘reading a rule asserting the binding force of 
                                                 
170 ACHPR International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project and Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-
wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, 31 October 1998, §115.  
171 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §109, referring 
to Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991 and Conka et al. v. Belgium, 13 March 2001 
(partly admissible).  
172 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §110. 
173 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §111, referring 
to Golder v. UK, 21 February 1975, §29. 
174 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §111, referring 
to Grand Chamber, Al-Adsani v. UK, 21 November 2001, §60. On Article 31(3) (c) VCLT see 
Chapter II, section 8. 
175 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §113. 
176 ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §102. 
177 Ibid. 
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interim measures into the Convention’ and that the ICJ’s judgment could not be relied on because 
the ICJ interpreted a provision of its own constitutive treaty.  
The dissenters considered the Court’s reliance on the ICJ’s judgment in LaGrand misguided 
because the ICJ was called upon to interpret a provision of its own constitutive treaty. In this case 
there was ‘a close relation between the enabling treaty provision and the purpose to be 
reached’.178 
“By contrast, no such provision can be found in the European Convention on Human Rights; 
and neither Article 26(d) of that Convention, empowering the Court to enact rules of procedure, 
nor Article 34, instituting the right of individual application, is sufficiently connected to the 
issue under consideration to fill a ‘gap’ in the Convention by instituting binding interim 
measures ex nihilo, thereby imposing on the States Parties to the Convention an obligation 
without their consent. To put it differently, there is a wide difference between the mere 
interpretation of a treaty and its amendment, between the exercise of judicial functions and 
international law-making”.179 
They also noted that ‘Cruz Varas was confirmed, regarding measures issued by the Court itself, in 
the Čonka case, only three months before the LaGrand judgment of the ICJ’.180 
According to the dissenters the judgments Cruz Varas and Čonka mean ‘in essence, that 
while the Court is entitled to interpret the provisions of the Convention, it may not – by way of 
interpretation or through the enactment of rules of procedure, or both – write new rules into the 
Convention, not even if there is a fairly widespread practice in the desired sense, as long as that 
practice is not uniform (see Belgium’s attitude in Čonka or that of Turkey in the present instance), 
accompanied by a corresponding opinio juris’.181 
Finally, they argued that the meaning attributed by the ICJ to the authority to ‘indicate’ pro-
visional measures cannot have an impact on the ECtHR as long as the Convention contains no 
authorisation to ‘indicate’ them.182 
2.4.4.5 EVALUATION OF THE DISSENTERS’ POSITION ON THE REFERENCE TO 
THE PRACTICE OF OTHER ADJUDICATORS 
It is likely that the European Commission and Court included the possibility to use provisional 
measures in their rules of procedure because they considered this possibility essential to their 
function as an adjudicator. It is also likely that they chose the wording of Article 41 ICJ Statute to 
make a connection with existing law on this issue. In this sense the meaning attributed by the ICJ 
to its authority to ‘indicate’ provisional measures certainly can have an impact on the European 
Court’s interpretation. 
By referring to uniform practice the dissenters seem to allude here to the development of 
customary international law without, however, specifying its relevance for the interpretation of 
the Convention obligations and the function of the Court. At the same time they consider that 
State practice should be ‘uniform’. They consider that the practice is not uniform because both 
Turkey and Belgium ignored the Court’s provisional measures in one case. Yet the ICJ deter-
                                                 
178 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, Joint partly 
dissenting opinion judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, §9.  
179 Id., §11. 
180 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §15. 
181 Id., Joint partly dissenting opinion judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, §7.  
182 Id., §21. 
 The Legal Status of Provisional Measures in Human Rights Adjudication 
921 
mined in its Nicaragua judgment that State practice does not have to be uniform, as long as Con-
tracting States generally comply.183 Only in the context of customary law that developed within a 
short time period would it be necessary to show extensive and virtually uniform State practice.184 
2.4.4.6 MAMATKULOV AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
The ECtHR pointed out that in its examination of the Mamatkulov case it would also have regard 
to ‘general principles of international law and the view expressed on this subject by other interna-
tional bodies’ since its decision in Cruz Varas.185 It noted that ‘in the light of the general princi-
ples of international law, the law of treaties and international case-law, the interpretation of the 
scope of interim measures cannot be dissociated from the proceedings to which they relate or the 
decision on the merits they seek to protect’.186 It referred to Article 31(1) Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties stipulating that treaties must be interpreted in good faith in the light of their 
object and purpose ‘and also in accordance with the principle of effectiveness’.187  
In fact while the Court referred to general principles of law it did not specify which particu-
lar principles of international law it considered applicable.188 Yet when looking at the judgment as 
a whole the Court does recognize a principle of law underlying the case law of the various adjudi-
cators. It observed that the ICJ, the IACHR, the HRC and CAT, while obviously operating under 
different treaty provisions, all ‘have confirmed in their reasoning in recent decisions that the 
preservation of the asserted rights of the parties in the face of the risk of irreparable damage repre-
sents an essential objective of interim measures in international law’.  
“Indeed it can be said that, whatever the legal system in question, the proper administration of 
justice requires that no irreparable action be taken while proceedings are pending”.189 
Moreover, the Court reiterated the importance of having remedies with suspensive effect in 
deportation or extradition proceedings.  
                                                 
183 ICJ Case concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua 
v. US), 27 June 1986, §186. The ICJ considered that ‘for a rule to be established as customary’ 
the corresponding practice did not have to be ‘in absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule’. It 
deemed it ‘sufficient that the conduct of States should, in general, be consistent with such rules, 
and that instances of State conduct inconsistent with a given rule should generally have been 
treated as breaches of that rule, not as indications of the recognition of a new rule’. To find a rule 
of customary international law the traditional approach is to look at opinio iuris and practice of 
States, not adjudicators and it is not clear whether States generally complied because they 
considered they were legally bound to do so or simply out of comity. 
184 See ICJ North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany v. the Netherlands), 20 February 1969, §74. 
185 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §110. 
186 Id., §123. 
187 Ibid. Note that Article 31(1) Vienna Convention does not specifically refer to the principle of 
effectiveness. Instead the practice of international adjudicators have understood this as an 
interpretative principle related to object and purpose. 
188 With regard to the principle of effectiveness it probably meant a principle of treaty interpretation, 
not of law. See also section 4 of this Chapter. 
189 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §124. 
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“The notion of an effective remedy under Article 13 requires a remedy capable of preventing 
the execution of measures that are contrary to the Convention and whose effects are potentially 
irreversible”.190 
It argued that the notion of an effective remedy mentioned in Article 13 ECHR is a principle 
inherent in the Convention, applicable not only to the domestic proceedings but also to the 
international proceedings before the ECtHR. 
“It is hard to see why this principle of the effectiveness of remedies for the protection of an 
individual’s human rights should not be an inherent Convention requirement in international 
proceedings before the Court, whereas it applies to proceedings in the domestic legal 
system”.191 
In that sense the Court appears to argue it is a general principle of law that remedies aiming to 
protect against (human rights) violations should be effective.192 Based on this principle, the 
Court’s provisional measures necessarily must be binding. After all, ‘under the Convention sys-
tem, interim measures, as they have consistently been applied in practice’ (…) ‘play a vital role in 
avoiding irreversible situations that would prevent the Court from properly examining the appli-
cation and, where appropriate, securing to the applicant the practical and effective benefit of the 
Convention rights asserted. Accordingly, in these conditions a failure by a respondent State to 
comply with interim measures will undermine the effectiveness of the right of individual applica-
tion guaranteed by Article 34 and the State's formal undertaking in Article 1 to protect the rights 
and freedoms set forth in the Convention’.193 
Provisional measures do not only permit the Court ‘to carry out an effective examination of 
the application but also to ensure that the protection afforded to the applicant by the Convention is 
effective; such indications also subsequently allow the Committee of Ministers to supervise exe-
cution of the final judgment. Such measures thus enable the State concerned to discharge its 
obligation to comply with the final judgment of the Court, which is legally binding by virtue of 
Article 46 of the Convention’.194 
The dissenting opinion provides the opportunity to further discuss some relevant issues. The 
dissenters challenged the argument that in order to meet the object and purpose of the right of 
individual complaint laid down in Art. 34 it is indispensable to accept the mandatory character of 
such measures. They considered that while this may be the case domestically, this is not so inter-
nationally. They advanced several reasons relevant to the discussion on general principles of 
international law. One is that ‘States are entirely free to accept or to refuse compulsory jurisdic-
tion of international courts and, if they do accept it, to limit its scope, for instance by not includ-
ing rules on the binding character of provisional measures’.195 They contrast this to the domestic 
level, ‘where the principle of compulsory jurisdiction of the courts prevails’.196 
                                                 
190 Ibid., referring to Čonka and others v. Belgium, 5 February 2002, §79. 
191 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §124. 
192 At the same time it is a general principle of interpretation that the provisions of a treaty should be 
interpreted so as to ensure their practical and effective implementation. 
193 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §125. 
194 Ibid. 
195 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, Joint partly 
dissenting opinion judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, §16. In this respect the dissenters refer to 
Article 47 (arbitration procedure) of the Washington (World Bank) Convention on the Settlement 
of Investment Disputes (1965). 
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Another reason they advanced involves the relationship between Article 34 ECHR and the 
Court’s provisional measures. The majority found that by ignoring its provisional measures the 
State had hindered the effective exercise of the right of individual complaint. The dissenters point 
out that ‘[b]y providing for interim measures and, a fortiori, by not vesting them with binding 
force, the right of individual application is “hindered” in no way; and to say the contrary would 
stretch the interpretation of Article 34 to a point at which the Court ceases to interpret and as-
sumes legislative functions’.197 
They added that the fact that ‘this is so is shown by other instruments of dispute settlement: 
nowhere else have jurisdiction and the right of application been linked to the issuance and the 
binding force of interim measures’.198  
In this context they pointed out that the argument in LaGrand was based on Article 41 ICJ 
Statute and its reference to the Court’s power to ‘indicate’ provisional measures. It was not based 
on Article 35 ICJ Statute, which was ‘the approximate equivalent’ of Article 34 ECHR. More-
over, Article 63(2) ACHR enabled the Inter-American Court to order provisional measures, but 
Article 34 ECHR could not serve as a ‘reasonable legal basis for drawing a similar conclusion’.199 
The dissenters considered that ‘there may well be a widespread rule on obligatory interim 
measures on the domestic level, based on the rule of compulsory jurisdiction applicable on that 
level’. On the other hand, ‘that rule does not prevail on the international level, which is why it 
cannot be applied as such on that level’. “In other words, the principle cannot be transposed to the 
business of international courts”.200 They concluded as follows: 
“There must, however, be a customary rule allowing international courts and tribunals, even in 
the absence of a treaty provision, to enact Rules of Procedure, a rule which may include the 
power to formulate interim measures. But that rule cannot be taken to include the power to 
prescribe such measures”.201 
2.4.4.7 EVALUATION OF THE DISSENTING OPINION WITH REGARD TO GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES 
It seems that the dissenters recognise a general principle of domestic law that provisional meas-
ures are legally binding, but that they consider that this cannot be a general principle of interna-
tional law because there is no rule of compulsory jurisdiction at the international level. Still, in 
my view once States have recognised an international adjudicator, the same principle of effec-
tiveness applies that requires provisional measures to be binding on the domestic level.  
In view of the fact that they start out by mentioning not only general principles of law, but 
also ‘general international law’, the reference of the dissenters to a ‘customary rule’ probably 
relates to customary international law. They consider that international courts and tribunals may 
                                                 
197 Ibid. The third reason why they consider that on the international level the effectiveness argument 
does not apply is that ‘one should not forget that for many years international tribunals such as 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (1920-1939) and its successor, the ICJ, for most of 
its existence (1946 to 2001), confined themselves to indicating provisional measures without 
specifying their binding character’. 
198 Ibid. 
199 Ibid. 
200 ECtHR Grand Chamber Joint partly Dissenting Opinion judges Caflisch, Türmen and Kovler, 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §22.  
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formulate provisional measures but not to prescribe them. They relate the power to formulate such 
measures to the ‘customary rule’ allowing adjudicators to enact Rules of Procedure.  
The reference by the dissenters to the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Invest-
ment Disputes is not entirely clear. They mention this Convention to illustrate that States are free 
to limit the scope of compulsory jurisdiction by not including rules on the binding character of 
provisional measures. Article 47 of the Washington Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes stipulates: 
“Except as the parties otherwise agree, the Tribunal may, if it considers that the circumstances 
so require, recommend any provisional measures which should be taken to preserve the 
respective rights of either party”. 
The fact, however, that in one treaty States explicitly include the possibility for parties to agree 
that the Tribunal may not use provisional measures does not negate the general principle of the 
inherent power to use provisional measures in systems of adjudication in which this power is not 
explicitly excluded. Neither does the fact that the language with regard to provisional measures 
used in this treaty is rather weak. Moreover, this example is derived from a commercial law 
treaty, making the comparison with the ECHR less appropriate. After all, the object and purpose 
of a human rights adjudication system such as that established under the ECHR, even more 
clearly than an adjudication system such as that established under the ICJ Statute, with general 
jurisdiction,202 requires the use of provisional measures to prevent irreparable harm to, at least, 
life and personal integrity. 
The dissenters’ reliance on the fact that Article 63(2) ACHR explicitly enables the Court to 
order provisional measures and on the fact that the ICJ’s judgment in LaGrand was based on a 
provision of the ICJ Statute specifically dealing with provisional measures (Article 41 ICJ Stat-
ute) does not convince. The fact that these courts obviously also refer to the provisions that spe-
cifically relate to provisional measures does not mean that they consider that there is no inherent 
authority to use binding provisional measures. As discussed, the IACHR has not just referred to 
Article 63(2) ACHR as the basis for its authority to order provisional measures, but also to Article 
62(3) ACHR on reparation, to Article 33 ACHR on the competence of the Commission and Court 
‘with respect to matters relating to the fulfilment of the commitments’ by the States parties as 
well as to ‘the judicial character of the Court and the powers derived therefrom’.203 It has stressed 
‘the Convention’s fundamental objective of guaranteeing the effective protection of human rights’ 
and pointed out that “States Parties must not take any action that will frustrate the restitutio in 
integrum of the rights of the alleged victims”.204 
In LaGrand the ICJ referred to the object and purpose of the ICJ Statute and considered that 
the power to indicate provisional measures entailed ‘that such measures should be binding, inas-
much as the power in question is based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to 
safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final judgment 
of the Court’.205 It also referred to the principle ‘universally accepted by the international tribu-
nals and likewise laid down in many conventions (...) to the effect that the parties to a case must 
abstain from any measure capable of exercising a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of 
                                                 
202 See Chapter I (ICJ). 
203 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi, Solís Corrales and Godínez Cruz cases, Order of 19 
January 1988, 1st ‘Considering’ clause. 
204 IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel, Order for provisional measures, 14 June 1998. 
205 ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §102. 
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the decision to be given, and, in general, not allow any step of any kind to be taken which might 
aggravate or extend the dispute’.206  
Aside from this general principle that States must refrain from causing prejudice to the 
‘execution of the decision to be given’, the HRC and CAT, to which the ECtHR does refer, and 
the African Commission, to which it does not refer, have in fact linked jurisdiction, the right of 
petition to the obligation to respect their provisional measures, focussing on the obligation to 
ensure respect for the ‘core rights’ in the treaties. Specifically, the human rights adjudicators have 
made the link between the importance of the rights to be protected and the binding nature of their 
provisional measures. 
The case law of the ECtHR confirms this. An indication of the importance it attaches to Ar-
ticles 2 (right to life) and 3 ECHR (prohibition or torture and cruel treatment) is the fact that it has 
noted that in expulsion and extradition cases it is only with regard to these rights that the obliga-
tion under Article 1 ECHR applied to ensure the Convention rights to everyone under their juris-
diction. The far reaching obligation not to expel or extradite is derived from the special nature of 
these articles, requiring a reading in conjunction with Article 1 ECHR, implying the principle of 
non-refoulement.207 
Similarly, it is in the context of the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment that effective proceedings before an international adjudicator trigger the inherent power 
to order legally binding provisional measures. The system of adjudication (both individual com-
plaint and inter-State) is undermined in particular by acts threatening the right to life and the 
prohibition of torture as shown in the relation between provisional measures and the right to 
reparation.208 It is exactly in such cases that States are legally bound to comply with provisional 
measures because without them the system of individual complaint itself is made nugatory, as the 
HRC calls it, and restitution in kind would be made impossible. 
2.4.4.8 EXPLAINING THE REVERSAL  
The ECtHR observed that in Cruz Varas it only determined the question whether the European 
Commission had power to order legally binding provisional measures. It noted that former Article 
25 applied only to proceedings brought before the Commission, adding that it conferred upon the 
petitioner a right of a procedural nature distinguishable from the substantive rights in the Conven-
tion. “The Court thus confined itself to examining the Commission’s power to order interim 
measures, not its own”.209 The Grand Chamber emphasised that ‘unlike the Court and the Com-
mittee of Ministers, the Commission had no power to issue a binding decision that a Contracting 
State had violated the Convention’. “The Commission’s task with regard to the merits was of a 
preliminary nature and its opinion on whether or not there had been a violation of the Convention 
was not binding”.210 
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With regard to Cruz Varas it stated that ‘[w]hile the Court is not formally bound to follow 
its previous judgments, in the interests of legal certainty and foreseeability it should not depart, 
without good reason, from its own precedents’.211 
“However, it is of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner 
which renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. It is a living 
instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”.212 
In addition, the Court stressed ‘that although the Convention right to individual application was 
originally intended as an optional part of the system of protection, it has over the years become of 
high importance and is now a key component of the machinery for protecting the rights and 
freedoms set forth in the Convention’.213 Moreover, since the entry into force of Protocol 11 ‘the 
right of individual application is no longer dependent on a declaration by the Contracting States’.  
“Thus, individuals now enjoy at the international level a real right of action to assert the rights 
and freedoms to which they are directly entitled under the Convention”.214 
The dissenters extensively quoted from Cruz Varas v. Sweden (1991) and noted that in Čonka v. 
Belgium (2001) the Court confirmed this decision in the context of its own provisional measures. 
Thus, they pointed out that the majority’s interpretation in Mamatkulov that Cruz Varas 
concerned only the Commission’s power to order provisional measures ‘is not very persuasive in 
the light of the Čonka decision, where the Court reiterated the principles set out in Cruz Varas 
with regard to its own jurisdiction’. They considered that there had not been any change since 
Čonka that would justify the ‘diametrically opposite conclusion’ in Mamatkulov and reiterated 
that the Court ‘should not depart, without good reason, from its own precedents’.215 
2.4.4.9 EVALUATION OF THE COURT’S EXPLANATION OF THE REVERSAL 
Indeed the distinction the Court draws between the provisional measures of the Court and those of 
the Commission, so as to justify the revision of its case law, is not very convincing. Even if the 
Commission’s task with regard to the merits ‘was of a preliminary nature’ it was the first adjudi-
cator responsible for dealing with individual complaints. If the Contracting States were free to 
ignore the provisional measures by the Commission, the Court noted, in reference to the ICJ, it 
would be ‘hampered in the exercise of its functions because the respective rights of the parties’ to 
the dispute before it were not preserved.  
                                                 
211 Id., §121, referring to Tyrer v. UK, 25 April 1978, §31 and Christine Goodwin v. UK, 11 July 
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213 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §122. 
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Moreover, the arguments with regard to effectiveness and object and purpose invoked by 
the Grand Chamber, as well as by the various adjudicators it referred to in its judgment, seem to 
apply also to the Commission’s provisional measures and must sound familiar to the members of 
the Commission and the dissenters in the Court’s Cruz Varas judgment. 
The distinction made between the legal status of the provisional measures by the Commis-
sion and the Court is a somewhat artificial attempt to pretend no shift in the case law has taken 
place. Even if the crucial element of Cruz Varas had indeed been the distinction between the 
Commission and the Court, as the Court seems to argue in Mamatkulov, the admissibility decision 
in Čonka v. Belgium clearly indicated that, based on Cruz Varas, the Court’s provisional meas-
ures were not legally binding either. Čonka, of course, is not a very persuasive precedent, because 
the Third Section, in a composition of seven Judges deciding on admissibility, did not really 
discuss and analyse the issue. The fact that it summarily confirmed the controversial judgment in 
Cruz Varas, decided more than ten years previously, with the narrowest of margins, seems more 
of an oversight than anything else.  
In that sense it would have been preferable had the Court explicitly acknowledged its shift 
from Cruz Varas and Čonka to Mamatkulov.216  
It did refer to its general case law on departing from earlier decisions regarding the interests 
of legal certainty and foreseeability and ‘the orderly development of the Convention case-law’ 
and to equality before the law.217 Such concerns, however, ‘would not prevent the Court from 
departing from an earlier decision if it was persuaded that there were cogent reasons for doing so. 
Such a departure might, for example, be warranted in order to ensure that the interpretation of the 
Convention reflects societal changes and remains in line with present-day conditions’.218  
“However, since the Convention is first and foremost a system for the protection of human 
rights, the Court must have regard to the changing conditions within the respondent State and 
within Contracting States generally and respond, for example to any evolving convergence as to 
the standards to be achieved”.219 
In this context the Court has proposed to ‘look at the situation within and outside the Contracting 
State to assess “in the light of present-day conditions” what is now the appropriate interpretation 
and application of the Convention’.220  
“It is of crucial importance that the Convention is interpreted and applied in a manner which 
renders its rights practical and effective, not theoretical and illusory. A failure by the Court to 
                                                 
216 See also Oellers-Frahm (2003), pp. 692-693 discussing the earlier Chamber decision in 
Mamatkulov (arguing that the positive step made by the Court to strengthen the effectiveness of 
the ECHR protection system could have been made explicit) and Tams (2003), p. 689 
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conclusion was exactly the opposite of that in Cruz Varas. The Court’s judgment would have 
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217 See e.g. ECtHR Cossey v. UK, 27 September 1990, §35 (orderly development) and Chapman v. 
UK, 18 January 2001, §70, Goodwin v. UK, 11 July 2002, §74 and Stafford v. UK, 28 May 2002, 
§68 (equality before the law).  
218 ECtHR Cossey v. UK, 27 September 1990, §35. Subsequently the Court used the phrase ‘good 
reason’ (rather than ‘cogent reasons’). See e.g. Goodwin v. UK, 11 July 2002, §74. 
219 See e.g. ECtHR Goodwin v. UK, 11 July 2002, §74, Stafford v. UK, 28 May 2002, §68 and 
Chapman v. UK, 18 January 2001, §70. 
220 See e.g. ECtHR Goodwin v. UK, 11 July 2002, §75, Stafford v. UK, 28 May 2002, §69 and 
references therein. 
 Chapter XVI 
928 
maintain a dynamic and evolutive approach would risk rendering a bar to reform or 
improvement”.221 
While the development to which the Court refers, including the now (since Protocol 11) obliga-
tory respect for the right of petition, is indeed significant, the individuals petitioning the Court in 
the pre-Protocol 11 period equally enjoyed ‘a real right of action’ to assert their rights under the 
Convention. The fact that the Contracting State previously had taken the additional step of recog-
nising the competence of the Court does not detract from the obligations of that State. Through its 
recognition of the competence of the Court the Contracting State had committed itself to preserve 
the rights claimed pending the proceedings and not to hinder the right of individual application. 
There was also good reason to now rule on the basis of the effectiveness approach generally used 
by the Court. 
The Court’s judgment generally has been welcomed.222 Indeed, the prohibition of torture 
was part of the Convention from the outset, as was the idea that the Convention’s substantive 
rights must be effectively ensured. Procedural rights intended to make effective substantive rights, 
such as the right not to be exposed to torture, must be interpreted so as to do just that. Procedural 
rights always assume the existence of substantive rights. Article 34 ECHR (and former Article 25 
ECHR) refers to the obligation not to hinder the right of petition in any way. The open-ended 
phrase ‘in any way’ indicates that the drafters left it to the Court to fill in what this means in 
practice. Ignoring provisional measures appears to be a very good way to hinder the effective 
exercise of the right of petition. 
The power to take provisional measures may be implied given the function of human rights 
adjudicators. In line with the principle of effectiveness applied in the interpretation of human 
rights treaties the binding nature of provisional measures is inherent to the effective exercise of 
this power.  
The power to take such measures can be presumed to be implied in the task of judicial bod-
ies supervising human rights treaties and the principle that these measures must be binding may 
be inherent in the concept of the protection of human rights. In any case it is implied in the State’s 
recognition of the right of individual petition and of the substantive rights in the Convention. 
It is, furthermore, doubtful whether a ‘uniform legal rule’ is necessary to prove the exis-
tence of a general principle. In my view such principle can be derived from national practices on 
provisional or interlocutory measures. These may be filled in differently in different places, but 
that only denies its existence as a ‘uniform rule’, not as a concept or general principle. The con-
cept represented by these measures has been applied in general international law to provide for 
the possibility of provisional measures in cases of international contention. Provisional measures 
in national law are legally binding and must be so, in order to perform their judicial function. 
There is no reason to assume otherwise in international law. 
The judgment of the Grand Chamber, in its conclusion, does not refer to the prevention of 
irreparable harm and does not make an explicit link between Article 34 and Article 3.223 On the 
other hand, earlier in the judgment it does refer to the ‘core rights’ under the Convention, irrepa-
                                                 
221 See Stafford v. UK, 28 May 2002, §68. In fact the Court also used this argument in his decision 
in Mamatkulov, 15 December 2004, §121. 
222 Discussing the 2003 and/or 2005 judgments see e.g. Letsas (2003), pp. 527-538; Oellers-Frahm 
(2003), p. 689; Tigroudja (2003), p. 601 (disagreeing); Rieter (2004), pp. 73-87; Cohen-Jonathan 
(2005b), pp. 283-307; Cohen-Jonathan (2005d); Rieter (2005), pp. 320-324; Vermeulen/de Vries 
(2005); Barkhuysen (2005); Bruin (2005); Mowbray (2005), pp. 377-386 (somewhat critical). 
223 See ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §§128-
129. 
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rable damage and the fact that the petitioners in this case were asserting rights under Articles 2 
and 3.224 
2.4.4.10 DEVELOPMENTS SINCE MAMATKULOV 
Since Mamatkulov the Court’s case law has evolved. In Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain (2006) the 
ECtHR noted, referring to a jurisprudential evolution of the relevant principles, that in Mamatku-
lov it had removed itself from its earlier case law on provisional measures (e.g. Cruz Varas (1991) 
and Conka (2001)).225 It recalled that it applied Rule 39 strictly, ordering provisional measures 
only in a limited range of cases in which there is an imminent risk of irreparable harm.226 It fur-
ther noted that in Shamayev et al. v. Georgia and Russia (2005) it had refined this conclusion 
with the statement that the fact that it was able to examine the case on the merits did not mean 
that Article 34 ECHR was not violated.227 Finally, it referred to Aoulmi, in which it stressed that 
the fact that the obligatory nature of its provisional measures had not yet been made explicit at the 
time of the expulsion did not detract from the obligations of the State under Article 34. It pointed 
out that this was the first time that the Court used the adjective ‘obligatory’ when referring to its 
provisional measures.228 
In the cases Mamatkulov, Shamayev and Aoulmi the State had ignored the Court’s provi-
sional measures. Moreover, the Court had noted that, in addition, upon the extradition or expul-
sion of the petitioners their lawyers had lost all contact with their clients. It found violations of 
Article 34 ECHR. In Aoulmi, for instance, the Court first concluded, more generally, that ‘the 
level of protection that the Court was able to afford the rights which he was asserting under Arti-
cle 3 of the Convention was irreversibly reduced’. It then added that ‘the gathering of evidence in 
support of the applicant’s allegations’ had ‘proved more complex’ as his lawyer had ‘lost all 
contact with him since his expulsion’.229 
Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain (2006) can be distinguished from the previous three cases to the 
extent that counsel was able to stay in touch with the petitioner after he had been extradited in 
violation of the Court’s provisional measures. In this case the ECtHR pointed out that one ques-
tion that still needed an explicit answer was whether the obligation of States to respect provisional 
measures was based on the finding ex post that the effective exercise of the right of petition was 
hindered upon removal. The Court considered that there was a clear difference with the previous 
cases and in that sense it could not conclude that the right to individual petition had been hin-
dered.230 Nevertheless, this conclusion, based on information received subsequent to the use of 
                                                 
224 See ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §108. On 
this issue see also Tams (2003), p. 688. 
225 ECtHR Case of Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, Judgment of 20 March 1991 and Conka et al. 
v. Belgium, Judgment of 13 March 2001 (partly admissible). 
226 ECtHR Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, Judgment of 10 August 2006 (5th Section), §72, referring to 
Mamatkulov, §§103-104 and 128. 
227 ECtHR Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, Judgment of 10 August 2006, §73. 
228 Id., §74, referring to Mamatkulov, §111. 
229 ECtHR Aoulmi v. France, Judgment of 17 January 2006 (4th Section), §104. See also 
Mamatkulov and Askarov, 15 December 2004, §127; Shamayev et al. v. Georgia and Russia, 
Judgment 16 September 2003 (2nd Section) (inadm.), §478 and Aoulmi, Judgment of 17 January 
2006, §93. 
230 ECtHR Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, Judgment of 10 August 2006, §79. The Court expresses it as 
follows: “En conséquence, il n’est pas possible de conclure à l’existence d’une entrave, dans le 
sens des affaires précitées, au droit au recours effectif du requérant”. In fact it may have meant 
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provisional measures did not relieve the State from its obligation not to hinder in any way the 
effective exercise of the right protected by Article 34 ECHR. The ECtHR pointed out that Article 
34 ECHR was in fact closely linked to the Rule on provisional measures laid down in Article 39 
of its Rules. This Rule enabled the Court to consider whether the petitioner would run a risk of 
irreparable harm because of an act or omission by the State. It added that, consequently, Rule 39 
enabled it to consider whether such act or omission would hinder the effective exercise of the 
right of petition.231 
More in particular the Court wished to point out that a provisional measure, by its nature, is 
provisional. Its necessity is evaluated at one particular moment in time by reason of the existence 
of a risk that could hinder the effective exercise of the right of petition in Article 34 ECHR. If the 
State party respects the provisional measure this risk is avoided and a future hindrance of the right 
of petition is eliminated. On the other hand, if the State does not respect the provisional measure, 
the risk of the obstruction of the effective exercise of this right continues and subsequent facts, as 
well as the State’s non-compliance itself, determine whether the risk has become a reality or not. 
Yet even if it has not become a reality, the Court’s provisional measure must be considered le-
gally binding. Whether or not Article 34 ECHR is violated cannot depend on the eventual confir-
mation of the existence of the risk. The fact that a State fails to respect a provisional measure 
decided by the Court, in light of the existence of a risk, is in itself a grave hindrance, at that par-
ticular moment, of the effective exercise of the right of individual petition.232 This was confirmed 
and specified in Paladi (2007) where the Court pointed out that a delay in the implementation of a 
provisional measure could also constitute a violation of Article 34 ECHR. It is not necessary to 
provide evidence of actual harm during the period of delay. Evidence of a risk of irreparable harm 
to one of the ‘core Convention rights’ is sufficient to trigger state responsibility.233 
3 PRINCIPLES OF INTERPRETATION AND GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
The power to order provisional measures has been referred to as an inherent part of the judicial 
function.234 In addition, the PCIJ already noted in the Electricity Company of Sofia in Bulgaria 
case (1939) that Article 41 on provisional measures applied the principle ‘universally accepted by 
international tribunals and likewise laid down in many conventions to which Bulgaria has been a 
party – to the effect that the parties to a case must abstain from any measure capable of exercising 
a prejudicial effect in regard to the execution of the decision to be given and, in general, not allow 
any step of any kind to be taken which might aggravate or extend the dispute’.235 
In both national and international systems for the settlement of legal disputes, the power to 
use provisional measures is a necessary attribute of the judicial function and the obligation to 
                                                                                                                       
that the right of petition was not hindered to the same extent as the cases mentioned previously. 
On Oleachea see also Woltjer (2006); Rieter (2007) and Haeck/Burbano Herrera/Zwaak (2008). 
231 ECtHR Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, Judgment of 10 August 2006, §80, referring to Mamatkulov, 
§108. 
232 ECtHR Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, Judgment of 10 August 2006, §81. 
233 ECtHR Paladi v. Moldova, 10 July 2007. See further Rieter (2007). 
234 Judge Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, in his Separate Opinion in the ICJ Northern Cameroons case, 
Judgment of 2 December 1963 (preliminary objections), p. 103 noted that it is ‘really an inherent 
jurisdiction, the power to exercise which is a necessary condition of the Court or of any court of 
law-being able to function at all’. See also Judge Singh in the ICJ Nuclear Test cases, Order of 22 
June 1973, p. 145 noting that Article 41 reflects an inherent power. 
235 PCIJ Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Order of 5 December 
1939, p. 199. See also Chapter I (ICJ). 
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respect them is necessitated by the effective protection of the right to life and the prohibition of 
torture and cruel treatment of those making use of the right of petition. After all the principle of 
effectiveness or effet utile is a principle of interpretation of particular relevance in human rights 
cases.236 Indeed, such provisional measures by international adjudicators ‘must carry some conno-
tation of obligation if they are to fulfil their function of ensuring some efficacy to the final out-
come of the proceedings’.237 
As discussed in Chapter II, it may be assumed that States have recognized supervisory 
mechanisms to human rights treaties in good faith, meaning that the human rights adjudicators 
established by these treaties have genuinely been assigned the task of monitoring compliance 
with, and therefore interpreting, the provisions of the treaty. Thus the practice developed by the 
human rights adjudicators arguably establishes the agreement of the parties regarding their inter-
pretation, exactly because these adjudicators were created under the treaty in order to interpret 
it.238 
As noted, apart from the relevance of the subsequent practice developed by the adjudicators 
to the interpretation of treaty provisions, ‘judicial decisions’ also constitute ‘subsidiary means for 
the determination of international law’.239 These may be domestic or international judicial deci-
sions. The phrase ‘judicial decisions’ is used, rather than ‘court decisions’, which potentially 
includes the decisions made in individual cases by treaty monitoring bodies.240 
Thus, in light of their special protective function it is argued that human rights adjudicators 
have the implied power to order binding provisional measures. They are binding through legal 
interpretation, as the power to use them is necessarily implied in the task of bodies supervising 
human rights treaties and their binding nature is based on a principle inherent in the concept of 
the protection of human rights together with the explicit duty of State parties to co-operate in 
good faith with the supervisory bodies. Once a State recognizes an individual complaint system it 
is bound not to frustrate it.241  
While a general principle of law is a source of law and a general principle of interpretation 
is a method rather than a source, it is not always easy to distinguish between the two in concrete 
cases.242 Both principles of interpretation and principles of law are developed and applied by 
                                                 
236 See e.g. IACHR Colotenango (Guatemala), Order of 5 September 2001, 5th ‘Considering’ clause; 
ECtHR (First Section) Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, Judgment of 6 February 2003, 
§109 and ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, Judgment adopted on 
15 December 2004, published on 4 February 2005.  
237 Harrington (2003), p. 58. See generally Elkind (1981), p. 169, who points out, p. 170, that 
provisional measures are not merely procedural and that the power to indicate them cannot be 
equated with the power to fix deadlines, admit counter claims or permit the intervention of third 
parties. In the context of human rights see e.g. Bernhardt (1994), p. 102. See also Pasqualucci 
(2005), p. 16 (‘The argument that interim measures are essential to the competence granted to 
quasi-judicial enforcement bodies by the States and that such measures are, therefore, implied in 
the underlying treaty is compelling and neceaary to the fabric of international law’). 
238 Of course States will sometimes argue that adjudicators overstepped their mark and tried to create 
rather than interpret the law. This is a discussion that cannot be avoided. It means in any case that 
adjudicators must motivate their findings, with a thorough and coherent legal analysis. See also 
Mahoney (1990), pp. 57-88, arguing, in the context of the practice of the ECtHR, that judicial 
activism and judicial self-restraint are two sides of the same coin. 
239 Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute. 
240 See further Chapter II (Systems), section 8. 
241 See also Harrington (2003), p. 63. 
242 It is not always self-evident whether, for instance, this functional approach is derived from the 
general principle of effectiveness as a general principle of law, or whether it is a method of 
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adjudicators and, in this case, are quite interrelated as to contents (the general principle of law 
possibly triggering the choice of certain interpretation methods over others). This is why they are 
discussed together in this section. 
The interpretative principle of effet utile applies to procedural standards as well, in particu-
lar the right of individual complaint and ‘the acceptance of the contentious competence of the 
judiciary organ of protection’.243 In the context of human rights treaties the principle of effet utile 
creates a presumption that the most protective interpretation is warranted. 
General principles of (international) law are used by adjudicators in order to fill gaps left by 
treaty law and customary law. Some principles are derived directly from the concept of law or 
from legal logic. Others originate from the domestic law of many States. Examples are nullum 
crimen sine poena, the obligation to compensate for harm caused and procedural protection of 
criminal defendants. Other general principles of international law are derived directly from (de-
velopments in) international law. Examples are the principles of state responsibility, the notion 
that each violation requires a remedy, which may in turn include restitutio in integrum and the 
jurisdictional principle of compétence de la compétence.244 The principle of good faith application 
and interpretation of international obligations, for instance, is often seen as the ultimate general 
principle of law.245  
Cohen-Jonathan, for instance, has pointed out that any proper administration of justice, 
whether internal or international, means to safeguard the rights invoked by the parties, and that 
this is the case with a particular vigilance and rapidity when there is a risk of irreparable harm to 
fundamental human rights.246 Ordering provisional measures is a power inherent to the function 
of each tribunal. This is in fact an expression of a general principle of international law in the 
sense of Article 38(1) (c) ICJ Statute.247 
As discussed, human rights adjudicators, alleged victims, NGOs and States appear to have 
assumed, even if implicitly, the existence of the principle of effective protection to prevent irrepa-
rable harm to persons as a fundamental norm around which the human rights system is built.248 
Several human rights adjudicators have been inspired by each other’s case law and have 
elaborated on and applied norms found in all human rights systems with regard to preventing 
                                                                                                                       
interpretation in itself. I would argue, however, that it is a general principle of interpretation 
rather than a general principle of law as a source of law as it is always related to a substantive 
rule that must be applied such as to have the intended effect. Yet the reason for choosing the 
principle of effectiveness when interpreting the treaty obligations of States may be a general 
principle of law, as discussed infra.. 
243 IACHR Judgment on preliminary objections in Constantine et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 1 
September 2001, separate opinion of judge A.A. Cançado Trindade, §15. 
244 On general principles of (international) law as a source of international law, see e.g. Cheng 
(1953). 
245 See e.g. treaty references in Article 2(2) UN Charter and Article 31 Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties; see also ICJ Nuclear Test Cases (New Zealand v. France), Judgment of 20 
December 1974, §46 (France was expected to live up to its unilateral declaration not to continue 
atmospheric testing: “Just as the very rule of pacta sunt servanda in the law of treaties is based 
on good faith, so also is the binding character of an international obligation assumed by unilateral 
declaration”) and Nuclear Test Cases (Australia v. France), judgment of 20 December 1974, §49. 
See ICJ Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), Judgment of 20 
December 1988, §94 (the principle of good faith is an underlying principle, always linked to 
existing obligations). 
246 Cohen-Jonathan (2005a), p. 434. 
247 Cohen-Jonathan (2005a), p. 433. 
248 See Chapter II (Systems). 
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irreparable harm to persons pending the proceedings before them. Indeed one might consider that 
this aspect of provisional measures in human rights cases can be seen in the practice of such a 
range of adjudicators and has obtained such a level of generality over such a period of time that it 
may indicate a general principle of law. 
Thus the obligation to respect provisional measures may be considered to be based on a 
general principle of law that pending the proceedings irreparable harm should be prevented. It 
applies even more in the context of complaints about ongoing or impending violations of funda-
mental human rights. Not just any adjudicator, but morally speaking any actor has to take this 
principle into account when dealing with urgent situations that threaten to cause irreparable harm 
to persons. 
For a human rights adjudicator to derive the existence of a general principle of international 
law, it is not State practice but the practice of other international adjudicators that is most rele-
vant. There is a general principle for States not to cause harm to other States and to show due 
diligence in preventing such harm. It is argued that there is a corollary and even stronger principle 
of preventing irreparable harm to persons pending international litigation. This principle is based 
on the practices developed by the human rights adjudicators themselves, to which States had 
assigned this adjudicatory function. The principle also appears to have become part of the hu-
manization of law that is seen in the approach of the ICJ to the use of provisional measures.249 
In cases pending before them all human rights adjudicators have used provisional measures 
to prevent irreparable harm to persons. They used provisional measures in cases involving rights 
singled out for their particularly fundamental nature. All relevant human rights treaties have done 
so with the right to life and the prohibition of torture or cruel treatment and they all pay special 
attention to these rights in their proceedings.250 The commonality in the practices of the adjudica-
tors appears to be based not just on the interpretative principle of effectiveness, but also on an 
implicitly recognized general principle of law aimed at the prevention of irreparable harm to 
persons. In fact this principle of preventing irreparable harm to persons underlies the decision-
making of all international adjudicators. 
4 CONCLUSION 
This Chapter argues that the authority of human rights adjudicators to take binding provisional 
measures is derived from the core rights singled out in the treaties, in light of the practice devel-
oped of attaching particular importance to the protection of personal integrity and (cultural) sur-
vival, read together with the right of individual petition.251 After all, the principles of effective-
ness and of the prevention of irreparable harm have been used by the adjudicators, either explic-
itly or implicitly, when interpreting these provisions. In addition it is submitted that the preven-
tion of irreparable harm is not just a principle of treaty interpretation, but has also developed into 
a general principle of law, which is, as such, binding on States (Article 38 (1)(c) ICJ Statute). 
The human rights adjudicators do have in common an underlying interpretative approach, 
both with regard to their implied power to use provisional measures and as to the binding nature 
of provisional measures. In fact one can speak of an ‘acquis humanitaire’ based on the standards 
                                                 
249 See Chapter I (ICJ). 
250 See Conclusion Part II. 
251 See also Conclusion Part II. 
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of protection that all human rights adjudicators have in common,252 which also applies to the legal 
status of provisional measures. 
The text of the treaties must be interpreted in light of their context and object and purpose in 
a dynamic manner, taking into account that they must be interpreted so as to have effect. The 
principle of effectiveness flowing from the object and purpose indicates that the adjudicators 
instituted under these treaties must have the power to use provisional measures. 
The ECtHR has considered that ‘in the light of the general principles of international law, 
the law of treaties and international case-law, the interpretation of the scope of interim measures 
cannot be dissociated from the proceedings to which they relate or the decision on the merits they 
seek to protect’.253 This statement about the scope of provisional measures shows that now the 
ECtHR too recognises that in the context of such measures procedural and substantive law meet. 
The emphasis on the decision on the merits that provisional measures seek to protect underscores 
the binding nature of these measures. After all, otherwise States would be allowed to cause irrepa-
rable harm to the claim on the merits, and, as the provisional measures generally relate to claims 
involving the survival and personal integrity, irreparable harm to persons.254 
By accepting the jurisdiction of an international (including regional) adjudicator a State has 
committed itself to an international system of adjudication.255 Just like a domestic system of 
adjudication, an international system can, in my view, only be effective if the adjudicator has the 
power to order provisional measures that are legally binding. In this respect the main difference 
between domestic and international systems of adjudication is the all-inclusive nature of the 
former on the one hand and the fact that in most international systems States initially are free to 
accept or reject compulsory jurisdiction. This difference, however, loses much of its significance 
once a State has accepted the jurisdiction of an adjudicator. Even if a rule on the binding character 
of provisional measures is not included as such in a treaty text, by accepting the competence of an 
adjudicator to deal with conflicts between States or between individuals and States the State has 
accepted the adjudicator’s judicial independence and its power to deal with these conflicts effec-
tively. The authority to use binding provisional measures is inherent to effective adjudication.  
Even if the treaty in question does not explicitly provide for the use of provisional meas-
ures, the duty to protect against threats to survival and personal integrity requires the State to take 
positive measures also pending international proceedings. If it is the international adjudicator who 
recommends such positive measures, in the form of provisional measures, respecting them is also 
required as part of the obligations entered into by the State’s recognition of the complaint proce-
dure.  
It is argued that the human rights adjudicators have been correct to stress that the effet utile 
of the adjudicator’s decision on the merits necessitates respect for the provisional measures indi-
cated by it. If decisions on the merits are not considered legally binding in all respects (such as 
certain recommendations for reparation), at least the State’s recognition of the substantive rights 
and its recognition of the individual complaint system require a basic level of action and absten-
tion on the part of the State. With regard to the most fundamental rights in the treaty at issue they 
require at least the protection of the practitioner from irreparable harm, as well as the good faith 
cooperation with the relevant adjudicator.  
                                                 
252 On the issue of convergence and divergence in general, see Chapter II, section 8. On the common 
core of the concept of provisional measures, see Conclusion Part II. Simma used the expression 
acquis humanitaire already in 1995, p. 173. 
253 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §123. 
254 See also Conclusion Part II on the relation between irreparable harm to the claim and to persons. 
255 See also Pasqualucci (2005), p. 49, noting that provisional measures must be considered binding 
when issued by both international judicial and quasi-judicial bodies. 
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An action or omission causing irreparable harm to persons (personal integrity and survival) 
is an aggravated breach of the human rights treaty. If a State has recognized the right of individual 
complaint (or inter-State complaint for that matter) and the adjudicator decided to use provisional 
measures to prevent such harm, ignoring these measures is an aggravated breach of the right of 
petition as well. 
While not an aggravated breach, ignoring other provisional measures, which may not (yet) 
fall within the common core, is also contrary to the obligation to cooperate with the adjudicator in 
good faith.  
Finally, a State may consider that the adjudicator was in error in using provisional meas-
ures. Also in such a case the State should respect the measures. In most such cases the State has a 
different assessment of the risk (urgency), but it is ultimately for the human rights adjudicator to 
decide on this. In addition, the State’s belief that the adjudicator was in error may also be based 
on a genuine conviction that the risk is not irreversible, meaning that the provisional measures can 
be situated beyond the outer limits. Even then the State must respect the provisional measures 
based on its obligations under the system of individual complaint. At the same time the adjudica-
tor must take care not to go beyond the outer limits, also for the sake of the sustainability of the 
individual petition system.  
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 CONCLUSION 
Part III showed that the serious nature of the harm risked has an impact on the approach of the 
human rights adjudicators to the requirements of prima facie admissibility and jurisdiction on the 
merits (Chapter XIV); on the requirements of immediacy and real risk (Chapter XV) and on the 
legal status of provisional measures (Chapter XVI).  
In addition, when deciding on the use of provisional measures the human rights adjudicators 
have also taken into account the inequality between the parties. Together with their awareness of 
the serious nature of the harm risked, this inequality played a role in the more lenient attitude of 
the human rights adjudicators towards the requirements of prima facie admissibility and jurisdic-
tion on the merits and of immediacy and real risk. It does not play a similar role in the discussion 
on the legal status of provisional measures.  
To the extent that cases before the ICJ also involve the rights of individuals, the case law of 
the human rights adjudicators could be relevant to it as well. Strictly speaking the inequality 
between the parties is a criterion only applying in the context of individual complaints about 
human rights violations. Yet the serious nature of the harm risked to persons clearly applies in the 
inter-State context of the ICJ as well. 
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 INTRODUCTION 
This Part deals on the one hand with the official responses by the addressee States to provisional 
measures and on the other hand with the human rights adjudicators’ follow up.  
For the clarification and further development of a legal concept of provisional measures as 
used by the human rights adjudicators, the focus of this book was on the discussion of the com-
mon core and outer limits of the concept as applied by the adjudicators with regard to the purpose 
of these measures (Part II). Subsequently it dealt with the impact of the irreparable nature of the 
harm on the approach of the adjudicators to requirements of prima facie admissibility and juris-
diction, immediacy and real risk at the stage of provisional measures, as well as on the binding 
nature of these measures (Part III).  
Another question with regard to provisional measures in human rights adjudication is 
whether (and how) they actually work. Yet the question of effectiveness is one of causality and an 
empirical question that falls outside the scope of this conceptual research. Nevertheless, the adju-
dicators address the States concerned with decisions on provisional measures with the express 
purpose of preventing irreparable harm to persons and ensuring the effectiveness of the individual 
petition system. Therefore it is useful to see what types of responses the addressee States have 
provided and how the adjudicators (and others) have followed up on (initial) non-compliance. 
This is what Part IV aims at. 
The available case law provides some information on the official responses of addressee 
States and the follow-up by adjudicators. Chapter XVII gives examples of the former in order to 
indicate types of reasoning chosen by States to justify their failure to comply vis-à-vis the adjudi-
cators. From the official responses available it is possible to identify various explanations for non-
compliance with provisional measures. This is not to say that the reasons forwarded by States are 
the ‘real’ reasons. Nor do the reasons forwarded for non-compliance explain why in the majority 
of cases States have complied with provisional measures. Nevertheless these are the reasons that 
are publicly available, generally by studying the references to them in the decisions on the merits 
published by the adjudicators subsequent to any discourse between them and the States with 
regard to the need for provisional measures.  
Chapter XVIII then deals with the related question of how the adjudicators have dealt with 
non-compliance with their provisional measures. The follow-up by the adjudicators may have an 
impact on compliance in the long run, not just vis-à-vis the State involved, but also vis-à-vis the 
other States that have recognized the right of individual petition in the human rights system at 
issue. In addition, the follow up by adjudicators and others to non-compliance by States provides 
an additional indication of the importance they attach to preventing irreparable harm to persons. 
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 THE OFFICIAL RESPONSES OF ADDRESSEE 
 STATES TO PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
1 INTRODUCTION 
Already in 1995 it was argued that ‘inasmuch as interim or provisional measures ordered by 
worldwide or regional treaty bodies are increasingly based on the expectation and on actual prac-
tice of compliance, such measures are becoming an integral part of the human rights legal protec-
tion system’.1  
Compliance with the provisional measures of the ICJ has improved over time, but still is not 
impressive.2 Do the responses of addressee States towards the provisional measures by human 
rights adjudicators differ in this respect? This Chapter deals with the official responses of States 
to the provisional measures directed against them.  
States seem to comply more often with the provisional measures of the human rights adju-
dicators than with their decisions on the merits.3 This may be due to the fact that what is required 
on the merits is permanent and often more detailed and extensive, resulting in more obstacles to a 
timely implementation than do provisional measures.4 Yet the general attitude of compliance with 
provisional measures may also be due to the realization that adjudicators generally take decisions 
on provisional measures in the most serious situations, in order to prevent irreparable harm to 
persons.5 Indeed the adjudicators themselves have been influenced in their decision-making on 
the use of provisional measures by the nature of the harm risked.6 The question arises whether 
compliance by States is also higher with regard to provisional measures aimed at protecting ir-
reparable harm to persons than with regard to other provisional measures. 
                                                 
1 Van Boven (1995), p. 106. 
2 See Chapter I (ICJ). 
3 See also e.g. Rodriguez who points out that States have complied more with provisional measures 
than with judgments. He qualifies them as a very effective instrument of human rights protection, 
Interview with Victor Rodriguez, senior research fellow at the International Human Rights Law 
Institute of DePaul University, former staff member Court, San Jose, Costa Rica, November 
2001. 
4 In the admissibility decision in HRC Irving Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 October 1998, for 
instance, the HRC specifically expressed its appreciation for the fact that the State had respected 
its provisional measures. Apparently the State’s attitude towards provisional measures was 
different from its attitude in general. After all, in the decision on the merits the Committee gave 
its usual remarks about the non-cooperation of the State with the proceedings in general, 
warranting a shift in the burden of proof from the petitioner to the State. 
5 With regard to the ECtHR Cohen-Jonathan (2005), p. 782 also notes that the Court’s selection of 
situations in which it would use provisional measures has always been very strict and because of 
that the States have mostly cooperated with the Court. 
6 Part III showed that the serious nature of the harm risked, together to some extent with the 
inequality between the parties, has an impact on the approach taken by the human rights 
adjudicators to the requirements of prima facie admissibility and jurisdiction on the merits; on the 
requirements of immediacy and real risk and on the legal status of provisional measures. 
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As discussed, in the concept of provisional measures procedural and substantive law meet. 
Compliance with provisional measures is based on a process that involves attitudes towards sub-
stantive issues as well. For the interpretation of the meaning of the concept of provisional meas-
ures a discourse takes place – sometimes consciously, sometimes not – between the various inter-
national adjudicators.7 For the implementation of the provisional measures domestically a dis-
course appears to take place as well. Internationally, apart from a discourse between the various 
adjudicators, it is mainly between the parties, on the one hand, and between the adjudicators and 
the parties, on the other. NGOs, the media, the other human rights adjudicators and authorities 
appointed within international systems, such as the UN or the Council of Europe, play a role as 
well. Domestically the discourse is mainly taking place between the parties, including the various 
branches of government, while media and NGOs play their part as well. 
In this discussion not only (or even mainly) the attitudes towards the concept of provisional 
measures, and thereby to the substantive law at issue, appear to be relevant, but other factors as 
well. Some domestic decision-makers may indeed personally adhere to the same principles under-
lying the use of the provisional measures and become convinced by the arguments used by the 
international adjudicator. It also happens that they were convinced of the need for action or ab-
stention already before the provisional measures were used. In such cases they may use the provi-
sional measure as leverage in the domestic discourse.  
Other decision-makers may not be convinced normatively, but may consider that apart from 
national interest factors advocating against the action or omission required by the provisional 
measure, there are national interest factors such as fear for the State’s international reputation 
(international embarrassment and loss of prestige) that would warrant compliance nevertheless. 
This book takes the approach that States that have recognized individual complaint proce-
dures under human rights treaties have consented to a normative process.8 This means that further 
along in the process States should no longer invoke traditional State sovereignty and State volun-
tarism arguments in order to justify non-compliance with decisions of international adjudicators. 
The obligation to comply with decisions of these adjudicators is considered a given.  
Obviously stating that this obligation exists does not as such effectuate compliance. States 
may have various reasons to deviate from legal commitments, including arguments that they are 
in fact not legally bound.9  
As consistent information on the responses of States is lacking, this Chapter simply pro-
vides examples of compliance and non-compliance with provisional measures to protect against 
irreparable harm to the survival and personal integrity (within the common core) on the one hand 
and provisional measures in miscellaneous cases (within the outer limits) on the other.  
The information on the responses by States to provisional measures is derived from the de-
cisions on the merits that refer to them.10 Occasionally this is supplemented by other information. 
Obviously this information can do no more than indicate to some extent the compliance of States. 
An examination of effectiveness would require consistent information about what really happened 
to the beneficiaries of the provisional measures, together with additional information on causality. 
This would be within the realm of social science research.  
Nevertheless it is assumed that other factors than the legal character of decisions, ‘such as 
the political will and the authority of the organ in question’ may often be more important to ex-
                                                 
7 See Chapter II (Systems), section 8. 
8 See generally about State consent to normative process, Hey (2003). 
9 See also Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
10 As the Inter-American Commission reserves a special section of its Annual Report to its practice 
with regard to precautionary measures and the Inter-American Court publishes its orders for 
provisional measures, references are made to these as well. 
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plain the responses of the addressee States and some references are made to such information.11 
This chapter simply aims to identify some levels of implementation, taking as example provi-
sional measures to halt executions, as well as to identify some aspects that help explain compli-
ance and non-compliance. If available, references are made to specific responses by adjudicators 
to justifications for non-compliance given by addressee States.12 
2 COMPLIANCE 
2.1 Introduction 
The adjudicators generally note that non-compliance with their provisional measures only occurs 
occasionally. In Mamamatkulov (2004), for instance, the European Court pointed out: “Cases of 
States failing to comply with indicated measures remain very rare”.13 Yet data on the level and 
manner of compliance are not generally compiled. 
As discussed, generally the Inter-American system provides more information on the prac-
tice of the adjudicators with regard to provisional measures than the other systems.14 This applies 
as well to the information on compliance by States with these provisional measures.15 Neverthe-
less, in the Inter-American system too the nature of the State’s reply and the level of compliance 
often remain unclear.16 At the same time the Inter-American Commission has noted that States, 
‘when formally approached’ sometimes show ‘different levels of responsiveness, diligence and 
efficiency of the IACHR’s requests’.17 
There are various levels at which States may comply with the provisional measures taken by 
human rights adjudicators. This section provides some examples, first organised by different 
types of provisional measures and then in different types of responses. 
                                                 
11 See Klerk (2000), p. 156. She points out that it ‘might be doubted whether compliance with views 
and judgments is much influenced by the extent to which they are binding’. See also Boerefijn 
(1999). On the legal status of provisional measures see Chapter XVI. 
12 Chapter XVII more generally discusses the follow up by adjudicators to non-compliance by 
States. 
13 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §105. 
14 See Chapter II (Systems). 
15 See the sections on transparency of information in Chapter II (Systems). 
16 See e.g. precautionary measures of 11 May 2000, on behalf of Mr. Uribe, a well-known human 
rights defender and an active member of the ‘José Alvear Restrepo’ Lawyers Collective. 
Apparently a military intelligence report identified him as part of the ‘ELN support network’. 
Some persons mentioned in this intelligence report have been extra-judicially executed. Others 
have been the victims of forced disappearance, arbitrary detention, or constant threats forcing 
them to move of live in exile. There is no information on the response of the State. Annual 
Report 2000, §16. 
17 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter V – Colombia, §118. 
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2.2 A range of attitudes towards implementation of provisional measures 
2.2.1 Introduction 
States often prefer to remedy a situation in advance of a decision on the merits. In such cases it 
may be possible then to discontinue the case or declare it inadmissible.18 In addition, while in 
some cases they are so determined to act a certain way that they prefer to act quickly in order 
actually to prevent an adjudicator from taking provisional measures, in other cases they may wish 
to a remedy the situation to avoid the embarrassment of a provisional measure. In such situations 
the staff of the adjudicator may inform the State in question informally of its intention to take 
formal provisional measures. The State will then act accordingly and a provisional measure will 
no longer be necessary.19 This section gives some examples of the range of attitudes towards 
implementation, starting with State responses to provisional measures to halt the execution of a 
death sentence. Then the responses to provisional measures to halt expulsion and extradition are 
discussed, those to measures in the context of detention and disappearances, health care outside 
the detention context and death threats. 
2.2.2 Various responses to provisional measures to halt executions 
2.2.2.1 INTRODUCTION 
This subsection focuses on the range of attitudes towards provisional measures to halt executions 
by the HRC, with some discussion of the Inter-American system as well. Some of the provisional 
measures by the African Commission to halt an execution have been ignored.20 Those by the 
Bosnia Chamber,21 the European Commission22 and the European Court have been respected.23 
                                                 
18 This is often the case in the European system.  
19 Several cases of compliance may be explained by factors other than the provisional measures, 
e.g. by domestic court decisions that did not take into account these measures but nevertheless 
decided to halt an execution or expulsion.  
20 ACHPR See International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project, Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-
Wiwa Jr. and Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, provisional measure somewhere between 2 
and 9 November 1995 (secret execution 10 November 1995 and Interights et al. (on behalf of 
Mariette Bosch) v. Botswana, provisional measures of 27 March 2001 (execution on 31 March 
2001). 
21 Bosnia Chamber Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH., provisional measure of 16 December 1996; 
Nail Rizvanović v. Fed.BiH, provisional measure of 2 September 1997 and Borislav Herak v. 
Fed. BiH, provisional measure of 10 November 1997. 
22 In 1957 the UK respected the Commission’s informal provisional measures in the Cyprus case 
(Greece v. UK) not to execute Nicolas Sampson. See EComHR Application of the European 
Convention of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms to the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. 
UK), report of the Commission, 26 September 1958, §34; in 1970 Greece, under the Colonels’ 
regime, respected the Commission’s provisional measures to halt the execution of 34 suspects. 
Partial Decision of the Commission as to the admissibility of the application, The Second Greek 
case (Denmark, Norway and Sweden v. Greece), 5 October 1970, §11. 
23 ECtHR Öcalan v. Turkey, Judgment of 12 March 2003 (provisional measure of 30 November 
1999 respected. See also Grand Chamber Judgment 12 May 2005. 
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The great majority of the HRC’s provisional measures to halt executions have been re-
spected.24 Only in some cases the Committee’s decisions on the merits specifically refer to do-
mestic decisions to stay an execution, possibly in part on the basis of the Committee’s provisional 
measures. States normally give no reasons for compliance with provisional measures or with 
other decisions. It is only when they disagree that they may provide some arguments and that they 
may even decide not to comply with them altogether.25 In light of the foregoing, the most obvious 
examples showing the attitude of the State party are cases of blatant disregard for the Commit-
tee’s provisional measures. Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Sierra Leone, the Philippines, Uzbeki-
stan and Tajikistan have executed petitioners despite provisional measures. In response, the HRC 
has expressed itself forcefully about the legal obligation of States under the OP to respect its 
provisional measures and to halt executions pending the proceedings before it.26 Jamaica was the 
addressee of the majority of provisional measures. This State always respected the Committee's 
provisional measures, but it withdrew from the OP in 1997.27 The responses of States to provi-
                                                 
24 During the period 1986-2004 information was examined about provisional measures to halt 
executions in cases against two Asian States (South Korea and the Philippines), against five 
States of the former Soviet Union (Georgia, Belarus, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Ukraine) and 
two African States (Sierra Leone and Zambia). The remainder of cases were all directed to 
Caribbean States: one to St. Vincent and the Grenadines, eight to Guyana, 24 to Trinidad and 
Tobago and 112 to Jamaica. 
25 In 1995 Trinidad and Tobago responded to the HRC that it would not respect its provisional 
measure because it was already respecting the conservatory order of the Court of Appeal. The 
HRC considered ‘this situation should have made it easier for the State party to confirm that there 
would be no obstacles to acceding to the Committee’s request; to do so would, in any event, have 
been compatible with the State party’s international obligations’, HRC Lincoln Guerra and Brian 
Wallen v. Trinidad and Tobago, 4 April 1995, §6.5. 
26 It has been very clear about the seriousness of the breach by these States of their obligations 
under the OP and the Covenant itself. It referred in particular to the obligation to cooperate with 
it in good faith, the obligation not to hinder its task to examine the case on the merits as well as to 
the obligations under Article 2 ICCPR. It has pointed out that the executions rendered 
examination by the HRC moot and the expression of its Views ‘nugatory and futile’. It also 
pointed out that a State should not execute petitioners once it knows they have submitted a case 
to the HRC, even when the Committee has not (yet) used provisional measures. See also Chapter 
XVI (Legal status) and Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
27 It withdrew on 23 October 1997. This became effective on 23 January 1998. Jamaica has always 
respected the provisional measures by the Committee, although it did point out that they could 
sometimes amount to an indefinite stay of execution and could, therefore, obstruct its 
administration of justice. In January 1998 its withdrawal from the OP became effective. It 
withdrew exactly because it wished to be able to execute its prisoners within the deadline set by 
the JCPC. The withdrawal of Jamaica, followed by that of Trinidad and Tobago and Guyana, 
from the individual complaint system has been deplored internationally. The reason for the 
withdrawals related to the deadline set by the JCPC combined with the factor public opinion. 
Already in June 1994 the Jamaica Council for Human Rights provided the HRC with extracts of 
two speeches made to Parliament by the Minister of National Security and Justice, forewarning 
the 1997 withdrawal. In the first speech the Minister pointed out that appeals to the UN Human 
Rights Committee and to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights had become the 
standard practice for persons sentenced to death whose appeals had been dismissed. “This in 
itself constitutes a source of considerable delay since a sentence of death could not be carried out 
whilst an appeal to one or other of these bodies is pending. To make matters worse the rules of 
these organisations not only permit but actually require that an applicant has to appeal to each of 
them in sequence. The proceedings cannot be shortened by simultaneous hearings”. The Minister 
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sional measures to halt executions have varied from explicitly positive, to silence and even blatant 
disregard. There seems to be a continuum between the above extremes, including granting a stay, 
conditional compliance (which could partially be attributed to the adjudicators’ provisional meas-
ures), domestic courts refusing to take into account the adjudication and explicit refusal by State 
authorities to respect provisional measures, culminating in an execution.  
2.2.2.2 EXPLICITLY POSITIVE RESPONSE BY THE STATE 
In some cases the State expressly informs the HRC that it will comply with the provisional 
measures to halt the execution of a death sentence.28 Of course while the international 
involvement, including the use of provisional measures, may play a role, this is not necessarily 
the case. Several cases of compliance with provisional measures halting executions of death 
sentences may also be attributed to the fact that there is a national policy of putting executions on 
hold,29 or on the fact that a domestic court or an executive has decided to commute the death 
sentence of the petitioner.30 Six days after using provisional measures to halt the execution of two 
                                                                                                                       
noted that this had put Jamaica in an ‘intolerable situation’. His Ministry and that of Foreign 
Affairs and Foreign Trade were ‘in dialogue with the international organisations to get concrete 
implementation of the general assurances given to speed up the hearing’. This way they hoped to 
be able to enforce their ‘own laws without depriving the convicts of their right to appeal to these 
international bodies’. “If a solution is not found, then we will have to take the serious but 
necessary step of curtailing the rights to appeal to one or other of these two bodies”. He noted 
that the people of Jamaica had been calling for the resumption of hanging and that he wished to 
assure the public that ‘this Government does not intend to abandon our sovereign right to 
implement our own laws’. “In this country death remains the penalty for capital murder and 
therefore must be carried out with as much efficiency and effectiveness as any other prescription 
in the judicial system”. The other speech discussed certain steps to be taken to speed up the 
appellate process in Jamaica, but it also pointed out that there should be a strict time-table of 21 
days for appealing to the JCPC in London, followed by a time-limit of 21 days for appeals to 
international human rights bodies. Letter of the Jamaica Council for Human Rights, 29 June 
1994, with extracts of the Minister’s speeches (on file with the author). 
28 See e.g. HRC Matlyuba Khudayberganova on behalf of her son Iskandar Khudayberganov v. 
Uzbekistan, 24 July 2007, §2.1: on 11 December 2003, the State party replied that the Supreme 
Court had deferred the execution, pending the Committee's final decision. States may fail to 
submit any observations on the admissibility or merits of a claim, showing a lack of co-operation 
generally, but still respond positively to the Committee’s provisional measures. See also, e.g., 
HRC Bernhard Lubuto v. Zambia, 31 October 1995. The State confirmed that ‘pursuant to the 
Committee’s request, the appropriate authorities have been instructed not to carry out the death 
sentence against the author while his case is before the Committee’.  
29 This may be the case, for instance, with regard to Zambia.  
30 See e.g. HRC Trevor Ellis v. Jamaica, 28 July 1992; Karina Arutyunyan on behalf of her brother 
Arsen Arutyunyan v. Uzbekistan, 29 March 2004, §1.2; Abdukarim Boimurodov on behalf of son 
Mustafakul Boimurodov v. Tajikistan, 20 October 2005, §2.7; Nazira Sirageva on behalf of her 
son Danis Siragev v. Uzbekistan, 1 November 2005, §1.2; Nadezhda Agabekova on behalf of her 
son Valery Agabekov v. Uzbekistan, 16 March 2006, §§1.2 and 4.2; Larisa Tarasova on behalf of 
her son Alexander Kornetov v. Uzbekistan, 20 October 2006, §§1.2. 
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petitioners the HRC received a response by the Chairman of the State Committee for Human 
Rights and Ethnic Relations of the Republic of Georgia.31  
“The State Committee for Human Rights and Ethnic Relations of the Republic of Georgia 
regards as its obligation to ensure the full enjoyment by the convicted of all the rights that are 
granted to them by the Georgian legislation and international instruments. We will also do our 
best to help commute the death penalty to one of imprisonment”.32 
It is not clear what exactly is the function of this State Committee in the system of government in 
Georgia, but given the fact that the authority to provide the HRC with an official response was 
delegated to this State Committee, it may be assumed that the State would at least respect the 
provisional measures by the HRC and stay the execution upon exhaustion of domestic remedies. 
The State Committee, moreover, also committed itself to strive for a permanent stay of execution 
in the form of a commutation. Subsequently the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and not the State 
Committee on Human Rights informed the HRC of the Decree of the President of Georgia of July 
1997 pardoning 54 persons and replacing their death sentences by twenty years imprisonment. It 
pointed out that Gelbakhiani and Dokvadze were among these 54 persons.33  
An interesting example of a case in which a stay was granted following receipt of provi-
sional measures by the HRC is Marshall v. Jamaica (1998).34 In this case London counsel sub-
mitted a complaint to the HRC in December 1996. The action by counsel had been triggered by a 
fax from the Secretary of the Governor-General of Jamaica, stating, among others, that the HRC 
had not yet registered Marshall’s case:  
“[O]ur process for implementing the sentence imposed has commenced and only a request from 
the U.N. under Rule 86 will stop it, so I would suggest that as a matter of urgency you get your 
application fully in order so that that office can decide whether a Rule 86 request is merited”. 
The fax ended with ‘D Day is December 12, 1996’. Counsel replied to this fax on the same day, 
expressing ‘extreme surprise’, referring to Marshall’s initial communication to the HRC of June 
1995 and to an agreement with the Jamaican government’s solicitors in London that they would 
await the reclassification process before they would take further steps in Marshall’s case. They 
received a response on the same day, pointing out that other counsel did seem to realize that the 
reclassification process had been finalized two weeks previously. The Office of the Governor-
General referred to the JCPC’s remark in Pratt and Morgan that ‘where nothing is done to pursue 
remedies it is up to the authorities to issue a writ and galvanize the prisoner and his legal 
                                                 
31 HRC Victor Domukovsky, Zaza Tsiklauri, Petre Gelbakhiani and Irakli Dokvadze v. Georgia, 6 
April 1998. Provisional measures were used on behalf of Gelbakhiani and Dokvadze. Chairman 
of the State Committee for Human Rights and Ethnic Relations wrote that the convicted ‘and 
other interested persons’ had the right to appeal a death sentence. The Chairman of the Collegium 
of the Supreme Court on Criminal Cases would first examine such complaint. If he would refuse 
it, the Chairman of the Supreme Court could consider the appeal. The Prosecutor General also 
had the right to re-examine the case. If the death sentence would still remain in force, the 
execution would be deferred until the Pardon Commission had examined it. He also noted that 
Georgia had acceded to the OP in the previous year so that the HRC could examine the case.  
32 Letter by the Chairman of the State Committee for Human Rights and Ethnic Relations, 16 
March 1996 (on file with the author). 
33 Letter of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of 9 September 1997 (on file with the author).  
34 HRC Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998, Note Verbale of 5 December 1996, 
submission of 4 December 1996 (on file with the author). 
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representatives into action’. It reminded them that it ‘need not have faxed you at all’ and pointed 
out: “We await the views of the U.N. as to whether the application will merit a request under Rule 
86”.35 Once it did receive a Note Verbale with a decision on provisional measures, the State 
informed the Committee that it ‘stood down the warrants for the abovementioned persons’.36  
2.2.2.3 LEVEL OF COMPLIANCE BY TRINIDAD WITH PROVISIONAL MEASURES OF 
THE INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION AND COURT 
In the death penalty cases pending before the Inter-American Commission States often do not 
reply to the Commission’s precautionary measures requesting a stay of execution. Trinidad, for 
instance, is not much inclined to comply with the Commission's precautionary measures. It may 
request for information on the case itself, but fail to reply to the precautionary measure as such. In 
the case of Mr. Baptiste the State simply informed the Commission again that the Instructions 
Relating to Applications from Persons under Sentence of Death issued by the Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago on 13 October 1997 also applied to his application.37 
From the end of 1998 for Trinidad and Tobago the pattern changed from (semi-)compliance 
to non-compliance, also with regard to the Court. In its Order of May 1999 the Court notes that 
the State had not complied with the obligation to submit periodic reports on the status of the 
appeals and regularly scheduled executions of the beneficiaries of the Court's provisional meas-
ures.38 Only in the second half of 2000 the State showed some willingness again to comply with 
its reporting obligations.39  
                                                 
35 Information letter to the counsel by the State, 3 December 1996 (on file with the author). 
36 In his complaint of 4 December 1996 counsel pointed out that a warrant had been issued for the 
execution of his client on 12 December 1996. On 4 December the Secretariat had also received an 
anonymous telegram from Jamaica, possibly sent through information by other inmates: “Keith 
McKnight and Clarence Marshall are at gallows from 2nd December 1996 please contact relevant 
authority St. Catherine Dist Prison” (on file with the author). The next morning the Secretariat 
faxed Special Rapporteur Pocar. That same day, after Pocar had authorized it, the Secretariat sent 
a Note Verbale to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and Foreign Trade informing the State of the 
registration of the communication and requesting it to make submissions on the admissibility of 
the case (under Rule 91) and not to carry out the death sentence (under Rule 86) while the HRC 
was considering the communication. A copy was sent to the Permanent Mission of Jamaica in 
Geneva. On 11 December the Secretariat received a fax from the Jamaican Mission that the 
Office of the Governor-General had informed it that they had received the Committee’s faxes in 
relation to three persons, including Marshall, whose cases were pending before it, and that they 
‘stood down the warrants for the abovementioned persons’. Note Verbale of 5 December 1996 
transmitting the case under Rule 86/91 and fax by Permanent Mission of Jamaica to U.N. Centre 
for Human Rights, 11 December 1996 (on file with the author). 
37 See IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 29 August 1998. 
38 The Court also considered that ‘neither the State nor the Commission has informed the Court 
immediately and sufficiently’, as required by its Order of August 1998, ‘of any significant 
developments concerning the circumstances’ of the beneficiaries. James et al. cases, Order for 
provisional measures, 25 May 1999. Here the Court also reprimands the Commission, 
presumably in light of the developments surrounding Mr. Briggs, who was later executed. 
39 In its Order of 26 August 2000 the Court required the State to submit information on or before 
the end of that month on the circumstances that led to the execution of Joey Ramiah. The State 
did so on 4 September 2000. The Court also required the Inter-American Commission to submit, 
by the end of the month, detailed information on the status of the cases of five persons. The 
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Trinidad and Tobago executed Mr. Briggs, arguing that the Court had no jurisdiction to 
maintain the provisional measures on his behalf.40 The Court's other provisional measures to halt 
executions, used in the James and Others case have been considered to be among the most effec-
tive of its provisional measures.  
With the respect shown by Trinidad for those provisional measures, as well as the respect 
by Jamaica for the provisional measures by the HRC halting executions, note must be made of the 
withdrawal of these States from the individual complaint system, which has been deplored inter-
nationally.41 
2.2.3 Various responses to provisional measures to halt expulsion and extradi-
tion 
2.2.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
There is little information about the cases in which States complied with provisional measures in 
non-refoulement cases and about what role these measures played as compared to other factors 
                                                                                                                       
Commission did so on 31 August 2000. The Court had urged the State as well to report every two 
months on the status of the appeals and scheduled executions of all the beneficiaries. On 5 
September 2000 the State informed the Court that ‘pursuant to its Order’ it was ‘in the course of 
preparing its bi-monthly report on the status of the appeals and scheduled executions of James et 
al. and it would be forwarding the said report to the Court within the next fourteen days’. While 
this shows willingness again, on the part of the State, to comply with the Court’s Orders, in 
October 2000 the Secretariat of the Court had to remind the State to submit its report and in 
November 2000 the Court considered that the State had failed to do so. IACHR James et al. 
cases, Order for provisional measures, 24 November 2000. 
40 The State considered that ‘after the Commission decided to publish its Article 51 report, there 
was no matter pending before the Commission, nor any matter pending before the Court, nor any 
other matter capable of being submitted to the Court’. It concluded that the Court’s ‘purported 
Order of 25 May 1999 was made without jurisdiction and, therefore, was null’. IACHR James et 
al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 16 August 2000, 13th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
41 Several States protested against the reservation by Trinidad and Tobago. With this reservation it 
purported to re-accede to the OP. They considered that obligations should not be watered down to 
such an extent that they become devoid of any meaning. Denmark, Norway and the Netherlands 
objected on 6 August 1999; Germany on 13 August, Sweden on 17 August, Ireland on 23 
August, Spain on 25 August, France on 9 September and Italy on 17 September 1999, 
www.un.org (consulted on 7 October 2004). Clearly, the persons most likely to wish to make use 
of the individual complaint procedure have deplored this withdrawal. One death row inmate from 
Jamaica, for instance, wrote in June 2000: “People in this country, the Government of Jamaica 
don’t know what he did when he withdraw from the United Nations, he just make a mistake, from 
that he keep on making mistake (...) this country is in a lot of danger at this time. (...) The prison 
is like a time bomb waiting to go off. Also the Governor General of Jamaica considered the 
United Nations for human rights recommendation, but they rejected them all. Also they did not 
let me know that they did this. (...) I went to the condemned cell at the gallows two time now and 
it was not easy over there. I don’t want to go back over this place again. This place will mad any 
man. (...) At this time we don’t have any more appeals to go through, we went through all the 
bodies. Also the Government of Jamaica is planning to withdraw from the Privy Council very 
soon. (...) Also please tell me what you think about the Caribbean Court? This Government is 
planning to carry out hanging in this country. Also most of the peoples of the Caribbean want to 
see hanging carried out”. (on file with the author). 
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favouring a stay of expulsion or extradition. Most cases in which expulsion or extradition was 
stayed do not indicate the specific response of the State. It is mainly in the context of non-
compliance that some information is available about the attitudes of States towards provisional 
measures.  
This subsection first gives some examples of compliance and non-compliance. Then it dis-
cusses three strategies by States unwilling to respect provisional measures: the speed of deporta-
tion as a way to pre-empt the use of provisional measures; requesting the adjudicator to withdraw 
provisional measures and invoking contrary obligations under international law. 
2.2.3.2 EXAMPLES OF COMPLIANCE AND NON-COMPLIANCE IN THE EUROPEAN 
SYSTEM AND UNDER THE ICCPR 
Various cases in which the adjudicator took provisional measures are subsequently solved and 
struck out. It may well be that provisional measures trigger a renewed consideration of a decision 
to expel someone. Yet States may prefer not to acknowledge this formally. As part of a friendly 
settlement they tend to emphasize that their decision to allow a petitioner to remain in the country 
is based on strictly humanitarian reasons rather than a legal obligation under a human rights 
treaty. Sometimes they add that their decision should not be regarded as a precedent.42 
Ms. Jabari had appealed against an order of deportation because under Iranian law she 
would be subject to death by stoning, whipping or flogging. The European Commission used 
provisional measures to stay the deportation. After Protocol 11 entered into force the Court con-
firmed the provisional measures, under Rule 39, until further notice. Turkey complied with the 
provisional measure.43 In Taspinar v. the Netherlands (1985) the European Commission had used 
provisional measures on behalf of a seven year old boy facing expulsion to Turkey. The State 
respected the provisional measures and subsequently informed the Commission that it no longer 
objected to his presence in the Netherlands.44  
Several types of non-compliance may also be observed. Interesting is the case of Muminov 
v. Russia (2008). On 24 October 2006 the Court had used provisional measures to prevent his 
expulsion to Uzbekistan. Later that day he was nevertheless expelled. Apart from the fact that this 
time the Court did find a violation of Article 3 – contrary to the case of Mamatkulov also involv-
ing a return to Uzbekistan45 – in this case there was a lack of clarity about the moment of expul-
sion and the awareness by the authorities of the Court’s provisional measures.46 The Court’s 
                                                 
42 See e.g. ECtHR Tatete v. Switzerland, 6 July 2000 (struck out).  
43 ECtHR Jabari v. Turkey, Judgment of 11 July 2000. 
44 EComHR Taspinar v. the Netherlands, 9 October 1985 (struck out). Yet there have been cases 
manifesting conflicting approaches within government. In A. v. France (inadm.1991) the 
European Commission noted ‘that the deportation order was issued by the Prefect of Ain on 4 
January 1991, whereas by that time, after an initial decision dated 9 October 1990 and subsequent 
decisions covering the period up to 18 January 1991, the Commission had decided to apply Rule 
36 of its Rules of Procedure and indicated to the Government that it would be desirable in the 
interests of the parties and the proper conduct of the proceedings not to expel the applicant before 
it had had time to examine the application in greater detail’. The Commission also notes that the 
Prefect issued the above-mentioned order despite its use of provisional measures and while the 
Government had stated that they had decided to comply with the Commission’s wishes, A. v. 
France, 27 February 1991 (inadm.), pp. 337-338.  
45 See Chapter XVIII (Follow-up), section 2.3.3. 
46 The Court observed that the parties disagreed as to whether the petitioner had been expelled 
‘before or after the Russian authorities had learnt about a Rule 39 request, as well as about the 
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discussion in this respect shows that it is crucial for counsel to inform the Office of the Represen-
tative of the relevant State at the European Court, as well as the detention centre or another com-
petent authority of the fact that a request for provisional measures has been made with the 
Court.47 Another intriguing aspect related to this case is the fact that apparently subsequently the 
Director of the Detention Centre for Aliens was convicted for abuse of power for authorising the 
execution of Muminov’s expulsion order while being aware that this order had not become final. 
The verdict specifically mentioned the fact that as a result of this unlawful action Russia had been 
unable to comply with the European Court’s provisional measure.48 
There are also occasions in which the State first ignored the adjudicator’s provisional meas-
ures, but later attempted to remedy the situation. In Dar v. Norway (2007), in violation of Article 
22 ICAT, the State deported the petitioner to Pakistan despite provisional measures. On the merits 
CAT found that the breach of Article 22 ICAT was remedied by Norway granting him a residence 
permit for three years upon return. According to the Committee the issue whether deportation 
constituted a violation of Article 3 ICAT had become moot because complainant had returned to 
Norway.49 
With regard to the HRC, in most expulsion and extradition cases States have respected its 
provisional measures to halt expulsion, extradition or other forms of forced return. Yet there have 
been cases of non-compliance. Interestingly, one case in which Canada respected a provisional 
measure related to the right to family life (Articles 17 and 23 ICCPR) rather than to non-
refoulement (Articles 6 and 7 ICCPR). The fact that it requested the HRC to clarify its criteria for 
using provisional measures and to withdraw them in this case because there was no risk of irrepa-
                                                                                                                       
actual time of his departure from the territory of Russia’. It confirmed that ‘the information 
concerning the application of Rule 39 in the applicant's case was published on its secure website 
at 7.17 p.m. (Moscow time) on the same date’. It found that the petitioner ‘most likely left the 
territory of Russia shortly before midnight (Moscow time) on 24 October 2006. The Government 
did not specify, however, when they had first learnt about the application of Rule 39 in the 
present case and whether the administration of the detention centre and other competent 
authorities had been notified of it, if at all’, ECtHR Muminov v. Russia, Judgment of 11 
December 2008, §135. It did not exclude the possibility that a State’s ‘failure to make practical 
arrangements for receiving and processing information from the Court regarding the examination 
of a Rule 39 request or the Court’s decision to apply it in a given case may raise an issue under 
Article 34 of the Convention. However, in the present case the Court cannot establish with 
sufficient certainty that having been put on notice about the Court's decision to apply Rule 39, the 
respondent Government deliberately omitted to comply with it’, §136. A willingness of Russian 
courts to comply is also shown in Ryabikin v. Russia, 19 June 2008, (the Kuybyshevskiy district 
court and the St. Petersburg City Court), see §§84-85. See also Mostafa et autres c. Turquie, 15 
January 2008, §38. 
47 The Court noted that it was ‘unclear whether the applicant's lawyer – assisted by members of a 
non-governmental organisation helping asylum-seekers – informed the Office of the 
Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court, the detention centre or another 
competent authority that the applicant had already lodged a request for interim measures under 
Rule 39 of the Rules of Court’. Accordingly, the Court noted, it could ‘not consider that the 
respondent State was duly informed that a request under Rule 39 had already been made’. 
‘Against this background, the Court’s assessment of the material before it leads it to find that 
there is an insufficient factual basis for it to conclude that the respondent State deliberately 
prevented the Court from taking its decision on the applicant’s Rule 39 request or notifying it of 
that decision in a timely manner, in breach of its obligation to cooperate with the Court in good 
faith’, ECtHR Muminov v. Russia, Judgment of 11 December 2008, §137. 
48 ECtHR Muminov v. Russia, Judgment of 11 December 2008, §44. 
49 CAT Nadeem Ahmad Dar v. Norway, 11 May 2007. 
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rable harm indicated a wish for a restrictive interpretation of the power to use provisional meas-
ures, but at the same time it showed that Canada took this power seriously and was willing to 
respect the Committee’s provisional measures even in this case.50 The very first case, dating from 
1978, involved an unidentified State that apparently respected the provisional measure as well.51  
In Weiss v. Austria (2003)52 the petitioner claimed that a sentence of 845 years imprison-
ment in the requesting State (US) would constitute a violation of this article. The Special Rappor-
teur used provisional measures, although they were more cautiously formulated and their mainte-
nance would depend on the response of the State to certain questions. The Administrative Court 
had also ordered a stay of his extradition. The authorities nevertheless attempted to surrender the 
petitioner. They only returned him to a detention facility ‘after a telephone call by the ranking 
officer of the airport police to the president of the Administrative Court’, in light of the stay 
granted by the Administrative Court and of the petitioner’s poor health. Subsequently, however, 
the investigating judge of the Vienna Regional Criminal Court ordered the surrender of the peti-
tioner, considering the Administrative Court ‘incompetent’ to entertain any proceedings or bar the 
extradition. The State extradited the petitioner to the US on 9 June 2002.53 
2.2.3.3 PRE-EMPTING THE USE OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES: SPEED OF DE-
PORTATION 
In Canepa v. Canada (1997) counsel suggested that one reason for the way in which the peti-
tioner was removed, on such short notice, may have been the wish to ensure removal in advance 
of the Committee's use of provisional measures.54 She also thought that the State might have 
depended as well on the expectation that, because of protocol, the Secretariat of the HRC would 
not be able to contact the State directly when the Canadian Mission in Geneva was closed.55 The 
State took issue with these allegations. It noted it was a strong supporter of the HRC and took its 
international human rights obligations seriously. It considered that the ‘facts in this case disclose 
no impropriety under domestic or international law’. It rejected ‘the implications by counsel for 
Mr. Canepa that it acted in a manner that might frustrate a possible request by the Committee for 
interim measures’. His removal, it pointed out, did ‘in no way’ prejudice the consideration of his 
                                                 
50 HRC Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996. See further Chapter IV. See e.g. C. v. Australia, 28 
October 2002, §4.32. The State ‘stayed the deportation in response to the Committee’s rule 86 
request pending finalization of this matter’. See further G.T. v. Australia, 4 November 1997, 
A.R.J. v. Australia, 28 July 1997, Baban v. Australia, 6 August 2003 and Bakhtiyari v. Australia, 
29 October 2003, A.A.T. v. Hungary, (disc.1993) and Karker v. France, 26 October 2000. 
51 HRC O.E. v. S., 26 July 1978. 
52 HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003. 
53 On 10 May 2002 the ECtHR had used provisional measures. Six days later it decided not to 
prolong them, ‘following representations of the State party’, §2.9. See further Chapter V (Non-
refoulement). The next day the Constitutional Court issued an injunction to stay the extradition 
until 23 May 2002. On that day this Court terminated the injunction. The petitioner once more 
requested the ECtHR to use provisional measures, which it denied. The next day he withdrew his 
application before the ECtHR. He submitted his case to the HRC, which used provisional 
measures. 
54 HRC Giosue Canepa v. Canada, 3 April 1997. Chapter XVI (Legal status), section 2.4.3 
discusses the attitude of the adjudicators to frustration of the right of petition through pre-emption 
of the possibility to request provisional measures. 
55 HRC Giosue Canepa v. Canada, 3 April 1997, Submission by counsel of 7 June 1994 (on file 
with the author). 
 The Official Responses of Addressee States to Provisional Measures 
955 
case by the Committee, nor ‘affect the position that Canada might take’ about its determination on 
the merits. It wished to assure the HRC of its ‘full and continued cooperation’.56 Independent of 
whether the State party or counsel was correct in this particular case (and independent of whether 
this case would have been an appropriate candidate for provisional measures),57 it cannot be 
excluded that some States may wish to quickly undertake certain action before provisional meas-
ures are used aiming at halting such action.  
There is at least one case in which the HRC was unable to use provisional measures given 
the speed of the deportation. This case, Judge v. Canada (2003), should have been an extradition 
case. The petitioner had requested a stay until Canada would seek and receive an extradition 
request from the US. If removed under the bilateral extradition treaty with the US the State could 
have asked for assurances against execution of the death penalty. However, he was deported on 
the day he submitted his petition, leaving no opportunity for the HRC to use provisional meas-
ures. Counsel pointed out that he was removed within hours after a court decision that was handed 
down ‘late evening’. Subsequently the State argued that the petitioner had not exhausted domestic 
remedies for his complaint about his deportation to the US. The Committee noted that the State 
‘had not contested the speed with which the author was deported, after the decision of the Supe-
rior Court’. Thus, ‘irrespective of whether the author could have appealed his case on the merits’ 
it found that ‘it would be unreasonable to expect the author to appeal such a case after his depor-
tation, the very act which was claimed to violate the Covenant’.58 
2.2.3.4 REQUESTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES 
In July 1978, in the early expulsion case of O.E. v. S (disc. 1978) the HRC expressed its apprecia-
tion to the Addressee State about the information it provided in response to its request whether it 
was contemplating the alleged victim’s deportation or extradition to country X. Nevertheless, 
‘pending further consideration of the case’, the Committee still considered that the alleged victim 
should not be handed over or expelled to that country.59 In two expulsion cases against Australia 
the State also respected the Committee’s provisional measures. About eleven months after it had 
used them in A.R.J. v. Australia (1997)60 the Attorney General of Australia transmitted a letter to 
the Chairman of the Committee in which he requested the HRC to withdraw the provisional 
measures, pointing out, among others, that the continued detention of the petitioner was the 
Committee’s responsibility.61 He noted that the authorities had placed the petitioner under immi-
gration detention in October 1996 and would keep him there ‘as long as the Committee had not 
reached a final decision on his claims’. This remark signifies, on the one hand, the State party’s 
willingness to respect the Committee’s provisional measures and stay the return of the petitioner 
to Iran pending the proceedings. On the other hand it shows the State’s disagreement with the 
                                                 
56 HRC Giosue Canepa v. Canada, 3 April 1997, Submission by the State of 13 June 1994 (on file 
with the author). 
57 See Conclusion Part II. 
58 HRC Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003. §7.6. The petitioner had been removed ‘in the early hours 
of 7 August 1998, before any appeal could be launched’. Previous decision had been ‘rendered 
orally on 6 August 1998, at approximately 20:00’. See §6.4. 
59 HRC O.E. v. S., 26 July 1978. In other words, it maintained its provisional measures. Later that 
year it discontinued the case. 
60 The HRC used provisional measures on 3 April 1996. A.R.J. v. Australia, 28 July 1997. 
61 He pointed out that ‘the author had been convicted of a serious criminal offence, after having 
entered Australia with the express purpose of committing a crime’. The immigration authorities 
had ‘given his applications full and careful consideration’.  
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provisional measure, hinting at the argument that the Committee is no fourth instance of appeal 
and emphasising the importance of its sovereign decision-making on law enforcement and immi-
gration. The State pointed out, moreover, that the petitioner’s continued detention was the Com-
mittee’s responsibility. This indicates that the stay (and continued detention) was indeed triggered 
by the Committee’s provisional measure.62 The State urged the Committee to give priority to the 
case. Requesting the HRC to decide on the petitioner’s claims on a priority basis is not the same 
as requesting it to withdraw its provisional measure. It is possible that its primary request was 
withdrawal and its subsidiary request was giving the case priority. The Attorney General ad-
dressed his letter to the Chairman of the Committee, rather than to the Special Rapporteur.63  
In G.T. v. Australia (1996)64 the Geneva Secretariat advised the petitioner to keep the 
Committee informed of the developments in her husband’s case and contact it immediately if he 
were under imminent threat of deportation.65 The Australian government submitted its comments 
on the admissibility and merits of the complaint only much later. This submission mainly dealt 
with evidentiary requirements, particularly the standard of proof.66 It requested the HRC to lift its 
provisional measures. It referred to assurances it had received from the Malaysian government 
that it would not prosecute its nationals for offences committed overseas.67  
                                                 
62 The State had requested the HRC to examine admissibility and merits at the same time. It pointed 
out that, following his application under the section of the Migration Act, allowing the Minister 
to grant persons the right to stay in Australia for humanitarian reasons, he had received a further 
bridging visa until July 1997 and if the Minister had not considered his request by then, he would 
be eligible for an extension of the visa. 
63 See also the decision of the HRC during its 55th session in 1995 about the competence of the 
Chairman to decide on provisional measures once the Working Group on Communications had 
taken up the question of admissibility. The Committee considered Australia’s request that same 
month, during its 59th session. In its View the HRC noted that it gave this request ‘careful 
consideration’. It decided that ‘on the balance of the material before it, the request for interim 
protection should be maintained, and that the admissibility and the merits of the petitioner’s case 
should be considered during the 60th session’. Joining the admissibility and merits was possible 
under the rules of procedure. The HRC has since decided to take this approach as a general rule, 
but at the time it may have been a response to the State’s request to treat the case on a priority 
basis. In any case, it expressed its appreciation about the fact that the State had also provided 
information and observation on the merits, although it was challenging the admissibility. This 
enabled the Committee to accelerate the proceedings. See further Chapter XIV on the relationship 
with admissibility and jurisdiction on the merits.  
64 HRC Mrs. G.T. v. Australia, 4 November 1997. 
65 Letter of the Secretariat to the petitioner of 19 March 1997 in G.T. v. Australia, 706/1996 (on file 
with the author).  
66 See Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk).  
67 Malaysia had explained that it may charge a Malaysian national on other offences that he may 
have committed in Malaysia. Australia added that it had informed the petitioner’s husband of 
these assurances two years previously and that he had responded that this information was ‘very 
comforting and reassuring’. Three months before its request to lift the provisional measures in 
G.T., Australia had addressed the Committee with a similar request in A.R.J. Different from that 
case, here the View did not inform us of the Committee’s reply, if any, to the request. In October 
1997 the petitioner requested the HRC to maintain its provisional measures. The petitioner 
pointed out that her husband committed a criminal offence in Malaysia under legislation 
providing for the mandatory death penalty for trafficking drugs. She also explained that another 
inmate in prison wrote his reply to the aforementioned assurances of 1995 and ‘that her husband 
signed the letter thinking it was a thank you letter in general terms’. She noted that his knowledge 
of English was limited and that he could not read or write it. Australia noted that it had 
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In one case, E.G. v. Canada (disc. 1997), counsel for the petitioner noted ‘with satisfaction 
that the Canadian Government has requested the withdrawal of interim protection, because this 
would appear to indicate that the Canadian Government now accepts the legitimacy of interim 
measures and, implicitly at least, its obligation to respect the requests of the Committee pursuant 
to Rule 86’.68  
2.2.3.5 INVOKING CONTRARY OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW 
Sometimes contrary obligations under international law have been invoked. The UK defended its 
decision to ignore the provisional measures by the European Court to halt the transfer of two 
detainees in Iraq from the UK authorities to the Iraqi authorities69 by reference to a domestic court 
decision ‘and its analysis of the application of the European Convention of Human Rights and the 
broader requirements of international law’, considering that it had ‘no lawful option other than 
transfer to the Iraqi authorities’.70 Apparently the State had also pointed out that the ECtHR had 
asked the UK to retain power in Iraq of the two petitioners when the UK had ‘no legal power to 
do so. Compliance with Strasbourg requests would normally be a matter of course but these are 
exceptional circumstances’.71 
                                                                                                                       
assurances from the government of Malaysia that it would not prosecute the petitioner again ‘in 
connection to the drug trafficking offences for which he was convicted in Australia and that no 
question of double jeopardy would arise’. In this light Australia considered that the petitioner was 
‘not at risk of imposition of a capital sentence should he be returned to Malaysia and, 
consequently, the Rule 86 request should be lifted’. Submission by the State of 3 June 1997 in 
G.T. v. Australia, 706/1996 (on file with the author). See about the often doubtful nature of 
assurances: Human Rights Watch (2004), also making reference to the more recent Concluding 
Observations of the HRC about the adequacy of assurances and the credibility of post-return 
monitoring mechanisms, pp. 10-12. On two occasions, one in 1993 and one in 1997 Canada 
respected the Committee’s provisional measures. Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996, 
538/1993, Rule 86 of 26 April 1993 and 18 March 1994; E.G. v. Canada, 17 November 1997 
(disc.) 738/1997, Rule 86 of 17 January 1997. 
68 HRC E.G. v. Canada (738/1997), initial submission 5 January 1997 (received 7 January 1997), 
Rule 86/91 of 17 January 1997; withdrawal of Rule 86 on 28 April 1997; petitioner’s request to 
withdraw the case of 26 May 1997. On 17 November 1997 the HRC informed the author that it 
had discontinued the case (on file with the author). 
69 See ECtHR provisional measures of 30 December 2008 by the Acting President of the Fourth 
Section. A scan of the ECtHR letter to counsel confirming its use of provisional measures was 
posted at <http://humanrightsdoctorate.blogspot.com/2009/01/uk-breaches-provisional-measures. 
html>. 
70 See the reference to the State’s Letter dated 31 December 2008 from Derek Walton, Agent of the 
Government of the United Kingdom to Mr T.L. Early, Section Registrar, European Court of 
Human Rights in: UK House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Letter by Chair 
Andrew Dismore MP to the Secretary of State for Defence, 13 January 2009, expressing concern 
regarding the transfer contrary to the European Court’s provisional measures and requesting 
clarifications, <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/JCHRAlSaadon.pdf>. 
71 See the reference to statements published in the Independent, Pair accused of murder handed 
over to Iraqi authorities, 31 December 2008, in: UK House of Commons Joint Committee on 
Human Rights, Letter by Chair Andrew Dismore MP to the Secretary of State for Defence, 13 
January 2009, expressing concern regarding the transfer contrary to the European Court’s 
provisional measures and requesting clarifications, <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/ 
upload/JCHRAlSaadon.pdf>. 
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These arguments are faulty. Given the difference in international obligations at stake the 
‘broader requirements of international law’ were those based on the ECHR and the UK should 
have told the Iraqi authorities that it had ‘no lawful option’ other than compliance with the 
Court’s provisional measures. Indeed, parliamentary concern was expressed in response to the 
transfer and the government’s justification for it. Detailed information on the provisional meas-
ures and the transfer was requested, as well as a ‘a more detailed a more detailed explanation of 
the Government’s view that its decision to transfer the applicants is compatible with the right of 
individual petition secured by Article 34 ECHR, in the light of the interim measures decision of 
the European Court of Human Rights. In particular: a. Why does the Government consider it was 
appropriate to ignore the interim measures decision of the European Court on the basis of the UK 
courts’ interpretation of international law, and on the application of the ECHR? b. Does the Gov-
ernment agree that the final interpretation of the Convention and the scope of its application is a 
matter for the ECHR? If not, please explain the Government’s view’.72 
2.2.4 Various responses to provisional measures to intervene in detention and 
disappearance cases 
2.2.4.1 DISAPPEARANCE CASES 
While not much information is available about the Inter-American Commission’s intervention in 
disappearance cases there are indications that these may have some effect, especially when it 
intervenes shortly after a disappearance.73 
Colombia established an urgent search mechanism, at least partially in light of its obliga-
tions under the ACHR and other human rights treaties.74 The Commission has in turn invoked this 
mechanism when it used precautionary measures. On 18 December 2001 the Commission used 
such measures to determine the whereabouts of two persons from the region of Antioquia and to 
                                                 
72 UK House of Commons Joint Committee on Human Rights, Letter by Chair Andrew Dismore 
MP to the Secretary of State for Defence, 13 January 2009, expressing concern regarding the 
transfer contrary to the European Court’s provisional measures and requesting clarifications, 
<http://www.parliament.uk/documents/upload/JCHRAlSaadon.pdf>. 
73 In March 1997, for instance, lawyers collective ‘José Alvear Restrepo’ in Colombia requested the 
Commission to take precautionary measures on behalf of one of its lawyers. Members of the 
National Police in Bogotá had arbitrarily detained him after a demonstration involving professors 
and students. CEJIL notes that the Commission immediately requested information from the 
Colombian government with regard to his detention and that he was freed the next day. Case of 
Mr. Vilalba Vargas, CEJIL case docket 1997. It is not clear whether the Commission simply 
requested information or indeed formally took precautionary measures. This example involves a 
specific type of threat to a human rights defender who is detained in unclear circumstances 
conducive to such disappearance. On 28 January 1999 the Commission was informed that a 
group of armed civilians had forcefully entered the headquarters of the Popular Training Institute 
(IPC) in Medellin, Antioquia and had abducted four investigators of the IPC. The Commission 
immediately took precautionary measures, that same afternoon. It urgently contacted Colombia to 
take the necessary measures to ascertain the whereabouts of the victims and protect their lives, 
physical integrity and liberty. Two of them were freed on 11 February and the two others on 19 
February 1999. The ‘Autodefensas’ of Córdoba and Urabá had claimed responsibility for the 
kidnappings. Annual Report 1999, Chapter III.C.1, §17. 
74 See Law 589/2000, 10 July 2000, criminalizing enforced disappearance, instituting a national 
search mechanism including an urgent search mechanism. 
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protect their lives and persons. They were last seen on 27 November 2001 at a Medellín metro-
politan police checkpoint. A few days later the two men contacted their families and told them a 
paramilitary group had abducted them. In its Annual Report the Commission notes that it ‘under-
took a series of steps toward clearing up this situation during its on-site visit’. This visit had taken 
place from 7 until 13 December, but apparently these steps had not been sufficiently effective as 
the Commission resorted to the formal issuance of precautionary measures. As part of these 
measures it asked Colombia to ‘launch a prompt and effective investigation using the urgent 
search mechanism established by Law 589/2000’.75 Again, the Commission does not indicate the 
precise contents of the State reply but it does note that it continued to receive information from 
the parties with regard to the situation of the protected persons.76 
2.2.4.2 HEALTH AND SAFETY IN DETENTION 
In the early detention cases dealt with by the HRC, involving political prisoners, it appeared that 
State parties sometimes were more willing to respond to inquiries about health situations than to 
the claim on the merits relating to arbitrary detention etc. At other times Uruguay, the State most 
often involved, simply responded by denying admissibility.77 The responses with regard to the 
health situation of political detainees ranged from blanket denial to precise information on medi-
                                                 
75 CIDH Annual Report 2001, §26.  
76 Ibid. 
77 The great majority of detention cases from the 1970s and 1980s relates to Uruguay, which at that 
time was led by a military junta. Other Latin American States from which such detention cases 
could have originated only recognized the right of individual complaint after a regime change. 
Uruguay, on the other hand, had ratified the OP in March 1976. Its military dictatorship lasted 
from 1973 to 1985. The State argued that the HRC exceeded its authority by dealing with 
complaints by detainees. In Sendic, for instance, the HRC had urged the State to provide 
information on the health and whereabouts of the petitioner's husband, to transmit all the written 
material, such as submissions of the parties and the decisions of the HRC in this case to Raúl 
Sendic himself and allow him to communicate directly with the Committee. The State 
particularly protested the latter part of this decision, arguing that the HRC had ‘absolutely no 
basis’ for its request to give ‘a detainee under the jurisdiction of the State party’ the opportunity 
to communicate directly with it. Accepting this decision would ‘create a dangerous precedent’. It 
considered that the HRC had violated ‘international instruments such as the Covenant and its 
Protocol’. Uruguay considered that the provisions in these instruments extended to State parties 
as subjects of international law. “Thus these international norms, like any agreement of such 
nature, are applicable to States and not directly to individuals. Consequently, the Committee can 
hardly claim that this decision extends to any particular individual”. The State even went so far as 
to argue that the Committee’s decision violated elementary principles and norms ‘and thus 
indicates that the Committee is undermining its commitments in respect of the course of 
promoting and defending human rights’. The HRC pointed out that the State’s argument was 
‘devoid of legal foundation’ because it had recognised the OP and, thus, the Committee’s 
competence to receive and consider communications from individuals. It pointed out that 
‘denying individuals who are victims of an alleged violation their right to bring the matter before 
the Committee is tantamount to denying the mandatory nature of the Optional Protocol’. The 
ability of detainees to communicate directly with the Committee was, in fact, a prerequisite for 
the effective application of the OP. Governments had no right to create obstacles to this 
communication. Such obstacles would, in many cases, render meaningless the individual 
complaint procedure. HRC Raul Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. 
Uruguay, 28 October 1981. 
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cal treatment. Especially in the last two detention cases against Uruguay this State provided de-
tailed information using medical terminology.78 It is clear that the HRC rewarded this because in 
these cases it did not find a violation with regard to the alleged victims’ health situations and it 
did not recommend the State to ensure adequate medical treatment.  
While the general attitude of Uruguay with regard to the HRC’s examination of cases of po-
litical prisoners in the 1970s and 1980s was far from cooperative, it is possible that the interest 
expressed by the HRC about the health of certain detainees has played a role not only in the 
State’s decision to provide information but also in its decision to provide medical care. In any 
case it is likely that the HRC intended its requests for information at least partially to trigger such 
reaction and, thereby, to put a halt to continuing violations and prevent further irreparable harm. 
Of course, the Committee itself has expressly referred to the other reason for requesting informa-
tion about an alleged victim’s state of health: as necessary evidence to determine whether there 
has been a violation. Between August 1984 and 1 March 1985, when the newly elected govern-
ment of Uruguay came to power, several people were released and cooperation improved dra-
matically since that time. 
The Inter-American Commission has regularly intervened in detention situations, In August 
2001, for instance, it took precautionary measures on behalf of an inmate at a women’s peniten-
tiary in Lima. The petitioners in her case had informed the Commission that her health problems 
included mobile breast lumps.79 Specialized examinations were necessary to identify their nature 
and treatment. The Commission requested Peru to immediately provide the medical examinations 
necessary to protect her health. The State responded that it was providing her with medical atten-
tion and administered the medical exams necessary to protect her health.80 
In 2003, in a case involving psychiatric patients the Commission used precautionary meas-
ures in the face of information about female patients having been raped, children held together 
with adults and two youths that ‘were kept for more than four years in solitary confinement in 
small cells, naked, and without access to the bathrooms’. It asked Paraguay to adopt measures to 
protect the ‘life and physical, mental, and moral integrity’ of these two youths as well as the other 
458 patients. In response the State noted that two weeks after it received the precautionary meas-
ures the President of Paraguay, together with the Minster of Public Health and Social Welfare 
‘visited the hospital to learn more about the situation. After their visit, action was taken, as the 
director was replaced and an audit was launched’.81 
2.2.4.3 IMMIGRATION DETENTION INVOLVING MINORS 
The HRC has dealt with immigration detention involving children. In Bakhtiari family v. Austra-
lia (2003)82 the Rapporteur had requested the State to inform the Committee of the measures it 
had taken on the basis of the evaluation by Australia’s own expert authorities that the children and 
their mother should have ongoing assessment outside of the Woomera detention centre in order to 
prevent further acts of self-harm. The State observed that it was closely monitoring the family and 
that there were individual care and case management plans in place that were regularly reviewed. 
It considered that release from detention would not be appropriate. ‘Its processes had determined 
                                                 
78 HRC Estradet Cabreira v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983 and Manera Lluberas v. Uruguay, 6 April 
1984. 
79 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III C1, §50. 
80 Ibid. 
81 CIDH Annual Report 2003, Chapter III C1, §60. 
82 HRC Bakhtiari family v. Australia, 29 October 2003. 
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that it did not owe protection obligations to Mrs Bakhtiyari and her children’. Moreover, ‘the 
Minister personally considered the case, inter alia in the light of the State party’s obligations 
including the Covenant, and decided that it would not be in the public interest to substitute a more 
favourable decision’. Finally, the State considered it inappropriate to release the children and their 
mother when their father’s visa was under consideration for cancellation for alleged fraud.83  
According to the State Article 24(1) ICCPR should not be interpreted as if it were the Con-
vention on the Rights of the Child. Referring to its previous response to ‘the Committee’s request 
for information pursuant to Rule 86’, it submitted that it had met its obligations with regard to the 
Bakhtiyari children. It added that ‘all staff in detention facilities must advice local child protection 
authorities if they consider a child is at risk of harm’. Arrangements had been formalised in this 
respect. Moreover, in light of the concern about their well-being, ‘special protective measures 
were implemented’.84 Subsequently, however, the children and their parents were released follow-
ing family court decisions.85 
                                                 
83 See HRC Bakhtiari family v. Australia, 29 October 2003, §§4.3 and 4.4. 
84 “An officer has been specifically assigned to monitor the children’s participation in educational 
and recreational activities, and to work with Mrs Bakhtiyari to encourage these ends. Records 
indicate that the two eldest boys attend school regularly, use computer facilities, play soccer 
regularly and attend exercise classes. They attend regular pool excursions and enjoy watching 
television, while Muntazar has actively taught other children cycling. Of the other children, the 
school-aged girls attend school and participate in recreational activities, including sewing with 
their mother”. 
85 On 19 June 2003 the Family Court determined that the prolonged detention of children was 
unlawful. It considered that there was an obligation under the UN Convention on the Rights of 
the Child to protect minors held in custody. Family Court, B and B v. Minister for Immigration & 
Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs [2003] FamCA 451, judgment of 19 June 2003, see 
www.familycourt.gov.au. It found that its jurisdiction extended to protection against prospective 
as well as present harm, including by third party. The appeal was initially brought on behalf of 
two boys aged fourteen and twelve. Their three sisters of eleven, nine and six were later added. In 
this light all three judges considered that the Court did have jurisdiction to make certain 
protective orders concerning in immigration detention (including those related to medical and 
educational facilities). The majority considered that if it was to be determined at trial that the 
children were being held in detention indefinitely, this would be unlawful. They considered that 
for the purposes of this case the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child had been incorporated 
into the Family Law Act by the Family Reform Act of 1995, pursuant to the external affairs 
power in the Constitution. They also considered that the Migration Act should be interpreted as 
having been passed subject to Australia’s obligations under the Children’s Convention or having 
regard to them. The Court ordered that the case be remitted for rehearing as a matter of urgency. 
Following this decision several political parties called for the release of the approximately 107 
children. The Labor party called upon the Government to immediately move families seeking 
asylum out of detention and into supervised housing, Agence France-Presse (via ClariNet), 
‘Release detained families now, opposition urges Australia’s Howard’, 21 June 2003, 
quickstart.Clari.net. The Democrats also emphasised this both following and previous to the 
landmark decision, Australian Democrats Senator Andrew Bartlett, media releases 03/373 and 
03/443 of 28 May and 20 June respectively, AusNews, AusIssues.com. Finally, the Greens 
equally re-emphasised that the 107 children should be released, Australian Greens-Federal leader 
Senator Bob Brown, media release of 19 June 2003, AusNews, AusIssues.com (consulted 13 
August 2003). In July 2003 the State party informed the Committee that Mrs Bakhtiyari and her 
three daughters ‘were currently resident in the Woomera Residential Housing Project, a facility 
aimed at special needs of women and children’. They were able to leave the house, provided they 
were escorted by correctional officers. By that time Mr Bakhtiyari was detained as well and the 
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Again it is unclear what role the Committee may have played. Presumably domestic pres-
sure and, ultimately, the decision of the family court were crucial. Nevertheless, the various inter-
national efforts, including the Committee’s provisional measures, may have played some role, 
directly or indirectly in the State’s treatment, monitoring and eventual release of the children.86  
2.2.4.4 SEPARATE MINORS FROM ADULT DETAINEES 
To some extent Honduras took seriously the Commission’s intervention in the case of the minors 
detained in adult prisons. A few months after its precautionary measures it informed the 
Commission of the ‘emergency measures taken to resolve the situation’.87 In October 1996 the 
Commission took precautionary measures for the protection of the juveniles at the San Pedro Sula 
Prison. The next month the petitioners informed the Commission that the State had not yet 
implemented the precautionary measures, that it ‘had failed to advise the courts that they were to 
cease the practice of incarcerating juveniles in adult facilities’ and that it ‘continued to allow 
juvenile offenders to be sent to those facilities’.88 A month later the petitioners reported once 
more that Honduras had not yet adopted the precautionary measures. It requested the Commission 
to seek a government report on the concrete measures adopted to assign public defenders to all 
juveniles and to seek a suspension of the practice of incarcerating juveniles in adult facilities. 
Three days later, on 26 December 1996, the Commission reiterated the precautionary measures 
and requested information about their concrete implementation.89  
2.2.4.5 HOSTILE RESPONSE, BUT SITUATION OF DETAINEE REMEDIED 
In April 2001 the Inter-American Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of a 
prisoner in Cuba. In its Annual Report the Commission quoted from the petitioners’ request for 
precautionary measures that ‘his health is delicate because of a tumor on his right lung’ and that 
the prisoner began a hunger strike in February 2001 in demand of medical care. The Commission 
did not receive a friendly response. The Commission reports that Cuba ‘returned the IACHR’s 
document requesting the precautionary measures in an envelope from the Cuban Interests Section 
in Washington D.C’.. It also reports, however, that it received information that the prisoner was 
moved to a hospital in Havana where he received specialized treatment. He was then transferred 
to a prison in that city.90 
                                                                                                                       
two sons remained at the Baxter Immigration Reception and Processing Centre, because they 
were over the age limit for release into the Residential Housing Project for ‘cultural sensitivities 
and security’. In August 2003 the Full Bench of the Family Court ordered the immediate release 
of all the children, pending resolution of the final application to the High Court. They were 
released that very day. More than two months later the HRC published its decision on the merits. 
Apart from violations of Article 9 (1) and (4), it also found violations of Article 24(1) and, 
potentially, of Articles 17(1) and 23(1) ICCPR. 
86 See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
87 CIDH Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999 (merits), §21. 
88 See also Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1997, Chapter II, §4a (cont.). 
89 Ibid. 
90 CIDH Annual Report 2001, §28. Cuba is in a special situation as it is subjected to human rights 
monitoring but expelled from the political organs of the OAS. According to the Commission the 
OAS General Assembly had only suspended the participation of the Cuban Government but not 
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2.2.5 Responses to provisional measures to ensure access to health care out-
side the detention context 
2.2.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As discussed in chapter XII, on occasion the Inter-American Commission has used provisional 
measures to ensure access to health care outside the detention context. The question arises how 
States have responded to such atypical provisional measures. 
2.2.5.2 ENSURE ACCESS TO HIV MEDICATION 
With regard to one of the new situations in which the Inter-American Commission has introduced 
the use of precautionary measures, namely to ensure access to medication for persons not in de-
tention, but suffering from a serious illness, there has been some compliance and little outright 
criticism by the States concerned with regard to the Commission’s decision to use the tool of 
precautionary measures in this context.  
The case of El Salvador serves as an example, also of the responsiveness of the Commission 
to the State showing cooperation. A month after the Commission requested El Salvador to ensure 
access to HIV medication to prevent the death of 27 persons, the State informed the Commission 
that the authorities were reviewing their medical files ‘in order to evaluate the anti-retroviral 
therapy and care needed for each case, and that they were seeking abroad the additional funds 
needed to provide the treatment’.91 A few months later the Board of Directors of the Social Secu-
rity Institute of El Salvador authorised the procurement of the triple anti-retroviral therapy for 
persons who are HIV-positive or have AIDS. From that day on, El Salvador began to provide the 
requested treatment.92 Subsequently the Commission continued to request information regarding 
the State’s compliance with the precautionary measures, but it did not heed to the petitioner’s 
request to seek provisional measures from the Court.93 
                                                                                                                       
the obligations of the State. Cuba does not subscribe to the Commission’s view that it still has 
obligations under the OAS Charter. 
91 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III C.1, §32. 
92 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §30. 
93 In March 2000 the petitioners requested that the Commission would declare that El Salvador had 
not complied with the precautionary measures. They requested the Commission to seek 
provisional measures from the Court. In March 2000 the State reported that it had appointed 
someone at the Office of the Director General for Foreign Policy as the liaison officer for the 
petitioners in relation to this case. That same month the Commission requested the petitioners to 
provide it with the names of the alleged victims who had died since it had began processing the 
case. It also requested specific information with regard to the precautionary measures. In April 
2000 the petitioners submitted this information and they asked the Commission again to request 
the Court to order provisional measures. Four days later they repeated this request. Later that 
month the Commission transmitted the petitioners’ comments to the State and requested more 
information with regard to compliance with the precautionary measures. In June 2000 the 
petitioners requested the Commission once more to move the case forward. In June El Salvador 
submitted the information the Commission had requested. This included ‘the list of persons 
identified in the request for precautionary measures, together with detailed information on 
medical care, treatment, medical recommendations and other pertinent information’. 
Commenting on the information provided by the State, the petitioners reiterated their position 
 
 Chapter XVII 
964 
In July 2000 the State reported that the Governing Board of the Salvadoran Social Security 
Institute had decided to authorize the purchase of the triple therapy medication. It mentioned that 
this was authorized ‘for persons who are insured’ and reported the establishment of a fund. On 20 
July 2000 El Salvador submitted additional information in relation to the treatment received by 
Mr. Miranda Cortéz. The Commission ‘expressed its appreciation for this information and for the 
action taken by the Salvadoran State within the context of the precautionary measures granted in 
this case’. Later that month the State submitted additional information on the action undertaken to 
implement the measures. This included ‘strengthening and taking up activities aimed at prevent-
ing the transmission of AIDS through education and the promotion of hygiene and preventive 
health … among the sectors most at risk for this disease’ and ‘creating a fund aimed at purchasing 
anti-retroviral medications for the provision of triple therapy to HIV infected persons’.94  
In December 2000 the Commission decided in so many words not to grant the petitioners’ 
request to seek provisional measures by the Court.  
“In making this decision the Inter-American Commission considered the information received 
from both parties, and evaluated the different actions taken by the Salvadoran State to provide 
medical treatment not only to the members of the Atlacatl Association but also to other persons 
infected with HIV/AIDS in that country. These actions had continued even after expiration of 
the deadline for precautionary measures on August 29, 2000”.95 
                                                                                                                       
that it had not complied with the Commission’s precautionary measures. They asserted, for 
instance, that the two alleged victims who died on 5 and 11 May 2000 had not received the 
treatment from the State 'that would have avoided their deaths’. Again, they requested the 
Commission to go to the Court for provisional measures. See footnote 3 in CIDH Jorge Odir 
Miranda Cortéz et al v. El Salvador, 7 March 2001 (adm.). 
94 In August the petitioners commented on this information, repeated their position on El Salvador’s 
non-compliance with the precautionary measures and their request to seek provisional measures 
by the Court. In the meantime, the period for the precautionary measures expired on 29 August 
2000 and the Commission did not extend the measures. They requested a hearing before the 
Commission, which took place in October 2000. In November and December 2000 the petitioners 
again asked the Commission to declare non-compliance and to seek provisional measures by the 
Court. In December El Salvador provided the Commission with a summary of its activities in 
order to comply with the precautionary measures. 
95 CIDH Jorge Odir Miranda Cortéz et al v. El Salvador, 7 March 2001 (adm.), §20. That same 
month, however, the Commission sent the State a request for information about the medical care 
and treatment provided to the 24 surviving persons identified in the case. In February 2001 the 
State informed the Commission that it had provided the anti-retroviral medication to eleven of the 
24 persons. It noted that this medication was available to the other persons as well ‘subject to the 
proper medical evaluation’. It had also expanded the provision of the medication to other persons 
not included in the case. With regard to the exhaustion of domestic remedies and the merits of the 
case, the State argued that the Commission should construe the information it had provided 
during the processing of the precautionary measures as the State’s response to the petitioners’ 
allegations. “The petitioners have availed themselves of domestic remedies and have at all times, 
had access to the appropriate entities in the country. We have evidence, which has also been 
provided to the Commission, pertaining to specialized medical and hospital care, the measures 
adopted by state institutions, the treatment provided to each patient living with HIV/AIDS, and 
the budget approved to provide them with the medication requested”. Communication from the 
state, 8 September 2000, 7 March 2001 (adm.), §29.The State also noted that patients who did not 
yet begin the treatment plan would be notified by telegram to appear at the Social Work Unit of 
 
 The Official Responses of Addressee States to Provisional Measures 
965 
El Salvador requested the Commission to close the case. It argued that the attention it provided to 
the alleged victims within the framework of the precautionary measures already demonstrated its 
compliance with its international commitments.96  
When declaring the case admissible the Commission noted the following:  
“The IACHR is aware of the fact that the people of El Salvador are in the midst of a very 
difficult period brought on by a series of natural disasters, which has placed enormous demands 
on the health authorities and officials. In that context, the Inter-American Commission 
appreciates the efforts of the Salvadoran authorities to address the needs of persons infected 
with HIV/AIDS in that country. The supply of anti-retroviral medications has been steadily 
increasing in recent months, and the state has announced that it will continue to adopt the 
measures necessary in that regard”.97 
2.2.5.3 ENSURE ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE TO SURVIVORS OF A MASSACRE 
Two weeks after the Inter-American Commission had taken precautionary measures in the Aguas 
Blancas case Mexico reported the measures it had taken to comply.98 These included ‘contacting 
each of the protected persons, providing access to health centres in the state of Guerrero, and 
holding meetings to resolve the problems that have been identified’. A month later, Mexico 
reported that a meeting that had taken place between the victims and several state and federal 
officials. During this meeting agreements were made in relation to medical attention, travelling 
and accommodation expenses and drugs and medical equipment ‘as indicated by their needs’.99 
2.2.6 Various responses to provisional measures aimed at protecting against 
death threats 
2.2.6.1 INTRODUCTION 
It appears from the case law that States are taking the Inter-American Court’s provisional meas-
ures more and more seriously. States generally do not question the Orders by the Court for provi-
sional measures. They often send a high level delegation to a hearing to argue why the Court 
should not order such measures.100  
The situation in which the Court has used provisional measures most often (as has the 
Commission) is in the context of death threats and harassment. Killings have subsided when 
whole communities have been covered by an order for provisional measures. 
                                                                                                                       
the Oncology Hospital of the Salvadoran Social Security Institute. The liaison officer for the case 
contacted the legal representative of the petitioners on this issue.  
96 CIDH Jorge Odir Miranda Cortéz et al v. El Salvador, 7 March 2001 (adm.), §3. 
97 Id., §48. 
98 CIDH Tomás Porfirio Rondin (‘Aguas Blancas’ case) v. Mexico, 18 February 1998. 
99 CIDH Floriberto Cruz and another 7 survivors of the massacre in Aguas Blancas, Guerrero v. 
Mexico, precautionary measures of 17 July 2001, CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), 
§40. 
100 The Dominican Republic, for instance, in the Haitians in the Dominican Republic case, sent a 
delegation to the Court that included the representatives of all the parties. On this case see 
Chapter XI (Mass expulsion). 
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The first time the Inter-American Court ordered provisional measures directing a State to 
protect persons against death threats was in the famous case Velásquez Rodríguez, the first one 
decided by the Court on the merits. What was interesting in this disappearance case, in which two 
witnesses had been killed, is that it was the State that first proposed to take certain measures. In 
its Order of 19 January 1988 the Inter-American Court noted that Honduras had proposed, during 
the Court hearing, to take measures on its own initiative to investigate and punish those responsi-
ble for the murders of the two witnesses. It had announced that it would submit to the Court the 
findings of the autopsies of the victims. Honduras had also proposed to protect persons under 
threat, in particular the two persons mentioned before in the letter of the President. Honduras had 
included in its submission press releases of the Secretariat of its Presidency and of its Inter-
Institutional Commission of Human Rights repudiating the assassination and the violence. The 
Inter-American Court subsequently ordered Honduras to ‘adopt concrete measures to make clear 
that the appearance of an individual before the Inter-American Commission or Court of Human 
Rights, under conditions authorized by the American Convention and by the rules of procedure of 
both bodies, is a right enjoyed by every individual and is recognized as such by Honduras as a 
party to the Convention’.101 
The Commission has used precautionary measures in many cases and sometimes they ap-
pear to be quite effective.102 Yet in other cases recourse to the Court is necessary. Sometimes the 
Commission takes a rather long time before actually doing so. In November 1995 the Commis-
sion requested Colombia to take precautionary measures on behalf of seven members of the Civic 
Human Rights Committee of Meta. This Committee exists since 1991 and its members have been 
subjected to constant threats and attacks since that time. Some have been summarily executed. 
Mr. Giraldo, however, who was protected by these precautionary measures, was murdered in 
October 1996. In response, the Commission requested the Court to take provisional measures on 
behalf of three of his family members as well as three members of the Civic Human Rights 
Committee of Meta, who had also been the beneficiaries of the Commission’s precautionary 
measures.103 The Court indeed did so.104  
                                                 
101 IACHR Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi/Solís Corrales and Godínez Cruz cases, Order of 19 
January 1988, Compendium 1987-1996, pp. 9-11. 
102 For instance, almost a month after the Commission had taken precautionary measures on behalf 
of the President of the Constitutional Court, Guatemala informed the Commission that it had 
already deployed two uniformed officers ‘to protect the perimeter’ of her home before the 
Commission’s precautionary measures. Later it had permanently assigned four plain-clothes 
officers from the protection and security service of the National Civilian Police to protect her. 
CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §31. Another example is that of a journalist in 
Mexico who had received death threats from members of the judicial police in the state of 
Sonora. Allegedly, these threats were connected to his investigation into corruption and ties to 
drug trafficking by the judicial police in that state. In September 1999 the Commission requested 
Mexico to protect his life and physical integrity. In October 1999 Mexico responded that the 
National Human Rights Commission communicated with him twice a day. Mexico also informed 
the Commission that it was investigating the alleged acts. Annual Report 1999, Chapter 3.C.1, 
§45. In March 2000, the Commission requested Brazil to take precautionary measures on behalf 
of Catherine Halvey, a human rights defender working with the Human Rights Centre of the 
Archdiocese of Manaos. She had informed the Commission that, as a result of her activities, she 
had received several death threats. Brazil replied that it had taken precautionary measures after 
the six months period. Apparently there was no reason to maintain the measures. CIDH Annual 
Report 2000, §12. 
103 Case 11.690. 
104 CIDH Annual report 1997, Chapter III (a) under ‘Colombia’. 
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Obviously a State may nominally follow up the Inter-American Commission’s suggestions, 
made either as part of precautionary measures or in the context of State or thematic reports or the 
Court’s provisional measures, without really solving the underlying problems. It cannot be ruled 
out that in some cases following, or seemingly following, the Commission’s suggestions may in 
fact exacerbate the situation locally. 
This subsection will further deal with responses that lack specificity, with the difficulty 
States have in implementing the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish, but also with 
specific measures taken by States in response. Also discussed are the use of provisional measures 
as leverage by certain members of government to indeed help achieve better protection, State 
compliance after regime change, the introduction by a State of a formalised protection program 
and the proactive approach by a State taking voluntary precautionary measures. 
2.2.6.2 LACK OF SPECIFICITY IN RESPONSE: WE ARE TAKING ‘THE APPROPRIATE 
STEPS’ 
Generally States respond to precautionary measures in the context of threats and harassment. 
Often they could be more specific about the implementation of the measures. They have noted, 
for instance, that they were ‘in the process of implementing’ them.105 Armed civilians allegedly 
reporting to the Governor of Oaxaca had issued politically motivated death threats against a group 
of residents of the town of San Miguel Copala.106 In August the Commission took precautionary 
measures. One of the beneficiaries was a survivor of an attack by these armed civilians who had 
been receiving medical treatment in Mexico City and was afraid to return home. Mexico 
responded that it had identified the perpetrators and issued warrants for their arrest. It added that 
the Human Rights Commission of Oaxaca state had played a role in solving the matter and that 
‘all the competent authorities were taking the appropriate steps within their respective areas of 
influence’. In September, however, the petitioners informed the Commission that the dangerous 
situation keeping one of the survivors of the ambush from returning to his community still 
existed.107 While many less forthcoming responses are possible, the reference to ‘taking the 
appropriate steps’ is very vague and given the reaction of the petitioners did not include specific 
protection allowing this one survivor to return. The statement that it had identified the 
perpetrators and issued warrants for their arrest would be very positive, if followed by 
information that the arrest indeed took place and the perpetrators were prevented from continuing 
their threats. According to the petitioners, however, for at least one survivor the dangerous 
situation still persisted. 
2.2.6.3 INVESTIGATE, PROSECUTE, PUNISH 
In general, as noted, the Commission’s precautionary measures on behalf of witnesses and human 
rights defenders seem to be reasonably effective.108 In the majority of cases the Commission does 
                                                 
105 Response by Guatemala of 11 April 1996 to precautionary measures of 2 March 1996 on behalf 
of five persons and their families the Commission requested Guatemala to take who had received 
various death threats. Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1997, §4a.  
106 In July 2001 they had shot several persons in an ambush. Two of them died. 
107 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §41. 
108 Early 1998 the President of the Court had adopted urgent measures requesting Guatemala to 
guarantee the personal integrity of the members of the Vásquez family, involved in the Paniagua 
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not resort to the Court to ask for provisional measures, although this may be due mainly to lack of 
resources on the part of the Commission. There is one aspect of its precautionary measures, how-
ever, that States usually do not respect. This is the obligation to investigate threats and punish 
those found responsible.109 
In December 2000 the Commission requested Guatemala to guarantee the life and physical 
integrity of the President of the Association of Family Members of the Detained and Disappeared 
of Guatemala (FAMDEGUA).110 It also requested Guatemala to take effective measures to guar-
antee the safety of persons visiting or working at the offices of this organisation. Guatemala in-
formed the Commission that the alleged perpetrators had been captured and that it was conducting 
judicial investigations and providing police protection.111  
Yet in those cases where there is a willingness to investigate and prosecute, the investigator 
and prosecutor, the witness and even the judges are often being threatened. In the end neither the 
original attacks, nor the subsequent threats and harassment are properly dealt with. Even when a 
prosecution results in a conviction, there are cases where the perpetrators escape or are liberated 
by armed groups and are not captured again, resuming their threats.112  
States are prepared to enter into detailed negotiations with the beneficiaries and the Com-
mission and take very specific action as suggested by the Commission, but their investigation of 
death threats, attacks and harassment lags behind dramatically. Prosecuting alleged perpetrators 
and punishing them when found guilty is a much more sensitive issue than spending resources on 
protective measures. The rate of compliance with regard to the latter is much higher than with 
regard to the former. This applies to the Court’s provisional measures as well. 
In April 2004 Guatemala informed the Court of the place of detention of the man convicted 
for the murder of Nicolas Blake, who was sentenced to 28 years in prison and would not be re-
leased before March 2025.113 Such detention is obviously an important step in the prevention of 
irreparable harm. Yet to the extent that the beneficiaries of provisional measures in the Blake case 
had been harassed by other persons, their acts should be investigated as well. 
                                                                                                                       
Morales (‘White Van’) case, President’s urgent measures of 10 February 1998. The Court ratified 
these in June. Subsequently the security of the beneficiaries improved, and upon suggestion of 
the Commission, the Court lifted its provisional measures, Order of 28 August 2001. 
109 In the Carpio-Nicolle v. Guatemala case, for instance, compliance with the concrete 
recommendations was good but the threats and harassment themselves had not been well 
investigated. Here the political profile of the family and the nature of the case were very 
important.  
110 FAMDEGUA is a petitioner in the case of the Dos Erres village massacre pending before the 
Commission, case 11. 681. 
111 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §33. 
112 In the Colotenango case several former civilian patrol members responsible for the murder and 
other facts dealt with in this case had escaped. The lives and physical integrity of the witnesses 
remained at risk as a result. The situation in Colotenango is very complicated because of the 
inter-community battle between members of PAC and non-members. In the circumstances, many 
believe that all the media attention did not help and neither did the pressure by the UN presence 
Minugua. The first Order was of 1994 and the orders were finally lifted by Order of 12 July 2007. 
They were lifted because the main point of contention between the beneficiaries and the State 
related to the non-implementation of a point agreed on in the friendly settlement in 1997. The 
Court clarified that lifting the Order did not mean that the State had fully met its obligations 
under the Convention specified in the Inter-American Commission’s Friendly Settlement Report, 
Juan Pablo Chanay (Guatemala), 13 March 1997 (Friendly Settlement). The State was not 
released either from its obligation to investigate, identify and, when appropriate, punish. 
113 IACHR Blake, Order of 17 November 2004, 10th ‘Having seen’ clause. 
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Often protection is partial and an ongoing process requiring continued vigilance on the part 
of NGOs and the Commission. The result is some compliance but not sufficient to ensure lasting 
protection. The situation of the Peace Community is a case in point.114 An incredible number of 
people from this Community have been murdered. The provisional measures ordered by the Inter-
American Court have helped achieve some protection to them. In addition the Community has 
gained international attention. Yet the members of this Community, as well as those persons 
providing services to them, are still in need of protection and the killings have not been investi-
gated. President Uribe has never been a friend of the Peace Community.  
At the same time, from the first Order for provisional measures in this case one may con-
clude that the government prefers to be perceived as being cooperative. Moreover, it seems that 
some civil servants, politicians or other officials are more willing to respect the Court’s Order 
than others. 
The comments of the State, in its reports or during hearings, may shed some light on its 
willingness to implement that part of the Court’s orders for provisional measures aiming at inves-
tigation and prosecution. It pointed out that a Committee of representatives of the Office of the 
Attorney General, the Office of the General Prosecutor and the Office of the UN High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights visited the local authorities of San José de Apartadó in order to promote 
investigations of the facts that took place in 1999-2000. This allowed for a formal opening of the 
investigations into the occurrences of April 1999, with the detention order for one person. The 
State’s representatives made the observation that the actions of the State need to aim at eliminat-
ing any trace of impunity and ‘render important results in the medium term’.115  
With regard to its obligation to investigate and prosecute, the State had mentioned several 
times that it had opened an investigation, that it was in a preliminary stage, or at the stage of 
collecting evidence. During the hearing, in November 2000, the Commission pointed out that a 
situation of total impunity was prevailing in spite of the collaboration of the Community with the 
judicial authorities. Some of the violent acts, moreover, were now being dealt with under the 
military criminal justice system, specifically by the military judge of the 17th Brigade of the Army 
dealing with the investigation of criminal offences. It was the 17th Brigade that was mainly impli-
cated in the violent acts against the Community perpetrated by paramilitaries. The State reported 
that its Defence Ministry had taken measures through the Lower Operating Unit (‘la Unidad 
Operativa Menor’). This included operations in the area and capture of several members of the 
paramilitary (‘Autodefensas’) as well as of the armed revolutionary group FARC.  
During the November hearing the State’s representatives had also noted that the Vice-
Presidency’s promotion of actions providing physical protection, in collaboration with the local 
authorities and the Network of Social Solidarity, reaffirmed the State’s commitment towards the 
Community of San José de Apartadó.116  
                                                 
114 See also Chapter IX (Threats). 
115 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. In the original text: ‘dar frutos importantes a mediano plazo’, ‘Having seen’ clause 10(g). 
116 The State was fully capable of contributing to and making concrete the implementation of these 
measures as well as to make progress in its dialogue with the Commission. They also pointed out 
that the Ministry of the Interior had followed up the developments around the Community since 
its creation. It had coordinated actions with local authorities and with City Hall in particular. It 
had provided humanitarian assistance to the displaced persons, which it had coordinated with the 
Municipality and the Office of the Governor. It had taken measures through the Lower Operating 
Unit (‘la Unidad Operativa Menor’). These included controls on the road between Apartadó and 
San José de Apartadó, as well as orders from the Commanders of the 17th Brigade of the Army to 
the local units to protect human rights. In all this the State had emphasized the rights of the Peace 
Community. The Office of the UNHCHR, the Office of the National Ombudsman, the ICRC and 
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Five days before it was expected to hand in its first implementation report the State held a 
meeting with representatives of several State organs to analyse the situation of the Community. 
During this meeting the decision was taken to send to the Community an Inter-Institutional 
Commission made up of representatives of the Vice Presidency, the Office of the Attorney Gen-
eral and the Office of the General Prosecutor. A week before the Court would hold its public 
hearing on the Commission’s request for provisional measures this delegation would visit the 
Community.117  
The State’s representatives acknowledged that the Court’s provisional measures, with their 
collective nature, were based on important precedents in international law.118 They observed that 
the Court’s hearing had allowed them to become more closely aware of all the different views. 
They also pointed out an additional purpose for the participating institutions: to take initiatives 
and be spokespersons inside the government so that the required actions would be implemented 
promptly and completely in the entire country.119 
During the public hearing the Commission referred to the commitment of the Vice-
Presidency of Colombia to allow the Community to ask for help, to resolve emergency situations 
and prevent violent acts from taking place. Measures to ensure this were now in the process of 
implementation and ‘among them are the supply of short wave radios, repair of the telephone 
system of the place, repair of the road, and the installations of reflecting lights in the urban central 
area’.120 The Commission emphasised these measures would be adopted by mutual agreement 
between the State, the Members of the Community and the petitioners in order to guarantee their 
effectiveness as well as compatibility with the Peace Community’s commitment to the principle 
of neutrality. It noted that personnel and armed protection inside the Community itself could 
endanger this commitment.121 This relates to the intention expressed by the State to position such 
people inside the Community. 
The State representatives pointed out that the State respected the position of the Peace 
Community and had worked with the authorities to ensure that they would afford armed protec-
tion on the outside of this Community. Nevertheless, the armed forces would be able to enter it if 
necessary. The State representatives also informed the Court that both the Minister of the Interior 
and the Office of Human Rights considered that the protection afforded to the Community must 
be coordinated. It is not clear whether they just meant coordination between the various govern-
mental offices and local authorities or also with the beneficiaries. The State representatives con-
tinued with the remark that the State had dealt with petitions through the Network of Social Soli-
darity and the Ministry had made available a sum of 35 million pesos for a project of workshops 
intended to relieve tension between the authorities and the Community and to restore confidence 
between them. They did say, in so many words, that the early warning system promised by the 
State must be coordinated between the Community and the public security forces in order for it to 
be effective.122 They pointed out that the Vice-Presidency had promoted multiple actions on 
behalf of the Community, including the aforementioned ‘installation of light reflectors in the 
                                                                                                                       
others had also provided training to the troops on human rights and humanitarian law issues. Id., 
‘Having seen’ clause 7(a). 
117 Id., ‘Having seen’ clause 7(b). 
118 In the original text: ‘Estas medidas adoptadas con su carácter colectivo, están sustentadas en 
importantes antecedentes del derecho internacional’. Id., ‘Having seen’ clause 10(h). See also 
Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 on beneficiaries. 
119 Id., ‘Having seen’ clause 7(h). 
120 Id., ‘Having seen’ clause 9(m), iv. 
121 Ibid. 
122 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000, ‘Having seen’ clause 10(f). 
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Community of San José and in La Unión, supply of communication radios and improvement of 
roads’. These were all undertaken in collaboration with the Municipality, the City Hall and the 
Network of Social Solidarity (‘Red de Solidaridad Social’).123 They also repaired the telephone of 
the town centre of the Community, which was now in operation.124  
The Order in the Peace Community case has been repeated and expanded several times.125 
Early 2008 the Constitutional Court of Colombia ordered the State, among others, to comply with 
the Orders of the Inter-American Court. A new and potentially far-reaching part of its judgment is 
its order to provide specific information on the members of the armed forces etc. who were pre-
sent in an area where massacres took place. The constitutional court also emphasized that the 
State should take efforts to gain the trust of the beneficiaries of the provisional measures.126 The 
Constitutional Court of Colombia has pointed out that part of the Inter-American Court’s provi-
sional measures was the requirement to investigate and prosecute. Despite the fact considerable 
time had passed with regard to several of the killings, still no investigations had been completed. 
It also pointed out that the fact that the State had ratified the ACHR required all institutions of the 
State to conduct themselves in accordance with the terms of the Convention, in such a manner 
that the Inter-American Commission and Court are not required to intervene. It added that the 
same could be said with regard to the International Criminal Court (ICC). By ratifying the ICC-
Statute Colombia had committed itself to do everything possible not to enter into a situation of 
                                                 
123 Id., ‘Having seen’ clause 10(e). 
124 Id., ‘Having seen’ clause 7(c). 
125 See e.g. IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 6 
February 2008. 
126 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sala de Revisión, T-1025/07, decided 3 December 2007, 
published 22 January 2008. The Constitutional Court concluded that the facts demonstrated that 
Colombia had failed to comply with its duty to prosecute the violations against the members if 
the Peace Community. Despite the gravity of the crimes and the fact that many of them had been 
committed many years back, as of yet there have been no convictions. Many old cases were still 
at the initial stage of investigation, or the investigation has been suspended. In many other cases 
no information is available at all on the stage of investigation and yet other cases appear to 
remain inactive as they have been transferred to other jurisdictions or a verdict has been passed 
inhibiting further investigation. All of this results in impunity, in violation of the right of the 
Community members to access to justice and the right to know the truth of what happened, §25. 
The petitioner in the case before the Constitutional Court had noted that by May 2006 the number 
of members that were assassinated already reached 175. The Constitutional Court also derived 
from the information provided to it by the Prosecutor’s Office that this Office was investigating 
more than 100 cases, §25. The Constitutional Court pointed out that in important percentage of 
the members that had established the Community had now been murdered. This situation was 
intolerable for a State that had committed itself in its Constitution to the protection of human 
rights. It added that it had previously established that the precautionary measures of the Inter-
American Commission and the provisional measures of the Court were legally binding. This 
meant that the provisional measures ordered by the Court in this context, on six occasions, 
obliged the State in a special manner to take the urgent measures necessary to protect the 
Community. Consequently the Court put together a serious list of requirements for the State to 
fulfil, including providing specific information on ongoing investigations and investigations that 
had yet to be initiated. The Office of the Public Prosecutor was to establish a proceeding for 
accelerating the military investigations so that it could properly start its investigations as well. It 
indicated how a high level officer was to be responsible for coordinating all proceedings with 
regard to the killings and harassment of members of the Peace Community and those providing 
services to them, §27. 
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being unable or unwilling to investigate and prosecute.127 This domestic judgment shows interna-
tional and domestic courts working to remind the State of its human rights obligations under 
international and domestic law.128 
2.2.6.4 SPECIFIC MEASURES 
In December 2000 the Commission requested Brazil to take precautionary measures on behalf of 
three Justice Advocates of São Paulo and their family members, as well as sixteen detainees. The 
last were detained in the Public Prison of Sorocaba in the State of São Paulo. They had received 
death threats ‘presumably linked to the mistreatment and torture taking place in that prison’.129 
The Commission requested Brazil to provide guarantees for the right to life and physical integrity 
of these persons as well as their ability to testify without fear of reprisal. In response, the State 
reported that it had transferred the guards involved in the case to administrative positions.130  
In response to a precautionary measure on behalf of three persons at the General Depart-
ment for Integrity in Public Service, Nicaragua denied that President Alemán had threatened ‘any 
public official’.131 It did note, however, that ‘in keeping with the measures requested, the protec-
tion and personal security had been increased including, in the case of Mr. Anaya, a personal 
escort service comprised of five persons, protection of his residence and place of work by a uni-
formed policeman 24 hours a day; and a telephone communications monitoring service, by the 
Department of Investigation of Personal Security Matters in co-ordination with the Department of 
Criminal Investigation of the National Police, to process information and investigate threats made 
against him’.132 
2.2.6.5 PROVISIONAL MEASURES AS LEVERAGE FOR THOSE INDIVIDUALS WITHIN 
GOVERNMENT THAT ARE INDEED INTERESTED IN PREVENTING IRREPA-
RABLE HARM 
Often the situations in which provisional measures are taken to protect persons against death 
threats and harassment are extremely complicated and volatile. There may be a partial willingness 
of a government to comply on the one hand and perpetrators with influential networks (of army, 
police and other governmental officials) on the other. 
                                                 
127 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sala de Revisión, T-1025/07, decided 3 December 2007, 
published 22 January 2008, §26. 
128 Ibid. In October 2007, upon invitation by the Colombian government, an ICC delegation visited 
Colombia. The ICC media Advisory announced that, among others, a meeting would take place 
with Colombian judges and others ‘to discuss relevant justice issues, including the 
implementation of the law on Justice and peace’., International Criminal Court Media Advisory: 
ICC Prosecutor visits Colombia’, 18 October 2007, at <www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/ 
282.html> (visited 13 May 2008). 
129 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §14. 
130 The Commission does not mention the State’s approach, if any, to the protection of the Justice 
Advocates and their family. CIDH Annual Report 2000, §14. 
131 It is interesting that Alemán himself, as a presidential candidate had once been under the 
protection of an Order for provisional measures by the Inter-American Court. See IACHR 
Alemán Lacayo (Nicaragua), Order of 6 February 1997, §4.2.2 and §5.1. 
132 CIDH Annual report 1999, Chapter 3.C.1, §46. 
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El Salvador, for instance, in one case reported to the Commission that it had instructed the 
Director General of the National Civil Police Force to protect the life and personal integrity of the 
García Prieto family. It had also ordered him to start or continue the investigation of the acts of 
intimidation against them. Finally it had instructed the Director General to review the out-of-court 
steps taken by the National Civil Police Force to gather information in the murder case of García 
Prieto Girald.133 Nevertheless repeated precautionary measures were necessary as the petitioners 
continued to receive threats in order to deter their search for justice in the murder case.134 
In some situations States themselves may find that provisional measures are very useful. 
This may be the case in certain regions where the provisional measures give them backing to deal 
with the armed forces.135 In some cases a government even indicates that it wishes the Court to 
take provisional measures. States may actually prefer the Court to maintain or reintroduce provi-
sional measures. They may use them as a ‘back-up’ in their struggle against certain sectors of 
their own armed forces, police or other governmental agencies.  
In its 1997 Annual Report the Commission mentions that it had the opportunity to meet 
with representatives of the Colombian government to discuss the Court’s decision to lift the pro-
visional measures when it handed down its final judgment in the Caballero Delgado and Santana 
                                                 
133 Mr García Prieto Girald was murdered in El Salvador in June 1994 in the presence of his wife 
and son. In October 1996, his family, CEJIL and IDHUCA requested the Commission to take 
precautionary measures for their protection (case 11.697). In June 1997 the Commission 
requested El Salvador to adopt precautionary measures safeguarding the life, liberty and personal 
integrity of three members of his family as well as of the attorneys and witnesses associated with 
the investigation and trial of those guilty of his death. More than two months later the 
government of El Salvador reported the above to the Commission. CIDH Annual Report 2001, 
Chapter III (a), §30. 
134 Subsequently the Commission sent a new request for precautionary measures. The government of 
El Salvador informed it that it was continuing its attempts to clarify the facts. In January 1998 the 
State informed the Commission of a meeting that had taken place between the beneficiaries and 
several authorities and some human rights defenders. The parties involved were the three family 
members and several public officers, the Director of the National Police Force, a representative 
of the Office of the Attorney for the Defence of Human Rights and someone from the Human 
Rights Institute of the José Simeón Cañas Central American University (IDHUCA). During this 
meeting a discussion took place about several options for the implementation of a security plan to 
protect the lives and integrity of this family. This security plan was also to protect the witnesses 
in connection with both the murder of Mr García Prieto Girald and with the acts of intimidation 
suffered by his family members. In November 2001, however, the Commission again took 
precautionary measures in connection with this case. It granted these measures on behalf of the 
parents of the murder victim and their legal advisers from the Human Rights Institute of the José 
Simeón Cañas Central American University. In its Annual Report 2001 the Commission refers to 
a preliminary report from El Salvador in which it noted that it had scheduled a meeting between 
its Attorney General, the family and their representatives for 22 November 2001. In this meeting 
it planned to reach an agreement on the necessary protection measures. On 5 December 2001 the 
petitioners ‘submitted a series of specific proposals for the Salvadorian authorities to pursue, 
including appointing a special prosecutor and a special investigator from the National Civilian 
Police, assigning the García Prieto family and their advisors security guards, details on the 
equipment needed to protect them, and holding regular meetings with the competent authorities’. 
CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §30. 
135 Interview by author with President of the IACHR Cançado Trindade, San José, Costa Rica, 
November 2001. 
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case.136 The Commission notes that the Court’s decision to lift these measures ‘raised some con-
cerns because of the dangerous situation of several persons as a result of the domestic investiga-
tions and tasks that were performed in this case’. Following this meeting, Colombia requested the 
Court to re-establish the provisional measures. In its Annual Report the Commission points out 
that this ‘constitutes an important precedent that is worthy of following in similar circumstances 
in the future’.137 Thus, in March 1997, the State itself proposed a continuation of the provisional 
measures, ‘as long as the risk situation continues, bearing in mind that the internal proceedings 
are currently being carried out by the investigating authorities [...] The Government of Colombia 
will inform the Honorable Court when it considers that the situation no longer warrants mainte-
nance of the measures requested, but until then, it trusts that these will be maintained, inasmuch 
as it is a question of protecting the life and physical integrity of those persons who have given 
evidence in the proceedings now under way and at those conducted by the Honorable Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’. The Court indeed did so.138 
2.2.6.6 COMPLIANCE AFTER REGIME CHANGE 
After Fujimori fled, the situation in Peru changed, even before elections took place. The Court 
was able to lift provisional measures in three cases, but in February 2001 it had to order them in 
another case. It ordered Peru to maintain those measures necessary to secure effectively the return 
of Ms Loayza to her country, guaranteeing her physical, psychological and moral integrity.139  
The other cases, however, were finally solved. In August 2000, in the case of Cesti Hur-
tado, the Court lifted the provisional measures dating from 1997. His security and that of his 
family did not appear to be at risk anymore. Thus, the circumstances of extreme gravity and ur-
gency, which had motivated the adoption of the provisional measures, no longer existed.  
That same month, in the case of the Constitutional Tribunal, the Court still had to ratify the 
resolution of the President of April 2000 for the protection of Ms Delia Revoredo. Again, in 
September 2000, the Commission informed the Court that acts of persecution persisted against 
her with the aim to deprive her of her liberty and her property and to prevent her from being re-
instituted as a member of the Constitutional Tribunal.  
In February 2001, however, Peru transmitted to the Court the express recognition of its re-
sponsibility for the violation of their rights of three magistrates of the Constitutional Tribunal 
including Delia Revoredo. Peru informed the Court that in November 2000 the seats in the Con-
stitutional Tribunal were returned to those three magistrates. In March 2001 the Court lifted the 
provisional measures. 
In November 2000, the Court had confirmed, and increased the scope of, provisional meas-
ures in the case of Baruch Ivcher. In February 2001, however, Peru informed the Court that it had 
annulled the decision to take away his Peruvian nationality. It had accepted the Commission's 
recommendations of December 1998140 and Mr Ivcher and his family and others would enjoy the 
                                                 
136 CIDH Annual Report 1997, section III(b). See IACHR Caballero Delgado and Santana 
(Colombia), Order of 31 January 1997 lifting its provisional measures following its judgment on 
the merits of 8 December 1995 and 29 January 1997. 
137 CIDH Annual Report 1997, section III(b). 
138 IACHR Caballero Delgado and Santana (Colombia), Order of 16 April 1997 reinstating its 
provisional measures. See also the Court’s Order of 6 February 2008 maintaining the provisional 
measures despite the State’s request to lift them. 
139 IACHR Loayza-Tamayo (Peru), Order of 3 February 2001. See also Order of 28 August 2001, 
lifting and terminating these provisional measures. 
140 See CIDH Report 94/98 of 9 December 1998. 
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protection of their physical, psychological and moral integrity as well as their judicial guarantees. 
Mr Ivcher was able to return to his previous position as shareowner of the news channel. Peru 
also indicated that it was at the disposition of the Commission to reach an amicable solution. The 
Court considered that the violations that were the reason for the order of provisional measures had 
ceased and it lifted the provisional measures.141 
2.2.6.7 FORMALISED PROTECTION PROGRAM 
The case Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia (2002) by the HRC is important because of its similarity to 
Colombian cases pending before the Inter-American Commission and Court. It is clear from the 
State’s response that witnesses, members of NGOs and trade unions are often facing threats. In its 
submission of September 1999 the State explained that it had instituted new protection programs: 
“In the particular case of union leaders, there is now a protection programme for witnesses and 
threatened persons. Provisions under this programme include an information centre, technical 
assistance, preventive action, emergency help, the purchase of communications systems, the 
purchase of vehicles, individual protection and protection for the offices of non-governmental 
and trade union organizations. Moreover, if the author should decide to return to the country, he 
would enjoy all the safeguards provided by the authorities and the protections merited in his 
particular case”.142 
The Commission’s Annual Reports also provide information on the attitudes of States with regard 
to implementation of requirements for immediate protection. In 1999, for instance, the Commis-
sion noted that Colombia had informed it that it had strengthened the Program of the Ministry of 
Interior for the protection of witnesses and persons receiving threats. The Risk Evaluation Com-
mittee of the Protection Program processes the requests for protection from human rights defend-
ers and witnesses. With the support of the General-Command of the National Police and if neces-
sary, the Armed Forces and the ‘Departamento Administrativo de Seguridad’, it co-ordinates the 
adoption of urgent measures. The Commission, however, notes that the budget for this program 
was, in American dollars, $250,000, ‘which cannot be considered an adequate or realistic amount 
in light of the high levels of risk these persons face’.143  
The State also reported that it had extended the terms of Law 418 of 1997 (intending to im-
plement final decisions of the Commission and Court on reparations) and that it had regulated a 
program for the protection for persons at risk. The State pointed out, moreover, that it General 
Law Budget included an amount of approximately $ 1,400,000,000 for preventive and protective 
measures in the field of human rights. This amount was assigned to the Special Administrative 
Unit for Human Rights of the Ministry of the Interior.144  
                                                 
141 IACHR Ivcher Bronstein et al. (Peru), Order of 14 March 2001. 
142 HRC Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia, 25 March 2002, §5.4. 
143 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter V – Colombia, §116. 
144 Id., §117. 
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2.2.6.8 TIMELINESS AND SPECIFICITY OF THE STATE’S REPORTING ON IMPLE-
MENTATION 
The attitude of States could differ when they are approached informally, rather than formally. In 
the case of Father Vogt (Guatemala) the Government presented its first implementation report on 
time, but it stated that there was no situation of extreme urgency in the municipality where he 
lived and that Father Vogt was ‘living and moving about in this and other communities and even 
travelling abroad in all tranquillity’. The Commission observed that his situation, on the contrary, 
was still one of extreme gravity and urgency and that full compliance with the Orders of the Court 
was ‘of the utmost importance’. The Government presented its second report more than 30 days 
after its first, one day before the Court hearing, stating that the police department was still 
providing day and night patrols and that Father Vogt was in communication with the police 
authorities and with the Pro-Defence Committee of El Estor (the community where he lived). 
Guatemala also stated that the investigations into the threats and harassments were continuing and 
the authorities had asked a domestic court to issue a warrant for the arrest of the person accused 
of making the threats. Guatemala mentioned the name of the alleged perpetrator.145 In relation to 
the timeliness of implementation reports of States, it seems that here the Court hearing provided a 
trigger for the Government to seriously prepare its second report.146 
2.2.6.9 PROACTIVE MEASURES BY THE STATE: VOLUNTARY PRECAUTIONARY 
MEASURES 
In Ecuador witnesses to a police killing were receiving threats. The Commission was informed 
that Pedro Baque and his friends had been riding a motorcycle on their way to buy motor-cross 
equipment when the national police intercepted them. Then they were shot. His two friends died 
and he was left there, seriously wounded. Following this, he, his family and his attorneys were 
being threatened so that he would be too scared to offer testimony in court. In June 1999, when 
the Commission expressed its concern about this situation during a country visit, Ecuador volun-
tarily adopted precautionary measures to guarantee the life and personal integrity of Pedro Baque, 
his family and attorneys and to guarantee their access to the courts. On 16 June 1999 the Com-
                                                 
145 IACHR Vogt case, Order of 27 June 1996, Compendium 1987-1996, p. 161. 
146 It appears from the Court’s order of 11 November 1997, in which it closed the provisional 
measures in the case of Father Vogt, that Guatemala had sufficiently respected the Court’s order. 
The Court refers to the Commission’s brief of 27 October 1997 requesting the withdrawal of the 
provisional measures. The Commission informed the Court that the petitioners had informed it 
that ‘owing to the effective and timely intervention of the Honourable Court those threats and 
direct and specific acts of harassment had abated considerably and [that] Father Vogt [was] 
conducting his pastoral activity in a normal manner … [and] that it would be fitting for the 
Honourable Court to order the withdrawal of the provisional measures presented on behalf of 
Father Vogt’. It does not discuss Guatemala’s compliance with the part of the provisional 
measures referring to the duty to investigate the threats. The Court does note that the 
Commission’s brief stated that it ‘will continue to monitor the situation in connection with its 
processing of the case and, if the circumstances so warranted, it would once more request that 
such measures be provided’. IACHR Vogt case, Order of 11 November 1997, Compendium July 
1996-June 2000, p. 426. 
 The Official Responses of Addressee States to Provisional Measures 
977 
mission ratified these precautionary measures, duly recognising Ecuador for having adopted them 
on its own initiative.147  
In November 2001 the Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of two cam-
pesino environmentalists in Mexico.148 They had been released from prison on that day. On the 
same day the Commission received a letter from the Undersecretary for Human Rights and De-
mocracy in which she noted that the Mexican government shared the concern of the petitioners 
about ‘incidents that could cause irreparable harm’ to these two persons. When Mexico reported 
their release it requested the Commission, on its own initiative, to grant precautionary measures 
on their behalf.149 Subsequently, when the beneficiaries had made reference to protection by PBI, 
the State responded that it would offer this organisation ‘the necessary facilities’ to fulfil their 
protective task.150 
3 STATED REASONS FOR NON-COMPLIANCE 
3.1 Introduction 
Do the responses depend on the types of cases, the substance of the request, the type of State (e.g. 
federal law States or common law States)? Do they depend on the type, the wording and the 
frequency of appeals? There are indications that the official responses by States may be explained 
by various other reasons as well. There are reasons for compliance, from norm-internalization to a 
wish to ‘join the club’; regain prestige etc. There are also reasons from non-compliance. This 
book gives some examples that indicate reasons for non-compliance that have been officially 
forwarded by States, such as their view on the legal status of provisional measures. 
At the same time the formal reasons for non-compliance may not necessarily be the 'real' 
reasons. This book refers to some other reasons that may be behind such decisions not to comply 
with certain provisional measures  
For the sake of presentation the stated reasons for non-compliance are subdivided into three 
categories: (1) disagreement with the (temporary) outcome of the normative process (substantive 
disagreement); (2) the reputation of the adjudicator, the manner in which the provisional measure 
has been communicated or disagreement with the decision-making process on the provisional 
measures at issue; and (3) the domestic situation (sometimes stated, sometimes underlying).  
Obviously in practice the various categories are interrelated. As justifications for non-
compliance, States have, among others, invoked provisions of their internal law, doubted the legal 
nature of the provisional measures by the adjudicator in question, invoked ‘contrary obligations’ 
of international law (such as an extradition treaty) as well as the fact that their domestic courts 
                                                 
147 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III C.1, §31. In the period covered by the 2000 Annual 
Report the Commission continued to receive information on these precautionary measures 
voluntarily granted by Ecuador on 14 June 1999. Annual Report 2000, §29. 
148 They were members of the Ecological Peasant Organisation of the Petatlán Sierra. 
149 See CIDH Teodoro Cabrera García and Rodolfo Montiel Flores v. Mexico, 27 February 2004 
(adm.), §6 and accompanying footnote.  
150 Id., §7. In the Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §44 the Commission speaks of the State’s 
willingness to provide PBI ‘with all possible support’ in order to protect the two beneficiaries. 
 Chapter XVII 
978 
(and another international adjudicator, such as the ECtHR) had already considered the case ‘ex-
tensively’.151  
3.2 Disagreement with the (temporary) outcome of the normative process 
Sometimes States use a substantive law argument to justify ignoring a provisional measure. Such 
disagreement on the substantive law has arisen when the State considered that a given situation 
does not result in a human rights violation. A case in point is the question whether ICCPR and 
ACHR prohibit application of the mandatory death penalty. The Court of Appeal of Barbados 
considered with regard to Article 6(2) ICCPR and Article 4(2) ACHR that ‘the question of what 
constitutes a ‘most serious crime’ for the purpose of those provisions obviously has to be deter-
mined in Barbados and nowhere else’.152 
In the Mary and Carrie Dann case involving land rights and cultural identity, the US had 
not respected the Commission’s precautionary measures. It claimed that the petition of the Danns 
did not involve a human rights violation at all. Instead, it considered, their claims involved 
‘lengthy litigation over land title and land use questions which have been carefully considered by 
all three branches of the United States Government’.153  
In this case the CIDH had taken precautionary measures already in 1993. Three years later, 
during a hearing in Washington, D.C., the petitioners informed the Commission that in March 
1992 the US had impounded and sold 161 horses belonging to the Danns and in November 1992 
                                                 
151 See e.g. HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §§6.1 and 6.2. The petitioner had pointed 
out that the treaty obligations were not really conflicting because the extradition treaty itself as 
well as Austria’s own legislation provided for refusal of extradition on human rights grounds. 
Moreover, even if there had been a conflict, ‘mandatory obligations under human rights treaties 
ought erga omnes, including under the Covenant, to take precedence over any interstate treaty 
obligation’. With regard to the situation of the petitioner following his extradition Austria 
observed that the US Attorney had applied to the US District Court for a re-sentencing of the 
petitioner since he was extradited ‘on fewer than all the charges for which he was initially 
sentenced’. ‘According to information supplied to the State party’ the re-sentencing would 
provide the petitioner with a full right of appeal against the new sentence as well as the original 
conviction. It also noted that it would continue to seek information from US authorities ‘in an 
appropriate manner’ about the proceedings in the US courts. See §§5.4 and 9.3. In its decision on 
the merits the HRC found violations of Article 14(1) ICCPR, taken together with Article 2(3) 
ICCPR, as well as a breach of the State’s obligations under the OP by extraditing the petitioner 
before the HRC could address the risk of irreparable harm. See also the discussion of this case in 
Chapter V (Non-refoulement). The petitioner had claimed also that he State had violated Article 
9(1) by surrendering to the US in breach of the Committee’s provisional measures. On 6 August 
2003, following the publication of the Committee’s decision on the merits, the Permanent 
Mission of Austria forwarded the Observations of the Government of Austria. It noted that it had 
complied with the Committee’s wish of publication by making the link to the View accessible to 
everyone on the website of the Constitutional Law Department of the Federal Chancellery. See 
<www.bka.gv.at/wir_informieren_ueber/grund_menschenrechte.html> (consulted on 10 July 
2003). It further considered that ‘in order to avoid similar situations in future’, it had generally 
complied with ‘the Committee’s legal view’ because the complaint proceedings in the 
petitioner’s case were pending before the Supreme Court and a decision was expected by 
September 2003. 
152 HRC Bradshaw v. Barbados, 19 July 1994, §4.2. 
153 CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, Report 99/99 of 27 September 1999 (case 11.140), §14 and 
19. 
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it had sold 269 of their horses. According to the petitioners a gold mining company called Oro 
Nevada Mining Company was claiming the land in question ‘under a law that permits mining 
companies to acquire land belonging to the United States for a token payment’.154 The precau-
tionary measures were repeated several times as the Bureau had continued with its trespass ac-
tions against the Danns and against other members of the Western Shoshone Nation. At one point 
the State noted: ‘out of respect for the Commission, the State Department has initiated an inter-
agency dialogue with the relevant Federal agencies to consider further the Commission’s request. 
In the meantime, however, the United States will not hold in abeyance the normal operation of its 
laws’.155 In June 1999 the Commission received another letter by the petitioners that federal 
officials were continuing trespass actions by issuing additional orders and decisions against the 
Danns and other Western Shoshone, despite the Commission’s precautionary measures.156 Subse-
quently the Commission received information that prompted it to reiterate its precautionary meas-
ures.157 As the US have not ratified the ACHR the Commission could not ask the Court to order 
provisional measures, something it normally does when compliance with its own precautionary 
measures is less than sufficient.  
In the context of the precautionary measures on behalf of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay 
the US has pointed out that it is not a Party to either the American Convention on Human Rights 
or any other convention making the Commission competent to consider the application of interna-
tional humanitarian law. It based its reasoning that the precautionary measures were unnecessary 
on the argument that the legal status of the detainees was clear. It was a matter of public record, it 
suggested, that the Guantanamo detainees are not prisoners of war (‘POWs’) because they ‘do not 
meet the criteria applicable to lawful combatants’. The US further argued that, pursuant to inter-
national humanitarian law, States engaged in armed conflict have a right to capture and detain 
                                                 
154 In February 1998, more than a year after the Commission used precautionary measures, the 
petitioners once more requested it to take such measures ‘to avoid immediate, grave and 
irreparable harm’. They stated that the Bureau of Land Management had issued, that month, 
notices declaring that the sisters Dann and other Western Shoshone people were trespassing on 
lands. It had also issued orders to remove cattle and property and threatened them with fines, 
imprisonment and confiscation. The petitioners argued that there was an urgent need for 
precautionary measures ‘because this aggressive Government action enhances the threat to the 
economic and cultural survival of the Danns and other Western Shoshone’. The Commission 
indeed reiterated its precautionary measure.  
155 CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 27 September 1999, §40. 
156 Because of the imminent threat of the impoundment of their cattle without further notice, the 
Danns initiated discussions with the Bureau. They met on 28 January 1999 and were invited to 
submit a proposal for an ‘interim measures agreement’. They presented such proposal on 28 
March 1999, but on 26 May 1999 the Bureau rejected it in ‘terms that essentially restate the 
BLM’s [Bureau of Land Management] position, that the Western Shoshone people no longer 
have rights to their ancestral lands’. Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 27 September 1999, §42. Two 
days later, the Bureau issued a notice of intent to impound any ‘unauthorized livestock grazing 
upon public land’. Again, the petitioners requested the Commission to issue precautionary 
measures. They stated that this notice ‘demonstrated the intention of the United States to deprive 
them of access to and use of their ancestral lands’, see §43. 
157 The Commission decided to take precautionary measures yet another time. It requested the US to 
‘take the appropriate measures to stay its intention to impound’ the cattle of the Dann sisters, 
until it had had the opportunity to fully examine the claims. CIDH Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 
27 September 1999, §44. When it declared the case admissible in September 1999 it decided to 
maintain in effect the precautionary measures of June 1999. Both the Yomba Shoshone Tribe and 
the Ely Shoshone Tribe wished to intervene in the case as amicus curiae. On the merits see CIDH 
Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 27 December 2002. 
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enemy combatants whether or not they are POWs. Alternatively, the US claimed that Guan-
tanamo detainees are treated humanely and that they are not facing any “peril or irreparable 
harm”, which would have been a precondition for imposition of provisional measures pursuant to 
Article 19(c) of the Commission's Statute.158 
In Mamatkulov (2005) the State considered that: “It would be straining the language of Ar-
ticle 3 intolerably to hold that by surrendering a suspect in accordance with the terms of an extra-
dition agreement, the extraditing State had subjected him to the treatment or punishment he re-
ceived after his conviction and sentence in the receiving State”.159 This would conflict with ‘the 
norms of international judicial process’ because ‘it would entail adjudication on the internal af-
fairs of foreign States that were not Parties to the Convention’.160  
In response, the European Court referred to its settled case-law that extradition may give 
rise to an issue under Article 3, ‘where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that the 
person in question would, if extradited, face a real risk of being subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3 in the receiving country’. “The establishment of such responsibility inevitably involves 
an assessment of conditions in the requesting country against the standards of Article 3 of the 
Convention. Nonetheless, there is no question of adjudicating on or establishing the responsibility 
of the receiving country, whether under general international law, under the Convention or other-
wise”.161 It noted that it ‘would hardly be compatible with the “common heritage of political 
traditions, ideals, freedom and the rule of law” to which the Preamble refers, were a Contracting 
State knowingly to surrender a person to another State where there were substantial grounds for 
believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment’.162 
Even when the State does not dispute the adjudicator’s interpretation of substantive provi-
sions on the merits, it may still argue that pending the proceedings the harm likely to occur is not 
irreparable. When the ECtHR used provisional measures requesting Turkey to ensure access to 
domestic counsel in the Öcalan case, the State did not wish to comply because it considered that 
this measure ‘went beyond the scope of the function that these orders are intended to serve’.163 
The Court informed the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe of Turkey’s refusal to 
comply.164  
In October 1987 Canada requested the HRC to review its admissibility decision in the Lubi-
con Lake Band case, arguing that the petitioner had not exhausted domestic remedies and the 
delays in the judicial proceedings ‘were largely attributable to the Band’s own inaction’. The 
State also insisted ‘that no irreparable damage to the traditional way of life of the Lubicon Lake 
Band had occurred and that there was no imminent threat of such harm, and further that both a 
                                                 
158 As phrased by the editorial staff of International Legal Materials in: International Law In Brief of 
the American Society of International Law, 4 June 2002 (the text of the precautionary measures 
was provided to the ILM office in print form). 
159 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §64. 
160 Ibid. 
161 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §67. 
162 Id., §68. 
163 ECtHR Information Note 5, April 1999, p. 6. See also Garry (2001), p. 410: “As the Commission 
and Court have had to rely on the good faith of the Member State in complying with the interim 
order, they have issued them only in extreme cases where there is an ‘apparent real and imminent 
risk of irreparable harm’”. See also CAT R.T. v. Switzerland, 24 November 2005. 
164 In general on follow-up see Chapter XVIII. 
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trial on the merits of the Band’s claims and the negotiation process constitute effective and valu-
able alternatives to the interim relief which the Band had unsuccessfully sought in the courts’.165  
Canepa was removed before his counsel could request the HRC to take provisional meas-
ures. The Committee had done so in the similar case Stewart. In Canepa the Minister did not 
agree to counsel’s request not to remove her client from Canada pending the case before the HRC. 
He ‘had to take account of the serious nature of the offences’ committed by the petitioner and of 
‘the fact that the removal to Italy would not cause irreparable harm’. His letter confirmed the 
willingness to ‘cooperate fully in the processing of the communication in order to expedite its 
final resolution’.166  
3.3 Communication of the provisional measures and disagreement with the 
decision-making process  
3.3.1 Introduction  
Compliance with provisional measures may relate to the reputation of the adjudicator, the 
visibility and specificity of its provisional measures. Specific arguments used by States to justify 
their non-compliance involve the alleged non-binding nature and procedural issues somehow 
implying a lack of due process on the part of the adjudicator.167 
3.3.2 Lack of due process 
Several justifications offered for non-compliance relate to the procedure followed by the adjudi-
cator in taking provisional measures. Obviously, also with regard to provisional measures the 
                                                 
165 HRC Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990, §29.4. In 
Länsman I, Ilmari Länsman v. Finland, 26 October 1994, the HRC did not use provisional 
measures because it considered they would be premature. It is the only case involving culture in 
which the HRC motivated its refusal to use them. This case also gives some indication of 
Finland’s attitude towards situations pending before the Committee. The State party referred to 
an inspection of the site during which the company representatives had noted that the 
construction of a proper road was necessary for the profitability of the project. The representative 
of the Forest District had replied that the Herdsmen’s Committee and the company had to 
negotiate a solution. The State party added that ‘the Forestry and Park Service has informed the 
Government that a decision on a possible new contract with the company will be taken only after 
the adoption of Views by the Committee in the present case’. This is an interesting addition in the 
sense that, on the one hand, the Forestry and Park Service (the new translation by the State for the 
Central Forestry Board) shows an awareness of the case pending before the HRC and the 
importance of suspending the activities in order not to pre-empt the Committee’s decision, and on 
the other hand the State itself simply mentions this for information but does not itself commit to 
this effect. 
166 HRC Giosue Canepa v. Canada, 3 April 1997. Letter of the Department of Justice to counsel 
faxed 31 May 1994 and faxed to the HRC by counsel on 6 June 1994 (on file with the author). 
See also section 3.4 of this chapter, referring to the ‘danger to the public’ argument.  
167 For criticism based on due process arguments see also ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 3 
March 1999, Separate Opinion Judge Schwebel and Judgment of 27 June 2001, Dissenting 
Opinion Judge Buergenthal as referred to in Chapter I (ICJ). Obviously these judges did not 
argue that a lack of due process would justify non-compliance by States. 
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parties should have had a fair hearing, if hearings are being held, and their submissions must be 
shown to have been considered.168  
At one point in the Blake case the State informed the Inter-American Court that it decided to 
cease to provide safety measures to certain persons as of that date, because the Court had not yet 
taken a decision on its previous request to lift the provisional measures.169 The Court specifically 
responded to this by noting that it ‘is not a permanent Court, so that matters submitted to its con-
sideration may only be decided when it is sitting’. When its previous session was held in Febru-
ary/March 2003 the Court ‘did not have sufficient information to evaluate the request to lift the 
provisional measures, because the State, the representatives, and the Commission had not yet 
transmitted all the requested information’.170 It pointed out ‘provisional measures are exceptional 
in nature, are adopted in function of the needs for protection and, once adopted, must be main-
tained while the basic requirements mentioned in the second considering paragraph subsist’.171 It 
stressed that ‘only the Court has the competence to decide on the continuance or lifting of a provi-
sional measure. Consequently, the provisional measures that it adopts are fully in force and pro-
duce their effects until the Court orders that they be lifted’.172 
In T.P.S. v. Canada (2000) the State questioned why it had not had an opportunity to have 
its say on the use of provisional measures now that some time had passed between the petitioner’s 
first request and CAT’s decision to take them, ‘a few days before his scheduled removal’. Canada 
pointed out that it had not been given the ‘opportunity to comment on these ex parte communica-
tions with the Committee’.173 While the HRC did not specifically respond to this statement, the 
duration of the proceedings, the extensive discussion on admissibility and the outcome of the case 
make this argument less credible. 
In a case involving cultural survival by interlocutory decision the HRC ‘invited the State 
party to submit to the Committee any further explanations or statements relating to the substance 
of the author's allegations, in addition to its earlier submissions’. At the same time it repeated its 
provisional measures ‘to avoid damage to the author and the members of the Lubicon Lake 
Band’.174 In its response to this interlocutory decision the State party asserted that it was ‘being 
denied due process, since the principles of natural justice require that a party be aware of the 
specific charge and evidence on which the accusations of the author of the communication are 
based. It claims that since it was never informed of the articles of the Covenant and the evidence 
in respect of which the communication was declared admissible, the principles of procedural 
                                                 
168 See in general Cassel (2002), p. 886. 
169 IACHR Blake, Order of 6 June 2003, 14th ‘Having seen’ clause, referring to the State’s note of 13 
May 2003. 
170 Id., 7th ‘Considering clause’.  
171 Id., 9th ‘Considering clause’. The second considering paragraph refers to the requirements of 
extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons 
mentioned in Article 63(2) ACHR. 
172 Id., 10th ‘Considering clause’. 
173 CAT T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000, §8.4 (“The Government of Canada first became aware that 
the petitioner had submitted a communication, including a request for interim measures, when the 
author’s counsel alluded to the Committee's granting of the request during a discussion with a 
CIC official on 18 December 1997, three months after the Committee had received the author's 
communication and request for interim measures. The record before the Committee reveals that 
the interim measures request was issued, after several appeals by the author’s counsel to the 
Committee, a few days before his scheduled removal”). 
174 HRC Chief Bernard Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990, §25. 
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fairness have not been respected, and that the federal Government remains prejudiced in its ability 
to respond to the Band’s claim’.175 
Following the public hearing before the Inter-American Court of 18 August 2000 the Do-
minican Republic submitted a brief alleging that the Commission ‘acted hastily’ when it requested 
provisional measures, as it did not wait for a State reply ‘nor did it use the means and mechanisms 
at its disposal to ascertain the complaint’. According to the Dominican Republic its deportation 
procedure did in fact ensure due process and a personalised treatment. It pointed out that this 
procedure consists of three stages: ‘detention and identification, investigation and depuration (sic) 
and, finally, verification and confirmation’.176 The Court did not specifically deal with this state-
ment nor with the allegation that the Commission ‘acted hastily’ when it required provisional 
measures. In fact the Commission had allowed the State six months time to reply to its own pre-
cautionary measures before it brought the case before the Court.  
Bosnia and Herzegovina considered that the English and Bosnian version of the Order not 
to hand over the petitioners to US authorities, who were then transferred to Guantanamo Bay, 
were ‘different in a number of decisive details’. It ‘assumes from these mistakes that both the 
President and the Vice President were outside of Sarajevo at the relevant time. Bosnia and Herze-
govina considers that in particular cases of such importance, the order should have been issued 
only after the President or any other judge issuing the order had personal insight into the files, 
even if that means that the judge must travel to Sarajevo immediately’.177 
When an adjudicator makes explicit procedures for requesting withdrawal of provisional 
measures, this does not guarantee that the State will respect them. CAT has observed ‘that its 
procedures are sufficiently flexible and its powers sufficiently broad to prevent an abuse of proc-
ess in a particular case’.178 In Dar v. Norway the State expelled the petitioner to Pakistan despite a 
provisional measure by CAT that explicitly referred to the possibility of review. Norway in-
formed CAT ‘that it refused the Committee's request. However, at no time did it ask the Commit-
tee to lift the request’.179 Half a year later he was allowed to return and was granted a residence 
permit for three years.180 
3.3.3 Delays 
Apart from arguing to have had insufficient time to respond, States have also argued that 
provisional measures have caused too much delay.181 Jamaica, which had a practice of respecting 
provisional measures to halt the execution of a death sentence, decided to withdraw from the OP 
to the ICCPR because domestic law obliged it to otherwise commute death sentences. For similar 
                                                 
175 Id., §26. 
176 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic case, Order of 18 
August 2000. Indeed, it is not immediately evident how these three stages could ensure due 
process. 
177 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §108. 
178 CAT Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, §13.10. 
179 CAT Nadeem Ahmad Dar v. Norway, 11 May 2007, §16.2. 
180 Id., §§1.2-1.4. The Special Rapporteur then denied a renewed request for provisional measures to 
prevent his deportation to Pakistan, see §1.5. While the reason is not mentioned, it is obvious that 
such deportation would not be imminent, see also Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
181 See e.g. Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Chapter V, §§23-25, in 
Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission 2001, Volume II, referring to precautionary 
measures of February 2001 on behalf of a journalist and director of a weekly magazine in 
Venezuela. 
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reasons Trinidad and Tobago sometimes responded to the HRC by making its compliance 
conditional on the ability of the HRC to determine a case within the deadline set by the State. In 
Smart v. Trinidad and Tobago (1998)182 the State party had informed the Committee that it would 
submit its comments on the admissibility of the case in three days. In its submission, two weeks 
later, the State party did not address the admissibility of the communication but informed the 
Committee that ‘to avoid further delays in the case of Mr. Smart, the State party would stay the 
author’s execution for a period of two months only’. The HRC quoted a longer part of the State’s 
submission:  
“1. The Government of Trinidad and Tobago is committed to upholding the rule of law and it 
would therefore not deny Mr. Smart access to the United Nations Human Rights Committee for 
the determination of his petition provided that the process is not abused by the condemned 
prisoner. 2. The Government however has a responsibility to ensure that these petitions are 
determined quickly so as not to frustrate the application of the law. Any delay or procrastination 
by the United Nations Human Rights Committee can have the effect of subverting the sentence 
of the Court and Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago. 3. The Government therefore requests 
the petition of Smart be heard and determined within two months of the Government of 
Trinidad and Tobago submitting its response to the application before the said Committee. 4. 
During the two month period, the Government will not carry out the death sentence…”. (italics 
E.R.) 
In other words, the State accused both the petitioner and the HRC of causing delays. Two weeks 
later the Committee, which was not in session at the time, replied through its Chairman. His letter 
reminded the State that it had been ‘the State party’s own failure to submit comments on the 
admissibility within the imparted deadline that had caused the delay in the deciding on the 
case’.183 The HRC did not respond specifically to the State’s remark that it would only stay the 
execution for two months, but it is clear from its reaction that it considers it should set the dead-
lines for the proceedings, not the State party.  
The State took a similar approach to the proceedings in the Inter-American system. In one 
of the Orders for provisional measures in the James case Trinidad stated that the Inter-American 
Commission had failed 'to follow the approximately eight months timeframe established by the 
State for appeals to international bodies'. It noted that the delay constituted cruel and unusual 
punishment as defined by the State's domestic laws as established by the [JCPC] case of Pratt and 
                                                 
182 HRC Clive Smart v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 July 1998. 
183 He informed the Ambassador that the Committee had instructed him ‘to express its regret that 
your Government has, to date, failed to comply with the deadline set for the State party’s 
observations relating to the admissibility’ of the case. This meant that the HRC could not 
consider the case at the session that was then pending. He announced that he intended to take up 
the case during its next session. Accordingly, he would wish to receive the State’s submission on 
the admissibility of the case within six weeks. He also pointed out that the HRC could only deal 
with the cases during its sessions and that the UN determined the dates of its three annual 
sessions. “If a State party does not comply with the deadlines set by the Committee, thereby 
making it necessary to hold over consideration of a case to subsequent sessions, the full 
responsibility for the resulting delay and its consequences is with the State party”. Request by 
counsel for use of Rule 86, 11 December 1995; Note Verbale transmitting the case under the Rule 
86/91, 18 December 1995; submissions by the State party of 5 and 19 March 1996 and letter by 
Chairperson Aguilar Urbina of 2 April 1996, all in relation to Smart v. Trinidad and Tobago, 
672/1995 (on file with the author). 
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Morgan. This ‘would de facto abolish the death penalty, thereby usurping the legislative functions 
of the State of Trinidad and Tobago’.184 
The Commission considered as ‘mere policy’ the time-frames the State wished to impose on 
the Court. These timeframes were, moreover, ‘inconsistent with the timeframes established by the 
Statutes and Rules of Procedure of the Commission and the United Nations Human Rights Com-
mittee’.185 The State’s Instructions Relating to Applications from Persons under Sentence of 
Death show that Trinidad wished to impose a timeframe on the Commission (as it has also done 
vis-à-vis the Human Rights Committee) so that it could comply with domestic case law and still 
execute its prisoners. In effect this meant Trinidad intended to disregard both its substantive and 
its procedural obligations under the ACHR. 
The Court referred to Trinidad’s letters of August 1998 informing the Court that it would 
not attend the public hearing and that it would not accept any responsibility for the Commission’s 
failure to organise its proceedings with regard to the death penalty cases pending before it within 
the time limits established by Trinidad. The Court noted that its President had sent Trinidad’s 
Prime Minister a letter indicating the Court’s concern about this attitude. It also referred to the 
State’s letter of September 1998 that it would no longer report on this case to the Court or to the 
Commission.186 The Court criticised the refusal of the State to recognise the obligatory nature of 
the Court’s decisions in this case and in particular its failure to appear at the Court’s hearing and 
to comply with its obligation to report periodically on the case.  
In December 1999 the Commission requested the Bahamas to stay the executions of Mr. 
Mitchell and Mr. Higgs. On 23 December 1999 the Bahamas wrote to the Commission that the 
‘government has already waited a considerable time for the receipt of recommendations from the 
IACHR in respect of Messrs. Higgs and Mitchell and will not further postpone the process of its 
domestic law’.187 
In Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain (2006) Spain had disrespected the ECtHR’s provisional 
measures. After receipt of the Court’s provisional measures the State sent the Court a decision by 
a domestic court confirming the extradition. This action, the Court pointed out in its Judgment on 
the merits, implied the State’s disrespect for the provisional measures. Subsequently, in its sub-
missions to the Court, the State insisted that normally it would respect them, but in this case the 
petitioner had been so tardy in requesting them that it had not had sufficient time to put in place 
                                                 
184 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 29 August 1998, ‘Having seen’ clause 5c. 
185 Id., ‘Having seen’ clause 6c. Judge García Ramírez made some remarks about the issue in his 
concurring. He took note of the ‘statements in the file, in the sense that the State of Trinidad and 
Tobago is under certain judicially established timeframes to execute the capital punishment’. He 
observed ‘that considerable time remains before these timeframes expire in the cases referred to 
by these provisional measures, as well as in those provisional measures previously considered by 
the Court, in which it has ordered the similar measures’. James et al. cases, Concurring Vote of 
Judge Sergio García-Ramírez. It is not clear whether this means that he would have voted 
differently otherwise or whether the remark was simply to stress that the State cannot use the 
timeframes argument as an excuse here. 
186 See IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 29 August 1998. In a footnote, the CIDH Annual Report 
referred to the State’s note of 5 February 1999 in which it requested the Court to confirm that the 
provisional measures on behalf of Mr. Briggs had been lifted. At the time of publication of the 
Court’s Annual Report the State had presented none of the periodic reports required in the 
Court’s resolution of 29 August 1998. 
187 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III.C.1, §11. On 5 January 2000 the Commission repeated its 
precautionary measures. The petitioners informed the Commission, however, also on 5 January 
2000, that the day before Mr. Higgs had committed suicide while shaving. On 23 February 2000 
they informed the Commission that Mr. Mitchell had been executed on 6 January 2000. 
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the necessary measures to prevent the extradition.188 The petitioner, on the other hand, considered 
that some two or three hours would have been sufficient to halt the extradition.189 The ECtHR did 
not accept the justification offered by the State. When it received the provisional measure the 
government sent it to the domestic court dealing with the case and subsequently transmitted the 
latter’s negative response back to the ECtHR. It appeared it had sufficient time to implement the 
provisional measures by ensuring the suspension of the extradition.190  
3.3.4 Procedural duration: what is provisional? 
The Inter-American Commission has now placed limits on the time period in which its 
precautionary measures are active. After a six months period, for instance, it reviews the measure 
and determines whether it must be maintained or not. Sometimes the measures are shelved 
because the situation is still the same and sometimes because the situation is more or less solved. 
At other times the Commission specifically maintains or renews them. The Court seems to take a 
similar attitude towards its provisional measures. In theory, it places limits on their duration. It is 
faced, however, with certain situations of continuing threats where sometimes even the State itself 
indicates that the court should maintain its provisional measures. The case of Digna Ochoa is a 
tragic example in which Mexico requested the Court to lift its order for provisional measures, 
because at a certain point in time ‘provisional’ is no longer ‘provisional’. The Commission 
informed the Court that the petitioners did not object to the State’s request and the Court lifted its 
provisional measures. Several months later human rights defender Digna Ochoa was murdered.191 
At the Court’s hearing of 26 November 2001 on the provisional measures requested by the 
Commission for the protection of, among others, the members of Centro Pro after the murder of 
Digna Ochoa, a member of the Court asked the petitioners why, prior to this murder, they had 
agreed to Mexico’s request to the Court to lift its provisional measures. One of the members of 
Centro Pro answered that they did not think the provisional measures made a difference.192 At the 
same time, they did attend this hearing to request new provisional measures for their protection.  
3.3.5 Disputing the binding nature of provisional measures or the authority to 
take them 
With regard to the HRC, according to the Court of Appeal of Canada ‘in signing the Protocol, 
Canada did not agree to be bound by the final views of the Committee, nor did it even agree that it 
would stay its own domestic proceedings until the Committee gave its views’. It considered that 
neither the Committee’s Views nor its provisional measures were binding on Canada ‘as a matter 
of international law, much less as a matter of domestic law’. It added that the States parties to the 
ICCPR and the OP had decided ‘as a matter of policy’ that they should not agree to be bound by 
the Committee’s Views nor ‘agree to refrain from taking any action against an individual who had 
sought the Committee’s views until they were known’. They left ‘each party state, on a case by 
case basis, free to accept or reject the Committee’s final views, and equally free to accede to or 
not accede to an interim measures request’.193  
                                                 
188 ECtHR Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, Judgment of 10 August 2006 (5th section), §§65 and 69-70. 
189 Id., §66. 
190 Id., §70. Generally on the follow up by the adjudicators see Chapter XVIII. 
191 See further Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk), section 3.2.6. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §32. 
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Different from what might have been expected it was only as an additional argument that 
the court referred to the wording of the OP and of Rule 86. It considered that this wording, as well 
as ‘the Committee’s own pronouncement’, ‘the opinions of recognised international law scholars’ 
and ‘case law’ showed that ‘the Committee’s final views and its interim measures request are not 
binding or enforceable in international law’.194 With regard to the wording it noted that both the 
OP and Rule 86 ‘used permissive language’ (‘views’) and added that ‘neither has an enforcement 
mechanism’. It further referred to international scholars considering that the HRC ‘cannot issue 
binding decisions’.195  
The domestic court considered that when Canada ratified the OP (the Court speaks of 
‘signed’) it ‘qualified’ the right to seek the Committee’s Views.196 In addition, arguing from the 
non-binding nature of the Committee’s Views, the domestic court considered that States parties 
‘did not agree to await the Committee’s views before enforcing their own laws’. “If Canada is 
free not to accept the Committee’s views, it is also free not to accede to an interim measures 
request”.197 
In Ahani v. Canada the HRC had used provisional measures to halt an expulsion.198 A do-
mestic court found that such measures were not legally binding and the petitioner was expelled. 
The court noted Ahani’s argument that, according to Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the 
Law of Treaties, States shall perform in good faith the international treaties to which they are a 
party. Counsel for Ahani had argued that if Canada did not wish to comply with the OP, it should 
denounce it rather than arbitrarily frustrate the proceedings. The court, however, considered ‘on 
its face the argument that Canada will not be acting in good faith by deporting Ahani now is 
difficult to support’. “In deporting him, Canada will be enforcing its own laws and the decision of 
its highest court. It will be doing nothing more than it is entitled to do under the terms of the 
Protocol”.199 In other words, it considered that Canada ‘would have every reason to hold a good 
faith belief that deporting Ahani now would not breach its obligations under the Covenant’ be-
cause it had a right to enforce its own laws, these laws also took into account fundamental rights, 
as interpreted by its Supreme Court, and it was entitled to deport Ahani ‘under the terms of the 
Protocol’. As a side remark the court noted:  
                                                 
194 Id., §35. 
195 It referred to the book by Burgers and Danelius on the Convention against Torture (1988), p. 9, 
Ghandhi; Bayefsky and Duxbury (2000) (none with page numbers). See Chapter XVI on legal 
status. It invoked the introduction to the second volume of the Selected Decisions of the HRC, 
published in 1990. This introduction made a comparison with the European Commission on 
Human Rights, noting that the decisions on the merits of both bodies are ‘non-binding 
recommendations’. This same introduction also noted that the Committee is ‘neither a court nor a 
body with a quasi-judicial mandate’. Selected Decisions of the Human Rights Committee under 
the Optional Protocol, Volume 2, (October 1982-April 1988), CCPR/C/OP/2, pp. 1-2. Note that 
this introduction has changed with the subsequent volumes. 
196 “In any given case, Canada first reserved the right to reject the Committee’s views, and second 
reserved the right to enforce its own laws before the Committee gave its views. In deporting 
Ahani, Canada is acting consistently with the terms under which it signed the Protocol. It is not 
denying Ahani procedural fairness or depriving him of any remedy to which he is entitled. Even 
under the Protocol, Ahani has no right to remain in Canada until the Committee gives its views. 
He can therefore hardly claim that the principles of fundamental justice give him that right”. 
Ontario Court of Appeal, Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §42. 
197 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §44. 
198 HRC Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004. 
199 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §46. 
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“If, however, Canada had not acted in good faith, then it may justifiably be open to public 
criticism. If it falls short of the laudable call of a full commitment to human rights conventions 
and treaties, other states may take it to task. But the principles of fundamental justice lie in the 
basic tenets of our legal system. They are found in the domain of the judiciary, the guardian of 
the justice system. What Ahani complains about is a matter for the court of public or 
international opinion, not for a court of law”.200 
One of the three judges of the Court of Appeal dissented addressing several of the arguments 
made in the majority decision in Ahani. Justice Rosenberg stressed the obligation in Article 2 
ICCPR ‘to respect and to ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction 
the rights recognised in the present Covenant’. He observed that this was a binding obligation that 
Canada had undertaken to perform the obligations in the Covenant in good faith. In reference to 
its obligations under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties he noted that Canada had also 
undertaken not to invoke the provisions of its internal law as a justification for a failure to per-
form.201 Moreover, it was ultimately the HRC, rather than a domestic court, that has the expertise 
on the meaning of the obligations in the ICCPR.202 He considered that ‘where the legislation had 
established a statutory right to review a decision that could affect the security of the person, it is a 
principle of fundamental justice that the state cannot unreasonably frustrate that right’.203 He 
quoted from Lord Millett in the JCPC case of Thomas v. Baptiste (1999): ‘the right to be allowed 
to complete a current appellate or other legal process without having it rendered nugatory by 
executive action before it is completed is part of the fundamental concept of due process’.204 
Rosenberg noted that ‘this principle of fundamental justice, although derived from a statutory 
right of review, can be applied by analogy to the process permitted by the Covenant and the Pro-
tocol’. This meant that ‘individuals within Canada facing a deprivation of their right to life, lib-
erty or security of the person have a right under s.7 of the Charter, within reason, to have their 
petition reviewed by the Human Rights Committee free from any executive action that would 
render this review nugatory’.205  
In T.P.S. v. Canada (2000) CAT expressed deep concern about Canada’s deportation of the 
petitioner to India despite the Committee’s provisional measures. According to Canada a request 
for provisional measures was ‘a recommendation to a State to take certain measures, not an or-
der’. “Support for this proposition may be found not only in the word employed (‘request’) in rule 
108, paragraph 9 but also in the European Court of Human Rights decision in Cruz Varas and 
others v. Sweden’.206 Interestingly, as discussed, based on general principles of law the European 
Court has since found that its provisional measures are legally binding.207  
In March 2006 the European Court had used provisional measures ordering Russia to allow 
a lawyer access to a petitioner who had been committed to a psychiatric hospital against his will. 
                                                 
200 Id., §47. 
201 Id., dissenting opinion of Rosenberg J.A., §70. 
202 He referred to the ‘arcane language’ of the OP in forwarding its ‘views’. He observed that both 
Canada and its provinces had changed legislation because of the Committee’s Views. Rosenberg 
dissent, §72. 
203 Ontario Court of Appeal, Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, Rosenberg dissent, §86. 
204 JCPC Thomas v. Baptiste, [1999] UKPC 13 (17 March 1999). 
205 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, Rosenberg dissent, §89. 
206 CAT T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000, §8.2. For other examples of State arguments to this effect, 
see e.g., HRC Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §5.3, CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 
2005, §8.2, CAT Tebourski v. France, 1 May 2007, §§8.6 and 8.7 and CAT Singh Sogi v. 
Canada, 16 November 2007, §7.7. 
207 See also Chapter XVI (Legal status) on the ECtHR Mamatkulov judgment overruling Cruz Varas. 
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Yet the Chief Doctor of that hospital informed the lawyer that ‘he did not regard the Court’s 
decision on interim measures as binding’.208 Subsequently two domestic court examined the 
European Court’s provisional measures and held that the lawyer should be allowed to meet the 
petitioner.209 But the hospital and the petitioner’s mother appealed against that decision and a 
higher court eventually quashed both decisions by the lower courts. Among others it held: “The 
Russian Federation as a special subject of international relations enjoys immunity from foreign 
jurisdiction, it is not bound by coercive measures applied by foreign courts and cannot be sub-
jected to such measures … without its consent. The [domestic] courts have no right to undertake 
on behalf of the Russian Federation an obligation to comply with the preliminary measures… 
This can be decided by the executive … by way of an administrative decision”.210 This Court later 
also held that ‘under Russian law the lawyer could not act on behalf of a client in the absence of 
an agreement between them’. It argued that the lawyer should have concluded such an agreement 
with the petitioner’s mother rather than with the petitioner himself, as she had the right, under 
domestic law, to act on his behalf in all legal transactions.211 On the merits the ECtHR found 
violations of Article 5 (lawfulness of his confinement in hospital and inability to obtain release), 
Article 6 with regard to the incapacitation proceedings and Article 8 (private life). Moreover, it 
found that the State failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34 by hindering peti-
tioner’s access to the European court and by not complying with its provisional measure indicated 
‘in order to remove this hindrance’. Specifically it noted that it was ‘struck by the authorities’ 
refusal to comply’.212 The interpretation by domestic courts that the provisional measure ‘was 
addressed to the Russian State as a whole, but not to any of its bodies in particular’ and that ‘Rus-
sian law did not recognise the binding force ‘of the European court’s provisional measures, was 
contrary to the Convention.213 The same applied to the interpretation that the petitioner could not 
act without the consent of his mother. Regarding the status of the lawyer, ‘it was not for the do-
mestic courts to determine whether or not he was the applicant’s representative for the purposes 
of the proceedings before the Court – it sufficed that the Court regarded him as such’.214 As to the 
legal force of a provisional measure, the Court quoted from its 2006 Aoulmi judgment and sum-
marised this by stating that a provisional measure is ‘binding to the extent that non-compliance 
with it may lead to a violation under Article 34 of the Convention’. “For the Court, it makes no 
difference whether it was the State as a whole or any of its bodies which refused to implement an 
interim measure”.215 
In some cases Trinidad and Tobago conditioned its compliance with the provisional meas-
ures on its own estimation of the admissibility of a complaint, arguing that the case was inadmis-
sible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and that it was already respecting the stay of exe-
cution ordered domestically.216 In Ashby it questioned the competence of the HRC to examine the 
                                                 
208 ECtHR Shtukaturov v. Russia, 27 March 2008, §34. 
209 Id., §37. 
210 Id., §38. See also sections 3.4.3 (Attitudes of domestic courts) and 3.4.5.3 (Generally negative 
attitude towards international supervision). 
211 Id., §39. 
212 Id., §142. 
213 Id., §§142-143. 
214 Id., §143. 
215 Id., §144. 
216 HRC Michael Bullock v. Trinidad and Tobago, 19 July 1995. The HRC observed that it was not 
for the State party but for the HRC to decide on the admissibility of a communication. It 
requested the State ‘to cooperate fully with the Committee’s examination of communications in 
the future’. Following this, it declared the case inadmissible, not for non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies, but because the jury instructions did not show such defects as to render them 
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communication because it had been submitted at a time when he had not exhausted his domestic 
remedies. Apparently, the State considered that the HRC could only legitimately use provisional 
measures after domestic remedies had been exhausted and the petitioner had been executed. The 
Committee pointed out:  
“The Committee remains deeply disturbed by the State party’s argument, being unable to 
appreciate how at one and the same time the State party could regard it as lawful to execute Mr. 
Ashby while indicating that he had not exhausted his local remedies. (Any remedies that may 
have existed cannot now be exhausted by Mr. Ashby)”.217 
The State also disputed the HRC’s finding in its public decision that it had failed to comply with 
its obligations under the OP and the ICCPR: 
“Apart from the fact that the relevant authorities were unaware of the request, the State party is 
of the view that rule 86 does not permit the Committee to make the request which was made nor 
does it impose an obligation on the State party to comply with the request”.218 
In the context of an Order for provisional measures by the Inter-American Court Trinidad has 
argued that ‘international organs have a duty to create the necessary machinery to allow a State to 
comply with its own domestic laws and its constitutional obligations in the field of human 
rights’.219 In its Order of August 1998, the Court, on the other hand, pointed out that the function 
of the supervisory organs of the ACHR ‘is to ensure that the provisions of the American Conven-
tion are observed and adequately applied by States in their domestic laws, and not, as Trinidad 
and Tobago has argued, to ensure that State Parties comply with their own domestic laws’.220  
Following the decisions of domestic courts in Trinidad and the UK, the State had read a 
warrant of execution to Anthony Briggs. His execution was scheduled for 28 July 1999. On 27 
July the Secretariat of the Inter-American Court, on instruction by the President of the Court, 
reminded the State of the Court’s Order of May 1999 maintaining its provisional measures on 
behalf of Anthony Briggs. Despite this, the State executed Mr. Briggs as scheduled. The next day, 
the State submitted its observations on his execution. As neither the Inter-American Commission 
nor the State submitted Briggs’ petition to the Court, the State argued, the Court’s Order for pro-
visional measures of 29 August was ‘spent’. It proceeded with the execution.221 
In several death penalty cases the US took the position that the Inter-American Commis-
sion’s recommendations were not legally binding. It considered that the Commission’s power to 
                                                                                                                       
manifestly arbitrary or a denial of justice and because it was generally for the appellate courts to 
review the judge’s discretion in relation to the admission of evidence. See further Chapter XIV 
on admissibility. 
217 See also Chapter XIV on the relationship with admissibility. 
218 HRC Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002, §5.6, referring to the Committee’s 
public decision of 26 July 1994. 
219 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 29 August 1998, ‘Having seen’ clause 5(e). 
220 Id., 10th ‘Considering’ clause. 
221 IACHR James et al. case, Order for provisional measures, 16 August 2000. It noted that the 
Commission completed its consideration of the case in November 1998 and transmitted the 
ensuing Article 50 Report to the State. In February 1999 the three-month period allowed under 
the Convention and the Statute of the Commission for submission of the matter to the Court 
expired. The Commission adopted its Article 51 Report in March 1999 and published it the next 
month. 
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grant precautionary measures did not exist in either the American Convention or the Statute of the 
Commission and, consequently. Thus its request was a non binding recommendation.222 
In April 2002 the US responded to the Inter-American Commission’s precautionary meas-
ures on behalf of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay. It claimed that the Commission acted without 
basis ‘in fact or law’ in requesting precautionary measures in this case. It also argued that the 
Commission did not have the requisite jurisdictional competence to apply international humani-
tarian law. According to the US it is humanitarian law, and not human rights law, that governs the 
capture and detention of enemy combatants in armed conflict. It argued that the Commission, 
‘whose mission ... is to interpret human rights under the [American Declaration of the Rights and 
Duties of Man],’ lacks the jurisdictional competence to interpret and apply humanitarian law. 
Alternatively, it claimed that the precautionary measures were neither necessary nor appropriate 
in the case at hand. It argued that the Commission lacked a mandate to request the US to imple-
ment precautionary and even if it had the authority to issue them, such measures would not be 
binding.223 
In March 2001, in the La Nación case, the Costa Rican court dealing with the case pub-
lished its decision of the previous day rejecting the competence of the Inter-American Commis-
sion to dictate precautionary measures with regard to decisions by national courts. Counsel for 
Herrera and the newspaper ‘la Nación’ petitioned for a review of this decision, but the court 
rejected this the next day for lack of ‘current interest’.224 In an Opinion published in ‘la Nación’ 
the NGO CEJIL criticised the Tribunal de Juicio for having misjudged and ignored the Commis-
sion’s precautionary measures. It noted that this Tribunal justified its decision on the basis of the 
assumption that the power to order precautionary measures is not a function of the Commission 
and, moreover, that its decisions do not have a binding character, which is to say they are a re-
quest rather than an order.225 CEJIL, on the other hand, affirmed that the competence of the 
Commission to adopt precautionary measures is part of its Rules of Procedure and is founded on 
Articles 33 and 41 ACHR. CEJIL expressed its surprise at the attitude of the State, considering 
that the Government had only recently presented a proposal to the General Assembly of the OAS 
aimed at fortifying the Inter-American Human Rights System by creating a follow-up mechanism 
for the political organs of the OAS. This mechanism would make effective the reports and rec-
ommendation of the Commission and the decisions of the Court. In other words, it pointed out 
that this contradiction between how the State expressed itself externally and how it acted domes-
tically could put at risk the international image of Costa Rica and the international obligations 
assumed by it.226 
                                                 
222 See e.g. CIDH Annual Report 2001, §56 regarding Nevius v. US; §57 regarding Robert Bacon Jr 
v. US; and §59 regarding Gerardo Valdez Maltos v. US. 
223 Digest of the US practice in international law 2002, Chapter 6, no. 21. ‘U.S. Additional Response 
to the request for precautionary measures’, 15 July 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/l/38642.htm> 
(consulted 8 January 2009). 
224 The phrase was: ‘por falta de interés actual’, in: Tribunal rechaza pedido de CIDH, Aduce que la 
Comisión no tiene competencia, La Nación, 24 March 2001, <www.nacion.com> (consulted 2 
April 2002). 
225 Literally, CEJIL wrote the following: “El tribunal justificó su decision señalando que dentro de 
las funciones de este órgano de protección de los derechos humanos no se encuentra la facultad 
de decretar medidas cautelares y que, además, sus resoluciones no tiene carácter vinculante, es 
decir, son una requisitoria y no una orden”. See: La Competencia de la CIDH, comunicado del 
Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional (CEJIL), in: La Nación, 5 April 2001, 
<www.nacion.com> (consulted 2 April 2002). 
226 La Competencia de la CIDH, comunicado del Centro por la Justicia y el Derecho Internacional 
(CEJIL), in: La Nación, 5 April 2001, <www.nacion.com> (consulted 2 April 2002). 
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Both the Commission and the CIDH Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression note, in 
their Annual Report for 2001, that Costa Rica’s ineffectiveness in protecting the freedom of ex-
pression ‘combined with the fact that the Costa Rican courts did not carry out the required precau-
tionary measures on a timely basis’ forced it to resort to the Inter-American Court, which subse-
quently adopted provisional measures.227 Costa Rica informed the Court that ‘due to a mistaken 
interpretation there had been confusion when [his] criminal record was certified’. It added that 
‘the Department of Judicial Records and Files had already taken the corresponding records to add 
definitively all the uncertainties surrounding [his] situation’ and it guaranteed that ‘a similar 
situation regarding certifications that might be issued in the future would by no means recur’. The 
Court took note of Costa Rica’s report and ordered it to continue to apply the provisional meas-
ures, in particular to ensure nullification of the registration in the Judicial Registry of Criminal 
Offenders.228 After the Court’s provisional measure, the State suspended all action against the 
journalist and the newspaper. In other words, it did more than the Court had requested. The State 
may have done this in order to prevent having to pay damages under national law later on, if the 
Court would eventually find a violation.229 
3.3.6 Reputation, clear communication, visibility and specificity 
The reputation of the adjudicator in the State in question may play a role. States may also argue, 
by way of justification for non-compliance with provisional measures, that the case law of another 
adjudicator is different on the issue at hand.230 
Yasseen and Thomas v. Guyana (1998) shows the importance of sending submissions to the 
correct address.231 In this case Guyana had mistakenly sent its submission to the UN Special 
                                                 
227 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §27 and Report of the Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression, Chapter V, §21. 
228 CIDH Report of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, Chapter V, §2 in: Annual 
Report 2001.  
229 On the merits the Inter-American Court found that the contested judgment by the domestic 
criminal court convicting Herrera Ulloa had the effect of violating his right to freedom of thought 
and expression. Therefore Costa Rica ‘must nullify that judgment and all the measures it ordered, 
including any involving third parties’. The state was to ‘take all necessary judicial, administrative 
and any other measures to nullify and abolish any and all effects of the November 12, 1999 
judgment’. IACHR Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Judgment of 2 July 2004 (merits and 
reparation), §195. The ‘State’s obligations vis-à-vis the ordered provisional measures are now 
replaced by the obligations ordered in the present judgment, effective as of the date of its 
notification’. Id., §196. With regard to the other claims the court found that its judgment 
constituted per se a form of reparation, except for Mr Herrera Ulloa for whom compensation was 
to be paid for non-pecuniary damages. 
230 Canada (in the context of refoulement) and the US (in the context of access to court for detainees 
at Guantanamo), for instance, have referred to the 1991 ECtHR judgment Cruz Varas where the 
European Court still considered not legally binding its provisional measures. See e.g. Ontario 
Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §37 and Digest of the US practice in 
international law 2002, Chapter 6, no. 21. ‘U.S. Additional Response to the request for 
precautionary measures’, 15 July 2002, <http://www.state.gov/s/l/38642.htm> (consulted 8 
January 2009). 
231 HRC Abdool Saleem Yasseen and Noel Thomas v. Republic of Guyana, 30 March 1998. The 
Committee received information from counsel that the Court of Appeal of Guyana had dismissed 
the petitioners’ application. Subsequently, the State party requested an extension of the deadline 
for submission of observations on admissibility. By contrast, in its View the HRC referred to a 
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Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary Executions instead of to the HRC and subsequently pro-
tested with the HRC that it failed to take into account its observations.232 While this mistake 
cannot be attributed to the Committee, the incident indicates the importance of open and efficient 
lines of communication between different departments of the High Commissioner’s Secretariat in 
Geneva. The staff, for instance, servicing the Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary 
Executions does have a responsibility in re-channelling communications not meant for it.  
Six months after the execution of Glenn Ashby in disregard of the Committee's provisional 
measures, the State party responded by mentioning that its authorities ‘were not aware’ of the 
‘request under rule 86 at the time of Mr. Ashby’s execution’.233  
“The representative of Trinidad and Tobago at Geneva transmitted a covering memorandum by 
fax at 16.34 (Geneva time) (10.34 Trinidad time) on 13 July 1994. This memorandum made 
reference to a note from the Centre for Human Rights. However, the note referred to was not 
attached to the memorandum. The entire application filed on behalf of Mr. Ashby, together with 
                                                                                                                       
note in which the State criticised the delays in the proceedings before the HRC. The Committee 
regretted the lack of co-operation from the State party and rejected this criticism. 
232 The HRC declared the case admissible in July 1997. In August of that year it received a Note 
Verbale in which Guyana’s Minister for Foreign Affairs expressed ‘disappointment and distress’ 
about this admissibility decision. The Minister wrote that the Committee had failed to take into 
account the government’s observations of October 1996 on the petitioners’ claims. The HRC, 
however, had not received these observations. “Upon inquiry by the Committee, it transpired that 
the State party’s submission of that date had been addressed to the Special Rapporteur for 
Summary and Arbitrary Executions of the UN Commission on Human Rights”. The confusion 
may have arisen because in February 1996 the Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary 
Executions, Ndiaye, had submitted an urgent appeal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Guyana 
as well, through its Permanent Mission. He had requested the State to refrain from carrying out 
the execution of Yasseen and Thomas scheduled two days later. Urgent appeal of 8 February 
1996 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Guyana by Bacre Waly Ndiaye (on file with the 
author). After Guyana was informed of this mistake it requested that its observations of 3 October 
1996 be incorporated into the case file and that the Committee reconvene to consider the 
admissibility and the merits of the case. The Committee gave the petitioners’ counsel an 
opportunity to comment on the above observations. It then reconsidered its admissibility 
decision. It observed, however, that the submission of October 1996 addressed the merits of the 
complaints rather than the admissibility. The only claim of which the State had challenged the 
admissibility was the claim that the jury foreman for the last trial, which had taken place in 1992, 
was related to the wife of the deceased. The State party argued that the petitioners did not raise 
this claim during the domestic proceedings. Observing that in that respect, in effect, domestic 
remedies had not been exhausted, the Committee set aside its earlier admissibility decision ‘in as 
much as it relates to this claim’. It saw no grounds to review its admissibility decision in relation 
to the other claims made by the petitioners. At the same time, the Chairperson pointed out that the 
mandate of the HRC under the OP is ‘distinct and entirely separate’ from that of the 
Commission’s Special Rapporteur on Summary and Arbitrary executions. Procedures before both 
bodies ‘may proceed in parallel, but independently of each other’. She also re-iterated the 
Committee’s provisional measures. Letter by the Chairperson of the HRC to the Permanent 
Representative of Guyana, 22 August 1997 (on file with the author). 
233 HRC Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002, §5.1. See also under ‘Execution by 
Trinidad and Tobago: the case Ashby’ 
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the Special Rapporteur’s request under rule 86, was received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
on 18 July 1994, that is, four days after Mr. Ashby’s execution”.234 
According to the State the Secretariat staff should have reminded the Permanent Representative of 
the urgency of the request. Without this, ‘he would not in any way have been aware of the ex-
treme urgency with which their request was to be transmitted to the relevant authorities in Trini-
dad and Tobago. It is not known whether the Committee in fact drew the urgency of the request to 
the attention of the Permanent Representative’. The HRC responded by writing that urgency was 
duly conveyed to the First Secretary at 16.05 on 13 July and was personally delivered.235  
In the case of Rockliff Ross v. Guyana (disc. 1997) the HRC used provisional measures 
within a day after receipt of the communication. The execution was scheduled on that day. De-
spite the extensive efforts by the Committee’s Secretariat to contact the relevant authorities in-
cluding the prison director, the petitioner was executed. It is not clear whether the State would 
have failed to comply as well had the Committee been in a position to issue provisional measures 
several days in advance of the execution date.236  
In Thompson v. St. Vincent & the Grenadines (2000)237 the HRC received information, a 
year and seven months after it used provisional measures, that the State had issued an execution 
warrant. The Special Rapporteur sent an immediate message to the State reminding it of the pro-
visional measure under Rule 86.238 The State let the HRC know ‘that it was not aware of having 
received the request nor the communication concerned’.  
“Following an exchange of correspondence between the Special Rapporteur for New 
Communications and the State party’s representatives, and after a constitutional motion had 
been presented to the High Court of St. Vincent and the Grenadines, the State party agreed to 
grant the author a stay of execution in order to allow the Committee to examine his 
communication”.239 
Bosnia and Herzegovina did not comply with the Bosnia Chamber’s Order for provisional meas-
ures to halt handing over the petitioners to US forces. Bosnia and Herzegovina alleged that the 
order had never been delivered to it ‘in a proper way’. It argued that ‘even if the order was trans-
mitted to the facsimile of the legal service of the Council of Ministers on 17 January 2002, at 6:26 
p.m., it could not have complied with the order, because the Council of Ministers, where the 
Agents are situated, stops working at 5:00 p.m. However, on 18 January 2002, at 9:00 a.m., when 
the Agents started working the next day, the applicants were already outside of the territory of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, the regular practice is that the Agents of Bosnia and Herze-
govina receive cases and decisions of the Chamber and other materials directly by courier’.240 
                                                 
234 HRC Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002, §5.1.  
235 See also the references to HRC Thompson v. St. Vincent & the Grenadines, 18 October 2000 and 
Ross v. Guyana, 10 December 1997 (disc.) as discussed in this section under ‘Communication 
and compliance’. 
236 HRC Rockliff Ross v. Guyana, 10 December 1997 (disc.), (703/1996) (on file with the author).  
237 HRC Eversley Thompson v. St. Vincent & the Grenadines, 18 October 2000. 
238 While the HRC seems to have received the information three days after the execution was 
scheduled, it acted immediately and the State granted a stay. This means he had not yet been 
executed at the time.  
239 HRC Mr. Eversley Thompson v. St. Vincent & the Grenadines, 18 October 2000. 
240 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §107. See also e.g. the State’s argument in ECtHR Koughouli v. France, 26 September 
2002 (inadm.), that even if the provisional measure had been in time, it would not postpone a 
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The visibility of provisional measures by the supervisory bodies concerned, including their 
motivation, may have an impact on the willingness of States to respect them.241 In this context it 
is also interesting to note that, in its press releases on precautionary measures, the Inter-American 
Commission has introduced a practice of attaching background information (less than half a page) 
on its mandate and composition, evidently intended to inform the (US) media.242 In addition, in 
particular in the Inter-American system another factor many petitioners and the Commission see 
as important in improving the effectiveness of precautionary and provisional measures is their 
specificity.243 
In almost all cases a decision of non-compliance may be based on a combination of reasons. 
In the aftermath of the execution of the execution of Glenn Ashby, for instance, the State sug-
gested several reasons for ignoring the Committee’s provisional measures: it did not get the re-
quest in time, the HRC had no authority under its Rule on provisional measures to make this 
particular request (because of non-exhaustion) and that this Rule did not impose an obligation to 
comply with the Committee’s provisional measures.244  
3.4 The domestic situation 
3.4.1 Introduction 
The lack of knowledge of human rights obligations245 and the perception that international human 
rights law is a foreign affairs issue, rather than one of domestic implementation, seems to apply to 
the three branches of government in various States and is relevant to explain respect and 
disrespect for provisional measures as well. This section deals with the attitude of domestic courts 
to international adjudicators, including the issue of incorporation into domestic law (3.3.2); then it 
gives examples of three types of excuses for non-compliance; the first is a professed inability to 
comply (3.3.3), the second is a statement denying responsibility (3.3.4); and the third is an 
outright refusal to comply (3.3.5). The latter may involve an emphasis on public safety or the idea 
that domestic authorities are less capable or appropriate to deal with the issue than are 
international adjudicators. 
                                                                                                                       
decision to expel based simply on a telephone request. In other words, the State apparently insists 
on receiving all the information before it is prepared to respect the Court’s provisional measures. 
241 The availability of persuasive provisional measures may contribute to convincing the State to 
comply in a particular case, although, as indicated by Viljoen/Louw (2007), pp. 1-34 with regard 
to the merits decisions of the African Commission, to the extent information was available the 
more persuasive merits decisions did not necessarily trigger compliance nor did cases of limited 
reasoning trigger non-compliance. Nevertheless this book considers accessible and persuasive 
provisional measures as a value in itself that will improve the concept in the long run and is more 
likely to be of use to non-governmental organisations in order to stir up public opinion than will 
less persuasive provisional measures. On follow-up by NGOs see section 4 of Chapter XVIII. 
242 See e.g. IACHR calls upon the United States to postpone execution of juvenile offender 
Alexander Williams, press release 7/02, 19 February 2002. See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
243 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
244 HRC Ashby v. Trinidad & Tobago, 21 March 2002, §5.6. 
245 In a country report, for instance, the Inter-American Commission recommended a State to take 
additional measures to ‘inform and train relevant officials at all levels, particularly judges and 
other decision-makers responsible for interpreting and applying the State’s human rights 
obligations, to ensure that they are aware of and understand those obligations under applicable 
international law’. See CIDH Canada Report 2000, §181. 
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3.4.2 Attitude of domestic courts towards international adjudicators  
As a branch of government, the judiciary plays an important role in the (non-)implementation of 
international obligations,246 including provisional measures. Issues like incorporation of interna-
tional law and the extent of deference to the executive are important in this respect. Sometimes 
international and national courts are each other’s allies.247 At other times domestic courts have a 
much more ‘internal’ outlook on international law, much more in unison with the executive. 
Both situations may be observed in the context of provisional measures to halt executions. 
The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) is a domestic court with jurisdiction in many 
Caribbean States, although based in London. In Thomas v. Baptiste (1999) it found that an execu-
tion in advance of the completion of proceedings in the Inter-American human rights system 
would violate domestic constitutional rights.248 In any case, on the basis of common law a ‘gen-
eral right’ could be found ‘accorded to all litigants not to have the outcome of any pending appel-
late or other legal process pre-empted by executive action’.249 The JCPC considered that the 
government had made the international proceedings part of the domestic criminal justice system 
by ratifying treaties providing for individual access to an international adjudicator. This meant 
that it had at least temporarily extended the scope of the due process clause in its Constitution.250  
It also pointed out that the constitutional reference to ‘protection of the law’ entitled the pe-
titioner to complete international complaint procedures. Because the State in question was a party 
                                                 
246 Next to organisations such as Interights, making accessible Commonwealth and international 
case law on human rights in searchable databases (<http://www.interights.org/database-
search/index.htm>; accessed 29 December 2007), commercial initiatives have also been 
introduced, including the Oxford University Press project coordinated by the University of 
Amsterdam called International Law in Domestic Courts (ILDC) (<http://ildc.oxfordlawreports. 
com/public/login>; accessed 29 December 2007), making available a searchable database of 
domestic case law from more than 60 jurisdictions both in original and in English translation, 
together with commentaries, regarding various topics of international law, including human 
rights. 
247 Take, for instance, the Constitutional Court of Colombia. 
248 JCPC Thomas v. Baptiste, 27 January 1999/17 March 1999 (reasoned). Lord Millett, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Steyn for the majority and Lord Puff of Chieveley and Lord 
Hobhouse of Woodborough dissenting. Initially it did not appear open to the relevance of 
international proceedings. In 1998, in the Fisher case, the JCPC determined that the petitioner 
had no legitimate expectation that the Bahamas would allow for a reasonable amount of time in 
order to complete the proceedings before the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. 
JCPC Fisher v. Minister of Public Safety and Immigration (No. 2), 5 October 1998. The 
dissenters considered it ‘hard to imagine a more obvious denial of human rights than to execute a 
man, after many months of waiting for the result, while his case is still under legitimate 
consideration by an international human rights body’. JCPC Fisher v. Minister of Public Safety 
and Immigration (No. 2), 5 October 1998. Dissenting opinion of Lord Slynn of Hedley and Lord 
Hope of Craighead, p. 452 E-F. The difference between the Fisher case (1998), concerning the 
Bahamas, and the Thomas case (1999), concerning Trinidad and Tobago, is that the Constitution 
of the Bahamas does not contain a due process clause while the Constitution of Trinidad does. In 
Higgs v. Minister of National Security the JCPC concluded that ‘the ratio decidendi of Thomas v. 
Baptiste is that a due process clause in section 4(a) of the Trinidad and Tobago Constitution gave 
the Crown power to accept an international jurisdiction as part of the domestic criminal justice 
system’. JCPC Higgs v. Minister of National Security, 14 December 1999, p. 245E. 
249 This was confirmed by the due process clause of the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago, JCPC 
Thomas v. Baptiste, 27 January 1999/17 March 1999 (reasoned), p. 23 D-E. 
250 JCPC Thomas v. Baptiste, 27 January 1999/17 March 1999 (reasoned), p. 23 E-F. 
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to the ACHR, the ICCPR and (for the cases still pending) the OP, the petitioner could obtain the 
reports by the Inter-American Commission and the HRC and present them to the Jamaican Privy 
Council for consideration before the latter would deal with his application for mercy. Until it had 
received and considered those reports the petitioner was entitled to a stay of execution.251 The 
JCPC pointed out that the relevant executive body of the State was to consider the reports of 
international human rights adjudicators. If, after considering such a report, it would decide not to 
accept its recommendations this executive body was obliged to provide an explanation.252  
One aspect that is likely to play a great role in the attitudes of domestic courts is the system 
of implementation of international law in domestic law: where is the domestic system situated on 
the continuum between monist and dualist? For more dualist systems: has the applicable interna-
tional treaty been incorporated in domestic legislation and does this legislation take into account 
the possibility of the international adjudicator taking provisional measures? The JCPC has con-
firmed a principle that is important in many common law countries, namely that international 
conventions do not alter domestic law, except in so far as they are incorporated. Nevertheless, it 
has noted that it is ‘sometimes argued that human rights treaties form an exception to this princi-
ple’.253 
Apart from the JCPC’s decisions, relevant to various Caribbean States, the domestic courts 
of individual States have sometimes faced decisions by international adjudicators. Two cases 
against Barbados show that in 1992 its courts dismissed the legal relevance of the proceedings 
under the OP.254 In Bradshaw v. Barbados (1994) counsel observed that ‘the court of first in-
stance refused to grant the author a stay of execution pending the consideration of his communi-
cation by the Human Rights Committee, and that it found that the author could not invoke the 
provisions of the Covenant, that the Covenant was not part of the law of Barbados, and did not 
bind the Government of Barbados in respect of it citizens’.255 The Court of Appeal then observed 
that ‘the provisions enabling written representations to the Human Rights Committee, and the 
procedural and other provisions thereunder, are not part of the law of Barbados’ because the State 
had not enacted legislation to fulfil its treaty obligations under the ICCPR and the OP.256  
                                                 
251 JCPC Lewis v. Jamaica, 12 September 2000, p. 85B-C. 
252 Id., p. 79E/F and 85C. 
253 JCPC Thomas v. Baptiste, 27 January 1999/17 March 1999 (reasoned), p. 23C.  
254 HRC Bradshaw v. Barbados, 19 July 1994 and Denzil Roberts v. Barbados, 19 July 1994. On 23 
May 1992 the authorities read Bradshaw a warrant for his execution on 25 May 1992. His 
counsel filed a constitutional motion and a stay of execution was granted on 24 May 1992. Four 
months later the court of first instance dismissed the constitutional motion. The Court of Appeal 
dismissed the appeal six months afterwards. As in the case of Bradshaw, in Roberts the HRC did 
not receive any further information from the State party about the petitioner’s constitutional 
motion since July 1992. On 24 November 1992 counsel informed the HRC that the court of first 
instance dismissed the constitutional motion on 29 September 1992 but granted a temporary stay 
of execution for six weeks, until 10 November 1992. The petitioner appealed to the Court of 
Appeal and applied for a stay of execution pending the hearing of the appeal against the decision 
of the court of first instance. On 19 November 1992 the Court of Appeal granted a stay of 
execution.  
255 HRC Bradshaw v. Barbados, 19 July 1994, §4.2. 
256 Ibid. 
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The HRC noted with concern the abovementioned remarks of the Court of Appeal of Bar-
bados.257  
“By ratifying the Covenant and the Optional Protocol, Barbados has undertaken to fulfil its 
obligations thereunder and has recognised the Committee’s competence to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a 
violation by the State party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant; while the Covenant is 
not part of the domestic law of Barbados which can be applied directly by the courts, the State 
party has nevertheless accepted the legal obligation to make the provisions of the Covenant 
effective. To this extent, it is an obligation for the State party to adopt appropriate measures to 
give legal effect to the views of the Committee as to the interpretation and application of the 
Covenant in particular cases arising under the Optional Protocol. This includes the Committee’s 
views under rule 86 of the rules of procedure on the desirability of interim measures of 
protection, to avoid irreparable damage to the victim of the alleged violation”.258 
The refusal of the State to respect the HRC’s provisional measures in Ahani is based on the argu-
ment of protection of the general public, but also on the approach of domestic courts towards the 
obligations under the OP. To understand the decision by the Supreme Court of Canada to dismiss 
Ahani’s appeal, it is important to note that while his case originated years before the terrorist 
attacks on the US of September 11th, the Supreme Court of Canada made a decision on his expul-
sion after that date.259 Subsequently counsel resorted to the HRC and its Special Rapporteur used 
provisional measures to halt his expulsion. When the Minister refused to do so, counsel brought 
the case before the Ontario Superior Court, which held that ‘if there is a right protected by s. 7 of 
the Charter not to have the outcome of any pending appellate or other legal process pre-empted 
by executive action, this does not extend to an analogous legal process such as a petition to an 
international body whose advise is not binding domestically’. The OP did not create a ‘legitimate 
expectation not to be deported pending consideration of a communication by the Committee’.260  
The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Ahani’s appeal from this decision by way of Justice 
Laskin’s majority opinion. It considered that the domestic system did not allow for application of 
international legal obligations and added that the HRC's provisional measures were not legally 
binding. It acknowledged that Ahani was still a Convention refugee under the definition in the 
Refugee Convention and noted that it ‘must therefore recognize that he still has a well-founded 
fear of persecution if returned to Iran’. Nevertheless, ‘no principle of fundamental justice entitles 
him to remain in Canada until his communication is considered by the Committee’.261 Justice 
                                                 
257 While it declared the case inadmissible for non-exhaustion, the HRC expressed concern about the 
fact that the State party had issued an execution warrant for May 1992, in spite of the provisional 
measures by Special Rapporteur Lallah earlier that month. The HRC confirmed these measures. 
258 HRC Peter Bradshaw v. Barbados, 19 July 1994 (inadm.), §§2.9, 2.10, 4.2, 5.3; see also Denzil 
Roberts v. Barbados, 19 July 1994, §§2.6, 2.7, 6.3. This follow-up and early expression by the 
HRC of the legal status of its Views and provisional measures dates from July 1994, the month in 
which another State, Trinidad and Tobago, executed a petitioner in defiance of a provisional 
measure. Generally on follow up see Chapter XVIII. 
259 Supreme Court of Canada Ahani v. Canada, 11 January 2002. 
260 Ontario Superior Court Justice Michael R. Dambrot, 15 January 2002, as referred to in Ontario 
Court of Appeal, Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §19. 
261 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §27. Ahani had argued that a 
domestic injunction was necessary ‘to preserve an effective remedy in international law’. 
Surprisingly, he did not refer to the Committee’s case law about provisional measures. He did 
consider ‘that the content of procedural fairness is greater the more vital the interest at stake, and 
that Canada’s international human rights commitments are an indicator, even an important 
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Laskin argued that neither the ICCPR nor the OP was incorporated into Canadian law. This meant 
that they had no legal effect in Canada. He considered that Ahani could not use the Canadian 
Charter and its principles of fundamental justice to ‘enforce Canada’s international commitments 
in a domestic court’.262 Laskin did refer to the case law of the JCPC. However, he ‘confessed’ that 
he had difficulty understanding the reasoning of that Court in Thomas v. Baptiste (1999).263 
Instead he preferred the arguments by Lord Goff, dissenting in that case, considering them ‘more 
in line’ with Canadian law.264 He considered that ‘this case demonstrates the difference between 
the proper role of the executive and the proper role of the judiciary’. “Judges are not competent to 
assess whether Canada is acting in bad faith by rejecting the Committee’s interim measures re-
quest and instead deporting Ahani immediately”.265 
He considered that the relevant considerations ‘lie within the executive’s expertise in for-
eign relations’. 
“Courts have no expertise in these matters, and in my respectful opinion, have no business 
intruding into them. Canada agreed to sign an international covenant and protocol that was not 
binding. It chose not to make these instruments part of its domestic law. It is not for the courts, 
under the guise of procedural fairness, to read in an enforceable constitutional obligation and 
commit Canada to a process that admittedly could take years, thus frustrating this country’s 
wish to enforce its own laws by deporting a terrorist to a country where he will face at best a 
minimal risk of harm”.266 
Another doctrine discussed by the domestic court was that of legitimate expectations. Justice 
Laskin noted that this doctrine was limited. “It is a doctrine of procedural fairness only. It creates 
no substantive rights”. He considered that Ahani tried to use the doctrine of legitimate expecta-
tions to impose procedural requirements on Canada rather than on the HRC. He pointed out that 
procedural fairness normally relates to participatory rights. Apart from this, he stated that ‘nothing 
in Canada’s past practice with interim measures requests or in its dealings with Ahani could give 
rise to a legitimate expectation that it would permit Ahani to remain in the country until the 
Committee considers his communication’.267 He emphasised that Canada ‘had no consistent 
practise of acceding to interim measures requests. In some cases it has; in others it has not’. He 
pointed out in particular that ‘in the only other case concerning a terrorist – Tejinder Pal Sing – 
Canada did not accede to an interim measures request from the United Nations Committee against 
Torture’. In this case too it concluded that the petitioner’s immediate removal was required by ‘its 
international obligation to ensure it did not become a safe haven for terrorists’.268 He also consid-
ered that Ahani was in fact seeking not only procedural fairness but also a substantive right to 
remain in Canada until the Committee delivered its Views. Rather than explaining why this was a 
                                                                                                                       
indicator, of the scope of the principles of fundamental justice'. Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. 
Canada, 8 February 2002, §30. 
262 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada (A.G.) (2002), §31. 
263 JCPC Thomas v. Baptiste, 27 January 1999/17 March 1999 (reasoned), Lord Millett, Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson and Lord Steyn for the majority and Lord Goff of Chieveley and Lord 
Hobhouse of Woodborough dissenting. 
264 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §33. 
265 Ibid. 
266 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §49. It may be assumed that he 
meant: ‘at worst a minimal risk of harm’. On the role of the judiciary and the executive in 
extradition cases see Smeulers (2002). 
267 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §§59-61. 
268 Id., §62. 
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substantive right, he only noted that the doctrine of legitimate expectations did not create substan-
tive rights. It referred to the ‘substantive right to remain in Canada until the Committee delivers 
its views, a process that could take years’.269  
Judge Rosenberg's dissent in Ahani discussed the rationale of the domestic principle of in-
corporation, invoked by the government, that international conventions are not binding unless 
they have been specifically incorporated into Canadian law. This was to protect Parliament and 
the people of Canada from executive action. This case, however, related to ‘administrative deci-
sion-making (as opposed to legislative interpretation)’.270 It was the government that sought to 
invoke this ‘non binding principle’ in order to ‘shield the executive from the consequences of its 
voluntary decision to enter into and therefore be bound by the Covenant and the Protocol’.271 The 
‘non-binding principle’ of treaty incorporation ‘goes only so far as to affirm that the Covenant 
and the Protocol do not create rights in the appellant that can be enforced in a domestic court’. In 
this case, however, the applicant ‘claims only the limited procedural right to reasonable access to 
the Committee, upon which the federal government has conferred jurisdiction’. Whatever the 
nature of this right of review, the government ‘should not be entitled to render it practically illu-
sory by returning him to Iran before he has had a reasonable opportunity to access it’. It was 
indeed ‘a principle of fundamental justice that individuals in Canada have fair access to the proc-
ess in the Protocol’.272 While he believed that application of the principle is more difficult in the 
international context ‘because of the difficulty for a Canadian court to assess the merits of a 
communication to the Committee’, he noted ‘a generally held consensus in Canada that in the 
human rights context an individual whose security is at stake should within reason be given the 
opportunity to access remedies at the international level’. This was ‘particularly so where the 
individual seeks access to a body of the stature of the Committee,’ with its adjudicative func-
tions.273 It was a ‘simple principle of justice that where there is a right there should be a rem-
edy’.274 At least in capital cases the JCPC had held that ‘states subject to a constitutionally en-
shrined due process clause may be obliged to await the decision of international bodies such as 
the Human Rights Committee’.275 Justice Rosenberg referred to JCPC cases ‘simply as an indica-
                                                 
269 Id., 8 February 2002, §63. 
270 As phrased by Weiser (2004), pp. 136-137, who notes that ‘this is not the accepted position in 
Canada’ although the Supreme Court had not yet specifically addressed this issue. Harrington 
(2003), p. 82, points out that the judge failed to take into account the practical realities of the OP. 
She suggests that the common law principle that unincorporated international treaties have no 
domestic legal consequences should not apply in the same extent to treaties creating international 
complaint procedures. 
271 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, Rosenberg dissent, §§91-92. 
272 Id., §93. 
273 Id., §94. He points out that Professor Walter Tarnopolsky was a member of the HRC before he 
was appointed to Supreme Court of Canada. He also refers to the statement by Lord Millett in 
Tangiora v. Wellington District Legal Services Committee, [2000] 1 W.L.R. 240 (P.C.), pp. 244-
245 that the (non-binding) views of the HRC ‘acquire authority from the standing of its members 
and their judicial qualities of impartiality, objectivity and restraint’.  
274 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, Rosenberg dissent, §§95-96. 
275 Id., §97. At §98 he quotes the dissenting opinion of Lord Nicholls in Briggs v. Baptiste, [2000] 2 
A.C. 40, §47: “By acceding to the Convention, Trinidad and Tobago intended to confer benefits 
on its citizens. The benefits were intended to be real, not illusory. The Inter-American system of 
human rights was not intended to be a hollow sham or, for those under sentence of death, a cruel 
charade”. 
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tion that countries with legal systems like ours have found that due process requires that individu-
als be given the opportunity to access these international bodies’.276  
3.4.3 ‘Sorry: we can’t comply’ 
3.4.3.1 INTRODUCTION 
States have often said that domestic legislation did not allow them to implement provisional 
measures. They said, for instance: ‘we can’t find the beneficiaries’. In 2001, in the Haitian mass 
expulsion case the Dominican Republic informed the Court that it still had not been able to locate 
the two beneficiaries of the Court’s second Order for provisional measures.277 Two more excuses 
of this kind are discussed in this section. 
3.4.3.2 ‘WE LACK THE AUTHORITY TO TAKE MEASURES’ 
Almost two months after it had taken precautionary measures in a case against Ecuador, during an 
on-site visit, member of the Inter-American Commission Marta Altolaguirre received a commit-
ment from the Minister of Defence that he would deploy the personnel needed to enforce the 
Commission’s precautionary measures. The petitioners, however, reported later that measures 
were never implemented and that ‘the Ministry of Defence had told them that it lacked the author-
ity to take such actions’. Thus, the Commission repeated its precautionary measures and asked the 
government to provide information on the implementation on a monthly basis.278 
In September 1996 the Inter-American Commission took precautionary measures on behalf 
of Roberto Girón and Pedro Castillo Mendoza. Guatemala responded two days later, ‘sending an 
explanation as to why it would not implement the measures requested’.279 In November 1997 the 
Commission requested Guatemala to take precautionary measures to stay the execution of Manuel 
Martinez Coronado. His complaint dealt with violations of due process.280 Guatemala went ahead 
with the execution despite the precautionary measure. It just stated that its Court system did not 
provide for the application of such measures to stay the execution of a death sentence. This is 
significantly different from its responses to precautionary measures involving death threats and 
harassment. 
                                                 
276 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, Rosenberg dissent, §99. He 
considered that the appellant has a procedural right because the executive had ratified the OP. 
“That right is a narrow one. It does not entitle him to any particular result either from the Human 
Rights Committee or the government once it receives the views of the Committee”. Rosenberg 
dissent, §113. 
277 It had requested the help of the Network ‘Dominican-Haitian Meeting’ and had met with them on 
27 November 2000. IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican 
Republic, Order of 26 May 2001.  
278 CIDH Annual Report 2001, Chapter III (a), §29. 
279 CIDH Annual Report 1996, Chapter II, §4a (cont.). 
280 CIDH Annual Report 1997, Chapter III (2a) under the heading ‘Guatemala’. 
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In Weiss v. Austria (2003) in response to the HRC Chairperson’s letter of regret281 with re-
gard to Austria’s decision to ignore the Committee’s provisional measures, the State argued that 
Rule 86 did not oblige States to amend their constitutions to arrange for direct effect. It consid-
ered that a Rule 86 request ‘does not as such have any binding effect under international law’. It 
‘cannot override a contrary obligation of international law, that is, an obligation under the extradi-
tion treaty between the State party and the United States to surrender a person in circumstances 
where the necessary prerequisites set out in a treaty were followed’.282  
On the Order not to hand over the petitioners to US authorities Bosnia and Herzegovina 
stated that the Bosnia Chamber was ‘fully aware’ that Bosnia and Herzegovina had ‘no authority 
to give effect to orders by the Chamber’: “In its provisional measure the Chamber requested the 
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina to prevent the applicants to be taken out of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina by the use of force. The esteemed Chamber, most certainly, should know by now that the 
state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in its distinction from its Entities, does not institutionally pos-
sess any instrument of force … and such wording of the order for provisional measures is not 
enforceable by the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina”.283 
3.4.3.3 ‘YOU ARE NOT BEING FAIR: WE CANNOT DO THE IMPOSSIBLE’ 
In the case of the deportation and expulsion of Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian origin, the 
Dominican Republic argued during the hearing of August 2000 that it is ‘obliged to maintain a 
permanent return and expulsion policy, but it is necessary to point out that the number of persons 
repatriated does not compensate even remotely for the number of persons who come into the 
country illegally’. According to the State, the Court’s acceptance of the Commission’s request for 
provisional measures ‘would be like tying the hands of a State that has been trying for years to 
make headway in the field of human rights and concerning its immigration problem’.284 In an-
other context the Inter-American Commission had already pointed out that the ‘State has the 
                                                 
281 In August 2002 the Chairperson of the HRC, by letter to the mission of Austria at the UN, 
expressed ‘great regret’ about the extradition in contravention of the request for interim 
protection. The HRC sought ‘a written explanation about the reasons which led to disregard of 
the Committee’s request for interim measures and an explanation of how it intended to secure 
compliance with such requests in the future’. On the same date the Special Rapporteur on New 
Communications requested the State ‘to monitor closely the situation and treatment of the author 
subsequent to his extradition, and to make such representations to the Government of the United 
States that were deemed pertinent to prevent irreparable harm to the author’s Covenant rights’. 
See HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §5.1. 
282 HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §5.3. 
283 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §109. See also ACHPR Interights (on behalf of Husaini et al.) v. Nigeria, April 2005, 
response by the State to provisional measures of 6 February 2002 assuring the Chairman of the 
Commission ‘that the administration and many Nigerians equally shared his concern’ and 
expressing’ optimism that, in the long run, justice would be done and Safiya’s life would be 
spared’. “While noting that the federal government could not unilaterally suspend the Sharia 
penal statutes and decisions which were within the prerogative of the state government in 
accordance with the Nigerian Constitution, the letter assured the Chairman that the administration 
would leave no stone unturned in ensuring that th right to life and human dignity of Safiya, and 
that of all other Nigerians that may be affected in future, were adequately protected”, §20. 
284 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic case, Order of 18 
August 2000. 
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obligation to keep order and maintain the conditions for ordinary life with the limits of the law. It 
cannot abdicate its sovereign obligation to provide guarantees, and the fact that a location is dis-
tant from the major urban centers is no excuse for shirking that responsibility’.285 
Sometimes the measures to be taken require considerable resources, in particular in the con-
text of protection against death threats. The protection required could sometimes amount to an 
internationally triggered domestic witness protection programme, but mostly it just requires allo-
cation of resources such as building a wall, between two warring factions in a prison. Delay in 
implementation may then be caused by inter-agency ducking and diving about finances. 
As noted, in the European system provisional measures have only once been used to protect 
persons against threats pending the proceedings before it. Yet on the merits the ECtHR has made 
quite clear that in order to protect life and personal integrity States are expected to take positive 
certain measures. In Kaya v. Turkey (2000) the government contended that they could not have 
provided effective protection against the attacks. The ECtHR was not convinced by this argument. 
“A wide range of preventive measures would have been available to the authorities regarding 
the activities of their own security forces and those groups allegedly acting under their auspices 
or with their knowledge”.286 
3.4.4 ‘Sorry: it is not our responsibility’ 
3.4.4.1 INTRODUCTION 
There have been several occasions when the State has stated it was not responsible for the non-
compliance, for instance because it was a private problem between individuals, because it was a 
problem created by the previous government and, most often, referring to the internal division of 
responsibilities between the national government and the governments of constitutive states in a 
federation. 
3.4.4.2 THE MATTER IS A ‘PRIVATE PROBLEM BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS’ 
In November 1995 the Inter-American Commission requested Guatemala to take precautionary 
measures on behalf of an official of the Myrna Mack Foundation and of an organisation of 
indigenous peoples in Santa Barbara in the Province of Huehuetenango. He had been threatened 
and attacked by both local militia patrols and military officers. As a result he had been obliged to 
leave the community. This interfered with his ability to continue his work on behalf of both 
organisations. Guatemala refused to implement the precautionary measures requested by the 
Commission. It alleged that ‘the matter was a private problem between individuals’.287 The State 
has not generally refused to take positive measures because of precautionary measures by the 
Commission or provisional measures by the Court, indicating that the refusal is based on a 
disagreement about the facts, not the law. 
                                                 
285 CIDH Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil, 13 April 1999, §114. 
286 ECtHR Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 28 March 2000, §100: “The Government have not provided any 
information concerning steps taken by them prior to the Susurluk report to investigate the 
existence of contra-guerrilla groups and the extent to which State officials were implicated in 
unlawful killings carried out during this period, with a view to taking appropriate measures of 
prevention”. See further Chapters IX (Threats) and XIII (Protection). 
287 CIDH Annual Report 1996, 14 Mach 1997, §4a. 
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3.4.4.3 ‘IT IS THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT’S FAULT’ 
In response to an argument by Honduras that the previous government was responsible for the 
situation that triggered precautionary measures, the Inter-American Commission has noted that 
just like a Government cannot justify a violation of state responsibility because it has been 
committed by a previous Government, it cannot justify non-implementation of precautionary 
measures on that basis either. After all, the Commission argues, ‘the passive subject of the 
obligations deriving from this provision of the Convention, which for the most part are concrete 
and automatic, is not the government or any other body that exercises public power but rather the 
State itself’. It also noted that ‘according to the principle of identity or continuity of the State in 
international law that responsibility subsists independently of any change of government over the 
course of time and, concretely, between the time of the illegal act that gave rise to the 
responsibility and the time that it is denounced’.288  
3.4.4.4 ‘IMPLEMENTATION IS THE PREROGATIVE OF THE RELEVANT CONSTITU-
ENT STATE IN THIS FEDERATION’ 
With regard to the United States (US) the Inter-American Commission has requested a stay of 
execution many times. It generally received no response at all,289 or it is informed that the Gov-
ernment has forwarded the Commission’s request to the Governor or the Office of the Attorney 
General of the constituent State in question.290 Shaka Sankofa (formerly Gary Graham) was sev-
enteen at the time of the offence for which he was subsequently sentenced to death and there were 
serious doubts about his guilt. Years later he was nevertheless executed.291In January 1999 the 
Commission requested the US to stay the execution of Sean Sellers. This stay would enable the 
Commission to ‘study the reports of alleged violations of his human rights, since he was a minor 
when he committed the crime for which he was sentenced to capital punishment, and he was 
mentally incapacitated’. Despite this request Mr. Sellers was executed as scheduled on 4 February 
1999.292 Stanley Faulder was a Canadian national sentenced to death in violation of the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations and his execution took place under vigorous protests by Can-
                                                 
288 CIDH Minors in Detention case (Honduras), 10 March 1999, §188. The Commission has used a 
similar argument with regard to the obligations of Cuba since the OAS had suspended the 
participation of the Government of Cuba, see paragraph 2.1 of this Chapter (ft. 1). 
289 See e.g. CIDH Zeitvogel v. US, Annual Report 1996, 14 March 1997, Chapter II, §4a (cont.); 
Faulder v. US, Annual Report 1999, Chapter III C.1, §66; Leisure v. US, Annual Report 1999, 
Chapter III C.1, §68; Michael Domingues v. US; Miguel Ángel Flores v. US; Alexander Williams 
v. US, Annual Report 2000 §§49, 51, 52. 
290 See e.g. CIDH Bannister v. US, Annual Report 1997, Chapter III (a); and Leisure v. US, Annual 
Report 1999, Chapter III C, §68; In one case, for instance, the State noted ‘the U.S. federal 
government had no involvement with the case prior to the receipt of the Commission’s request 
and that Mr. Thomas had been executed by the state of Virginia on January 10, 2000, after the 
U.S. Supreme Court refused to grant a stay’. The US sent this note the day after the execution.6 
January 2000, Douglas Christopher Thomas, Case 12. 240, scheduled for execution in Virginia 
on 10 January 2000, executed as scheduled according to information sent by the US on 11 
January 2000, Annual report 2000, §47. 
291 CIDH Case of Gary T. Graham, now known as Shaka Sankofa v. US, 15 June 2000 (adm.) and 29 
December 2003 (merits). 
292 CIDH Annual Report 1998, Chapter III (a), §23. 
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ada.293 The US message appears to be that it bears no responsibility for the actions of its constitu-
ent states. 
The federal structure may be more an argument of convenience than the real reason for non-
compliance. Moreover, in a federal death penalty case it obviously cannot use the argument that 
the decision to grant a stay is a prerogative of the relevant constituent state.294 In the context of 
the Order by the Inter-American Court for provisional measures on behalf of the detainees of 
Mendoza, in March 2007 the Corte Suprema de Justicia of Argentina pointed out that it was a 
matter of national rather than regional interest in the consequences of compliance or non-
compliance with the recommendations and decisions adopted by the Inter-American Commission 
and Court. The national executive must represent the State internationally and bear responsibility 
for any wrongs. The matter has left the domestic sphere and regional authorities and courts could 
not counteract the obligations incurred by the State. It added that this also appeared from the fact 
that the Inter-American Commission and Court clearly addressed the State and not the Province 
of Mendoza.295 Significantly, the Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación also quoted from the 
Inter-American Court’s Order of 30 March 2006 to the effect that the State cannot invoke reasons 
of domestic law as an excuse for not taking firm, concrete and effective action to implement the 
Order. The State could not justify failure to comply fully with the excuse that the provincial and 
national authorities were unable to coordinate their activities to prevent the killings and violence 
that had continued to take place despite the Court’s provisional measures. 
In international proceedings it is the State that is responsible, independent of its unitary or 
federal structure.296 
3.4.5 ‘We won’t comply’ 
3.4.5.1 INTRODUCTION 
As noted, most provisional measures are generally respected, but this chapter discusses the 
reasons for States that fail to comply with them. On some occasions a State refuses outright to 
comply with provisional measures because of domestic concerns or a generally negative attitude 
towards international supervision.  
3.4.5.2 DOMESTIC CONCERNS INCLUDING STATE SECURITY AND PUBLIC SAFETY 
In S.I.G. v. the Netherlands (1985) the Netherlands ignored the European Commission’s provi-
sional measures arguing that respecting them would bring the government in conflict with its 
                                                 
293 CIDH Annual Report 1999, Chapter III C.1, §66. 
294 See e.g. CIDH Juan Raúl Garza v. US, 4 April 2001 (adm.), in which the Commission had 
already issued a Report on the merits. He has been executed on 19 June 2001. See CIDH Annual 
Report 2000, §48.  
295 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, 20 March 2007, as quoted by the IACHR Las 
Penitentiarias de Mendoza (Argentina), President’s Order of 22 August 2007 (maintaining the 
existing provisional measures, but refusing to amplify them), 13th ‘Considering’ clause. 
296 IACHR Las Penitentiarias de Mendoza (Argentina), 11th ‘Considering’ clause, as quoted by the 
Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación, 20 March 2007, as quoted by the IACHR Las 
Penitentiarias de Mendoza (Argentina), President’s Order of 22 August 2007 (maintaining the 
existing provisional measures, but refusing to amplify them), 13th ‘Considering’ clause. See also 
Article 27 VCLT. 
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domestic legislation. There was some follow-up by the Commission in that it reminded the Dutch 
Government of its established practice with regard to provisional measures.297 
In the ‘immigration context’ provisional measures raised ‘some particular difficulties’ in 
which occasionally other (non legal) considerations may take precedence.298 Canada often refers 
to its obligations under domestic law.299  
                                                 
297 EComHR S.I.G. v. the Netherlands, 10 October 1985 (inadm.). See also EComHR S. v. the 
Netherlands, 5 March 1984 (inadm.) where the Dutch government refused to comply with the 
Commission’s provisional measures. In practice it did not expel the petitioner pending the 
proceedings in Strasbourg, but the attitude displayed remains puzzling. The State argued, among 
others, that there had not been a prima facie violation of the ECHR. It argued it had a policy 
freedom to decide in which cases to comply and referred to the text of the Rule on provisional 
measures, which uses the verb: ‘may indicate’. A Dutch court also concluded that the 
Netherlands was not obliged to comply: President of the Court in Rotterdam in summary 
proceedings, 2-4-1984, KG 118. See e.g. the critical comments by Zwart (1985), pp. 65-71. 
298 See HRC Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §5.3. The State ‘fully supported the important role 
mandated to the Committee and would always do its utmost to cooperate with the Committee’. It 
stated that ‘it took its obligations under the Optional Protocol very seriously and that it was in full 
compliance with them’. Noting that ‘alongside its human rights obligations it also has a duty to 
protect the safety of the Canadian public and to ensure that it does not become a safe haven for 
terrorists’ (§5.2), it considered that requests for provisional measures are ‘recommendatory rather 
than binding’ because neither the ICCPR nor the OP provide for them. It pointed out that it 
nevertheless ‘usually responded favourably’ to requests for provisional measures. It had seriously 
considered the instant request ‘before concluding in the circumstances of the case, including the 
finding (upheld by the courts) that he faced a minimum risk of harm in the event of return, that it 
was unable to delay the deportation’. “The State party pointed out that usually it responds 
favourably to requests its decision to do so was determined to be legal and consistent with the 
Charter up to the highest judicial level”. See §5.3. A word (or several words) seems to be 
missing in this sentence. It is not clear, moreover, whether it considered the procedure under the 
OP the ‘highest judicial level’. It referred to its constitutional obligations under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms rather than to its international obligations. In the ‘immigration 
context’ provisional measures raised ‘some particular difficulties’ in which occasionally other 
(non legal) considerations may take precedence. However, this ‘should not be construed as a 
diminution of the State party’s commitment to human rights or the Committee’, §5.3. 
Interestingly, given the fact that it was its decision to return the petitioner contrary to the 
Committee’s provisional measures, Canada argued with regard to the Committee’s request to 
monitor his treatment in Iran that it had ‘no jurisdiction’ over him and ‘was being asked to 
monitor the situation of a national of another State party on that State party’s territory'. 
Nevertheless, ‘in a good faith desire to cooperate with the Committee’ it stated that Iranian 
authorities had advised it on 2 October 2002 that Ahani ‘remained in Iran and was well’, §5.4. It 
added that a representative of the Iranian embassy had contacted it at the end of September of that 
year informing it that the petitioner had called to enquire about three pieces of luggage he had left 
at the detention centre. According to the State this showed that he did not fear the Iranian 
government and that the latter was willing to assist him. It also noted that the petitioner visited 
the Canadian embassy in Iran in October 2002. He did not raise ill treatment issues, but only 
noted he had difficulty to obtain employment. Canada stated that it had indicated to Iran that it 
expected it to comply fully with its international human rights obligations. See §5.4. Almost a 
year later counsel for the petitioner pointed out that she had initially considered that the petitioner 
had been arrested upon arrival, but not mistreated and subsequently had been released. Later, 
however, she had repeatedly attempted to call his family and was told that ‘he was at another 
location and/or that he was sick’. She also pointed out that Canadian officials had reported no 
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Some States have argued that the HRC should consider State security and public policy before it 
would impose constraints on State parties. Yet these considerations may not determine whether or 
not there has been a violation of the Covenant. It is only in the context of permissible restrictions 
that these considerations could play a role. Similar to many other countries in Canada the Minister 
has a broad discretion in deciding whether or not to extradite someone and under which conditi-
ons. The Extradition Treaty between Canada and the US does provide for the possibility of 
seeking assurances against the death penalty, but in practice the Minister did not consider it ne-
cessary to routinely seek assurances in every case in which the death penalty was an issue.  
In Kindler (1993) Canada submitted on the merits that it shared a 4,800 kilometre un-
guarded border with the US and that there had been a steadily increasing number of extradition 
requests from the US. In 1980 there were 29 such requests and by 1992 there were 83.300 Canada 
did not specify how many of these involved death penalty cases, but it explained it chose not to 
seek assurances against the death penalty on a routine basis because it did not wish to become a 
haven for the most wanted and dangerous criminals from the US. In Ng v. Canada (1993) counsel 
for the petitioner pointed out that the increase in extradition requests related to tax offences and 
other reasons unrelated to dangerous criminals.301 The State respected the provisional measures in 
                                                                                                                       
contacts since fall 2002 and neither had Amnesty International been able to obtain further 
information. See §6.1. 
299 Weiser (2004) argues that ‘current judicial approaches do not give full and consistent credence to 
international obligations undertaken by Canada, nor do they offer sufficient guidance on the 
effect of international human rights treaties on domestic laws’. (p. 114) ‘There appears to be no 
presumption of conformity’ with regard to international obligations unless the court is faced with 
‘legislation enacted specifically in furtherance of a treaty’. She refers to the statement of the 
Supreme Court in Suresh that ‘our concern is not with Canada’s international obligations qua 
obligations’. The court simply looks at international law as evidence of Canada’s principles of 
fundamental justice rather than ‘as controlling in itself’, p. 133. She offers explanations for 
Canada’s attitude towards international legal obligations. There are few countries, she notes, 
facing ‘as many constitutional obstacles as Canada to the successful integration of domestic and 
international law’. Apart from the role of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
fact that treaties are not considered self-executing she refers to the fact that treaty ratification is 
an executive act and ‘the extent of Parliamentary scrutiny in the process of treaty adherence is 
limited’, p. 122. The assessment and considerations on which a decision to ratify is based 
‘remains an internal document and so, non-governmental actors (including courts) face obvious 
difficulties in trying to identify the international obligations underlying a particular domestic 
law’. Subsequently there is ‘no systematic review’ either ‘of new legislation for consistency with 
treaty obligations’, pp. 127-128. She points out that recently ‘other countries with Westminster-
style Governments have taken steps to rectify similar situations’, p. 123. In practice federalism is 
another obstacle. She points out that ‘while the federal Executive alone is empowered to enter 
into international treaties, it has no power to implement them in areas of provincial jurisdiction’. 
By contrast, in other federal States ‘such as Australia, the federal government retains residual 
power to legislate a furtherance of a treaty, even where the subject matter typically falls outside 
federal jurisdiction’, p. 124. 
300 In HRC Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993 and Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994, the State 
referred to 88 cases by 1992. 
301 Canada and the US had amended the terms of their bilateral treaty in 1991, making taxation 
offences extraditable and removing ambiguities about the rules of double jeopardy and 
reciprocity. The increase in extradition requests, she noted, could well be attributable to these 
amendments. She submitted that at the time of her client’s surrender, the applicable article in the 
treaty had been in place for fifteen years. During this time the Minister of Justice had only made 
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Cox v. Canada (1994), the third extradition case, but in all three cases Canada put forward argu-
ments against extradition with assurances. It considered that only if it had summarily or arbitrarily 
taken its decision to extradite without assurances the extradition would violate the petitioner’s 
rights. The Committee took specific note of the reasons advanced by the minister of justice, ‘in 
particular, the absence of exceptional circumstances, the availability of due process and of appeal 
against conviction, and the importance of not providing a safe-haven for those accused of mur-
der’.302  
                                                                                                                       
three decisions on whether or not to ask for assurances that the death penalty would not be 
imposed or executed. 
302 HRC Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993 §15.5-15.6. In both Kindler and Ng the State party 
referred to the United Nations Model Treaty on Extradition, arguing that this treaty allowed for 
discretion in obtaining assurances against the death penalty. This argument does not convince. 
The model treaty on extradition, like the bilateral treaty between the US and Canada, is not a 
human rights treaty and does not aim to be one. It simply provides the option to obtain assurances 
in order to help solve possible conflicts of participating States’ obligations under human rights 
treaties. In other words, the extradition treaty may provide for discretion, allowing a State to 
obtain assurances, while that State’s human rights obligations oblige the State to make use of this 
possibility. In this respect counsel pointed out that ‘it is very significant that the existence of the 
discretion embodied in article 6, in relation to the death penalty, enables the contracting parties to 
honour both their own domestic constitutions and their international obligations without violating 
their obligations under the bilateral Extradition Treaty’. See e.g. Ng v. Canada, 5 November 
1993, §11.2. Although unrelated to its task under the OP or the Covenant, in its decision on the 
merits the HRC added an observation on Canada’s obligations under treaties other than the 
ICCPR, noting that abolition of the death penalty did not release Canada from its obligations 
under extradition treaties. It considered that only if the decision to extradite without any 
assurances would have been taken arbitrarily or summarily it would have violated its obligations 
under Article 6 ICCPR. See e.g. Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994. Counsel stressed that 
Pennsylvania had stated in its extradition application that it was seeking the death penalty. The 
HRC observed once more that the domestic abolition of capital punishment did not release 
Canada of its obligations under the extradition treaties. “However, it is in principle to be expected 
that, when exercising a permitted discretion under an extradition treaty (namely, whether or not 
to seek assurances that capital punishment will not be imposed) a State which has itself 
abandoned capital punishment would give serious consideration to its own chosen policy in 
making its decision. The Committee observes, however, that the State party has indicated that the 
possibility to seek assurances would normally be exercised where exceptional circumstances 
existed. Careful consideration was given to this possibility. The Committee notes the reasons 
given by Canada not to seek assurances in Mr. Cox’s case, in particular, the absence of 
exceptional circumstances, the availability of due process in the State of Pennsylvania, and the 
importance of not providing a safe haven for those accused of or found guilty of murder”. See 
§16.4. See also Kindler v. Canada, §14.5 and Ng v. Canada, §15.5 (in this case the phrasing was 
slightly different: ‘However, it should be expected that’). In the three cases the HRC considered 
that Canada’s decision was not taken arbitrarily or summarily. In other words, while pointing out 
that States must be ‘mindful of the possibilities for the protection of life when exercising their 
discretion in the application of extradition treaties’, the HRC left a wide margin of discretion to 
the State. This remark is particularly striking firstly because it seems that in this case the HRC 
takes the approach that the question whether or not there is a violation depends on whether there 
are conflicting treaty obligations. Secondly, these obligations are not really conflicting because 
the applicable extradition treaty explicitly provides for the possibility to request assurances. A 
reason for this approach may be the ambiguity within the Committee about the interpretation of 
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In a case before its own Supreme Court, ten years after the Committee’s decision in Kindler 
and Ng, but before its reversal of these cases, the Canadian government argued once more that if 
it would seek assurances and the US would refuse these it could face the possibility that the re-
spondent might avoid a trial altogether. The Supreme Court replied with the question why the US 
would prefer not to try them at all if the death penalty could not be imposed. It also noted that in 
cases where assurances against the death penalty had been asked of the US (by Mexico, by Euro-
pean states and twice by Canada) the US had indeed given them.303 In this domestic case Canada 
emphasised once more the need to ensure that Canada would not become a ‘safe haven’ for dan-
gerous fugitives. However, the Supreme Court argued that there was no evidence that extradition 
to face life imprisonment without release or parole provided a lesser deterrent to those seeking a 
‘safe haven’ than did the death penalty. “Elimination of a ‘safe haven’ depends on vigorous law 
enforcement rather than on infliction of the death penalty by a foreign State after the fugitive has 
been removed from this country”.304 This domestic law case, decided ten years after the extradi-
tions of Kindler, Ng and Cox, changed Canada’s attitude, at least domestically. In a unanimous 
decision issued in February 2001 the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that Canadian authorities 
must seek and obtain assurances against the death penalty to States that still impose it. In all but 
exceptional circumstances this obligation outweighs all other considerations. The decision turns 
on the increasing awareness of the possibility of error in criminal cases, making the death penalty 
unacceptable since it is irrevocable. While this new attitude has no direct bearing on the HRC’s 
provisional measures, the Supreme Court of Canada addressed several issues the State had 
brought up in its arguments before the HRC ten years earlier.  
The Court states that it must determine what constitutes the applicable principles of funda-
mental justice in the extradition context. These principles are derived from “the basic tenets of our 
legal system”.305 It noted that its appreciation of the applicable principles of fundamental justice 
may have changed since 1991.306 Its concern about wrongful convictions was probably the most 
important factor in the Court’s change of heart.307 The recent developments originating in the 
                                                                                                                       
the obligations under Article 6 for States that have abolished the death penalty. The HRC 
reversed its case law in 2003. See Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003.  
303 Supreme Court of Canada United States v. Burns, 15 February 2001. 
304 Id. 
305 The question before the Supreme Court was whether ministerial discretion in extradition cases 
might go so far that it would infringe on the rights and freedoms in the Canadian Constitution. 
“Although it is generally for the Minister, not the court, to assess the weight of competing 
considerations in extradition policy, the availability of the death penalty opens up a different 
dimension. Death penalty cases are uniquely bound up with basic constitutional values and the 
Court is the guardian of the Constitution”. 
306 “While these basic tenets have not changed since 1991 when Kindler and Ng were decided, their 
application 10 years later must take note of factual developments in Canada and in relevant 
foreign jurisdictions”. 
307 The Court stated: “The accelerating concern about potential wrongful convictions is a factor of 
increased weight since Kindler and Ng were decided. The avoidance of conviction and 
punishment of the innocent has long been in the forefront of ‘the basic tenets of our legal 
system’. The recent and continuing disclosures of wrongful convictions for murder in Canada and 
the United States provide tragic testimony to the fallibility of the legal system, despite its 
elaborate safeguards for the protection of the innocent. This history weighs powerfully in the 
balance against extradition without assurances when fugitives are sought to be tried for murder 
by a retentionist state, however similar in other respects to our own legal system”. The Court 
devoted several paragraphs on a discussion of wrongful convictions cases in Canada, the US and 
the UK (§§96-117) and concluded that there was an inherent risk of judicial error in the Anglo-
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United States itself, bringing to light so many wrongful convictions, contributed to convince the 
Supreme Court of Canada that legal systems cannot be infallible, that mistakes are bound to be 
made even in the best systems with the best lawyers and judges. Apart from this, its arguments 
included the following: 
“It is final. It is irreversible. Its imposition has been described as arbitrary. Its deterrent value 
has been doubted. Its implementation necessarily causes psychological and physical suffering. It 
has been rejected by the Canadian Parliament for offences committed within Canada. Its 
potential imposition in this case is thus a factor that weighs against extradition without 
assurances”. 
The Canadian Supreme Court does not seem to have been influenced by the HRC case law, but 
rather by developments in the US itself and by international developments in general.308 
In T.P.S. v. Canada (2000) the State submitted that ‘the examination of possible irreparable 
harm should be a rigorous one, particularly when the individual concerned was found to represent 
a danger to the public or, as in the author’s case, whose continued presence in the State was de-
termined to be contrary to the public interest’.309 It then submitted that the authorities had con-
cluded that the risk was minimal ‘on the basis of the documentary evidence submitted by the 
author as well as their own evidence regarding the author’s risk upon removal to India’. Finally, it 
mentioned that a judge of the Federal Court Trial Division had determined that the risk to the 
author was not sufficient to justify a stay of his removal.310 It is not clear whether this judge was 
aware of the involvement of CAT and its provisional measures.  
With regard to the State’s policy argument based on the obligation under the post-
September 11th Security Council resolution, in his dissent to the domestic Ahani case Justice 
Rosenberg pointed out that Canada was ‘not harbouring terrorists or setting itself up as a haven 
for terrorists’. If Canada would nevertheless be concerned that the OP would be used ‘as a vehicle 
to shield terrorists’ it could denounce it. “It did not have to ratify the Protocol and many nations, 
such as the United States of America and the United Kingdom, have not done so”.311 He found it 
‘difficult to accept that the federal government ratified the treaty because it knew it could not be 
made to comply with its binding obligations’. “This would undermine the good faith obligation 
inherent in ratifying treaties”. He noted the statements by the government of Canada in 1976 
announcing it would ratify the ICCPR and the OP: ‘our becoming party to these extremely impor-
tant human rights instruments will enable us to play a more active role internationally in the hu-
man rights field and will moreover strengthen our credibility in urging other states also to become 
parties and to implement their provisions’.312 Another official government statement he referred 
to was that Canada ‘accepts the authority of the UN Human Rights Committee to hear com-
                                                                                                                       
American system. This discussion included a summary of recent concerns raised within the USA 
(§§104-111). This inherent risk was clearly an important argument for the Court to change its 
views. 
308 In turn the HRC’s reversal of Kindler and Ng does appear to be influenced by Burns, see Judge v. 
Canada, 5 August 2003. 
309 CAT T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000, §8.3. Also referring to the ‘danger to the public’ argument 
see the State in CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §8.10. 
310 CAT T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000, §8.3. 
311 Ontario Court of Appeal, Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, dissenting opinion of Rosenberg, 
§101. 
312 Statement by Hon. Allan J. MacEachen (Secretary of State for External Affairs) to the House of 
Commons, 18 May 1976, as quoted by Rosenberg, §103 in Ontario Court of Appeal, Ahani v. 
Canada, 8 February 2002, dissenting opinion of Rosenberg. See also Harrington (2003), p. 56. 
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plaints’ under the OP and that Canada’s human rights undertakings strengthen its ‘reputation as a 
guarantor of its citizens’ rights and enhance our credentials to urge other governments to respect 
international standards’.313  
Responding to the argument that ‘the Committee, which is chronically under funded, can 
take years to reach a decision’, he considered that the right of access to the HRC was ‘not abso-
lute and the appellant may not have an unconditional right to stay in Canada indefinitely’.314 He 
‘would not foreclose the possibility that the government might be able to show that the Commit-
tee process will result in such an intolerable delay that the balance of convenience favours depor-
tation’.315 “I would think, however, that would be an unusual case. Here the domestic procedures 
have occupied over eight years and the appellant has remained in custody throughout. Canada can 
hardly complain about some delay at the Committee level when it is a condition of invoking that 
jurisdiction that all domestic remedies have been exhausted”.316 He remarked, furthermore, that 
the principle of fundamental justice that the right of access to the HRC includes a stay of expul-
sion ‘may only be enforced in cases where the individual’s life, liberty or security of the person 
interests are implicated, as in the case of a Convention refugee’. “The right to pursue the interna-
tional remedy is not a means for delaying deportation in less serious cases”.317  
The domestic court clearly confuses legal status and enforcement. The ICJ itself explained 
that those are two different matters when it noted ‘the fact that the court does not itself have the 
means to ensure the execution of orders (...) is not an argument against the binding nature of such 
orders’.318 While the domestic court referred to ‘case law’ to support its view that provisional 
                                                 
313 See Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, dissenting opinion of 
Rosenberg, §103, quoting from Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy, at a government 
internet address that is not accessible anymore. Presently the government provides information 
entitled ‘Canada’s Commitment to Human Rights’, last updated 9 April 2003, at <www.dfait-
maeci.gc.ca/foreign_policy/human-rights/hr3-commit-en.asp> (consulted on 3 August 2004). On 
this page it states that it takes its international human rights obligations seriously, that it accepts 
the authority of the UN treaty monitoring Committees to hear complaints ‘from Canadian 
citizens’ (this is imprecise because it has recognised this right for ‘individuals subject to its 
jurisdiction’) under the OP and the Convention against Torture. “These international mechanisms 
provide an independent perspective on the state of human rights in Canada, and allow the 
Canadian government to review laws or policies which may be in conflict with international 
obligations. This willingness to accept independent, constructive criticism is critical to Canada’s 
credibility, both domestically and internationally. Canada holds itself to the same standard it 
expects from other countries”. 
314 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, dissenting opinion of Rosenberg, 
§§105 and 106. 
315 The reference to ‘balance of convenience’ is derived from the domestic test for granting an 
interlocutory injunction. “That test requires the court first to make a preliminary assessment of 
the merits of the case to ensure that there is a serious question to be tried. Secondly, the court 
must determine whether the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the application were 
refused. Finally, an assessment must be made as to which of the parties would suffer greater harm 
from the granting or refusal of the remedy pending a decision on the merits”. Ontario Court of 
Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, dissenting opinion of Rosenberg, §107, referring to 
RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General) (1994), 111 D.L.R. (4th) 385 (S.C.C.), at 400. 
316 Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, dissenting opinion of Rosenberg, 
§110. 
317 Apart from this, he considered that there could be cases in which the balance of convenience 
would favour removal ‘as where the applicant poses an unacceptable risk to public security even 
where, as in this case, he or she is being held in custody’, Rosenberg dissent, §109. 
318 See ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), 27 June 2001, §107. 
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measures are not binding, it did not specify this case law, let alone refer to the Committee’s con-
sistent decisions actually emphasising the legal obligation to respect provisional measures.319 
Harrington points out that in light of the Committee’s strong statements in previous cases on the 
seriousness of ignoring its provisional measures and given ‘the ready availability of this informa-
tion on the internet’, it was ‘disturbing’ that the domestic court did not mention this line of juris-
prudence and even ‘more disturbing that Canada continues to simply decline to abide by a rule 86 
request rather than, at a minimum, making an application to have the request withdrawn’. “It is 
also disturbing that Canada routinely accepts the Committee’s rules of procedure on relatively 
minor issues, such as the form and due date for its submissions, but disregards the procedures 
developed by the Committee for the preservation of an individual’s life or physical integrity”.320 
The domestic court took the baffling position that ‘the international community has agreed 
to binding obligations in other treaties’, but ‘in the Covenant and the Protocol, it made a policy 
decision to do otherwise’.321 Mystifying is also the Court’s statement that ‘both the European 
Court of Human Rights and the Privy Council have acknowledged that the Committee’s views are 
not binding or enforceable’. It referred to the European Court’s judgment in Cruz Varas, dealing 
with the provisional measures in the European system. Obviously the ECtHR would have no 
competence to pronounce itself on the legal status of the Committee’s Views. Thus, the domestic 
court must have had the intention to draw an analogy between the European system and the sys-
tem under the OP. In that context it is significant that the ECtHR has since determined that its 
provisional measures to halt refoulement are legally binding, confirming the approach taken by 
the HRC and the Committee against Torture.322 
The domestic court seems to have a rather limited conception of the function of the judici-
ary in the context of international obligations. Apparently it thought that compliance with interna-
tional treaties was a political rather than a legal matter. Also the ‘political question’ doctrine does 
not necessarily mean that such compliance is not a legal matter. The decision to declare provi-
sional measures non-binding appears to be based on the conviction that it is a legal matter. 
It is exactly in times of ‘real or perceived threat’ that the ‘responsibility of the judiciary to 
protect human rights comes under special scrutiny’.323 It does not seem, however, that the domes-
tic courts considered they had such a responsibility in Ahani. The Court also failed to mention 
CAT’s response to Canada’s non-compliance in T.P.S. v. Canada.324 It places undue deference to 
                                                 
319 See also Harrington (2003), pp. 83-84. The court also referred to an incorrect observation in the 
introduction to the Committee’s earlier volumes of Selected Decisions. This introduction does not 
comport with the approach of the HRC itself. In any case an introduction to a bound volume of 
the Committee’s Selected Decisions is not nearly as authoritative as the Committee’s Views, 
Concluding Observations and other official public statements. 
320 Harrington (2003), p. 72, pp. 83-84. 
321 See Ontario Court of Appeal Ahani v. Canada, 8 February 2002, §37. 
322 ECtHR (first section) Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, 2 February 2003 and Grand 
Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, discussed in Chapter XVI 
(Legal status). Similarly the US tried to base its argument of the non-binding character of the 
Inter-American Commission’s precautionary measures on the 1991 Cruz Varas judgment by the 
ECtHR, see Digest of the US practice in international law 2002, Chapter 6, no. 21. ‘U.S. 
Additional Response to the request for precautionary measures’, 15 July 2002, 
<http://www.state.gov/s/l/38642.htm> (consulted 8 January 2009). 
323 See Macklin (2002), p. 15, discussing the domestic Ahani and Suresh cases. 
324 See CAT T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000. See also Harrington (2003), pp. 85-86. 
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the executive and starts from the remarkable assumption that the ICCPR and the OP, international 
treaties ratified by Canada, are not binding.325  
In his case the length of proceedings was mainly due to the domestic proceedings. Ahani 
had been in detention fighting his expulsion since June 1993. Only in 2002, upon exhaustion of 
domestic remedies, he petitioned the HRC.326 
Harrington concludes that the Ahani decision by the Ontario Court of Appeal was ‘a most 
regrettable and undesirable precedent and one that runs counter to the very principles and spirit of 
international dispute settlement, a phenomenon that now extends beyond interstate disputes to 
include those between states and individuals where a State has given its consent’.  
“By allowing Canada to disregard requests for interim measures from a body such as the 
Human Rights Committee, the Ontario Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Canada have, 
in essence, gutted the right of individual petition of all utility, since any subsequent finding of a 
violation will be impossible to remedy with the individual outside Canada’s jurisdiction”.327 
France has also justified ignoring provisional measures by CAT because a petitioner was a 
‘demonstrably dangerous common criminal’ who ‘presented a particularly disproportionate risk to 
public order and the safety of third parties’.328 CAT itself emphasised that in non-refoulement 
cases the balancing with the general interest, preferred by many States, is not allowed. In Adel 
Tebourski v. France (2007) CAT noted that ‘article 3 of the Convention offers absolute protection 
to anyone in the territory of a State party which has made the declaration under article 22. Once 
this person alludes to a risk of torture under the conditions laid down in article 3, the State party 
can no longer cite domestic concerns as grounds for failing in its obligation under the Convention 
to guarantee protection to anyone in its jurisdiction who fears that he is in serious danger of being 
tortured if he is returned to another country’.329 It noted that ‘even if the Committee takes into 
consideration all the comments which the State party has submitted on this communication, the 
declaration made by the State party under article 22 confers on the Committee alone the power to 
assess whether the danger invoked is serious or not. The Committee takes into account the State 
party's assessment of the facts and evidence, but it is the Committee that must ultimately decide 
whether there is a risk of torture’.330 
                                                 
325 Harrington points out that the ‘lack of a world policeman does not make a treaty any less binding 
on a state that has voluntarily agreed to become a party through ratification or accession’. In this 
context she expresses concern about the domestic court’s obviously incorrect ‘appreciation of the 
very nature of international law’. Harrington (2003), p. 83. She adds that the responses by the 
HRC and the CAT to the State’s non-compliance show that the two international adjudicators do 
not recognize exceptions in the context of terrorism. The wish to deport suspected terrorists ‘does 
not justify downgrading long-standing treaty law commitments in the field of human rights to 
ineffective exhortations’, Harrington (2003), p. 86. 
326 In January and May 2002 the HRC used provisional measures. Canada nevertheless deported 
Ahani in June 2002. The Committee published its View in March 2004. Mansour Ahani v. 
Canada, 29 March 2004. 
327 Harrington (2003), p. 86. 
328 CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §8.10. 
329 CAT Adel Tebourski v. France, 1 May 2007, §8.3. Obviously this response equally indicates the 
follow up by CAT, see also Chapter XVIII. 
330 CAT Adel Tebourski v. France, 1 May 2007, §8.3. 
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3.4.5.3 GENERALLY NEGATIVE ATTITUDE TOWARDS INTERNATIONAL SUPERVI-
SION 
3.4.5.3.1 Introduction 
In the interest of easing domestic or international pressures a State may respond to provisional 
measures in a hostile fashion, indifferently or, on the other hand, in a cooperative manner. The 
role of the media and public opinion may be manifested both ways. It may result in public sham-
ing of the State, triggering compliance, or in pressure on the State not to implement provisional 
measures. The latter may occur in the context of the death penalty and certain asylum cases. In 
such cases States domestic public opinion often is considered much more important than interna-
tional public opinion. States may then have a negative attitude towards international supervision, 
which is also reflected in their response to provisional measures.  
In February 2002 the Inter-American Commission used precautionary measures calling on 
the US to stay the execution of British citizen Mr. Housel, scheduled to be executed in Georgia on 
12 March 2002.331 He was executed as scheduled. An indication of the intransigent attitude of the 
State with regard to this subject matter is the fact that this was done despite involvement not just 
by the Inter-American Commission, but also by the U.K. government, the European Union and 
the Council of Europe, which had all appealed for clemency.332 This subsection provides some 
other examples in this respect. 
3.4.5.3.2 ‘No foreign meddling with judicial orders or lawfully imposed sen-
tences’ 
In its Order of May 1999 the Inter-American Court referred to a note of Trinidad and Tobago of 
September 1998. In this note Trinidad asserted that ‘the Court does not have jurisdiction (…) to 
take any steps or decide upon any measures that will frustrate the implementation of a lawfully 
imposed sentence of death in Trinidad and Tobago’. Trinidad also declared that it would not ‘be 
consulting with the Commission or the Court any further in these matters’.333 
After extraditing a petitioner on whose behalf the HRC had used provisional measures Aus-
tria noted that its reason for disrespecting the provisional measures and extraditing the petitioner 
was that a lower court had blocked the State’s compliance. It noted that the Federal Minister of 
Justice had ordered the Public Prosecutor’s Office in Vienna ‘to file a request with the investigat-
ing judge of the Vienna Regional Criminal Court seeking suspension of the extradition’. How-
ever, ‘the Court refused to comply with this request, on the basis that Rule 86 of the Committee’s 
                                                 
331 Amnesty International, Urgent Action, 4 March 2002, AI Index: AMR 51/043/2002. 
332 Amnesty International, further information on EXTRA 18/02(AMR 51/043/2002, 4 March 2002), 
AI Index: AMR 51/046/2002, 13 March 2002. See the urgent humanitarian appeal sent on 4 
March 2002 by Spain as the current president of the EU together with Denmark, its subsequent 
president and the European Commission on behalf of the EU to both the Governor of Georgia 
and to the Chairman of the Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. See also the statement of 
Walter Schwimmer, the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, condemning the decision to 
refuse clemency in this case, press statement of 12 March 2002, 131a (2002) and the statement of 
the President of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe of 13 March 2002, 137a 
(2002). 
333 IACHR James et al. case, Order of 25 May 1999. 
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Rules of Procedure may neither invalidate judicial orders nor restrict the jurisdiction of an inde-
pendent domestic Court’.334  
3.4.5.3.3 ‘We don’t need outsiders’ 
After the execution of three petitioners and beneficiaries of the Committee's provisional measures 
one State party had argued that it was ‘highly inappropriate’ for counsel to petition the HRC after 
they had applied for presidential clemency and this application had been rejected.335 In response 
the HRC expressed ‘grave concern about the State party’s explanation for its action’ and pointed 
out:  
“There is nothing in the Optional Protocol that restricts the right of an alleged victim of a 
violation of his or her right under the Covenant from submitting the communication after a 
request for clemency or pardon has been rejected, and the State party may not unilaterally 
impose such a condition that limits both the competence of the Committee and the right of 
alleged victims to submit communications”.336 
3.4.5.3.4 ‘Our own system of protection suffices’ 
States often consider that domestic courts can do the job. In Weiss v. Austria (2003) the State 
emphasised ‘the extensive consideration’ of the petitioner’s case by the Austrian courts and the 
ECtHR, implying that there was no need for the HRC to examine a case like this.337  
They have also justified ignoring provisional measures by stating that the allegations of the 
asylum seeker were ‘not credible’. Mansi had claimed that his expulsion to Jordan involved a risk 
that ‘he would be detained and tortured in the way he has been tortured before’. Upon his expul-
sion he also claimed a violation of Articles 1 and 25 (current Article 34) ECHR by Sweden for 
deporting him despite the provisional measures. The State had submitted that the petitioner had 
‘changed his story several times’. It considered that his allegations, pending the domestic pro-
ceedings in Sweden, that he had suffered torture in Jordan were not credible. Only at a late stage 
he had mentioned anything about torture. “At the time of the expulsion the Government had 
available relevant and reliable information about the current situation in Jordan. There was no 
reason to believe that the applicant would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 of the 
Convention in Jordan”.338 The Commission examined the question whether, ‘at the time of the 
expulsion, there existed substantial grounds for believing that he faced a real risk of being treated 
contrary to Article 3 of the Convention in Jordan’. At the stage of admissibility it had carried out 
a preliminary examination of the issue. It considered that it raised ‘questions of fact and law 
which are of such a complex nature that their determination should depend on an examination of 
the merits’.339 Mansi was returned to Jordan contrary to the Commission’s provisional measures. 
                                                 
334 See HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §5.2. 
335 HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by Alexander 
Padilla and Ricardo III Sunga) v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000, §§3.1 and 5.3. 
336 Id., §5.3. Additionally, the HRC noted that the State party had not shown that the course of 
justice would have been obstructed by acceding to its request for provisional measures.  
337 See HRC Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §5.3. 
338 EComHR Mansi v. Sweden, 7 December 1989, §1. 
339 Ibid. 
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There he was subjected to ill treatment upon his return to Jordan, and subsequently needed treat-
ment at the Danish torture rehabilitation centre. The case was closed with a friendly settlement.340 
In 2000 the Philippines ignored provisional measures by the HRC to halt an execution be-
cause it considered that the beneficiaries of the Committee's provisional measures had received a 
fair trial.341 
During 1997 alone the Inter-American Commission granted precautionary measures in four-
teen death penalty cases with regard to Trinidad and Tobago.342 In the case of Mr. Ross the 
Commission received the following response: ‘(t)his petition duplicates the petition to the Judicial 
Committee of the Privy Council, and the petitioner seeks to use the Commission as a fourth level 
of appeal, which is not its function’.343 In the case of Mr. Thomas Trinidad and Tobago likewise 
responded that ‘(t)he petitioner is attempting to use the Commission as a fourth level of appeal’ 
and it added that this is ‘only permissible if there has been some denial of justice’. It argued that 
this could not be the case: ‘(t)his matter has been presented to the Privy Council, which rejected 
the appeal. As a result, it is unthinkable that justice was denied’.344  
The response of Trinidad and Tobago has often been rather blunt: ‘There was no denial of 
justice and Mr. Denny Baptiste was not treated in a cruel and inhuman manner. In addition, legal 
assistance is available to the poor’.345  
In its first submission to the Inter-American Court to apply for provisional measures to halt 
the execution of persons, the Commission pointed out that it had adopted its own precautionary 
measures, but that Trinidad did not respond. Later, Trinidad alleged that the Commission did not 
have jurisdiction ‘either by its acts or omissions to prevent in any way a sentence, authorized by 
the Constitution and laws of Trinidad and Tobago and pronounced by a Court of competent juris-
diction, from being carried into effect’. It declared that it was ‘at liberty to carry out the death 
sentences according to its domestic laws’.346 The State’s attitude towards the Commission’s deci-
sions was that Article 41 only empowered the Commission to make recommendations. This 
meant that the Commission could not overturn judgments of domestic courts.347  
3.4.5.3.5 ‘Dangerous international law’ 
Tensions flared up as views on the government policy on detention of immigrants, both pro and 
contra, were expressed in the press. This was especially so in the context of discussions in the 
press on the detention of children in Australia. The Bakhtiyari case was often taken as an 
example. Commenting on the Family Court decision in April 2002 to hear the case of the two 
Bakhtiyari boys in September, one newspaper qualified this as ‘a skewed interpretation of the 
law’. This is an example of one section of public opinion in Australia. It noted:  
                                                 
340 EComHR Mansi v. Sweden, 9 March 1990 (Friendly settlement). 
341 HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by Alexander 
Padilla and Ricardo III Sunga) v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000. 
342 See CIDH Annual Report 1997, Chapter III (2a), under ‘Trinidad and Tobago’. 
343 The case of Mr. Ross, response of 23 December 1997, ibid. 
344 The case of Mr. Thomas, response of 15 December 1995, ibid. 
345 The cases of Mr. Hilaire and Mr. Baptiste respectively, ibid. 
346 IACHR James, Briggs, Noel, Garcia and Bethel cases, Order of the President for urgent 
measures, 27 May 1998. 
347 For some very critical comments on the general attitude of Trinidad see e.g. IACHR Caesar v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 11 March 2005, individual opinion of Judge Jackman. 
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“As even Nicholson [family court judge, E.R.] noted in his Cape Town address, international 
treaties and conventions don’t hold much sway under Australian domestic law. That, of course, 
has not stopped him and other activist judges from relying on so-called international law in their 
ideologically driven attempts to seek justice – a short hand word for what the law should be 
according to them. It’s easy. These conventions are couched in generous language. Like a 
horoscope they can mean just about whatever you want them to mean. And so, as law professor 
Pat Lane said recently, ‘the commonwealth Government’s innumerable international assurances 
lie in ambush’, waiting to overturn the decisions of domestic democratic bodies”.348 
3.4.5.3.6 ‘We decide how our country should be run’ 
In response to international criticism (not just the provisional measures by the HRC, but a range 
of statements and visits by other UN officials)349 of its system of mandatory immigration 
detention, also for children, Australia’s Foreign Minister told the Australian parliament: ‘We do 
not run off to the United Nations asking how Australia should be run,’ and ‘whatever the rights 
and wrongs of these issues, we will decide them for ourselves, not have bureaucrats in Geneva 
decide them for us’.350  
3.4.5.3.7 Conclusion on domestic reasons for non-compliance 
Many interrelated factors play a role. The precise reasoning may be blurred. An argument, for 
instance, that the assessment of risk by domestic courts is better may be based not only on the 
assumption that international adjudicators are more removed from the facts, but also on the fact 
that the domestic court took into account the risk to society in its assessment of the risk to the 
petitioner, while the international adjudicator has pointed out that the international obligation is of 
such nature that it does not allow for balancing.351  
Compliance with provisional measures seems to be more difficult in relation to decisions to 
execute extradition or expulsion orders or even death sentences in a democracy. While the inter-
national adjudicator takes provisional measures considering that the petition has brought a valid 
claim under international law and is facing irreparable harm to life or personal integrity, domestic 
authorities may decide not to comply in order to satisfy and protect the public. The mobilization 
of shame customarily referred to as an important means of enforcement of human rights obliga-
tions does not apply to the same extent in such cases. There may be a belief among many mem-
bers of the public, as reported by the media, that human rights only apply to law-abiding citizens, 
experiencing an urgent need to protect their own safety and not wishing to know exactly how this 
is being done.352 It may also be a partial explanation of the attitudes of Trinidad and Tobago and 
                                                 
348 J. Albrechtsen, ‘Ideology blurs role of judiciary’, The Australian, 21 August 2002, originally 
posted at <www.theaustralian.com.au>. It may still be found at the website of the Richard 
Hillman Foundation, in apparent support of her position, <www.rhfinc.org.au/docs/blurs.pdf> 
(consulted on 4 August 2004). 
349 See Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
350 Michael Millett and Michael Bradley, ‘Criminals better off than asylum seekers’, Sydney 
Morning Herald, 7 June 2002, <www.smh.com.au> (consulted on 9 April 2003). 
351 See also Conclusion Part II and Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
352 For instance, during the first period Fujimori (Peru) was in power he was popular for being tough 
on crime and terrorism.  
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the US.353 In other cases States might comply in order to avoid media attention, but this obviously 
is less often the case with regard to halting executions in democracies with a public opinion 
largely favouring the death penalty or largely suspicious of foreign courts.  
4 CONCLUSION 
A distinction may be made between responses in which the parties (in particular the State) protest 
against the (temporary) outcome of the normative process, on the one hand, and against the de-
velopment of the process as such on the other hand. Explanations for the first type may be derived 
from the system of implementation in domestic law, specific politics, the role of media, domestic 
and international NGOs and other international actors.354 This response may differ depending on 
the type and specificity of the provisional measure.  
Explanations of non-compliance based on the second type, disagreement with the decision-
making process of the adjudicator, may relate to the procedures of the adjudicator in general or to 
specific issues arising in the case, e.g. relating to the principle of audiatur et altera pars or the 
lack of transparency in the decision-making process. 
Non-compliance should not necessarily be attributed to the common law system. Equally, 
non-common law countries such as Austria and Finland have argued that their administrative 
system did not permit them to implement provisional measures because they did not have the 
authority to overrule the decision of a domestic court. This is a problem occurring in both com-
mon and civil law systems. It may be related more to the fact that in many States international law 
is not part of domestic law. Thus, one explanation for non-compliance may be that international 
obligations have not (yet) been incorporated in the domestic system. In addition, compliance may 
also depend on whether it is a federal State, on the role of the media, of public opinion (as per-
ceived) and on the fact that there will be elections soon.  
Apart from the domestic circumstances at the time, some explanatory power for the atti-
tudes of addressee States may lie, for instance, in the perceived authority of the adjudicator 
among the State parties in general or the attitude of that particular State to international adjudica-
tors in general. 
As to the type of provisional measures, what may matter is the controversial nature of the 
particular subject matter, the required measures of protection (positive or negative, general or 
detailed) and whether the provisional measure has been accompanied by some explanation. 
The paucity of consistent information on State responses does not allow for a clear answer 
to the question whether States respond more favourably to provisional measures that aim to pro-
tect those rights that are commonly considered the most fundamental. Yet the fundamental nature 
of some of the rights involved does seem to play a role in the follow up by the adjudicators and 
others, which is discussed in the next chapter. 
As Buergenthal has pointed out: 
“The effectiveness of decisions by international human rights tribunals ordering provisional 
measures depends, in large measure, on their judicious use. They are exceptional measures and 
should be reserved for exceptional and urgent situations. Most of the time that means that they 
should be granted very sparingly. Such orders are likely to be disregarded or not fully complied 
                                                 
353 It has been suggested that the Inter-American Commission and Court sometimes are too keen on 
publicity. In fact an important factor in non-compliance, for instance in relation to Peru and the 
US, is the public’s inborn fear for personal security. Interview by author with Charles Moyer, San 
Jose, Costa Rica 2001. 
354 See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
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with by States if they are permitted to be transformed from an exceptional remedy into one 
more procedural tool to be used against a recalcitrant State. Their effectiveness depends on their 
exceptional character precisely because that is how they preserve their shock value and 
corresponding effect on public opinion. Here it must never be forgotten that, in the final 
analysis, public opinion will determine whether or not the State will comply with the 
decision”.355 
 
                                                 
355 Buergenthal (1994), p. 93. 
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 CHAPTER XVIII 
 FOLLOW-UP ON NON-COMPLIANCE 
1 INTRODUCTION 
In some cases the ICJ has requested follow-up in its initial Orders for provisional measures in-
volving the fate of human beings.1 This chapter gives examples of the manner in which the human 
rights adjudicators have followed up on the implementation of their provisional measures, includ-
ing the possible consequences attached to non-compliance with provisional measures with regard 
to findings on admissibility and merits (section 2). Indeed this follow-up by the adjudicators 
themselves is considered to be a very important factor contributing to the effectiveness of provi-
sional measures: ‘securing a vigilant and active follow-up monitoring process’, it has been noted, 
is an important condition for the effectiveness of urgent action procedures.2  
The public statements made by authorities from various inter-State systems of cooperation 
(section 3), as well as those made by NGOs (section 4) may help reinforce the follow-up activities 
performed by the adjudicators themselves.3 
In addition to indicating a conviction that following up on compliance with provisional 
measures is important to ensure their effectiveness, the practice of the adjudicators, officials of 
intergovernmental organisations and NGOs also indicates their awareness of the irreparable na-
ture of the harm at stake. 
2 FOLLOW-UP BY THE ADJUDICATORS 
2.1 Introduction 
With regard to the developments in monitoring compliance with provisional measures this section 
focuses on the practice of the HRC and the Inter-American Commission and Court. It also gives a 
few examples from the practice of CAT. Further, some references are made to the follow-up on 
provisional measures separate from the individual petition procedure, as part of the state reporting 
procedure (section 2.2). 
With regard to the possible consequences of failure to respect provisional measures for de-
ciding on admissibility a few references are made to HRC case law. For such consequences for 
                                                 
1 See further Chapter I (ICJ), section 7. 
2 Van Boven (2005), p. 106. See also Boerefijn (1999b), pp. 101-112 on the general issue of 
follow-up. 
3 In turn these organisations use the provisional measures decided on by the adjudicators in order 
to reinforce their own goals of preventing irreparable harm to persons. Obviously critical 
domestic follow-up on (intended) non-compliance also occurs. See e.g. questions put by members 
of parliament in the case of J.R. v. the Netherlands, 124/1998, 19 November 1999 (disc.) as well 
as the comment by Rieter/Van Boven/ Flinterman (1999) and letter of the Netherlands Advisory 
Committee for International Affairs of 13 July 1999, as referred to in Böcker (2006), p. 137. 
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decisions on the merits, the ECtHR judgment in Mamatkulov is singled out for discussion (section 
2.3). 
2.2 Monitoring compliance 
2.2.1 Introduction 
This section sets out by explaining the gradual approach to follow-up taken by the HRC. It then 
focuses on its follow-up to its provisional measures to halt executions, on the one hand, and to 
halt expulsion or extradition, on the other. Subsequently it deals with one method of follow-up; 
that of sending reminders. Then follow-up by CAT and ‘seguimiento’ in the Inter-American 
system is discussed, as well as monitoring in the European system and under the Dayton peace 
agreement. Finally this chapter briefly refers to the possibility for adjudicators of using the 
respective State reporting procedures to follow up on provisional measures previously taken 
under the complaint proceedings. 
2.2.2 The gradual approach of the HRC 
The HRC has introduced a Special Rapporteur on Follow Up on Views, which indicates the im-
portance it attaches to follow-up in general.4 Yet since provisional measures apply pending a case 
this Rapporteur does not deal with the follow-up on provisional measures. This is done by the 
Special Rapporteur on New Communications and Interim Measures as well as by the full Com-
mittee. Nevertheless there is a substantive link between the State's obligations at the merits stage 
and at the provisional measures stage.5 For instance, the HRC has sometimes followed up its 
decision on the merits, urgently communicating to the State, in the face of an execution date, that 
at the very least its findings of a violation meant that the death sentence should not be executed. 
There is no consistent policy or practice regarding this type of monitoring or follow-up.  
The practice of the HRC with regard to follow-up in general, and to follow-up on provi-
sional measures in particular, has developed significantly. In the detention cases of the 1970s and 
1980s, in the face of insufficient response, the HRC generally followed up its informal request for 
provisional measures at periodic intervals,6 including as part of its admissibility decision. At that 
stage it sometimes made a stronger request than it had made previously, namely to ensure access 
to medical treatment. At the same time it rewarded any semblance of cooperation by the State by 
referring to it extensively. As a result, in some of these cases, on the merits it did not refer to the 
importance of ensuring medical attention. 
                                                 
4 CAT has equally done so, but CEDAW thus far continues with an ad hoc follow-up procedure. In 
its report on its 7th session the Working group on Communications under the OP to the CEDAW 
recommended to continue with an ad hoc follow-up procedure and refrain, ‘for the time being’ 
from establishing a permanent mechanism, see its report, in Annex IX to the 2006 Annual 
Report, A/61/38, §9(c); see also Report of the Working Group on Communications, 26 February 
2007, in Sessional/Annual Report of Committee CEDAW/C/2007/111/WGCOP/L.1, §8(e), 
appointing, ad hoc, two of its members in order to follow up its View in A.S. v. Hungary (on this 
case see Chapter IX on protection against threats). 
5 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
6 See Chapter II (Systems) and Chapter VII (Detention) on the issue of informal provisional 
measures. 
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Sendic v. Uruguay (1981) serves as an example of follow-up in the context of the early de-
tention cases dealt with by the HRC.7 The State argued, more than two months after the HRC 
used informal provisional measures, that the case was inadmissible because the same matter had 
been submitted to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights. It did not provide any of the 
information requested by the HRC. A week later the petitioner commented on the State’s submis-
sion, stating that she had never submitted her husband’s case to the Inter-American Commission. 
She also informed the HRC of the place of detention of her husband that had become known 
‘thanks to strong international pressure’.8 When it declared the case admissible the HRC pointed 
out the State’s obligation under Article 4(2) OP and decided that it ‘should be requested to furnish 
the Committee with information on the present state of health of Raúl Sendic Antonaccio, the 
medical treatment given to him and his exact whereabouts’. It is noteworthy that the Committee 
again asked about his whereabouts. The petitioner had already provided some information but the 
HRC had never received any response by the State.9 The petitioner also asked the HRC ‘to take 
appropriate action with a view to securing her husband’s right to submit a communication him-
self’.10 In October 1980 she argued once more that her husband had the right to be informed of the 
Committee’s admissibility decision, taken more than two months previously. Later that same 
month the HRC noted that in her first submission the petitioner had expressed ‘grave concern as 
to her husband’s state of health and the fact that his whereabouts were kept secret’. Taking into 
account ‘the fact that its previous requests for information about the present situation of Raúl 
Sendic Antonaccio had gone unheeded’ and further noting the latest letter by the petitioner, the 
HRC decided to formally follow up on the situation. It reminded the State of its previous decision 
requesting ‘information about the state of health of Raúl Sendic Antonaccio, the medical treat-
ment given to him and his exact whereabouts’. It urged the State ‘to provide the information 
sought without any further delay’ and, ‘as requested by Violeta Setelich, the State party should be 
requested to transmit all written material pertaining to the proceedings (submissions of the parties, 
decisions of the Human Rights Committee) to Raúl Sendic Antonaccio, and that he should be 
given the opportunity himself to communicate directly with the Committee’.11  
On the merits the HRC noted ‘with deep concern’ the State’s failure to fulfil its obligations 
under Article 4(2) OP. It also pointed out that Uruguay had ‘completely ignored the Committee’s 
repeated requests’ for information about the health and whereabouts of Mr. Sendic. It is unable to 
fulfil its task if State parties do not provide it with all the relevant information. Knowledge of the 
state of health of the person concerned is ‘essential to the evaluation of an allegation of torture or 
ill-treatment’. In other words, judging from this remark alone, the emphasis of the Committee’s 
request for information seems actually to have been the need for information and not the need for 
intervention.12  
                                                 
7 HRC Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. Uruguay, 28 October 1981. 
8 According to the petitioner, Uruguay ‘had refrained from giving any information on her 
husband’s state of health because he was kept on an inadequate diet in an underground cell with 
no fresh air or sunlight and his contacts with the outside world were restricted to a monthly visit 
that lasted 30 minutes and took place in the presence of armed guards’. 
9 HRC Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. Uruguay, 28 October 1981. 
10 This shows that already in very early cases the petitioners of a communication emphasised the 
autonomy of the actual victim under the individual complaint system. 
11 HRC Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. Uruguay, 28 October 1981. 
12 For an example of follow-up by the HRC in a disappearance case see HRC Tshishimbi v. Zaire, 
25 March 1996. When the HRC declared the case admissible it criticized the lack of cooperation 
on the part of the State and specifically followed up the Special Rapporteur’s provisional 
measures. In its examination of the merits the HRC once more noted ‘with serious concern the 
total absence of cooperation’ by the State party. It referred to the State’s obligations under Article 
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The first time a State ignored the formal provisional measures of the HRC, the Committee 
simply expressed its regret. The case involved halting destruction of the natural habitat. In the 
Lubicon Lake Band case (1990)13 the HRC did not monitor compliance with its provisional meas-
ures other than by sending a renewed request for provisional measures more than a year after it 
first used them. Even if it had eventually recommended a remedy seeking a permanent or interim 
injunction, this would have been too late because it was tardy in using provisional measures in the 
first place and because the State did not appear to respect them once they had been taken. The 
HRC could have monitored compliance more actively.14 
The first non-refoulement case in which a State ignored the Committee’s provisional meas-
ures was Kindler v. Canada (1993). The HRC found no violations of Articles 6 and 7 but it ex-
pressed ‘its regret that the State party did not accede to the Special Rapporteur’s request under 
rule 86’.15 In his dissent Aguilar Urbina specifically commented on the way the petitioner was 
extradited in disregard for the Special Rapporteur’s provisional measures.  
“On ratifying the Optional Protocol, Canada undertook, with the other States Parties, to comply 
with the procedures followed in connection therewith. In extraditing Mr Kindler without taking 
into account the Special Rapporteur’s request, Canada failed to display the good faith which 
ought to prevail among the parties to the Protocol and the Covenant”.16 
It was in this context that he considered there had been a violation of Article 26 ICCPR (right to 
equality). He pointed out that Canada had given ‘no explanation as to why the extradition was 
                                                                                                                       
4(2) OP and pointed out, once more, that the State had failed to react to the Special Rapporteur’s 
provisional measures in May 1993. The Committee pointed out that it had not received any 
information on the fate of Mr. Tshishimbi at all; see also Mohammed Bashir El-Megreisi 
(submitted by his brother Youssef El-Megreisi) v. Libya, 23 March 1994. The HRC had requested 
information on the whereabouts of the alleged victim on several occasions. In its View it noted 
‘with regret and great concern’ the absence of cooperation by the State party and pointed out that 
it is implicit in Article 4(2) OP and in Rule 91 that the State party must investigate in good faith 
all the allegations of violations of the Covenant and provide the Committee with the information 
available to it. An example of follow-up by the Bosnia Chamber is its decision on the merits in 
Matanović et al. v. Republika Srpska, 6 August 1997, noting in §5 that it never received a 
response from Republika Srpska to its requests with regard to the whereabouts of a Roman 
Catholic priest and his parents, and in §31 that the respondent had not taken part in the 
proceedings before the Ombudsperson and Chamber until after the case had been declared 
admissible, stressing the obligation of the Parties to the Agreement to cooperate with the 
Chamber and the Ombudsperson under Articles X (5) and XIII (4). 
13 HRC Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990. 
14 In HRC Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 30 October 1996, another case involving a claim of 
destruction of the natural habitat, the petitioner had requested the Committee to reiterate its 
provisional measures, but it did not do so. Apparently, in December 1995 a negotiation took 
place between the parties, in which a solution was actively sought. Note of the Secretariat of 8 
December 1995 after speaking with the Finnish Foreign Ministry and counsel to the petitioners 
(on file with the author). 
15 HRC Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993, §17. 
16 HRC Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993, dissent Aguilar Urbina, §23. See also his dissent in HRC 
Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, §12. 
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carried out so rapidly once it was known that the author had submitted a communication to the 
Committee’.17 
“By its censurable action in failing to observe its obligations to the international community, a 
State party has prevented the enjoyment of the rights which the author ought to have had as a 
person under Canadian jurisdiction in relation to the Optional Protocol. In so far as the Optional 
Protocol forms part of the Canadian legal order, all persons under Canadian jurisdiction enjoy 
the right to submit communications to the Human Rights Committee so that it may hear their 
complaints. Since it appears that Mr Kindler was extradited on account of his nationality and in 
so far as he has been denied the possibility of enjoying its protection in accordance with the 
Optional Protocol, I find that the State party has also violated article 26 of the Covenant”.18 
Lallah equally pointed out that the very notion of protection required preventive measures, in 
particular in relation to the right to life, because once a person is deprived of his life ‘it cannot be 
restored to him’.19 
While in Ng v. Canada (1993) the HRC expressed its regret that the State had not acceded 
to its request to stay the petitioner’s extradition, it did so only when it decided to join the question 
of the victim requirement to the consideration of the merits. In Kindler it had expressed its regret 
as part of its discussion on the merits. Since the HRC did find a violation of Article 7 in Ng, it 
could have argued that Canada’s extradition despite the Committee’s provisional measures was an 
aggravated violation of Article 7. Instead, it requested Canada ‘to make such representations as 
might still be possible to avoid the imposition of the death penalty’ and it appealed to this State to 
ensure that a similar situation did not arise in the future.20 It may have considered that the matter 
was too sensitive to draw attention to it, especially given the heinous crimes Ng was charged 
with. In fact Aguilar Urbina was the only Committee member to specifically deal with Canada’s 
failure to respect the Committee’s provisional measures.21 
The quality of submissions by petitioner and State may have an impact on the attitude of the 
adjudicators towards non-compliance by governments and on whether or not they will take provi-
sional measures in the first place. Equally, certain factual situations, such as public opinion, may 
have an impact on the attitude of the adjudicator towards whether it will take provisional meas-
ures in certain situations as well as its attitude towards non-compliance. Yet the lack of firm 
response in these cases by the HRC as a whole may mainly be due to the fact that they were 
among the first in which it was faced with non-compliance. 
                                                 
17 HRC Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993, dissent Aguilar Urbina, §24. 
18 Ibid. 
19 HRC Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993, dissent Lallah, §3.3. He also suggested that the Canadian 
act concerned arbitrary deprivation of life under Article 6(1) because ‘unequal treatment is in 
effect meted out to different individuals within the same jurisdiction’. He noted that under 
Canadian law Canada could not sentence an individual to death through its judicial arm but it did 
find it possible, through its executive arm, to extradite him to face the real risk of such sentence. 
He would therefore have found a violation of Article 26 which ‘regulates a State party’s 
legislative, executive as well as judicial behaviour’. Chanet also would have found a violation of 
Article 26. 
20 HRC Ng. v. Canada. In his dissent Lallah considered that there had been a violation of Articles 6 
and 7 and ‘(e)ven at this stage, Canada should use its best efforts to provide a remedy by making 
appropriate representations, so as to ensure that, if convicted and sentenced to death, the author 
would not be executed’. 
21 HRC Ng. v. Canada, dissenting opinion Aguilar Urbina, §§12-13. 
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Subsequent to these sensitive extradition cases the HRC did develop a practice of strong 
condemnation on the basis of the obligations under the OP and the ICCPR, as discussed next. 
2.2.3 Follow-up by the HRC on halting executions 
As noted, it has been on the occasion of executions of death sentences in defiance of its provi-
sional measures that the HRC has expressed itself most strongly on the rationale of provisional 
measures and their legal status.22 
                                                 
22 In the vast majority of death penalty cases States have respected the Committee’s provisional 
measures. Sometimes execution dates are scheduled even after the HRC has found a violation and 
recommended commutation. In such cases the HRC has also followed up, but not by using 
provisional measures, as the Inter-American Court had done. See e.g. HRC Anthony McLeod v. 
Jamaica, 31 March 1998. The Special Rapporteur had used provisional measures in January 
1997. In March 1998 the HRC adopted its Views in this case, recommending a new appeal or 
release. Two months later counsel noted that he was still awaiting the Committee’s Views and 
that his client was at risk of execution in June. He inquired when the HRC would make a 
determination on the merits. It seems he was not yet aware of the aforementioned View. He 
urgently requested the HRC to reapply provisional measures. Apparently the execution date was 
postponed to early 1999, when counsel again approached the HRC. This is one example of a case 
in which the Secretariat had to remind the State of the Committee’s Views and of the State’s 
obligation, under Article 2, to provide the victim with an effective remedy rather than with a 
warrant of execution. Note Verbale transmitting the case under Rule 86/91, 17 January 1997; fax 
by counsel of 12 and 20 May 1998 and 19 January 1999; faxes by Amnesty International of 19 
and 20 January 1999 pointing out that scheduling a warrant of execution ‘flies in the face of 
recommendations’ by the HRC and ‘would undermine the very international protection of 
fundamental human rights which petitions to the Committee are designed to provide’; letter by 
the Secretariat to the Permanent Mission referring to the Views of 31 March 1998 and the State’s 
obligation under Article 2 ICCPR to provide an effective remedy, noting that a warrant of 
execution had been issued and reiterating its recommendation that the victim should be granted a 
new appeal hearing or be released, 22 January 1999 (on file with the author). In April 1997 the 
Special Rapporteur reiterated his earlier request for provisional measures in Abdool Saleem 
Yasseen and Noel Thomas v. Republic of Guyana, 30 March 1998. following an urgent 
submission by their counsel. Six days previously she reported that a government minister had 
publicly stated that the death sentences against her clients would be carried out in due course. See 
letter by counsel of 18 April 1997, with an attached newspaper article from the Starbroek news of 
16 April 1997; Note Verbale of 24 April 1997 to the Permanent Mission reiterating the Rule 86 
request of 7 February 1996 (on file with the author). Subsequently, in March 1998 the HRC 
found violations of the right to a fair trial and recommended the release of the petitioners. At the 
end of that year Guyana withdrew from the OP. In September 1999 it announced that it would 
proceed with the execution of Yasseen and Thomas. Both Amnesty International and the Guyana 
Human Rights Association took action on their behalf and on 10 September the UN Secretary 
General sent a Note Verbale to the Attorney General of Guyana (copied to the Permanent 
Mission in New York) reiterating the Committee’s recommendations and urging the State to 
refrain from carrying out the death sentence. Again he referred to the obligations undertaken by 
the State under the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol.Amnesty International press release of 10 
September 1999, ‘Guyana: two men to be hanged after an unfair trial’, AI Index: AMR 
35/02/1999; letter by Michael McCormack, Co-President of the Guyana Human Rights 
Association to Secretary General Kofi Annan, with copies to the UN Legal Counsel and the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights, 12 September 1999; Note Verbale by the UN Secretary 
General to the Attorney General of Guyana of 10 September 1999. As becomes clear from a letter 
by the father of Yasseen sent to the UN Development Programme in Guyana on 14 August 2000 
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Over the years it has taken a stronger position on non-compliance.23 It now condemns such 
executions as incompatible with the obligation to respect the Covenant in good faith and with the 
right of individual communication under the OP. 
The day after the execution of Rockliff Ross, in defiance of a provisional measure by the 
HRC, the Secretariat sent a note to counsel: 
“We profoundly regret having learnt of Mr. Ross’ execution on 4 June 1996. By the time of his 
execution, the case had in fact been registered upon instruction of the Chairman of the Human 
Rights Committee and been sent to the President of Guyana”. 
The case was discontinued after the execution since the purpose of the submission had been to 
prevent the execution and counsel had not submitted any further comments. Aguilar Urbina, the 
Chairperson of the HRC addressed the Permanent Representative of Guyana in a formal response 
to the execution. He pointed out that the case had been transmitted before the execution took 
place, that it included a provisional measure and that the Superintendent of the Prison had also 
been informed.  
“On 23 July 1996 the Committee discussed the case of Mr. Ross and expressed dismay at his 
execution on 4 June 1996, in spite of the Committee's request for interim protection. In the 
name of the Committee and further to its unanimously adopted instructions, I should like to seek 
prompt written explanations from your Excellency's Government as to the reason for which the 
Committee's request was not respected. I am at you disposal for any clarifications in the 
matter”.24 
Trinidad and Tobago executed Glenn Ashby in July 1994 despite the Committee’s provisional 
measure, six days before he would have been eligible for commutation of his sentence under the 
JCPC’s Pratt and Morgan rule.25 
Following the HRC's use of provisional measures the petitioner had written to the Mercy 
Committee. He had requested the right to be heard before that body, ‘stating that the Human 
Rights Committee was considering his communication and asking that the Mercy Committee 
await the outcome of the Human Rights Committee’s recommendations’. Five days later the 
Mercy Committee rejected his petition for mercy. On that same day a warrant for execution was 
read to him, to take place on 14 July 1994 at 6 a.m.26 The subsequent events show that the assur-
                                                                                                                       
(and transmitted to the HRC on 25 August 2000) both were still on death row at that time (on file 
with the author). 
23 See also Harrington (2003), p. 69 referring to a ‘movement towards recognizing the binding 
nature of interim measures requests’ as ‘reflected’ in the jurisprudence of the HRC. She notes 
that the Committee ‘has taken an increasingly stronger stance’ and ‘what were once seen as mere 
“failures to cooperate” are now viewed as violations of a state’s very obligations under the 
ICCPR regime’. 
24 HRC (The late) Rockliff Ross v. Guyana, 10 December 1997 (disc.), (703/1996), letter by 
Secretariat to counsel, 4 June/15 June 1994; Note Verbale by Chairman Aguilar Urbina to the 
Permanent Representative of Guyana, 24 July 1994 (on file with the author).  
25 HRC Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002. 
26 HRC Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002, §6.2. 
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ances by Trinidad to the JCPC that Ashby would not be executed before he had exhausted the 
available remedies could not be depended upon.27  
“At this point, one of Mr. Ashby’s lawyers appeared in Court with a written transcript of an 
order of the Privy Counsel staying the execution. The order had been read to him over the 
telephone, having been granted at approximately 6:30 a.m. Trinidad and Tobago time (11:30 
a.m. London time). Shortly thereafter, it was announced that Mr. Ashby had been hanged at 
6:40 a.m.”.28 
The HRC met the day after the execution requesting clarifications on an urgent basis. It invited 
the State to send an authorised person to provide such clarifications at that session’s plenary 
                                                 
27 “The representative of the Attorney-General of Trinidad and Tobago then informed the Privy 
Council that Mr. Ashby would not be executed until all possibilities of obtaining a stay of 
execution, including applications to the Court of Appeal in Trinidad and Tobago and the Privy 
Council, had been exhausted. This was recorded in writing and signed by counsel for Mr. Ashby 
and counsel for the Attorney-General”. HRC Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002, 
§6.3. Before the Court of Appeal, however, counsel for the respondents said that the petitioner 
would nevertheless be hanged at 7 a.m. (noon London time) unless the Court of Appeal granted a 
conservatory order. “The Court of Appeal then proposed to adjourn until 11 a.m. Trinidad and 
Tobago time in order to seek clarification of what had taken place before the Privy Council. 
Lawyers for Mr. Ashby asked for a conservatory order until 11 a.m., noting that the execution 
had been scheduled for 7 a.m. and that counsel for the respondents had made it clear that Mr. 
Ashby could not rely on the assurance given to the Privy Council. The Court expressed the view 
that, in the interim, Mr. Ashby could rely on the assurance given to the Privy Council and 
declined to make a conservatory order. The Court instead decided to adjourn until 6 a.m. Lawyers 
for Mr. Ashby applied for an interim conservatory order until 6 a.m. but the Court denied this 
request. At no time did the lawyers for the State party indicate that the execution was scheduled 
to take place earlier than 7 a.m”. Id. §6.4 on 14 July at 10.30 a.m. London time, the JCPC held a 
special sitting, preparing a document about the decision-making the previous day. The Registrar 
immediately faxed this document to the Court of Appeal and to counsel for both sides in Trinidad 
and Tobago. The JCPC also requested further clarification of the Attorney-General’s position. 
Having received no such clarification, the JCPC ordered a stay of execution at about 11.30 a.m. 
London time. The Court of Appeal reconvened at approximately the same time, 6.20 a.m. 
Trinidad and Tobago time. Twenty minutes later counsel again applied to the Court of Appeal for 
a conservatory order. This Court denied the order, once more emphasising that the petitioner 
could rely on the assurance given to the JCPC. Id., §6.6. According to the State party the Court of 
Appeals did not express the view that counsel should rely on the assurances given to the JCPC 
that Mr. Ashby would not be executed. “Instead, the Court expressed that it was not prepared to 
do anything until the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council resolved the dispute”. Id., §9.8. 
See also Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1994, 
CCPR/C/SR.1352, 31 July 1996, §§5-10. During this meeting Committee member Francis 
(Jamaica) also observed that the Clerk of the Court of Appeals had been asked to attend the 
meeting at 6 p.m. on 14 July in order to communicate any decision of the Court to the 
Government. However he did not attend this meeting and appeared only after the execution. He 
wondered whether or not his absence had been deliberate. He also noted that the order for 
execution referred to an execution time between 6 a.m. and noon and he would like to know why 
the petitioner had been executed so early in the morning, §§18-19. 
28 Six days after the execution the Permanent Mission transmitted a copy of an undated media 
release issued by the advocate-general of Trinidad. According to this press release all the 
requirements of the law and the Constitution of Trinidad and Tobago had been satisfied.  
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meeting of the Committee. Moreover, it decided to hold a public meeting on this issue. At this 
meeting it briefly addressed the information transmitted by the Permanent Mission. 
“The Committee studied the said media release and regretted that no replies had been given to 
its specific question. It noted with concern that the State party had failed to explain why it had 
not complied with the Committee’s request of interim measures of protection, and that nor the 
proceedings under the Optional Protocol, nor the Committee was mentioned in the media 
release”.29 
Twelve days after the execution the HRC held a public meeting, on an exceptional basis, and 
issued a public statement in which it expressed its indignation regarding the State’s failure to 
comply with its provisional measures and strongly urged the State party ‘to ensure, by all means 
at its disposal, that situations similar to that surrounding the execution of Mr. Ashby do not re-
cur’.30 The Committee decided to continue its consideration of the case under the OP.  
Normally discussions about individual cases are not public, let alone published. Yet in this 
situation the Committee decided to make an exception and publish its summary records.31 In 
addition it published its discussion in the Annual Report to the General Assembly.32 
During the meeting the Chairman of the Committee had pointed out that States parties had 
thus far respected all the Committee’s provisional measures to halt executions (in more that 100 
cases).33 Each member of the Committee made an individual statement. All of them strongly 
regretted the execution, and all of them, except for Francis (Jamaica), argued for a strongly 
worded response. Aguilar Urbina (Costa Rica), for instance, considered that Trinidad and Tobago 
had carried out an extrajudicial execution and the Committee should react strongly.34 El Shafei 
(Egypt) stressed that the other States parties to the OP should take up the issue of the serious 
breach by the authorities of Trinidad and Tobago of their obligations.35 Sadi (Jordan) considered 
that Mr. Ashby had been the victim of a very grave miscarriage of justice. Following the execu-
tion ‘there was no hope of being able to remedy any mistakes that might have been committed 
during his trial’. “The authorities owed the Committee an explanation, but they owed to Mr. 
Ashby’s family even more”.36 Francis (Jamiaca) ‘particularly regretted’ the State’s behaviour ‘as 
he himself was from the Caribbean’.37 Bán (Hungary) ‘shared the sorrow and indignation of the 
other members of the Committee’. The HRC should indeed ‘insist on the need to clarify under 
what circumstances and for what reasons it had taken place’. “That information was very impor-
                                                 
29 HRC Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1994, 
CCPR/C/SR.1352, 31 July 1996, §10. 
30 HRC Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002, §3.4. 
31 HRC Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1994. 
32 See A/49/40, §§410-411. During the special session Higgins had noted that the Committee had 
decided to adopt a new format for its Annual Report that ‘would highlight the cooperation or lack 
of co-operation by a State party, whether in regard to submission of reports or communications’. 
In that light the case of Mr. Ashby ‘should be given a prominent place in the annual report to be 
adopted at the end of the current session’. HRC Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad 
and Tobago, 26 July 1994, §39. 
33 HRC Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1994, §2. 
34 Id., §12. 
35 Id., §31. 
36 Id., §32. 
37 Id., §17. 
 Chapter XVIII 
1030 
tant, as it could prevent the recurrence of such incidence”. The HRC should continue its investiga-
tion and seek assurances of non-repetition.38 
With regard to Trinidad’s media release following the execution, Higgins pointed out that 
‘(t)he media release was in no way a reply to the Committee: it was, quite simply, an insult’. She 
also expressed her concern about the situation of two other petitioners, Guerra and Wallen, and 
pointed out that the Committee should press the authorities to comply with the provisional meas-
ures in their cases. She pointed out that the State was bound to respect the provisional measures 
on behalf of Guerra and Wallen and other cases.39 
Prado Vallejo (Ecuador) equally pointed out: “Others besides Mr. Ashby were awaiting 
execution in Trinidad and Tobago, and it was to be hoped that the authorities would fulfil their 
obligations towards them. It was also to be hoped that the State party would understand the grav-
ity of its actions and in future honour its commitments in good faith”.40 He noted that the State 
‘had not honoured its obligations under the Covenant and the Optional Protocol’ and ‘committed 
a flagrant violation of article 6 of the Covenant’.41 
Pocar (Italy) stated that each State had ‘the legal obligation to cooperate with the Commit-
tee when it considered communications concerning that State party, and at the very least it must 
allow it to examine those communications in the most effective possible manner’.  
“That was an obligation which the State party had to fulfil in good faith. As to the Covenant, 
under article 39, the Committee established its own rules of procedure, and no State party had 
ever contested any of the provisions of those rules, including rule 86. By ignoring those 
provisions, Trinidad and Tobago had clearly prevented the Committee from examining the 
communication of Mr. Ashby in the most effective way”.42 
Higgins (UK) drew particular attention to Article 1 OP and pointed out that the Committee ‘was 
clearly not in a position to consider a communication under the normal procedure if its author was 
dead’. She noted that ‘if the Committee had been able to consider the communication under the 
usual conditions, it might have concluded that the Covenant had not been violated by the State 
party’.43 
“One thing, however, was certain: Trinidad and Tobago had violated the provisions of both the 
Covenant and the Optional Protocol. With respect to the Covenant, no matter what the merits of 
Mr. Ashby’s complaint, it was clear that the State party had violated article 6, given that it had 
ignored the guarantees called for by the Optional Protocol. The State party had also violated that 
instrument by refusing to cooperate with the Committee, particularly by failing to reply to the 
questions asked and to cooperate more generally with the Committee’s procedure”.44 
Thus Higgins duly noted the link to the seriousness of the harm risked, pointing out that ignoring 
provisional measures and executing the petitioner pending the proceedings ignoring the Commit-
tee’s provisional measures, was in itself a violation of Article 6 (right to life), ‘no matter what the 
merits’ of the petition.45 Condemning the execution she proposed that the Committee would 
                                                 
38 Id., §37. 
39 Id., §§24-29. 
40 Id., §33. 
41 Ibid. 
42 HRC Summary Record of the 1352nd meeting: Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1994, §22. 
43 Id., §24. 
44 Id., §27. 
45 Ibid. 
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‘strongly assert that such incident should be avoided in the future’ and that the State ‘was bound 
to grant the Committee’s request under rule 86’ in other cases.46  
Wennergren (Sweden) considered that the State had committed ‘a flagrant violation of the 
Committee’s rules of procedure’. Nevertheless he considered, different from Higgins, that ‘it was 
only subsequently that the Committee would be able to determine whether or not article 6 of the 
Covenant had been violated’.47 
The Chairman proposed the adoption of a text expressing the Committee’s deep concern 
and regret. The ‘attitude of the authorities was in flagrant breach of their obligations under the 
Covenant and the Optional Protocol’. He suggested that the Committee would ‘deplore the State 
party’s failure to make available a representative for the meetings at which Mr. Ashby’s case 
would be considered’. The Committee could recall that the State was bound to fulfil its obliga-
tions under the Covenant and the OP. It should also ‘insist on the need for a favourable reply by 
the authorities of Trinidad and Tobago' to the provisional measures on behalf of two other peti-
tioners as well.48 Lallah (Mauritius) supported this proposal and Mavrommatis (Cyprus) said that 
the Committee should also issue a press release. He agreed that the case should be mentioned in 
the Annual Report ‘but would go even further: that case could be the subject of a special section 
of the report, given the grave consequences of the State party’s failure to cooperate’.49 Francis 
considered that the Committee ‘should avoid using verbs such as “condemn” and “deplore” in the 
text to be adopted’. “It was true that the authorities of Trinidad and Tobago had committed irrepa-
rable damage, but the Committee should try to use wording that was generally acceptable to its 
members, and he was in favour of using measured language”.50 The Chairman concluded that the 
Secretariat would be asked to draft a decision based on his proposal and the suggestions by mem-
bers of the Committee.51 
Thus the Committee’s position towards the obligation to respect its provisional measures 
first became clear with its immediate response to the execution of Glenn Ashby in 1994, also 
showing the position of individual members. Its first decision on the merits that fully establishes 
its position, however, is Piandiong et al. v. the Philippines (2000), not Ashby v. Trinidad that was 
only decided on the merits in 2002.52 The executions rendered examination by the HRC moot and 
the expression of its Views ‘nugatory and futile’. Flouting its provisional measures, ‘especially by 
irreversible measures such as the execution of the alleged victim’ undermined the protection of 
Covenant rights under the OP.53 To underscore its indignation the HRC has not waited until its 
decision on the merits, but exceptionally published its Summary Records discussing an individual 
case (following the execution of Ashby) and on several occasions issued press releases condemn-
ing executions.54 
                                                 
46 Id., §29. 
47 Id., §35. 
48 Id., §41. This concerned the case of Guerra and Wallen also pending before the HRC. 
49 Id., §§42-43. 
50 Id., §44. 
51 Id., §45. 
52 HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000. 
53 See HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by 
Alexander Padilla and Ricardo III Sunga) v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000. See also 
Mansaraj et al.; Gborie et al. and Sesay et al. v. Sierra Leone, 16 July 2001 and Glenn Ashby v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002. In addition see Barno Saidova v. Tajikistan, 8 July 2004. 
54 See e.g. press release, ‘Human Rights Committee deplores the execution of six individuals in 
Uzbekistan’, 24 July 2003. The petitioners who were executed were Muzaffar Mirzaev (case 
1170/2003), Shukrat Andasbaev (case 1166/2003), Ulugbek Ashov (case 1165/2003), Ilkhon 
Babadzhanov and Maksud Ismailov (case 1162/2003), and Azamat Uteev (case 1150/2003).  
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Thus, by the time it published its decision on the merits in Ashby (2002) it had already pub-
lished Piandiong v. the Philippines (2000)55 and the case against Sierra Leone (2001), involving 
executions that took place subsequent to that of Glenn Ashby.56 Apart from violations of Article 
14(3)(c) and (5) ICCPR (undue delay), the HRC found a violation of Article 6(1) and (2) for 
carrying out the execution when his sentence was still under challenge. It discussed closely the 
State’s breach of the principle of good faith and the obligations under the OP. 
“[H]aving regard to the fact that the representative of the Attorney-General informed the Privy 
Council that Mr. Ashby would not be executed until all possibilities of obtaining a stay of 
execution had been exhausted, the carrying out of Mr. Ashby’s sentence notwithstanding that 
assurance constituted a breach of the principle of good faith which governs all States in their 
discharge of obligations under international treaties, including the Covenant. The carrying out 
of the execution of Mr. Ashby when the execution of the sentence was still under challenge 
constituted a violation of article 6, paragraphs 1 and 2, of the Covenant”.57 
The State had breached its obligations under the OP ‘by proceeding to execute Mr. Ashby before 
the Committee could conclude its examination of the communication, and the formulation of its 
Views’. It found the State’s act ‘particularly inexcusable’ because the HRC had used provisional 
measures specifically requesting it to refrain from executing Mr. Ashby pending the 
determination of the case.  
“The behaviour of the State party represents a shocking failure to demonstrate even the most 
elementary good faith required of a State party to the Covenant and the Optional Protocol”. 
When Sierra Leone executed twelve petitioners in spite of the Committee's provisional measures, 
the HRC expressed ‘its indignation’ not only through its Permanent Mission in New York but also 
through the Office of the Secretary General’s Special Representative in Freetown. At the same 
time it referred to the State's obligations under the reporting procedure of Article 40 ICCPR.58 
Sometimes the HRC also has a meeting with officials of the State party to follow up on an 
execution.59 
In Piandiong the HRC not only used several paragraphs of its View to stress the serious na-
ture of the violation, it also entered these paragraphs in its Annual Report under the separate 
heading ‘Breach of Optional Protocol obligations’.60 Harrington points out that by doing so the 
HRC put all UN member States ‘on notice as to the severity with which the body created by states 
to supervise them now viewed a state’s failure to abide by a request for interim measures’.61 
                                                 
55 HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000. 
56 HRC Mansaraj et al.; Gborie et al. and Sesay et al. v. Sierra Leone, 16 July 2001. 
57 HRC Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002. 
58 HRC Public Decision, 4 November 1998, CCPR/C/64/D/839/1998, 4 November 1998. For the 
View on the merits, see: HRC Mansaraj et al.; Gborie et al. and Sesay et al. v. Sierra Leone, 16 
July 2001. 
59 Two weeks after the execution of the three petitioners in Piandiong, for instance, the Special 
Rapporteur for New Communications and the Vice-Chairperson met with the representative of 
the State party. See Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by 
Alexander Padilla and Ricardo III Sunga) v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000. 
60 See A/56/40 (2001), §§128-130. 
61 Harrington (2003), p. 72. 
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2.2.4 Follow-up by the HRC on halting expulsion and extradition 
In Weiss v. Austria (2003) the HRC devoted a separate heading to the State’s failure to respect its 
provisional measures. It found, in the circumstances of the case, that the State breached its 
obligations under the OP by extraditing the petitioner before the Committee could address his 
allegation of irreparable harm to his rights under the ICCPR. It specifically noted that it had 
offered the State the opportunity to convince it that provisional measures were not warranted, but 
rather than taking this opportunity the State simply ignored the provisional measures and went 
ahead with the extradition. 
“In particular, the Committee is concerned by the sequence of events in this case in that, rather 
than requesting interim measures of protection directly upon an assumption that irreversible 
harm could follow the author’s extradition, it first sought, under Rule 86 of its Rules of 
Procedure, the State party’s views on the irreparability of harm. In so doing, the State party 
could have demonstrated to the Committee that extradition would not result in irreparable 
harm”.62 
In fact this specification indicated bad faith on the part of the State. 
The HRC specifically responded to the State’s non-compliance in Ahani. In August the 
Chairperson to the HRC expressed ‘great regret’ at the deportation, seeking a written explanation 
about the reasons that led to this disregard for its provisional measures. A few days later the 
Committee followed up this action through its Special Rapporteur, acting under its Rule on provi-
sional measures, who requested the State ‘to monitor closely the situation and treatment of the 
author subsequent to his deportation to Iran and to make such representations to the Government 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran that were deemed pertinent in order to prevent violations of the 
author’s rights under articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant’.63 In its View in the Ahani case the HRC 
reiterated its conclusion that the State breached its obligations under the OP by deporting the 
petitioner before the Committee’s determination of his claim.64 The State had mainly referred to 
its obligations under domestic law.65 At the same time it pointed out that it ‘usually responded 
                                                 
62 See HRC Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §7.1. See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
63 See HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §5.1. 
64 Id., §11. 
65 Weiser (2004) argues that ‘current judicial approaches do not give full and consistent credence to 
international obligations undertaken by Canada, nor do they offer sufficient guidance on the 
effect of international human rights treaties on domestic laws’, p. 114. ‘There appears to be no 
presumption of conformity’ with regard to international obligations unless the court is faced with 
‘legislation enacted specifically in furtherance of a treaty’. She refers to the statement of the 
Supreme Court in Suresh that ‘our concern is not with Canada’s international obligations qua 
obligations’. The court simply looks at international law as evidence of Canada’s principles of 
fundamental justice rather than ‘as controlling in itself’, p. 133. She offers explanations for 
Canada’s attitude towards international legal obligations. There are few countries, she notes, 
facing ‘as many constitutional obstacles as Canada to the successful integration of domestic and 
international law’. Apart from the role of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the 
fact that treaties are not considered self-executing she refers to the fact that treaty ratification is 
an executive act and ‘the extent of Parliamentary scrutiny in the process of treaty adherence is 
limited’, p. 122. The assessment and considerations on which a decision to ratify is based 
‘remains an internal document and so, non-governmental actors (including courts) face obvious 
difficulties in trying to identify the international obligations underlying a particular domestic 
law’. Subsequently there is ‘no systematic review’ either ‘of new legislation for consistency with 
treaty obligations’, pp. 127-128. She points out that recently ‘other countries with Westminster-
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favourably’ to requests for provisional measures.66 The HRC stressed that Canada was under an 
obligation ‘to avoid similar violations in the future, including by taking appropriate steps to en-
sure that the Committee’s requests for interim measures of protection will be respected’.67 
2.2.5 One of the methods of follow-up: sending reminders 
In some cases it was also important to confirm to the State that a case was still pending before the 
HRC. In Shaw v. Jamaica (1998)68 counsel wrote to the Committee, on 18 May 1988, that the 
State had threatened not to further postpone the execution ‘unless counsel could intimate,’ by 20 
May 1988, that he would make an application to the Inter-American Commission of Human 
Rights.69 Counsel pointed out: ‘Whilst Mr. Shaw’s motion is pending before the UN Human 
Rights Committee, I cannot submit an application to the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights. In the circumstances, it is imperative that the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights make strong representations to the Jamaican authorities that Mr. Shaw’s matter is 
still pending before the Human Rights Committee and has been afforded Rule 86 protection’. The 
HRC often repeats its provisional measures. An example is Junior Leslie v. Jamaica (1998).70 In 
this case there was a real and immediate danger of the petitioner’s execution. After all, he was 
only two months away from having been on death row for five years. Because of the JCPC case 
law, counsel believed that the Jamaican Government was prioritising Leslie’s case with a view to 
executing him before the period of five years would elapse.71 
                                                                                                                       
style Governments have taken steps to rectify similar situations’, p. 123. In practice federalism is 
another obstacle. She points out that ‘while the federal Executive alone is empowered to enter 
into international treaties, it has no power to implement them in areas of provincial jurisdiction’. 
By contrast, in other federal States ‘such as Australia, the federal government retains residual 
power to legislate a furtherance of a treaty, even where the subject matter typically falls outside 
federal jurisdiction’, p. 124. See also Chapter XVII on official responses. 
66 See HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §5.3. In fact until then it had respected the 
Committee’s provisional measures four times and ignored them three times (all in the 
immigration context). The other time the HRC used provisional measures related to Article 27 
ICCPR and indigenous peoples. Canada ignored these as well. See further the discussion in this 
section on its compliance with the provisional measures by CAT and the Inter-American 
Commission. 
67 HRC Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, §12. 
68 HRC Steve Shaw v. Jamaica, 2 April 1998. 
69 He enclosed a letter of 15 March 1998 by the Secretary of the Governor General: ‘execution will 
not be further postponed unless intimation in writing is given to the Governor General that an 
application will be made to the second International Human Rights Body, in this case the Inter 
American Commission on Human Rights. The intimation must be made by May 20, so you may 
wish to act accordingly’. 
70 HRC Junior Leslie v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998. 
71 In this light he requested the HRC to repeat its provisional measures and the HRC did so four 
days after it received counsel’s fax and five days before the scheduled hearing. Another example 
is Reece v. Jamaica (disc. 1993): the first Rule 86/91 was transmitted to the State on 25 
November 1987 (based on a decision of 12 November 1987); it was repeated as part of the 
admissibility decision of 30 March 1988, interlocutory decision of 2 November 1989 and letter of 
24 March 1992, again to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with a copy to the Permanent Mission 
of Jamaica in Geneva. Lloyd Reece v. Jamaica, admissibility decision of 30 March 1989; 
interlocutory decision of 2 November 1999; Letter by the UN Secretariat of 24 March 1992 to the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Jamaica concerning Lloyd Reece, 247/1987. Eventually the HRC 
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2.2.6 Follow-up by CAT 
In Brada v. France (2005) CAT used strong wording. It stressed that the State party ‘seriously 
failed’ in its obligations under Article 22 ICAT ‘because it prevented the Committee from fully 
examining a complaint relating to a violation of the Convention, rendering action by the Commit-
tee futile and its comments worthless’.72 In Agiza v. Sweden (2005) it addressed, in passing, one 
reason that States might forward for ignoring provisional measures.73 After pointing out that by 
making the declaration under Article 22 ICAT, recognizing the right of individual petition, a State 
‘assumes an obligation to cooperate fully with the Committee’, it observed that ‘its procedures are 
sufficiently flexible and its powers sufficiently broad to prevent an abuse of process in a particular 
case’.74 
Pending the case the Committee, through its Special Rapporteur, follows up by recalling the 
State’s obligation to respect provisional measures and requesting clarifications on the ‘current 
status and whereabouts’ of the petitioner extradited in disregard of the Committee’s provisional 
measures.75 During the Committee’s sessions the situation may also be discussed. In this case, for 
instance, CAT had sent a letter expressing ‘grave concern about the manner in which the State 
party acted in the case’ and requesting timely information on her ‘current whereabouts and state 
of well-being’.76 
After finding a violation of Articles 3 and 22 ICAT in Tebourski v. France (2007) the 
Committee wished to be informed, among others, of the steps taken ‘to make reparation for the 
breach of article 3 of the Convention, and to determine, in consultation with the country (also a 
State party to the Convention) to which he was deported, the complainant's current whereabouts 
and the state of his well-being’.77 
In Dar v. Norway (2007) CAT had used provisional measures in April 2004. Early June 
Norway informed the Committee that it would not comply, but at the end of that month it added 
that it would refrain from proceeding with the expulsion to Pakistan until the court of first in-
stance had reviewed the case.78 In September 2005 he was expelled to Pakistan after all.79 In its 
admissibility decision, two months later, CAT observed that ‘in ratifying the Convention and 
voluntarily accepting the Committee’s competence under article 22’, the State ‘undertook to 
cooperate with it in good faith in applying the procedure’. It pointed out that compliance with the 
provisional measure called for ‘was essential in order to protect the person in question from ir-
reparable harm, which could, moreover, nullify the end result of the proceedings before the 
                                                                                                                       
discontinued the case after it received a confirmation by the petitioner’s counsel that he wished to 
withdraw his application. Letter from counsel to the UN Secretariat of 28 April 1993 (on file with 
the author). Yet another example is Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999; fax by 
counsel of 23 December 1998; response by Secretariat of 31 December 1998; faxes by Amnesty 
International of 19 and 20 January 1999 pointing out that his execution while his petition is 
pending before the HRC would violate ‘the country’s international obligations and his rights to a 
remedy’; fax by counsel of 21 January 1999 and Note Verbale to the State of 22 January 1999 
reminding it of the earlier provisional measure (on file with the author). 
72 CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §6.1. 
73 See Chapter XVII (Official responses), section 3.3. 
74 CAT Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, §13.10. 
75 CAT Elif Pelit v. Azerbaijan, 1 May 2007, §8.2. 
76 Id., §8.4. The State party subsequently did provide updated information and noted that a member 
of its embassy had had private conversations with her, §§8.19.4. 
77 CAT Adel Tebourski v. France, 1 May 2007, §10. 
78 CAT Nadeem Ahmad Dar v. Norway, 11 May 2007, §1.2. 
79 Id., §1.3. 
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Committee’. It explicitly ‘invited’ the State ‘to comply with the Committee’s request for interim 
measures of protection’.80 On the merits it found that Norway had remedied the breach of its 
obligations under Article 22, half a year after the expulsion that CAT’s provisional measures had 
meant to halt, by facilitating the safe return of the petitioner and granting him a residence permit 
for three years.81 Thus it appears that the Committee invited remedial action by the State pending 
the proceedings and when this action was undertaken, rewarded the State by not finding a viola-
tion. 
2.2.7 ‘Seguimiento’ in the Inter-American system 
Reiterating and specifying provisional measures are just two of the methods the adjudicators have 
in dealing with States that fail to implement the obligations indicated in these measures. The 
Inter-American Commission, for instance, has several other (more or less resource intensive) 
tools to deal with non-compliance: on-site visits, country reports, discussion of the non-
compliance in its Annual Reports, case law, renewed precautionary measures and requesting the 
Court to order provisional measures.82 
The OAS is still politicised and its General Assembly is not inclined to clearly support the 
Inter-American Commission and Court in their monitoring and follow-up of compliance with 
State obligations under the Convention and Declaration.83 In this sense, the Inter-American sys-
tem differs from the European human rights system. Comparatively speaking, the political bodies 
of the Council of Europe seem more inclined to support the ECHR both in its political statements 
and in its financial contribution. 
Since 1998 the Commission has established the practice of seguimiento or follow-up on its 
case law. Seguimiento is the creation of a follow-up policy after the final decision. This way the 
Commission tries to monitor the activities of States with regard to its recommendations. Follow-
up seems to be one of the better ways to increase effectiveness, both of precautionary and provi-
sional measures and of decisions on the merits.84 During the stage of seguimiento States some-
times reply that they need more time. Sometimes they say that they take it very seriously but 
chose not to act on the Commission’s final report.85 Normally States do not send the information 
on their compliance with provisional measures in time. The information they do send usually is 
very general and rather vague. In response, the Inter-American Commission’s decisions on pre-
                                                 
80 Id., §6.7 (referring to its established case law in this respect). 
81 CAT Nadeem Ahmad Dar v. Norway, 11 May 2007, §§16.4, 17 and 18. 
82 The African Commission has also sent its urgent appeals in the context of individual complaints, 
not just to the State concerned, but also to authorities of the African Union. See e.g. ACHPR 
Interights (on behalf of Husaini et al.) v. Nigeria, April 2005, provisional measures (‘urgent 
appeal’) of 6 February 2002 ‘to His Excellency Amara Essy of the African Union, respectfully 
urging him to draw the attention of the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the 
Commission’s request and to positively respond thereof’, §14. The next month the Director of the 
Political Affairs Department of the AU wrote to the Chairman of the African Commission that 
the Secretary General of the AU had formally taken up the matter, §18. See further §22. 
83 For some pointed comments and analysis on the failure of the OAS political organs see e.g. 
IACHR Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, Judgment of 11 March 2005, individual opinion of 
judge Ventura Robles. In general see Gómez (1998b), pp. 173-197. 
84 Similar to Article 46 of its new Rules, dealing with the follow-up of compliance with its final 
reports, Article 25(3) of its Rules confirms the Inter-American Commission’s increasing practice 
to follow up compliance with precautionary measures. 
85 Interview by author with Juan Mendez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. 
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cautionary measures have now become very detailed so as to invite specific responses with regard 
to their implementation. 
The Inter-American Commission also makes use of press releases stating its grave concern 
about impending executions ignoring the fact that the case is pending before the Inter-American 
human rights system. Such an execution would deprive the alleged victim of his ‘fundamental 
right to have his complaint effectively determined by the Commission’ and would cause him 
irreparable harm. It would be incompatible with the international human rights obligations under 
the OAS Charter and related instruments.86 
The case of Rudolph Baptiste is interesting because the Inter-American Commission also 
used the tool of precautionary measures as part of its Report on the merits. On 13 April 2000 the 
Commission decided to publish its report in this case. One of its recommendations in this report 
was a request to Grenada to adopt precautionary measures to stay his execution.87 At the time of 
the publication of Annual Report 2000 the Commission had not received any reply yet from 
Grenada.88 What is interesting here is that, according to the information provided in the Annual 
Report, the Commission requested precautionary measures as part of its report on the merits in a 
case that it had not sent to the Court for its consideration, as Grenada has not recognized the 
competence of the Court. In other words, given the use of precautionary measures, the case is not 
closed yet, while at the same time it can never go any further.89 
At the end of April 2000 armed inmates in the Bogotá Model Prison clashed, leaving 25 
persons dead and 17 wounded. Subsequently political prisoners continued to be threatened by 
paramilitary prisoners wearing AUC bracelets. The Commission took precautionary measures on 
their behalf in May 2000.90 
“The threats made by paramilitary inmates against political prisoners in that penitentiary 
materialised in an attack last July with a high toll of deaths and injuries, even though the Com-
mission’s precautionary measures were still in effect”. During its on-site visit, 7-13 December 
2001, at the invitation of the administration of President Pastrana, the Commission visited the 
facilities at the Model Prison ‘to check on compliance with the protective measures it had issued’. 
During its visit the Commission did not find full compliance, although it appreciated the appoint-
ment of a new director and hoped that he would be given ‘the appropriate means to fulfill his 
functions’. It obtained a pledge by the Government to begin to build a separate partition by the 
end of that month in order to prevent new acts of violence. Both in a press release concluding its 
                                                 
86 See e.g. CIDH press release 7/02 ‘IACHR calls upon the United States to postpone execution of 
juvenile offender Alexander Williams, 19 February 2002. Obviously it has also used press 
releases to publicly condemn executions that have taken place nevertheless. See e.g. CIDH press 
release 33/08 ‘IACHR condemns execution of José Ernesto Medellín’, (condemning the 
execution ‘in contempt of’ the Commission’s precautionary measures and its report on the merits 
in which it had concluded that the failure to fulfil the obligations under Article 36(1) VCCR did 
not meet the minimum standards of due process and a fair trial required under Articles XVIII and 
XXVI of the American Declaration. It reminded the State in its press release that in its report on 
the merits it had pointed out that iIf the State executed the victim based on those proceedings, ‘it 
would commit an irreparable violation of his fundamental right to life, protected by Article I of 
the American Declaration’). 
87 CIDH Baptiste v. Grenada, 13 April 2000. 
88 CIDH Annual Report 2000, §31. 
89 Id., §31. 
90 Id., §17. 
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visit and in its Annual Report the Commission emphasized that it would ‘continue to closely 
follow security conditions in the jail and compliance with the precautionary measures’.91 
The Commission’s precautionary measures on behalf of the 9-11 detainees at Guantanamo 
Bay have been confirmed and expanded several times and eventually the Commission followed 
this up with a Resolution of July 2006 concluding that the non-compliance had ‘resulted in irrepa-
rable prejudice to the fundamental rights of the detainees at Guantanamo Bay including the rights 
to liberty and to humane treatment’. The Resolution urged the US, among others, to close Guan-
tanamo without delay.92 
Sometimes the Commission issues press releases specifically to reinforce its precautionary 
measures. At other times it simply reacts to specific situations of gross human rights violations 
such as the murder of a human rights defender. In a press statement of 15 February 2002, for 
instance, the Commission condemned the torture and assassination in Colombia of human rights 
defender Ms. María del Carmen Florez on the previous day.93 The Commission referred to a 
General Assembly resolution of June 2001 deploring acts directly or indirectly preventing or 
hampering the tasks of human rights defenders. The Assembly urged the member States to inten-
sify their efforts to adopt the necessary measures guaranteeing the lives, personal integrity and 
freedom of expression of these human rights defenders. It also instructed the Permanent Council 
to follow up its resolution and to present to the General Assembly information about State com-
pliance with it. In light of this resolution94 the Commission informed the OAS Permanent Council 
of the extra-judicial execution of Ms. Florez.95 
The Inter-American Commission has institutionalised its capacity to deal with the situation 
of human rights defenders, thereby facilitating the monitoring the implementation of its precau-
tionary measures and the provisional measures of the Court. In December 2001 the Executive 
Secretariat of the Commission established the ‘Human Rights Defenders Functional Unit’. As the 
President of the Commission noted in his presentation of the Commissions Annual Report of 
2001, ‘(t)his Unit will be in charge of collecting information on the plight of human rights de-
fenders in the America’s, maintaining contact with governmental and non-governmental organiza-
tions, and coordinating the Secretariat’s work in this area. This initiative should contribute to 
more comprehensive knowledge of the situation and to mechanisms to help the OAS work more 
effectively and with greater coordination’.96 
                                                 
91 CIDH Press release 33/01 ‘Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concludes its visit to 
the Republic of Colombia’, 13 December 2001, §18 and Annual Report 2001, Chapter IV, §16. 
92 See CIDH Guantanamo Bay case, precautionary measures of 23 July 2002, 18 March 2003, 29 
July 2004 and 28 October 2005. CIDH Resolution 1/06 in Press Release 27/06, ‘Inter-American 
Commission urges to close Guantanamo without delay’, 28 July 2006, available at 
<http://www.cidh.org/Comunicados/English/2006/27.06eng.htm> (consulted 6 October 2006). 
See further Chapter VIII (Ensuring procedural rights). 
93 She was working on the alleged forced disappearance of Alcides Torres Arias whose case was 
pending before the Commission. Ms. Florez was preparing the next hearing before the 
Commission. 
94 General Assembly resolution AG/RES.1818, (XXXI-O/01), June 2001. 
95 CIDH ‘IACHR deplores the assassination of Maria del Carmen Florez in Colombia’, press 
release 6/02, 15 February 2002. In English the Inter-American Commission uses the same 
acronym as the Court: IACHR. 
96 Address by Dr. Juan E. Méndez, President of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
upon presenting the CIDH Annual Report for 2001 to the Committee on Juridical and Political 
Affairs of the Permanent Council of the OAS, 30 April 2002 (<www.cidh.org/discoursos/ 
04.30.02.eng.htm>). 
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The Commission considers that if it publishes a final report or if the Court publishes a deci-
sion and for a long time the government does not do anything about implementation, the only 
option it has under the Convention is to report this to the OAS General Assembly. In order to 
prepare a report for the General Assembly the Commission introduced a ‘re-opening of the issue’ 
for the purposes of follow-up and implementation. It may, for instance, call a hearing and ask the 
government what it is doing about the recommendations that had been sent to them more than a 
year before. Many governments have protested that the Commission does not have jurisdiction to 
do this but the Commission believes it is actually part of its jurisdiction, being an implied power 
as the Commission has to protect the integrity of the system.97 While this relates to its follow-up 
on decisions on the merits and not its precautionary measures, it does show the Commission's 
resolve indeed to protect the integrity of the system. 
The Inter-American Court has also engaged in follow-up. It has done so both in the context 
of its judgments on the merits and reparations and in the context of its provisional measures. It 
needs to know the extent to which States have complied with its rulings in order to monitor com-
pliance with the undertaking made by the States ‘to comply with the judgment of the Court in any 
case to which they are parties’ (under Article 68) and, in particular, to inform the General Assem-
bly of ‘the cases in which a State has not complied with its judgments’ (Article 65 ACHR).98 
During 2007 the Inter-American Court started a new procedure of holding private hearings on 
monitoring compliance with its judgments.99 
The hearings that are held in order to decide on the use, maintenance, expansion or termina-
tion of provisional measures are important in themselves: ‘besides calling public attention to the 
case’, a hearing ‘gives the provisional measures procedure a solemnity that enhanced the chances 
of compliance and enables the Court to better assess the need for such measures’.100 
In its Orders for provisional measures the Court requires the State and the Commission to 
report to it on the implementation of its provisional measures.101 Preparing the periodic reports on 
                                                 
97 Interview by author with Juan Mendez, Washington D.C., 17 October 2001. 
98 “Accordingly, the Court must monitor that the States concerned comply with the reparations it 
has ordered, before informing the OAS General Assembly about any failure to comply with its 
decisions. The Court’s monitoring of compliance with its decisions implies, first, that it must 
request information from the State on the actions carried out to implement compliance, and then 
obtain the comments of the Commission and of the victims or their representatives. When the 
Court has received this information, it can assess whether the State has complied with its 
judgment, guide the State’s actions to that effect, and comply with its obligation to inform the 
General Assembly, in the terms of Article 65 of the Convention”. IACHR Annual Report 2006, 
pp. 41-42. 
99 IACHR Annual Report 2007, p. 40. As pointed out by Buergenthal (1994), pp. 91-92, already 
before an initial Order for provisional measures is made, ‘the mere threat of a hearing’ would 
tend ‘to make the State concerned more willing to adopt on its own certain protective measures it 
was previously unwilling to consider’. The developments since 1994 have confirmed this. The 
possibility of hearings has become an important tool at different stages of the proceedings before 
the Court and the private hearings that have in fact taken place since 2007 monitoring compliance 
with the Court’s judgments have reportedly already had an important positive effect in the 
attitude of States.  
100 Buergenthal (1994), p. 94. 
101 Buergenthal (1994), p. 92 notes that the Court cannot really act on the follow-up information 
provided by the Commission unless it is sitting. “To deal with this problem the Court in one case 
assigned to its own Permanent Commission the task of monitoring compliance. The Commission 
then began to transmit to the Court, without comment or analysis, all communications it received 
from the attorneys in the case relating to the provisional measures, forcing the Court to conclude 
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State compliance required by the Court is an enormous task for the Commission to tackle. It has 
to depend largely on the petitioners, usually NGOs, and it complements this, to some extent, with 
information gathered during on-site visits. The main problem in countries like Colombia, is losing 
contact with the beneficiaries. Local NGOs may be under death threats themselves and/or, be-
cause of an ongoing conflict, the Commission cannot send people to a particular area to gather 
information. Sometimes the Commission simply has to inform the Court that it is not in a position 
to give information on the current situation.102 Information on the situation of the beneficiaries of 
precautionary and provisional measures is essential for any follow-up. Without such information 
these measures cannot be effective. Especially in cases of threats and internal displacement effec-
tiveness is fundamentally related to access. The intended beneficiaries are often located in remote 
places to which the Inter-American Commission, the petitioners or even the UNHCR have no 
access.103 Without access to the beneficiaries it proves very problematic to monitor a State’s 
compliance with provisional measures. Obviously, when the Commission and the petitioners 
cannot find the victims, the Commission is unable to monitor compliance and without follow-up 
the effectiveness decreases both of its own precautionary measures and of the provisional meas-
ures ordered by the Court. 
The Court also holds hearings for a follow-up on its provisional measures. It has specifi-
cally followed up on promises made by States. In the Peace Community case Colombia had 
pointed out both in 2000 and in 2002 that it was seeking to design an early warning system to be 
coordinated between the Community and the public security forces in order to be effective.104 
While it had already announced this in 2000, in 2002 it was still at the intentional stage. In 2002 
the Court ordered that, in agreement with the beneficiaries or their representatives, the State must 
also establish a mechanism for continuous surveillance and permanent security in the Community, 
in conformity with the terms of the Court’s Order.105 
In its Order for provisional measures in the mass expulsion case the Court expressed its ap-
preciation about the State’s willingness – shown at the public hearing – to improve its procedures 
and practices.106 This remark is important for the Court’s follow-up of its provisional measures 
because at that stage it may refer to the State’s promise and enquire about the results. The State 
assured the Court that with regard to the other people protected by the provisional measures, no 
deportations had occurred.  
In Orders to halt an execution the Inter-American Court provides the rationale for its use of 
provisional measures: ‘if the State were to execute the alleged victims, this would lead to an 
irreparable situation, as well as constitute conduct incompatible with the object and purpose of the 
Convention’.107 This type of motivation may enhance compliance. The same applies to clarity: it 
                                                                                                                       
that it was being asked to perform functions it was not really competent to perform under the 
Convention. As a result the Court returned the matter to the Commission for further monitoring. 
The matter was never resubmitted to the Court”. The matter was that of Bustíos-Rojas (Peru). See 
Order of 8 August 1990 for the Court’s decision to monitor itself and Order of 17 January 1991 
returning the matter to the Commission. 
102 See also Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk). 
103 See also Chapter XIII (Protection), section 3 on beneficiaries. 
104 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 24 November 
2000. 
105 IACHR Peace Community of San José de Apartadó case (Colombia), Order of 18 June 2002. 
106 IACHR Haitians and Dominicans of Haitian Origin in the Dominican Republic, Order of 18 
August 2000. 
107 See e.g. IACHR James et al., Order of 26 November 2001 (12th ‘Considering’ clause); Raxcacó 
et al., 30 August 2004 (9th ‘Considering’ clause) and Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, 25 
November 2004 (9th ‘Considering’ clause). 
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must be very clear to the State what is expected from it. If the responses of States on previous 
occasions leave much to be desired, the Court’s follow-up will be more specific.108 
As noted, the references in its Orders to the State’s reporting obligations show that the 
Court has incorporated some form of follow-up in its Orders themselves.109 Yet in some instances 
the Court has also followed up the implementation of its Orders outside of the Orders themselves. 
In conformity with Article 65 ACHR, it informed the General Assembly of the State’s failure to 
comply with its decisions on provisional measures. It requested the General Assembly to urge the 
State to comply with them. It also wished to put on record its concern about Trinidad’s denuncia-
tion of the Convention, on 26 May 1998. It pointed out that this decision, which was without 
precedent in the history of the Inter-American human rights system, did not apply to the Court’s 
provisional measures in this case. Finally, the Court considered that while States Parties have a 
right to denounce international instruments, when it concerns international human rights treaties, 
due to their special nature, such denunciation affects the international or regional human rights 
system as a whole. This particular situation justified, therefore, involvement on the part of the 
OAS General Assembly to request Trinidad to reconsider its decision.110 
It appears, however, from the Court’s note to the OAS Secretary General of May 1999, that 
the General Assembly did not properly receive the Court’s request to urge Trinidad to comply 
with its obligations under the Convention. In this note the Court asked the Secretary General to 
bring its letter to the attention of the General Assembly. It quoted Article 65 and pointed out that 
‘it falls to the General Assembly to take formal note of the recommendations which the Court 
makes in its Annual Report concerning non-compliance with its decisions, and to issue such 
comments as it may consider pertinent’. It wrote that until then all States Parties to the ACHR had 
complied with its Orders. Trinidad and Tobago was the ‘sole exception’.111 
                                                 
108 This was the case already early on the Court’s practice. Buergenthal (1994), p. 82 refers to the 
matter of Bustíos Rojas regarding the protection of witnesses to the killing of a journalist in Peru, 
in which the IACHR, in its second Order, 17 January 1991 responded to Peru’s reported manner 
of compliance with the Court’s Order. Peru had informed the Court that it had ‘established a 
system of military liaisons whom the protected persons could contact’. In its follow-up the Court 
ordered Peru to supplement this system ‘in three Peruvian localities with a comparable civilian 
liaison system’. “This part of the order can be traced to the concern expressed by the Commission 
that the persons to be protected, some of whom were in hiding, accused various military officers 
of having been the killers. The witnesses might therefore have had a justified fear of military 
liaison officers affiliated with the very units that could have been involved in the murder and 
attempted cover-up”. IACHR Bustíos Rojas (Peru), Order of 17 January 1991. On specificity see 
further Chapter XIII (Protection), section 3. 
109 In its Order of August 1998, for example, the Court required the State to report every two weeks 
on the status of the appeals and scheduled executions. It also required the Commission to send its 
observations on these reports within two days of their receipt. It ordered both the State and the 
Commission to inform it immediately of any significant developments. James et al. cases, Order 
of 29 August 1998. 
110 CIDH Informe Anual 1998, II (Actividades Jurisdiccionales y consultivas de la Corte), K. 
(Estado de Cumplimiento de las Sentencias de la Corte), §7. 
111 The Court reminded the Secretary General that, in the new structure of the General Assembly, the 
Presidents of the Inter-American Commission and Court (and the Inter-American Juridical 
Committee) could no longer orally present their Annual Reports. Instead, the Assembly only 
received for consideration a Resolution on the observations and recommendations to the Annual 
Reports approved by the Permanent Council. Both the Commission on Juridical and Political 
Matters and the Permanent Council, however, had omitted the Court’s recommendation. Thus, 
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“It is a matter of profound concern to the Court that, in the operative part of the 
recommendations concerning its 1998 Annual Report, which the Commission on Juridical and 
Political Matters and the Permanent Council of the Organisation are forwarding to the General 
Assembly, no mention is made of the Court’s recommendation…”.112 
The Court decided to send copies of this letter to all Ministers of Foreign Relations of the OAS 
member States and also to their Permanent Representatives to the OAS in Washington D.C.113 
This proactive approach was considered necessary to ensure that all OAS Member States are 
aware of the situation. Still, the General Assembly adopted no resolution on this issue during its 
1999 session. 
                                                                                                                       
the General Assembly would be ‘precluded from considering and commenting on’ the Court’s 
recommendation to urge Trinidad to comply with the Court’s Orders.  
112 IACHR James et al. case, Note of the Court to His Excellency Ambassador Julio César Aráoz, 
President of the Permanent Council, 24 May 1999. The Court emphasised that the protection of 
human rights is the most important function of the OAS, ‘as has been acknowledged by Your 
Excellency’. The omission of the Court’s recommendation ‘affects the very essence of the Inter-
American System of human rights protection, which finds its most telling expression in the 
binding nature of the judgements issued by the jurisdictional organ, the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights’. The Court also noted that previously it had already taken steps to convince the 
Permanent Council, by sending two notes to its President. These notes, which the Court enclosed, 
remained without effect. In May 1999 the Court sent the first note to the President of the 
Permanent Council. This letter referred to the draft Resolution on the Court’s Annual Report that 
the Commission on Juridical and Political Affairs had presented to the Permanent Council. 
“When studying the draft Resolution that will be submitted to the General Assembly, the Court 
noted with some surprise that, whilst its second “considering” makes mention to [sic] Article 65 
and to the duty of the Court to report the cases in which a State fails to comply with its 
judgements, the operative exhortation to the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago to comply with the 
Orders of the Court has been omitted”. IACHR James et al. case, Note of the Court to His 
Excellency Ambassador Julio César Aráoz, President of the Permanent Council, 24 May 1999. 
The Court emphasised the importance of the support of the highest organ of the OAS to help 
safeguard the effectiveness of the Inter-American system. It requested the inclusion in the draft 
Resolution of an operative paragraph in which ‘the General Assembly urges the Republic of 
Trinidad and Tobago to comply’ with the Court’s Orders for provisional measures. Such 
inclusion would be ‘in compliance with’ Article 65 ACHR. The Court also requested the 
President to submit its note to the next session of the full Permanent Council, James et al. case, 
Note of the Court to His Excellency Ambassador Julio César Aráoz, President of the Permanent 
Council, 24 May 1999. The Court received a reply by the President of the Permanent Council. It 
did not specify its contents but acknowledged its receipt and reiterated that ‘the Court esteems 
that it is convenient that the Permanent Council consider and decide upon the inclusion of an 
operative paragraph relating to Trinidad and Tobago’s failure to comply with its Orders for this 
Tribunal’, James et al. case, Note of the Court to His Excellency Ambassador Julio César Aráoz, 
President of the Permanent Council, 25 May 1999. As mentioned before, the Court included these 
letters in its note to the OAS Secretary General. It concluded that: “The Court is of the view that 
this issue which is of fundamental importance for the Organisation and the Inter-American 
System, should receive the benefit of a pronouncement by the General Assembly, the highest 
organ of the Organisation”. James et al. case, Note of the Court to His Excellency César Gaviria 
T., Secretary General of the OAS, 27 May 1999. 
113 IACHR James et al. case, Note of the Court to His Excellency César Gaviria T., Secretary 
General of the OAS, 27 May 1999. 
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During its Thirtieth Regular Session in Windsor, Canada, which was held from 4 to 6 June 
2000, the President of the Court presented the Court’s Annual Report 1999 to the General As-
sembly. The General Assembly had once more changed its structure, at least to the extent that the 
Court’s President was able again to personally present the Court’s Report. In June 2000 the Gen-
eral Assembly adopted its amended Rules of Procedure. These state that the ‘chairs or representa-
tives’ of, among others, the Commission and the Court ‘may attend the General Assembly with 
the right to speak’.114 
Upon his presentation, the General Assembly adopted a resolution in which it reiterated 
‘that the judgments of the Court are final and may not be appealed and that the states parties to the 
Convention undertake to comply with the rulings of the Court in all cases to which they are 
party’. The Assembly also urged States that had denounced the ACHR or withdrawn their recog-
nition of the Court’s obligatory jurisdiction to reconsider their decisions.115 In other words, in its 
Session of June 2000 the General Assembly issued the Resolution the Court had requested it to 
take the year before. Now the Assembly itself referred to Article 65 ACHR establishing that the 
Court ‘shall submit’ to the General Assembly a Report on its work during the previous year. It 
pointed out that the Court ‘shall specify, in particular, the cases in which a state has not complied 
with the Court’s judgments and make any pertinent recommendations’. The Assembly also reiter-
ated the Court’s statement about the particular nature of the regional human rights system: ‘bear-
ing in mind that the denunciation of inter-American legal instruments on human rights and the 
withdrawal of recognition of the Court’s binding jurisdiction affect the regional system as a 
whole, due to its particular nature’.116 
The Court had followed up specifically the cases of Mr. Ramiah and Mr. Briggs. In these 
cases it only approached the State itself, but did not resort to the General Assembly. In June 1999 
Trinidad had executed Joey Ramiah in violation of the Court’s provisional measures. As a first 
response to the execution the Court pointed out that Mr. Ramiah ‘was protected by the Provi-
sional Measures ordered by the Court’.117 The State may have thought that, in light of the attitude 
of the OAS Permanent Council with regard to the Court’s Annual Report 1998 and the conse-
quent lack of discussion of the Court’s Report of non-compliance under Article 65 ACHR during 
the 1999 Session of the General Assembly, there was not much risk of General Assembly in-
volvement if it would execute some of its prisoners in violation of the Court’s provisional meas-
ures.  
On 27 July 1999 the Deputy Secretary of the Court wrote to Trinidad that the President of 
the Court had directed him to urgently request the State to present information on the Commis-
sion’s communication informing the Court that Trinidad had read Mr. Briggs a warrant of execu-
tion.118 He reminded the State of the Court’s provisional measures on behalf of Mr. Briggs, in 
                                                 
114 OAS General Assembly, Amendments to the Rules of Procedure, OEA/Ser.P, AG/RES. 1737 
(XXX-O/00), 5 June 2000 (original: Spanish). 
115 OAS General Assembly, Resolution AG/RES. 1716 (XXX-O/00), 5 June 2000, reproduced in: 
Annual Report 2000, III (Other activities of the Court), 8. (Thirtieth Regular Session of the 
General Assembly of the OAS) and Commission Annual Report 2000, Chapter IIa. 
116 OAS General Assembly, Observations and Recommendations of the Member States on the 
Annual Report of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, AG/RES. 1716 (XXX-O/00), 5 
June 2000, reproduced in: Commission Annual Report 2000, Chapter Iia. 
117 IACHR James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 16 August 2000. 
118 In the Briggs case the Commission informed the Court, in June 1999, that the High Court of 
Trinidad and Tobago had dismissed an application to stay his execution and that the State’s Court 
of Appeal had dismissed his appeal. The latter court indicated that ‘notwithstanding the Order of 
the Court of 25 May 1999, it was not satisfied that any substantive issue respecting Anthony 
Briggs was pending before the Inter-American Court’. It also refused to grant a stay of execution 
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particular its Order of May 1999. In this Order ‘the Court considered the circumstances of Mr. 
Briggs’ case before the Inter-American system and after deliberation’ decided to maintain the 
measures until such time as the Court would have issued a decision.119 Trinidad executed An-
thony Briggs that same day. 
In its Order of 16 August 2000 the Court censured the State for having executed Anthony 
Briggs and Joey Ramiah. It pointed out that ‘pursuant to the Orders of the Inter-American Court’ 
Trinidad and Tobago ‘had a duty to preserve the life and physical integrity of Anthony Briggs and 
Joey Ramiah’.120 It reprimanded Trinidad for failure to submit the required fortnightly reports on 
the circumstances of the beneficiaries of the Court’s provisional measures. The Order considered 
that the State ‘did present its observations on the execution of Anthony Briggs and, in like man-
ner, this Court deems important to obtain information on the circumstances that led to the execu-
tion of Joey Ramiah’. It then referred to the Court’s obligation to comply in good faith with the 
provisions and to its duty not to take actions that may frustrate restitution in kind of the rights of 
the alleged victims. The Court referred to Article 65 ACHR on the recommendations the Court 
shall submit to the General Assembly in cases of non-compliance. Although this reference can be 
found in its considerations and not in its decisions, it gives an indication of the action the Court 
might undertake as follow-up to the State’s non-compliance. 
As part of its follow-up it required Trinidad to submit information, within two weeks, ‘on 
the circumstances that led to the execution of Joey Ramiah so that the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights may consider it and include it in its report to the next General Assembly of the 
Organisation of American States’.121 In September 2000, ‘pursuant to the Order of the Court’, the 
State ‘presented information regarding the circumstances that led to the execution of Joey 
Ramiah’.122 
In February 2000 the Commission submitted to the Court the case of Constantine et al. v. 
Trinidad and Tobago, which encompassed the case of Joey Ramiah. In its Judgment in this case, 
Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin and others, the Court found that the State had arbitrarily 
deprived Mr. Ramiah of his right to life in violation of Article 4 ACHR. “This situation is aggra-
vated because the victim was protected by Provisional Measures ordered by this Tribunal, which 
expressly indicated that his execution should be stayed pending the resolution of the case by the 
inter-American human rights system”.123 The State had ‘caused irreparable harm to the detriment 
of Joey Ramiah, by reason of its disregard of a direct order of the Court and its deliberate decision 
                                                                                                                       
pending an appeal to the Privy Council. Mr. Briggs’ solicitors instead brought an expedited 
petition for special leave to appeal to the Privy Council. They sought a stay of his execution 
pending the determination of this petition. On 21 June the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council indeed granted him leave to appeal as well as a stay of execution. It requested ‘further 
clarification from his solicitors as to the nature of the matter relating to him that was pending 
before the Inter-American Court’. On the same day the Commission informed the Court of this 
situation. The next month, however, the Privy Council dismissed his appeal. See further Chapter 
XIV (Jurisdiction). 
119 Letter of Deputy Secretary Renzo Pomi to the honourable Ralph Maharaji, M.P., Minister of 
Foreign Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, 27 July 1999, REF: CDH-S/877. The Court also 
reproduced the relevant parts of this letter in: James et al. cases, Order for provisional measures, 
16 August 2000.  
120 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 16 August 2000. See also the Order of 24 November 2000. 
121 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 16 August 2000. 
122 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 24 November 2000. 
123 IACHR Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 
2002, §198. 
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to order the execution of this victim’.124 It stressed ‘the seriousness of the State’s non-compliance 
in virtue of the execution of the victim despite the existence of Provisional Measures in his fa-
vour, and as such’ found the State responsible for violating Article 4 ACHR.125 
While the Court ordered different forms of reparation in the cases of the other victims, with 
regard to Mr. Ramiah this was no longer possible. Instead it ordered payment of damages for 
immaterial harm to his wife (to be used on behalf of their son) and mother. In light of the Court’s 
remark about its provisional measures, its finding of an additional violation in the case of Mr. 
Ramiah can be seen as a form of follow-up of the Court’s provisional measures in his case. Nev-
ertheless the Court should also have found a violation of Article 63(2) ACHR on provisional 
measures.126 Moreover, as has the European Court with regard to Article 34 ECHR, it could have 
found a violation of the right of individual petition (Article 44 ACHR).127 
The Court did not refer to the execution of Briggs because his case was not included in the 
Commission’s submission to the Court that resulted in the Hilaire, Constantine and Benjamin and 
others Judgment. In order to follow up the Briggs case the Commission could have instituted new 
proceedings on the State’s non-compliance with its recommendations in the Article 51 Report and 
with the Court’s provisional measures. It could have moved such a case quickly through and 
submitted it to the Court. Yet it did not do so.128 
The Court had summoned the State and the Commission to a public hearing in August 1998 
to discuss the provisional measures to halt the executions. Yet, Trinidad informed the Court that it 
‘must decline’ its summons to appear at this public hearing. The President of the Court sent a note 
to the Prime Minister of Trinidad reiterating the importance of this State’s appearance before the 
Court to fulfil its obligation as a State Party to the ACHR.  
When in 1998 Trinidad announced its refusal to appear before the Inter-American Court the 
Court's President pointed out that the Court had always relied on the good faith and cooperation 
of States so that it could carry out its mandate. He expressed the following strongly worded criti-
cism:  
“the failure of a State Party to appear at a public hearing, to which it has been duly summoned, 
is without precedent in the history of the Court. The Tribunal is seriously concerned by the 
implications of Trinidad and Tobago’s decision in the present matter and its ramifications”.129 
The Court’s President explained the importance of such hearing in which the Court sought to 
permit the Commission and the State to present their arguments in a public forum ‘without com-
promising their positions in the proceedings which are currently pending before the Commission’. 
Apart from allowing both parties the opportunity to publicly present their arguments, such a 
hearing was also important, ‘due to the urgency and complexity of these matters’, to enable the 
Court to fully consider these arguments.130 The Court later stressed that Trinidad’s failure to 
appear at the public hearing ‘represents a violation of its international obligations under the 
American Convention’.131 
                                                 
124 Id., §199. 
125 Id., §200. 
126 On non-compliance with the Court’s provisional measures as a violation of Article 63(2) ACHR 
itself, see already Buergenthal (1994), p. 88. 
127 See Chapter XVI (Legal status). See also Haeck/Burbano Herrera/Zwaak (2008), p. 46 and p. 63. 
128 See also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction). 
129 IACHR James et al. case, note from the President to the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, 
19 August 1998, Series E, Compendium 2. 
130 Ibid. 
131 IACHR James et al. cases, Order of 9 August 1998. 
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In its Order for provisional measures in Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados the Inter-American 
Court has pointed out that the State is ‘under the obligation to keep this Tribunal informed regard-
ing the actions it has taken to comply with the Order of the President. The provision of such 
information is essential in order to permit the Court to evaluate the State’s degree of compliance 
with the said Order’.132 In this case the Court decided that despite the temporary stay of execution 
by the High Court of Barbados, it would maintain its provisional measures. It considered the stay 
‘a crucial step on the part of the State’ to protect the fundamental rights of the beneficiaries ‘as 
well as to facilitate the processing of their cases in accordance with the requirements of the 
American Convention’. It noted, however, that the State had failed to submit the report required 
in the President’s Order two months previously and the Court consequently decided to maintain 
its Order.133 
Often the Inter-American Court follows up earlier provisional measures by confirming, 
specifying and/or expanding them. The Court has also maintained its provisional measures, in 
some of its cases, even after its decision on the merits of the case, because some of the witnesses 
involved in that case were still being threatened. In some of these cases the Court’s Judgment on 
Reparations was still pending, but it seems that even if that were not the case, the Court does not 
consider a case ‘closed’ until a State has implemented the Court’s Judgment on Reparations. Yet 
it now started the practice of continuing monitoring specifically as part of its procedure for super-
vision of Compliance of Judgments, often thereby concluding its provisional measures and in-
stead issuing Orders on (non-)compliance.134 At other times it decides to lift them with regard to 
those beneficiaries that are no longer at risk of irreparable harm to their life or personal integrity. 
It has also decided to lift provisional measures when it considered its monitoring was more ap-
propriately related to compliance with a judgment on the merits or reparation.135 
Following up on its Judgments in the cases Fermín Ramírez and Raxcacó Reyes the Inter-
American Court pointed out that it is a power inherent in its jurisdictional function to supervise 
compliance with its decisions.136 States must apply their obligations in good faith (pacta sunt 
servanda) and the State may not forward internal reasons for non-compliance. The obligations 
apply to all organs of the State. Implementation by State agents of a domestic law that violates the 
ACHR triggers international state responsibility. When a State has ratified an international treaty 
such as the ACHR its domestic courts, as part of the State apparatus, are obliged to ensure that the 
                                                 
132 IACHR Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados. Order of 25 November 2004, §6. 
133 Ibid. 
134 See also Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). It may also combine the two types of 
Orders, see e.g. IACHR Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Order of 27 January 2009, declaring 
Guatemala’s partial compliance with the Judgment on Reparations, declaring to keep open its 
monitoring process until full compliance is achieved and maintaining its provisional measures of 
11 March 2005 (Provisional Measures and Monitoring Compliance with Judgment). 
135 See e.g. IACHR Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community (Nicaragua), Order of 26 
November 2007. In December 2008 the Commission issued a press release praising the 
demarcation and titling of ancestral lands belonging to the Awas Tingni. The government of 
Nicaragua gave them the property title to 73,000 hectares of its territory, which ‘marked a critical 
step forwards’ in the resolution of the case. See CIDH press release 62/08, ‘IACHR hails titling 
of Awas Tingni Community lands in Nicaragua’, 18 December 2008. 
136 See e.g. IACHR Order on supervision of compliance of the cases Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala 
and Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala and on the request to expand the provisional measures in 
Raxcacó Reyes y otros, 9 May 2008, 1st ‘Considering’ clause. 
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effects of the decisions made under the ACHR are not diminished because of the application of 
domestic laws that revolts against its object and purpose.137 
In its (consecutive) Orders the Inter-American Court also follows up on the implementation 
of the provisional measures ordered by it and, while doing so, it refers to the particularly impor-
tant role of the Commission in adequately and effectively following up on the implementation of 
the measures ordered by the Court. It stresses that the State’s reports reflect the adoption of the 
priority measures established by the Court by describing the specific results achieved.138 
The Court has pointed out that provisional measures have an exceptional character. They 
are ordered in function of the necessities of protection and, once ordered, they must be maintained 
as long as the Court considers that the basic requirements of extreme gravity and urgency and the 
prevention of irreparable harm to the persons protected by them, are still fulfilled.139 
In the context of three cases against Venezuela the Court noted that the State had questioned 
the Court’s power to supervise its provisional measures, rather than responded to the requirement 
to provide information. Venezuela considered that the Court exceeded its power of supervision of 
compliance if it demanded information from the State, on an obligatory basis, with regard to the 
implementation of its measures or called into question the manner in which the State was imple-
menting them.140 Yet, as the Court has noted, the power to supervise the compliance with its 
provisional measures and give instructions as requested by the parties or proprio motu is a power 
inherent to the Court’s functions.141 In other words it is simply part of the normal exercise of its 
jurisdictional functions.142 
The State’s duty to inform the Court has a dual character. It requires for its effective imple-
mentation the formal presentation of a document as well as specific, recent and detailed informa-
tion with regard to the implementation of the specific obligations.143 In this respect the Court has 
stressed that it follows a written procedure that permits it to supervise compliance with the provi-
sional measures adopted by it and to guarantee respect for the contradictory nature of the proceed-
ings so that all parties (the State, the Commission and the beneficiaries) must have the opportu-
nity to provide the Court with the information they consider relevant with regard to the compli-
ance with the Order. Often public hearings take place that allow for oral testimonies by the par-
ties.144 
In 2008, when faced with a request to expand the provisional measures in Raxcacó Reyes y 
otros, the Court pointed out that because Article 62(2) ACHR refers to cases of prima facie ur-
gency, while the risk of irreparable harm in these cases related to violations that have already 
been established by judgments of the Court that have res iudicata status, it would not order the 
provisional measures requested. Instead it ordered the State simply to comply with its judgment, 
adding specifications and noting that it would continue to monitor the situation.145 
                                                 
137 IACHR Order on supervision of compliance of the cases Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala and 
Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala and on the request to expand the provisional measures in Raxcacó 
Reyes y otros, 9 May 2008, 4th ‘Considering’ clause. The Court also referred to Article 27 VCLT. 
138 IACHR Matter of Mendoza prisons, Order of 27 November 2007, 3rd ‘Decisional’ clause. 
139 IACHR Matter of Liliana Ortega et al. (Venezuela), Order of 14 June 2005, 5th ‘Considering’ 
clause. 
140 IACHR Liliana Ortega et al.; Luisiana Ríos et al.; Luis Uzcátegui; Marta Colomina and Liliana 
Velásquez (Venezuela), Order of 4 May 2004, 16th ‘Considering’ clause. 
141 Id., 9th ‘Considering’ clause. 
142 Id., 11th ‘Considering’ clause. 
143 Id., 15th ‘Considering’ clause. 
144 Id., 10th ‘Considering’ clause. 
145 IACHR Order on supervision of compliance of the cases Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala and 
Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala. See also e.g. IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the “Dr. 
 
 Chapter XVIII 
1048 
In any case, as noted, the Inter-American Court has now decided, in cases in which it has al-
ready found violations on the merits, often simply to order compliance with the obligations based 
already on its previous Judgments rather than ordering provisional measures to halt irreparable 
harm. In other words it now more clearly distinguishes between supervision of its judgments on 
the merits and reparation and supervision, expansion or termination of its provisional measures. 
2.2.8 Supervision and monitoring in the European system 
The former European Commission on Human Rights has sometimes followed up specifically on 
its provisional measures, in the face of possible or actual non-compliance. It did so, for instance, 
by renewing them in response to certain developments.146 It has also used follow-up provisional 
                                                                                                                       
Sebastião Martins Silveira” Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 
September 2006, Matter of the persons imprisoned in the “Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira” 
Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006 and Case of 
Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Order of 2 February 2007 on supervision of 
compliance, 9th and 12th ‘Considering’ clauses. As part of the request to expand the provisional 
measures in Raxcacó Reyes y otros, 9 May 2008, the petitioners had also requested provisional 
measures on behalf of one person whose case was still pending in the Inter-American system, but 
this was a new matter that could not be dealt with as an expansion of existing provisional 
measures. Thus it involved a new request for provisional measures in a matter not yet pending 
before the Court. Therefore it was the Commission that had to request these measures and not the 
petitioners. See Chapter II (Systems). After the Commission indeed did so, the Court decided to 
order provisional measures on his behalf. IACHR Order on supervision of compliance of the 
cases Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala and Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala and on the request to 
expand the provisional measures in Raxcacó Reyes y otros, 9 May 2008, 51st-63rd ‘Considering’ 
clauses. 
146 In EComHR B. v France (1987) the petitioner gave himself up to the French police. He explained 
that he himself wished to be extradited in order to be able to defend himself. Once detained, he 
allegedly found out he had already been sentenced to death in absentia in Morocco. EComHR B. 
v. France, 22 January 1987 (inadm.), p. 173. He feared that, upon return, he would ‘not be 
entitled to adversarial proceedings together with the guarantees accompanying a fair trial’. “If 
that proved to be the case, he would not be in a position to defend himself and enforcement of the 
death penalty would therefore constitute treatment contrary to Article 3 of the Convention”, p. 
174. In August 1985 the President of the European Commission used provisional measures to 
halt his extradition. The next month the French Government informed the Commission that it had 
asked the Moroccan authorities to specify whether, in the event of Mr. B. being handed over to 
them, he could be retried in the Government’s presence in Morocco. It had also asked for a 
formal undertaking that, if the death penalty were to be pronounced a second time, it would not 
be enforced. The Commission decided to adjourn its examination of the case in light of the 
information provided by France. Many months later, in July 1986, the French Government 
informed the Commission that, according to the Moroccan authorities, a retrial was possible. 
From this, it concluded that it could ‘carry out the extradition in the next few weeks’. p. 175. As 
the Commission put it, the Government referred ‘only to the first of the two conditions with 
which the Moroccan authorities had been asked to comply’, p. 175. Accordingly, in August, 
October and December 1986 the President of the Commission renewed the application of Rule 
36, p. 175. It specifically requested the views of the parties with regard to the question ‘whether a 
person detained with a view to extradition who receives a communication of this kind is not 
justified in placing legitimate confidence in the Government’s consenting to his extradition only 
if the Moroccan authorities give a formal undertaking that, in the event of the death penalty being 
pronounced a second time, it will not be enforced’. It added the question whether ‘a change in the 
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measures to the effect that the State that ignored its provisional measures to halt an expulsion or 
extradition should enable the return of the petitioner. In Cruz Varas v. Sweden (1990) the Euro-
pean Commission specifically pointed out, under Rule 36 on provisional measures, that the State 
should take measures to enable the petitioner’s return to Sweden as soon as possible ‘given the 
failure of the Government to comply’ with its earlier provisional measures.147 The State re-
sponded that the National Immigration Board was responsible for granting permission to enter 
and remain in Sweden. A week after receipt of the Commission’s provisional measures the Gov-
ernment had informed the Board of these measures. Two weeks later the Board rejected the re-
quest from Mr. Cruz Varas to be allowed to return to Sweden.148 The Commission only followed 
up this decision when it maintained its provisional measures a few days later, but when the Board 
subsequently confirmed this rejection the Commission did not respond. Instead it decided, a few 
months later, not to prolong its provisional measures.149 
In Mansi v. Sweden (1989) the State again ignored the Commission’s provisional measures. 
In this case as well the Commission subsequently invoked Rule 36 so that the Government would 
take measures to enable the petitioner to return to Sweden as soon as possible. Sweden informed 
the Commission that it had transmitted these provisional measures to the National Immigration 
Board. This is interesting because the Government had expelled Mansi despite this Board’s pro-
posal not to do so.150 Both Amnesty International and a representative of the Swedish Embassy in 
Jordan confirmed that he had been tortured upon return. Later the petitioner was allowed to return 
to Sweden and the case never came before the ECtHR because a friendly settlement was agreed 
upon.151 
As noted, the Inter-American Court itself monitors compliance. In the European system it is 
the Committee of Ministers (the Permanent Representatives of the member States) of the Council 
of Europe that supervises the execution of the Court’s judgments under Article 46(2) ECHR. It 
generally does so through constructive dialogue. Normally a case remains on the agenda until the 
State concerned has informed the Committee of the measures it has taken to implement the judg-
ment. Following this the Committee adopts a resolution containing the information given by the 
State.152 
                                                                                                                       
Government’s attitude’ was ‘liable to constitute a violation of Article 3 of the Convention, in 
view of the confidence awakened in the prisoner and the extreme seriousness of the issue 
concerning him’, pp. 175-176. The case was subsequently declared inadmissible for non-
exhaustion. 
147 EComHR Cruz Varas et al. v. Sweden, 7 June 1990 (Article 31 report), §§61 and 73. 
148 Id., §§62 and 38. 
149 Id., §§63 and 38. See also §§105-127 and dissenting opinion Sperduti. 
150 EComHR Mansi v. Sweden, 7 December 1989 (adm.), p. 244. 
151 EComHR Mansi v. Sweden, 9 March 1990 (Friendly settlement). 
152 See e.g. Klerk (2000), p. 154; Van der Velde (1997); VandeLanotte/Haeck (2005), pp. 733-752; 
Zwaak (2008) and Lodeweges (2008), pp. 949-953. Among others, within the Council of Europe 
a Department for the Execution of Judgments of the ECtHR has been established. Moreover, the 
Committee of Ministers has suggested to the Court, in its Resolution (2004) 3, 12 May 2004 to 
specifically identify systemic problems underlying the violations found, especially ‘when it is 
likely to give rise to numerous applications’, so as to assist states in finding the appropriate 
solution and the Committee of Ministers in supervising the execution of judgments’. See also 
Chapter XIII (Protection). This 2004 resolution also invited the Court to ‘specifically notify any 
judgment containing indications of the existence of a systemic problem not only to the state 
concerned and to the Committee of Ministers, but also to the Parliamentary Assembly, to the 
Secretary General of the Council of Europe and to the Council of Europe Commissioner for 
Human Rights, and to highlight such judgments in an appropriate manner in the database of the 
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The Court’s Rule 39 on provisional measures also specifically refers to the Committee of 
Minister’s monitoring role. The Committee of Ministers has the role to follow up on compliance 
with the Court’s provisional measures. Apparently one reason for including in Rule 39 a para-
graph on follow-up was to compensate for the fact that legally binding provisional measures were 
not included as such in Protocol 11.153 Garry notes the significance of the fact that this follow-up 
procedure is the same as that used after a binding final judgment has been issued under Article 
46(2) ECHR.154 The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, by way of its Committee 
on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, has actively followed up on provisional measures as well.155 
Nevertheless the fact that the Committee of Ministers does perform a task monitoring com-
pliance of judgments as well as provisional measures and that the Parliamentary Assembly also 
plays a role, does not exclude the Court’s own role in monitoring compliance. Lawson suggests 
this would apply in particular to monitoring measures directly related to the rights of the individu-
als involved: cessation of the violation, restitutio in integrum and payment of compensation, 
rather than changes in legislation. He also suggests that the Court should be able to keep the case 
on its docket to allow the national authorities, for instance, to reopen a criminal case. If this takes 
too long the European Court could still intervene.156 The text of Article 41 ECHR certainly allows 
the ECtHR to monitor compliance with its judgments, including reparation in the form of restitu-
tio in integrum. Like the Inter-American Court it could later issue a judgment on reparations 
taking into account the measures already taken by the State.157 Lawson gives some additional 
                                                                                                                       
Court’. Formally the Secretary General has the power, under Article 52 ECHR, to request from 
the State an explanation of its implementation of the Convention. The fact that the resolution 
refers to the Secretary General may open up the possibilities of this provision somewhat. The 
reason why the Committee also refers to the Parliamentary Assembly is obviously related to the 
fact that the latter has already involved itself in the supervision of judgments and may employ 
possibilities for publicity. The Committee of Ministers itself publishes interim decisions on 
implementation, which may include increasingly urgent language. The fact that it makes public 
such decisions is a way to pressure the State through public opinion. An interesting option 
suggested by Zwaak (2008), p. 362 is the use of Article 17 Statute of the Council of Europe, 
under which the Committee of Ministers may set up advisory or technical committees or 
commissions, for instance ‘for the purpose of taking evidence and other tasks within the context 
of its function under the Convention’. Indeed such committees could also assist in the follow-up 
on provisional measures, especially of those revealing an underlying systemic problem affecting 
large groups of people. 
153 See interview by Garry (2001) with Judge Pellonpää, Section IV, 16 June 2000, p. 409. 
154 Garry (2001), p. 409. 
155 See e.g. its response to Russia ignoring the Court’s provisional measures to suspend the 
deportation of a person to Uzbekistan. The President of the Parliamentary Assembly René van 
der Linden wrote to the Chairman of the Russian delegation to PACE to ask for explanations, see 
Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 
‘Member states’ duty to co-operate with the European Court of Human Rights’, Doc. 11183, 9, 
February 2007, Explanatory memorandum by Rapporteur Christos Pourgourides, §52 (in 
footnote). In this case the ECtHR found Russia in violation of Article 3 ECHR (among others). 
Yet given the conflicting information with regard to the timeline of the expulsion and the moment 
Russia received the provisional measures, the Court felt unable to find a violation of Article 34 
ECHR for disrespecting its provisional measures, Muminov v. Russia, 11 December 2008. 
156 See Lawson (Preadvies 1999), pp. 82-83, p. 85. 
157 See also Lawson (Preadvies 1999), p. 82. In the proposed 14th Protocol, awaiting ratification by 
Russia, it is the Committee of Ministers that can ask the Court to interpret its previous judgments 
in order to assist the Committee in its supervisory role. In addition the Committee of Ministers 
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arguments. The effet utile of the procedure requires implementation of the Court’s judgments by 
the States and access to an effective procedure for the victim in case of State failure. Non-
compliance, moreover, is an aggravated breach of the ECHR. The Court could reopen the case (or 
open a new case) and in its judgment on compensation it could take into account the fact that the 
State knowingly violates the Convention. The Committee of Ministers does not have this possibil-
ity. In this respect he emphasises that the Court should make clear in its judgment the measures it 
expects of the State.158 It is suggested that these arguments for the Court's role in monitoring 
compliance with its judgments apply equally to its role in following up its provisional measures.  
2.2.9 Follow-up on provisional measures under the Dayton Accord 
Strangely, Article XI, 1(b) of Annex 6 of the Dayton Accord grants the Bosnia Chamber the 
power ‘to include an order for provisional measures in its final decision on the merits of a case’. 
The Chamber seems to have found a way to interpret this provision: “This power might be used to 
regulate the position of the parties before the decision becomes final and binding, or pending the 
full implementation of the decision”.159 Indeed, pending implementation it may often be useful to 
follow up on the situation of the victims in order to make sure that nothing happens that could 
prevent further implementation.160 
In de case of Boudellaa et al. (2002) the Bosnia Chamber examined on the merits the obli-
gations of the respondent Parties in handing over the petitioners to US forces. This led to their 
detention at Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. It had been done contrary to the Chamber’s 
provisional measures.161 In response to Bosnia and Herzegovina ignoring its provisional measures 
to halt the removal of the petitioners the Bosnia Chamber found ‘that the expulsion was unlawful 
because it was carried out in violation of the Chamber’s binding order for provisional measures of 
17 January 2002, which ordered both respondent Parties to take all necessary steps to prevent the 
applicants from being taken out of the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Chamber recalls 
that in its previous case law, the Chamber has held that an order for provisional measures is bind-
ing and has the status of national law’.162 
The Bosnia Chamber specifically responded to allegations by Bosnia that the order had not 
been delivered to it in a timely and proper manner and that it had no authority to give effect to the 
Orders by the Chamber.163 It noted: “It is not necessary for the Chamber to examine these submis-
sions. It is undisputed that the applicants were held in detention by officials of the Federation 
when its order was issued, that they were handed over to US forces by officials of the Federal 
                                                                                                                       
may specifically refer a case to the Court asking it to determine whether a State has failed to 
comply with a judgment. See further Zwaak (2008), pp. 357-360. 
158 Lawson (Preadvies 1999), p. 91. 
159 See Bosnia Chamber Annual Report 2000 (under the heading ‘provisional measures’). 
160 Similarly, the Inter-American Court only considers a case closed once the State has fully 
implemented it. Before such time it may maintain provisional measures, for instance to protect 
witnesses. See also further Chapter XIV discussing jurisdiction. 
161 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §§4-5. 
162 Id., §185 (adding: ‘The Chamber recalls that, for example, in the D.K. case, it held that the 
eviction of the applicant was not in accordance with the law, for the purposes of Article 8(2) of 
the Convention, even though the competent authorities had established that the applicant was an 
illegal occupant, because there was an order for provisional measures of the Chamber prohibiting 
the eviction (case no. CH/98/710, D.K. v. Republika Srpska, decision on admissibility and merits 
of 2 November 1999, paragraphs 33-37, Decisions August-December 1999)’). 
163 See also Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
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Ministry of Interior, and that the order for provisional measures had been brought to the attention 
of the Federal Ministry of Interior before the hand-over of the applicants. This is sufficient to 
establish the unlawfulness of the expulsion in this respect as well”.164 
The Chamber found that ‘the respondent Parties have not followed the requirements of a le-
gal expulsion procedure arising from the domestic law. They thereby violated the condition set 
out in Article 1 paragraph 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the Convention of a decision reached in accor-
dance with law’.165 
The violations fell ‘within the responsibility of both respondent Parties’. “The law and also 
the factual actions taken by both respondent Parties in regard to (…) the hand-over of the appli-
cants to US forces, after ensuring through diplomatic contacts that those forces would take them 
into custody and take them out of the country, involved actions by both respondent Parties which 
constitute a violation of the applicants’ rights”.166 
Given the possibility that US authorities might seek and impose the death penalty against 
the petitioners, the Chamber found that the respondent Parties should have sought assurances 
from the US before handing them over. The fact that they had not done so constituted a violation 
of Article 1 Protocol 6 to the ECHR.  
Among others, Bosnia and Herzegovina was ordered to take all possible steps to prevent the 
death penalty from being pronounced against and executed on the petitioners. This also meant that 
they should seek assurances from the US, through diplomatic contacts, that they will not be sub-
jected to the death penalty.167 The Chamber ordered both respondent Parties to ‘retain lawyers 
authorised and admitted to practice in the relevant jurisdictions and before the relevant courts, 
tribunals or other authoritative bodies in order to take all necessary action to protect the appli-
cants’ rights while in U.S. custody and in case of possible military, criminal or other proceedings 
involving the applicants, each of the respondent Parties bearing half the cost of the attorney fees 
and expenses’.168  
In addition, if the petitioners did not return within a year, the respondent Parties were to pay 
the compensation in the amount of 10,000 KM to the petitioners’ families in Bosnia and Herze-
govina.169 Both respondent Parties were also ordered to report to the Chamber every two months 
until full implementation of the Chamber’s decision was achieved.170 
2.2.10 Follow-up as part of the different reporting procedures 
In the Inter-American system there are two forms of seguimiento. Apart from a follow-up specifi-
cally on the case law, the Commission also uses its country visits and the reports it prepares to 
comment on failure to comply with its precautionary measures and the Court's provisional meas-
ures.171 
Under the Convention against Torture and the ICCPR the reporting procedure has played a 
role both in providing country specific information that could help make provisional measures 
more focused and in providing the adjudicators with another forum for the follow-up on compli-
                                                 
164 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §187. 
165 Id., §188. 
166 Id., §189. 
167 Id., §330. 
168 Id., §331. 
169 Id., §332. 
170 Id., §333, 20th ‘Decisional’ clause. 
171 This happened the first time in a report on Ecuador, providing a precedent for the later country 
reports on Mexico, Brazil and Colombia. 
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ance with their provisional measures. After all they can simply enter into dialogue directly with 
State representatives during the public hearings on the State reports and they can subsequently 
refer to non-compliance in their Concluding Observations with regard to these reports.172 In its 
Concluding observations CAT has referred to the ‘absolute nature’ of Article 3 ICAT and ex-
pressed concern with regard to the failure by some States to comply with all provisional meas-
ures.173 In the European system the country reporting procedure is not used, although it would be 
possible under Article 52 ECHR.174 
2.3 Possible consequences attached to non-compliance with provisional 
measures with regard to the admissibility and merits stage 
2.3.1 Introduction 
Obviously there are many kinds of consequences of non-compliance with provisional measures. 
First and foremost it is the intended beneficiary of the provisional measures who suffers the con-
sequences of an exposure to irreparable harm. Then obviously there the legal and political conse-
quences for the State concerned. 
One question in the context of the follow-up by the adjudicators, is whether this is still 
aimed at preventing (further) irreparable harm in the case at hand, or if no longer possible, 
whether it is aimed at preventing recurrence of non-compliance in future cases. What are the legal 
consequences for State of ignoring provisional measures?175 
Is the only legal consequence of non-compliance an aggravated breach in case a violation of 
the substantive right is indeed found? As discussed, another possibility is finding a procedural 
violation of the substantive right, such as the non-refoulement rule. In any case most adjudicators 
assume that the right of petition is no longer effective when acts occur that are of an irreparable 
nature, which is generally seen in the light of the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treat-
ment and torture. 
                                                 
172 Yet the fact that most of the time and resources of the Committees is reserved to the reporting 
procedure also limits their capacity to deal with individual petitions. 
173 CAT Press release HR/4844 ‘Committee against Torture Concludes 34th session: Issues 
Concluding Observations on Reports of Canada, Switzerland, Finland, Albania, Uganda and 
Bahrain’, 20 May 2005 (referring to the report of Canada), <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/ 
2005/hr4844.doc.htm> (consulted 17 April 2006). 
174 See e.g. Verhey (1996), pp. 103-116, suggesting the usefulness of the country reporting 
procedure to complement the individual complaint procedure. 
175 Another question is what are the consequences of compliance. Often the case is then solved and 
may be struck out of the list of pending cases. Yet this is not always the case. See e.g. ECtHR 
Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, where the State argued that the petitioner had an 
official permit to stay in the Netherlands, which ‘solved’ the case. The Court, on the other hand, 
noted that the permit was granted based on a general policy based on the Court’s provisional 
measures. The Court considered it feasible that the petitioner would then have to reintroduce the 
case before the Court once the general policy is withdrawn and he can again be expelled. In fact, 
the use of provisional measures in this case required an final examination of the case so as to 
confirm or dismiss the real risk alleged. The Court declared the case admissible and held on the 
merits that the petitioner’s expulsion would be in violation of Article 3 ECHR. See also Woltjer 
(2007), p. 362. 
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This section focuses on the impact on the admissibility decision and on the evidentiary re-
quirements for finding a violation on the merits of the substantive rights invoked. While reference 
is made to the practice of the HRC and CAT, the focus is on the ECtHR judgment in Mamatkulov. 
2.3.2 Deciding on admissibility 
In the disappearance case of Tshishimbi v. Zaire (1996), in which it had used provisional meas-
ures, the HRC noted, using the usual expression, that ‘in the circumstances, due weight had to be 
given to the author’s allegations, to the extent that they were sufficiently substantiated’. This 
remark indicates a relationship between lack of co-operation. including respect for provisional 
measures, and the standard and burden of proof required for the final determination of the case. 
The HRC also referred to the impossibility to have access to Mr. Tshishimbi or to ‘obtain reliable 
information about his whereabouts and state of health’. This explained why non-exhaustion of 
local remedies did not preclude it from examining the communication. In other words, the State’s 
unresponsiveness to the request for information on his whereabouts and state of health was an 
additional factor establishing a lack of effective local remedies.176 
In Guerra and Wallen v. Trinidad and Tobago (1995) the HRC deeply regretted that the 
State was ‘not prepared to give the undertaking requested by the Committee’ in its provisional 
measure, ‘apparently because it considers itself bound by the conservatory order issued by the 
Court of Appeal on 29 April 1994’.177 The HRC considered that, in fact, ‘this situation should 
have made it easier for the State party to confirm that there would be no obstacles to acceding to 
the Committee’s request; to do so would, in any event, have been compatible with the State 
party’s international obligations’.178 In view of the fact that the State was not prepared to respect 
the provisional measures taken pending the case, the HRC could also have decided to maintain 
these measures, as it did in several other cases it had declared inadmissible for non-exhaustion.179 
This case was decided after the public discussion condemning the execution of Ashby but before 
the decision on the merits in Piandiong. 
2.3.3 Evidentiary requirements: deciding on the merits 
The HRC and CAT have occasionally said something on the obligations of States on the merits in 
a case in which the State had ignored their provisional measures. In two cases involving Belarus 
the executions had already taken place when the HRC took provisional measures.180 On the merits 
                                                 
176 HRC Tshishimbi v. Zaire, 25 March 1996. 
177 HRC Lincoln Guerra and Brian Wallen v. Trinidad and Tobago, 4 April 1995, §2.3. 
178 Id., §6.5. 
179 See Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
180 HRC Igor Lyashkovich and Mariya Staselovich v. Belarus, 3 April 2003. In one of these cases 
the petitioner declared that death sentences are executed in secret in Belarus and neither the 
condemned prisoner nor his family are informed of the date of execution. In July 2002 the HRC 
addressed specific questions to the petitioner and the State party in this case to find out the exact 
execution date. It also requested the State to inform it ‘at what time did the State party learn about 
the existence of the communication’. It asked the petitioner whether she had informed the State 
party of the submission of the case to the HRC before the registration of the case. The State party 
replied to the Committee’s request in September 2002, but only to the question about the precise 
date of the execution and not about ‘the exact moment from which the State party was aware of 
the existence of the communication’. HRC Igor Lyashkovich and Mariya Staselovich v. Belarus, 
3 April 2003, §6.1; see also Anton Bondarenko and Natalia Schedko (submitted by the latter on 
behalf of her deceased son and herself) v. Belarus, 3 April 2003, §7.1. Counsel asserted, ‘without 
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the HRC noted its earlier case law that a State party violated its obligations under the OP by 
executing a person who has submitted a communication to the HRC. This was so not only in 
cases where it had explicitly requested provisional measures of protection ‘but also on the basis of 
the irreversible nature of capital punishment’.181 Yet the relevant earlier case law, Piandiong et al. 
v. the Philippines (2000),182 was decided and published subsequent to the execution of Lyashke-
vich and Bondarenko. For this reason the HRC decided it could not hold the State party responsi-
ble for a breach of the OP for the execution of the death sentence after the submission of the 
communication but prior to its registration. This means, however, that in new death penalty cases 
formal use of provisional measures by the HRC is not strictly necessary. 
In Weiss v. Austria (2003) the State had extradited the petitioner to the US in contravention 
of the the HRC’s provisional measures. Consequently, the State was ‘under an obligation to make 
such representations to the United States’ authorities as may be required to ensure that the author 
does not suffer any consequential breaches of his rights under the Covenant, which would flow 
from the State party’s extradition of the author in violation of its obligations under the Covenant 
and the Optional Protocol’. It was also ‘under an obligation to avoid similar violations in the 
future, including by taking appropriate steps to ensure that the Committee’s request for interim 
measures of protection will be respected’.183 
In Dar v. Norway (2007) the petitioner had been deported to Pakistan in spite of CAT’s 
provisional measures. This was in violation of Article 22 ICAT, but this breach was remedied 
because Norway granted him a residence permit for three years upon return. CAT considered that 
the issue whether deportation constituted a violation of Article 3 has become moot because the 
petitioner had returned to Norway.184 
After finding a violation of Articles 3 and 22 in Brada v. France (2005) CAT noted that it 
wished ‘to be informed, within 90 days, of the steps the State party has taken in response to the 
views expressed above, including measures of compensation for the breach of article 3 of the 
Convention and determination, in consultation with the country (also a State party to the Conven-
tion) to which the complainant was returned, of his current whereabouts and state of well-
being’.185 
Part of following up non-compliance with provisional measures in non-refoulement cases 
should also be in the assessment on the merits whether the forced removal indeed constituted a 
violation of non-refoulement. The question then arises as well what should be the role of subse-
                                                                                                                       
giving any further detail’, that Mrs Staselovich ‘had informed her son’s lawyer, the Supreme 
Court and the prison authorities that she had submitted a communication to the Human Rights 
Committee before her son’s actual execution’. HRC Igor Lyashkovich and Mariya Staselovich v. 
Belarus, 3 April 2003, §5.5; see also Anton Bondarenko and Natalia Schedko (submitted by the 
latter on behalf of her deceased son and herself) v. Belarus, 3 April 2003, §6.5. According to the 
petitioner the State had breached its obligations under the OP by ignoring the fact that she had 
sent a petition to the HRC and that she had informed her son’s lawyer, the prison authorities and 
the Supreme Court about this. The State party did not specifically refute this claim. It only 
referred to the date it received the HRC’s note verbale with the provisional measure, seven 
months after the execution. 
181 HRC Igor Lyashkovich and Mariya Staselovich v. Belarus, 3 April 2003, §5.5; see also Anton 
Bondarenko and Natalia Schedko (submitted by the latter on behalf of her deceased son and 
herself) v. Belarus, 3 April 2003, §6.5. 
182 HRC Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by Alexander 
Padilla and Ricardo III Sunga) v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000. 
183 See HRC Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, §11.1. 
184 CAT Nadeem Ahmad Dar v. Norway, 11 May 2007, §16.5. 
185 CAT Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, §15. 
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quent information. It should be clear that when subsequent information provided by the State is 
taken into account, the information provided by the petitioner (if possible) or his counsel should 
be as well. 
In Elif Pelit v. Azerbaijan (2007) CAT found a violation not just of Article 22 ICAT, but 
also of Article 3. It referred to the fact that Azerbaijan had ignored its provisional measures, 
together with the fact that the assurances provided by Turkey (the receiving State) were insuffi-
cient and the fact that Azerbaijan had not respected Conclusion No. 12 of the UNHCR Executive 
Committee to the effect that it should have recognized the determination of refugee status by 
Germany, another State party to the Refugee Convention.186 
In Cruz Varas (1991) the European Court pointed out that the European Commission or its 
President only took provisional measures in exceptional circumstances.187 In expulsion or extradi-
tion cases they serve the purpose of ‘putting the Contracting States on notice that, in the Commis-
sion’s view, irreversible harm may be done to the applicant if he is expelled and, further, that 
there is good reason to believe that his expulsion may give rise to a breach of Article 3 of the 
convention’.188 Apparently the Court distinguished the irreparable harm which may be done to the 
petitioner from the breach of Article 3 of the Convention that this expulsion may give rise to. It 
then merely concluded that a State, when it decides not to comply with a provisional measure, 
knowingly assumes the risk of being found in breach of Article 3 following adjudication of the 
dispute. Any such finding would then have to be seen as aggravated by the failure to comply with 
the indication, since by way of this provisional measure the State had had its attention drawn to 
‘the dangers of prejudicing the outcome of the issue then pending before the Commission’.189 
The Commission, however, had previously stated that Contracting Parties do not have a 
choice between either complying with their obligations, or instead trying to provide a remedy for 
the violation once it has been established.190 It had referred to the text of Article 1 of the Conven-
tion, stipulating that the High Contracting Parties “shall secure” the rights and freedoms in the 
Convention, and to the Court’s statements on the interpretation of the Convention’s provisions so 
as to make its safeguards practical and effective. It had concluded that the primary obligation of 
the Contracting Parties must always be not to violate the Convention in the first place. 
Yet there was something else at stake than the risk for States of being found in breach of an 
international rule. An interpretation of such human rights treaties necessarily must take as a point 
of reference the position of the (potential) victim. Sweden specifically based its refusal to take 
provisional measures on its view that these were not legally binding. The likelihood of being 
found in aggravated breach after completion of the dispute’s adjudication may induce States to 
take provisional measures seriously, but apparently such inducements are not equal to a situation 
where provisional measures are legally binding. 
The ECtHR (Grand Chamber) case Mamatkulov (2005) has particular relevance for the dis-
cussion of assessment of risk at the stage of provisional measures, because it illustrates the extent 
to which on the merits the ECtHR gave weight to its assessment of real risk at the stage of provi-
                                                 
186 CAT Elif Pelit v. Azerbaijan, 1 May 2007, §11. It also noted that ‘(b)y establishing Tunisia as the 
destination for the complainant, in spite of the latter's explicit request not to be returned to his 
country of origin, the State party failed to take account of the universally accepted practice in 
such cases, whereby an alternative solution is sought with the agreement of the individual 
concerned and the assistance of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees and a third country willing to receive the individual who fears for his safety’, §8.5. 
187 ECtHR Cruz Varas et al. v. Sweden, Judgment of 20 March 1991, §103. 
188 Ibid. 
189 Ibid. 
190 ECtHR Cruz Varas et al. v. Sweden, Judgment of 20 March 1991, §126. 
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sional measures when the State subsequently ignored these.191 In reference to this case, where the 
petitioners rather than the State bore the consequences, it is argued that that the minority opinion 
of Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan in fact took the better approach.192 
Because the State had ignored the Court’s provisional measures in Mamatkulov the Court 
had been prevented from effectively examining the complaint under Article 3 ECHR. Neverthe-
less, despite many indications of risk of a violation of Article 3, the Court rewarded the State for 
this behaviour by not finding a violation of this article.193 Instead it only found a violation of 
Article 34 ECHR. In the circumstances of the case it found that the petitioners ‘undeniably suf-
fered non-pecuniary damage’ that ‘cannot be repaired solely by a finding that the respondent State 
has failed to comply with its obligations under Article 34’. In that light the Court awarded each 
applicant € 5,000 for non-pecuniary damage.194 
It is doubtful, in my view, whether an award for non-pecuniary damage alone helps repair 
the harm done or prevent future violations. This situation is particularly grave given the serious 
indications of risk available at the time of extradition, indications that indeed triggered the use of 
provisional measures and that were borne out by subsequent facts. 
At the merits stage the petitioners’ counsel had pointed out the significant difference be-
tween the situation of the petitioners in Turkey, before extradition, when they had denied the 
charges against them, and their full admission of the same charges once in Uzbekistan. They 
referred to the lack of legal assistance and suggested they had been forced to ‘confess’ the 
crimes.195 
According to Turkey Article 3 should only apply in extradition cases when it was certain 
that the requesting State would inflict the prohibited treatment. The petitioner should produce 
strong evidence that there were substantial grounds for believing he or she was facing torture or 
ill treatment. The State also argued that Article 3 should not be ‘construed in a way that would 
engage the extraditing State’s responsibility indefinitely’. Its responsibility ‘should end once the 
extradited person had been found guilty and had started to serve his or her sentence’.  
The Court acknowledged that the findings by international human rights organisations de-
nouncing an administrative practice of torture and other forms of ill treatment of political dissi-
dents described the general situation in Uzbekistan. These findings, however, did not support the 
specific allegations made by the petitioners in this particular case. Corroboration by other evi-
dence was necessary.  
The ECtHR assesses issues ‘in light of all the material placed before it or, if necessary, ma-
terial obtained proprio motu’.196 
“Since the nature of the Contracting States’ responsibility under Article 3 in cases of this kind 
lies in the act of exposing an individual to the risk of ill-treatment, the existence of the risk must 
be assessed primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been 
known to the Contracting State at the time of the extradition; the Court is not precluded, 
                                                 
191 See also Chapter XVII (Official State responses). 
192 See also Rieter (2007), p. 975. 
193 See Chapter XV on assessment of immediacy and risk. 
194 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §134. 
195 During the extradition proceedings in Turkey the petitioners had denied the charges against them 
‘and adduced relevant evidence in their defence’. By contrast, counsel pointed out, the fact that 
the petitioners, once in Uzbekistan, and without legal assistance by a lawyer of their choosing, 
‘had fully admitted the same charges to the Uzbek authorities’, ‘showed that they had been forced 
through torture and ill-treatment to “confess” to crimes they had not committed’. ECtHR Grand 
Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, §60. 
196 ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, §69. 
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however, from having regard to information which comes to light subsequent to the extradition. 
This may be of value in confirming or refuting the appreciation that has been made by the 
Contracting Party of the well-foundedness or otherwise of an applicant’s fears”.197 
When the petitioner has not been extradited or deported during the Court’s examination of the 
case ‘the relevant time will be that of the proceedings before the Court’ (i.e. the relevant time for 
the assessment of the risk).198 In other words, if the State had respected the provisional measures 
the Court would have determined whether there was a real risk on the basis of the situation at the 
time of its decision on the merits rather than at the time the expulsion or extradition was initially 
intended. The Court noted that this situation ‘typically arises when deportation or extradition is 
delayed’ as a result of a provisional measure by the Court. Such measure ‘means more often than 
not that the Court does not yet have before it all the relevant evidence it requires to determine 
whether there is a real risk of treatment proscribed by Article 3 in the country of destination’.199 
On the other hand, in this case the date that should be taken into consideration when assess-
ing whether there was a real risk of a violation of Article 3 was 27 March 1999, when the peti-
tioners were extradited despite the Court’s provisional measure. 
“By applying Rule 39, the Court indicated that it was not able on the basis of the information 
then available to make a final decision on the existence of a real risk. Had Turkey complied (…) 
the relevant date would have been the date of the Court’s consideration of the case in the light 
of the evidence that had been adduced”.200 
It then pointed out that ‘Turkey’s failure to comply with the indication given by the Court has 
prevented the Court from following its normal procedure. Nevertheless, the Court cannot specu-
late as to what the outcome of the case would have been had the extradition been deferred as it 
had requested. For this reason, it will have to assess Turkey’s responsibility under Article 3 by 
reference to the situation that obtained on 27 March 1999’.201 
When the Grand Chamber adopted its Judgment in Mamatkulov, on 15 December 2004, the 
representatives of the petitioners had still been unable to contact the petitioners.202 The Court 
concluded as follows: 
“In the light of the materials before it, the Court is not able to conclude that substantial grounds 
existed at the aforementioned date for believing that the applicants faced a real risk of treatment 
proscribed by Article 3. Turkey’s failure to comply with the indication given under Rule 39, 
which prevented the Court from assessing whether a real risk existed in the manner it 
considered appropriate in the circumstances of the case, must be examined below under Article 
34”.203 
                                                 
197 Ibid., §69, referring to Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, §§75-76 and 
Vilvarajah and others v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, §107. 
198 See e.g. ECtHR Chahal v. the United Kingdom, Judgment of 15 November 1996, §§85-86 and 
ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §69. 
199 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §69. 
200 Id., §75. 
201 Id., §75. 
202 Id., §36. 
203 Id., §77. The Court noted that Turkey had asserted that it extradited the petitioners after it had 
obtained an assurance from the Uzbek Government. In fact it was the Public Prosecutor of 
Uzbekistan who gave the assurance that the ‘applicants’ property will not be liable to general 
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With regard to Mamatkulov and Askarov the Court concluded that the facts clearly showed that 
their extradition prevented it ‘from conducting a proper examination of their complaints in accor-
dance with its settled practice in similar cases and ultimately from protecting them, if need be, 
against potential violations of the Convention as alleged’.204 It found a violation of Article 34.205 
In short, in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey the Grand Chamber confirmed (more or 
less) the earlier decision by the First Section206 finding no violation of Art. 3 despite its recogni-
tion of the adverse situation with regard to respect for the prohibition of torture and cruel treat-
ment in Uzbekistan, and notwithstanding the fact that Turkey had ignored the Court’s provisional 
measures in violation of Article 34. 
Different from the judgment of the First Section, in which there were no dissents, in the 
Grand Chamber three judges dissented on this issue. Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan would 
indeed have found violations of Article 3.207 They pointed out that the prohibition of ill-treatment 
‘is an absolute prohibition even in the case of expulsion and extradition and that the activities of 
the individual in question, however undesirable or dangerous and whether or not terrorist-related, 
cannot be a material consideration where a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 has been 
shown’.208 They emphasised that when there is a real risk of a violation of Article 3 it is not al-
lowed to extradite someone by arguing that ‘a refusal to extradite would interfere with rights 
under international treaties or conflict with the norms of international judicial process or would 
inevitably involve an assessment of conditions in the requesting country which is not a Party to 
the Convention against the standards of Article 3 of the Convention’.209 
                                                                                                                       
confiscation, and the applicants will not be subjected to acts of torture or sentenced to capital 
punishment’. The prosecutor added that Uzbekistan ‘is a party to the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and accepts and re-affirms its obligation to comply with the requirements of the 
provisions of that Convention as regards both Turkey and the international community as a 
whole’. ECtHR Grand Chamber Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §76. 
Uzbekistan also produced medical reports from the doctors of the Uzbek prisons in which the 
applicants were subsequently held. 
204 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §127. 
205 See Chapter XVI on legal status. 
206 ECtHR (First Section) Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, 6 February 2003. See also 
Rieter (2004). 
207 They would also have found a violation of Article 6 and Judge Rozakis (Greece) joined them in 
this. 
208 Joint partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §2, referring to Chahal v. UK, 15 
November 1996, §§79-80.  
209 Joint partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan, ECtHR Grand Chamber, 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §2, referring to Soering v. UK, 7 July 
1989, §§83 and 88-91. The dissenters confirmed that the existence of a risk must be assessed 
‘primarily with reference to those facts which were known or ought to have been known to the 
Contracting State responsible for returning the person at the time of the extradition or expulsion 
at question’. “The Court is not precluded from having regard for information which comes to 
light subsequent to the return of the person, such information being of potential value in 
confirming or refuting the appreciation made by the Contracting State or the well-foundedness or 
otherwise of an applicant’s fears”. Joint partly Dissenting Opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and 
Hedigan, ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §3. 
At the same time they acknowledged, in reference to Vilvarajah, that ‘evidence as to the actual 
treatment received by the applicant on his return to the receiving country is not conclusive, the 
essential question being whether it was foreseeable at the time of the expulsion that the person 
would be subjected to ill-treatment reaching the threshold of Article 3’. Joint partly Dissenting 
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They pointed out that the question to be determined was whether there were substantial 
grounds for believing that the applicants faced a real risk of ill-treatment on 27 March 1999, the 
date on which they were handed over to the Uzbek authorities.  
“By applying Rule 39 the Chamber of the Court was necessarily satisfied that there existed at 
least a prima facie case for the existence of such a risk. There appears to us to have been a 
strong basis for such a view”.210 
They added the following: 
“It is unclear to us what further corroborative evidence could reasonably be expected of the 
applicants, particularly in a case such as the present, where it was Turkey’s failure to comply 
with the interim measures indicated by the Court which has prevented the Court from carrying 
out a full and effective examination of the application in accordance with its normal procedures. 
In such a situation, we consider that the Court should be slow to reject the complaint under 
Article 3 in the absence of compelling evidence to dispel the fears which formed the basis of the 
application of Rule 39”.211 
Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan considered that substantial grounds had indeed been shown 
‘for believing that the applicants faced a real risk of ill-treatment and that, in returning the appli-
cants despite this risk, Article 3 of the Convention has been violated’.212 
                                                                                                                       
Opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan, ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and 
Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §3, referring to Vilvarajah and others v. UK, 30 October 
1991, §112. 
210 They referred in particular to Amnesty International’s briefing for CAT, made public in October 
1999, noting a growing number of reports of ill-treatment and torture by law enforcement 
officials since 1997 of persons perceived to be members of Islamic congregations, especially 
suspected supporters of banned movements such as Erk. Moreover, the briefing noted the 
response in the wake of bomb explosions in the capital in February 1999 and statements of 
officials, including the President, that ‘if not directly sanctioning the use of violence by State 
agents, could be perceived at the very least as condoning the use torture and ill-treatment’. The 
dissenters considered that the ‘undisputed findings’ about the general situation in Uzbekistan 
‘provide strong grounds for believing that the applicants were at particular risk’. “Not only were 
both applicants members of Erk but both were arrested in March 1999 (shortly after the reported 
terrorist bomb attacks in Tashkent) on suspicion of homicide, causing injuries by explosions and 
an attempted terrorist attack on the President of Uzbekistan himself”. Joint partly Dissenting 
Opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan. ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and 
Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §7. 
211 Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan. ECtHR Grand Chamber, 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §8. 
212 Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan. ECtHR Grand Chamber, 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §13. They disputed the reliance by the 
Court on the assurances given by the Uzbek Government, the statement by the Public Prosecutor 
that Uzbekistan was party to the Convention against Torture and the medical reports from the 
doctors of the Uzbek prison in which the petitioners were being held upon extradition. They 
found it ‘striking that the only assurance which was received prior to the applicants’ surrender 
(namely, that of 9 March 1999) was not even communicated to the Court until 19 April 1999, 
well after the application of Rule 39 and after the extradition had been effected in disregard of the 
Court’s interim measures’. See also Chapter XVII (Official State responses). “Moreover, an 
assurance, even one given in good faith, that an individual will not be subjected to ill-treatment is 
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With regard to the assurances in Mamatkulov the Court did not address the fact that Turkey 
used the Uzbek assurances as an excuse for having ignored the Court’s provisional measures.213 
Moreover, it entered new information by forwarding reports by medical doctors made subsequent 
to the extradition. In this context the Court could have taken the opportunity to examine the value 
of such assurances on the basis of generally available information without adhering to its ap-
proach of taking into account only the information available at the time of extradition. After all 
the State did not invoke the assurances to convince the Court to withdraw its provisional meas-
ures, but instead invoked them after having ignored these measures. The fact that the State de-
prived the Court of the opportunity to assess these assurances in advance of the extradition should 
not provide the State the additional advantage that critical reports published subsequently could 
not be taken into account, if these discredit the value of such assurances, especially not when the 
reports by medical staff provided subsequently by the State were indeed taken into account.  
Other information that became available subsequently equally confirms the European 
Court’s assessment of real risk at the provisional measures stage. In April 2001 the HRC ex-
pressed grave concern about ‘consistent allegations of widespread torture, inhuman treatment and 
abuse of power by law enforcement officials’.214 In June 2002 CAT equally was concerned about 
the ‘particularly numerous, ongoing and consistent allegations of particularly brutal acts of torture 
and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment committed by law enforcement 
personnel’.215 It was also concerned about the ‘lack of access for persons deprived of liberty, 
immediately after they are apprehended, to independent counsel, a doctor or medical examiner 
and family members, an important safeguard against torture’.216 Moreover, it noted ‘a lack of 
practical training for doctors in the detection of signs of torture or ill-treatment of persons who 
have been or are in custody’.217 The Committee further expressed alarm over the ‘de facto refusal 
of judges to take account of evidence of torture and ill-treatment provided by the accused, so that 
there are neither investigations nor prosecutions’ and concerning ‘the numerous cases of convic-
tions based on confessions, and the continued use of the criterion of “solved crimes” as the basis 
                                                                                                                       
not of itself a sufficient safeguard where doubts exist as to its effective implementation”. Joint 
partly dissenting opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan. ECtHR Grand Chamber, 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §§9 and 10, referring to Chahal v. UK, 
judgment of 15 November 1996, §105. They considered that the situation for political dissidents 
in Uzbekistan at the time of their surrender was such as to ‘give rise to serious doubts’ about the 
effectiveness of the assurances. The same applied to the reliance on the fact that Uzbekistan was 
party to the Convention against Torture. In this respect they referred in particular to the findings 
of Amnesty International. Joint partly dissenting opinion of Judges Bratza, Bonello and Hedigan. 
ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §§10 and 11. 
Finally, they noted that the medical reports were ‘very brief and unspecific’, following medical 
examinations apparently carried out ‘at least 21 months after the extradition of the applicants and 
some 18 months after their trial and conviction’. “Insofar as any regard may be had to events 
occurring after the extradition had taken place we can attach very little weight to these reports 
which cast no light on the treatment received by the applicants in the intervening period and, 
more particularly, in the period leading up to their trial”. 
213 Generally on the controversial issue of assurances, see e.g. Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk), 
section 3.2.4 on non-refoulement cases. 
214 HRC Concluding Observations, 4 April 2001, CCPR/CO/71/UZB, 26 April 2001, §7. 
215 CAT Concluding Observations CAT/C/CR/28/7, 6 June 2002, §5a. 
216 Id., §5b. 
217 Id., §5d. 
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for promotion of law enforcement personnel, which, taken together, create conditions that pro-
mote the use of torture and ill-treatment to force detainees to “confess”’.218  
A few days before publication of the judgment by the First Section the UN Special Rappor-
teur on the question of torture, Theo van Boven, concluded that systemic torture takes place in 
Uzbekistan.219 The Concluding Observations by CAT and the HRC and the report by the Special 
Rapporteur all seem to indicate that the assurances such as those provided to Turkey by Uzbeki-
stan are of little value.220 
The rationale for taking into account only the information available at the time of the extra-
dition relates to the fact that the human rights situation may significantly change between that 
time and the decision on the merits.  
Indeed, if the situation is improved and the petitioners have not yet been extradited the 
Court may find that the extradition would now be allowed under the Convention despite the fact 
that it considered there was a real risk a few years previously at the provisional measures stage. If 
the situation has deteriorated this will also be taken into account, except when the petitioner has 
already been extradited, even if the petitioner was indeed subjected to ill-treatment.  
Yet when the State extradited petitioners despite provisional measures, this approach gives 
an unfair advantage to the State. This is exacerbated in a situation such as this where the State 
invokes assurances to justify ignoring the Court’s provisional measures.221 In fact the State re-
ceived one of the letters by Uzbekistan on 9 March, nine days before the Court used provisional 
measures. It could have informed the Court of these assurances and requested the Court not to 
maintain its provisional measures. The Court would then have been able to examine the contents 
of the assurances.222 It would have noted, for instance, that Uzbekistan did not reaffirm its obliga-
tions under the ICCPR and the OP, but only referred to its obligations under the Convention 
against Torture. In this respect it is significant that Uzbekistan executed several petitioners to the 
OP in blatant disregard of the HRC’s provisional measures.223 These cases concerned complaints 
about confessions extracted under torture. In the context of anti-terrorism measures it is also 
                                                 
218 Id., §5h. In May 2002 the delegation of Uzbekistan before CAT indicated that the authorities 
were considering to train medical personnel in recognizing and preventing torture. It is unlikely 
that the physicians who provided the medical certificates on the health of the petitioners would 
have already received such training and would have been aware that the authorities should not 
pressure them. Press release, ‘Committee Against Torture concludes consideration of report of 
Uzbekistan’, CAT 28th session, 2 May 2002. 
219 Special Rapporteur on the question of torture (Theo van Boven), E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2, 3 
February 2003. 
220 See also Human Rights Watch (2004).  
221 Tams (2003), p. 678 takes a different approach, considering that ‘the Court sensibly opted for a 
relatively restrictive reading’ of Article 3 and that it ‘had good reason to rely on Uzbekistan’s 
formal assurances to respect the international guarantees against torture and inhuman treatment’. 
Nevertheless, he finds it ‘slightly surprising’ that the Court ‘seemed to downplay the relevance of 
independent assessments by bodies such as Amnesty International’. He noted that independent 
country reports ‘seem a rather helpful (although not sufficient) source of information’ to assess 
whether there is a real risk.  
222 The other letter of assurances invoked by Uzbekistan was of 10 April 1999, after which the 
petitioners had been extradited. It was only on 19 April 1999 that Turkey informed the Court of 
these assurances.  
223 Press release, ‘Human Rights Committee deplores the execution of six individuals in 
Uzbekistan’, 24 July 2003. See also Chapter III (Halting executions) and Chapter XVII (Official 
State responses). 
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noteworthy that Uzbekistan only refers to the prohibition of torture and not to that of cruel, inhu-
man or degrading treatment or punishment laid down in Article 7 ICCPR.  
Obviously, while Uzbekistan refers to its obligations under the Convention against Torture 
alone, ignoring its obligations under the ICCPR that are similar to Article 3 ECHR, Turkey never-
theless has the obligation to secure the right not to be subjected to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment in Article 3 ECHR for everyone under its jurisdiction. 
Thus the ECtHR generally holds responsible the extraditing State for those violations that 
this State could have foreseen at the time of extradition, not taking into account subsequent 
events. Nevertheless, in circumstances such as these it would have been more in line with the aim 
of using provisional measures to protect against irreparable harm to persons if the Court would 
have found that the evidence available at the time of removal indeed indicated a real risk of access 
to counsel being blocked and of incommunicado detention and torture. 
The fact that it has to assess Turkey’s responsibility by reference to the situation on the day 
they were extradited does not mean that the Court should ignore the fact that at the time it used 
provisional measures it considered there was a real risk of a violation of Article 3 in the request-
ing State, a risk that Turkey, through its extradition in defiance of the Court’s provisional meas-
ures, made impossible to assess properly. In this respect the fact that the petitioners’ counsel were 
unable to contact them in Uzbekistan is indeed significant for the assessment whether Turkey 
violated Article 3 when it extradited the petitioners. The Court itself concluded that in this case 
the extradition ‘irreversibly reduced’ the level of protection it could offer to the rights asserted 
under Articles 2 and 3.224  
Much weight is to be given to the initial finding of prima facie risk at the stage of provi-
sional measures, because by ignoring these measures the State has made it impossible for the 
Court to examine all the evidence it needs. As to subsequent information, the Court should not 
pay heed just to what the State is saying, but also to publicly available information. 
If, upon renewed assessment of the information available at the time of the extradition, there 
is credible evidence of systematic torture and ill-treatment, combined with the individual factors 
that extradition was requested specifically for these petitioners, on charge of terrorism, the bal-
ance should generally tilt in favour of the person at risk. After all, the Court used provisional 
measures so as to be able to examine the case properly and it was the extraditing State that ig-
nored them. In such cases the burden should shift to the State to show that these rights have not 
been violated. 
In a slightly different context the Court has considered that a failure to investigate allega-
tions of ill-treatment in itself constituted a violation of Article 3.225 Similarly, in my view a failure 
to fully cooperate with the ECtHR and adequately consider whether there is a real risk of a viola-
tion of Article 3, together with a failure to respect the right of individual petition by ignoring the 
Court’s provisional measures in the context of Article 3, may in itself constitute a violation of that 
article. 
Given the serious nature of the harm risked and the vulnerability of one party (the peti-
tioner) vis-à-vis the other (the State), it should be the State that should bear the consequences of 
its non-compliance with the adjudicator's provisional measures.226 
                                                 
224 ECtHR (Grand Chamber), Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, §108.  
225 ECtHR Assenov et al. v. Bulgaria, 28 October 1998. 
226 See also Rieter (2005b) and Vermeulen/De Vries (2005), §5. 
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3 FOLLOW-UP BY OTHER AUTHORITIES IN VARIOUS INTER-STATE SYSTEMS 
OF COOPERATION 
As noted when discussing the legal status of provisional measures, authorities other than the HRC 
have also stressed that States should comply with the Committee’s provisional measures.227 The 
UN Rapporteur against Torture, for instance, did so in 2003 and 2004228 and the Deputy UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights equally urged respect for the Committee’s provisional measures 
(2003). He emphasised the importance of respecting ‘interim measures of protection ordered by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies’.229 With regard to executions of death sentences in violation of the 
provisional measures by the HRC he spoke of a ‘grave breach’ of the obligations under both the 
ICCPR and the OP.230 
During his visit of March 2003 the Deputy High Commissioner for Human Rights, Bertrand 
Ramcharan, discussed with senior officials, the compliance with provisional measures ‘ordered 
by’ the HRC. He was visiting countries in Central Asia to enhance dialogue and technical coop-
eration.231 
                                                 
227 Indeed ‘there may be good reasons to utilize both avenues [urgent action under both treaty and 
non treaty protection system] concurrently so as to enhance the chances of relief’, Van Boven 
(2005), p. 106. 
228 See e.g. Special Rapporteur on Torture, mission to Uzbekistan of November-December 2002, 
E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2. See also official statement by the Special Rapporteur on Torture, 13 
September 2004, referring to the ‘interim measures ordered by the Committee and urgent appeals 
dispatched by United Nations monitoring mechanisms regarding persons whose life and physical 
integrity may be at risk of imminent and irreparable harm’.  
229 Press release Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand 
Ramcharan, ‘Deputy Human Rights Chief ends visit to Uzbekistan with call for implementation 
of official commitments’, 14 March 2003.  
230 See e.g. press release Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand Ramcharan, 
‘Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights asks Uzbek government not to carry out death 
sentences in cases under international appeal’, 4 July 2003 and ‘Acting High Commissioner for 
Human Rights deeply concerned at executions in Uzbekistan’, 25 July 2003.  
231 ‘Official visit of the Deputy High Commissioner in Tajikistan’, 
<www.unhchr.ch/news/tajikistan.htm> (consulted 6 March 2003). In April 2001 Tajikistan 
executed Mr. Gaibullodzhon Ilyasovich Saidov. In January of that year the Committee had used 
provisional measures on his behalf. The State party had not responded. While the HRC devoted a 
separate section of its decision on the merits to the State’s failure to respect its provisional 
measures, reiterating the remarks made in earlier decisions, it did not issue a press release.The 
initial provisional measures were addressed to the State on 12 January 2001. The execution took 
place on 4 April 2001. The Committee was informed of this on 10 May 2001. With this 
knowledge, a Note Verbale was sent to the State on 18 May 2001 requesting information on the 
situation of Mr. Saidov and reiterating the provisional measures. On 19 June 2001 the 
Chairperson of the Committee addressed the State with a request for clarification on the non-
compliance with the provisional measures. Finally, on 3 August 2001, a Note Verbale was 
addressed to the State requesting it to provide information on ‘what steps were taken by the State 
to comply with the Committee’s rule 86 request, on what grounds Mr. Saidov was executed, and 
what measures are being taken by the state to guarantee compliance with such requests in future’. 
On 5 December 2002 the State was invited, once more, to provide this information. Barno 
Saidova v. Tajikistan, 8 July 2004. 
 Follow-Up on Non-Compliance 
1065 
In July 2003 the HRC issued a press release deploring the execution of six beneficiaries of 
its provisional measures in Uzbekistan.232 The UN Special Rapporteur on the question of torture 
had already addressed the issue of compliance with the provisional measures of the HRC during 
his mission to Uzbekistan (November-December 2003). In his report he noted with concern that it 
became clear from his discussion with the Acting Chairperson of the Supreme Court that this 
Court, which reviews all death penalty cases, was not aware of the Committee’s provisional 
measures. He pointed out that a large number of the provisional measures related to death sen-
tences based on confessions allegedly extracted under torture.233 He recommended: 
“All competent government authorities should give immediate attention and respond to interim 
measures ordered by the Human Rights Committee and urgent appeals dispatched by United 
Nations monitoring mechanisms regarding persons whose life and physical integrity may be at 
risk of imminent and irreparable harm”.234 
From the press release of the HRC deploring the executions of six individuals it appears that at 
least one of the individual cases addressed by the UN Rapporteur was also pending before the 
HRC. This was the case of Ulugbek Eshov. The Rapporteur noted, among others, that it was 
reported that Eshov was forced to sign a confession and that he could not stand or walk during the 
trial. His mother saw him last in August 2001. The Rapporteur pointed out that fears had been 
expressed that he ‘may have been’ executed.235 Subsequent to his visit the Rapporteur addressed 
the Chairperson of the HRC and expressed an interest in coordinating his activities with those of 
the HRC and exchange information on urgent cases including those in which the Committee had 
used provisional measures.236 
As noted, in March 2003 the Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 
visited Uzbekistan as part of an official trip to countries of Central Asia to enhance dialogue and 
technical cooperation. During his visit he noted that ‘in several instances, interim measures of 
protection ordered by Human Rights Treaty Bodies had not been respected and that persons had 
even been executed notwithstanding such orders’. He urged respect for such provisional meas-
                                                 
232 It pointed out that their cases were pending before it. Moreover, it had issued provisional 
measures on their behalf. The petitioners had alleged that their death sentences were preceded by 
an unfair trial. The HRC noted that it had discussed the information of their execution during its 
plenary session. It reminded the State party of ‘its position that it amounts to a grave breach of 
the Optional Protocol to execute an individual whose case is pending before the Committee, in 
particular where a request for interim protection under rule 86 of the Committee’s Rules of 
Procedure has been issued’. It reiterated the provisional measures ‘in all other cases currently 
pending under the Optional Protocol in respect of Uzbekistan’. The State was not to execute the 
persons involved before the HRC had concluded its consideration of those cases. More generally, 
it requested the State party’s full cooperation with all cases currently pending before it. Finally, it 
took the opportunity to request the State to submit its second periodic report by April 2004, as 
requested in its Concluding Observations three years previously. Press release, ‘Human Rights 
Committee deplores the execution of six individuals in Uzbekistan’, 24 July 2003. The petitioners 
who were executed were Muzaffar Mirzaev (case 1170/2003), Shukrat Andasbaev (case 
1166/2003), Ulugbek Ashov (case 1165/2003), Ilkhon Babadzhanov and Maksud Ismailov (case 
1162/2003), and Azamat Uteev (case 1150/2003). 
233 Special Rapporteur against Torture (Theo van Boven), Report of mission to Uzbekistan, 
E/CN.4/2003/68/Add.2, 3 February 2003, §§36 and 64.  
234 Id., §70 (u).  
235 Id., §40. 
236 Information on file with the author. 
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ures.237 In July 2003 he asked the government of Uzbekistan once more not to carry out the exe-
cution of detainees whose cases were pending before the HRC. He re-iterated the importance of 
respecting interim measures of protection issued by human rights treaty bodies. Indicating that 
Special Procedures of the Commission on Human Rights had also brought some of these cases to 
the attention of the government, he urged the State ‘to make all necessary efforts in order to en-
sure strict observance of its international human rights obligations’ under the ICCPR and its OP 
‘and to cooperate fully with the Special Procedures.238 
Following the press release by the HRC deploring the execution of six petitioners in contra-
vention of its provisional measures, the Acting High Commissioner equally expressed his concern 
and deep regret about these executions. He stressed that they ‘render futile review by the Human 
Rights Committee of these cases, which amounts to a grave breach of Uzbekistan’s obligations’ 
under the ICCPR and the OP.239 During its summer session (14 July-8 August 2003) the HRC 
discussed the situation once more, deplored the executions and ‘reminded the State party of its 
position that it amounts to a grave breach of the Optional Protocol to execute an individual whose 
case is pending before the Committee, in particular where a request for interim protection under 
rule 86 of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure has been issued’.240 
Since the execution of these six persons, Uzbekistan has executed at least three other peti-
tioners as well. Apparently the HRC sent several letters for clarification, but it did not issue a 
press release. The Special Rapporteur on Torture did. He referred to his mission to Uzbekistan at 
the end of 2002. He deeply regretted that he continued ‘to receive information on the execution of 
persons whose death sentences were allegedly based on confessions extracted under torture in 
Uzbekistan’. He strongly deplored that ‘in a number of cases the Government disregarded re-
quests of the United Nations Human Rights Committee to stay executions pending its considera-
tions of the cases’. He pointed out that since the publication of the report of his visit at least nine 
persons had been executed despite the Committee’s provisional measures. On the first six execu-
tions he had already commented previously. In this press statement he referred to the last two 
executions, of Azizbek Karimov and Yusuf Zhumayev, on 10 August 2004. He appealed to the 
government to ‘ensure strict observance’ of its obligations under the ICCPR, the OP and the 
Convention against Torture as well as to co-operate fully with the Special Procedures of the 
Commission on Human Rights. Once more he drew attention to the recommendations on the 
report of his visits.  
“In particular, that all competent Government authorities give immediate attention and respond 
to interim measures ordered by the Committee and urgent appeals dispatched by United Nations 
monitoring mechanisms regarding persons whose life and physical integrity may be at risk of 
imminent and irreparable harm”.241 
                                                 
237 Press release Deputy United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand 
Ramcharan, ‘Deputy Human Rights Chief ends visit to Uzbekistan with call for implementation 
of official commitments’, 14 March 2003.  
238 Press release Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand Ramcharan, ‘Acting High 
Commissioner for Human Rights asks Uzbek government not to carry out death sentences in 
cases under international appeal’, 4 July 2003. 
239 Press release Acting High Commissioner for Human Rights Bertrand Ramcharan, ‘Acting High 
Commissioner for Human Rights deeply concerned at executions in Uzbekistan’, 25 July 2003.  
240 Press release ‘Human Rights Committee rules on complaints of violations from individuals’, 4 
September 2003. 
241 Press Release Special Rapporteur on Torture ‘UN expert deplores Uzbekistan’s lack of co-
operation with UN human rights mechanisms’, 13 September 2004. See also Radio Free 
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Reuters reports that his statements ‘followed several similar critiques of the former Soviet Central 
Asian state’s human rights record from U.N. bodies and independent international organisations’. 
It also notes that ‘President Karimov rejects criticism of his harsh treatment of opponents and 
jailing of thousands of dissident Muslims’. “He says secular rule in the country is endangered by 
militants seeking to set up a hardline Islamic state”.242 
Tajikistan has a moratorium on the death penalty since March 2004. In 2005 the President 
of Uzbekistan decided to put executions on hold and the death penalty was officially abolished as 
of 1 January 2008.243 
Moving to the Americas, in the case of juvenile offender Alexander Williams the Inter-
American Commission had issued press releases about its precautionary measures. The EU had 
also sent an urgent humanitarian appeal, as had the Secretary General of the Council of Europe. 
The state of Georgia (US) later decided to commute Williams’ death sentence, although this may 
have been predominantly for domestic reasons.244 
At other times there appears to be concerted action by various international authorities that 
implicitly reinforces provisional measures used by human rights adjudicators. On 3 May 2002 the 
HRC used provisional measures requesting Australia to inform it of what measures it had taken to 
prevent any further acts of self-harm by at least two of the children of Mrs. Bakhtiyari detained in 
immigration detention.245 In May/June 2002 the regional advisor to the UN High Commissioner 
                                                                                                                       
Europe/Radio Liberty, based on AP/Reuters, ‘Uzbekistan accused of ignoring UN over death 
penalty’, 13 September 2004, <www.rferl.org> (consulted on 14 September 2004); also referring 
to a statement of 13 September by the Independent Human Rights organisation of Uzbekistan that 
a man convicted of terrorism the previous week might have been tortured to death in prison. 
Authorities had said that he died of natural causes; Scoop media, ‘UN human rights official 
deplores executions in Uzbekistan’, 14 September 2004, <www.scoop.co.nz> (consulted 14 
September 2004). 
242 Reuters Foundation AlertNet, ‘UN sleuth hits US ally Uzbekistan on executions’, 13 September 
2004, <www.alertnet.org> (consulted on 14 September 2004). 
243 Associated press ‘EU welcomes Uzbekistanś abolition of the death penalty’, 4 January 2008. In 
some previous HRC cases Uzbekistan had respected the provisional measures. In Arutyunyan v. 
Uzbekistan (2004), the HRC used provisional measures in March 2000 and in May of that year 
the State party informed the Committee that his sentence had been commuted to twenty years 
imprisonment at the end of March 2000: Arsen Arutyunyan (submitted by his sister Karina) v. 
Uzbekistan, 29 March 2004. In the case of Ikram Mukhtarov the State also respected the 
Committee’s provisional measures. This was around the same time as it ignored them in two 
other cases. The petitioner had been sentenced to death in May 2004. ‘The court reportedly 
ignored the claim that his “confession” to the murders was extracted in the torture’. The HRC 
used provisional measures on his behalf in July 2004. In August 2004 the judicial board of the 
Supreme Court of Uzbekistan overturned his death sentence and referred his case for further 
investigation. The Uzbek NGO Mothers Against the Death Penalty and Torture had been 
campaigning on his behalf. This Organisation believes that international pressure has ‘played a 
crucial role in getting his case re-examined’. Amnesty International, further information on 
Urgent Action 234/04, 23 September 2004, AI Index: EUR 62/023/2004. 
244 See urgent humanitarian appeal of 21 August 2000, under the French Presidency and of 14 
February 2002 by Spain as the current EU president, together with Denmark, the subsequent 
president and the European Commission to the Governor of Georgia and the Chairman of the 
Georgia Board of Pardons and Paroles. See also appeal of 15 February 2002 for clemency by 
Walter Schwimmer, Secretary General of the Council of Europe, press release 085a (2002) and 
press release of the Secretary General welcoming the commutation of the death sentence of Mr. 
Williams to a prison sentence, press release 107a (2002), 26 February 2002.  
245 HRC Bakhtiari family v. Australia, 29 October 2003. See also Chapter VII (Detention). 
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of Human Rights and the UN Working Group on Arbitrary Detention visited and criticized immi-
gration detention centres and the immigration of children.246 Some months later a Rapporteur of 
the UN Committee of the Rights of the Child, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees and the 
Executive Director of UNICEF Australia spoke out against the mandatory immigration detention 
of children as well.247 
The case of minors detained in adult prisons in Honduras,248 in which the CIDH had used 
precautionary measures, had also generated an international outcry. One Honduran newspaper 
even reported that the Italian authorities had warned the Honduran Government that the European 
Union would introduce, within 40 days, trade sanctions against Honduras for violation of interna-
tional treaties on the rights of children.249 
                                                 
246 See e.g. Cynthia Banham, ‘UN deplores “tragedy” of asylum system’, 1 August 2002, 
<www.smh.com.au> (consulted 9 April 2003), referring to regional advisor Justice Bhagwati’s 
statement, after his visit of Woomera in May and June 2002: “These children were growing up in 
an environment which affected their physical and mental growth and many of them were 
traumatised and led to harm themselves in utter despair”. He also said that the children were 
being ‘deprived of adequate educational services appropriate to their age’. The Government 
responded by criticising him for including ‘a number of emotive descriptions and assertions that 
have no foundation in the human rights instruments to which Australia is a party’; see also Grant 
Holloway ‘UN links Australian camps to self-harm and suicide’, 6 June 2002, <www.cnn.com> 
(consulted 9 April 2003). The Working Group expressed concern that the conditions in the 
detention camps could lead to a ‘collective depression syndrome’. Some of the concerns already 
expressed by the Working Group on Arbitrary Detention in advance of the publication of its 
report related to the detention of vulnerable people ‘especially children, pregnant women, the 
disabled and the elderly’ and to the legality of using private security firms to run the detention 
camps. Chairman Joinet said that ‘the use of private security reduced the care of the detained to a 
“bottom-line business” equation’. He also considered that the contractual relationship ‘reinforced 
the disciplinary nature of detention’. See Michael Millett and Michael Bradley, ‘criminals better 
off than asylum seekers’, Sydney Morning Herald, 7 June 2002, <www.smh.com.au> (consulted 
9 April 2003). The Immigration Minister, Philip Ruddock noted: “I would simply say that the 
issue of how the detention centres themselves are managed is not a matter (in which) treaties or 
any involvement of the UN is appropriate”. He pointed out: “We make a decision in terms of 
certain standards that we expect will be applied. The operators have to meet those standards and 
we seem to get the best value for tax payers here in Australia and we do that through a 
competitive tendering system”. Grant Holloway ‘UN links Australian camps to self-harm and 
suicide’, 6 June 2002, <www.cnn.com> (consulted 9 April 2003). 
247 See e.g. Judith Carp as quoted by Caroline Overington, ‘Australia attacked for harming child 
asylum seekers’, 2 May 2002, <www.theage.com.au> (consulted 9 April 2003); Tony Stevens, 
‘UN call for release of child detainees’, the Age, 15 July 2002, <www.theage.com.au> (consulted 
on 9 April 2003) and the UN High Commissioner for Refugees pointed out, in September 2002, 
that ‘Australia’s policy of mandatory, indefinite detention of asylum seekers, particularly 
children, is an outrageous violation of international conventions and human rights’. See The 
World Today, ‘Govt. grilled by UN over treatment of asylum seekers’, Australian Broadcasting 
Cooperation 26 September 2002, <www.acc.net.au> (consulted on 9 April 2003). 
248 CIDH Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999 (merits), §21. 
249 ‘Honduras violates its Constitution by incarcerating minors with adult prisoners’ in: La Nación, 
July 1995; In its footnote 57 the Commission also refers to several other articles: see ‘Canada 
asks why children are being jailed in Honduras’ in: El Heraldo, 2 June 1995; Letter from 
London’s Central American Human Rights Committee to President Reina, 26 April 1996; ‘They 
exploit international pressure exerted over the unlawful incarceration of juveniles’ in: El Heraldo, 
8 April 1995.  
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On the failure to comply with the Bosnia Chamber’s Order for provisional measures not to 
hand over the petitioners to the US authorities the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights, which had been asked to submit an amicus curiae brief in this case, argued ‘that the 
respondent Parties have no defence to their failure to comply with the Chamber’s order for provi-
sional measures. In accordance with Annex 6 to the General Framework Agreement, the Cham-
ber’s decisions are final and binding on all parties. The UN OHCHR notes that superseding the 
authority of the Chamber, an independent judicial body, with that of the Executive undermines 
the rule of law’.250 Even more than in the context of international treaties, follow-up by various 
officials has occurred in the hybrid 'constitutional' system that existed under the Dayton Peace 
Agreement. For instance OSCE officers have played a role in monitoring compliance with Bosnia 
Chamber decisions, including Orders for provisional measures.251 Both the Office of the High 
Representative252 and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) were 
involved in monitoring compliance with Judgments and decisions by the Bosnia Chamber. 
In the context of follow-up by authorities from various inter-State systems of cooperation, 
general policy documents can be relevant as well. In 2001 the EU adopted Guidelines to EU 
policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment.253 In its actions against torture the EU would ‘urge third countries’ to take measures, 
among others to “comply with the requests for interim measures of protection, rulings, decisions 
and recommendations of international human rights bodies” and ‘ensure that no one is forcibly 
returned to a country where he or she risks being subjected to torture or ill-treatment’ and “co-
operate with the relevant Council of Europe mechanisms, in particular the decisions of the Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights and recommendations of the Committee for the Prevention of Tor-
ture”. The EU noted it will ‘support the relevant international and regional mechanisms (e.g. the 
Committee Against Torture, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the relevant 
Special Rapporteurs) and stress the need for states to co-operate with the mechanisms’.254 These 
Guidelines are interesting also because in order to convincingly invoke them vis-à-vis third coun-
tries, the EU members may be expected themselves to respect provisional measures. 
4 FOLLOW-UP BY NGOS 
The follow-up by the adjudicators can be reinforced not just by officials of international organisa-
tions, but also by NGOs.255 Often these NGOs were actively supporting the petition in the first 
                                                 
250 Bosnia Chamber Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 
2002, §140. 
251 See e.g. Annual Reports 1999 and 2000 of the Bosnia Chamber, in its overview of cooperation 
with international institutions in BiH and Periodic Report of the Human Rights Field Operation in 
the former Yugoslavia of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, April 1998, 
§§27-29. See also Berg Handbook (1999), p. 10. 
252 The High Representative is at the same time the EU’s Special Representative. See the website of 
the High Representative: <http://www.ohr.int/>. 
253 “The purpose of these guidelines is to provide the EU with an operational tool to be used in 
contacts with third countries at all levels as well as in multilateral human rights fora in order to 
support and strengthen on-going efforts to prevent and eradicate torture and ill-treatment in all 
parts of the world”. 
254 Guidelines to EU policy towards third countries on torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment, adopted by General Affairs Council – Luxembourg, 09/04/01, 
<http://ec.europa.eu/external_relations/human_rights/torture/guideline_en.htm>. 
255 On the role of NGOs see e.g. Keck/Sikkink (1998). 
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place. In Mamatkulov (2003) the International Commission of Jurists had submitted an amicus 
curiae arguing for the binding nature of provisional measures. 
Moreover, in the African and Inter-American systems, NGOs may themselves be the peti-
tioners. Especially in the context of the Inter-American system NGOs (often themselves the peti-
tioners, but not the beneficiaries of the provisional measures) regularly issue press releases con-
demning non-compliance with decisions by the Inter-American Commission and Court, including 
their precautionary and provisional measures. To give just one example, in a press release CEJIL 
and Amazon Watch expressed their concern regarding Ecuador's failure to comply with the 
Commission's precautionary measures, initially ordered in December 2005 and expanded in Au-
gust 2006 in order to protect several legal counsel in domestic litigation against Chevron-Texaco 
who were being threatened by members of the military. As Ecuador had not done anything to 
protect them and the attacks were persisting the NGOs proposed the State to take the following 
specific measures: to install alarms and means to identify the origin of telephone calls, secure 
telephone lines and police surveillance. The government should study these proposals and meet 
with the beneficiaries that same week to discuss them.256 
Obviously it is easier for the beneficiaries and NGOs to use provisional measures as a tool 
to approach governments and the media in order to prevent irreparable harm when these measures 
include argumentation and sufficient precision.257 
A good illustration of the interplay between a human rights adjudicator, officials of inter-
governmental organisations and NGOs as part of international rather than regional litigation is the 
case of Habré, the former dictator of Chad. In April 2001 CAT had decided on provisional meas-
ures to the effect that Senegal should not expel Habré and should take all necessary measures to 
prevent him from leaving the territory of Senegal in violation of the principle that a person sus-
pected of torture should be either prosecuted or extradited. Subsequently President Wade of 
Senegal told journalists that he was still seeking Habré’s departure. He claimed that the UN had 
not asked Senegal to hold Habré. In response Human Rights Watch (HRW) urged him to comply 
with the provisional measure and to hold Habré until he could be extradited to face torture 
charges.258 In September 2001, following an appeal by UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, Presi-
dent Wade stated that he had agreed to hold Habré in Senegal ‘pending an extradition request 
from a country such as Belgium capable of organising a fair trial. He ‘reaffirmed this pledge in a 
meeting with Human Rights Watch in May 2002’.259 
This shows how different actors can reinforce each other’s actions.260 Kofi Annan had the 
backup of CAT determining individual complaints under the Convention against Torture with its 
provision on aut dedere aut iudicare. CAT had requested the State, as an urgent measure, to 
prevent Habré from leaving Senegal in any other way than through extradition. Its provisional 
measure, in turn, was strengthened by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, using his authority and 
position. All of this was triggered by Chadian organisations, supported by international NGOs 
who made sure to report on these actions both domestically and internationally.  
As noted, this is a case about which much information has been made available, especially 
by NGOs. This makes it possible to discuss what happened subsequently, between the date of the 
                                                 
256 CEJIL, ‘Ecuador no cumple con las medidas cautelares de la CIDH’, press release of 6 March 
2007. 
257 See also Chapter II (Systems), section 8.2. 
258 Human Rights Watch, Senegalese President urged to aid rights prosecution, 27 June 2001, 
<www.hrw.org> (consulted 10 April 2003). 
259 Human Rights Watch, The case against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet’, 2003/2006, 
<http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/habre_0402.pdf> (consulted 14 June 2007). 
260 See also, more generally, Chapter XVII (Official responses). 
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Committee’s provisional measures and of its decision on the merits. This information, as dis-
cussed below, illustrates how the provisional measures have helped prevent irreversible harm to 
the claim under the Convention against Torture. 
In early 2002 the Belgian investigating judge and a police team visited Chad. 
“The visit was front-page news in Chad and transformed the abstract case against Habré in far-
off courts into a concrete reality, touching off a minor revolution in a country where Habré’s 
most brutal henchmen still occupy most of the key security posts”.261 
While President Déby had ousted Habré, many high ranking officials in the new government of 
Chad had been implicated in Habré’s crimes. Thus, the new government had not sought his extra-
dition from Senegal. Yet the fact itself that Habré was indicted in Senegal ‘had an immediate 
impact back in Chad’. After his arrest in Senegal, President Déby of Chad met with representa-
tives of the Chadian association of victims of political repression AVCRP and told them that ‘the 
time for justice has come’.262 In October 2000 seventeen victims had lodged criminal complaints 
in courts in Chad for torture, murder and disappearance against identified members of Habré’s 
police. Human Rights Watch reports that ‘in May 2001 a Chadian investigating judge began to 
hear witnesses, and in September 2002, he started calling in the defendants to testify’.263 Public 
attention in Senegal to Chad’s ex-dictator may also have played a role in the decision of the gov-
ernment of Chad to allow the victims and human rights NGOs access to the files of the Documen-
tation and Security Directorate (DDS), Habré’s political police. Subsequently, one of the afore-
mentioned NGOs264 examined these files and submitted them to the investigating judge in Bel-
gium. Meanwhile, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, together with 
Human Rights Watch was making a statistical analysis of the document.265 
All of this indicates that the authorities in Chad had allowed victims and organisations some 
measure of access to files both in order to find the truth and in order to facilitate prosecution, 
albeit not in Chad itself. A similar approach is evident from Chad’s decision to inform the Belgian 
judge of its withdrawal of Habré’s immunity. In a letter to the judge investigating the charges 
against Habré in Belgium, in October 2002, the Minister of Justice of Chad wrote that ‘Habré can 
not claim to enjoy any form of immunity from the Chadian authorities’.266 
At the same time, the actions before courts in Chad, Senegal and Belgium apparently have 
not been without risks for the victims and their representatives. HRW refers to ‘security forces 
                                                 
261 Human Rights Watch, The case against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet’, 2003/2006, 
<http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/habre_0402.pdf> (consulted 14 June 2007). 
262 Id. 
263 Id. 
264 The association of victims of political repression (AVCRP). 
265 Human Rights Watch, The case against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet’, 2003/2006, 
<http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/habre_0402.pdf> (consulted 14 June 2007). 
266 On 5 December 2002 HRW and FIDH received a copy of this letter and made it public. Letter of 
Minister of Justice, Djimain Koudj-Gaou, to the ‘Juge d’Instruction’ of Brussels, Tribunal First 
Instance, 7 October 2002: “La Conference Nationale Souveraine tenue à N’Djaména du 15 
Janvier au 7 Avril 1993 avait officielement levé toute immunité de juridiction à Monsieur 
HISSEIN HABRE. Cette position a été confortée par la Loi No 010/PR/95 du 9 Juin 1995 
accordant l’amnistie aux détenus et exiles politiques et aux personnes en opposition armée, à 
l’exclusion de ‘l’ex Président de la République, HISSEIN HABRE, ses co-auteurs et/ou 
complices’. Dés lors, il est clair que Monsieur HISSEIN HABRE ne peut prétendre à une 
quelconque immunité de la part des autorités Tchadiennes et ce depuis la fin de la Conférence 
Nationale Souveraine”. See <www.hrw.org> (consulted on 18 April 2003). 
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commanded by one of the ex-DDS defendants’ that threw a grenade at counsel for the Interna-
tional Committee for the Trial of Habré, Jacqueline Moudeina. She was severely injured and her 
office was later ransacked.267 Amnesty International notes that members of the security forces 
reportedly enquired who was Ms. Moudeina and then threw a teargas grenade in her direction. 
Following this, a senior member of the security forces who had been searching for her was said to 
have visited twice the medical centre to which she had been brought.268 The Vice-President of one 
of the NGOs, Mr. Souleymane Guengueng,269 apparently had been tailed by uniformed men and 
was suspended from his civil service job just after the visit of the Belgian judge.270 As noted, Mr. 
Guengueng was one of the victims on whose behalf HRW had submitted the case before CAT and 
requested provisional measures to prevent impunity for Habré.271 
In September 2005 an international arrest warrant was issued and Belgium asked for 
Habré’s extradition from Senegal. The Chairperson of the Commission of the African Union 
supported the request, as did the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture and the UN Secretary-
General. Almost two months later he was arrested and taken into custody in Senegal. Its Court of 
Appeal, however, ruled that it had no jurisdiction to decide on an extradition request involving a 
former head of state. It was subsequently decided that he could remain in Senegal, which would 
request the January 2006 summit of the African Union to ‘indicate the competent jurisdiction’ for 
his trial. The African Union set up a Committee of Eminent African Jurists to consider this ques-
tion. This Committee should take into account, among others, ‘adherence to the principles of total 
rejection of impunity’, to fair trial standards, efficiency, accessibility to the trial by alleged vic-
tims and by witnesses as well as priority for an African mechanism.272 Following this Commit-
                                                 
267 Human Rights Watch, The case against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet’, 2003/2006, 
http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/habre_0402.pdf (consulted 14 June 2007). 
268 Amnesty International Annual Report 2002, AI index POL 10/001/2002.  
269 Vice-President of the AVCRP. 
270 Human Rights Watch, The case against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet’, 2003/2006, 
<http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/habre_0402.pdf> (consulted 14 June 2007). 
271 In February 2003 Human Rights Watch stated it was confident that President Wade would keep 
his promise to extradite Habré if a third State would guarantee him a fair trial. The President had 
made a commitment to the UN and Kofi Annan to keep Habré in Senegal until he could be 
brought to justice elsewhere. Reed Brody de Human Rights Watch sur l’affaire Habré: ‘nous 
faisons confiance au Président Wade’, Le Soleil (Senegal), 25 February 2003. In February 2003, 
when he was in Paris, President Wade formally excluded any possibility for trial of Habré in 
Senegal. A trial where the civil parties and the defence would produce two to three thousand 
witnesses would ‘ridicule the Senegalese justice system’. He pointed out that any State that so 
wished could bring an extradition request before the Senegalese judiciary that, if it were up to 
him, would receive a favourable response. He noted, however, that, as of yet, no country had 
requested such extradition. Hissène Habré ne sera pas jugé au Sénégal, selon Wade, Le Soleil, 24 
February 2003. 
272 Human Rights Watch, The case against Hissène Habré, an ‘African Pinochet’, 2003/2006, 
<http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/habre_0402.pdf> (consulted 14 June 2007). See also the 
African Union resolution itself: Assembly/AU/Dec.103 (VI). Meanwhile Amnesty International 
requested the Chairperson of African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights ‘to establish 
contacts with the Senegalese authorities and to request information on the steps taken by Senegal 
to comply with its obligations under international law and to report back to the Commission at its 
next session’. Amnesty International, ‘African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Oral 
statement on options for trial of Hissene Habre’, AI Index: AFR 01/004/2006 (Public), News 
Service No: 115, 11 May 2006. 
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tee’s advice,273 the AU mandated ‘Senegal to prosecute and ensure that Hissène Habré is tried, on 
behalf of Africa, by a competent Senegalese court with guarantees for fair trial’.274 
Concerted action by various international and domestic actors, intergovernmental and non 
governmental, is particularly warranted in situations involving death threats. As discussed in 
chapter IX, thus far, there is only one case in which information is available on the use of provi-
sional measures by the HRC to protect against death threats. The Special Rapporteur of the HRC 
had used them in January 2004 and had requested the State to inform the Committee on the meas-
ures it had taken in compliance within thirty days.275 On 2 February 2004 the non-governmental 
organisation Asian Human Rights Commission spread an urgent appeal relating to an attempt on 
                                                 
273 Report of the Committee of Eminent African Jurists on the case of Hissene Habré, May 2006 
“27. The Committee recommends that an African option should be adopted. 28. Habré should be 
tried by an African member State – Senegal or Chad in the first instance, or by any other African 
country. 29. Senegal is the country best suited to try Habré as it is bound by International law to 
perform its obligations. 30. Chad has the primary responsibility to try and punish Hissène Habré. 
It should therefore cooperate with Senegal”. See <http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/> (consulted 
16 May 2008). 
274 AU Decision On The Hissene Habré Case And The African Union Doc. Assembly/Au/3 (Vii), 2 
July 2006. See <http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/> (consulted 16 May 2008). On subsequent 
developments, see e.g. HRW press release ‘Senegal: New Law Will Permit Habré’s Trial’, 2 
February 2007; HRW press release ‘Senegal Failing to Act on Trial of Hissène Habré; One Year 
After Dakar Agreed to Try Chad Ex-Dictator, Victims are Still Waiting; Chadians March for 
Justice’, 30 June 2007; HRW press release ‘EU to Aid Senegal in Preparing Hissène Habré’s 
Trial’, 19 January 2008 (in response to a request by the Senegalese President for international 
assistance) and Open letter to the international and African communities of the Steering 
Committee of the International Committee for the Fair Trial of Hissène Habré, 15 April 2008 See 
<http://www.hrw.org/justice/habre/> (consulted 16 May 2008). See also Thijs Bouwknecht of 
Radio Netherlands Worldwide, ‘rights Council should press Senegal over Habré; 5 February 
2008, quoting petitioner Guengueng; The Human Rights Council needs to tell Senegal to comply 
with the UN ruling and bring Habré to justice”. The article notes that the European Commission, 
Chad itself, France, Switzerland, Belgium and the Netherlands ‘have already agreed to help fund 
the trial, but are still waiting for Senegal to present a detailed budget’. The State has now 
amended its law, including its constitution, ‘to allow its courts to prosecute genocide, crimes 
against humanity, torture and war crimes committed in the past’. “Meanwhile, however, it has 
appointed the former coordinator of Habré’s legal defence team, Madické Niang, as minister of 
justice, responsible for the organisation of the trial’. <http://www.rnw.nl/internationaljustice/ 
specials/Universal/090905-habre> (consulted 13 February 2009). In May 2009 Belgium 
submitted a case against Senegal before the ICJ, requesting provisional measures. The ICJ, by a 
majority, decided not to grant these, Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or 
Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order of 28 May 2009. While Belgium’s action, inspired by 
NGOs, can as such be interpreted as a form of follow-up, neither Belgium’s submission, nor the 
ICJ’s Order referred to the previous provisional measure by CAT. The dissenting opinion by 
Judge Cançado Trindade, on the other hand, did, §84. See also his reference to discussion of the 
matter by the United Nations Human Rights Council, §45.  
275 This meant that the Committee expected a response no later than on 9 February 2004. HRC 
Michael Anthony Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 1189/2003, provisional measures of 9 January 2004 as 
reproduced by the Human Rights Correspondence School, a project of the Asian Human Rights 
Commission, lesson series 33, p. 3, 14 April 2004, <www.hrschool.org> (consulted on 5 August 
2004). 
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the petitioner’s life earlier that day.276 It called for ‘a thorough inquiry into the conduct of the Sri 
Lankan Government in terms of Rule 86’. It also called ‘for the international community to coop-
erate in making the Sri Lankan government accountable under the international obligations of the 
ICCPR’. It also called upon the government itself ‘to investigate this matter thoroughly and to 
arrest and prosecute the offenders, provide due medical care and compensation for Mr. Fernando 
and to provide the utmost protection to Mr. Fernando and his family’.277 The next day it issued an 
official statement. It pointed out that, while chloroform was sprayed on his face, a van pulled 
nearby, presumably to take him away. “This violent incident raises very serious issues as to 
whose responsibility it is to ensure that the Sri Lankan government implements the UNHRC’s 
interim measures that were issued to it”. It noted that the representative of Sri Lanka in Geneva 
would have been informed of the provisional measures on the day they were decided. It was his 
duty to transmit this information to the Minister of Foreign Affairs as soon as possible. The minis-
ter would then be duty-bound to ‘inform the government of such an important decision by the 
UNHRC’. 
“Given the importance of the decision, it would have been the right of the president, the prime 
minister and the cabinet to know about the communication from the UNHRC. Once the 
government is informed about the UNHRC’s decision, the relevant authorities would be 
informed to take immediate action on the basis of the communication. In this particular 
instance, the two most relevant authorities are the attorney general and the inspector general of 
police (IGP). If the attorney general and the IGP had been informed by the government of the 
interim measures, it can be presumed that under normal circumstances they would take 
immediate action to see that they are implemented and would report back to the government of 
the actions that had been taken. The fact that no action has been taken suggests that either the 
attorney general and the IGP were not informed about the relevant interim measures or they 
neglected to attend to the matter after receiving this information. Whatever the case, Mr. 
Fernando did not receive any form of protection despite the interim measures; and as a result of 
this failure, he was subjected to a brutal attack which could have ended with even more drastic 
consequences than those that he is presently suffering”.278 
The Asian Human Rights Commission pointed out that the State’s failure to adequately 
implement the provisional measures raises important questions that would likely feature in the 
public debate, ‘both locally and internationally’. 
“At what point, for instance, did the government fail to ensure its compliance with these interim 
measures? At whose desk did the communication from the UNHRC stop? (…) (H)as Sri Lanka 
developed a procedure to deal with its treaty obligations, particularly in terms of treaties to 
which it has become a state party in relation to the United Nations? What stipulated procedure 
exists for dealing with communication from the relevant international authorities? Above all, in 
terms of the great importance of the UNHRC, is there any existing mechanism to implement 
and respond to their communication specifically?”279 
                                                 
276 It reported that he went to see a friend ‘when a bearded person appeared and held a handkerchief 
to his face’. He reportedly felt dizzy, but managed to escape to a tailor shop that he knew. He 
collapsed there and his father was informed and took him to the hospital. 
277 Asian Human Rights Commission, Urgent Appeal of 2 February 2004, <www.derechos.org> 
(consulted on 5 August 2004). 
278 A statement by the Asian Human Rights Commission, ‘Attack on Tony Fernando, Sri Lanka 
seriously embarrassed internationally’, <www.ahrchk.net> (consulted on 5 August 2004). 
279 Id. 
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First of all, the government should immediately comply with the provisional measures ‘even at 
this late stage’. The petitioner was now in the hospital undergoing treatment. He ‘should be given 
the protection available to him as a citizen of Sri Lanka and in response to Sri Lanka’s 
international obligations’.  
“The duty to provide direct protection lies with the IGP. The duty to see to the overall 
implementation of the interim measures lies with the attorney general. It is up to them to act 
promptly and boldly now to demonstrate the government’s willingness and capacity to protect 
its citizens”.280 
The NGO noted that the perpetrators were still at large and that the government has a duty to 
answer these questions and to bring the perpetrators to justice.281 
Seven days after the attack the Asian Human Rights Commission received a letter by the 
petitioner explaining that he had been provided with security at the hospital on 2 February (noon) 
until his discharge on 7 February. Two armed police officers protected him under the instruction 
of the ministry of defence. Upon his discharge they brought him back home, but informed him 
‘that they had instruction to give protection only at the hospital’ and until he was brought home. 
They said that there was nothing more they could do and if he needed further protection he should 
talk to ‘higher ups’. He was now in hiding, moving from place to place. He also referred to the 
non-compliance with the Committee’s provisional measures and noted that there had been three 
persons in the van that had been waiting to take him following the attack the previous week.282 
It may be expected that the HRC sent a remainder if it did not receive a response to its pro-
visional measures by 10 February 2004. However, the Committee probably merely would take 
specific action with regard to the attack of 2 February 2004 following specific submissions by the 
petitioner or the State with regard to the incidents. The Special Rapporteur on Torture, on the 
other hand, did intervene on his behalf.283 Sri Lanka is one of the few States in the Asian region 
that accepted the right of individual complaint to the HRC.284 
In 2002 the Inter-American Commission took precautionary measures on behalf of several 
forensic anthropologists and their families in Guatemala who were receiving threats to intimidate 
them into stopping the exhumations of victims of the armed conflict buried in clandestine ceme-
teries. Guatemala had informed the Commission that it had in fact offered police protection to 
those beneficiaries who had ‘expressly accepted it’.285 NGOs regularly take Urgent Action 
through their own networks. In September 2005 Amnesty International issued an Urgent Action 
on behalf of one of the persons mentioned in the Commission’s precautionary measures (2002) 
and his family. It referred to these precautionary measures and noted that concerns remained that 
the level of protection they were receiving was inadequate. Following a death threat received by 
the anthropologist’s sister and her husband two policemen were initially stationed outside their 
                                                 
280 Id. 
281 Id. 
282 Letter of Tony Fernando, 9 February 2004, urgent appeal update of 10 February 2004, 
<www.ahrchk.net> (consulted on 5 August 2004). 
283 UN Special Rapporteur on Torture Urgent appeal of 16 February 2004, also referring to the 
Committee’s provisional measures. The Special Rapporteur had previously contacted the State on 
Fernando’s behalf on 25 September 2003. Moreover, the Special Rapporteur on the Freedom of 
Opinion and Expression had done on 23 December 2003 (on file with the author).  
284 For other Asian States that have recognised the right of individual complaint see the e.g. 
Philippines, South Korea, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. 
285 CIDH Annual Report 2002, §56. 
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house and she received 24 hour police protection.286 NGOs have equally used press releases to 
condemn non-compliance with provisional measures.287 
5 CONCLUSION 
The practice of the adjudicators as well as that of officials from intergovernmental organisations 
and that of NGOs shows that follow-up is considered to be essential. Without it provisional meas-
ures can be expected to decrease in effectiveness.  
Follow-up can take place by the political bodies formally assigned that task within the rele-
vant human rights system, but in practice this is insufficient or sometimes even non-existent. The 
Geneva bodies and the Inter-American Commission and Court have taken it upon themselves to 
monitor not just compliance with their decisions on the merits, but also with their provisional 
measures. Apart from repeated messages to the State concerned to the effect that the provisional 
measures remain in force, the adjudicators have also made use of press releases, Court hearings 
(Inter-American Court), country visits (Inter-American Commission), hearings in the context of 
State reports and referring to compliance with provisional measures in Concluding Observations 
on these reports (the Geneva bodies HRC, CAT and CEDAW). 
In addition it is argued that ignoring provisional measures has consequences for how the 
complaint on the merits can be examined. Not only the right of individual petition is violated, but 
often the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment is too. In fact the burden 
should shift to the State to show that these rights have not been violated. 
Finally, apart from the adjudicators themselves, officials from intergovernmental organisa-
tions and NGOs have also 'followed up' on the provisional measures taken by the adjudicators. 
This may indeed help increase the pressure on the State to comply after all (if still possible) or 
otherwise at least to comply in future. Moreover it underscores the awareness of NGOs and offi-
cials appointed by intergovernmental organisations of the serious nature of the harm risked and 
appears to confirm their recognition of a general principle to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
 
                                                 
286 “However, from late December 2005 onwards, the police officers stationed outside the house 
failed to report on duty on some days. On 7 January, three days three days before the written 
death threat was received, they stopped coming altogether. Since these most recent threats, the 
homes of Gianni Peccerelli and Bianka Peccerelli Monterroso are being guarded by police. 
However, as they have been threatened directly, the FAFG [the Forensic Anthropology 
Foundation, ER] is calling for the authorities to provide them with personal protection 24 hours a 
day, and to guarantee that this level of protection will be maintained”. Amnesty International, 
Urgent Action, 13 January 2006 (referring to previous Urgent Action of 14 September); this 
Action was circulated by the Guatemala Human Rights Commission (Washington, D.C.) as well. 
287 See e.g. Human Rights Watch, ‘Italy: halt expulsion of Tunisian at risk of torture, Respect Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights Ruling’, 3 June 2008 and Update of 5 June 2008, 
<http://hrw.org/English/docs/2008/06/03/italy19016_txt.htm> (consulted 23 September 2008). 
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 CONCLUSION 
This Part dealt with the official responses by States to provisional measures and with the follow 
up by the adjudicators (and others). As to the first, Chapter XVII noted that States generally re-
spect provisional measures, sometimes explicitly confirming their compliance. It then focused on 
those situations in which States have failed to comply. It discussed official responses by States 
justifying why they failed to comply with a provisional measure in which the State protested 
against the (temporary) outcome of the normative process, on the one hand, and official responses 
protesting against the development of the process as such, on the other hand. Explanations for the 
first category of responses may be derived from the system of implementation in domestic law, 
specific politics, the role of media and other actors. Explanations of non-compliance based on the 
second type, disagreement with the decision-making process of the adjudicator, may relate to the 
procedures of the adjudicator in general or to specific issues arising in the case, e.g. relating to the 
principle of audiatur et altera pars or the lack of transparency in the decision-making process. 
These official responses simply present legal arguments for a decision of non-compliance 
that in fact is likely to be based on domestic reasons of a political rather than legal nature. More-
over, the paucity of consistent information on State responses does not allow for a clear answer to 
the question whether States respond more favourably to provisional measures that aim to protect 
those rights that are commonly considered the most fundamental. 
It may be expected that governments wishing to maintain an image of democracy would 
generally be more receptive to provisional measures indicated by human rights adjudicators than 
would more authoritarian and repressive governments. Yet there is an exception to this receptive-
ness in relation to the execution of death sentences and decisions to expel or extradite convicted 
criminals or suspected terrorists. If international adjudicators consider that these persons run a 
real risk of irreparable harm not only to their human rights claim, but to their survival or personal 
integrity,  domestic authorities are often less open to this assessment exactly because of a segment 
of public opinion that revolves around fear.  
In such circumstances even the fact that the provisional measures relate to life and personal 
integrity may not be decisive for compliance in and of itself. For instance the decision not to halt 
an execution despite a provisional measure ordered by an international adjudicator may be ex-
plained by a public opinion strongly in favour of the death penalty. In fact a provisional measure 
protecting against irreparable harm to the claim (not involving a core right) rather than to persons 
may then be less controversial. 
The practice of the adjudicators as well as that of officials from intergovernmental organisa-
tions and that of NGOs shows that follow-up is considered to be essential (Chapter XVIII). The 
follow up by the political bodies formally assigned with that task within the human rights systems 
is often insufficient or sometimes even non-existent. The Geneva adjudicators and the Inter-
American Commission and Court have taken it upon themselves to monitor non-compliance with 
their provisional measures. They repeatedly send messages to the State concerned to the effect 
that the provisional measures remain in force. Such follow up may often require increased speci-
ficity of these provisional measures as well.1 In addition the Inter-American Court has held Court 
hearings discussing implementation of its provisional measures and has assigned the Commission 
                                                 
1 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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an important monitoring role in this respect. The Inter-American Commission has paid attention 
to implementation of its own precautionary measures and those of the Court during country visits. 
The Geneva bodies have asked questions on the implementation of provisional measures during 
hearings in the context of State reports, etc.  
Chapter XVIII argued that ignoring provisional measures has consequences for how the 
complaint on the merits can be examined. Not only the right of individual petition is violated, but 
often the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treatment are too. In such cases of 
non-compliance the burden should shift to the State to show that these rights have not been vio-
lated. 
UN independent experts as well as NGOs may also play an important role in the follow-up 
on provisional measures. Publicity in the context of other activities (for those adjudicators that 
have other (non-adjudicatory) tasks in the human rights system as well) could be a useful tool to 
counteract non-compliance, as long as each situation is assessed individually as to the anticipated 
impact of such publicity on the beneficiaries, especially if domestic (or local) public opinion 
strongly disfavours the protection of the beneficiaries of the provisional measures.2 
In contrast to the partly negative domestic factor of public opinion in such cases, in the long 
run it may also be the strength of the external disapproval for non-compliance that will help de-
termine compliance with future cases. This external disapproval, through the follow up by the 
adjudicators, as well as statements by international organisations, NGOs and other States, does 
seem to be determined, at least partially, by the irreparable nature of the harm the provisional 
measures aim to prevent, thereby reaffirming the common core of the concept as it currently 
stands.  
 
                                                 
2 The involvement of the media is very important in this respect. Yet the impact of the media may 
tip the balance both ways. Especially national media may make or break compliance. In addition, 
in the face of negative domestic media interest in provisional measures powerful States may be 
less inclined to comply with them than States in transition that are counting on joining 
international organizations or receiving financial support and therefore more interested in 
avoiding external disapproval. 
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 GENERAL CONCLUSION 
1 INTRODUCTION 
This book examined the legal concept of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. The 
General Conclusion brings together aspects of the conclusions to the various chapters, with an 
emphasis on the conclusion to Part II on the purpose of provisional measures. That preliminary 
conclusion examined the extent of the convergence or divergences in the approaches of the adju-
dicators. A conceptual framework was presented discussing the core common to provisional 
measures in the human rights systems as well as the outer limits of such measures. The frame-
work is based, on the one hand, on the factual question whether two or more adjudicators have 
used provisional measures in a given context (e.g. halting executions) and on the other hand on 
the underlying rationale of preventing irreparable harm that the provisional measures of the vari-
ous adjudicators have in common. In other words, the ‘common core’ refers to the types of situa-
tions in which a provisional measure is based on a common underlying rationale and in which 
more than one human rights adjudicator has in fact used provisional measures. The ‘outer limits’ 
of the concept refers to the boundaries beyond which one can no longer speak of provisional 
measures, as the harm risked is not irreversible. It is argued that the use of provisional measures 
in such situations is therefore inappropriate. In addition there is a continuum between the outer 
limits of the concept and its common core. Along this continuum various provisional measures 
can be situated as ordered by the human rights adjudicators. In this respect the contexts in which 
the various adjudicators operate are significant. It should be noted, moreover, that the common 
core of the concept is not fixed, but may change over time, when a new underlying rationale 
becomes apparent in the case law of the various adjudicators, backed by actual provisional meas-
ures ordered in more than one system.  
By singling out some of the best practices developed in the human rights systems discussed 
in this book this General Conclusion also suggests steps that could be taken to improve the func-
tioning of provisional measures. It takes into account, where relevant, the following criteria to 
determine how provisional measures could best assist a beneficiary: accessibility, motivation and 
consistency, responsiveness to the specific situation, consultation and follow-up. The criteria of 
accessibility, motivation and consistency were selected for use in this study as they were thought 
to make provisional measures more convincing vis-à-vis addressee States. Responsiveness to the 
specific situation and consultation were considered necessary for the effectiveness of these meas-
ures in protecting the individual and follow-up by the adjudicators was used as a criterion because 
it has generally been regarded as essential in treaty monitoring. 
Cançado Trindade already referred to the transformation of the concept of provisional 
measures through international human rights law, from precautionary to protective, as an example 
of the humanisation of public international law.1 Indeed, as argued in this study, the concept of 
provisional measures has been adapted to some extent in order to fit the context of international 
                                                 
1 See e.g. IACHR Matter of the persons imprisoned in the “Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira” 
Penitentiary in Araraquara, São Paulo (Brazil), Order of 30 September 2006, individual opinion 
Judge Cançado Trindade, §27. 
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human rights law, yet this may be relevant not just in the practice of the human rights adjudica-
tors, but also in that of other international adjudicators faced with issues involving the fate of 
human beings.  
Interestingly, there are also situations in which human rights adjudicators take a more lim-
ited approach to provisional measures than the ICJ and ITLOS. One explanation may be the fact 
that several constitutive documents of the human rights adjudicators do not contain a specific 
reference to provisional measures, which makes the adjudicators more cautious in using them. At 
the same time the principles of effective protection of human rights and of prevention of irrepara-
ble harm to persons would argue for a lenient approach to, for example, evidentiary requirements 
at the stage of provisional measures. The fact that the approach of human rights adjudicators is 
not always lenient appears due more to pragmatic than to principled reasons, for fear that a ‘too 
lenient’ approach might eventually render provisional measures less effective.  
Yet with regard to other aspects of provisional measures the human rights adjudicators have 
developed a firm practice stressing the importance of preventing irreparable harm to persons and 
specifying the manner in which this prevention is to take form. This could, in turn, be relevant as 
well to adjudicators with a general competence, not limited to human rights issues, when they are 
dealing with issues involving irreparable harm to persons. The value still attached to the tradi-
tional concept of State consent in the contentious procedure before the ICJ might not yet allow the 
ICJ to join in all aspects of the practice on provisional measures developed by the human rights 
adjudicators. This applies in particular to the case law on jurisdiction and admissibility. Yet on 
other issues the ICJ, when dealing with situations involving risk of irreparable harm to persons, 
may indeed draw inspiration from the practice developed by the human rights adjudicators. An 
example is taking into account the question whether the interests of the individuals caught up in 
the conflicts between States are properly represented by their States. After all, while the States are 
the formal beneficiaries and addressees of the provisional measures by the ICJ, when provisional 
measures aim at preventing irreparable harm to persons de facto these persons are the beneficiar-
ies. Another, related, example would be increasing the specificity of the Orders for provisional 
measures, allowing for additional scrutiny and follow-up precisely to prevent irreparable harm to 
persons. 
2 THE SETTING OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
ADJUDICATION 
2.1 Introduction 
The development of the concept of provisional measures in international human rights 
adjudication must be seen in the context of the traditional concept as developed by the ICJ, which 
is also subject to the ‘humanisation’ of international law (Chapter I). At the same time it must be 
seen in the specific context of each system of human rights adjudication (Chapter II). 
2.2 The humanisation of the traditional concept  
The rationale behind the use of provisional measures is to ensure a meaningful outcome of a case 
brought before a court or other adjudicator. More specifically, the traditional purposes of provi-
sional measures as used by the ICJ are twofold. The first is the preservation of rights, the breach 
of which is both imminent (or already taking place) and likely to cause irreparable harm to the 
rights claimed. The second, applied only incidentally, is the preservation of proper legal proceed-
ings. In other words, in the first case there should be a link between the right and remedy claimed 
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and the provisional measure and in the second case there should be a link between the provisional 
measure and the purpose of having a fair and accurate procedure.  
The ICJ is not a human rights court. It does not even deal with individual complaints. Yet in 
spite of the limitations it is faced with as an adjudicator dealing only with inter-State complaints, 
it does seem to realise the importance of the protection of groups and individuals. It has used 
provisional measures for reasons not necessarily closely related to the rights claimed or to the 
proceedings. It has taken provisional measures in border conflict cases, for instance, not only to 
maintain the status quo in relation to the claim, but also to prevent irreparable harm to civilians 
living in the border area. Their rights were not the (main) subject of a State’s request for provi-
sional measures against another State. In the practice of the ICJ the traditional twofold distinction 
may have been extended to a threefold distinction: to prevent irreparable harm to the claim, to the 
procedure or to individuals not central to the dispute. 
The ICJ’s finding in LaGrand that its provisional measures are legally binding was not 
made dependent on the fact that basic rights of the human person were involved, but was simply 
part of its traditional function. The power to indicate provisional measures is required by the 
object and purpose of Article 41 ICJ Statute and ‘based on the necessity, when the circumstances 
call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the 
final judgment of the Court’.2 
At the same time some conflicts between States in which the ICJ orders provisional meas-
ures may indeed concern the rights of individuals and the (human rights) obligations of States 
towards them. In such cases its provisional measures may either aim to halt measures that could 
result in irreparable harm to a large group of people (armed activities; nuclear tests, etc), or aim at 
the (diplomatic) protection of specific individuals (halt execution of a death sentence; release 
persons held hostage).  
Various aspects of the Court’s orders for provisional measures specifically show its respon-
siveness to the fate of human beings. In the Chorzów factory (1927) case, concerning a request to 
grant a pecuniary claim at the provisional measures stage, rather than to secure rights basic to the 
human being, the PCIJ was strict and refused to order provisional measures because it considered 
that the request coincided with the claim on the merits and was in fact a request for an interim 
judgment. On the other hand, without breaking with Chorzów factory, the ICJ did take provisional 
measures in the Nuclear Test cases (1973).3 While it did not explain the difference, it is likely, 
especially in light of subsequent cases, that it took into account the enormity of the possible con-
sequences to the environment and population of the applicant States. In the Hostages case (1979) 
it again ordered provisional measures overlapping to a great extent with the main claim. What 
distinguishes these cases from the Chorzów factory case is that they involved the fate of human 
beings. 
In some cases, at the stage of provisional measures, the ICJ was yet to determine on the 
merits whether a certain act or omission by a State would indeed constitute a violation of the 
rights invoked by the other State (e.g. the Nuclear Test cases). In other cases it was clear that 
certain acts or omissions constituted a violation of the rights invoked, but the dispute related to 
evidence and/or imputability (e.g. the Hostages case and DRC v. Uganda).  
The ICJ has also taken into account the basic rights of the individual in its attitude towards 
procedural requirements. In a particularly urgent case it used provisional measures in advance of 
a hearing on the use of provisional measures: in an Order to halt the imminent execution of an 
individual it was prepared to ‘reward’ the requesting State for submitting the claim and request 
                                                 
2 ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §102. 
3 Only two of the judges considered this approach incorrect, as rewarding an attempt to obtain an 
‘interim judgement’. 
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for provisional measures strategically late, as the individual facing execution could hardly be 
punished for his State being procedurally remiss. Had the claim only involved pecuniary interests, 
rather than the life of an individual, such decision would have been unlikely. A similar conclusion 
may be drawn with regard to the recent majority decision by the ICJ to order provisional meas-
ures to halt the execution of death sentences pending a case involving a request for the interpreta-
tion of its previous judgment Avena. This despite the fact that the respondent State had argued 
that there was no dispute between the parties regarding this interpretation and the Court therefore 
had no jurisdiction to order provisional measures.4 
In some cases States may invoke human rights treaties. Even if they act on the basis of dip-
lomatic protection rather than erga omnes obligations, they in fact ask the ICJ to interpret State 
obligations under human rights treaties and, therefore, to take into account the rights of the indi-
viduals concerned. In such cases the assessment of the risk involved and the role of the beneficiar-
ies may differ from the approach normally taken by the ICJ in its use of provisional measures and 
approximate more closely the provisional measures taken by human rights adjudicators. At the 
same time, as noted, States may sometimes be involved in legal disputes that have developed into 
military conflicts, with their citizens caught in the middle. If the States involved bring the case 
before the Court and request provisional measures, not particularly invoking the rights of the 
individuals, the ICJ nevertheless takes into account the basic rights of the individual. As a result 
the provisional measures ordered may differ from those requested by the State(s). In general the 
Court seems to be more resourceful in drafting Orders for provisional measures different from 
those requested when the case involves the fate of human beings. In such cases it refers to the 
obligations of both Parties, it adds the obligation not to aggravate the dispute and it reminds States 
of their task in the maintenance of peace and security. 
The more recent decisions to take provisional measures in the consular protection/death 
penalty cases, on the one hand, and in the cases on mass human rights violations, on the other, 
constitute examples of the humanisation of international law. The practice of the ICJ indicates, 
albeit tentatively, that adjudicators not exclusively dealing with human rights may develop sensi-
tivity for the plight of human beings caught up in conflicts between States, with its consequent 
effects on the concept of provisional measures. 
2.3 The principle of effective protection and the inherent authority to take 
provisional measures 
While in most inter-State proceedings not involving human rights the principle of State sover-
eignty (and in particular State consent) is still important, in human rights adjudication (mostly 
between an individual and a State, but also inter-State) the principle of effective protection of 
human rights is predominant. Moreover, even in inter-State proceedings not automatically involv-
ing human rights, State sovereignty it is not the only relevant principle. Other relevant principles 
may be effective protection of the environment or the preservation of peace as well as preventing 
irreparable harm to persons. 
Human rights adjudicators have the inherent authority to use provisional measures.5 If the 
treaty also includes inter-State proceedings it should be possible to use provisional measures in 
these proceedings as well. The authority to use provisional measures includes the authority to use 
                                                 
4 ICJ Request for interpretation of the judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena 
and other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 16 July 2008. 
5 Chapter II (Systems) discussed the authority to use provisional measures in the context of each 
human rights system. 
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them proprio motu. Especially in cases in which potential beneficiaries are unable to contact the 
adjudicator directly, the adjudicator should be able to intervene on his own motion on the basis of 
other credible information. The main concern in this respect should not be whether the adjudica-
tors have the authority to do so – which is derived from their function and the purpose of provi-
sional measures – but whether it is expected that the beneficiary will agree. In some situations 
involving death threats and harassment an intended beneficiary may not wish to be identified in 
the text of provisional measures.6  
The inherent authority to order provisional measures, based on the principle of effective 
protection, also implies the possibility of delegation. Without the possibility to delegate the power 
to use provisional measures to one member of the court or adjudicatory body these measures will 
be deprived of their protective function. After all, various adjudicators only convene periodically. 
The member to whom the authority has been delegated should indeed report to the main body 
about the use of all provisional measures. An obligation to consult other members of the Court or 
Committee could be useful as well, but this should not be required at the cost of expedience. 
2.4 Transparency or the lack thereof 
This book emphasises the importance of motivation and accessibility of an adjudicator’s provi-
sional measures. In most systems the transparency of decision-making on provisional measures is 
insufficient. The availability of information is not very balanced over the different bodies. The 
Inter-American Court of Human Rights publishes its decisions on provisional measures separately 
and these decisions are motivated. The other systems, however, offer virtually no explanations on 
the use of provisional measures. The use of provisional measures is simply mentioned in the 
decision on the merits or inadmissibility. The unpublished letters to the parties informing them of 
decisions about provisional measures normally do not clarify the criteria for their use either.  
Most adjudicators do not formally reject requests by petitioners to take provisional meas-
ures. Thus it is not possible to systematically trace failed attempts to convince them to take such 
measures. Systematic references to refusals to use provisional measures are only found in the 
decisions by the Inter-American Court, the Bosnia Chamber and, to some extent, the Committee 
against Torture. The lack of references by the other adjudicators is unfortunate because cases in 
which the petitioners failed to convince the adjudicators to take provisional measures could give 
particular insight into their approach to the concept.  
It might be said that providing a motivation for the use of provisional measures would al-
ready anticipate the final determination of the case. Yet in that case it would be the use itself of 
the measures rather than the motivation that would anticipate the decision on the merits. Motiva-
tion only serves to clarify the basis for using provisional measures and to make visible the most 
important criteria applied by the adjudicator. If this already indicates a certain direction the adju-
dicator may take, this is very likely to happen as well if he omits making explicit such a motiva-
tion. Adjudicators like the ICJ, with a more general mandate, not only involving human rights, 
have also motivated their orders for provisional measures. The motivation and publication of the 
Orders of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights is commendable and States have not com-
plained that this anticipated the eventual decision. In human rights cases involving the risk of 
irreparable harm to persons the rule of non-anticipation by the adjudicator of the decision on the 
merits simply means that provisional measures should not dictate the direction of the ultimate 
determination of the main conflict. This approach is based on the threat of irreparable harm to 
persons on the one hand and the difference in availability of evidence and time for evaluation of 
                                                 
6 See further Chapter XIII (Protection), section 4 (beneficiaries). 
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this evidence at different stages of the proceedings. The assessment of the evidence for the pur-
pose of provisional measures should not prejudice the eventual decision. It should be clear, for 
instance, that the final decision is based on an evaluation of all the available evidence and argu-
ments on the basis of the principle audi alteram partem. After all adjudicators should make avail-
able the information to both parties and allow them the opportunity to respond. In fact this princi-
ple should apply already pending the proceedings to any follow-up decision with regard to the 
provisional measures initially taken.  
In the text of the initial decision informing the State of the provisional measure there is no 
need for the adjudicator to already invite the State party to suggest that the measures be lifted. As 
part of the written proceedings the State party would have to respond to the provisional measures 
by a certain deadline. In its response it has to indicate how it is complying with the provisional 
measures. At the same time it has the opportunity to indicate why it does not (fully) agree with 
them and it may suggest that the adjudicator lift them. The petitioner would have an opportunity 
to comment on the State party’s compliance and, if need be, on the arguments of the State that the 
provisional measures should be lifted. Following this exchange of information and comments the 
adjudicator could decide to maintain, lift or adapt its provisional measures. 
Hearings on requests by petitioners for provisional measures may clearly help enhance the 
persuasive force of provisional measures as well, and play a role in follow-up. They would offer a 
formalized forum for dialogue between the parties on this issue. Nevertheless, they are not always 
practicable in the context of international adjudication, unless there would be a fund specifically 
for the purpose of paying the expenses of indigent petitioners in cases considered of particular 
importance by the adjudicator. Moreover, the absence of such hearings does not significantly 
diminish the authority of provisional measures that are substantiated and publicly accessible. The 
initial decisions sent to the State party should already contain a brief (standard) motivation refer-
ring to the purpose of provisional measures. The decision confirming these initial decisions 
should contain a clear motivation similar in structure to the Orders for provisional measures by 
the Inter-American Court of Human Rights.  
With a brief explanation for the use of provisional measures both the State and the peti-
tioner may be able to provide a more focused response. The provisional measure would be sub-
stantiated by referring to the authority to use it, to the purpose of preventing irreparable harm to 
persons and to the applicable rights, as well as by noting that the decision is made in light of the 
urgency of the situation and based on prima facie evidence of an imminent risk of irreparable 
harm. The adjudicator could also refer to previous decisions on the legal status of provisional 
measures, indicate the follow-up information required as well as the relevant time limits. For 
adjudicators that do not yet motivate their use of provisional measures, substantiation in this form 
would not imply an inordinate increase of the workload. It would only require one extra page in a 
Note Verbale or Order to the government (sent for information to the petitioners) that could par-
tially be standardised.7 
While a certain measure of flexibility for the adjudicator is warranted, better accessibility to 
the public of information about the use of these measures and some explanation of their use 
would help increase predictability of decision-making. The practice of using them should have 
consistency within each system. All of this would enhance legal certainty as well as the credibility 
of the adjudicator and the concept of provisional measures as such. It would make these measures 
more persuasive and it would enhance coherence within and even among systems. Transparency 
on the use of provisional measures would also enhance access of potential beneficiaries to the tool 
                                                 
7 The Inter-American Court uses such a standardised model, adding the relevant information for 
the case at issue. 
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of provisional measures and it would provide conditions for a more informed media, which in 
turn could help improve State compliance. 
Accessibility, transparency, coherence and consistency in the use of provisional measures 
should be increased, among others by making public the decisions and by including reasoning. 
One of the aims of the research was to assist in this process by collecting, systematizing and 
analysing the relevant information. This book makes reference mainly to those cases that are 
easily verifiable. An exception is made for the practice of the HRC because for several years it 
failed to mention its use of provisional measures in its final decisions altogether. Without refer-
ence to information derived from the case files the practice discussed would not be representative. 
Because eventually an opportunity was offered to examine case files in Geneva on the Commit-
tee’s practice with regard to provisional measures it was decided to make the information re-
trieved more widely available in this book.  
The current lack of transparency in the practice of most adjudicators made an impact on the 
methodology used in this book. Given the breadth of systems and subject matters discussed, and 
as most provisional measures are not published, exhaustive discussion of the practice with regard 
to all subject matters dealt with by all the adjudicators when using provisional measures was not 
possible. It was not necessary either since this book takes an illustrative rather than an exhaustive 
approach. The cases discussed were selected because they were informative about a particular 
aspect of provisional measures. Typical cases were discussed providing insight into the features 
of provisional measures that the various systems have in common. Similar cases were also men-
tioned in which other adjudicators confirmed the approach taken in these typical cases or in which 
they chose to take a different approach. The book also examined atypical cases (Chapter XI) in 
order to explore the outer limits of the concept.  
At a more abstract level some underlying principles and ideas can be found in the human 
rights systems. These have been used to clarify and develop a legal concept of provisional meas-
ures in human rights cases. These principles and ideas are linked to the existing doctrine on provi-
sional measures in general international law. Thus, based on more abstract principles that the 
approaches of the adjudicators have in common, this book aimed to fill gaps in the doctrine. 
While it did not claim to be exhaustive in discussing the practices of the different systems, the 
breadth and depth of the source material used made possible a comprehensive overview, allowing 
conclusions to be drawn about the common core and outer limits of provisional measures in hu-
man rights adjudication.  
2.5 Cross-fertilization 
The overview presented in Chapter II served to highlight commonalities as well as differences 
between the human rights systems. As to the commonalities, the systems are facing common 
problems and issues, which may sometimes result in converging interpretations, occasionally 
consciously (often referred to as ‘dialogue’ or ‘cross-fertilization’), at other times more indirectly. 
As to the differences between the systems, they may help explain possible divergences in the 
approaches of the adjudicators with regard to provisional measures. These divergences were 
explored to clarify the use of provisional measures that are situated on a continuum beyond the 
common core, but still within the outer limits of the concept (Chapter XII). 
The differences and commonalities in the systems may help to explain why the respective 
practices of the adjudicators converge or diverge with regard to the use of provisional measures. 
Awareness of convergence and divergence may in turn enhance the understanding of the common 
core and outer limits of the current concept of provisional measures in human rights adjudication.  
As an example of an international law concept on which the approaches of the various adju-
dicators may differ, this research on provisional measures also contributes to the ongoing discus-
sion on the proliferation of international adjudicators and the ‘fragmentation’ of international law, 
 General Conclusion 
1086 
or in any case the importance of coherence in the application of international law. Article 31(3)(c) 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is particularly relevant as an expression of the 
aim of increasing coherence in the law applied to different subject matters. It reflects the principle 
of systemic integration, referring to ‘any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties’ as an element that must be taken into account with the context when 
interpreting a treaty provision. A presumption exists of consistency of the text to be interpreted 
with general international law, unless this would undermine the object and purpose of the system. 
International human rights law may to some extent be seen as a ‘regime’ or ‘a set of implicit 
or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures around which actors’ expec-
tations converge in a given area of international relations’.8 Indeed, human rights adjudicators, 
alleged victims, NGOs and States appear to have assumed, even if implicitly, the principle of 
effective protection to prevent irreparable harm to persons as a fundamental norm around which 
the human rights system is built. At the same time, in light of the principle of systemic integra-
tion, this special ‘regime’ does not, and should not weaken general international law. 
The African Commission is explicitly authorized to ‘draw inspiration from’ rules of interna-
tional law other than those found as such in the ACHPR or to take those ‘into consideration’ (see 
Articles 60 and 61 ACHPR). The African Court even ‘shall apply’ the provisions of the ACHPR 
as well as ‘other instruments ratified by the States concerned’ (Article 7 Protocol).9 The older 
instruments, in particular the ECHR, are not explicit in this respect, but nevertheless cross-
fertilization does appear to take place. In some cases even the ECtHR has explicitly referred to the 
case law of other adjudicators. 
Obviously it is more difficult to find a common understanding of legal concepts and achieve 
convergence in interpretation with regard to a large number of States from different regions of the 
world. Yet if all adjudicators have a similar interpretative approach to certain phenomena and 
legal texts, this would validate that interpretation for the time being. Cross-fertilization can make 
an interpretation more convincing and more coherent from the perspective of the development of 
a body of international case law.  
Consultation by adjudicators of the case law developed by other adjudicators and familiarity 
with their interpretative approaches is warranted. The practice that has been developed by human 
rights adjudicators in the application of the human rights treaties subsequent to their entry into 
force is relevant when a given treaty is applied domestically, as well as when other international 
adjudicators invoke the provisions of that treaty. International adjudicators may do so either di-
rectly, as the ICJ has done, or in order to inform the meaning of the particular treaty they super-
vise. In both cases they consider the subsequent practice of the relevant treaty bodies as well. This 
is so either as law applicable in the relations between the parties or as the authoritative interpreta-
tion of a treaty provision that is conceptually similar, which interpretation could therefore serve as 
a source of inspiration or even indicate underlying general principles of law or interpretation. 
The text of Article 31(3)(b) VCLT, ‘any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation’, arguably could man-
date a dynamic interpretation involving subsequent developments. After all, it may be assumed 
that States parties ratified human rights treaties, including the supervisory mechanisms, in good 
faith, meaning that the human rights adjudicators established by these treaties have genuinely 
been assigned the task of monitoring compliance therewith and therefore the task of interpreting 
the provisions of the treaty. Thus in a way the practice developed by the human rights adjudica-
                                                 
8 Krasner (1983), p. 2. 
9 This concerns the Protocol to the African Charter establishing an African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, not the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human 
Rights, see Chapter II, section 5.2. 
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tors could be seen as establishing the agreement of the parties regarding their interpretation as 
such, exactly because they created these adjudicators under the treaty in order to interpret it. Had 
States preferred to reserve each interpretation for themselves, their recognition of the individual 
complaint system would have been in bad faith. This is not to be assumed. In light of the object 
and purpose of the human rights treaty, which is not traditionally inter-State, as well as of the 
individual complaint mechanism included in the treaty, one may conclude that there is no need for 
the consent of each State party to each and every finding by these adjudicators. They have agreed 
to, and signed up for, a ‘process’ of treaty interpretation by an expert body functioning as an 
adjudicator in the context of the individual complaint procedure.10 
Apart from the relevance of the subsequent practice developed by the adjudicators to the in-
terpretation of treaty provisions, ‘judicial decisions’ also constitute ‘subsidiary means for the 
determination of international law’ (Article 38(1)(d) ICJ Statute). These may be domestic or 
international judicial decisions. The term ‘judicial decisions’ is used, rather than ‘court decisions’, 
which potentially includes the decisions made in individual cases by treaty monitoring bodies or 
WTO Panels. The argument is often made that such decisions are ‘quasi-judicial’, but even if that 
is the case, what could be argued to be most relevant is the range of States whose obligations are 
covered by the interpretation, rather than the exact legal status of the findings. In other words, a 
decision of a domestic court, which may be binding on one particular State, certainly has less 
legal authority vis-à-vis other States, than the interpretation by a treaty monitoring body. Never-
theless, the findings by domestic courts and other domestic adjudicators may be used as subsidi-
ary means for the determination of international law. In this vein the decisions of treaty bodies on 
individual complaints against States could equally, and more suitably, serve as subsidiary means 
for the determination of this law. 
Further dialogue about the concept within, as well as between the various systems, will un-
doubtedly enhance the quality and persuasiveness of provisional measures by human rights adju-
dicators. Meanwhile, for this research ‘information-rich’ cases were selected in order to gain 
insight into the concept of provisional measures in human rights adjudication. Some of them 
related to situations in which (almost) all human rights adjudicators have used provisional meas-
ures, others concerned unusual situations.  
Most of the best practices with regard to provisional measures can be found in the Inter-
American system. As noted, in this system the information is also the most accessible. The Orders 
for provisional measures by the Inter-American Court have been published separately. Yet it must 
be kept in mind that some of what this book identifies as ‘best practices’ might be explained by 
the particularities of a regional system and could not always easily be transferred to other sys-
tems. 
As noted in the Introduction, when the underlying approaches of all adjudicators, as well as 
the specific practice of at least two of them converge, this study speaks of a common core.  
It is assumed that if the adjudicators indeed move towards a more uniform approach this 
will make the provisional measures more persuasive to domestic courts, the executive and the 
legislator. In addition it presumably is more ‘costly’ for a State’s image to ignore such provisional 
measures because of their enhanced legitimacy.  
                                                 
10 See Chapter II (Systems), §8.3. 
 General Conclusion 
1088 
3 THE PURPOSE OF PROVISIONAL MEASURES IN HUMAN RIGHTS 
ADJUDICATION 
3.1 Introduction 
In general international law the purposes of provisional measures relate to preserving the rights of 
the parties, preserving the procedure and preventing irreparable harm. In human rights adjudica-
tion preventing irreparable harm is the main purpose. This has taken on a specific meaning, relat-
ing primarily to harm to persons and only secondarily to harm to the claim or the procedure. Risk 
of irreparable harm to persons should normally be established by a two-prong test of (1) irrepara-
ble harm to persons and (2) irreparable harm to the rights claimed, including the possibility of 
reparation. The third type of irreparable harm, harm to the procedure, may play a role as well if 
persons other than the alleged victim(s) are risking irreparable harm.11 This is the case when 
witnesses, counsel or family members of the alleged victim are harassed and receive death threats. 
In such cases there is no need to establish a relationship with the main claim. Here the test is (1) 
irreparable harm to persons and (2) irreparable harm to the integrity of the complaint procedure. 
The ECtHR, the HRC and CAT adjudicate in systems that do not have an article on provi-
sional measures included in their constitutive documents. They nevertheless use provisional 
measures because they consider that the power to do so is inherent in the protective function of 
the adjudicator, which is why they have included a reference to this power in their Rules of Pro-
cedure. Yet, maybe because of the absence of a reference in the constitutive documents them-
selves, they are more cautious in the use of provisional measures than the Inter-American Com-
mission and Court. 
In addition worldwide systems generally take a more limited approach than regional sys-
tems because they are further removed from the situations and have fewer possibilities for super-
vision. In order to determine the common core it is important to examine a system with less ex-
tensive possibilities. Thus, this book has taken the HRC as a point of departure. It is the most 
internationally applicable system, comparable in content to the regional systems.  
The adjudicators appear to agree that in order to make provisional measures effective it is 
necessary, with respect to the kinds of situations in which they are taken, to draw the line some-
where. Part II of this book provided a conceptual motivation on where to draw the line. Acts or 
omissions by the State that are reversible cannot be irreparable, making irreversibility a threshold 
criterion for the use of provisional measures. Yet it is submitted in this book that acts or omis-
sions that are irreversible are not necessarily irreparable. They are if they would result in harm for 
which forms of reparation other than restitutio in integrum would be unacceptable, while such 
restitution would no longer be possible.  
In other words, violations of rights causing irreparable harm must be prevented since a re-
turn to the status quo ante is impossible after the irreversible has taken place (irreversibility), 
                                                 
11 In addition, as noted, preventing irreparable harm to the procedure could be seen as a collateral 
purpose in death penalty and non-refoulement cases. The execution of a petitioner, for instance, 
pending the proceedings causes irreparable harm to the fairness of the proceedings before the 
adjudicator and, thereby, the integrity of the individual complaint procedure under the treaty in 
question. Clearly, when one party in a conflict kills the other party during the course of legal 
proceedings instituted in order to settle their conflict, that party, rather than the adjudicator, 
settles the conflict. Such a course of action, moreover, is not conducive to the principle of 
equality of arms. This form of irreparable harm to the proceedings is so serious that the use of 
provisional measures to prevent it could be justified even if there is no clear link with an eventual 
remedy preserving the life of the victim. 
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while the nature of the harm implies that such violations can never be repaired by financial com-
pensation (irreparability). In human rights cases the relevance of this traditional reason for using 
provisional measures is particularly striking. 
Based on the practices in the various systems and the principles underlying the use of provi-
sional measures the following findings were presented about the common core and outer limits of 
the concept. 
3.2 Within the common core: preventing irreparable harm to persons 
The practice of the human rights adjudicators with regard to provisional measures is rich but often 
incoherent and lacking explanation. There are four situations in which international human rights 
adjudicators most often make use of the tool of provisional measures. The first is to halt the exe-
cution of petitioners who are sentenced to death until the adjudicator has been able to examine 
their complaints (Chapter III). The second is to halt the expulsion, extradition or deportation of 
petitioners until the adjudicator has been able to examine their complaints involving non-
refoulement (Chapter V). The third is to intervene in a timely manner in detention situations 
involving risks to health and dignity (Chapter VII). The fourth is to order a State to provide pro-
tection to witnesses, human rights defenders and others against threats to their lives and physical 
integrity (Chapter IX).  
The first situation, where provisional measures are used in order to halt an execution while a 
case is pending before an adjudicator, is a more traditional use of provisional measures by human 
rights adjudicators. Almost all adjudicators in international human rights cases have used provi-
sional measures this way. For the HRC supervising the ICCPR this is the predominant situation in 
which it used provisional measures, at least until both Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago withdrew 
their recognition of the right of individual complaint.12  
The second situation involving their use to halt deportations, is predominant in the practice 
by CAT as well as in the European human rights system. The European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), or – in the past – the Convention organs (Court and Commission), indicates provisional 
measures when a State should halt an extradition or expulsion until the Court has examined 
whether this would result in a violation of Articles 2 (right to life) and 3 (prohibition of torture 
and cruel treatment) ECHR. When there is a real risk that the petitioner will be subjected to tor-
ture or inhuman treatment in the requesting or receiving State, extradition or expulsion would be 
contrary to the international obligations of the extraditing or expelling State. If there is a chance 
that such situation will occur, the Court may indicate to the State that, as a provisional measure, it 
should not expel or extradite this person until it has been able to determine whether such a real 
risk does or does not exist. In that case the measure taken may be temporary, in the sense that the 
extradition or expulsion may nevertheless take place later if the supervisory body, once it has 
determined the case, concludes that this would not result in a violation of the State’s international 
obligations. Alternatively, the final decision may cause the provisional measure to lose its tempo-
rary nature (as a provisional measure) and become permanent.13 The same applies to the practice 
of CAT to order provisional measures to halt expulsion or extradition in cases involving claims 
under Article 3 ICAT (non-refoulement). 
The third situation deals with ongoing detention situations in which detainees face risks to 
their lives and personal integrity. It was initially mainly the HRC that intervened in such situa-
                                                 
12 See Chapter XIV on jurisdiction and admissibility as well as XVII on the official responses of 
addressee States. 
13 See Chapter XIII on the relationship with reparation. 
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tions pending the proceedings, albeit often without formally invoking its Rule on provisional 
measures. Currently it is mainly in the Inter-American system that provisional measures often aim 
at protecting the lives and personal integrity of all persons detained in, working at or visiting the 
premises of a certain detention facility. Nevertheless, the other adjudicators have also used provi-
sional measures in this context. 
The fourth situation, involving protection against threats, is most prominently used in the 
Inter-American system. This is an innovative approach to provisional measures that is still evolv-
ing, but that appears to already have saved lives. The example of the Inter-American Commission 
and Court to protect alleged victims, witnesses and other persons against death threats has been 
followed by the other adjudicators. While these have not yet built an extensive practice in this 
regard, their decision to intervene in these circumstances may be explained by the importance 
attached in all human rights systems to preventing irreparable harm to life and physical integrity 
(Chapter IX). Even the ECtHR may be expected to start taking a firm approach in taking provi-
sional measures in situations of death threats and harassment as well.  
Other situations in which provisional measures have been used with a similar underlying ra-
tionale of preventing irreparable harm to life and personal integrity are measures in order to halt 
corporal punishment or ensure the safety of persons recently disappeared. Indeed, adjudicators in 
human rights cases have taken most provisional measures in relation to the right to life and the 
prohibition of cruel treatment and torture. These fundamental rights have an exceptional position 
within all human rights treaties. For instance they are considered non-derogable in all treaties 
under examination exactly because their violation, even during a state of emergency, would defeat 
the whole purpose of the treaty. The exceptional nature of these non-derogable rights is also 
confirmed by the fact that their violation may constitute a crime against humanity. All adjudica-
tors agree that even if the treaty in question does not explicitly provide for the use of provisional 
measures, the duty to protect against threats to life and personal integrity requires the State to 
abstain from action or take positive measures, also pending international proceedings.14 
Chapter VIII argued that the few provisional measures that have been taken to ensure access 
to court and counsel may equally belong to the common core when these rights are accessory to 
the protection against ill treatment and torture and against threats to life. 
As noted, the position taken in this book is that the common core of provisional measures is 
flexible rather than frozen in time. The right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel treat-
ment clearly necessitate the use of provisional measures because violations result in irreparable 
harm to persons threatening their very existence. Yet there are situations not involving the right to 
life and the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture in which human rights adjudicators have 
used provisional measures that have by now become part of the common core, namely to ensure 
cultural survival and prevent mass expulsion and forced eviction in a context of pervasive dis-
crimination. This may be explained by the special position of indigenous peoples and of minori-
ties in a particularly vulnerable position. For instance, an appropriate form of reparation for viola-
tions of the right to culture and religion should take into account cultural integrity and survival. 
Financial compensation alone would not constitute meaningful redress because the very existence 
as a cultural group may be at stake. Pending the proceedings provisional measures could prevent 
such irreparable harm (Chapter X).  
Irreparable harm results from the violation of rights crucial to a person’s or a group’s basic 
existence or crucial to a person’s dignity. In some contexts provisional measures may assist in 
alleviating the situation even of potentially large groups of people. At present the use of provi-
sional measures to protect collective rights has been limited to protecting indigenous culture and 
protecting religious rights in the context of persecution of ethnic groups Combined with pervasive 
                                                 
14 See also Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
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discrimination, mass expulsion or internal displacement may indeed be so serious as to constitute 
not just undue hardship, but irreparable harm to the very existence of people. Such harm must be 
prevented rather than only redressed following the mass expulsion or displacement. Mass expul-
sion (and internal displacement) must be prevented exactly because the causes may be endemic 
(e.g. based on religious or ethnic grounds) and the consequences may have extremely long-term 
effects for a large group of people. The protection against forced displacement ‘by expulsion or 
other coercive means from the area in which the persons concerned are lawfully present’ is an-
other norm recognised by the HRC for its fundamental nature.15 The use of provisional measures 
to prevent or halt such violations could be warranted. At the same time international adjudicators 
may not be able to collect enough information to assist the potential beneficiaries with provisional 
measures that are sufficiently focused. Thus while the use of provisional measures in cases of 
mass expulsion and internal displacement may be justified normatively, in practice it does not 
seem to be immediately possible. If at all, in an international system such provisional measures 
should only be used incrementally on the basis of clearly established case law on the merits as 
well as an ongoing exchange of thoughts with the particular State in question and the alleged 
victims (Chapter XI). Nevertheless, in light of the underlying rationale and the practice of more 
than one adjudicator of actually using provisional measures in this context these situations now 
belong to the common core.  
In sum, under universal treaties provisional measures are normally reserved for the preven-
tion of irreparable harm to persons. Such provisional measures are taken in a limited set of cir-
cumstances, mainly involving claims about the right to life and the prohibition of torture and cruel 
treatment. Sometimes it concerns the cultural survival of indigenous peoples. In certain extreme 
situations the prohibition of discrimination may also trigger provisional measures, often in the 
context of mass expulsion, forced eviction and the right to family and private life or freedom of 
religion. Thus, presently the purpose of provisional measures in human rights adjudication is to 
prevent irreparable harm to persons and this relates to ensuring survival of persons and groups 
and ensuring personal integrity. This constitutes the core common to provisional measures used 
by international adjudicators in human rights cases. 
The adjudicators have also used provisional measures in other situations, which are cur-
rently situated beyond the common core. Yet it is suggested that particularly in systems not pro-
viding for them in the text of the constitutive document, provisional measures should remain 
exceptional. If the authority of human rights adjudicators to use provisional measures is not based 
on the constituent document but derived from their function (and based on the rules of proce-
dure),16 the importance of preventing irreparable harm requires that they are limited to situations 
threatening the very existence and personal integrity. 
Provisional measures should not be used to prevent human rights violations that ‘simply’ 
cause undue hardship rather than irreparable harm. This is not because this would not be possible 
conceptually, but because it risks devaluating the system, especially if used abruptly and without 
sufficient explanation and discussion. 
Still the rule that provisional measures are only to be used to prevent irreparable harm to 
persons should be applied with a certain measure of flexibility, taking into account, for instance, 
the developmental rights of children and their ensuing special right to protection. If the benefici-
ary is a young child one might indeed speak of prevention of irreparable harm to persons in some 
cases that would otherwise cause undue hardship short of irreparable harm. 
                                                 
15 See HRC General Comment 29 on states of emergency, 31 August 2001, §13, referring to Article 
7(1)(d) and 7(2)(d) of the Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
16 See further Chapter XVI (Legal status). 
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Indeed, the risk of irreparable harm may vary depending on the vulnerability of the persons 
involved. Irreparable harm to persons refers not only to harm to physical integrity, but also to 
psychological and moral integrity, as long as the adjudicator would be likely to find a violation of 
the prohibition of cruel treatment and torture when dealing with such a case on the merits.  
In any case in order for provisional measures to remain exceptional any expansion of their 
use by these adjudicators should only involve other rights essential for the very existence of per-
sons and indigenous peoples. In fact, as noted, these rights coincide with rights recognised for 
their particular fundamental nature within the treaty.  
When provisional measures presently belong to the common core the adjudicator may be 
expected to use them, whether the system is regional or international, and whether its authority to 
use them is based on an explicit treaty provision on provisional measures or not. On the other 
hand, when provisional measures do not belong to the common core adjudicators could still de-
cide to take them, so long as their aim and the protection required are not beyond the outer limits 
of the concept by dealing with situations that are easily reversible. Whether such use of provi-
sional measures is advisable would depend on the context. One relevant factor is the international, 
regional or ‘constitutional’ nature of the complaint system. Regional systems with a monitoring 
presence or at least the capacity of making country visits and organising hearings are likely to 
have a better chance to collect sufficient information and focus the provisional measures on the 
specific needs of the beneficiaries. This applies even more to the provisional measures of more 
‘constitutional’ or hybrid adjudicators, such as the Bosnia Chamber. Another relevant factor is 
whether the adjudicator was established in order to deal with a broad range of rights (HRC, 
CIDH, IACHR, EComHR, ECtHR, Bosnia Chamber) or with one issue in particular (CAT, CE-
DAW, CERD).17  
International adjudicators are generally seen as having the authority to use provisional 
measures, but not the obligation. In other words, it is a discretionary power. It could be argued, 
however, that given their function, human rights adjudicators do have the obligation to use provi-
sional measures if they consider there is a risk of irreparable harm to persons meeting the criteria 
for the common core of provisional measures involving situations in which they have been used 
in other human rights systems as well. This indeed is the approach taken by the Inter-American 
Court, which is of course able to base this explicitly on the wording of Article 63(2) (‘shall’).18 
This applies in particular if the case law on the merits is abundantly clear on the risk of ir-
reparable harm to life or personal integrity. Yet provisional measures may fall within the common 
core even without pre-existing case law on the merits on the obligation to abstain from certain 
measures or instead to take certain action. Like the ICJ (e.g. in the Nuclear Test cases),19 on occa-
sion human rights adjudicators have also used provisional measures in situations where there was 
no case law on the merits yet. Examples are a provisional measure to protect witnesses in the first 
case pending before the Inter-American Court, to halt refoulement in early cases pending before 
the European Commission, to halt corporal punishment and halt measures destroying the natural 
habitat (in a case involving indigenous culture) in cases pending before the HRC, or to halt de-
struction of embryos in a case pending before the ECtHR. If adjudicators are too cautious in this 
respect and do not use provisional measures for lack of specific precedent on the merits (or even 
                                                 
17 See also Chapter II (Systems). 
18 See e.g. IACHR Matter of Capital El Rodeo I and El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center, 
Order of 8 February 2008, 19th ‘Considering’ clause (“As is evident in the instant case, the 
irreparable nature of the extremely serious and urgent threat has to do with the right to life and 
physical integrity that the Court has the obligation to protect whenever there are circumstances 
such as the ones described in Article 63 (2)”). 
19 See Chapter I. 
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for lack of a previous provisional measure in a similar case) they take the chance that irreparable 
harm will be caused to persons. The risk of such irreparable harm is greater in cases where previ-
ous developments, such as Concluding Observations by the UN adjudicators, already indicate the 
possibility that the adjudicator will find a violation on the merits. 
3.3 Within or beyond the outer limits: preventing irreversible harm to the 
claim  
This book identified the directions the various human rights adjudicators are taking to advance the 
scope of provisional measures in their own system. In this light it explained the outer limits of the 
concept in the various systems. It identified a few situations in which provisional measures were 
taken that are beyond the outer limits of the concept (Chapter XII). It is argued that the criteria of 
immediacy (Chapter XV) and irreversibility are relevant in all systems. In some situations the use 
of provisional measures is inappropriate, as they aim to prevent harm that would mostly be re-
versible. An example would be a single action hindering the freedom of expression or the inde-
pendence of the judiciary. Yet in a climate of harassment against journalists or the judiciary, when 
single infringements add up, this could indeed result in irreversible harm to the claim. In such a 
context it could be appropriate for regional adjudicators with an explicit mandate to use provi-
sional measures to order them to prevent irreversible harm to the claim. Moreover, such a climate 
of harassment would probably involve death threats and harassment against the personal integrity 
of the intended beneficiaries as well, bringing the provisional measures within the common core 
of the concept to the extent that they aim to protect the life and personal dignity of the person 
involved, while also specifying that this person should be able to continue his or her activities (as 
a journalist, judge, witness, human rights defender, etc.). 
All human rights adjudicators may take steps to expand the use of provisional measures. 
Even an international adjudicator like the HRC, with no reference to provisional measures in its 
constituent document, may do so, but this requires particularly careful reasoning. Generally 
speaking it may be useful for all adjudicators to expand their use of provisional measures progres-
sively rather than in a sudden and unexpected manner not based on a pre-existing rationale (Chap-
ter II).  
Some provisional measures are typical to a certain region. The most particular adjudicator 
dealt with in this book, the Bosnia Human Rights Chamber, may serve as an example. The Bosnia 
Chamber was a hybrid and non-permanent body that has been rather specific in its approaches to 
provisional measures, closely adapting its practice to the exigencies of the post-war situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Chamber had to deal with the aftermath of a four year war with 
ethnic cleansing and discriminatory practices that were still pervasive after the war. It had to deal 
with only three addressees (the State of BiH and its constituent parts: the Federation of BiH and 
the Republica Srpska), all from the same geographical region. The Secretariat of the Chamber 
was based in the area concerned and the Chamber held its sessions there. Although it was a sui 
generis body rather than a constitutional court, its case law clearly is – and should be – more 
context-specific than that of an international adjudicator like the HRC. This was reflected in its 
use of provisional measures to halt forced eviction and in certain provisional measures involving 
personal integrity and religion (Chapter XII). 
Adjudicatory caution may explain why human rights adjudicators only use provisional 
measures to prevent irreparable harm to persons and generally not for other purposes. In that 
sense they take a more restrictive approach than the ICJ. Yet once a situation does involve irrepa-
rable harm to persons, the approach of the adjudicators is innovative and dynamic. 
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3.4 The protection required 
Chapter XIII discussed several issues involving protection. The first three were the type and 
specificity of the protective measures and the group of beneficiaries and addressees. The last issue 
involved the link between the protection required as part of provisional measures and the protec-
tion required on the merits (cessation, assurances of non-repetition) and as part of a judgment on 
reparation.  
The protection required in provisional measures takes various forms. They range from for-
mal to informal and from abstention to action, representing various types of positive measures. 
Not only the right to personal security but also the right to life and the prohibition of cruel treat-
ment and torture themselves imply positive obligations in order to prevent irreparable harm. In 
that light, rather than abstention alone, an element of positive action is present in most provisional 
measures as well. This should be made explicit in cases involving ongoing situations such as 
adverse detention conditions, recent disappearances and death threats (Chapters IX and XIII).  
Often provisional measures indicate the required result, such as to refrain from executing a 
death sentence or to protect persons against threats. Sometimes they are also more precise as to 
how the State should achieve this result, or at least they rule out certain activities that do not 
qualify as compliance. Thus, in the Inter-American system the provisional measures have become 
increasingly specific, partly in light of the experiences of the Commission and Court with certain 
States. In fact these measures provide insight into the ways States could or must protect persons 
under their jurisdiction against threats by paramilitary groups or other groups operating with the 
acquiescence of (certain factions of) the army, the police, or other authorities. They show, for 
instance, that protection against threats means that the State must protect the beneficiaries in the 
area in which they live and work, rather than banishing them to ‘safe areas’, claiming that this 
would absolve it from taking protective measures. Providing effective protection against death 
threats is not divorced from other human rights obligations, which means that States must assist 
internally displaced persons to return safely and allow human rights defenders or journalists to 
continue the activities that had triggered the threats in the first place. Generally speaking the 
States involved do not appear to find fault with this approach, possibly also because the provi-
sional measures concern the most basic of rights: the right to life and the prohibition of torture 
and cruel treatment. 
This specificity applies especially to regional systems. Nevertheless, similar to the practice 
in regional systems it is argued that international adjudicators should also specify their provisional 
measures, so as to provide clarity to States on what is expected of them, but they should do so 
even more gradually than the regional systems. This gradual approach is warranted exactly be-
cause of the less cohesive nature of an international as opposed to a (presumably more coherent) 
regional monitoring system and the diminished possibility in an international system of collecting 
and interpreting information. Another aspect that might play a role is the sensitivity of some 
States and the way these States would base their disagreement with certain provisional measures 
on regional doctrine, or insist on sovereignty over protection of human rights.  
In a way decisions by international human rights adjudicators combine a top-down and a 
bottom-up approach. After all, they are initiated with the individual’s (or group’s) complaint to 
the adjudicator, following exhaustion of domestic remedies. Subsequently the international adju-
dicator orders provisional measures and the individuals, groups and supporting NGOs in turn 
invoke these measures at the domestic level.  
The discussion on subsidiarity (and on the related margin of appreciation in the interpreta-
tion of treaty obligations) is more prominent in some systems than in others and plays out differ-
ently in each system. Yet especially with regard to ensuring respect for core rights specificity 
could become important in all systems and the provisional measures taken by the other human 
rights adjudicators could at least give some direction to an adjudicator regarding what the State is 
expected to do or to abstain from doing in order to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
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In order to uphold the legitimacy of provisional measures it is vital to adhere to principles of 
procedural fairness. In this regard it is important to make sure that the positions and arguments of 
both parties are duly taken into account. Yet in the face of irreparable harm to persons adjudica-
tors should not balance the rights of the intended beneficiaries with the general interest. 
In the European system the tables have sometimes been turned by addressing the alleged 
victim under the Rule on provisional measures. This book argued that, given the more vulnerable 
procedural position of the alleged victim, it is not appropriate to address an order for provisional 
measures to him or her instead of to the State, suggesting a detainee that stopping a hunger strike 
is a prerequisite for examining the case. Of course an adjudicator may call on a petitioner to stop 
his hunger strike as part of his or her duty to cooperate and may draw inferences from the failure 
to do so even after the State has complied with the adjudicator’s provisional measures to improve 
a detention situation, but this is not the same as using the tool of provisional measures vis-à-vis 
the petitioner.  
Both as to purpose and as to substance the provisional measures should be consistent with 
similar measures already taken by the same adjudicator in order to increase their credibility and 
avoid discriminatory application vis-à-vis various beneficiaries and addressees. Comparable 
situations should be treated similarly and different situations should be treated differently.  
Apart from the type (action or abstention) and specificity of provisional measures, in order 
to give full effect to the protective nature of provisional measures it must be clear who is included 
as a beneficiary and whether and how the beneficiaries have been consulted about the measures 
intended to protect them. Especially with regard to large groups of persons, such as those cases 
involving indigenous culture and in cases involving protection against death threats, the issue of 
consultation is important. Do the intended beneficiaries really want the provisional measures? In 
addition consultation is important to ensure effective implementation of the provisional measures 
in a manner that truly protects the beneficiaries.  
The Inter-American system has developed a special approach with regard to the beneficiar-
ies of provisional measures. It does not aim to protect the alleged victim exclusively. Sometimes 
it aims to protect witnesses, counsel, or others. It regularly extends the group of beneficiaries and 
often seeks to protect a large group. This book argued that the practice developed in the Inter-
American system of using provisional measures to protect the members of a defined community, 
or people working at human rights organisations, as well as all other persons visiting the prem-
ises, is appropriate. While they are not identified by name, the beneficiaries of the required pro-
tective measures are clear to the State.  
Sometimes beneficiaries may live in remote areas or be otherwise difficult to reach. In such 
cases it should not be required to have the names and addresses of each beneficiary, as long as 
there are indications that they are likely to agree with the provisional measures ordered on their 
behalf and as long as there are no (subsequent) indications of disagreement.  
The wider impact of provisional measures also deserves attention. A good faith implemen-
tation of the obligations under the human rights treaty warrants a pro-active stance of the State to 
ensure the underlying rationale to a provisional measure is achieved as well. 
States interested in supporting early warning systems could invest in this type of monitoring 
by international and regional adjudicators, especially if, like is often the case in the Inter-
American system, the provisional measures aim to protect an extended group of beneficiaries and 
concrete and effective follow-up is possible.  
The final issue discussed in Chapter XIII (Protection) was the link between the protection 
required as part of provisional measures and the protection required on the merits (cessation, 
assurances of non-repetition) and as part of a judgment on reparation. There should be such a link 
in the sense that the protection required as part of the provisional measure should never go further 
than that required as part of the decision on the merits or reparation. 
The general purpose of the provisional measure is to safeguard a final determination that 
makes sense in the light of the human rights treaty. Therefore there should be a correlation be-
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tween the measures required pending and upon conclusion of the procedure, in case a violation is 
indeed found. Without such correlation the question arises whether the object of the provisional 
measure was simply to postpone the suffering until after the expected finding. This would be an 
unsatisfactory approach to the concept of provisional measures. An obligation on the merits 
aimed at restoring the situation as much as possible or at least at preventing further degradation in 
the context of a finding of a violation of the right to life, prohibition of torture and cruel treat-
ment, the prohibition of mass expulsion and of violations of cultural and religious rights endan-
gering cultural survival would justify the type of provisional measure taken pending the proceed-
ings to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
Thus the authority to order provisional measures and the authority to order action or absten-
tion on the merits, as well as reparations, are closely related. In some cases it would be particu-
larly unacceptable to await the harm and then award pecuniary damages. Prevention (or putting a 
halt to ongoing violations) would be the only appropriate measure exactly because the harm is 
irreparable. In these cases, any form of financial compensation would be insufficient in relation to 
the harm done. The reason for using provisional measures would then be so pressing that States 
would normally feel especially embarrassed to ignore them.  
With regard to ordering a State to protect a person against threats, the aim seems to be iden-
tical in provisional measures and on the merits. The link between halting an execution pending 
the proceedings and ordering commutation or a new trial as a form of reparation as part of the 
decision on the merits is evident. If in the final determination of the case the adjudicator does not 
recommend at least the preservation of the life of the victim it seems that its provisional measures 
to prevent harm to persons serve little purpose.  
In other words, preventing harm to the claim and ensuring that adequate measures can be 
taken upon the finding of a violation are prerequisites to preventing harm to the person. This book 
argued that this would apply as well to situations in which the alleged victim and the beneficiary 
do not coincide. As noted, persons who are not the alleged victims may still receive protection as 
beneficiaries of provisional measures, for instance because they are receiving threats as witnesses 
in the case at hand. What the petitioner needs to show, for purposes of such provisional measures, 
is the threat of irreparable harm to persons and the relationship of these persons to the alleged 
victim. In order to make sure that the action or abstention required of the State remains credible, 
the petitioner also needs to show that the provisional measures would go no further than the even-
tual remedy would have, if the persons involved had been the alleged victims. Yet in order to 
obtain an eventual form of reparation as part of a judgment on the merits, persons other than the 
alleged victims obviously must institute their own proceedings. 
Both in provisional measures and on the merits the ultimate aim is to prevent irreparable 
harm to persons. The substance of the protection required is often similar as well at both stages. 
What is different is the function of the protection required: at the provisional measures stage 
reference is made to this protection in order to ensure a final outcome that makes sense in case a 
violation would be found on the merits in which it would also be determined that certain protec-
tive measures are necessary in order to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
Thus there is a continuum between the substance of provisional measures, on the one hand, 
and cessation, assurances and reparation, on the other hand. Whether pending the proceedings or 
upon a finding of a violation on the merits, States have the obligation to prevent irreparable harm 
to persons by taking measures of protection that may substantively coincide, even though the 
function of these measures differs depending on whether they are required pending the proceed-
ings or upon the finding of a violation. 
In sum, alleged victims have the right to a remedy in the sense that they should be able to 
initiate a meaningful procedure. The adjudicators may then use provisional measures pending this 
procedure in order to ensure its effectiveness. Ensuring this effectiveness means in particular that 
a meaningful outcome such as cessation and specific forms of reparation must not be made im-
possible already pending the case. At the same time provisional measures may protect beneficiar-
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ies beyond the alleged victims. In all those cases a permanent injunction would be pointless with-
out the interim injunction.  
4 THE IMPACT OF THE IRREPARABLE NATURE OF THE HARM 
4.1 Introduction 
The case law developed by the human rights adjudicators shows a convergence, rather than diver-
gence of jurisprudence on provisional measures, with regard to the purpose of preventing irrepa-
rable harm to persons and the impact of this purpose on questions involving jurisdiction and legal 
status. This could be explained by an awareness of each other’s jurisprudence, sometimes evident 
from conscious cross-referencing of jurisprudence, as was seen in the ECtHR judgment in 
Mamatkulov. Moreover, to the extent that they are not aware of each other’s jurisprudence, it 
could be explained simply by the fact that all the human rights adjudicators examined in this book 
are dealing with similar treaty provisions, for instance on the right to life and the prohibition of 
torture and cruel treatment and on the right of individual petition.  
The principle of preventing irreparable harm to persons involves protection of the very exis-
tence of persons and groups. The common core with regard to the purpose of provisional meas-
ures has various consequences. Part III showed that the serious nature of the harm risked has an 
impact on the approach of the human rights adjudicators to the requirements of prima facie ad-
missibility and jurisdiction on the merits (Chapter XIV); on the requirements of immediacy and 
real risk (Chapter XV) and on the legal status of provisional measures (Chapter XVI).  
4.2 Jurisdiction, admissibility and provisional measures 
What is the standard for assuming the competence to use provisional measures in light of the 
likelihood of jurisdiction on the merits? The rules discussed in Chapter I on traditional interna-
tional law seem to apply in human rights cases as well, but in the latter cases the adjudicator 
appears to take a more flexible approach, not requiring prima facie admissibility. Rather, only if 
the case were prima facie inadmissible an adjudicator would have no competence to use provi-
sional measures. In other words there is no need to determine admissibility and jurisdiction on the 
merits other than at very first glance.  
More than the ICJ, human rights adjudicators have confirmed the principle that there is no 
need to finally establish their jurisdiction before using provisional measures. If the State has not 
ratified the individual complaint procedure, the adjudicator clearly has no jurisdiction on the 
merits and therefore no competence to use provisional measures. Yet in other situations, for pur-
poses of provisional measures, the adjudicator is normally assumed to be competent to deal with 
the case. Generally speaking the human rights adjudicators are not reticent on this issue. The HRC 
and the Inter-American Court have used provisional measures in cases involving disputed recog-
nition of their authority. They reserved determination of a dispute on jurisdiction, e.g. on the 
significance of certain reservations, to the phase of preliminary objections or admissibility and 
meanwhile used provisional measures.  
This principle also applies, or should apply, in the context of the extraterritorial application 
of human rights treaties. Most adjudicators, including the ICJ, have recognized that States may 
have obligations under human rights treaties with regard to acts (and sometimes omissions) by 
their agents outside of the national borders. Some human rights adjudicators have also been faced 
with requests for provisional measures in this context and this may increasingly be the case in the 
future. While the case law on the merits is yet to fully crystallize, the adjudicators should not 
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shrink from using provisional measures, if otherwise warranted, simply because they might later 
declare themselves incompetent to deal with such an ‘extraterritorial’ petition. 
As to the duration of provisional measures, human rights adjudicators sometimes indicate 
that they apply until a given date, until ‘further notice’ or until a decision on admissibility has 
been made. In those cases, if there would still be urgency, they would extend the provisional 
measures just before expiry of the previous date, or upon declaring the case admissible. At other 
times they note that the provisional measures apply ‘pending the case’, meaning throughout the 
proceedings. One remarkable practice of the HRC has been to maintain its provisional measures 
upon declaring a case inadmissible. It did so in death penalty cases where the inadmissibility 
declaration related to non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and was open to review. In its deci-
sion it reminded the State, under its Rule on provisional measures, not to execute the petitioner in 
the period between exhaustion and a renewed petition to the HRC. Thus if it declares a death 
penalty case inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies, it may maintain provisional 
measures to cover the period between inadmissibility and the resubmission of the case following 
exhaustion. If the State would execute the petitioner before he would have a chance to renew his 
submission, this would in fact pre-empt the use provisional measures.20 In such cases it operates 
from the perspective that the case is still pending. This shows the importance the HRC attaches to 
the function of its provisional measures to protect against irreparable harm. It seems to have 
developed a sui generis approach to jurisdiction and admissibility for purposes of provisional 
measures, based on this protective function. If there is prima facie evidence of irreparable harm it 
would indeed be appropriate for adjudicators dealing with human rights cases to maintain their 
provisional measures in cases susceptible to review. 
The Inter-American Court has even determined that, if necessary, its provisional measures 
remain applicable beyond its judgment on reparations because it considers cases closed only once 
they are fully implemented. Therefore it regards its jurisdiction as extending until that moment.21 
Nevertheless more recently it has begun emphasizing its system on follow-up on compliance. 
This possibility has now become well-established. Thus, in cases where the risk of irreparable 
harm related to violations that had already been established by judgments of the Court (with res 
iudicata status), it does appear even more appropriate to resort to this follow- up procedure rather 
than maintaining or adopting provisional measures.22 
In general, human rights adjudicators, like other international adjudicators, consider provi-
sional measures terminated upon inadmissibility declaration or final judgment. Yet they often deal 
with extreme situations of threats to life and physical integrity. In some cases this warrants an 
approach to jurisdiction and admissibility that is slightly different from that taken by other adjudi-
cators, dealing with non-human rights cases. Even without formally maintaining or taking provi-
sional measures, if there is still a threat following final determination, the follow-up proceeding 
could specifically indicate that the case would only be closed once it has been resolved.23 At 
minimum, the adjudicator should commit actively to follow up the final decision not only through 
                                                 
20 See also the discussion in Chapter XVI (Legal status) on the case law of the HRC to the effect 
that a good faith application of the ICCPR and its Optional Protocol means that States are to halt 
executions once they are informed that a petition has been brought before the HRC, in other 
words, already before the HRC has taken provisional measures. 
21 In a similar vain, the HRC has sometimes followed up its decision on the merits, urgently 
communicating to the State, in the face of an execution date, that at the very least its findings of a 
violation meant that the death sentence should not be executed. In fact this is a follow-up to its 
final View, finding a violation of Article 14 and, therefore, Article 6 ICCPR. On the official 
responses of States and the follow-up on provisional measures see Chapters XVII and XVIII. 
22 See Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction), section 2.5 and Chapter XVIII (Follow-up), section 2.2. 
23 See also Chapter XVIII (Follow-up). 
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regular follow-up proceedings but also through emergency proceedings and press releases. Never-
theless the latter would mainly be appropriate for the Inter-American Commission or the treaty 
bodies because of their range of functions going beyond the adjudicatory function alone. In ex-
ceptional cases an adjudicator could also decide proprio motu to ask the petitioner whether she 
wishes to re-institute a case and take new provisional measures. A final option would be to ‘main-
tain’ the provisional measures formally. This last option would be feasible after an adjudicator has 
built up a considerable practice of using provisional measures aiming to protect witnesses, human 
rights defenders and others against death threats and harassment, as is the case in the Inter-
American system. Provisional measures could then become a tool to some extent operating inde-
pendently from the main proceedings. Nevertheless, if a specific tool for follow-up has been 
established, this could sometimes be more appropriate, especially, as the Inter-American Court 
has indicated, in the context of the obligation to investigate, prosecute and punish previous viola-
tions.  
Moreover it is argued that for those adjudicators that have no additional monitoring func-
tions (i.e. the various regional courts) there should always be a real claim on the merits with 
which the provisional measures are connected. Turning the concept of provisional measures into a 
summary procedure standing on its own, disconnected from any intent by the petitioner to even 
continue proceedings on the merits, would move it too far from its origins as developed by the 
ICJ and its predecessor. While for the protection of human rights a dynamic approach is war-
ranted, maintaining some continuity with the traditional concept is also important. Continuity has 
a persuasive force of its own. Thus in order to prevent irreparable harm to persons the use of 
strongly worded provisional measures, operating somewhat independently from the main case 
(jurisdiction, merits, reparation), would be warranted as long as the petitioners have brought a 
genuine claim on the merits as well. 
As noted, thus far the Inter-American system is the only system that has on occasion main-
tained provisional measures even beyond the judgments on the merits or reparations. It is also a 
system that includes a provision on provisional measures in the treaty itself. Different from sys-
tems where the authority to use provisional measures is implied, this explicit presence may justify 
such ‘free-standing’ provisional measures. A case is treated as pending so long as it has not yet 
been implemented. On the other hand, if the authority is implicit the irreparable harm to persons 
must be linked much more clearly to the case to be dealt with on the merits, either because of 
irreparable harm to the claim or because of irreparable harm to the procedure. 
With regard to general international law the argument has been made that because provi-
sional measures primarily serve the legal interests of those requesting them, ‘the principle of 
equality of parties before justice requires that the balance be restored by restraint in the practice of 
granting interim protection and by allowing the benefit of doubt to serve the respondent’.24 Obvi-
ously this argument does not apply in cases involving risk of irreparable harm to persons. In such 
cases it is clearly not necessary nor warranted, in light of the urgency concerned, to wait until 
jurisdiction and admissibility are fully determined before using provisional measures.25 Within 
the conceptual framework proposed in this book, and consonant with the practice of the HRC and 
Inter-American Court, it is suggested that if the State has withdrawn from the individual com-
plaint proceeding and different interpretations are possible about the competence (e.g. ratione 
temporis) of the adjudicator to still deal with the case, this should be examined as part of the 
decision on preliminary objections or admissibility and not already at the stage of provisional 
measures.  
                                                 
24 Sztucki (1983), pp. 258-259. 
25 As noted, in this respect Rule 94(3) of the CERD Rules of Procedure is an anomaly. 
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The ICJ itself noted in its Order in the Nuclear Test cases (1973) that it should be sufficient 
that there is no a priori lack of jurisdiction.26 Clearly in light of the principle of effective protec-
tion against irreparable harm to persons27 in human rights adjudication there should be no need to 
determine prima facie admissibility.  
As discussed, only if the case were prima facie inadmissible an adjudicator would have no 
competence to use provisional measures. In such cases it would be worthwhile if UN treaty body 
adjudicators would put in place a procedure by which their secretariats could forward to other 
appropriate UN bodies or special mechanisms urgent cases for which they have such prima facie 
lack of jurisdiction. In the alternative they could inform the petitioners about other possibilities. 
From the analysis of the wider issue of admissibility (not just involving jurisdiction on the 
merits) in cases in which provisional measures were used, it is clear that at the stage of provi-
sional measures there is no need for full evidence about admissibility either. While the case law 
does not explicitly say whether some measure of prima facie evidence for admissibility is re-
quired for the use of provisional measures, the human rights adjudicators do use provisional 
measures before they declare cases (in-)admissible. 
If the applicable remedies have no suspensive effect, exhaustion of domestic remedies is not 
necessary before granting provisional measures. In decisions on admissibility human rights adju-
dicators have made clear that domestic remedies must only be exhausted to the extent that they 
have suspensive effect. If they do not have such effect, resort is warranted to an international 
adjudicator who can also use provisional measures before determining that indeed the domestic 
remedies lack suspensive effect. After all, it is exactly in situations in which the domestic reme-
dies do not prevent irreparable harm that provisional measures are warranted. In this approach the 
international adjudicator would equally have competence to use provisional measures if the do-
mestic proceedings are theoretically capable of halting certain measures, in other words, have 
suspensive effect, but not in practice. This is not contrary to the text of the respective provisions 
on exhaustion, while it corresponds with the principle of effective protection of persons against 
irreparable harm.28  
In addition, if a complaint is submitted to more than one international adjudicator, provi-
sional measures could initially be used. In urgent cases petitioners may resort to various interna-
tional and domestic adjudicators at the same time. This does not necessarily conflict with rules on 
exhaustion of local remedies on the one hand and non-submission of the ‘same matter’ to differ-
ent international adjudicators on the other hand, as long as this is done only at the early stages of 
the proceedings, in order to prevent irreparable harm to the persons involved. Subsequently the 
petitioner should indicate which claim he maintains. Any provisional measures used by the other 
adjudicator should then be withdrawn. 
In any case, whether the authority to order provisional measures is implicit or explicit, the 
case law of the human rights adjudicators with regard to jurisdiction and admissibility clearly 
shows their awareness of the irreparable nature of the harm. 
4.3 Immediacy, risk and provisional measures 
In the practice of the human rights adjudicators there is a link as well between the importance 
attached to preventing irreparable harm to persons and the issue of imminence, immediacy or 
                                                 
26 ICJ Nuclear Tests case (New Zealand v. France), Order of 22 June 1973. 
27 See Conclusion Part II and Chapter XVI (Legal status).  
28 See Conclusion Part II on the purpose of preventing irreparable harm to persons and Chapter XVI 
on legal status. 
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temporal urgency. While conceptually a similar link would be expected between the importance 
attached to preventing irreparable harm on the one hand and assessment of risk on the other, in 
practice this does not always appear to be the case. 
For provisional measures in human rights cases the risk to be prevented generally relates to 
irreparable harm to the life or physical integrity of persons and the cultural survival of indigenous 
groups. When the alleged risk is imminent quick action is to be preferred over lengthy delibera-
tion about the existence of such risk. In cases where there is friction between lack of information 
and the risk involved, the standard of proof may have to be lowered. Given the overriding impor-
tance of protecting the very existence of people(s)29 this applies to the assessment of risk in hu-
man rights cases even more than it does to such assessment in other cases.30 Yet in practice it 
seems that the human rights adjudicators sometimes take a rather restrictive approach in their use 
of provisional measures.  
Looking at the specific situations in which provisional measures have been used in human 
rights cases it is evident that they related to future or ongoing facts. Nevertheless the level of 
evidence available may differ considerably. In some cases of ongoing harm very concrete evi-
dence is available already at the stage of provisional measures to show the risk of irreparable 
harm. In other cases, involving future harm, the adjudicators have to determine at this stage 
whether there is a ‘real risk’.  
In all these cases the factors to be taken into account in the decision on the merits coincide 
with those relevant for an assessment at the stage of provisional measures. The difference lies in 
the difficulty of proving future facts. In non-refoulement cases involving claims of a risk to life or 
physical integrity in the receiving or requesting State if someone would be removed to that State, 
the facts necessary for a risk assessment are often difficult to obtain. A combination of those facts 
is usually required for a risk assessment.  
Some examples illustrate the various situations in which petitioners have requested the use 
of provisional measures. With regard to requests for provisional measures to protect persons 
whose life is threatened, concrete evidence of recent threats and harassment could be provided. In 
the eventual decision on the merits of claims involving death threats and harassment the evidence 
that must be provided is similar, but more definitive and establishing attribution.  
A situation in which the adjudicators have to attach great importance to circumstantial evi-
dence is that of enforced disappearances.31 In this case as well the factors taken into account on 
the merits are equally important in the assessment for the use of provisional measures, again 
without having to establish at that stage attribution of the disappearance to the State. With regard 
to provisional measures, however, the adjudicator will additionally take into account the question 
whether the alleged disappearance is sufficiently recent to make the use of provisional measures 
worthwhile. 
For provisional measures to put a stop to ongoing ill-treatment or ensure access to medical 
treatment in detention concrete evidence concerning ill-treatment may be provided as well. Again 
similar criteria of what has to be proved at the merits stage must be met. In relation to requests for 
provisional measures to halt corporal punishment or the execution of a death sentence it is even 
possible to provide very concrete evidence of material risk.32  
In contrast, in expulsion or extradition cases the claims of irreparable harm are more uncer-
tain because they deal with future facts. The criterion to be met on the merits is that there is a real 
                                                 
29 See Conclusion Part II. 
30 See Chapter I (ICJ and ITLOS). 
31 See Chapter VI (Disappearances) and Chapter XV (Immediacy and risk), section 3.2. 
32 Obviously a conviction and especially an execution date may equally provide evidence of 
temporal urgency or, in other words, the imminence of the risk. 
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risk of such harm. Here the risk assessment for decision-making on provisional measures equally 
coincides with the assessment of ‘real risk’ at the merits stage. Specific factors that may be rele-
vant in this respect are the general human rights situation in the receiving State and, if available at 
the stage of provisional measures, evidence that petitioners have been ill treated in the receiving 
State, that they belong to a specific (ethnic) group that is being targeted, that they have been 
politically active (in the opposition) in the receiving State or have subsequently been vocal about 
their State of origin while in the sending State. It is argued in this respect that in these urgent 
cases, all adjudicators should be able to consult and take into account information derived from 
publicly available reports by authorities such as UN Special Rapporteurs or by reputable NGOs, 
even when the parties did not provide it. 
The foregoing means that the type of evidence necessary to show a real risk is similar at the 
merits and provisional measures stages. Thus the type of evidence required on the merits coin-
cides with that required for provisional measures.  
It is only the standard of proof that may be lower at the stage of provisional measures. The 
question arises to what extent evidence of real risk and prima facie evidence of such risk differ or, 
more generally speaking, whether and how the standard of proof on the merits could be relevant 
already in the assessment of risk of irreparable harm pending the proceedings. 
The contours of the assessment of risk for the use of provisional measures may be sketched 
in relation to the various stages of decision-making. The strictest requirements can be found 
exactly in relation to the merits. At the admissibility stage the standard of evidence to be shown 
by the petitioner is lower than at the merits stage. Among others, there must be prima facie evi-
dence of admissibility ratione materiae. On the premise that provisional measures may be used in 
advance of the admissibility declaration the level of evidence required is again lower than that 
required at the admissibility stage. In other words, the petitioner must be able to show evidence of 
risk of irreparable harm at very first sight (prima prima facie).  
Of course in all situations referred to (disappearances, threats, treatment in detention, expul-
sion) the State is in a position to cover up or withhold information. In general this warrants a 
lowering of the standard of proof required for the petitioner before the burden shifts to the State. 
Yet the question arises whether the issue of burden of proof is relevant already at the provisional 
measures stage. In this respect there is a difference between the provisional measures that are 
taken for the first time in a given case and those that are taken subsequently. Initially, when an 
adjudicator has to decide urgently on the use of provisional measures, this is often on the basis of 
an urgent evaluation of the credibility and sufficiency of the information provided by the peti-
tioner alone. Yet when the adjudicator takes a provisional measure and subsequently is called 
upon to confirm, adapt or withdraw this measure, the burden of proof does play a role similar to 
that at the merits stage. If the State provides information to the effect that the petitioner is not (or 
no longer) facing irreparable harm, the petitioner wishing a continuation of the provisional meas-
ures, must bring evidence to convince the adjudicator that such continuation is necessary despite 
the information provided by the State.  
Provisional measures show that adjudicators believe the matter to be so urgent that meas-
ures should be taken, although they have not yet been able to evaluate all the evidence and argu-
ments in relation to the main claim. The adjudicator simply tried to assess, on an urgent basis and 
when the case was pending, all the information available at that point of the risk of irreparable 
harm to the person involved.  
In my view the requirement that provisional measures must not prejudice the eventual legal 
determination is related to the assessment of risk.33 If provisional measures are taken this does not 
                                                 
33 Chapter I discussed the issue of prejudgment in the context of the provisional measures by the 
ICJ. 
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mean that a violation will eventually be found. This is so exactly because pending the case the 
adjudicator takes decisions on the basis of urgency, without being able to examine fully the evi-
dence in relation to the main claim. 
If the adjudicator did not use provisional measures, eventually it can still find a violation of, 
for instance, the right to life. If it did use provisional measures it can still declare the case inad-
missible or find no violations. With regard to the evidence, in other words, the decision on provi-
sional measures is unrelated to and does not predetermine the decision on the merits.34 What is 
important is that upon final determination the adjudicator is not led by the fact that provisional 
measures were taken pending the proceedings. After all, a full assessment of the evidence at the 
merits stage must be stricter than an assessment of risk at the provisional measures stage. The 
latter concerns a prima facie assessment only. Moreover, this assessment concerns those claims 
alone that relate to irreparable harm.35  
4.4 The legal status of provisional measures  
Chapter XVI argued that the authority of human rights adjudicators to take binding provisional 
measures is derived from the core rights singled out in the treaties, in light of the practice devel-
oped of attaching particular importance to the protection of personal integrity and (cultural) sur-
vival, read together with the right of individual petition.36 After all, the principles of effectiveness 
and of the prevention of irreparable harm have been used by the adjudicators, either explicitly or 
implicitly, when interpreting these provisions. In addition it is submitted that the prevention of 
irreparable harm is not just a principle of treaty interpretation, but has also developed into a gen-
eral principle of law, which is, as such, binding on States (Article 38 (1)(c) ICJ Statute). 
The human rights adjudicators do have in common an underlying interpretative approach, 
both with regard to their implied power to use provisional measures and as to the binding nature 
of provisional measures. In fact one can speak of an ‘acquis humanitaire’ based on the standards 
of protection that all human rights adjudicators have in common,37 which also applies to the legal 
status of provisional measures. 
The text of the human rights treaties must be interpreted in light of their context and object 
and purpose, in a dynamic manner, taking into account the need to ensure that they have effect. 
The principle of effectiveness flowing from the object and purpose indicates that the adjudicators 
instituted under these treaties must have the power to use provisional measures. As discussed, the 
ICJ’s finding in LaGrand that its provisional measures were legally binding was not made de-
pendent on the fact that basic rights of the human person were involved, but was simply part of 
the Court’s traditional function. Nevertheless the principle of effectiveness came into play. The 
power to indicate provisional measures was required by the object and purpose of Article 41 ICJ 
Statute and ‘based on the necessity, when the circumstances call for it, to safeguard, and to avoid 
prejudice to, the rights of the parties as determined by the final judgment of the Court’.38 
                                                 
34 See Chapter XIV (Jurisdiction and admissibility). 
35 This should also be reflected in the motivation of provisional measures that this book argues for, 
see e.g. Chapter II, section 8.2. 
36 See also Conclusion Part II. 
37 On the issue of convergence and divergence in general, see Chapter II, section 8.3. On the 
common core of the concept of provisional measures, see Conclusion Part II. The term ‘acquis 
humanitaire’ was also used by Simma (1995), p. 173, although not in the specific context of the 
concept of provisional measures. 
38 ICJ LaGrand (Germany v. US), Judgment of 27 June 2001, §102. 
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The ECtHR has considered that ‘in the light of the general principles of international law, 
the law of treaties and international case-law, the interpretation of the scope of interim measures 
cannot be dissociated from the proceedings to which they relate or the decision on the merits they 
seek to protect’.39 This statement about the scope of provisional measures shows that now the 
ECtHR too recognises that in the context of such measures procedural and substantive law meet. 
The emphasis on the decision on the merits that provisional measures seek to protect underscores 
the binding nature of these measures. After all, otherwise States would be allowed to cause irrepa-
rable harm to the claim on the merits, and, to the extent the provisional measures relate to claims 
involving survival and personal integrity, which is generally the case, irreparable harm to per-
sons.40 
By accepting the jurisdiction of an international (including regional) adjudicator a State has 
committed itself to an international system of adjudication. Just like a domestic system of adjudi-
cation, an international system can, in my view, only be effective if the adjudicator has the power 
to order provisional measures that are legally binding. In this respect the main difference between 
domestic and international systems of adjudication is the all-inclusive nature of the former on the 
one hand and the fact that in most international systems States initially are free to accept or reject 
compulsory jurisdiction on the other. This difference, however, loses much of its significance 
once a State has accepted the jurisdiction of an adjudicator. Even if a rule on the binding character 
of provisional measures is not included as such in a treaty text, by accepting the competence of an 
adjudicator to deal with conflicts between States or between individuals and States, the State has 
accepted the adjudicator’s judicial independence and its power to deal with these conflicts effec-
tively. The authority to use binding provisional measures is inherent to effective adjudication.  
Even if the treaty in question does not explicitly provide for the use of provisional meas-
ures, the duty to protect against threats to survival and personal integrity requires the State to take 
positive measures also pending international proceedings. If it is the international adjudicator who 
recommends such positive measures, in the form of provisional measures, respecting them is also 
required as part of the obligations entered into by the State’s recognition of the complaint proce-
dure.  
It is argued that the human rights adjudicators have been correct to stress that the effet utile 
of their decisions on the merits necessitates respect for the provisional measures indicated by 
them pending the proceedings. If decisions on the merits are not considered legally binding in all 
respects (such as certain recommendations for reparation), at least the State’s recognition of the 
substantive rights in the treaty and its recognition of the individual complaint system require a 
basic level of action and abstention on its part. The most fundamental rights in the treaty at issue 
require at least the protection of the petitioner from irreparable harm, as well as the good faith 
cooperation by the State with the relevant adjudicator.  
An action or omission causing irreparable harm to persons (involving personal integrity and 
survival) is an aggravated breach of the human rights treaty. If a State has recognized the right of 
individual complaint (or of inter-State complaint for that matter) and the adjudicator decided to 
use provisional measures to prevent such harm, ignoring these measures is an aggravated breach 
of the right of petition as well. 
While not an aggravated breach, ignoring other provisional measures, which may not (yet) 
fall within the common core, is also contrary to the obligation to cooperate with the adjudicator in 
good faith. If a State considers that the adjudicator was in error in using provisional measures it 
should still respect the measures. In most such cases the State has a different assessment of the 
risk (urgency), but it is ultimately for the human rights adjudicator to decide on this. In addition, 
                                                 
39 ECtHR Grand Chamber, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 15 December 2004, §123. 
40 See also Conclusion Part II on the relation between irreparable harm to the claim and to persons. 
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the State’s belief that the adjudicator was in error may be based on a genuine conviction that the 
risk is not irreversible, meaning that the provisional measures are situated beyond the outer limits. 
Even then the State must respect the provisional measures based on its obligations under the 
system of individual complaint. At the same time the adjudicators must take care not to go beyond 
the outer limits, also for the sake of the individual petition system. After all their provisional 
measures must be seen as worthy of compliance in the long run. 
4.5 The principle of preventing irreparable harm and taking into account 
the inequality between the parties 
The foregoing indicates that the effet utile of human rights treaties and the principle of preventing 
irreparable harm to persons not only necessitate the use of provisional measures that are legally 
binding, but these principles, as well as the due process principle of taking into account the de 
facto inequality between the parties, also influence the assessment of jurisdiction, admissibility 
and urgency at the provisional measures stage. 
The further discussion deals with the principle of preventing irreparable harm and the prin-
ciple of taking into account de facto inequality between the parties. The more adverse the impact 
of certain measures is likely to be on the well-being of people, facing a situation that would be 
intolerable, the more reason adjudicators have for the use of provisional measures pending the 
proceedings, particularly if the task of the adjudicator specifically relates to this issue or if the 
problem in question is endemic in the region involved.  
As noted in Chapter II, international human rights law may to some extent be seen as a ‘re-
gime’ or ‘a set of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures 
around which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations’.41 Indeed, 
human rights adjudicators, alleged victims, NGOs and States appear to have assumed, even if 
implicitly, the principle of effective protection to prevent irreparable harm to persons. 
In addition, when deciding on the use of provisional measures the human rights adjudicators 
have also taken into account the factual inequality between the parties. Together with their aware-
ness of the serious nature of the harm risked, this inequality has also played a role in the more 
lenient attitude of the human rights adjudicators towards the requirements of prima facie admissi-
bility and jurisdiction on the merits and of immediacy and real risk. It does not play a similar role 
in the discussion on the legal status of provisional measures because, as discussed, the authority to 
use binding provisional measures is inherent in effective adjudication in any case.  
To the extent that cases before the ICJ also involve the rights of individuals, the case law of 
the human rights adjudicators could also be relevant to it. The inequality between the parties is a 
criterion applying particularly in the context of individual complaints about human rights viola-
tions. Yet taking into account the serious nature of the harm risked to persons clearly applies in 
the inter-State context of the ICJ as well. 
Insofar as general international law is truly in the process of humanization,42 resort to inter-
national law rules that harm the effective protection of human rights is becoming increasingly less 
likely. While it is important for the human rights adjudicators, as it is for other adjudicators, to 
pursue consistency and coherence in the application of general concepts and principles of interna-
tional law, two factors must be taken into account. The first is that in any case often the most 
human rights protective interpretation applies, simply based on the text of the relevant human 
rights treaty. The second is that the interpretation of rules of general international law by human 
                                                 
41 Krasner (1983), p. 2. 
42 See also Chapter I, section 3.4. 
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rights adjudicators may be more correct, in the circumstances, than that of the ICJ or that ex-
pressed in certain general doctrine. Moreover, while human rights law as such may not (yet) be 
seen as hierarchically higher than international law regarding other values, this is different with 
regard to the law developed to prevent irreparable harm to persons. As Sands has suggested, in 
some cases the object and purpose of the human rights system would be undermined by applying 
the interpretation advanced by general international adjudicators.43 Thus, in order to safeguard the 
object and purpose of the human rights system, which is at minimum to protect persons against 
irreparable harm, in case of differences with regard to the approach of the ICJ, e.g. on the issue of 
reservations, the human rights adjudicators may have to continue to ‘diverge’ until the ICJ fol-
lows their lead.  
5 OFFICIAL STATE RESPONSES AND FOLLOW-UP BY THE ADJUDICATORS 
While the question of effectiveness is one of causality and is an empirical question that falls 
outside the scope of this conceptual research, it was considered useful to give a brief overview of 
the types of official responses by addressee States (Chapter XVII) and of the follow-up provided 
by the adjudicators and others (Chapter XVIII). 
Chapter XVII noted that States generally respect provisional measures, sometimes explicitly 
confirming their compliance. It then focused on those situations in which States have failed to 
comply. It discussed official responses by States justifying why they failed to comply with a 
provisional measure. It distinguished two categories, one where the State protested against the 
(temporary) outcome of the normative process, and another where the State protested against the 
development of the process as such. Explanations for the first category of responses may be de-
rived from the system of implementation in domestic law, specific politics, the role of media, 
domestic and international NGOs and other international actors. Explanations of non-compliance 
based on the second type, disagreement with the decision-making process of the adjudicator, may 
relate to the procedures of the adjudicator in general or to specific issues arising in the case, e.g. 
involving the principle of audiatur et altera pars or the lack of transparency in the decision-
making process. 
These official responses simply present legal arguments for a decision of non-compliance 
that in fact is likely to be based on domestic reasons of a political rather than legal nature. More-
over, the paucity of consistent information on State responses does not allow for a clear answer to 
the question whether States respond more favourably to provisional measures that aim to protect 
those rights that are commonly considered the most fundamental. 
The adjudicators are the final interpreters of what would be irreparable harm, both during 
the proceedings and in their decisions on the merits. The general authority of the supervisory 
body is obviously linked with the persuasiveness of its case law. A distinction may be made, 
however, between the authority of the body in general, and its authority in the specific target-
State. Apart from these types of authority and apart from residual doubts regarding the legal status 
of provisional measures, there are several other aspects that play a role in the attitude of States 
towards the provisional measures of the respective supervisory bodies.  
Not even national courts can work miracles and protect everyone from harm. Regional and 
international adjudicators are even less in position to be an Action Hero. If tested against Super-
man standards the provisional measures by the international adjudicators would fail miserably. 
Their intervention against irreparable harm always takes place by proxy. They order the State to 
do what it should have done already or to refrain from acting in other cases. Their powers are 
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simply those of authority and persuasion, making use of the wish of most States to perform well 
internationally and of their fear of international embarrassment. This is all the more reason for 
adjudicators to always strive to improve the persuasiveness of their decisions on provisional 
measures, among others by providing reasoning and promoting dialogue.  
As was the practice especially before the former European Commission, given the rationale 
of protecting persons against irreparable harm, where appropriate the adjudicator should also 
allow a State to anticipate a formal provisional measure and make such measure unnecessary by 
solving an urgent situation. At the same time, the follow-up of such situations as well as the fol-
low-up on actual provisional measures should ensure also that the adjudicator is aware of the 
particular circumstances of the case and immediately addresses stalling techniques and evasive 
replies. 
It may be expected that governments wishing to maintain an image of democracy would 
generally be more receptive to provisional measures indicated by human rights adjudicators than 
would more authoritarian and repressive governments, among others for fear of public opinion. 
Yet there is an exception to this receptiveness in relation to the execution of death sentences and 
decisions to expel or extradite convicted criminals or suspected terrorists. If international adjudi-
cators consider that these persons run a real risk of a irreparable harm not only to their human 
rights claim, but to their survival or personal integrity, domestic authorities are often less open to 
this assessment exactly because of public opinion.  
In such cases the fact that the provisional measures relate to life and personal integrity may 
not be decisive in and of itself (e.g. the decision not to halt an execution despite a provisional 
measure ordered by an international adjudicator may be explained by a public opinion strongly in 
favour of the death penalty). In fact in such a context a provisional measure protecting against 
irreparable harm to the claim (not involving a core right) rather than to persons may be less con-
troversial, making it easier for the State to comply. 
Chapter XVIII noted that the practice of the adjudicators, as well as that of officials from in-
tergovernmental organisations and that of NGOs, shows that follow-up on provisional measures is 
considered to be essential. In practice the follow-up by the political bodies formally assigned with 
that task within the human rights systems is insufficient or sometimes even non-existent. The 
Geneva adjudicators and the Inter-American Commission and Court have taken it upon them-
selves to monitor non-compliance with their provisional measures. They repeatedly send mes-
sages to the State concerned to the effect that the provisional measures remain in force. Such 
follow-up may often require increased specificity of these provisional measures as well.44 In 
addition the Inter-American Court has held Court hearings discussing implementation of its pro-
visional measures and has assigned the Inter-American Commission an important monitoring role 
in this respect. This Commission has paid attention to implementation of its own precautionary 
measures and of those of the Court also during country visits. The Geneva bodies have asked 
questions on the implementation of provisional measures during hearings in the context of State 
reports as well.  
In addition Chapter XVIII argued that ignoring provisional measures has consequences for 
how the complaint on the merits can be examined. Not only the right of individual petition is 
implicated when a State has ignored provisional measures, but often the right to life and the pro-
hibition of torture and cruel treatment are too. In such cases of non-compliance with provisional 
measures, on the merits the burden should shift to the State to show that these rights have not 
been violated. 
Follow-up could be one of the best tools to ensure compliance. In particular the Inter-
American Court shows a proactive approach in this respect. Any mechanisms for resort to the 
                                                 
44 See also Chapter XIII (Protection). 
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political bodies of the organisation within which the adjudicatory system has been created should 
also be employed to the full. Adjudicators that have other monitoring functions as well, such as 
the Geneva bodies and the African and Inter-American Commissions, may refer to compliance 
with their provisional measures in that context, e.g. when discussing State reports. When States 
nevertheless do not comply, the resort to publicity by NGOs or independent UN experts could be 
a useful method to help counteract this. Nevertheless it is important in this respect as well that 
each situation is assessed individually as to the anticipated impact of such publicity on the benefi-
ciaries, especially if domestic (or local) public opinion strongly disfavours the protection of the 
beneficiaries of the provisional measures.  
In the long run it may also be the strength of the external disapproval for non-compliance 
that will help determine compliance in future cases. This external disapproval, through the follow-
up by the adjudicators, as well as statements by international organisations, NGOs and other 
States, does seem to be determined, at least partially, by the irreparable nature of the harm the 
provisional measures aim to prevent, thereby reaffirming the common core of the concept as it 
currently stands. An ‘acquis humanitaire’ has now been achieved based on standards of protection 
that all human rights adjudicators have in common.  
6 AN ‘IDEAL’ PROVISIONAL MEASURE 
The use of provisional measures has helped protect persons against irreparable harm and their 
respect or disrespect has a significant impact on the integrity of the regional and international 
human rights systems. While the reasons for States to ignore provisional measures often are unre-
lated to their persuasiveness, the respect specific provisional measures command more generally 
does depend on their contents, the transparency of the decision-making procedure with regard to 
them, their purpose, the manner in which they are adapted to the situation at hand, their motiva-
tion and legal status.  
The ‘common core’ discussed in this book refers to the types of situations in which a provi-
sional measure appears to be based on a common underlying rationale and more than one human 
rights adjudicator has in fact used provisional measures in such situation. Currently the situations 
falling within the common core are those where provisional measures aim to prevent irreparable 
harm to persons. Such irreparable harm results from the violation of rights crucial to a person’s or 
a group’s basic existence or crucial to a person’s dignity. This entails ensuring survival of persons 
and groups and ensuring respect for personal integrity.  
Given their function, human rights adjudicators do have the obligation to use provisional 
measures if they consider there is a risk of irreparable harm to persons meeting the criteria for the 
common core of provisional measures. This applies in particular if the case law on the merits is 
abundantly clear on the risk of irreparable harm to life or personal integrity.  
On the other hand, in some situations the use of provisional measures is inappropriate, as 
they aim to prevent harm that would mostly be reversible. In this book such provisional measures 
are considered to be situated beyond the outer limits of the concept.  
There are also many measures that can be placed along the continuum between the common 
core and the outer limits of the concept. In order to prevent a devaluation of the human rights 
system in question, particularly in systems not referring to provisional measures in the text of 
their constitutive documents, an ‘ideal’ provisional measure is a measure that is taken in excep-
tional circumstances, preferably situated within the common core or closely gravitating towards 
that core.45 At the same time an ‘ideal’ provisional measure is sufficiently adapted to the exigen-
                                                 
45 See Chapter XII (Other situations). 
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cies of the situation at hand. Thus human rights adjudicators should have sufficient flexibility to 
be able to take steps to expand their use of provisional measures. Yet generally speaking they 
should do so progressively rather than in a sudden and unexpected manner not based on a pre-
existing rationale.  
The Inter-American system is the system this book has often referred to for best practices 
with regard to the protection of witnesses, displaced persons, indigenous culture, human rights 
defenders and peace communities. The system is innovative and, compared to the other systems, 
shows a closer awareness of the circumstances of the individual cases. Provisional measures by 
the Inter-American Court are also more persuasive than those by the other human rights systems 
because they are published and they provide reasoning. 
The practice in the Inter-American system exemplifies the continuum between preventing 
and compensating for human rights violations, as well as the importance of monitoring and fol-
low-up.  
Yet provisional measures are also context specific and what works in one system does not 
necessarily work in another. Of course the adage applies that the smaller the group, the greater the 
cohesion and the tighter the ordre public. Nevertheless, the international mechanisms of individ-
ual complaint (the Geneva supervisory bodies) and of individual accountability as well as interna-
tional rules and supervision on trade and the law of the sea demonstrate the creation of various 
types of larger public orders, often warranting increased cross-referencing and cooperation. This 
applies even more to the rules and supervisory mechanisms (including the right of individual 
complaint) established by regional organisations. Organisations such as the Council of Europe 
and the OAS have created an ordre public with regard to human rights. The participating States 
have voluntarily submitted to international supervisory mechanisms and set in motion a process 
that would be difficult to reverse. They cannot, at convenient times, ignore or withdraw from this 
supervision by insisting on their complete sovereignty without severely damaging their own 
reputation.  
For provisional measures by the UN adjudicators to serve their purpose it is also important 
– and this is specific to the Geneva context – that staff members of the High Commissioner’s 
Secretariat in Geneva maintain open and efficient lines of communication so that provisional 
measures by the treaty bodies and urgent appeals by special proceedings, such as the Special 
Rapporteurs on torture or executions, reinforce each other.  
The persuasiveness of the provisional measures depends on their legitimacy, motivation, 
publication, consistency and follow-up. They must be credible and convincing. Another relevant 
factor is their precision, showing the awareness by the adjudicator of the situation in the target 
State suggesting the necessary measures in that particular context. This awareness of the situation 
in the target State also means that the adjudicator must have sufficient flexibility.  
The effet utile of human rights treaties necessitates the use of binding provisional measures. 
These measures are authoritative if their use is coherent, credible and transparent and if they are at 
the same time closely adapted to the exigencies of the situation. All of this is warranted to ensure 
they effectively protect persons against irreparable harm. 
 

 1111 
  
  
 SAMENVATTING 
Voorlopige maatregelen in internationale rechtspraak over mensenrechten ter voorkoming van 
onherstelbare schade 
 
Deze studie onderzoekt de ontwikkeling van het juridische concept van de voorlopige maatregel 
in internationale klachtprocedures ingesteld bij mensenrechtenverdragen. Is er sprake van een 
convergentie in de benadering van de verschillende regionale en internationale rechterlijke colle-
ges op het gebied van de rechten van de mens? De praktijk van deze verschillende rechterlijke 
colleges bij het gebruik van voorlopige maatregelen is systematisch geanalyseerd met betrekking 
tot overtuigingskracht, waarbij de verschillende aspecten zijn belicht die een rol spelen in de 
discussie over het traditionele interstatelijke concept van de voorlopige maatregel. Het betreft de 
volgende aspecten van voorlopige maatregelen: de bevoegdheid tot het nemen ervan, de inhoud, 
de te beschermen personen, de rechten van de aangesproken Staten, de vraag in hoeverre de be-
voegdheid van het Hof om de zaak ten gronde te behandelen een rol speelt; de beoordeling van 
het bewijs van risico als zodanig en van de vraag hoe onmiddellijk de dreiging is, de juridische 
status en de follow-up op de reacties van Staten.  
De studie presenteert een conceptueel kader dat laat zien dat er inderdaad sprake is van een 
convergerende trend die de overtuigingskracht van voorlopige maatregelen kan vergroten. Hierbij 
is zowel de gemeenschappelijkheid van de onderliggende reden voor het gebruik ervan van be-
lang, als het feit dat twee of meer juridische colleges daadwerkelijk in die situatie een voorlopige 
maatregel hebben gebruikt. Daarnaast spelen criteria als transparantie in de besluitvorming ook 
een rol bij de overtuigingskracht ten aanzien van Staten. Omdat voorlopige maatregelen inderdaad 
effectieve bescherming moeten kunnen bieden is het ook van belang dat zij qua inhoud zijn afge-
stemd op de concrete situatie en dat de te beschermen personen hierover worden geconsulteerd. 
DEEL I  
DE CONTEXT WAARBINNEN HET CONCEPT ‘VOORLOPIGE MAATREGEL’ ZICH 
ONTWIKKELT 
Hoofdstuk I gaat in op het traditionele concept ‘voorlopige maatregelen’ zoals ontwikkeld door 
het Internationaal Gerechtshof. Daarnaast refereert het aan de praktijk van zijn voorganger, het 
Permanente Hof van International Justitie en aan de praktijk van het Zeerechttribunaal.  
De focus van het hoofdstuk ligt op de humanisering van het concept, die ook al bij het In-
ternationaal Gerechtshof kan worden waargenomen. Dit Hof, dat uitsluitend klachten behandelt 
van de ene Staat tegen de andere, houdt namelijk rekening met het lot van mensen die verstrikt 
zijn geraakt in conflicten tussen Staten. Dit blijkt niet alleen uit zijn voorlopige maatregelen in de 
context van klachten van de ene Staat over schending van mensenrechtenverplichtingen door de 
andere, maar ook uit voorlopige maatregelen die het Hof nam in de context van het Weense Ver-
drag inzake Consulaire Bescherming en in de context van bepaalde grensconflicten. In dit kader 
heeft het soms een voorlopige maatregel genomen die overeenkwam met de klacht ten gronde, of 
formuleerde het juist andere maatregelen dan gevraagd door de Partij(en). 
Van oudsher is het doel van voorlopige maatregelen om rechten te beschermen die op het 
punt staan om te worden geschonden, terwijl dit onherstelbare schade aan de geclaimde rechten 
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zou kunnen opleveren. Eventueel kunnen voorlopige maatregelen ook als doel hebben om te 
verzekeren dat de procedure als zodanig goed verloopt. In ieder geval moeten zij dus een zinnige 
einduitspraak kunnen waarborgen. Een zeker verband tussen een verzoek van een Staat om voor-
lopige maatregelen en de rechten die ten gronde worden ingeroepen ligt dan voor de hand. Als het 
gaat om serieuze situaties waar het lot van personen (en niet alleen andere belangen van Staten) in 
het geding is, stelt het Hof zich niet rigide op. Dit is zelfs zo als de klacht en het verzoek om 
voorlopige maatregelen elkaar grotendeels overlappen. Dit blijkt bijvoorbeeld uit de voorlopige 
maatregelen in de Hostages case en in de Nuclear Test cases. Bij een dergelijke overlap in klacht 
en verzoek tot voorlopige maatregelen zonder dat het lot van personen in het geding is, zou het 
Hof waarschijnlijk het verzoek afwijzen als een verkapt verzoek om een tussenvonnis.  
Aan de andere kant houdt het Hof om dezelfde reden, namelijk bescherming van personen, 
ook niet strikt vast aan de eis dat er een duidelijk verband moet zijn met de hoofdklacht, hoewel 
het dus ook geen verhuld verzoek om een tussenvonnis mag zijn. In grensconflicten heeft het Hof 
eveneens voorlopige maatregelen genomen die vooral gericht waren op bescherming van de 
grensbewoners tegen geweld van beide partijen en daarnaast op het waarborgen van bewijsmate-
riaal. Juist ter bescherming van personen is het Hof inventief in het herformuleren van door een 
Partij verzochte voorlopige maatregelen. Het Hof zou zelfs ambtshalve (proprio motu) dergelijke 
voorlopige maatregelen kunnen nemen wanneer de argumenten van de partijen daar maar enigs-
zins aanleiding toe geven.  
Hoewel het Internationaal Gerechtshof eventuele procedurele strategieën van Staten (bij-
voorbeeld om stukken erg laat in te dienen) niet wenst te belonen, heeft het hierop een uitzonde-
ring gemaakt toen de indiener (Duitsland) zo’n strategie had gevolgd terwijl het leven van de de 
facto te beschermen persoon (LaGrand) op het spel stond. Het Hof nam een voorlopige maatregel 
om zijn executie op te schorten zonder eerst een hoorzitting te houden en de argumenten van 
beide partijen te horen, zoals bij het Hof anders wel gebruikelijk is. Ook dit illustreert een zekere 
humanisering in de benadering van het Hof. 
Het Hof kan zelf bij zijn gebruik van voorlopige maatregelen eveneens kijken naar de prak-
tijk van de toezichthoudende instanties bij mensenrechtenverdragen. Het heeft in een andere 
context ook naar de interpretaties verwezen van die instanties. De notie ‘judicial decisions’ in 
artikel 38(1) (d) van het Statuut van het Internationaal Gerechtshof verwijst ten slotte niet alleen 
naar uitspraken van het Internationaal Gerechtshof als hulpmiddel voor het bepalen van rechtsre-
gels maar naar ‘judicial decisons’ in het algemeen.  
Hoofdstuk II belicht voorlopige maatregelen in de context van de verschillende onderzochte 
mensenrechtensystemen waarbinnen personen klachten kunnen indienen: drie toezichthoudende 
comités bij VN-verdragen (het Mensenrechtencomité, het Comité tegen foltering en het Comité 
tegen discriminatie van vrouwen), drie regionale Commissies en Hoven (in het Inter-
Amerikaanse, het Europese en het Afrikaanse systeem) en een sui generis instantie (de Bosnia 
Chamber). Bij sommige van deze instanties staat de bevoegdheid voorlopige maatregelen te 
nemen letterlijk vermeld in het betreffende verdrag zelf, bij andere is dit niet het geval. Het gaat 
echter om een impliciete bevoegdheid die voortvloeit uit het feit dat deze instanties de functie 
hebben individuele klachten juridisch te beoordelen. Zij moeten de verplichtingen van een Staat 
bepalen, op basis van een juridische procedure, bij een juridisch conflict met een of meerdere 
personen. Het beginsel van effectieve mensenrechtenbescherming veronderstelt dat deze instan-
ties ten minste onherstelbare schade moeten kunnen voorkomen, ook proprio motu. Bovendien is 
het bij instanties die slechts enkele malen per jaar bijeenkomen van belang dat de bevoegdheid tot 
het nemen van voorlopige maatregelen wordt gedelegeerd naar een van de leden.  
Het hoofdstuk bespreekt het gebrek aan publicatie en motivatie van voorlopige maatregelen 
in de meeste systemen en betoogt dat het vergroten van de toegankelijkheid van informatie over 
voorlopige maatregelen en hun motivatie noodzakelijk is om de overtuigingskracht van deze 
maatregelen te vergroten. Dit maakt het ook mogelijk effectief naar deze maatregelen te verwijzen 
in vergelijkbare zaken voor de nationale rechter. 
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De mensenrechtensystemen zijn zeer divers. Dit leidt tot een verscheidenheid aan situaties 
waarin slechts één rechterlijk college voorlopige maatregelen heeft genomen (bijvoorbeeld de 
Bosnia Chamber om gedwongen uithuiszettingen op te schorten). Maar ook dit blijkt niet te zijn 
gebaseerd op een divergentie in de onderliggende benadering van het concept. Uit deel II blijkt 
dat er duidelijk meer sprake is van convergentie dan van divergentie. Dit heeft te maken met het 
doel van voorlopige maatregelen. 
DEEL II  
HET DOEL VAN DE INGESTELDE VOORLOPIGE MAATREGELEN 
Dit deel presenteert een conceptueel kader met een gemeenschappelijke kern, een uiterste grens 
en de bandbreedte daartussen. Het gaat hierbij om een zich ontwikkelend concept, waardoor de 
gemeenschappelijke kern en de bandbreedte in de loop van de tijd kunnen veranderen. In de kern 
betreft het die situaties ter bescherming van rechten die in de verschillende systemen in eind-
uitspraken zijn geselecteerd als van uitzonderlijk belang en waarbij in twee of meer systemen ook 
daadwerkelijk voorlopige maatregelen zijn genomen. Hierbij wordt dus zowel normatief-
inhoudelijk als feitelijk getoetst. Het onderzoek stelt dat de uiterste grens van het concept ‘voor-
lopige maatregel’ wordt overschreden als deze maatregel wordt genomen in situaties die niet 
onomkeerbaar zijn. Een voorbeeld is een maatregel in de vorm van een opdracht aan de Staat om 
tijdens de procedure de klager geen boetes op te leggen. In dergelijke situaties die buiten de gren-
zen van het concept vallen is het gebruik van voorlopige maatregelen ongepast omdat dit de 
algemene overtuigingskracht van het middel kan aantasten bij de effectieve bescherming tegen 
ernstige schendingen.  
Er zijn ook mensenrechtensituaties die niet binnen de gemeenschappelijke kern vallen maar 
wel binnen de uiterste grenzen blijven omdat de voorlopige maatregelen wel degelijk beogen iets 
onomkeerbaars te voorkomen. Deze voorlopige maatregelen liggen op verschillende punten op de 
bandbreedte tussen de uiterste grens en de gemeenschappelijke kern. Hoe meer het, in de situatie 
waarin in eén van de systemen een voorlopige maatregel is genomen, rechten betreft die in de 
verschillende systemen zijn geselecteerd om hun uitzonderlijk belang, hoe dichter bij de gemeen-
schappelijke kern zo’n maatregel kan worden gesitueerd.  
Momenteel wordt in alle systemen de facto het criterium gehanteerd dat de voorlopige 
maatregel ‘onherstelbare schade’ moet voorkomen. Het kan hierbij gaan om schade aan de eis of 
de procedure. In het conceptueel kader gaat het dan simpelweg om het voorkomen van onom-
keerbare situaties. Daarnaast worden voorlopige maatregelen genomen met als doel werkelijk 
onherstelbare schade aan personen te voorkomen. Onherstelbaar wordt in dit kader gezien als een 
overtreffende trap van onomkeerbaar. Het gaat namelijk om de onmogelijkheid van rechtsherstel. 
Het gaat om onomkeerbare situaties die hoe dan ook moeten worden voorkomen omdat zij 
ondraaglijk zijn. Het door de Staat in het vooruitzicht stellen van herstel achteraf (met een geld-
bedrag) is simpelweg onbehoorlijk.  
In de praktijk gaat het bij het voorkomen van onherstelbare schade om bescherming van de 
rechten die in alle systemen zijn geselecteerd om hun grote belang. Wanneer een voorlopige 
maatregel de bescherming van eén van deze rechten betreft en wanneer in twee of meer systemen 
in een dergelijke situatie zo’n maatregel is genomen, spreekt dit boek dus over een gemeenschap-
pelijke kern. Hiervan is op dit moment sprake bij het opschorten van uitvoering van de doodstraf 
en lijfstraffen en van uitlevering en uitzetting in de context van non-refoulement; bij het ingrijpen 
in detentieomstandigheden en ter bescherming van verdwenen of bedreigde personen. Daarnaast 
is de gemeenschappelijke kern uitgebreid met het recht op toegang tot rechtsbijstand en rechter 
wanneer het recht op leven en het respect voor de persoonlijke integriteit in het geding zijn; met 
het waarborgen van het voortbestaan van inheemse culturen en bescherming van religieuze rech-
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ten van minderheden (in Bosnië als post-conflict gebied); en in specifieke situaties van diepge-
wortelde discriminatie ook met de bescherming tegen willekeurige (massale) uitzettingen en 
gedwongen uithuiszettingen.  
Hoofdstukken III tot en met XI bespreken deze situaties, waarbij wordt gekeken of er inder-
daad een verband is tussen de inhoud van de voorlopige maatregel genomen tijdens de procedure 
en de inhoud van de einduitspraak. Oordeelt het rechterlijke college in dergelijke gevallen meestal 
dat er inderdaad sprake is van een schending en is de Staat volgens de einduitspraak ook verplicht 
om iets te doen of na te laten om een dergelijke schending te voorkomen of stop te zetten? Er is 
bijvoorbeeld geen overtuigend verband tussen de voorlopige maatregel die tijdens de procedure 
wordt genomen ter opschorting van een executie en de klacht dat het verblijf in een dodencel in 
strijd is met het verbod op wrede behandeling indien het rechterlijk college in zijn einduitspraak 
nooit concludeert dat een dergelijk verblijf in strijd is met dit verbod. Er is ook geen overtuigend 
verband tussen een voorlopige maatregel en de claim ten gronde als het rechterlijk college welis-
waar concludeert dat er een schending heeft plaatsgevonden (bijvoorbeeld van het verbod op 
wrede behandeling), maar daaraan niet de conclusie verbindt dat omzetting van de doodstraf naar 
een gevangenisstraf onderdeel moet zijn van het rechtsherstel waarop het slachtoffer recht heeft. 
Zonder een dergelijk verband kan er geen sprake zijn van het voorkomen van onomkeerbare 
schade aan de eis. Dan is het gebruik van voorlopige maatregelen ongepast omdat ten gronde de 
Staat dan nooit verplicht kan worden iets te doen of na te laten wat de voorlopige maatregelen 
eerder wel vorderden. De klager wordt dan bijvoorbeeld alsnog geëxecuteerd. 
Hoofdstuk XII bespreekt atypische situaties waarin maar in één systeem voorlopige maatre-
gelen zijn genomen en bespreekt waar op de bandbreedte deze kunnen worden geplaatst en of het 
gebruik van voorlopige maatregelen in sommige situaties niet buiten de uiterste grens van het 
concept valt. Hoofdstuk XIII gaat in op de inhoud van de voorlopige maatregelen. De Staat moet 
vaak niet alleen iets nalaten, maar heeft ook de positieve verplichting om iets te doen. Het Inter-
Amerikaanse Hof en, meer nog, de Inter-Amerikaanse Commissie zijn hierbij het meest specifiek 
in de aanwijzingen aan de Staat over de vereiste bescherming. Het hoofdstuk stelt onder meer dat 
het subsidiariteitsbeginsel niet in de weg hoeft te staan aan het besluit van een internationaal 
rechterlijk college om verplichtingen van Staten in het kader van voorlopige maatregelen nader te 
concretiseren. Dit geldt ook voor het Europese Hof. In sommige gevallen is nader concretiseren 
noodzakelijk om de gewenste bescherming te bereiken. Bij voorlopige maatregelen om het voort-
bestaan van inheemse culturen te waarborgen is het van belang dat de woordvoerder de groep in 
kwestie inderdaad vertegenwoordigt. Bij doodsbedreigingen kan het nodig zijn de lijst van te 
beschermen personen in vervolg-maatregelen uit te breiden naar familieleden, collega’s en derge-
lijke. Terecht heeft het Inter-Amerikaanse Hof bepaald dat het niet altijd nodig is alle te bescher-
men personen met naam en toenaam te noemen. Soms is het niet mogelijk de namen van iedereen 
te achterhalen. De te beschermen personen willen bijvoorbeeld inderdaad wel beschermd worden, 
maar zijn bang om hun naam vrij te geven. Het is dan toch mogelijk voorlopige maatregelen te 
nemen om hen te beschermen. Het moet voor de Staat alleen duidelijk zijn dat iemand tot de 
bedreigde groep behoort, zoals een specifieke ‘Peace Community’, of iedereen die het gebouw 
van een plaatselijke mensenrechtenorganisatie bezoekt. Van groot belang is wel dat als de te 
beschermen personen bij naam worden genoemd, zij hiermee instemmen, dat alle te beschermen 
personen inderdaad beschermd willen worden en dat zij vervolgens ook worden geraadpleegd bij 
de implementatie van de genomen voorlopige maatregel. 
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DEEL III  
IMPACT VAN DE ONHERSTELBARE AARD VAN DE TE VOORKOMEN SCHADE 
Dit deel betreft de impact van de onherstelbare aard van de te voorkomen schade op de benade-
ring door de rechterlijke colleges van onderwerpen zoals de ontvankelijkheid en bevoegdheid om 
de zaak ten gronde te beoordelen; het vereiste bewijs van risico, de onmiddellijkheid van dit risico 
en de juridische status van voorlopige maatregelen.  
Het blijkt dat zij bij de besluitvorming over het al dan niet nemen van voorlopige maatrege-
len een minder strikte benadering hebben van zowel onmiddellijkheid van het risico als ontvanke-
lijkheid en bevoegdheid ten gronde. Dit komt door het beginsel van effectieve bescherming tegen 
onherstelbare schade aan personen, en het beginsel dat rekening moet worden gehouden met de 
feitelijke ongelijkheid tussen de beoogde te beschermen persoon aan de ene kant en de Staat aan 
de andere. Voor het nemen van voorlopige maatregelen is het alleen nodig dat de niet-
ontvankelijkheid van een zaak niet prima facie (op het eerste gezicht) duidelijk is en dat bevoegd-
heid ten gronde niet a priori ontbreekt. Een Staat heeft bijvoorbeeld een voorbehoud gemaakt, 
waardoor deze Staat de bevoegdheid van het rechterlijk college betwist om een zaak ten gronde te 
beoordelen. Maar er bestaat discussie over de rechtmatigheid van dit voorbehoud. In dergelijke 
gevallen is het wel degelijk gepast een voorlopige maatregel eerder in de procedure te nemen, 
voordat de besluitvorming over rechtsmacht plaatsvindt. 
Voor ontvankelijkheid ratione materiae kijken de meeste rechterlijke colleges naar de vraag 
of er prima facie bewijs is van een reëel risico. Omdat de vraag naar het al dan niet instellen van 
voorlopige maatregelen nog vóór de besluitvorming over ontvankelijkheid aan de orde komt, zou 
daar het criterium van prima prima facie (op het allereerste gezicht) bewijs moeten gelden. Het 
beginsel van effectieve bescherming tegen onherstelbare schade aan personen, en het beginsel dat 
rekening moet worden gehouden met de feitelijke ongelijkheid tussen de partijen, hebben er 
echter in de context van uitlevering- en uitzettingszaken voor het EHRM niet toe geleid dat het 
vereiste bewijs van ‘reëel risico’ echt minder streng wordt beoordeeld. Het beginsel van effectie-
ve bescherming tegen onherstelbare schade aan personen geeft wel voor alle internationale  
rechterlijke colleges de genomen voorlopige maatregelen noodzakelijkerwijs een verplichtend 
karakter, ook wanneer de bevoegdheid om voorlopige maatregelen te nemen niet expliciet in het 
verdrag is opgenomen.  
DEEL IV  
DE REACTIES VAN STATEN OP VOORLOPIGE MAATREGELEN EN DE REACTIES 
VAN ORGANISATIES EN DE RECHTERLIJKE COLLEGES ZELF OP GEVALLEN VAN 
NIET-NALEVING 
De effectiviteitvraag is een empirische vraag die buiten de reikwijdte valt van dit conceptuele 
onderzoek. Wel is er in deel IV voor gekozen een kort overzicht te geven van de verschillende 
soorten officiële reacties van Staten op de voorlopige maatregelen van de verschillende rechterlij-
ke colleges (hoofdstuk XVII). Normaal gesproken respecteren Staten de aan hen opgelegde voor-
lopige maatregelen. Er zijn echter ook notoire gevallen van niet-naleving. In hun officiële reactie 
proberen Staten dit te rechtvaardigen met inhoudelijke argumenten of door middel van protest 
tegen de manier waarop de besluitvorming heeft plaatsgevonden. De echte redenen voor niet-
naleving hoeven echter niet overeen te komen met de officiële rechtvaardiging zoals gericht aan 
het internationale rechterlijk college.  
Hoofdstuk XVIII betreft het toezicht op de naleving, waarbij verschillende rechterlijke col-
leges zichzelf een taak hebben toebedeeld, vaak bij gebrek aan toezicht door de politieke instan-
ties die daarin officieel een taak hebben. Dit eigen toezicht kan verschillende vormen aannemen, 
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van het sturen van herinneringen aan de betreffende Staat tot het nemen van steeds specifiekere 
vervolgmaatregelen gericht aan die Staat. Niet-naleving, bijvoorbeeld door iemand uit te zetten in 
strijd met een voorlopige maatregel, heeft ook consequenties voor de beoordeling van de klacht 
ten gronde. Naast een specifieke inbreuk op het effectief klachtrecht kunnen hierdoor ook het 
recht op leven en het verbod van foltering en wrede behandeling geschonden worden. Dit boek 
betoogt dat wanneer een Staat voorlopige maatregelen heeft genegeerd de bewijslast moet over-
gaan naar die Staat die dan overtuigend moet aantonen dat deze rechten toch niet zijn geschonden. 
Dit is dan ook een vorm van ‘follow-up’. Het hoofdstuk constateert verder dat ook andere officië-
le instanties (bijvoorbeeld binnen de VN) en mensenrechtenorganisaties op hun manier ‘toezien’ 
op de naleving van voorlopige maatregelen. Ook dit toezicht, door de rechterlijke colleges zelf, 
door andere officiële instanties en door mensenrechtenorganisaties is gebaseerd op het beginsel 
van effectieve bescherming tegen onherstelbare schade aan personen. 
CONCLUSIE 
De meest overtuigende voorlopige maatregelen van internationale rechterlijke colleges zijn die 
welke ingrijpen in mensenrechten situaties die anders niet alleen onomkeerbaar maar ook onher-
stelbaar zouden zijn en die een onderliggende redenering en praktijk gemeen hebben met voorlo-
pige maatregelen genomen door andere internationale rechterlijke colleges. Momenteel is die 
gemeenschappelijke onderliggende redenering de bescherming van het leven en de persoonlijke 
integriteit. Wanneer in de praktijk twee of meer internationaal rechterlijke colleges ook daadwer-
kelijk voorlopige maatregelen hebben genomen in situaties op basis van een dergelijke onderlig-
gende redenering is er sprake van een gemeenschappelijke kern van het concept. 
In de specifieke context van het rechterlijk college in kwestie kan het gebruik van voorlopi-
ge maatregelen ook gepast zijn wanneer de situatie niet binnen de gemeenschappelijke kern valt, 
zolang het gebruik van de voorlopige maatregel wel binnen de grenzen van het concept blijft. 
Voorlopige maatregelen die ingrijpen in mensenrechtensituaties die niet onomkeerbaar zijn vallen 
buiten de grenzen van het concept. Het gebruik van zulke voorlopige maatregelen speelt Staten 
die voorlopige maatregelen in andere gevallen naast zich neerleggen in de kaart omdat het aanzien 
van het middel hiermee wordt geschaad. Maar het zijn niet alleen de ernst van de situatie waarin 
wordt ingegrepen en een gemeenschappelijke redenering en praktijk van meerdere instanties die 
voorlopige maatregelen overtuigend maken. De voorlopige maatregelen van het Inter-
Amerikaanse Hof zijn overtuigender dan die van het EHRM, Afrikaanse Commissie, de Comités 
in Geneve en de Bosnia Chamber simpelweg omdat zij apart worden gepubliceerd en gemotiveerd 
en bovendien meer zijn toegespitst op de specifieke situatie dan de voorlopige maatregelen inge-
steld door de andere rechterlijke colleges.  
Het feit dat de meeste voorlopige maatregelen genomen in de verschillende systemen bin-
nen de gemeenschappelijke kern vallen, vergroot de overtuigingskracht van het concept ‘voorlo-
pige maatregel’ als zodanig. Zij worden genomen om onherstelbare schade aan personen te voor-
komen. 
 1117 
  
  
 BIBLIOGRAPHY1 
A 
Abi-Saab, G., ‘Fragmentation or Unification: Some Concluding Remarks’, in Symposium Issue: 
‘The Proliferation of International Tribunals: Piecing Together the Puzzle’, 31(4) NYU J. Int’l 
L. Pol. 679 (1999), pp. 919-933 
Aceves, W.J., ‘Annotation of ICJ Order and US Supreme Court Breard v. Green’, 92 American 
Journal of International Law 517 (1998), pp. 517-523 
Aceves, W.J., ‘Avena and other Mexican Nationals’, 97 American Journal of International Law 
923 (2003), pp. 923-929 
Aceves, W.J., ‘Consular Notification and the Death Penalty: the ICJ’s Judgment in Avena’, ASIL 
Insight, April 2004 
Ascencsio, H., ‘La responsabilité selon la Cour Internationale de Justice dans l’affaire du géno-
cide Bosniaque’, 2 RGDIP 285 (2007), pp. 285-302 
Addo, M., ‘Interim Measures of Protection for Rights under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations’, 10(4) European Journal of International Law 713 (1999), pp. 713-732 
‘Agora: Breard’ with contributions by J. Charney, W. Reisman, C. Bradley, J. Goldsmith, L. 
Henkin, C. Vázquez, J. Paust, L. Fisler Damrosch, F. Kirgis, A-M Slaughter, 92 American 
Journal of International Law 666 (1998), pp. 666-712 
Aguiar, A., ‘Apuntes sobre las medidas cautelares en la Convención Americana sobre Derechos 
Humanos’, in: R. Nieto (ed.), La Corte y el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
Corte IDH, San José 1994 
Ajibola B.A., ‘Compliance with Judgments of the International Court of Justice’, in: M.K.  
Bulterman, M. Kuijer (eds.), Compliance with Judgments of International Courts, Proceed-
ings of the symposium organized in honour of Professor Henry G. Schermers by Mordenate 
College and the Department of International Public Law of Leiden University, The Hague, 
Boston, London 1996, pp. 7-38 
Alefsen, H., ‘The Council of Europe and Enforcement of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzego-
vina’, in: W. Benedek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: from 
Theory to Practice, Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 149-154 
Alfredsson, G., J. Grimheden, B.G. Ramcharan, A. de Zayas (eds.), International Human Rights 
Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 
The Hague [etc.] 2001 
Alleweldt, R., ‘Protection against Expulsion under Article 3 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, 4 European Journal of International Law 360 (1993), pp. 360-376 
                                                 
1 Different from the manner customary in Dutch literature,  names such as ‘Van Boven’ can be 
found under ‘V’ rather than ‘B’. This applies similarly to surnames starting with ‘De’ or ‘Van 
der’. 
 Bibliography 
1118 
Alleweldt, R., Schutz vor Abschiebung bei drohender Folter oder unmenschlicher oder erniedri-
gender Behandlung oder Strafe: Refoulement-Verbote im Völkerrecht und im deutschen Recht 
unter besonderer Berücksichtigung von Artikel 3 der Europäischen Menschenrechtskonven-
tion und Artikel 1 des Grundgesetzes, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 1996 
Alston, P. (ed.), Peoples’ Rights, Oxford University Press, Academy of European Law, European 
University Institute 2001 
Alston, P., Crawford, J., The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty Monitoring, Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge 2000 
Amann, D.M., ‘Guantánamo Bay’, 42 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 263 (2004) pp. 
263-348 
Amerasinghe, C.F., ‘The Bosnia Genocide case’, 21 Leiden Journal of International Law 411 
(2008), pp. 411-428 
Amnesty International, Angel Francisco Breard: Facing Death in a Foreign Land, March 1998, 
AI-Index: AMR 51/14/98 
Amnesty International, The Execution of Angel Breard: Apologies are not enough, 1 May 1998 
Amnesty International, Using the International Human Rights System to Combat Racial Dis-
crimination, A Handbook, 2001, AI-Index: IOR 80/001/2001 
Amnesty International, ‘A time for Action, Protecting Consular Rights of Foreign Nationals 
Facing the Death Penalty’, August 2001, AI-Index: AMR 51/106/2001 
Amnesty International, ‘Rights at Risk, Amnesty International’s Concerns Regarding Security 
Legislation and Law Enforcement Measures’, January 2002, AI-Index: ACT 30/001/2002 
Amnesty International, ‘Time is Wasting: Respect for the Land Rights of the Lubicon Cree long 
Overdue’, April 2003, AI-Index: AMR 20/001/2003 
Amnesty International, Niemandsland, Opvang van Vluchtelingen in de Regio, Amnesty Interna-
tional, Amsterdam, 2003 
Amnesty International, ‘Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unlawful Detention of Six Men from Bosnia-
Herzegovina in Guantánamo Bay’, 30 May 2003, AI-Index Eur 63/013/2003  
Amnesty International, ‘USA, Human Dignity Denied, Torture and Accountability in the “War on 
Terror”’, 27 October 2004, AI-Index: AMR 51/145/2004 
Amnesty International, ‘USA, Guantánamo: Trusting the Executive, Prolonging the Injustice’, 26 
January 2005, AI-Index: AMR 51/030/2005 
Amnesty International, ‘USA, Guantánamo and beyond: The Continuing Pursuit of Unchecked 
Executive Power’, 13 May 2005, AI-Index: AMR 51/063/2005 
Amnesty International, Secret detention in CIA ‘Black Sites’, 8 November 2005, AI-Index: AMR 
51/177/2005 
Amnesty International, USA: Torture and secret detention testimony of the ‘disappeared’ in the 
‘war on terror’, 4 August 2005, AI-Index: AMR 51/108/2005 
Amnesty International, Below the radar: secret flights to torture and disappearance, 5 April 
2006, AI-Index: AMR 51/051/2006 
Amnesty International, Partners in crime: Europe’s role in US renditions, 14 June 2006, AI-
Index: EUR 01/008/2006 
Amnesty International, ‘USA, Justice at last or more of the same? Detentions and Trials after 
Hamdan v. Rumsfeld’, 18 September 2006, AI-Index: AMR 51/146/2006 
Anaya, J.A., S. Wiessner, ‘The UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous peoples: towards Re-
empowerment’, in: JURIST-Forum, Legal News and Research, University of Pittsburgh 
School of Law, 3 October 2007, at: <http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2007/10/un-declaration-
on-rights-of-indigenous.php> 
Anaya, S.J., Indigenous Peoples in International Law, Oxford University Press, New York 1996 
Anaya, S.J., C. Grossman, ‘The Case of Awas Tingni v. Nicaragua, a New Step in the Interna-
tional Law of Indigenous Peoples’, 19(1) Arizona Journal of international and Comparative 
Law 1 (2002), pp. 1-15 
 Bibliography 
1119 
Anaya, S.J., R.A. Williams, ‘The Protection of Indigenous Peoples’ Rights over Lands and Natu-
ral Resources Under the Inter-American Human Rights System’, 14 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 33 (2001), pp. 33-86 
Anaya Valencia, R., C. Jackson, L. van de Putte, R. Ellis, ‘Avena and the World Court’s Death 
Penalty Jurisdiction in Texas: Addressing the Odd Notion of Texas’s Independence from the 
World’, 23 Yale Law & Policy Review 455 (2005), pp. 455-507 
Andreu-Guzman, F., ‘The Draft International Convention on the Protection of All Persons from 
Forced Disappearance’, 62-63 ICJ Review 73 (2001), pp. 73-106 
Ankumah, E.A., The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights: Practices and Proce-
dures, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1996 
Antoine, R.M.B, ‘The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council – an Inadequate Remedy for 
Death Row Prisoners’, 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 179 (1992), pp. 179-
190 
Aolain, F. Ni, ‘The Emergence of Diversity: Differences in Human Rights Jurisprudence’, 19 
Fordham International Law Journal 57 (1995), pp. 101-142 
Aolain, F. Ni, ‘The Evolving Jurisprudence of the European Convention on Human Rights Con-
cerning the Right to Life’, 19(1) NQHR 21 (2001), pp. 21-42  
d’Argent, P., ‘Le droit à un recours et à réparation des victimes de violations flagrantes du droit 
international des droits de l’homme et de violations graves du droit international humanitaire’, 
Annuaire Français de Droit International 2005, pp. 27-56 
Ashworth, A., Human Rights, Serious Crime and Criminal Procedure, Sweet & Maxwell, Lon-
don 2002 
d’Aspremont, J., ‘The Recommendations made by the International Court of Justice’, 56 ICLQ 
185 (2007), pp. 185-198 
Association of the Bar of the City of New York & Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 
Torture by Proxy: International and Domestic Law Applicable to ‘Extraordinary Renditions’, 
New York 2004 
Ayala Corao, C., ‘La jerarquía de los Tratados de Derechos Humanos’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox 
(ed.), El Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos Humanos, Insti-
tuto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, San José (Costa Rica) 1998, pp. 137-154 
Aybay, R., ‘A New Institution in the Field: The Human Rights Chamber of Bosnia and Herzego-
vina’, 15(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 529 (1997), pp. 529-558  
 
B 
Babcock, S., ‘The Role of International Law in United States Death Penalty Cases’, 15 Leiden 
Journal of International Law 367 (2002), pp. 367-387 
Bal, P., E.R. Rieter, ‘Habeas corpus in de Verenigde Staten: een ultiem maar uiterst beperkt 
rechtsmiddel’, 31(1) Delikt en delinkwent 1 (2001), pp. 1-57 
Barkhuysen, T., Artikel 13 EVRM: effectieve nationale rechtsbescherming bij schending van 
mensenrechten, diss. Leiden, Vermande, Lelystad 1998 
Barkhuysen, T, Annotation of ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 
February 2005, in: AB 2005, 274 (annotation of Grand Chamber judgment on the legal status 
of provisional measures)  
Barkhuysen, T., M.L. van Emmerik, E.R. Rieter, Procederen over mensenrechten onder het 
EVRM, het IVBPR en andere VN-verdragen, Ars Aequi Libri, Nijmegen 2002 (1st); 2008 
(2nd) 
Barkhuysen, T., M.L. van Emmerik, P.H.P.H.M.C. van Kempen (eds.), The Execution of Stras-
bourg and Geneva Human Rights Decisions in the National legal Order, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London 1999 
Barnhoorn, L., K. Wellens (eds.), Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International 
Law, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1995 
 Bibliography 
1120 
Bassiouni, Ch., ‘International crimes: jus cogens and obligatio erga omnes’, 59(4) Law and Con-
temporary Problems 63 (1996), pp. 63-74 
Bassiouni report: independent expert to prepare a revised version of the Principles and Guide-
lines, Bassiouni, reports E/CN.4/1999/65 and E/CN.4/2000/62 
Battjes, H., European Asylum Law and International Law, Brill Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
Leiden 2006 
Battjes, H. (HBA), Annotation of N. v. UK, 27 May 2008, in: Jurisprudentie Vreemdelingenrecht 
JV 2008/266 
Bayefsky, A. (ed.), The UN Human Rights Treaty System in the 21st Century, Kluwer Law Inter-
national, the Hague/London/Boston 2000 
Bayefsky, A., The UN Human Rights Treaty System: Universality at the Crossroads, Transna-
tional Publishers, Ardsley, N.Y. 2001 
Bayefsky, A., How to Complain to the UN Human Rights Treaty System, Transnational Publish-
ers, New York 2002 
Bedi, S., The Development of Human Rights Law by the Judges of the International Court of 
Justice, Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland Oregon 2007 
Bedjaoui, M., ‘À propos de la place des droits de la personne humaine dans la jurisprudence de la 
Cour internationale de Justice’, in: P. Mahony et al., Protection of Human Rights: The Euro-
pean Perspective, Studies in Memory of Rolv Ryssdal, Heymans, Köln 2000, pp. 87-93 
Beirlaen, A., ‘De ordonnantie van 11 september 1976 gewezen in de zaak Plateau continental de 
la Mer Egée en de bevoegdheidsproblematiek in de fase der voorlopige maatregelen van het 
Internationale Hof van Justitie’, 14 Revue belge de droit international 425 (1978-1979), pp. 
425-459 
Beirlaen, A., De conservatoire maatregelen van het Internationale Gerechtshof, diss. Free Uni-
versity Brussels, 1979-1980 
Beirlaen, A., ‘De bindende kracht en afdwingbaarheid van de door het internationale Hof van 
Justitie aangeduide conservatoire maatregelen’, 18 Revue belge de droit international 739 
(1984-1985), pp. 739-775 
Bekker, G., ‘Human Rights News: III Africa’, 22(2) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 293 
(2004), pp. 293-299 
Benedek, W. (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: from Theory to Prac-
tice, Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague [etc.] 1999 
Ben-Naftali, O., M. Sharon, ‘What the ICJ Did Not Say About the Duty to Punish Genocide: The 
Missing Pieces in a Puzzle’, 5(4) Journal of International Criminal Justice 859 (2007), pp. 
859-874  
Benvenisti, E., ‘Margin of Appreciation, Consensus, and Universal Standards’, 31(4) New York 
University Journal of International Law and Politics 843 (1999), pp. 843-854 
Berman M.R., R.S. Clark, ‘State Terrorism: Disappearances’, 13 Rutgers Law Journal 531 
(1982), pp. 531-577 
Bernhardt, J.P.A., ‘The Provisional Measures Procedure of the International Court of Justice 
through U.S. Staff in Tehran: Fiat Iustitia, Pereat Curia?’, 20(3) Virginia J. Int.’l L. 557 
(1980), pp. 557-613 
Bernhardt, R. (1994a), ‘Interim Measures of Protection under the European Convention on Hu-
man Rights’, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts, 
Springer-Verlag, Berlin [etc.] 1994, pp. 95-114 
Bernhardt, R. (ed.) (1994b), Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts, Springer-
Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1994 
Birdsong, L.E., ‘Is there a Rush to the Death Penalty in the Caribbean: the Bahamas says no’, 13 
Temple International and Comparative Law Journal 285 (1999), pp. 285-308 
 Bibliography 
1121 
Blaauw, M., “‘Denial and Silence’’ or “Acknowledgement and Disclosure”’, 84 International 
Review of the Red Cross 767 (2002), pp. 767-783 
Boerefijn, I. (1999a), The Reporting Procedure under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Intersentia, Antwerp [etc.] 1999 
Boerefijn, I. (1999b), ‘Follow up of the Views of the United Nations Treaty Bodies’, in: T. Bark-
huysen et al. (eds.), The Execution of Strasbourg and Geneva Human Rights Decisions in the 
National Legal Order, Kluwer Law International, The Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 101-112 
Boerefijn, I. (2005a), Annotation of CEDAW A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005, 2/2003, 30(4) 
NJCM- bulletin 470 (2005), pp. 470-480 
Boerefijn, I. (2005b), ‘Foltering is het probleem, niet de oplossing: het verbod van foltering en 
andere wrede, onmenselijke of vernederende behandeling of bestraffing in het kader van VN-
verdragen’, 30(3) NJCM-bulletin 240 (2005), pp. 240-258 
Boerefijn, I. (2005c), ‘Domestic Violence against Women in International Human Rights Law’, 
in: I. Westendorp, R. Wolleswinkel (eds.), Violence in the Domestic Sphere, Intersentia, Ant-
werp [etc.] 2005, pp. 35-57 
Bomhoff, J., L. Zucca, ‘The Tragedy of Ms. Evans: Conflicts and Incommensurability of Rights’, 
2 European Constitutional Law Review 434 (2006), pp. 434-442 
Bonifaz Tweddle, G., ‘Las medidas cautelares, urgentes y provisionales en el Sistema Interameri-
cano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos’ in: Política Internacional/Academia Dip-
lomática del Perú, n. 85, julio-setiembre 2006, pp. 55-97 
Borgen, C.J., ‘Transnational Tribunals and the Transmission of Norms: Hegemony of Process’, 
St. John’s University School of Law Legal studies Research Paper series, August 2005 
Boulesbaa, A., The U.N. Convention against Torture and the Prospects for Enforcement, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1999 
Böcker, R., ‘Feeling the Heat in Geneva and New York, The Netherlands before the UN Treaty 
Bodies in Individual Complaints Procedures’, in: N. Blokker, R. Lefeber, L. Lijnzaad, I. van 
Bladel (eds.), The Netherlands in Court, Essays in honour of Johan G. Lammers, Brill, Leiden 
2006, pp. 125-140 
Böhler, B., De zwerftocht van een leider, Achter de schermen van de zaak Öcalan, Arbeiderspers 
Amsterdam 2000 
Bradley, C.A., ‘Breard, our Dualist Constitution, and the Internationalist Conception’, 51 Stan-
ford Law Review 529 (1998-1999), pp. 529-566 
Brems, E., Case note on Evans v. UK (7 March 2006), European Human Rights Cases 2006, pp. 
428-442 
Brody, R., F. Gonzáles, ‘Nunca Más: an analysis of international instruments on “Disappear-
ances”’, 19 Human Rights Quarterly 365 (1997), pp. 365-405 
Bronkhorst, D., ‘Naming Names’, 16(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 457 (1998), pp. 
457-474 
Brook, J., ‘Federalism and Foreign Affairs: how to Remedy Violations of the Vienna Convention 
and obey the U.S. Constitution, too’, 37 University of Michigan Journal of Law Reform 573 
(2004) pp. 573-597 
Brown, Ch., A Common Law of International Adjudication, Oxford University Press, New York 
2007 
Bruin, R., ‘“More than a Mere Possibility”, Risicogroepen, het Committee tegen Foltering en de 
bewijslast’, NAV 145 (1998), pp. 145-150 
Bruin, R., Case note of ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 
2005, NAV 2005/79  
Bruin, R., Case note of ECtHR N. v. UK, 27 May 2007, NAV 2008/28 
Bruin, R., K. Wouters, ‘Terrorism and the Non-derogability of Non-refoulement’, 15(1) Interna-
tional Journal of Refugee Law 5 (2003), pp. 5-29 
 Bibliography 
1122 
Buergenthal, Th, ‘The Revised OAS Charter and the Protection of Human Rights’, 29 American 
Journal of International Law 828 (1975), pp. 828-836 
Buergenthal, Th, ‘The Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, 76 American Journal of Interna-
tional Law 231 (1982), pp. 231-245 
Buergenthal, Th, ‘The Advisory Practice of the Inter-American Human Rights Court’, 79 Ameri-
can Journal of International Law 1 (1985), pp. 1-27 
Buergenthal, Th., ‘Interim Measures in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in: R. Bern-
hardt (ed.), Interim Measures indicated by International Courts, Springer-Verlag, Berlin 
1994, pp. 69-94 
Buergenthal, Th., ‘International Tribunals and National Courts: The Internationalization of Do-
mestic Adjudication’, in: U. Beyerlin et al. (eds.), Recht Zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung: 
Völkerrecht, Europarecht, Staatsrecht: Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt, Springer, Berlin 
1995, pp. 687-703 
Buergenthal, Th., ‘The Normative and Institutional Evolution of International Human Rights’, 
19(4) Human Rights Quarterly 703 (1997), pp. 703-723 
Buergenthal, Th., ‘Proliferation of International Courts and Tribunals: is it good or is it bad?’, 14 
Leiden Journal of International Law 267 (2001), pp. 267-275 
Buergenthal, Th., Remembering the Early Years of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice No. 1, 2005 
Buergenthal, Th., D. Cassell, ‘The Future of the Inter-American Human Rights System’, in: J.E. 
Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los derechos 
Humanos, Instituto Interamericano de Drechos Humanos, San José 1998, pp. 539-571 
Buergenthal, Th., D. Shelton, Protecting Human Rights in the Americas: Cases and Materials (4th 
rev. ed.) International Institute of Human Rights, Strasbourg, Engel Verlag, Kehl 1995 
Bulterman, M., Case note Behrami and Behrami, 2 May 2007, EHRC 2007/111 
Bulterman, M.K., M. Kuijer (eds.), Compliance with judgments of international courts, Kluwer 
Law Intenational, The Hague 1996 
Buquicchio-de Boer, M., ‘Interim Measures by the European Commission of Human Rights’, in: 
M. de Salvia, M.E. Villiger (eds.), The Birth of European Human Rights Law. Liber Ami-
corum Carl Aage Nørgaard, Nomos, Baden-Baden 1998, pp. 229-236 
Burgers, J.H., H. Danelius, The United Nations Convention against Torture: A Handbook against 
Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht 1988 
 
C 
Caflisch, L., A. Cançado Trindade, ‘Les Conventions Américaines et Européennes des Droits de 
l’Homme et le Droit International Général’, 108(1) RGDIP 5 (2004), pp. 5-62  
Cançado Trindade, A., Co-existence and Co-ordination of Mechanisms of International Protec-
tion of Human Rights (at Global and Regional Levels), 202 Collected Courses Hague Acad-
emy (1987-II) 
Cançado Trindade, A., ‘Derecho internacional de los Refugiados y derechos internacional de los 
derechos Humanos: aproximaciones y convergencias’, 119-120 Estudios Internacionales del 
instituto de estudios Internacionales 321 (1997), pp. 321-350  
Cançado Trindade, A. (1998a), ‘The Operation of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in: 
D.J. Harris, S. Livingstone (eds.), The Inter-American System of Human Rights, Oxford Clar-
endon Press, Oxford 1998, pp. 133-149 
Cançado Trindade, A. (1998b), ‘The Consolidation of the Procedural Capacity of Individuals on 
the Evolution of the International Protection of Human Rights: Present State and Perspective 
at the Turn of the Century’, 30(1) Colombia Human Rights Law Review 1 (1998), pp. 1-27 
Cançado Trindade, A. (1998c), ‘Reflexiones sobre el Futuro del sistema interamericano de Pro-
teccíon de los derechos Humanos’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El Futura del Sistema In-
 Bibliography 
1123 
teramericano de Protección de Los Derechos Humanos, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos 
Humanos (IIDH), San José, Costa Rica 1998, pp. 573-604 
Cançado Trindade, A., ‘The Inter-American System of Protection of Human Rights (1948-2000): 
Evolution, Present State and Perspectives at the Dawn of the XXIst Century’, International 
Institute of Human Rights, XXXI Study session, Strasbourg, 10-13 July 2000, AACT/1-
AACT/60, pp. 113-172 
Cançado Trindade, A., Preface by the President of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights to 
Series E: Provisional Measures, No. 2, Compendium: July 1996-June 2000, Secretariat of the 
Court, San José, Costa Rica 2000 
Cançado Trindade, A., ‘The Evolution of Provisional Measures of Protection under the Case-law 
of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (1987-2002)’, 24(5-8) Human Rights Law 
Journal 162 (2003), pp. 162-168 
Cançado Trindade, A., ‘The Development of International Human Rights Law by the Operation 
and the Case-law of the European and the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights’, speech 
on the occasion of the opening of the judicial year, 22 January 2004, 
<www.echr.coe.int/Eng/Speeches> (consulted on 14 July 2004) 
Cançado Trindade, A., ‘Les mesures provisoires de protection dans la jurisprudence de la cour 
interaméricaine des droits de l’homme’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Mesures 
conservatoires et droits fondamentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 145-163 
Carlson, S.N., G. Gisvold, Practical Guide to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, NY 2003 
Caron, D.D., ‘Interim Measures of Protection: Theory and Practice in Light of the Iran-United 
States Claims Tribunal’, 46 ZaöRV 465 (1986), pp. 465-518 
Carozza, P.G., ‘Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law in International Human Rights: Some 
Reflections on the Jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights’, 73(5) Notre Dame 
Law Review 1217 (1998), pp. 1217-1237 
Carozza, P.G, ‘Subsidiarity as a Structural Principle of International Human Rights Law’, 97 
American Journal of International Law 38 (2003), pp. 38-79 
Carter, L.E., ‘Compliance with ICJ Provisional Measures and the Meaning of Review and Recon-
sideration under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Avena and other Mexican Na-
tionals (Mex. v. U.S.)’, 25(1) Michigan Journal of International Law 117 (2003), pp. 117-134 
Cassel, D., ‘A United States View of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights’, in: P. Nikken 
(ed.), The Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas Buergenthal, 
IIDH/IIHR, San José, Costa Rica 1996, pp. 209-230 
Cassel, D. (1999a), ‘Peru Withdraws from the Court: will the Inter-American Human Rights 
System meet the Challenge?’, 20(4-6) Human Rights Law Journal 167 (1999), pp. 167-175  
Cassel, D. (1999b), ‘Judicial Remedies for Treaty Violations in Criminal Cases: Consular Rights 
of Foreign Nationals in United states Death Penalty Cases’, 12 Leiden Journal of Interna-
tional Law 851 (1999), pp. 851-888 
Cassel, D., ‘International Remedies in National Criminal Cases: ICJ Judgment in Germany v. 
United States’, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 69 (2002), pp. 69-86 
Cassel, D., ‘Extraterritorial Application on Inter-American Human Rights Instruments’, in: F. 
Coomans, M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, In-
tersentia, Antwerp/Oxford 2004, pp. 175-181 
Castan, M., S. Joseph, J. Schultz, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: 
Cases, Materials and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004 
Cerna, C.M., ‘International Law and the Protection of Human Rights in the Inter-American Sys-
tem, 19 Houston Journal of International Law 731 (1997), pp. 731-759 
Cerna, C.M., ‘Extraterritorial Application of the Human Right Instruments of the Inter-American 
System’, in: F. Coomans, M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford 2004, pp. 141-174 
 Bibliography 
1124 
Cerna, C., Out of bounds? The approach of the Inter-American system for the promotion and 
protection of human rights to the extraterritorial application of human rights law, Working 
Paper 6 of the NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2006 
Cerone, J., ‘The Application of Regional Human Rights Law beyond Regional Frontiers: The 
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and US Activities in Iraq’, ASIL Insight Octo-
ber 25, 2005 
Cerone, J., Out of bounds? Considering the reach of international human rights law, Working 
Paper 5 of the NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice, 2006 
Charney, J.I. (1999a), Is International Law threatened by Multiple International Tribunals?, 271 
Recueil des Cours, Collected courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 1998, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1999 
Charney, J.I. (1999b), ‘The Impact on the International Legal System of the Growth of Interna-
tional Courts and Tribunals’, 31(4) New York University Journal of International Law and 
Politics 697 (1999), pp. 697-708 
Charney, J.I., ‘The “Horizontal” Growth of International Courts and Tribunals: Challenges or 
Opportunities?’, 96 American Society of International Law 369 (2002), pp. 369-380 
Cheng, B., General Principles of Law as applied by International Courts and Tribunals, Grotius 
Publications Limited, Cambridge 1987 (reprint from 1953) 
Chenwi, L., Towards the Abolition of the Death Penalty in Africa, A Human Rights Perspective, 
Pretoria University Law Press 2007, <http://www.pulp.up.ac.za/pdf/2007_02/2007_02.pdf> 
Clark, T., ‘Mainstreaming Refugees Rights. The 1951 Refugee Convention and International 
Human Rights Law’, 17(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 389 (1999), pp. 389-410 
Clements, L.J., N. Mole, A. Simmons, European Human Rights Taking a Case under the Coven-
tion, Sweet & Maxwell, London 1999 
Cohen-Jonathan, G., ‘De l’effet juridique des “mesures provisoires” dans certaines circonstances 
et de l’efficacité du droit de recours individuel: à propos de l’arrêt de la cour de Strasbourg 
Cruz Varas du 20 Mars 1991’, Revue Universelle des Droits de l’homme 205 (1991), pp. 205-
209 
Cohen-Jonathan, G., ‘Les rapports entre la Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme et les 
autres traités conclus par les Etats Parties’, in: R. Lawson, M. de Blois (eds.), The Dynamics 
of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe; Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers (Vol. 
3), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht [etc.] 1994, pp. 79-111 
Cohen-Jonathan, G., ‘Cour Européenne des Droits de L’Homme et Droit International Général 
(1998-1999)’, XLV Annuaire Français de Droit International 767 (1999), pp. 767-789 
Cohen-Jonathan, G. (2005a), ‘Sur la force obligatoire des mesures provisoires, l’arrêt de la 
Grande Chambre du 4 février 2005, Mamatkulov et Askarov contre Turquie’, 2 RGDIP 421 
(2005), pp. 421-434 
Cohen-Jonathan, G. (2005b), ‘Conclusions générales’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), 
Mesures conservatoires et droits fondamentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 283-307 
Cohen-Jonathan, G. (2005c), ‘À propos des arrêts Assanidzé (8 avril 2004), Ilascu (8 juillet 2004) 
et Issa (16 novembre 2004). Quelques observations sur les notions de ‘juridiction’ et 
‘d’injonction’’, 63 Revue Trim. Dr. H. 767 (2005), pp. 767-785 
Cohen-Jonathan, G., J.-F. Flauss (eds.) (2005d), Mesures conservatoires et droits fondamentaux, 
Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005 
Collins, L., Provisional and Protective Measures in International Litigation, 234(III) Recueil des 
Cours, Academy of International Law 9 (1992), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht [etc.] 
1993 
Conforti, B., ‘Unité et fragmentation du droit international: Glissez mortels, n’appuyez pas’, 1 
RGDIP 6 (2007), pp. 6-18 
Conte, A., S. Davidson, R. Burchill, Defining Civil and Political Rights: the Jurisprudence of the 
United Nations Human Rights Committee, Ashgate, Aldershot 2004 
 Bibliography 
1125 
Coomans, F., ‘The Ogoni Case before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 
52 ICLQ 749 (2003), pp. 749-760 
Coomans, F., M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights Treaties, In-
tersentia, Antwerp/Oxford 2004 
Crawford, J., ‘The Right of Self-Determination in International Law: Its Develoment and Future’, 
in: Ph. Alston (ed.), Peoples’ Rights, Academy of European Law, European University Insti-
tute, Oxford University Press, Oxford [etc.] 2001, pp. 7-67  
Crockett, C.H., ‘The Effects of Interim Measures of Protection in the International Court of Jus-
tice’, 7 Calif. West Int.’l L.J. 348 (1977), pp. 348-384  
 
D 
Davidson, J.S., The Inter-American Human Rights System, Darthmouth Publishing Company, 
Aldershot 1997 
De Feyter, K., World Development Law, Sharing Responsibility for Development, Intersentia 
Antwerp/Groningen/Oxford 2001 
De Feyter, K., S. Parmentier, M. Bossuyt, P. Lemmens (eds.), Out of the Ashes, Reparation for 
Victims of Gross and Systematic Human Rights Violations, Intersentia, Antwerpen/Oxford 
2005 
De Salvia, M., ‘La pratique de la cour européenne des droits de l’homme relative aux mesures 
provisoires’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Mesures conservatoires et droits fon-
damentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 177-194 
De Salvia, M., E. Villiger (eds.), The Birth of European Human Rights Law, Liber amicorum, 
Studies in Honour of Carl Aage Nørgaard, Nomos, Baden-Baden 1998 
De Schutter, O., ‘Les mesures provisoires devant la Cour de justice des communautés européen-
nes dans le domaine des droits fondamentaux’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Me-
sures conservatoires et droits fondamentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 93-130 
De Wet, E., ‘The Protection Mechanism under the African Charter and the Protocol on the Afri-
can Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights’ in: G. Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B.G. Ramcharan, 
A. de Zayas (eds.), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour 
of Jakob Th. Möller, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers The Hague [etc.] 2001, pp. 713-729 
Decaux, E., ‘Les mesures d’urgence devant la Commision des droits de l’homme des nations 
unies et ses organses subsidiaires’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Mesures con-
servatoires et droits fondamentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 241-275 
Denbeaux, M., J. Denbeaux, ‘The Guantanamo Detainees: the Government’s Story’, Report on 
Guantanamo detainees, a profile of 517 detainees through analysis of department of defence 
data, 2 August 2006, <http://law.shu.edu/news/guantanamo_report_final_2_08_06.pdf#search 
=%22Denbeaux%20Guantanamo%22> 
Devine, D.J., ‘Provisional Measures ordered by the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
in the Area of Pollution, the Mox Plant Case (Ireland v. United Kingdom) ITLOS Case No. 
10, 3 December 2001’, 28 SAYIL 263 (2003), pp. 263-275 
De Zayas, A., ‘The Examination of Individual Complaints by the United Nations Human Rights 
Committee under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights,’ in: G. Alfredsson et al. (eds.), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 2001, pp. 67-121 
Doerfel, J., ‘The Convention against Torture and the Protection of Refugees’, 24(2) Refugee 
Survey Quarterly 83 (2005), pp. 83-97 
Dommen, C., ‘Claiming environmental rights: some possibilities offered by the United Nation’s 
human rights mechanisms’, 11(1) Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 1 
(1998), pp. 1-48 
Donders, Y.M., Towards a Right to Cultural Identity?, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford/New York 
2002 
 Bibliography 
1126 
Douma, W., The Precautionary Principle, its Application in International, European and Dutch 
Law, Diss. Groningen 2003, T.M.C. Asser Press, The Hague 2004 
Dugard, J., ‘The Future of International Law; a Human Rights Perspective – with some Com-
ments on the Leiden School of International Law’, 20 LJIL 729 (2007), pp. 729-739 
Dulitzky, A., ‘La aplicación de los tratados sobre los derechos humanos por los tribunals locales: 
un estudio comparado’, in: M. Abregú, C. Courtis (eds.), La aplicación de los tratados sobre 
los derechos humanos por los tribunals locales, CELS Centro de Estudios Legales y Sociales, 
Buenos Aires 1997, pp. 33-74 
Dulitzky, A., ‘La Duración del procedimiento: responsabilidades compartidas’, in: J.E. Mendez, 
F. Cox (eds.), El Futura del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos Hu-
manos, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH), San José, Costa Rica 1998, 
pp. 363-390 
Dumbauld, E., Interim Measures of Protection in International Controversies, Nĳhoff, The 
Hague 1932 
Dumbauld, E., ‘Relief pendente lite in the Permanent Court of International Justice’, 39 AJIL 391 
(1945), pp. 391-405 
Dupuy, P.M., L’unité de l’ordre juridique international, 297 RCADI Recueil des Cours, Collected 
courses of the Hague Academy of International Law 2002 
Dupuy, P.M., ‘Crime sans châtiment ou mission accomplie?’, 111(2) RGDIP 243 (2007), pp. 243-
258  
Duxbury, A., ‘Saving Lives in the International Court of Justice: the Use of Provisional Measures 
to Protect Human Rights’, 31 California Western International Law Journal 141 (2000), pp. 
141-176 
 
E 
Eissen, M.A., ‘Les mesures provisoires dans la Convention européenne des droits de l’homme’, 2 
Human Rights Journal 252 (1969), pp. 252-256 
Elkind, J.B., Interim Protection, a Functional Approach, Nijhoff, The Hague [etc.] 1981 
Ergec, R., J. Velu, La Convention Européenne des Droits de L’Homme; extrait du Répertoire 
pratique du droit belge Complément, tome VII, Bruylant, Bruxelles 1990 
Escher, A., ‘Release of vessels and crews before the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea’, 3 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 411 (2004), pp. 411-507 
Evans, M., R. Murray (eds.), The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the System in 
Practice: 1986-2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002 
Evatt, E., ‘Individual Communications under the Optional Protocol to the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights’, in: S. Pritchard (ed.), Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations 
and Human Rights, Zed Books Ltd. (London), the Federation Press (Annandale/Leichardt, 
Australia) 1998, pp. 86-115 
 
F 
Farer, T., ‘The Future of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights: Promotion versus 
exposure’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protec-
ción de los Derechos Humanos, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, San José 
1998, pp. 515-536 
Faúndez Ledesma, H., ‘La Independencia e Imparcialidad de los Miembros de la Comisión y de 
la Corte: Paradojas y desafíos’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El Futura del Sistema In-
teramericano de Protección de Los Derechos Humanos, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos 
Humanos (IIDH), San José, Costa Rica 1998, pp. 185-210 
 Bibliography 
1127 
Faúndez Ledesma, H., El sistema interamericano de protección de los derechos humanos: aspec-
tos institucionales y procesales, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH), San 
José, Costa Rica 1999 (2nd ed.) 
Faure, M.G., E.I.L. Vos, Juridische afbakening van het voorzorgsbeginsel: mogelijkheden en 
grenzen, Zoetermeer, Gezondheidsraad 2003 
Feria Tinta, M., ‘Individual Human Rights v. State Sovereignty: the Case of Peru’s Withdrawal 
from the Contentious Jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, Current Le-
gal Developments’, 13 Leiden Journal of International Law 985 (2000), pp. 985-996 
Feria Tinta, M., ‘Due Process and the Right to Life in the Context of the Vienna Convention on 
Consular Relations: Arguing the LaGrand Case’, 12(2) European Journal of International 
Law 363 (2001), pp. 363-366 
Fitzpatrick, J., ‘The Unreality of International Law in the United States and the LaGrand Case’, 
27 Yale Journal of International Law 427 (2002), pp. 427-433 
Fix-Zamudio, H., ‘La Protección Judicial de los Derechos Humanos en Latinoamérica y en el 
Sistema Interamericano’, 8 Revista IIDH 8 (1989), pp. 8-64 
Fix-Zamudio, H., ‘El derecho Internacional de los derechos Humanos en law Constituciones 
Latinoamericanas y en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos’, in: P. Nikken (ed.), 
The Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas Buergenthal, IIDH/IIHR, 
San José, Costa Rica 1996, pp. 19-32 
Fix-Zamudio, H., ‘The European and the Inter-American Courts of Human Rights: a Brief Com-
parison’, in: P. Mahony, F. Matscher, H. Petzold, L. Wildhaber (eds.), Protecting Human 
Rights: The European Perspective, Studies in memory of Rolv Ryssdal, Carl Heymanns Ver-
lag KG, Köln 2000, pp. 507-533  
Flauss, J.-F. (2005a), ‘Notule sur les mesures provisoires devant la Commission africaine des 
droits de l’homme et des peuples,’ in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Mesures con-
servatoires et droits fondamentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 231-239 
Flauss, J.-F. (2005b), ‘Discussion’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Mesures conserva-
toires et droits fondamentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 195-214 
Flinterman, C., Soevereiniteit en de rechten van de mens, Inaugurale rede Universiteit Utrecht, 19 
januari 2000 Utrecht: Studie- en Informatiecentrum Mensenrechten (SIM) 2000 
Flinterman, C., ‘United Nations Human Rights Reform: Some Reflections of a CEDAW-member’ 
(Column), 21(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 621 (2003), pp. 621-624 
Flinterman, C., E. Ankumah, ‘The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in: H. Han-
num (ed.), Guide to International Human Rights Practice, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley, 
New York 2004 (4th), pp. 171-188 
Fitzmaurice, G., The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice, Vol 2, Grotius, 
Cambridge 1986 
Forder, C., ‘Positieve verplichtingen in het kader van het Europees Verdrag tot Bescherming van 
de Rechten van de Mens en Fundamentele Vrijheden’, 17(6) NJCM-Bulletin 611 (1992), pp. 
611-637 
Forder, C., J. Wittingham, Case note on Evans v. UK, 7 March 2006, NJCM 863 (2006), pp. 863-
880 
Forster, M.J.C., ‘The Mox Plant Cases – Provisional Measures in the International Tribunal for 
the Law of the Sea’, 16 Leiden Journal of International Law 611 (2003). pp. 611-619 
Freestone, D., E. Hey (eds.), The Precautionary Principle in International Law. The Challenge of 
Interpretation (International Environmental Law and Policy Series, Vol. 31), Kluwer Law In-
ternational, The Hague/London/Boston 1996 
Froidevaux, S., ‘L’humanitaire, le religieux et la mort’, 848 International Review of the Red 
Cross (special issue on the missing) 785 (2002), pp. 785-801 
 
 Bibliography 
1128 
G 
Gaeta, P. (2007a), ‘Genocide d’état et responsabilité pénale individuelle’, 2 RGDIP 273 (2007), 
pp. 273-283 
Gaeta, P. (2007b), ‘On what Conditions can a State be held Responsible for Genocide?’, 18(4) 
EJIL 631 (2007), pp. 631-684 
Gaffikin, B., ‘The International Court of Justice and the Crisis in the Balkans Case Concerning 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia)’, 17 Sydney Law Review 458 (1995), pp. 458-472 
Garry, H.R., ‘When Procedure involves Matters of Life and Death: Interim Measures and the 
European Convention on Human Rights’, 7(3) European Public Law 399 (2001), pp. 399-432 
Gathii, J. Thuo, ‘Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda)’ 101 American Journal of International Law 142 (2007), 
pp. 142-149 
Gattini, A., ‘Breach of the Obligation to Prevent and Reparation thereof in the ICJ’s Genocide 
Judgment’, 18(4) EJIL 695 (2007), pp. 695-713 
Gelmamez, M.S., ‘Constitution, Ombudsperson and Human Rights Chamber in ‘Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’’, 17(3) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 277 (1999), pp. 277-329 
Ghandhi, P.R., The Human Rights Committee and the Right of Individual Communication: Law 
and Practice, Ashgate, Aldershot/Brookfield (USA)/Singapore/Sydney 1998 
Ghandhi, S., ‘Avena and other Mexican Nationals’, 53 International & Comparative Law Quar-
terly 738 (2004), pp. 738-746 
Giardina, A., ‘Provisional Measures in Europe: Some Comparative Observations’, 4 Diritto del 
commercio internazionale: pratica internazionale e diritto interno 791 (1993), pp. 791-802 
Gill, T., E. van Sliedregt, ‘Guantánamo Bay: a Reflection on the Legal Status and Rights of 
“Unlawful Enemy Combatants”’, 1 Utrecht Law Review 28 (2005), pp. 28-54 
Gilman, D., ‘Confidentiality in the Proceedings as a Topic in the Discussion of Reform’, in: J.E. 
Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos 
Humanos, IIDH, San José, Costa Rica 1998, pp. 261-290 
Goldie, L.F.E., ‘The Nuclear Test Cases: Restraints on Environmental Harm’, 5 Journal of Mari-
time Law & Commerce 491 (1973-74), pp. 491-505 
Goldman R.K., ‘International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law and the Internally Dis-
placed’, in: P. Nikken (ed.), The Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Tho-
mas Buergenthal, IIDH/IIHR, San José, Costa Rica 1996, pp. 517-548 
Goldman, R.K., B.D. Tittemore, Unprivileged Combatants and the Hostilities in Afghanistan: 
Their Status and Rights under International Humanitarian and Human Rights Law, American 
Society of International Law Task Force Paper, Washington 2002 
Goldstone, R.J., R.J. Hamilton, ‘‘Bosnia v. Serbia: Lessons from the Encounter of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice with the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia’, 
21 Leiden Journal of International Law 95 (2008), pp. 95-112 
Gómez, V. (1998a), ‘Seguridad Jurídica e Igualdad Procesal ante los Órganos’, in: J.E. Mendez, 
F. Cox (eds.), El Futura del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos Hu-
manos, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, San José 1998, pp. 213-240 
Gómez, V. (1998b), ‘The Interaction between the Political Actors of the OAS, the Commission 
and the Court’, in: D.J. Harris, S. Livingstone (eds.), The Inter-American System of Human 
Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1998, pp. 173-197 
Gómez, V., ‘Inter-American Commission on Human Rights and the Inter-American Court of 
Human Rights: New Rules and Recent Cases’, 1(1) Human Rights Law Review 111 (2001), 
pp. 111-126 
Gomien, D., ‘Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina: European Practice, Fraught Federalism 
and the Future’, in: W. Benedek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Day-
 Bibliography 
1129 
ton: from Theory to Practice, Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 107-120 
Gomien, D., ‘The Human Rights Ombudsperson for Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in: G. Alfredsson, 
J. Grimheden, B.G. Ramcharan, A. de Zayas (eds.), International Human Rights Monitoring 
Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers The Hague 
[etc.] 2001, pp. 763-770 
Gomien, D., D. Harris, L. Zwaak, Law and Practice of the European Convention on Human 
Rights and the European Social Charter, Council of Europe Publishing, Strasbourg 1996 
Gondek, M., ‘Extraterritorial Application of the European Convention on Human Rights. Territo-
rial Focus in the Age of Globalization?’, 52 Netherlands International Law Review 349 
(2005), pp. 349-387 
González Espinoza, O.I., La protección internacional del ser humano y las medidas provisionales 
dictadas en el marco de la Convención Americana sobre Derechos Humanos, con énfasis en 
la práctica de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Tesis Universidad de Costa 
Rica, Facultad de Derecho, May 2002 
Goodman, R, ‘Human Rights Treaties, Invalid Reservations and State Consent’, 96(3) American 
Journal of International Law 531 (2002), pp. 531-560 
Goodwin-Gill, G.S., J. MacAdam, The Refugee in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2007 (3rd) 
Gorlick, B., ‘The Convention and the Committee against Torture; a Complementary Protection 
Regime for Refugees’, 11(3) International Journal of Refugee Law 479 (1999), pp. 479-495 
Gorlick, B., ‘Human Rights and Refugees: Enhancing Protection through International Human 
Rights Law’, 69(2) Nordic Journal of International Law 117 (2000), pp. 117-177 
Goy, R., ‘La Cour Permanente de Justice Internationale et les Droits de l’Homme’, in: V. Berger 
et al. (eds.), Liber Amicorum Marc-André Eissen, Bruylant, Brussels 1995, pp. 199-232 
Gray, C., Judicial Remedies in International Law, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1987 
Gray, C., ‘Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)), Orders of Pro-
visional Measures of 8 April 1993 and 13 September 1993’, 43 International and Compara-
tive Law Quarterly 704 (1994), pp. 704-714 
Gray, C., ‘The Use and Abuse of the International Court of Justice: Cases concerning the Use of 
Force after Nicaragua’, 14(5) EJIL 867 (2003), pp. 867-905 
Gross, L., ‘Some Observations on Provisional Measures’, in: Y. Dinstein, M. Tabory (eds.), In-
ternational Law at a Time of Perplexity, Essays in Honour of Shabtai Rosenne, Nĳhoff, 
Dordrecht 1989, pp. 308-324 
Gros Espiell, H., ‘Opiniones Disidentes y separadas en la Corte Interamericana de derechos 
Humanos’, 4 Revista Uruguaya de derecho procesal 456 (1988), pp. 456-466 
Grossman, C., ‘Disappearances in Honduras: The Need for Direct Victim Representation in 
Human Rights Litigation’, 15 Hastings Int’l & Comp. L. Rev 363 (1992), pp. 363-389 
Grünfeld, F., Vroegtijdig optreden van omstanders ter voorkoming van oorlogen en schendingen 
van de rechten van de mens, Inaugural speech Utrecht University, 2003, available online at 
<http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=3830> 
Grünfeld, F., ‘The Role of Bystanders in Human Rights Violations’, in: F. Coomans et al. (eds.), 
Rendering Justice to the Vulnerable: Liber Amicorum in Honour of Theo van Boven, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague/London/Boston 2000, pp. 131-143 
Grünfeld, F., A. Huĳboom, The Failure to Prevent Genocide in Rwanda: the Role of Bystanders, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2007 
Gubbay, A.R., ‘The Protection and Enforcement of Fundamental Human Rights: The Zimbab-
wean Experience’, 19 Human Rights Quarterly 227 (1997), pp. 227-254 
Guggenheim, P., Les Mesures Provisoires de Procédure Internationale et leur Influence sur le 
Développement du Droit des Gens, Recueil Sirey, Paris 1931 
 Bibliography 
1130 
Guggenheim, P., Les Mesures Conservatoires Dans la Procédure Arbitrale et Judiciaire, 40 
Recueil des Cours, Recueil Sirey, Paris 1933 
Gumedze, S., ‘Bringing Communications before the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’, 3(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 118 (2003), pp. 118-148 
 
H 
Haeck, Y., C. Burbano Herrera, ‘Provisional Measures in the Case Law of the European Court of 
Human Rights’, 4 NQHR 625 (2003), pp. 625-676 
Haeck, Y., C. Burbano Herrera, L. Zwaak, ‘Strasbourg Takes Away any Remaining Doubts and 
Broadens its Pan-European Protection: Non-Compliance with a Provisional Measure Auto-
matically Leads to a Violation of the Right of Individual Application… or Doesn’t it?’, 1 
European Constitutional Law Review 41 (2008), pp. 41-63 
Hafner, G., ‘Risks Ensuing from Fragmentation of International Law’, UN Doc. ILC 
(LII)/WG/LT/L.1/Add.1, at 24 (2000) (included as annex to UN Doc. A/55/10 (2000) 
Haller, G., ‘The Human Rights Regime in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the European Context’, in: 
W. Benedek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: from Theory to 
Practice, Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 
The Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 25-32 
Hallo de Wolf, A., ‘Defending the Defenders: hoe beschermt het internationaal recht mensenrech-
ten NGO’s’, 27(5) NJCM-Bulletin 531 (2002), pp. 531-546 
Hamalengwa, M., C. Flinterman, E.V.O. Dankwa (eds.), The International Law of Human Rights 
in Africa: Basic Documents and Annotated Bibliography, Nijhoff, Dordrecht/Boston 1988 
Hannum, H., ‘The Protection of Indigenous Rights in the Inter-American System’, in: D.J. Harris, 
S. Livingstone (eds.), The Inter-American System of Human Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1998, pp. 323-344 
Hannum, H. (ed.), Guide to International Human Rights Practice, Transnational Publishers, 
Ardsley, New York 2004 (4th) 
Hannum, H., R.B. Lillich, International Human Rights: Problems of Law, Policy, and Practice, 
Aspen Publishers, Boulder (Co) 1995 (3rd) 
Harrington, J. (Joanna), ‘Punting Terrorists, Assassins and other Undesirables: Canada, the Hu-
man Rights Committee and Requests for Interim Measures of Protection’, 48 McGill L.J. 55 
(2003), pp. 55-87 
Harrington, J. (Joanna), ‘The Absent Dialogue: Extradition and the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights’, 32 Queen’s Law Journal 82 (2006), pp. 82-134 
Harrington, J. (Julia), ‘Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Strategies and Roles of Non-
Governmental Organizations by Claude Welch (book review)’, 9 Harvard Human Rights 
Journal 333 (1996), pp. 333-338. 
Harrington, J. (Julia), ‘Special Rapporteurs of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’, 1(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 247 (2001), pp. 247-267 
Harrington, J. (Julia), ‘The African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, in: M. Evans, R. 
Murray (eds.), The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, the System in Practice: 
1986-2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002, pp. 305-334 
Harris, D., M. O’Boyle, C. Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
Butterworths, London 1995 
Harris, D., S. Livingstone (eds.), The Inter-American System of Human Rights, Clarendon Press, 
Oxford 1998 
Hathcock, J.N., ‘The Precautionary Principle – An Impossible Burden of Proof’, 3(4) AgBioFo-
rum 255 (2000), pp. 255-258, <www.agbioforum.org> 
Helfer, L.R., A.-M. Slaughter, ‘Why States Create International Tribunals: A Response to Profes-
sors Posner and Yoo’, 93 California Law Review 1 (2005), pp. 1-58 
 Bibliography 
1131 
Helfer, L.R., A.-M. Slaughter, ‘Towards a Theory of Effective Supranational Adjudication’, 107 
Yale Law Journal 273 (1997), pp. 273-391 
Helfer, L.R., ‘Forum Shopping for Human Rights’, 148(2) University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view 285 (1999), pp. 285-379 
Henckaerts, J.M., Mass Expulsion in Modern International Law and Practice, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, The Hague 1995 
Henrard, K., Devising an Adequate System of Minority Protection: Individual Human Rights, 
Minority Rights and the Right to Self-determination, Nĳhoff, The Hague 2000 
Herdegen, M., Völkerrecht, Beck, München 2004 (3rd) 
Hey, E., Teaching International Law: State-Consent as Consent to a Process of Normative De-
velopment and Ensuing Problems, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2003 
Heyns, C. (ed.), Human Rights Law in Africa (Vol. 2), Martinus Nijhoff, Leyden 2004 
Heyns, C. (ed.), Compendium of Key Human Rights Documents of the African Union, Pretoria 
University Law Press, Pretoria 2005 
Heyns, C., M. Killander, ‘The African Regional Human Rights System’, in: F. Gómez Isa, K. De 
Feyter (eds.), International Protection of Human Rights: Achievements and Challenges, Uni-
versity of Deusto, Bilboa 2006, pp. 509-543 
Heyns, C., F. Viljoen, ‘Current Developments: An overview of International Human Rights Pro-
tection in Africa’, 15 SAJHR 421 (1999), pp. 421-445 
Heyns, C., F. Viljoen, ‘The Regional Protection of Human Rights in Africa: An Overview and 
Evaluation’, in: P.T. Zeleza, P.J. McConnaughay (eds.), Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and 
Development in Africa, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2004, pp. 129-143 
Hicks, P., ‘The Human Rights Role of the Office of the High Representative and Other Imple-
menting Organizations’, in: W. Benedek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina af-
ter Dayton: from Theory to Practice, Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 127-148 
Higgins, R., Problems and Process, International Law and how to use it, Clarendon Press, Oxford 
1994 
Higgins, R., ‘Interim Measures for the Protection of Human Rights’, 36 Columbia Journal of 
Transnational Law 91 (1997), pp. 91-108 
Higgins, R., ‘The International Court of Justice and Human Rights’, in: K. Wellens (ed.), Interna-
tional Law: Theory and Practice, Essays in Honour of Eric Suy, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional/Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague/Boston/London 1998, pp. 691-705 
Higgins, R., ‘The ICJ, the ECJ, and the Integrity of International Law’, 52 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 1 (2003) pp. 1-20 
Higgins, R., ‘Human Rights in the International Court of Justice’, 20 LJIL 745 (2007), pp. 745-
751 
Highet, K., ‘U.S. Withdrawal from Proceedings Initiated by Nicaragua’, 79 The American Jour-
nal of International Law 438 (1985), pp. 438-441 
Highet, K., ‘Evidence and Proof of Fact’, in: L. Fisler Damrosch (ed.), The International Court of 
Justice at a Crossroads, Transnational Publishers/Dobbs Ferry, New York 1987, pp. 355-375 
Highet, K., ‘Evidence, the Chamber and the ELSI Case’, in: R.B. Lillich (ed.), Fact-finding be-
fore International Tribunals, Transnational Publishers, Inc., Ardsley-on-Hudson, New York 
1992, pp. 65-68 
Hirsch Ballin, E.M.H., ‘The VS en het internationale recht: onthouden van consulaire bijstand aan 
ter dood veroordeelde Duitsers’, 50(10) Ars Aequi 807 (2001), pp. 807-819 
Hood, R., The Death Penalty, a Worldwide Perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002 
Horn, F., Reservations and Interpretative Declarations to Multilateral Treaties, North-Holland, 
Amsterdam 1988 
 Bibliography 
1132 
Huff, A., ‘Resource Development and Human Rights: A Look at the Case of the Lubicon Cree 
Indian Nation of Canada’, 10 Colo. J. Int’ l Environmental Law & Policy 161 (1999), pp. 
161-194 
Human Rights First, ‘Getting to Ground Truth, Investigating US Abuses in the “War on Terrror”’, 
September 2004, <www.HumanRightsFirst.org> 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Empty Promises: Diplomatic Assurances no Safeguard against Torture’, 
Vol. 16, No. 4 (D), April 2004 
Human Rights Watch, The United States’ Disappeared; the CIA’s long-term ghost detainees, a 
Human Rights Watch briefing paper, October 2004 
Human Rights Watch, ‘Still at Risk: Diplomatic Assurances no Safeguard against Torture’, Vol. 
17, No. 4 (D), April 2005 
 
I 
ILA, ‘Interim Report of the Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice of the 
International Law Association (ILA), on the Impact of Findings of the United Nations Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies on National Courts and Tribunals, at the New Delhi Conference 
(2002)’, 70 International Law Association’ Rep. Conf. 508, April 2-6 (2002), pp. 507-555 
ILA, ‘Final Report of the Committee on International Human Rights Law and Practice of the 
International Law Association (ILA) on the Impact of Findings of the United Nations Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, at the Berlin Conference (2004)’, 71 International Law Association’ 
Rep. Conf. 621 August 16-21 2004, pp. 621-702 
Ingelse, C., The UN Committee against Torture: An Assessment, Kluwer Law International, The 
Hague 2001 
Iwamoto, Y., ‘The Protection of Human Life through Provisional Measures indicated by the 
International Court of Justice’, 15 Leiden Journal of International Law 345 (2002), pp. 345-
366 
 
J 
Jacobs, F.G., ‘Interim Measures in the Law and Practice of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities’, in: R. Bernhardt (ed.), Interim Measures Indicated by International Courts, 
Springer Verlag, Berlin/Heidelberg/New York 1994, pp. 37-68 
Jayawickrama, N., The Judicial Application of Human Rights Law, National, Regional and Inter-
national Jurisprudence, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2002 
Jennings, R., ‘The LaGrand Case’, 1 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribu-
nals, 13 (2002) pp. 13-54 
Joseph, S., ‘Rendering Terrorists and the Convention against Torture’, 5 Hum.Rts.L. Rev. 339 
(2005), pp. 339-446 
Joseph, S., J. Schultz, M. Castan, The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 
Cases, Materials and Commentary, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2004 (2nd) 
 
K 
Kammerhofer, J., ‘The Binding Nature of Provisional Measures of the International Court of 
Justice: the ‘Settlement’ of the Issue in the LaGrand Case’, 16(1) Leiden Journal of Interna-
tional Law 67 (2003), pp. 67-83 
Kamminga, M.T., Inter-State Accountability for Violations of Human Rights, University of Penn-
sylvania Press, Philadelphia 1992 
Kamminga, M.T., ‘The Precautionary Approach in International Human Rights Law: How It can 
Benefit the Environment’, in: E. Hey, D.A.C. Freestone (eds.), The Precautionary Principle 
and International Law, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1996, pp. 171-186 
 Bibliography 
1133 
Kamminga, M.T., De humanisering van het volkenrecht, Inaugurele rede, Universiteit Maastricht, 
2001 
Kamminga, M.T., ‘The Evolving Status of NGOs under International Law: a Threat to the Inter-
State System?’, in: G.P.H.. Kreijen et al. (eds.), State, Sovereignty, and International Govern-
ance, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2002, pp. 387-406 
Kamminga, M.T., ‘Humanisation of International Law’, in: I. Boerfijn, J. Goldschmidt (eds.), 
Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human rights: Essays in Honour of Cees Flinter-
man, Intersentia, Antwerp 2008, pp. 29-40 
Kamminga, M.T., Final Report on the Impact of International Human Rights Law on General 
International Law, presented on behalf of the Committee of Human Rights Law and Practice 
of the International Law Association (ILA), July 2008, made available on SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1150664> (consulted 5 August 2008) 
Kälin, W., ‘Human Rights and Statehood’, in: W. Benedek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina after Dayton: from Theory to Practice, Human Rights Centre of the University 
of Sarajevo, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 59-66 
Kazazi, M., Burden of Proof and Related Issues, A Study on Evidence before International Tribu-
nals, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston 1996 
Kempees, P., N. Mol, A. van Steijn, ‘Voorlopige maatregelen bij het Europees Hof voor de Rech-
ten van de Mens’, in 5 NAV 299 (2004), pp. 299-300 
Kingsbury, B., ‘Reconciling Five Competing Conceptual Structures of Indigenous Peoples’ 
Claims in International and Comparative Law’, 34 N.Y.U. J. Int’l L. & Pol. 189 (2001), pp. 
189-250 
Kirgis, F.L., ‘The Supreme Court decides a Consular Convention case’, 10(16) ASIL Insight 7 
July 2006 
Klabbers, J., ‘Executing Mr Breard’, 67(3) Nordic Journal of International Law 357 (1998), pp. 
357-364 
Klabbers, J., ‘Accepting the Unacceptable? A New Approach to Reservations to Multilateral 
Treaties’, 69 Nordic Journal of International Law 179 (2000), pp. 179-193 
Klein, E., ‘Individual Reparation Claims under the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights: The Practice of the Human Rights Committee’, in: A. Randelzhofer, C. Tomuschat 
(eds.), State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations of 
Human Rights, Kluwer Law International 1999, pp. 27-41 
Klerk, Y., ‘The Character of the Views of the Human Rights Committee’, in: F. Coomans et al. 
(eds.), Rendering Justice to the Vulnerable, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/ 
Boston 2000, pp. 149-159 
Klerk, Y.S., Het ECRM-Toezichtmechanisme; verleden, heden, toekomst, dissertation, Ars Aequi 
Libri, Nijmegen 1995 
Knoops, G.G.J., ‘Het House of Lords “Torture” arrest en de gevolgen voor counter-terrorism door 
overheden: van “geheime vluchten”, CIA tot Guantanamo Bay’, 55 Ars Aequi 116 (2006) pp, 
116-122 
Koh, H. Hongju, ‘Refugees, The Courts, and the New World Order’, Utah Law Review 999 
(1994a), pp. 999-1025 
Koh, H. Hongju, ‘America’s Offshore Refugee Camps’, 29 University of Richmond Law Review 
139 (1994b), pp. 139-173 
Koh, H. Hongju, ‘Why do Nations Obey International Law?’, 106 The Yale Law Journal 2599 
(1997), pp. 2599-2659 
Kokott, J., The Burden of Proof in Comparative and International Human Rights Law, Civil and 
Common Law Approaches with Special Reference to the American and German Legal Sys-
tems, Kluwer Law International, The Hague/London/Boston 1998 
Koskenniemi, M., P. Leino, ‘Fragmentation of International Law? Postmodern Anxieties’, 15(3) 
Leiden Journal of International Law 553 (2002), pp. 553-580 
 Bibliography 
1134 
Krisch, N., ‘The Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 58(3) ZaöRV 
713 (1998), pp. 713-726 
Kritsiotis, D., ‘Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v. Uganda): Provisional Measures’, 50(3) International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 662 (2001), pp. 662-670 
Krsticevic, V., ‘Líneas de Trabajo para Mejorar la Eficacia del Sistema’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox 
(eds.), El Futura del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos Humanos, Insti-
tuto Interamericano de Drechos Humanos, San José 1998, pp. 413-448 
Krüger, H.C., ‘Probleme der Beweiserhebung durch die Europäische Kommission für Menschen-
rechte’, 6 Bulletin Des Droits De L’Homme 43 (1996), pp. 43-56 
Künzli, A., ‘Case Concerning Mexican Nationals’, 18(1) Leiden Journal of International Law 49 
(2005), pp. 49-64  
Küttler, E., Die Menschenrechtskammer für Bosnien-Herzegowina, Berliner Wirtschafts-Verlag 
GmbH, Berlin 2003 
Kwiatkowska, B., ‘The International Court of Justice and the Law of the Sea’, in: J. Makarczyk 
(ed.), Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of 
Krzysztof Skubiszewski, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 1996, pp. 439-485 
 
L 
LaGrand Symposium: ‘Reflections on the ICJ’s LaGrand Decision’, 27 YaleJIL 423 (2002), pp. 
423-452 
Lagrange, P., ‘La protection des témoins: entre le possible et le souhaitable’, in: L. Burgorgue-
Larsen (ed.), La répression internationale du génocide rwandais, Collection du CREDHO-
Université de Paris-Sud et Rouen, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2003, pp. 41-83 
Lakha Sriram, C., ‘Trying Habre in Senegal: An African Solution to an African Problem?, Jurist, 
Legal News and Research, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 6 July 2006, 
<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/07/trying-habre-in-senegal-african.php>  
Lavranos, N., ‘The Mox Plant and IJzeren Rijn Disputes: which Court is the Supreme Arbiter?’, 
19 Leiden Journal of International Law 223 (2006) pp. 223-246 
Lawson, R., M. de Blois (eds.), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe. 
Essays in Honour of Henry G. Schermers (Vol. 3), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 
1994 
Lawson, R.A., ‘Positieve verplichtingen onder het EVRM – Opkomst en ondergang van de Fair 
Balance-test,’ in 20(5) NJCM-Bulletin 558 (1995), pp. 558-573 and 20(6) NJCM-Bulletin 727 
(1995), pp. 727-750 
Lawson, R., E. Myjer, ‘De zaak loopt volstrekt uit de hand...’ Een interview met de nieuwe Ne-
derlandse leden van het Europese Hof en de Europese Commissie voor de Rechten van de 
Mens, 22(2) NJCM-Bulletin 104 (1997), pp. 104-123 
Lawson, R., De internationale rechter en de Nederlandse rechtsorde, Preadvies; Handelingen 
Nederlandse Juristen-Vereniging jrg. 129, Tjeenk Willink, Deventer 1999 
Lawson, R., ‘Life after Bankovic: on the Extraterretorial Application of the European Convention 
on Human Rights’, in: F.Coomans, M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Hu-
man Rights Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp [etc.] 2004, pp. 83-123 
Lawson, R., ‘Behrami en Behrami t. Frankrijk en Saramati t. Frankrijk, Duitsland en Noorwegen, 
Mission impossible, het EVRM is niet van toepassing op vn-vredesmissies, (annotation), 32 
NJCM 39 (2007), pp. 39-63 
Leach. Ph., ‘The British military in Iraq – the Applicability of the espace juridique doctrine under 
the European Convention on Human Rights’, Public Law (2005), pp. 448-458 
Leach, Ph., Taking a Case to the European Court of Human Rights, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2007 (2nd) 
 Bibliography 
1135 
Letsas, G., ‘International Human Rights and the Binding Force of Interim Measures’, 5 European 
Human Rights Law Review 527 (2003), pp. 527-538 
Leuprecht, P., ‘Human Rights – The Foundation of Justice and Peace’, in: W. Benedek (ed.), 
Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: from Theory to Practice, Human 
Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 
1999, pp. 15-18 
Lewis-Anthony, S., M. Scheinin, ‘Treaty-Based Procedures for Making Human Rights Com-
plaints Within the UN System’, in: H. Hannum (ed.), Guide to International Human Rights 
Practice, Transnational Publishers, Ardsley/New York 2004 (4th), pp. 43-64 
Lijnzaad, L., Reservations to UN-human Rights Treaties: Ratify and Ruin?, Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, Dordrecht 1995 
Lillich, R.B., ‘Notes and Comments, The Soering Case’, 85 AJIL 128 (1991), pp. 128-149 
Lillich, R.B. (ed.), Fact-finding before International Tribunals, Transnational Publishers, Inc., 
Ardsley-on-Hudson/New York 1992 
Lloyd, A., R. Murray, ‘Institutions with Responsibility for Human Rights Protection under the 
African Union’, 48(2) Journal of African Law 165 (2004), pp. 165-187 
Lodeweges, A., ‘Executie-impressies, ontwikkelingen in de praktijk van de tenuitvoerlegging van 
Hof-uitspraken’, 33(7) NJCM 949 (2008), pp. 949-953 
Lombardi, G., R. Sluder, D. Wallace, ‘Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates: The Missouri 
Experience and Its Legal Significance’, 61(2) Federal Probation 3 (1997), pp. 3-11 
 
M 
MacDonald, R.St.J., ‘Interim Measures in International Law, with Special Reference to the Euro-
pean System for the Protection of Human Rights’, 52(3-4) ZaöRV 703 (1992), pp. 703-740 
Macklin, A., ‘Refugee Women and the Imperative of Categories’, 17(2) Human Rights Quarterly 
213 (1995), pp. 213-277 
Macklin, A., ‘Mr. Suresh and the Evil Twin’, 20(4) Refuge 15 (2002), pp. 15-22 (see 
<www.law.utoronto.ca> (consulted 18 July 2004) 
McLachlan, C., ‘The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Con-
vention’, 54 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 279 (2005), pp. 279-320 
Mahoney, P., ‘Judicial Activism and Judicial Self-Restraint in the European Court of Human 
Rights: Two Sides of the Same Coin’, 11(1-2) Human Rights Law Journal 57 (1990), pp. 57-
88 
Maison, R., ‘Les ordonnances de la CIJ dans l’affaire relative à l’application de la Convention sur 
la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide’, 5 EJIL 381 (1994), pp. 381-400 
Malinverni, G., ‘La pratique des Comités conventionnels des nations unies en matière de mesures 
conservatoires’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Mesures conservatoires et droits 
fondamentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 63-75 
Mampuya, A., ‘Responsabilité et réparations dans le conflit des Grands-Lacs au Congo-Zaire’, 
108(3) Revue générale de droit international public 679 (2004), pp. 679-707 
Mani, V.S., ‘On Interim Measures of Protection: I.C.J. Practice’, 13 Indian Journal of Interna-
tional Law 262 (1973), pp. 262-272 
Mani, V.S., ‘The Right to Consular Assistance as a Basic Human Right of Aliens – A Review of 
the ICJ Order dated 3 March 1999’, 39(3) Indian Journal of International Law (1999), pp. 
431-446 
Maraj, R. (Minister of Foreign Affairs), ‘Notice to Denounce the Optional Protocol to the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights’, 20 (4-6) Human Rights Law Journal 280 
(1998), pp. 280-281 
Marr, S., The Precautionary Principle in the Law of the Sea: Modern Decision Making in Inter-
national Law, Nĳhoff, Leiden 2003 
 Bibliography 
1136 
Martin, C., “The Moiwana Village Case: A New Trend in Approaching the Rights of Ethnic 
Groups in the Inter-American System”, 19(2) Leiden Journal of International Law 491 
(2006), pp. 491-504 
Martin, I., ‘International Experiences for Human Rights Monitoring’, in: W. Benedek (ed.), Hu-
man Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: from Theory to Practice, Human Rights 
Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 
67-72 
Martin, S., ‘The Missing’, 84 International Review of the Red Cross 723 (2002), pp. 723-726 
Mayer, J., ‘Outsourcing Torture, The Secret History of America’s Extraordinary Rendition Pro-
gram’, The New Yorker, 7 February 2005 
McCorquodale, R., ‘An Inclusive International Legal System’, 17(3) Leiden Journal of Interna-
tional Law 477 (2004), pp. 477-504 
McGoldrick, D., The Human Rights Committee: Its Role in the Development of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford 1994 
McGoldrick, D., ‘Extraterritorial Application of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’, in: F. Coomans, M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford 2004, pp. 41-72 
McKie, K.L., ‘Executions and Apologies: The U.S., International Law and Right to Consular 
Notification’, 11 Critical Criminology 199 (2002), pp. 199-215 
Medina Quiroga, C., The Battle of Human Rights: Gross, Systematic Violations and the Inter-
American System, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1988 
Medina Quiroga, C., La Convención Americana: Teoría y jurisprudencia; vida, integridad per-
sonal, libertad personal, debido proceso y recurso judicial, Universidad de Chile 2005 
Medina Quiroga, C., C. Nash Rojas, Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos: Introduc-
ción a sus Mecanismos de Protección Universidad de Chile, Centro de Derechos Humanos 
2007 
Meijknecht, A.K., Towards International Personality: the Position of Minorities and Indigenous 
Peoples in International Law, Intersentia/Hart, Antwerp/Groningen/Oxford 2001 
Mendelson, M., ‘Interim Measures of Protection in Cases of Contested Jurisdiction’, 46 B.Y.I.L 
259 (1972-1973), pp. 259-322 
Mendelson, M., ‘The international Court of Justice and the Sources of International Law’, in: V. 
Lowe, M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in 
Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, pp. 63-89 
Méndez, J.E., F. Cox (eds.), El Futuro del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos 
Humanos, Instituto Interamericano de Derechos Humanos, San José 1998 
Méndez, J.E., J.M. Vivanco, ‘Disappearances and the Inter-American Court: Reflections on a 
Litigation Experience’, 13 Hamline Law Review 507 (1990), pp. 507-577 
Méndez, J.E., J.M. Vivanco, V. Krsticevic, ‘Amicus Curiae’, 18 Revista IIDH 29 (1993), pp. 29-
44 
Mennecke, M., C.J. Tams, ‘LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America)’, 51(2) ICLQ 
449 (2002), pp. 449-454 
Meron, Th., The Humanization of International Law, Hague Academy of International Law, Vol. 
3 (General Course 2003), Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2006 
Merrills, J.G., The Development of International Law by the European Court of Human Rights, 
Manchester University Press, Manchester 1993 
Merrills, J.G., ‘Interim Measures of Protection in the Recent Jurisprudence of the International 
Court of Justice’, 44(1) ICLQ 90 (1995), pp. 90-146 
Milano, E., ‘Diplomatic Protection and Human Rights before the International Court of Justice: 
Re-fashioning Tradition?’, XXXV Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 85 (2004), pp. 
85-142 
Milanović, M., ‘State Responsibility for Genocide’, 17(3) EJIL 553 (2006), pp. 553-604 
 Bibliography 
1137 
Milanović, M., ‘State Responsibility for Genocide: a Follow-up’, 18(4) EJIL 669 (2007), pp. 669-
694 
Mol, N., ‘Implications of the Special Status Accorded in the General Framework Agreement for 
Peace to the European Convention on Human Rights’, in: M. O’Flaherty, G. Gisvold (eds.), 
Post-war Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, The Hague/Boston 1998, pp. 27-69 
Mole, N., ‘Issa v. Turkey: Delineating the Extra Territorial Effect of the European Convention on 
Human Rights’, 1 European Human Rights Law Journal 86 (2005), pp. 86-91 
Morel, C., ‘Defending Human Rights in Africa: The Case for Minority and Indigenous Rights’, 
1(1) Essex Human Rights Review 54 (2004), pp. 54-65 
Mowbray, A.R., The Development of Positive Obligations Under the European Convention on 
Human Rights by the European Court of Human Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford 2004 
Mowbray, A.R., ‘A New Strasbourg Approach to the Legal Consequences of Interim Measures’, 
5(2) Human Rights Law Review 377 (2005), pp. 377-386 
Mowbray, A.R., Cases and Materials on the European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2007 (2nd) 
Mugwanya, G.W., Human Rights in Africa, Enhancing Human Rights through the African Re-
gional Human Rights System, Transnational Publishers, New York 2003 
Müller, D., ‘Procedural Developments at the International Court of Justice’, 3 The Law and Prac-
tice of International courts and tribunals 553 (2004), pp. 553-579 
Murphy, S.D., ‘Contemporary Practice of the United States relating to International Law’, 98 
American Journal of International Law 579 (2004), pp. 579-609 
Murray, R., ‘Serious or Massive Violations under the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights: A Comparison with the Inter-American and European Mechanisms’, 17(2) Nether-
lands Quarterly of Human Rights 109 (1999), pp. 109-133 
Murray, R. The African Commission on Human and People’s Rights & International Law, Hart 
Publishing, Oxford/Portland Oregon 2000 
Murray, R., Human Rights in Africa, From the OAU to the African Union, Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge 2004 
Murray, R., M. Evans (eds.), Documents of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights, Hart Publishing, Oxford/Portland Oregon 2001 
Murray, R., S. Wheatley, ‘Groups and the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 25 
Human Rights Quarterly 213 (2003), pp. 213-236 
Mutua, M., ‘African Human Rights Organizations: Questions of Context and Legitimacy’, in: 
P.T. Zeleza, P.J. McConnaughay, Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Development in Africa, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2004, pp. 191-215 
Myjer, E., ‘Straatsburgse Myj/meringen: wie het eerst komt is niet altijd urgent’, 32(7) NJCM 
1073 (2007), pp. 1073-1075 
 
N 
Naldi, G.J., The Oganization of African Unity, an Analysis of its Role, Mansell Publishing, New 
York 1999 (2nd) 
Naldi, G.J., ‘Notes and Comments: Limitation of Rights under the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights: The Contribution of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’, 17 South African Journal of Human Rights 109 (2001), pp. 109-118 
Naldi, G., ‘Interim Measures of Protection in the African system for the Protection of Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’, 2(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 1 (2002), pp. 1-9 
Naldi, G.J., ‘Interim Measures in the UN Human Rights Committee’, 53 ICLQ 445 (2004), pp. 
445-454 
Neussl, P., ‘Bosnia and Herzegovina still far from the Rule of Law/Basic Facts and Landmark 
Decisions of the Human Rights Chamber’, 20(7-11) HRLJ 290 (1999), pp. 290-302 
 Bibliography 
1138 
Nicholson, F., P. Twomey, Refugee Rights and Realities, Evolving International Concepts and 
Regimes, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1999 
Nieto Navia, R., ‘Las medidas provisionales en la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos: 
Teoría y Praxis’, in: R. Nieto Navia (ed.), La Corte y el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos 
Humanos, Corte IDH, San José Costa Rica 1994, pp. 369-398 
Nieto Navia, R., ‘Aplicación por la Corte Interamericana de derechos Humanos de las Normas de 
la Convención de Viena sobre el derecho de los Tratados sobre Interpretación en Diversos 
Idiomas’, in: P. Nikken (ed.), The Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of 
Thomas Buergenthal, IIDH/IIHR, San José, Costa Rica 1996, pp. 397-418 
Nikken, P., ‘Perfeccionar el Sistema Interamericano de Derechos Humanos sin Reformar al pacto 
de San José’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El Futura del Sistema Interamericano de Protec-
ción de Los Derechos Humanos, The Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of 
Thomas Buergenthal, IIDH/IIHR, San José, Costa Rica 1996, pp. 25-44 
Nmehielle, V.O., The African Human Rights System: Its Law, Practice, and Institutions, Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 2001 
Nørgaard, C.A., ‘Interim Measures Under the European System for Protection of Human Rights’, 
in: K. Thorup, J. Rosenbløm (eds.), Festskrift til Ole Due (Liber Amicorum), Forlaget Tom-
son, Stockholm 1994, pp. 278-297 
Nørgaard, C.A, H.C. Krüger, ‘Interim and Conservatory Measures under the European System of 
Protection of Human Rights’, in: M. Nowak, D. Steurer, H. Tresser (eds.), Fortschritt im Be-
wusstsein der Grund- und Menschenrechte, Progress in the Spirit of Human Rights, Fest-
schrift für Felix Ermacora, Engel Verlag, Kehl/Strasbourg/Arlington 1988, pp. 109-117 
Nowak, M., U.N. Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: CCPR Commentary, N.P. Engel, 
Kehl/Strasbourg/Arlington 1993 
Nowak, M., ‘The Human Rights Chamber for Bosnia and Herzegovina adopts its First Judgment’, 
18 HRLJ 174 (1997), pp. 174-178 
Nowak, M. (1999a), ‘Is Bosnia and Herzegovina Ready for Membership in the Council of 
Europe? The Responsibility of the Committee of Ministers and of the Parliamentary Assem-
bly’, 20 HRLJ 285 (1999), pp. 285-289 
Nowak, M. (1999b), ‘Shortcomings of Effective Enforcement of Human Rights in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, in: W. Benedek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: 
from Theory to Practice, Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Martinus  
Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 95-106 
Nowak, M. (2000a), ‘Lessons for the International Human Rights Regime from the Yugoslav 
Experience’, Academy of European Law (ed.), Collected Courses of the Academy of Euro-
pean Law, Volume VIII, Book 2, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2000, pp. 141-208 
Nowak, M. (2000b), ‘Is the Death Penalty an Inhuman Punishment?’, in: T.S. Orlin, A. Rosas, M. 
Scheinin (eds.), The Jurisprudence of Human Rights Law: A Comparative Interpretive Ap-
proach, Turku, Finland: Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University 2000, pp. 27-
45 
Nowak, M., ‘Individual Complaints Before the Human Rights Commission for Bosnia and Her-
zegovina’, in: G. Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B.G. Ramcharan, A. de Zayas (eds.), Interna-
tional Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 2001, pp. 771-793 
 
O 
O’Boyle, M., ‘Torture and Emergency Powers under the European Convention on Human Rights: 
Ireland v. United Kingdom’, 71 AJIL 674 (1977), pp. 674-691 
O’Boyle, M., ‘The European Convention on Human Rights and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction: a 
Comment on ‘Life after Bankovic’’, in: F. Coomans, M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford 2004, pp. 125-139 
 Bibliography 
1139 
O’Riordan, T., J. Cameron, A. Jordan (eds.), Reinterpreting the Precautionary Principle, Cam-
eron May, London 2001 
Oda, S., ‘Provisional Measures, The Practice of the International Court of Justice’, in: V. Lowe, 
M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Justice: Essays in Honour of 
Sir Robert Jennings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, pp. 541-556 
Odinkalu, C.A., ‘The Role of Case and Complaints Procedures in the Reform of the African 
Regional Human Rights System’, 1(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 225 (2001), pp. 
225-246 
Oellers-Frahm, K., Die einstweilige Anordnung in der internationalen Gerichtbarkeit, Springer-
Verlag, Berlin 1975 
Oellers-Frahm, K., ‘United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran Case’, in: R. Bern-
hardt (ed.), Encyclopedia of Public International Law 2, Max Planck Institute, North-Holland 
Publishing Company, Amsterdam/New York/Oxford 1981, pp. 282-286 
Oellers-Frahm, K., ‘Remarks Concerning the Indication of Provisional Measures by the ICJ in the 
Case of Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) of 8 April 1993 
(Summary)’, 53(3) Zeitschrift für ausländisches und öffentliches Recht und Völkerrecht 654 
(1993), pp. 654-656 
Oellers-Frahm, K. (2001a), ’Entscheidungen – IGH – 27.6.01 – Verbindlichkeit einstweiliger 
Anordnungen des IGH. Nichtbeachtung durch die USA. Individualrechte. Fall LaGrand 
(Deutschland gegen USA)’, 28(11-13) EuGRZ 287 (2001), pp. 287-298 
Oellers-Frahm, K. (2001b), ‘Multiplication of International Courts and Tribunals and Conflicting 
Jurisdiction- Problems and Possible Solutions’, in: J.A. Frowein, R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max 
Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 5, Kluwer Law International, The Hague 2001, pp. 
67-104 
Oellers-Frahm, K, ‘Verbindlichkeit einstweiliger Massnahmen: Der EGMR vollzieht – endlich – 
die erfordliche Wende in seiner Rechtsprechung, Anmerkung zum Fall Mamatkulov und Ab-
durasulovic gegen Türkei’, 30 (22-23) EuGRZ 689 (2003), pp. 689-693 
O’Flaherty, M., Human Rights and the UN, Practice before the Treaty Bodies, Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 1996 
O’Flaherty, M., ‘Report on the Conference on Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina: From 
Theory to Practice’, in: W. Benedek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after 
Dayton: from Theory to Practice, Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 6-13 
O’Flaherty, M., ‘Human Rights and the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina’, in: G. Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B.G. Ramcharan, A. de Zayas (eds.), Interna-
tional Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, Mar-
tinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 2001, pp. 749-762 
Oguz, N., S. Miles, ‘The Physician and Prison Hunger Strikes: Reflecting on the Experience in 
Turkey’, 31 J Med Ethics 169 (2005), pp. 169-172 
Onoria, H., ‘The African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights and the Exhaustion of 
Local Remedies Under the African Charter’, 31(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 1 
(2003), pp. 1-24 
Orakhelashvili, A., ‘Questions of International Judicial Jurisdiction in the LaGrand Case’, 15 
Leiden Journal of International Law 105 (2002), pp. 105-130 
Orakhelashvili, A., ‘Judicial Competence and Judicial Remedies in the Avena Case’, 18(1) Leiden 
Journal of International Law 31 (2005), pp. 31-48 
Orakhelashvili, A., Peremptory Norms in International Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2006 
Ouguergouz, F., The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights: A Comprehensive Agenda 
for Human Dignity and Sustainable Democracy in Africa, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague 2003 
 Bibliography 
1140 
Ovey, C., R. White, The European Convention on Human Rights, Oxford University Press, Ox-
ford 2006 
 
P 
Padilla, D.J., ‘The Future of the Inter-American Human Rights System’, 3(1) Human Rights Brief 
(American University Washington College of Law), 1995, <http://www.wcl.american. 
edu/hrbrief/v3i1/iahr31.htm>  
Padilla, D.J., ‘Provisional Measures under the American Convention on Human Rights’, in: C. 
Gaviria (ed.), Liber Amicorum Héctor Fix-Zamudio, San José, Costa Rica 1998, pp. 1189-
1196 
Padilla, D., ‘An African Human Rights Court: Reflections From the Perspective of the Inter-
American System’, 2(2) African Human Rights Law Journal 185 (2002), pp. 185-194 
Pajic, Z., ‘An Overview of the substantive Human Rights Regime after Dayton: A Critical Ap-
praisal of the Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in: M. O’Flaherty, G. Gisvold (eds.), 
Post-war Protection of Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, The Hague 1998, pp. 1-12 
Pajic, Z., ‘A Critical Appraisal of the Dayton Constitution of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in: W. 
Benedek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: from Theory to Prac-
tice, Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 33-44 
Palmisano, G., ‘Les garanties de non-repetion entre codification et realization juridictionnelle du 
droit: à propos de l’affaire LaGrand’, 4 Revue Générale de Droit International Public 753 
(2002), pp. 753-789 
Partsch, K.J., ‘Vor- und Nachteile einer Regionalisierung des internationalen Menschenrecht-
schutzes’, 16 (1-2) EuGRZ 1 (1989), pp. 1-9 
Pasqualucci, J.M., ‘Provisional Measures in the Inter-American Human Rights System: An Inno-
vative Development in International Law’, 26(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 
803 (1993), pp. 803-864 
Pasqualucci, J.M., ‘Sonia Picado, First Woman Judge on the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights’, 17 HRQ 794 (1995), pp. 794-806 
Pasqualucci, J.M. (1996), ‘Thomas Buergenthal: Holocaust Survivor to Human Rights Advocate’, 
18 Human Rights Quarterly 877 (1996), pp. 877-899 
Pasqualucci, J.M., The Practice and Procedure of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, 
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003 
Pasqualucci, J.M., ‘Interim Measures in International Human Rights: Evolution and Harmoniza-
tion’, 38(1) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 1 (2005), pp. 1-49 
Patton, M.Q., Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods, Sage, Thousand Oaks 2002 (3rd) 
Paulson, C., ‘Compliance with Final Judgments of the International Court of Justice since 1987’, 
98(3) American Journal of International Law 434 (2004), pp. 434-461 
Paust, J. (2003), ‘Judicial Power to Determine the Status and Rights of Persons Detained without 
Trial’, 44 Harvard International Law Journal 505 (2003), pp. 505-532 
Paust, J. (2004a), ‘Post-9/11 Overreaction and Fallacies Regarding War and Defense, Guan-
tanamo, the Status of Persons, Treatment, Judicial Review of Detention, and Due Process in 
Military Commissions’, 79 Notre Dame Law Review 1335 (2004), pp. 1335-1364 
Paust, J. (2004b), ‘After 9/11, “No Neutral Ground” with Respect to Human Rights: Executive 
Claims and Actions of Special Concern and International Law Regarding the Disappearance 
of Detainees’, 50 The Wayne Law Review 79 (2004), pp. 79-96 
Paust, J., ‘Unsafe Harbour, the G.O.P. ‘compromise’ on Detainee Treatment’, JURIST- Forum 
Legal News and Research, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, 22 September 2006, at: 
<http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2006/09/unsafe-harbor-gop-compromise-on.php> (consulted 
15 October 2007) 
 Bibliography 
1141 
Paust, J., ‘Medellín, Avena, the Supremacy of Treaties, and Relevant Executive Authority’, 31(2) 
Suffolk Transnational Law Review 301 (2008), pp. 301-333 
Pauwelyn, J., Conflict of Norms in Public International law: How WTO law relates to Other 
Rules of International Law, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2003 
Penal Reform International, Making Standards Work, An international handbook on good prison 
practice, The Hague 2001 (2nd), <www.penalreform.org> 
Petzold, H., ‘The Convention and the principle of subsidiarity’, in: R.St.J. Macdonald, F. 
Matscher, H. Petzold (eds.), The European System for the Protection of Human Rights,  
Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1993, pp. 41-62 
Picado Sotela, S., ‘Thomas Buergenthal’, in: P. Nikken (ed.), The Modern World of Human 
Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas Buergenthal, IIDH/IIHR, San José, Costa Rica 1996, pp. 
19-32 
Pinto, M., ‘Las relaciones entre los Órganos del Sistema’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El Fu-
tura del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos Humanos, Instituto Inter-
americano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH), San José, Costa Rica 1998, pp. 169-184 
Pinto, M., ‘De la protection diplomatique à la protection des droits de l’homme’, 3 Revue Gé-
nérale de Droit International Publique 513 (2002), pp. 513-548 
Pityana, N.B., ‘The Challenge of Culture for Human Rights in Africa: the African Charter in a 
Comparative Context’, in: M. Evans, R. Murray (eds.), The African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, the System in Practice: 1986-2000, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 
2002, pp. 219-245 
Pityana, N.B., ‘Hurdles and Pitfalls in International Human Rights Law: The Ratification Process 
of the Protocol to the African Charter on the Establishment of the African Court on Human 
and Peoples’ Rights’, 28 South African Yearbook of Internatinal Law 110 (2003), pp. 110-129 
Prakken, T., Het laatste woord, zes opstellen over verdediging in strafzaken, Kluwer, Deventer 
2005 
Pritchard, S. (ed.), Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights, Zed Books Ltd., 
London, the Federation Press, Annandale/Leichardt, Australia 1998 
Pronto, A., ‘Human-Rightism’ and the Development of General International Law’, 20 LJIL 753 
(2007), pp. 753-765 
 
Q 
Quigley, J., A.S. Shank, ‘Death Row as a Violation of Human Rights: Is It Illegal to Extradite to 
Virginia?’, 30 VJIL 214 (1989), pp. 241-272 
 
R 
Raguz, B., ‘The Ombudsman Institution of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina’, in: W. 
Benedek (ed.), Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina after Dayton: from Theory to Prac-
tice, Human Rights Centre of the University of Sarajevo, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The 
Hague [etc.] 1999, pp. 121-124 
Ramcharan, B.G., ‘Complementarity between Universal and Regional Organizations/Perspectives 
from the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights’, 21(8) Human Rights Law Journal 324 
(2000), pp. 324-326 
Ramcharan, B.G., The United Nations High Commisioner for Human Rights, the Challenges of 
International Protection, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/Kluwer Law International, The Hague 
[etc.] 2002 
Ratner, M., ‘How We Closed the Guantanamo HIV Camp: The Intersection of Politics and Litiga-
tion’, 11 Harvard Human Rights Journal 187 (1998), pp. 187-220 
 Bibliography 
1142 
Ray, S., ‘Domesticating International Obligations: How to ensure U.S. Compliance with the 
Vienna Convention of Consular Relations’, 91 Californian Law Revue 1729 (2003), pp. 1729-
1771 
Redgwell, C.J., ‘Reservations to Treaties and Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 
24(52)’, 46 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 390 (1997), pp. 390-412 
Reed, L., ‘Great Expectations: Where does the Proliferation of International Dispute Resolution 
Tribunals Leave International Law?’, 96 American Society of International Law 219 (2002), 
pp. 219-237 
Reichler, P.S., ‘Tribute to Professor Abram Chayes: Holding America to its Own Best Standards: 
Abe Chayes and Nicaragua in the World Court’, 42 Harvard International Law Journal 15 
(2001), pp. 15-46 
Reisman, M., Systems of Control in International Adjudication and Arbitration: Breakdown and 
Repair, Duke University Press, Durham, NC 1992 
Rieter, E., ‘Interim Measures by the World Court to suspend the Execution of an Individual: the 
Breard Case’, 16(4) Netherlands Quarterly of Human Rights 475 (1998), pp. 475-494 
Rieter, E., ‘Het VN-Comité tegen foltering, interim maatregelen en de Nederlandse verplichtin-
gen’, 24(8) NJCM-Bulletin 1136 (1999), pp. 1136-1145  
Rieter, E. (2002a), ‘Het Internationaal Gerechtshof over rechtsherstel en de bindende kracht van 
voorlopige maatregelen: Duitsland t. VS (LaGrand)’, 27(4) NJCM-Bulletin 481 (2002), pp. 
481-491 
Rieter, E. (2002b), ‘ICCPR Case Law on Detention, the Prohibition of Cruel Treatment and some 
Issues Pertaining to the Death Row Phenomenon’, 1 Journal of the Institute of Justice and In-
ternational Studies 83 (2002), pp. 83-103 (<www.cmsu.edu/cj/journal.htm>) 
Rieter, E. (2003a), ‘Het recht op leven, het verbod van wrede behandeling en de voorlopige 
maatregelen van het EHRM: eindelijk effectief klachtrecht’, 21 Nederlands Juristenblad 1074 
(2003), pp. 1074-1076 
Rieter, E. (2003b), Annotation of Shamayev and 12 Others t. Georgië en Rusland, 1 European 
Human Rights Cases 23 (2003), pp. 23-27  
Rieter, E., ‘Effectief klachtrecht, onherstelbaar letsel en voorlopige maatregelen door het EHRM’, 
29(1) NJCM-Bulletin 73 (2004), pp. 73-87 
Rieter, E. (2005a), ‘Motiveringsvereisten voor de Straatsburgse voorlopige maatregelen, het 
voorbeeld van de Somalische zaken’, 30(1) NJCM 25 (2005), pp. 25-44 
Rieter, E. (2005b), Annotation of Mamatkulov en Askarov t. Turkije, 4 februari 2005, 4(6) Euro-
pean Human Rights Cases (2005), pp. 320-324 
Rieter, E., Annotation of Afd. Bestuursrechtspraak Raad van State, 6 januari 2006, rol nr. 
200508638/1, JV 2006/189, pp. 736-739 
Rieter, E., Annotation of Paladi v. Moldavia, 10 July 2007, 39806/05, European Human Rights 
Cases (EHRC) 2007/101, pp. 969-975 
Rivera-Salgado, G., Equal in Dignity and Rights: the Struggle of Indigenous Peoples of the 
Americas in an Age of Migration, inaugural address Utrecht University, Utrecht 2005 
Robertson, E., ‘Psychological Injury and the Prison Litigation Reform Act: A ‘Not exactly’ Equal 
Protection Analysis’, 37 Harvard Journal on Legislation 105 (2000), pp. 105-158 
Rodley, Sir N.S., The Treatment of Prisoners in International Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 1999 (2nd) 
Rodley, Sir N.S., ‘Urgent Action’, in: G. Alfredsson et al. (eds.), International Human Rights 
Monitoring Mechanisms, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 2001, pp. 279-283 
Rodley, N.S., ‘United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of the Com-
mission on Human Rights – Complementarity or Competition?’, 25(4) Human Rights Quar-
terly 882 (2003), pp. 882-908 
 Bibliography 
1143 
Rodríguez Pinzón, D., ‘Presumption of Veracity, Nonappearance and Default in the Individual 
Complaint Procedure of the Inter-American System on Human Rights’, 25 Revista IIDH 125 
(1998), pp. 125-148 
Rodríguez Rescia, V., ‘La ejecución de sentencias de la Corte’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El 
Futura del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos Humanos, Instituto Inter-
americano de Derechos Humanos, San José 1998, pp. 51-72 
Rogge, K., ‘Einstweilige Massnahmen in Verfahren von der Europäische Komission für Men-
schenrechte’, 35 Neue Jurist. Wochenschr. 1569 (1977), pp. 1569-1570 
Rosenne, S., Provisional Measures in International Law, the International Court of Justice and 
the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005 
 
S 
Salvioli, F.O., ‘Derechos, Acceso y Rol de las Víctimas’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El Fu-
tura del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos Humanos, Instituto In-
teramericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH), San José, Costa Rica 1998, pp. 293-342 
Sands, Ph., ‘Treaty, Custom and the Cross-Fertilization of International Law’, 1 Yale Journal of 
Human Rights and Development Law 85 (1999), pp. 85-105 
Sands, Ph., ‘Turtles and Torturers: the Transformation of International Law’, 33 NYU J. Int’l L. 
Pol. 527 (2001), pp. 527-558 
Sands, Ph., Principles of International Environmental Law, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 2003 (2nd) 
Savadogo, L., ‘Case concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic 
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda): the Court’s Provisional Measures Order of 1 July 2000’, 
72 BYIL 357 (2002), pp. 357-380 
Schabas, W., ‘Soering’s Legacy: the Human Rights Committee and the Judicial Committee of the 
Privy Council take a Walk down Death Row’, 43 International and Comparative Law Quar-
terly 913 (1994), pp. 913-921 
Schabas, W.A., The Death Penalty as Cruel Treatment and Torture, Capital Punishment Chal-
lenged in the World Courts, Northeastern University Press, Boston 1996 
Schabas, W.A. (2002a), The Abolition of the Death Penaly in International Law, Cambridge 
University Press, Cambridge 2002 
Schabas, W.A. (2002b), ‘The ICJ ruling against the United States: Is it really about the death 
penalty?’, 27 Yale Journal of International Law 445 (2002), pp. 445-452 
Schabas, W., ‘Discussion’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Mesures conservatoires et 
droits fondamentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 77-90 
Schachter, O., ‘Creativity and Objectivity in International Tribunals’, in: R. Bernhardt, W.K. 
Geck, G. Jaenicke, H. Steinberger, Volkerrecht als Rechtsordnung internationale Gerichts-
barkeit Menschenrechte, Festschrift für Hermann Mosler, Springer-Verlag, Berlin/ 
Heidelberg/New York 1983, pp. 813-821 
Scheinin, M., ‘The Right to enjoy a Distinct Culture: Indigenous and Competing Uses of Land’, 
in: Th.S. Orlin et al. (eds.), The Jurisprudence of Human Rights: a Comparative Interpretive 
Approach, Åbo Akademi University Institute for Human Rights, Turku 2000, pp. 159-222 
Scheinin, M., ‘How to Untie a Tie in the Human Rights Committee’, in: G. Alfredsson et al. 
(eds.), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms, Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. 
Möller, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers/Kluwer Law International, The Hague [etc.] 2001, pp. 
129-145 
Scheinin, M. (2004a), ‘Reservations by States under the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights and its Optional Protocols, and the Practice of the Human Rights Committee’, 
in: I. Ziemele (ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Re-
gime: Conflict, Harmony or Reconciliation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden 2004, pp. 
41-58 
 Bibliography 
1144 
Scheinin, M. (2004b), ‘Extraterritorial effect of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights’, in: F. Coomans, M. Kamminga (eds.), Extraterritorial Application of Human Rights 
Treaties, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford 2004, pp. 73-81 
Schermers, H.S., ‘Acceptance of International Supervision of Human Rights’, 12 Leiden Journal 
of International Law 821 (1999), pp. 821-831 
Schiffman, H.W., ‘The LaGrand Decision: The Involving Legal Landscape of the Vienna Con-
vention on Consular Relations in U.S. Death Penalty Cases’, 42 Santa Clara Law Review 
1099 (2002), pp. 1099-1135 
Schiffrin, N., ‘Jamaica Withdraws the Rights of Individual Petition under the International Cove-
nant of Civil and Political Rights’, 92 American Journal of International Law 564 (1998), pp. 
564-568 
Schmidt, M., ‘Individual Human Rights Complaints Based on United Nations Treaties and the 
Need for Reform’, 41 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 645 (1992), pp. 645-659 
Schmidt, M., ‘Treaty-based Human Rights Complaints Procedures in the UN – Remedy or Mi-
rage for Victims of Human Rights Violations?’, 2 Human Rights – Droits de l’Homme 13 
(1998), pp. 13-18 
Schmidt, M., ‘The Death Row Phenomenon: a Comparative Analysis’, in: T.S. Orlin, A. Rosas, 
M. Scheinin (eds.), The Jurisprudence of Human Rights Law: A Comparative Interpretive 
Approach, Turku, Finland: Institute for Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University 2000, pp. 
47-72 
Schulte, C., Compliance with Decisions of the International Court of Justice, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2004 
Schwebel, S. (1996a), ‘Commentary’, in: M.K. Bulterman, M. Kuijer (eds.), Compliance with 
Judgments of International Courts, Proceedings of the symposium organized in honour of 
Professor Henry G. Schermers, Mordenate College and the Department of International Pub-
lic Law of Leiden University, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 1996, pp. 39-62 
Schwebel, S. (1996b), ‘The Treatment of Human Rights and of Aliens in the International Court 
of Justice’, in: V. Lowe, M. Fitzmaurice (eds.), Fifty Years of the International Court of Jus-
tice, Essays in Honour of Sir Robert Jennings, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1996, 
pp. 327-350 
Seiderman, I., Hierarchy in International Law: the Human Rights Dimension, Intersentia/Hart, 
Antwerpen/Groningen/Oxford 2001 
Sepúlveda, M., The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Intersentia/Hart, Antwerpen/Groningen/Oxford 2003 
Sevinç, M., ‘Hunger strikes in Turkey’, 30 Human Rights Quarterly 655 (2008), pp. 655-679 
Shahabuddeen, M., Precedent in de World Court, Hersch Lauterpacht Memorial Lectures, Cam-
bridge University Press, Cambridge 1997 
Shany, Y., The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and Tribunals, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2003 
Shea, M.P., ‘Expanding Judicial Scrutiny of Human Rights in Extradition Cases After Soering’, 
17(1) Yale Journal of International Law 85 (1992), pp. 85-138 
Shelton, D., ‘The Independence of International Tribunals’, in: P. Nikken (ed.), The Modern 
World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas Buergenthal, IIDH/IIHR, San José, 
Costa Rica 1996, pp. 299-334 
Shelton, D., ‘The Legal Status of the Detainees at Guantanamo Bay: Innovative Elements in the 
Decision of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of 12 March 2002’, 23 Human 
Rights Law Journal 13 (2002), pp. 13-14 
Shelton, D. (2004a), ‘Case concerning Avena and other Mexican Nationals’, 98 American Jour-
nal of International Law 559 (2004), pp. 559-566 
 Bibliography 
1145 
Shelton, D. (2004b), ‘The Inter-American Human Rights System’, in: H. Hannum (ed.), Guide to 
International Human Rights Practice, Transnational Press, Ardsley, NY 2004 (4th), pp. 127-
141 
Shelton, D. (2005a), Remedies in International Human Rights Law, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2005 (2nd) 
Shelton, D. (2005b), ‘Discussion’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Mesures conserva-
toires et droits fondamentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 165-176 
Shelton, D. (2006a), ‘Normative Hierarchy in International Law’, 100 American Journal of Inter-
national Law 291 (2006), pp. 291-323 
Shelton, D. (2006b), ‘Subsidiarity and Human Rights’, 27 Human Rights Law Journal 4 (2006), 
pp. 4-11 
Simma, B., The Charter of the United Nations, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1994 
Simma, B., ‘International Human Rights and General International Law: a Comparative Analy-
sis’, IV(2) Collected Courses of the Academy of European Law 1993, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, Dordrecht 1995, pp. 153-236 
Simma, B., ‘Introduction: Fragmentation in a Positive Light’, Symposium: Diversity or Cacoph-
ony?: New Sources of Norms in International Law’, 25(4) Mich. J. Int’l L. 845 (2004), pp. 
845-847 
Sivakumaran, S, ‘Case Comment: Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punish-
ment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro)’, 56(3) 
ICLQ 695 (2007), pp. 695-708 
Slaughter, A.-M., ‘A Typology of Transjudicial Communication’, 29 University of Richmond Law 
Review 99 (1994), pp. 99-135 
Slaughter, A.-M., ‘Judicial Globalization’, 40 Virginia Journal of International Law 1103 (2000), 
pp. 1103-1124 
Slaughter, A.-M., ‘A Global Community of Courts’, 44 Harvard International Law Journal 191 
(2003), pp. 191-219 
Smeulers, A., In Staat van Uitlevering, Intersentia, Antwerpen 2002 
Smeulers, A., J. de Vries, ‘Het Europees aanhoudingsbevel, gerechtvaardigd vertrouwen?’, 28(4) 
NJCM 428 (2003), pp. 428-460 
Sohn, L.B., ‘The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals rather than 
States’, 32 American University Law Review 1 (1982), pp. 1-64 
Sohn, L.B., ‘The Contribution of Latin American Lawyers to the Development of the United 
Nations Concept of Human Rights and Economic and Social Justice’, in: P. Nikken (ed.), The 
Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas Buergenthal, IIDH/IIHR, San 
José, Costa Rica 1996, pp. 33-56 
Sorel, J.-M., ‘Article 31’, in: O. Corten, P. Klein (eds.), Convention de Vienne sur le droit des 
traités – commentaire article par article, Bruylant, Bruxelles 2006, pp. 1289-1338 
Sorel, J.-M., ‘Les multiples lectures d’un arrêt: entre sentiment d’impunité et sentiment de cohé-
rence, une décision à relativiser’, 111 RGDIP 259 (2007), pp. 259-272 
Spielmann, A., D. Spielmann, ‘La cour unique et permanente et les mesures provisoires’, in: P. 
Mahoney et al. (eds.), Protecting Human Rights: the European Perspective, Studies in Mem-
ory of Rolv Ryssdal, Heymanns, Köln 2000, pp. 1346-1358 
Spijkerboer, Th., Case note CAT Gamal El Rgeig v. Switzerland, 22 January 2007, JV 160 
(2007), pp. 660-661 
Spijkerboer, Th., Case note ECtHR Saadi v. Italy, 23 February 2008 (Grand Chamber), 33(7) 
NJCM 1005 (2008), pp. 1005-1017 
Spronken, T., Verdediging, een onderzoek naar de normering van het optreden van advocaten in 
strafzaken, diss. Maastricht, Gouda Quint, Deventer 2001 
Steenbergen, H., T. Zwart, Annotation of ECtHR Cruz Varas et al. v. Sweden, NJCM (1991), pp. 
335 ff. 
 Bibliography 
1146 
Stephens, T., ‘The LaGrand Case (Federal Republic of Germany v United States of America), 
The Right to Information on Consular Assistance under the Vienna Convention on Consular 
Relations: a Right for what Purpose?’, 3 Melbourne Journal of International Law 143 (2002), 
pp. 143-164 
Steyn, J., ‘Guantanamo Bay: the Legal Black Hole’, 53 International and Comparative Law 
Quarterly 1 (2004) pp. 1-15 
Szabó, E., ‘Provisional Measures in the World Court: Binding or Bound to be Ineffective?’, 10 
Leiden Journal of International Law 475 (1997), pp. 475-489 
Sztucki, J., Interim Measures in the Hague Court: an Attempt at a Scrutiny, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, The Hague 1983 
 
T 
Taillant, J.D., R. Picolotti, ‘In the Wake of the Discussions on Reforming the Inter-Aemrican 
Human Rights System. Behind the Scenes at the OAS’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), El Fu-
tura del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos Humanos, Instituto In-
teramericano de Derechos Humanos (IIDH), San José, Costa Rica 1998, pp. 117-134 
Tams, C., ‘Recognizing Guarantees and Assurances of Non-repetition: LaGrand and the Law of 
State Responsibility’, 27 Yale Journal of International Law 441 (2002), pp. 441-444 
Tanaka, Y., ‘Prompt Release in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: Some 
Reflections on the ITLOS Jurisprudence’, Netherlands International Law Review 237 (2004), 
pp. 237-271 
Tanaka, A., Y. Nagamine, The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Ra-
cial Discrimination: A guide for NGOs, Minority Rights Group, London 2000 
Taqi, I., ‘Adjudicating Disappearance Cases in Turkey: an Argument for Adopting the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights’ Approach’, 24 Fordham International Law Journal 940 
(2001), pp. 940-987 
Tatulli, J.R., ‘UN report: Resolving Africa’s Longest Civil War: Updates on the Case Concerning 
Armed Activities in the Democratic Republic of Congo’, 19 New York Law School Journal of 
Human Rights 903 (2003), pp. 903-912 
Terlouw, A., ‘Gepasseerd’, Case note of Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 32(2) NJCM 179 
(2007), pp. 179-194 
Terlouw, A., ‘De zaag in de stoelpoten van het absolute karakter van artikel 3 EVRM’, Case note 
of ECtHR N. v. UK, 27 May 2007, 33(7) NJCM 1034, (2008), pp. 1034-1051 
Thirlway, H., ‘The Indication of Provisional Measures by the International Court of Justice’, in: 
R. Bernhardt (ed.), Interim Measures indicated by International Courts, Springer-Verlag, 
Berlin 1994, pp. 1-36 
Thomassen, W., ‘Het kleine verschil en de grote gevolgen’, 33(7) NJCM 930 (2008), pp. 930-935 
Thompson, J.J., ‘La libertad de Prensa en el Sistema Interamericano’, in: P. Nikken (ed.), The 
Modern World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas Buergenthal, IIDH/IIHR, San 
José, Costa Rica 1996, pp. 231-254 
Thornberry, P., Indigenous Peoples and Human Rights, Manchester University Press, Manchester 
2002 
Tittemore, B.D., ‘Guantanamo Bay and the Precautionary Measures of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights: a Case for International Oversight in the Struggle against Terror-
ism’, 6(2) Human Rights Law Review 378 (2006), pp. 378-402 
Tomuschat, C., ‘Making Individual Communications an Effective to for the Protection of Human 
Rights’, in: U. Beyerlin (ed.), Recht zwischen Umbruch und Bewahrung: Völkerrecht, Eu-
roparecht, Staatsrecht; Festschrift für Rudolf Bernhardt, Springer-Verlag, Heidelberg 1995, 
pp. 615-634 
Tomuschat, C., ‘Individual Reparation Claims in Instances of Grave Human Rights Violations: 
The Position under General International Law’, in: A. Randelzhofer, C. Tomuschat (eds.), 
 Bibliography 
1147 
State Responsibility and the Individual: Reparation in Instances of Grave Violations of Hu-
man Rights, Kluwer Law International, London 1999, pp. 1-25 
Tomuschat, C., Human Rights: Between Idealism and Realism, Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2003 
Toufayan, M., ‘Human Rights Treaty Interpretation: a Postmodern Account of its Claim to ‘Spe-
ciality’’, 2 NYU Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper 2005 
Toufayan, M., ‘The World Court’s Distress when Facing Genocide: a Critical Commentary on the 
Application of the Genocide Convention Case (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia (Ser-
bia and Montenegro))’, 40 Tex. Int’l L. J. 233 (2005), pp. 233-261 
Treves, T., ‘Conflicts between the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and the Interna-
tional Court of Justice’, 31 International Law and Politics 809 (1999), pp. 809-831 
Tridimas, T., The General Principles of EC Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford 1999 
Trouwborst, A., Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law, Klu-
wer Law International, the Hague/London/New York 2002 
Tushnet, M., L. Yackle, ‘Symbolic Statutes and Real Laws: the Pathologies of the Antiterrorism 
and Effective Death Penalty Act and the Prison Litigation Reform Act’, 47 Duke Law Journal 
1 (1997), pp. 1-86 
 
U 
Udombana, N.J., ‘Toward the African Court on Human Rights and Peoples’ Rights: Better Late 
Than Never’, 3 Yale Human Rights and Development L.J. 45 (2000), pp. 45-50 
Udombana, N.J., ‘Can the Leopard Change its Spots? The African Union Treaty and Human 
Rights’, 17(6) American University International Law Review 1177 (2002), pp. 1177-1261 
Udombana, N.J. (2003a), ‘So far, so far: The local Remedies Rule in the Jurisprudence of the 
African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights’, 91(1) The American Journal of Inter-
national Law 1 (2003), pp. 1-37 
Udombana, N.J. (2003b), ‘Interim Measures: a Comparative Study of Selected International 
Institutions’, 43 Indian Journal of International Law 479 (2003), pp. 479-532 
Umozurike, U.O., The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Martinus Nijhoff Publish-
ers, The Hague 1997 
Umozurike, U.O., ‘The Complaint Procedure of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’, in: G. Alfredsson, J. Grimheden, B.G. Ramcharan, A. de Zayas (eds.), International 
Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms: Essays in Honour of Jakob Th. Möller, Martinus Ni-
jhoff Publishers, The Hague [etc.] 2001, pp. 707-712 
 
V 
Van Alebeek, R. The Immunity of States and their Officials in the Light of International Criminal 
Law and International Human Rights Law, E.M. Meijers Institute of Legal Studies, Leiden 
University 2006 
Van Boven, Th.C., People Matter, Views on International Human Rights Policy, collected and 
introduced by Hans Thoolen, Meulenhoff, Amsterdam 1982 
Van Boven, Th.C., ‘Facing Urgent Human Rights Cases; Legal and Diplomatic Action’, in: R. 
Lawson, M. de Blois (eds.), The Dynamics of the Protection of Human Rights in Europe. Es-
says in Honour of Henry G. Schermers, (Vol. 3), Nijhoff, Dordrecht 1994, pp. 61-78 
Van Boven, Th.C., The Protection of Human Rights in Europe, Collected Courses of the Academy 
of European Law, Vol. IV(2) 1993, Nijhoff, The Hague 1995 
Van Boven, Th.C., Rapporteur, Study concerning the Right to Restitution, Compensation, and 
Rehabilitation for Victims of Gross Violations of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
Final Report, E/CN.4/sub.2/1993/8, 2 July 1993; revised version E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/17, 24 
May 1996 and E/CN.4/1997/104, 16 January 1997 
 Bibliography 
1148 
Van Boven, Th.C., ‘Prevention, Early-Warning and Urgent Procedures: A New approach by the 
Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination’, in: E. Denter, N. Schrijver (eds.), 
Reflections on International Law from the Low Countries, in Honour of Paul de Waart, Klu-
wer Law International, The Hague 1998, pp. 165-182 
Van Boven, Th.C., ‘Rendering Justice to Victims: A Case for Reparations’, in: W.J M. van 
Genugten et al. (eds.), Realism and Moralism in International Relations, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, The Hague 1999, pp. 197-211 
Van Boven, Th.C. (2000a), ‘The Petition System under the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, A Sobering Balance-Sheet’, in: J.A. 
Frowein, R. Wolfrum (eds.), Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law, Kluwer Law In-
ternational, The Hague 2000, pp. 271-287 
Van Boven, Th.C. (2000b), ‘‘Political’ and ‘Legal’ Control Mechanisms: Their Competition and 
Coexistence’, in: F. Coomans et al. (eds.), Human Rights from Exclusion to Inclusion; Princi-
ples and Practice, An Anthology from the Work of Theo van Boven, Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, The Hague 2000, pp. 49-72  
Van Boven, Th.C. (2001a), ‘CERD and Article 14; The Unfulfilled Promise’, in: G. Alfredsson et 
al. (eds.), International Human Rights Monitoring Mechanisms, Kluwer Law International, 
The Hague 2001, pp. 153-166 
Van Boven, Th.C. (2001b), ‘Reparations; a Requirement of Justice’, in: Corte Interamericana de 
Derechos Humanos, El Sistema Interamericano de Protección de los Derechos Humanos en 
el Umbral de los Siglo xxi, Corte Interamericana des Derechos Humanos, San José, Costa Ri-
ca 2001, pp. 653-670 
Van Boven, Th.C., ‘La preambule dans la Convention de la Saufegarde de Droits de l’Homme 
Europeenne’, in: J.E. Pettiti, E. Decaux, P.-H. Imbert (eds.), La Convention Europeenne des 
Droits de l‘Homme, Commentaire article par article, Economic, Paris 1995 (2nd ed. 2002), 
pp. 125-134, also published in: F. Coomans et al. (eds.), Human Rights from Exclusion to In-
clusion; Principles and Practice, An Anthology from the Work of Theo van Boven, Kluwer 
Law International, The Hague 2000, pp. 401-411 
Van Boven, Th.C., ‘Agiza t. Zweden, Het Anti-Foltercomité scherpt het non-refoulement beginsel 
aan’, 31(5) NJCM 746 (2006), pp. 746-758 
Van Boven, Th.C., ‘Reparative justice – Focus on victims’, SIM lecture 2007, 25(4) Netherlands 
Quarterly of Human Rights 723 (2007), pp. 723-735 
Van Boven, Th.C., C. Flinterman, F. Grünfeld, I. Westendorp (eds.), Seminar on the Right to 
Restitution, Compensation and Rehabilitation for Victims of gross Violations of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Maastricht, 11-15 March 1992, SIM Special No. 12 
Van Boven, Th.C., C. Flinterman, E. Rieter (1999), ‘Nederland wil asielzoeker uitzetten in strijd 
met een interim maatregel van het VN-Comité tegen Folteringen’, 20 Nederlands Juristen-
blad 908 (1999), pp. 908-909 
Van Boven, Th.C., E. Rieter (2000), ‘Nederland, het Internationale Gerechtshof en de doodstraf’, 
39 Nederlands Juristenblad 1921 (2000), pp. 1921-1922 
Vande Lanotte, J., Y. Haeck, Handboek Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens, deel 1, 
algemene beginselen, Intersentia, Oxford 2005 
Vandenhole, W., The Procedures before the UN Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Divergence or 
Convergence?, Intersentia, Antwerp 2004 
Van den Wyngaert, Ch., ‘Applying the European Convention on Human Rights to Extradition: 
Ppening Pandora’s Box?’, 39 ICLQ 757 (1990), pp. 757-779 
Van der Mei, A.-P. (2005a), ‘The New African Court on Human and Peoples’ Rights: Towards an 
Effective Human Rights Protection Mechanism for Africa?’, 18 Leiden Journal of Interna-
tional Law 113 (2005), pp. 113-129 
Van der Mei, A.-P. (2005b), ‘The Advisory Jurisdiction of the African Court on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights’, 5(1) African Human Rights Law Journal 27 (2005), pp. 27-46 
 Bibliography 
1149 
Van der Velde, J., Grenzen aan het toezicht op de naleving van het EVRM, Stichting NJCM-
Boekerij, Leiden 1997 
Van der Velde, J., ‘Positieve verplichtingen’, in: A.W. Heringa, J.G.C. Schokkenbroek, J. van der 
Velde (eds.), EVRM Rechtspraak en Commentaar, Koninklijke Vermande, The Hague 2002, 
pp. 1-22 
Van der Wilt, H., ‘Après Soering: the Relationship between Extradition and Human Rights in the 
Legal Practices of the Netherlands, Germany and the United States’, XLII (1) NILR 53 
(1995), pp. 53-80 
Van Dijk, P., F. van Hoof, A. van Rijn, L. Zwaak (eds.), Theory and Practice of the European 
Convention on Human Rights, Intersentia, Antwerpen/Oxford 2006 (4th) 
Van Emmerik, M., Schadevergoeding bij schending van mensenrechten, De rechtspraktijk onder 
het EVRM vergeleken met die in Nederland, diss. Leiden, Leiden 1997 
Van Kempen, P.H.P.H.M.C., Heropening van procedures na veroordelingen door het EHRM. 
Over redres van schendingen van het EVRM in afgesloten strafzaken alsook afgesloten civiele 
en bestuurszaken, Wolf Legal Publishers, Nijmegen 2003 
Ventura Robles, M.E., La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, San José, Charla dictada 
el 20 de junio de 2001, en el XIX Curso Interdisciplinario en Derechos Humanos del Instituto 
Interamericano de Derechos Humanos 
Verdross, A., B. Simma, Universelles Völkerrecht, Tehorie under Praxis, Duncker & Humblot, 
Berlin 1984 (3rd) 
Verhey, L.F.M., ‘Implementatie van het EVRM door de wetgever’, in: A.W. Heringa, E. Myjer 
(eds.), 45 jaar EVRM 1950-1995, Speciaal nummer NJCM-Bulletin 21(1), Leiden 1996, pp. 
103-116 
Vermeer-Künzli, A., ‘As If: the Legal Fiction in Diplomatic Protection’, 18(1) European Journal 
of International Law 37 (2007), pp. 37-68 
Vermeulen, B.P., Case note ECtHR Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, JV 30 (2007), 
pp. 319-323 
Vermeulen, B.P., K.M. de Vries, Case note ECtHR (Grand Chamber) Mamatkulov and Askarov v. 
Turkey, 4 February 2005, JV (2005), p. 89  
Viljoen, F., E. Baimu, ‘Courts for Africa: Considering the Coexistence of the African Court on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights and the African Court of Justice’, 22(2) Netherlands Quarterly of 
Human Rights 241 (2004), pp. 241-267 
Viljoen, F., L. Louw, ‘The Status of the Findings of the African Commission: From Moral Per-
suasion to Legal Obligation’, 48 Journal of African Law 1 (2004), pp. 1-22 
Vivanco, J.M., ‘Fortalecer o reformar el Sistema Interamericano’, in: J.E. Mendez, F. Cox (eds.), 
El Futura del Sistema Interamericano de Protección de Los Derechos Humanos, IIDH San 
José, Costa Rica 1998, pp. 51-72 
Vlemminx, F.M.C. (2002a), Een nieuw profiel van de grondrechten: een analyse van de presta-
tieplichten ingevolge klassieke en sociale grondrechten, Boom Juridische uitgevers, Den 
Haag 2002 (3rd Rev.) 
Vlemminx, F.M.C. (2002b), ‘De autonome rechtstreekse werking van het EVRM; De Belgische 
en Nederlandse rechtspraak over verzekeringsplichten ingevolge het EVRM – Preadvies uit-
gebracht voor de Nederlandse Vereniging Voor Rechtsvergelijking op 19 december 2002 te 
Maastricht’, 62 Geschriften van de Nederlandse Vereniging voor Rechtsvergelĳking 1 (2002), 
pp. 1-120 
Volio Jiménez, F., ‘La Protección de los Derechos Humanos’, in: P. Nikken (ed.), The Modern 
World of Human Rights: Essays in Honour of Thomas Buergenthal, IIDH/IIHR, San José, 
Costa Rica 1996, pp. 287-298 
Vos, E., G. van Calster (eds.), Risico en voorzorg in de rechtsmaatschappij, Intersentia, Antwer-
pen 2004 
 Bibliography 
1150 
W 
Warbrick, C., ‘Interim Protection from Genocide’, 52 Cambridge Law Journal 367 (1993), pp. 
367-371 
Weckel, Ph., ‘Les measures conservatoires devant les jurisdictions internationals de caractère 
universel’, in: G. Cohen-Jonathan, J.-F. Flauss (eds.), Mesures conservatoires et droits fon-
damentaux, Bruyant, Bruxelles 2005, pp. 33-53 
Weckel, Ph., ‘L’arrêt sur le Génocide: le souffle de l’avis de 1951 n’a pas transporté la Cour’, 111 
RGDIP 305 (2007), pp. 305-331 
Weiser, I., ‘Undressing the window: Treating International Human Rights Law meaningfully in 
the Canadian Commonwealth System’, 37 U.B.C. Law Review 113 (2004), pp. 1-34 
Welch, C.E., Protecting Human Rights in Africa: Roles and Strategies of Non-Governmental 
Organizations, University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 1995 
Wellens, K., ‘Diversity in Secondary Rules and the Unity of International Law: Some Reflections 
on Current Trends’, 25 Netherlands Yearbook of International Law 3 (1994), pp. 3-37 
Wellens, K. (1998a) (ed.), International Law: Theory and Practice; Essays in Honour of Eric 
Suy, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 1998 
Wellens, K. (1998b), ‘Reflections on some Recent Incidental Proceedings before the International 
Court of Justice’, in: E. Denters, N. Schrijver (eds.), Reflections on International Law from 
the Low Countries in Honour of Paul de Waart, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, The Hague 
1998, pp. 417-441 
Wellens, K., Remedies against International Organisations, Cambridge University Press, Cam-
bridge 2002 
Wellens, K., R. Huesa-Vinaixa, L’influence des sources sur l’unité et la fragmentation du droit 
international, Bruylant, Brussels 2006 
Westendorp, I., Women and Housing: Gender makes a Difference, diss., Intersentia, Antwerp 
2007 
Wibisana, M.R.A.G., Law and Economic Analysis of the Precautionary Principle, diss., Maas-
tricht 2008 
Wiebalck, A., ‘Genocide in Bosnia and Herzegovina? Exploring the Parameters of Interim Meas-
ures of Protection at the ICJ’, 28(1) Comparative and International Law Journal of Southern 
Africa 83 (1995), pp. 83-106 
Wijnakker, C., ‘NJCM-Commentaar op de regelgeving over het toedienen van dwangvoeding, 
Duidelijke regelgeving met betrekking tot het toedienen van dwangvoeding aan gedetineerden 
broodnodig’, 31(3) NJCM 434 (2006), pp. 434-449 
Willems, J., Wie zal de opvoeders opvoeden? Kindermishandeling en het recht van het kind op 
persoonswording, diss. Maastricht, T.M.C. Asser Press, Den Haag 1998 
Wilson, R.J., ‘Researching the Jurisprudence of the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights: a legislator’s perspective’, 10 American University International Journal of Law and 
Policy 1 (1994-1995), pp. 1-18 (in 1997 this Journal was renamed American University Inter-
national Law Review), for the text see also <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/ 
commissn.htm> (accessed 26 July 2005) 
Wilson, R.J., ‘Defying Worl Law in the Angel Breard Case, State Department Dishonored Our 
Treaty Obligations’, Legal Times of Washington (27 April 1998) 
Wilson, R.J., ‘The Index of Individual Case Reports of the Inter-American Commission on Hu-
man Rights: 1994-1999’, 16 American University International Law Review 353 (2001), pp. 
353-647 
Wiseberg, L., ‘Protecting Human Rights Activists and NGOs: what more can be done?’, 13(4) 
Human Rights Quarterly 525 (1991), pp. 525-544 
Woltjer, A., Case note ECtHR Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, EHRC 36 (2007), pp. 
362-363 
Woltjer, A, Case note ECtHR Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, 10 August 2006, EHRC (2006), p. 128
 1151 
Y 
Yang, Q., ‘Thou shalt not violate provisional measures’, 60 Cambridge Law Journal 441 (2001) 
pp. 441-446 
Yoo, J.C., J.C. Ho, ‘The Status of Terrorists’, 44 Virginia Journal of International Law 207 
(2003), pp. 207-228 
Young, K., ‘UNHCR and ICRC in the Former Yugoslavia: Bosnia-Herzegovina’, 83(843) IRRC 
781 (2001), pp. 781-805 
Young, K., The Law and Process of the U.N. Human Rights Committee, Transnational Publishers 
Arsdley NY 2002 
Young, L., ‘Setting Sail with the Charming Betsy: Enforcing the International Court of Justice’s 
Avena Judgment in Federal habeas corpus Proceedings’, 89 Minnesota Law Review 890, 
(2005) pp. 890-915 
 
Z 
Zeleza, P.T., P.J. McConnaughay, Human Rights, the Rule of Law, and Development in Africa, 
University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia 2004 
Ziemele, I. (ed.), Reservations to Human Rights Treaties and the Vienna Convention Regime: 
Conflict, Harmony or Reconciliation, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Boston/Leiden 2004 
Zwaak, L., International Human Rights Procedures: Petitioning the ECHR, CCPR and CERD, 
Ars Aequi Libri, Nijmegen 1991 
Zwaak, L., ‘The Role of the Council of Europe and its Committee of Ministers, Analysing the 
Efficiency of Measures taken under Article 46(2) of the ECHR’, in: I. Boerefijn, J. Gold-
schmidt (eds.), Changing Perceptions of Sovereignty and Human Rights, Essays in Honour of 
Cees Flinterman, Intersentia, Antwerp 2008, pp. 355-380 
Zwart, T. (1985a), ‘Aan de Amerikanen overgeleverd; uitlevering, ECRM en voorlopige maatre-
gelen’, 10(7) NJCM 562 (1985), pp. 562-571 
Zwart, T (1985b), ‘Onrechtmatige eigenwijsheid’, 10(1) NJCM 65 (1985), pp. 65-71 
Zwart, T., The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions, dissertation Leiden, Nijhoff, Dordrecht 
1994 
Zyberi, G., The Humanitarian Face of the International Court of Justice, Its Contribution to 
Interpreting and Developing International Human Rights and Humanitarian Law Rules and 
Principles, Intersentia, Antwerp/Oxford/Portland 2008 
 
 

 1153 
  
  
 TABLE OF CASES 
1 PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE (PCIJ) 
Orders granting or denying provisional measures 
Sino-Belgian treaty case, Denunciation of the Treaty of 2 November 1865 between China and Belgium, 
Order of 8 January 1927...................................... 9, 14, 19, 22, 23, 46, 47, 52, 61, 79, 589, 594 
Chorzów Factory (Indemnities) (Germany v. Poland), Order of 21 November 1927 (denied).. 43, 44, 52 
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of 19 August 1929............................... 49, 88 
Legal Status of the South-Eastern Territory of Greenland (Norway v. Denmark;  
 Denmark v. Norway), Order of 3 August 1932 (denied)............................................... 11, 14, 50 
Administration of the Prince von Pless (Germany v. Poland), Order of 11 May 1933 (denied)............ 61 
Polish Agrarian Reform and the German Minority (Germany v. Poland),  
 Order of 29 July 1933 (denied)................................................................................................. 83 
Electricity Company of Sofia and Bulgaria (Belgium v. Bulgaria), Order of 5 December 1939 ... 14, 16, 
47, 89, 90, 927, 933 
 
Judgments 
Mavrommatis Concessions Cases, Judgment of 30 August 1924 .......................................................... 22 
 
Advisory Opinions 
Minority schools in Albania, Advisory Opinion of 6 April 1935......................................................... 509 
2 INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (ICJ) 
Orders granting or denying provisional measures 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co. (UK v. Iran), Order of 5 July 1951 ..................................... 14, 57, 61-64, 74, 731 
Interhandel case (Switzerland v. US), Order of 24 October 1957 (denied)................................ 62, 75, 76 
Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland) & (FRG v. Iceland), Orders of 17 August 1972 ........  10, 14-16, 
27, 40, 43, 46, 63-65, 91 
Nuclear Tests cases (Australia v. France) & (New Zealand v. France), Orders of 22 June 1973 ........ 20, 
43, 47, 52, 62-64, 79, 99, 535, 536, 540, 707, 720, 789, 930, 932, 1083, 1094, 1102 
Trial of Pakistani Prisoners of War (Pakistan v. India), Order of 13 July 1973 (denied) ..................... 76 
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Order of 11 September 1976 (denied) . 16, 19, 50, 52, 
63, 65, 80, 81 
US Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Hostages case) (US v. Iran), Order of 15 December 1979
.................................... xii, 9, 10, 15, 23-27, 36-38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 52, 53, 56, 63, 64, 81, 80, 99, 
 329, 541, 1083, 1114 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), Order of  
 10 May 1984................................................................................7, 11, 17, 37, 45, 52, 63, 64, 87 
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Mali), Order of 10 January 1986 ......................7, 10, 15, 18, 19, 26, 27, 
 37, 40, 47, 91, 95 
Arbitral Award of 31 July 1989 (Guinea-Bissau v. Senegal),  
 Order of 2 March 1990 (denied) ........................................................................16, 38, 40, 50, 64 
 Table of Cases 
1154 
Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Order of 29 July 1991 (denied) ... xvii, 9, 15, 39, 
40, 42, 44, 45, 51, 58, 64, 65, 75, 76, 80-83, 596 
Questions of Interpretation and Application of the 1971 Montreal Convention arising from the Aerial 
Incident at Lockerbie (Libya v. UK) & (Libya v. US),  
 Orders of 14 April 1992 (denied) .............................................................................. 9, 17-19, 58 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of  
 Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Orders of 8 April and 13 September 1993 .....  
xxx, 6, 7, 9, 10, 17, 29, 37, 40, 44, 53, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, ,78, 87-88, 90,-91-, 95-97, 9, 881 
Request for an examination of the situation in Accordance with Paragraph 61 of the Court’s Judgment 
of 20 December 1974 in the Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France) case, Order of 22 
September 1995 (denied).............................................................................................. 57, 79, 85 
Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria),  
 Order of 15 March 1996 ................................................ 7, 11, 18, 26, 27, 37, 41, 48, 64, 92, 597 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations/Breard (Paraguay v. US), Order of 9 April 1998 ......... 9, 11, 
31, 32, 45, 53, 55, 59, 89-94, 213, 589 
Legality of the use of force (Serbia and Montenegro v. Belgium & US/Canada/France/Germany/Italy/ 
Netherlands/Portugal), Orders of 2 June 1999 (denied) ..................................................... 11, 64 
LaGrand (Germany v. US), Order of 3 March 1999................................................xi, xii, xxi, 6, 7, 9-11, 
31-33, 45, 49, 53-55, 58, 59, 66, 87-90, 92-94, 97, 99, 
122, 189, 199, 213, 240, 589, 6329, 881, 918-920, 923-925, 981, 1011, 1083, 1105 
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Congo v. Uganda), Order of 1 July 2000............ xii, 11, 
18, 26, 29, 37, 38, 45, 78, 91, 97, 98, 305, 328, 734, 735 
Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (Congo v. Rwanda), Order of 10 July 2002 (denied) ... 11, 
19, 49, 50, 56, 65-70, 197, 747 
Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. US), Order of 5 February 2003.........................xii, 9-11, 
31-36, 45, 53, 55, 56, 59, 74, 77, 90, 92, 95, 96, 98, 100, 122, 124, 213, 241, 632, 791, 1084 
Certain criminal proceedings in France (Congo v. France), Order of 18 July 2003 (denied).. 11, 16, 18, 
45, 64, 70, 71 
Case concerning Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Orders of 13 July 2006  
 and 23 January 2007 (denied)......................................................... 11, 19-21, 50, 52, 75-76, 791 
Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and other 
Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), Order for provisional measures of 16 July 2008.............. 31, 
34-36, 55, 59, 73, 91, 94, 122, 135, 213, 241, 629, 1084 
Case concerning the application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russia), Order of 15 October 2008 ..................... 10, 30, 133 
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Order of  
28 May 2009 (denied).................................................... 41, 55, 81, 88, 101, 558, 589, 700, 1073 
 
Judgments 
Corfu Channel (UK v. Albania), 9 April 1949............................................................................. 808, 872 
Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., Judgment on preliminary objections of 22 July 1952 ........ 14, 57, 61-64, 74, 731 
Nottebohm (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala) 2nd phase, 6 April 1955....................................................... 517 
Arbitration Judgment of the King of Spain of 1906 (Honduras v. Nicaragua), Judgment of 18 
November 1960 ...................................................................................................................... 100 
The North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Germany v. Denmark) and (Germany v. the Netherlands),  
20 February 1969.................................................................................................................... 921 
Nuclear Test Cases (New Zealand v. France and Australia v. France), 20 December 1974.... 20, 43, 47, 
52, 57, 62-64, 80, 86, 100, 101, 537, 726, 789, 933, 934, 1083, 1094, 1102 
Border and Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), 20 December 1988..................... 932 
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (Hostages case) (U.S. v. Iran),  
 24 May 1980.............................................xii, 9, 10, 15, 23-27, 36-38, 40, 41, 43, 44, 52, 53, 56, 
 63, 64, 81, 80, 99, 329, 541, 1083, 1114 
 Table of Cases 
1155 
Military and paramilitary activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US), 26 November 1984 
(jurisdiction and admissibility) ................................................................................................. 17 
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. US),  
 27 June 1986 ...................................................................................................................... 87, 95 
Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros (Hungary v. Slovakia), 25 September 1997.....................75, 76, 85, 87, 657, 791 
LaGrand (Germany v. United States), 27 June 2001 .............xi, xii, xxi, 6, 7, 9-11, 31-33, 45, 49, 53-55, 
 58, 59, 66, 87-90, 92-94, 97, 99, 122, 189, 199, 213, 240, 
589, 632, 881, 918-920, 923-925, 981, 1011, 1083, 1105 
Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. US), 31 March 2004..................xii, 9-11, 31-36, 45, 53, 
55, 56, 59, 74, 77, 92, 95, 96, 100, 124, 213, 241, 632, 793, 1084 
Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (DRC v. Uganda),  
 Judgment of 19 December 2005 ........................................ 29, 30, 37, 38, 78, 90, 91, 96, 97, 99, 
305, 328, 734-735, 1083 
Armed activities on the territory of the Congo (DRC v. Rwanda), 
 3 February 2006 (Jurisdiction).......................................................................................... 37, 200 
Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia  
 and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 26 February 2007 .............xxx, 6, 7, 9, 10, 17, 29, 
37, 40, 44, 53, 57, 58, 60, 63, 64, 78, 87-88, 90, 91, 95-97, 99, 881 
Request for interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the case concerning Avena and  
 other Mexican nationals (Mexico v. US), 19 January 2009 .............31, 34-36, 55, 59, 73, 91, 94, 
122, 135, 213, 241, 629, 1084 
 
Advisory Opinions 
Competence of the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United Nations,  
 3 March 1950.......................................................................................................................... 197 
Conditions of admission of a State to membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter),  
 28 May 1958........................................................................................................................... 199 
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West 
Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 26 January 1971 ...... 194, 401 
Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 20 July 1962 ........................................................................ 887 
Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons (request by General Assembly),  
 8 July 1996 Nuclear weapons advice................................................................................ 20, 711 
Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territory, 9 July 2004 . 203 
 
Order in the context of a request for an Advisory Opinion 
Applicability of the obligation to arbitrate under section 21 of the UN Headquarters Agreement of  
 26 June 1947, Order of 9 March 1988........................................................................................ 6 
3 INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL ON THE LAW OF THE SEA (ITLOS) 
Orders granting or denying provisional measures 
M/V ‘Saiga’ case (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Order of 11 March 1998........... 7, 12, 18, 
28, 38-41, 56, 57, 72, 76, 82, 83 
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999 ..................... 8, 13, 21, 
73, 74, 76, 77, 82, 86, 791, 863, 872 
The MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order of 3 December 2001...............8, 21, 46, 72, 73, 77, 82, 195 
MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Suspension of proceedings on jurisdiction and merits  
 and request for further provisional measures, 24 June 2003 ............8, 21, 46, 72, 73, 77, 82, 195 
Case concerning Land Reclamation by Singapore in and around the Straits of Johor (Malaysia v. 
Singapore), Order of 8 October 2003 ......................................................................................... 8 
 
 Table of Cases 
1156 
Judgments 
M/V ‘Saiga’ case (St. Vincent and the Grenadines v. Guinea), Judgment of 4 December 1997....... 8, 21, 
46, 72, 73, 77, 82, 195 
4 ARBITRAL TRIBUNAL UNDER UNCLOS 
 Arbitral Tribunal constituted pursuant to Article 287, and Article 1 of Annex VII, of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea for the dispute concerning the MOX Plant, 
international movement of radioactive materials, and the protection of the marine environment 
of the Irish Sea, The MOX Plant case (Ireland v. UK), Order No. 3, suspension of proceedings 
on jurisdiction and merits and request for further provisional measures, 24 June 2003............ 74 
5 CEDAW 
A.T. v. Hungary, 26 January 2005, 2/2003 ..................... 70, 132, 135, 138, 142, 431, 433, 443, 592, 595 
General Recommendation 19 on violence against women, 29 January 1992....................................... 433 
6 CERD 
Lacko v. Slovakia, 9 August 2001, CERD/C/59/D/11/1998 ................................................................ 770 
7 COMMITTEE AGAINST TORTURE (CAT) 
Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, CAT/C/12/D/13/1993.......................................................... 137 
B. M’B. v. Tunisia, 5 May 1994 (inadm.), CAT/C/14/D/14/1994.................132, 411, 433, 626, 754, 754 
Tahir Hussain Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, CAT/C/13/D/15/1994 ...................................... 828 
Ismail Alan v. Switzerland, 8 May 1996, CAT/C/16/D/21/1995 ......................................................... 818 
Mr. Kaveh Yaragh Tala v. Sweden, 15 November 1996, CAT/C/17/D/43/1996 ................................. 818 
X, Y and Z v. Sweden, 6 May 1998, CAT/C/20/D/61/1996.................................................................. 138 
I. A. O. v. Sweden, 6 May 1998 (inadm.), CAT/C/20/D/65/1997 ........................................................ 819 
Cecilia Rosana Núñez Chipana v. Venezuela, 10 November 1998, CAT/C/21/D/110/1998 ............... 903 
P. S. S. v. Canada, 13 November 1998, CAT/C/21/D/66/1997 ........................................................... 137 
Avedes Hamayak Korban v. Sweden, 16 November 1998, CAT/C/21/D/88/1997............................... 303 
Josu Arkauz Arana v. France, 9 November 1999, CAT/C/23/D/63/1997 ........................................... 768 
T.P.S. v. Canada, 16 May 2000, CAT/C/24/D/1999/1997 ....... 828, 903, 904, 911, 982, 988, 1010, 1012 
S.L. v. Sweden, 11 May 2001, CAT/C/26/D/150/1999 ........................................................................ 817 
S. and S.A. v. the Netherlands, 11 May 2001, CAT/C/26/D/142/1999 ................................................ 821 
B.S. v. Canada, 14 November 2001, CAT/C/27/D/166/2000 .............................................................. 292 
Dzemajl et al v. Yugoslavia, 21 November 2002, CAT/C/29/D/161/2000........................... 443, 520, 714 
J.A.G.V. v. Sweden, 11 November 2003, CAT/C/31/D/215/2002........................................................ 138 
T.M. v. Sweden, 18 November 2003, CAT/C/31/D/228/2003.............................................................. 290 
Z.T. v. Australia, 19 November 2003, CAT/C/31/D/153/2000 ............................................................ 138 
Hanan Attia v. Sweden, 17 November 2003, CAT/C/31/D/199/2002.................................................. 836 
A.R. v. The Netherlands, 21 November 2003, CAT/C/31/D/203/2002 ................................................ 821 
S.S v. The Netherlands, 5 May 2003, CAT/C/30/D/191/2001 ............................................................. 303 
M.A.K. v. Germany, 12 May 2004, CAT/C/32/D/214/2002..........................................140, 817, 822, 839 
Luis Jacinto Rocha Chorlango v. Sweden, 22 November 2004, CAT/C/33/D/218/2002..................... 303 
Mafhoud Brada v. France, 17 May 2005, CAT/C/34/D/195/2002 ......................772, 773, 904, 905, 988, 
1010, 1013, 1035, 1055 
Ahmed Hussein Mustafa Kamil Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, CAT/C/34/D/233/2003 .......... 266, 633, 
 819, 836, 837, 903-905, 983, 1035 
R.T. v. Switzerland, 24 November 2005 (inadm.), CAT/C/35/D/242/2003 ................................. 140, 980 
Iratxe Sorzábal Díaz v. France, 3 May 2005, CAT/C/34/D/194/2001 ................................................ 768 
 Table of Cases 
1157 
Suleymane Guengueng et al. v. Senegal, 17 May 2006, CAT/C/36/D/181/2001......... 132, 141, 554-558, 
1072, 1073 
S.P.A. v. Canada, 7 November 2006, CAT/C/37/D/282/2005............................................................. 821 
I.A.O. v. Sweden, 15 November 2006, CAT/C/37/D/280/2005 ........................................................... 819 
Gamal El Rgeig v. Switzerland, 15 November 2006, CAT/C/37/D/280/2005 ............................. 301, 822 
C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, 17 November 2006, CAT/C/37/D/279/2005 .............................................. 818 
V.L. v. Switzerland, 20 November 2006, CAT/C/37/D/262/2005...................................... 139, 818, 1147 
E.R.K and Y.K. v. Sweden, 30 April 2007, CAT/C/38/D/270&272/2005 ............................................ 820 
A.R.A. v. Switzerland, 30 April 2007, CAT/C/38/D/305/2006............................................................. 784 
Elif Pelit v. Azerbaijan, 1 May 2007, CAT/C/38/D/281/2005.....................266, 267, 836, 837, 904, 905, 
1035, 1056 
Adel Tebourski v. France, 1 May 2007, CAT/C/38/D/300/2006 ..............266, 772, 905, 988, 1013, 1035 
Nadeem Ahmad Dar v. Norway, 11 May 2007, CAT/C/38/D/249/2004..............268, 768, 905, 953, 983, 
984, 1035, 1036, 1055 
C.A.R.M. v. Canada, 18 May 2007, CAT/C/38/D/298/2006 ....................................................... 817, 836 
L.Z.B. and her daughter J.F.Z. v. Canada, 8 November 2007 (inadm.), CAT/C/39/D/304/2006........ 768 
K.A. v. Sweden, 16 November 2007 (inadm.), CAT/C/39/D/308/2006................................................ 820 
Bachan Singh Sogi v. Canada, 16 November 2007, CAT/C/39/D/297/2006....................... 268, 907, 989 
T.A. v. Sweden, 22 November 2007, CAT/C/39/D/303/2006 .............................................................. 820 
M.X. v. Switzerland, 7 May 2008, CAT/C/40/D/311/2007 .................................................................. 820 
Z.K. v. Sweden, 9 May 2008, CAT/C/40/D/301/2006.......................................................................... 820 
R.K. et al. v. Sweden, 16 May 2008, CAT/C/40/D/309/2006............................................................... 820 
 
CAT discontinued case 
J.R. v. the Netherlands, 124/1998, 19 November 1999 (disc.)........................................................... 1021 
 
CAT General Comments 
General Comment 1, Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the context of Article 22,  
 21 November 1997 ..........................................................................................134, 266, 303, 818 
General Comment 2 on Implementation of Article 2 by States Parties, 23 November 2007...............  134  
8 HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (HRC) 
 Those situations, uncovered during the research for this book, in which the HRC used 
provisional measures but did not mention this in its View or inadmissibility decision, are 
indicated by an asterisk: *, followed by the date(s) of the provisional measure. 
 
[Category I]1 
O.E. v. S., 25 January 1978, 22/1977, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 5 (1984); 26 July 1978,  
 CCPR/C/OP/1 at 6........................................... 113, 126, 129, 133, 269, 284, 785, 824, 954, 955 
M.A. v. S., 24 April 1979, com. no. 20/1977, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 5 and 20 .................................... 313, 341 
Moriana Hernandez Valentini de Bazzano (on her own behalf, as well as on behalf of her husband,  
 her stepfather and her mother) v. Uruguay, 15 August 1979 (seventh session), 
CCPR/C/7/D/5/1977........................................................................................122, 341, 345, 374 
Pietraroia v. Uruguay, 27 March 1981, CCPR/C/12/D/44/1979................................................. 341, 673 
Aumeeruddy-Czieffra et al. v. Mauritius, 9 April 1981, CCPR/C/12/D/35/1978................................. 285 
Sergio Ruben Lopez Burgos (submitted by his wife Delia Saldias de Lopez) v. Uruguay,  
 29 July 1981, CCPR/C/13/D/52/1979............................................................................. 404, 438 
Lilian Celiberti de Casariego v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981, CCPR/C/13/D/56/1979 .............. 402, 436, 734 
                                                 
1 See Chapter II (Systems), section 2.4.6 on the categories of HRC decisions. 
 Table of Cases 
1158 
Raul Sendic Antonaccio (submitted by his wife Violeta Setelich) v. Uruguay,  
28 October 1981, CCPR/C/14/D/63/1979 ............................. 311, 340, 346, 785, 899, 959, 1023 
Altesor v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982, CCPR/C/15/D/10/1977...............................113, 339, 340, 343, 669 
Bleier v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982, CCPR/C/15/D/30/1978 ............................................... 321, 809, 872 
Guerrero v. Colombia, 31 March 1982, CCPR/C/15/D/45/1979...........................10, 317, 408, 411, 444, 
531, 601, 614, 965 
Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay, 1 April 1982, CCPR/C/15/D/73/1981 (See also Rule 91 of  
 24 October 1980, CCPR/C/OP/1, p. 7) ....................................................313, 346, 347, 441, 673 
Dermit Barbato (submitted by Mr. Gilmet Dermit on behalf of his cousins) v. Uruguay,  
21 October 1982, CCPR/C/17/D/84/1981 ...................................................................... 319, 445 
E.H.P. v. Canada, 27 October 1982 (inadm.), CCPR/C/17/D/67/1980 ............................................... 541 
Dave Marais v. Madagascar, 24 March 1984, CCPR/C/18/D/49/1979.......115, 313, 321, 343, 344, 348, 
388, 440, 901 
Daniel Monguya Mbenge v. Zaire, 25 March 1983, CCPR/C/18/D/16/1977 ...................................... 439 
Vasilskis v. Uruguay, 31 March 1983, CCPR/C/18/D/1980 ................................................ 343, 375, 845 
E.W. and others v. the Netherlands, 8 April 1993 (inadm.), CCPR/C/47/D/429/1990 ........................ 538 
Drescher Caldas (represented by his wife Ibarburu de Drescher) v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983,  
 43/1979, CCPR/C/OP/2, p. 80........................................................................................ 313, 341 
Estradet Cabreira v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983, CCPR/C/19/D/105/1981 ...................................... 343, 960 
Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983, CCPR/C/19/D/107/1981 ................................ 116, 320 
Almirati Nieto (submitted by Almirati Garcia) v. Uruguay, 25 July 1983, CCPR/C/19/D/92/1981 .... 122 
Oxandabarat Scarrone v. Uruguay, 4 November 1983, CCPR/C/20/D/103/1981 ...................... 375, 673 
Martinez Machado v. Uruguay, 4 November 1983, CCPR/C/20/D/83/1981....................... 122, 123, 313 
Manera Lluberas v. Uruguay, 6 April 1984, CCPR/C/21/D/123/1982................................ 115, 673, 960 
Muteba v. Zaire, 24 July 1984, CCPR/C/22/D/124/1982 .............................................115, 348, 388, 389 
A.D. (on behalf of the Mikmaq Tribal Society) v. Canada, 29 July 1984 (inadm.), 78/1980, 
CCPR/C/OP/2, pp. 23-25................................................................................................ 497, 641 
D.F. v. Sweden, 26 March 1985 (inadm.), CCPR/C/24/D/183/1984 ................................................... 626 
John Wight v. Madagascar, 1 April 1985, CCPR/C/22/D/115/1982 ................................... 344, 388, 440 
Monja Jaona v. Madagascar, 1 April 1985, CCPR/C/24/D/132/1982 ........................................ 344, 440 
Baboeram v. Suriname, 4 April 1985, CCPR/C/24/D/146/1983 and 148-154/1983............................ 444 
Hiber Conteris v. Uruguay (submitted by his sister Ilda Thomas), 17 July 1985, 
CCPR/C/25/D/139/1983......................................................................................................... 809 
Lucia Arzuaga Gilboa (submitted by her aunt Felicia Gilboa de Reverdito) v. Uruguay,  
1 November 1985, 147/1983, CCPR/C/OP/2, p. 176.............................................................. 343 
Eric Hammel v. Madagascar, 3 April 1987, CCPR/C/29/D/155/1983, 3 April 1987 and  
 CCPR/C/OP/2, pp. 11 and 179 ............................................................................... 344, 388, 440 
Raul Cariboni (submitted by his wife Ruth Magri de Cariboni) v. Uruguay, 27 October 1987,  
 159/1983, CCPR/C/OP/2, p. 189 ............................................................................................ 344 
Lafuente Penarrieta, Rodriguez Candia, Ruiz Caceres and Toro Dorado v. Bolivia,  
 2 November 1987, CCPR/C/31/D/176/1984........................................................... 115, 344, 785 
Herrera Rubio v. Colombia, 2 November 1987, CCPR/C/31/D/161/1983 .......................................... 372 
L.G. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988 (inadm.), CCPR/C/33/D/285/1988 ...................................................... 754 
L.S. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988 (inadm.), CCPR/C/33/D/286/1988....................................................... 754 
C.J. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988 (inadm.), CCPR/C/33/D/252/1987, 12 August 1988  
 (See also X. v. S., Rule 86/91 decision of 13 November 1987, CCPR/C/OP/2, p. 4)...... 754, 761 
L.C. et al. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988 (inadm.), 257/1987, A/43/40 (1988), pp. 269-271...................... 754 
O.W. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1988 (inadm.), CCPR/C/33/D/227/1987 ..................................... 119, 127, 754 
Kitok v. Sweden, 27 July 1988, CCPR/C/33/D/197/1985 .....................................473, 474, 488, 498, 641 
Hendriks v. the Netherlands, 27 July 1988, CCPR/C/33/D/201/1985 ................................................. 770 
Robinson v. Jamaica, 30 March 1989, CCPR/C/35/D/223/1987..................................111, 244, 253, 685 
Pratt and Morgan v. Jamaica, 6 April 1989, CCPR/C/35/D/210/1986 and 225/1987, 7 April  
(See also X v. S, Rule 86/91 decision of 21 July 1986, CCPR/C/OP/2, p. 3)... 124-125, 679, 688 
A.A. v. Jamaica, 30 October 1989 (inadm.), CCPR/C/37/D/251/1987 ................................ 107, 754, 776 
 Table of Cases 
1159 
H.G.B. and S.P. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 3 November 1989 (inadm.), CCPR/C/37/D/268/1987 ....... 674 
Alfredo and Samuel Sanjuán Arévalo (submitted by their mother Elcida Arévalo Perez) v. Colombia,  
 3 November 1989, CCPR/C/37/D/181/1984................................................................... 116, 320 
A.W. v. Jamaica, 8 November 1989 (inadm.), CCPR/C/37/D/290/1988 ..................................... 756, 783 
G.S. v. Jamaica, 8 November 1989 (inadm.), CCPR/C/37/D/369/1989 (* 15 September 1989,  
 only Rule 86 ....................................................................................................756, 783, 811, 812 
M.K. v. France, 8 November 1989 (inadm.), CCPR/C/37/D/222/1987 ............................................... 478 
Bernard Ominayak, Chief of the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada, 26 March 1990, 
CCPR/C/38/D/167/1984..................................................................115, 121, 125, 127, 451-454, 
 468, 470, 471, 498, 499, 597, 626, 638, 639, 674-677, 693, 
 780, 781, 800, 801, 855, 856, 980-982, 1024 
D.F. v. Jamaica, 26 March 1990, CCPR/C/38/D/329/1988................................................................. 783 
R.A.V.N. et al v. Argentina, 26 March 1990 (inadm.), CCPR/C/38/D/345/1988 ................................. 674 
Delgado Páez v. Colombia, 12 July 1990, CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985, 23 August 1990 ........................ 437 
L.R. and T.W. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990, CCPR/C/39/D/258/1987.............................................. 754, 755 
D.B. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990, CCPR/C/39/D/259/1987 ............................................................ 754, 755 
C.B. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990, CCPR/C/39/D/260/1987............................................................. 754, 755 
N.C. v. Jamaica, 13 July 1990, CCPR/C/39/D/278/1988 ............................................................ 754, 755 
Carlton Reid v. Jamaica, 20 July 1990, CCPR/C/39/D/250/1987 ................109, 239, 244, 247, 775, 816 
Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 July 1990, CCPR/C/39/D/232/1987.................. 239, 243, 373, 
680, 812, 813 
Giry v. Dominican Republic, 20 July 1990, CCPR/C/39/D/193/1985 ................................................. 513 
N.A.J. v. Jamaica, 26 July 1990 (inadm.), CCPR/C/39/D/246/1987 ................................... 127, 755, 756 
E.B. v. Jamaica, 26 October 1990, CCPR/C/40/D/303/1988........................................244, 754, 755, 776 
W.W. v. Jamaica, 26 October 1990, CCPR/C/40/D/254/1987......................................109, 244, 754, 755 
R.M. v. Jamaica, 26 October 1990 (inadm.), CCPR/C/40/D/315/1988 ............................... 754, 755, 776 
A. H. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 October 1990 (inadm.), CCPR/C/40/D/302/1988 ...112, 686, 688, 689 
D.S. v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991, CCPR/C/41/D/234/1987..................................................................... 756 
 
[Category II] 
Paul Kelly v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991, CCPR/C/41/D/253/1987 ........... 109, 239, 240, 244, 246, 247, 250, 
375, 684, 776, 816, 817 
Irvine Reynolds v. Jamaica, 8 April 1991, CCPR/C/41/D/229/1987................................... 253, 776, 818 
D.D. v. Jamaica, 11 April 1991, CCPR/C/41/D/313/1988 .......................................................... 754, 755 
D.S. v. Jamaica, 11 April 1991, CCPR/C/41/D/304/1988 ................................................................... 756 
Michael Sawyers and Michael and Desmond McClean v. Jamaica, 11 April 1991,  
 CCPR/C/41/D/ 226/1987 and 256/1987 ..................................................130, 775, 813, 816, 818 
M.F. v. Jamaica, 21 October 1991, CCPR/C/43/D/233/1987...................................................... 754, 776 
Aston Little v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991, CCPR/C/43/D/283/1988 ..........246, 250, 684, 775, 776, 816 
Raphael Henry v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991, CCPR/C/43/D/230/1987........................... 244, 247, 250, 
684, 775, 776, 814, 816 
Willard Collins v. Jamaica, 1 November 1991, CCPR/C/43/D/240/1987 ....253, 443, 685, 774, 776, 815 
G. J. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 5 November 1991, CCPR/C/43/D/331/1988........................................ 756 
R.L., M.B. M.H. and 14 other members of the Whispering Pine Band v. Canada, 5 November 1991, 
CCPR/C/43/D/358/1989................................................................................................. 473, 474 
Wolf v. Panama, 26 March 1992, CCPR/C/44/D/289/1988................................................................. 374 
Glenford Campbell v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992, CCPR/C/44/D/248/1987...........240, 244, 248, 816, 817 
Delroy Prince v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992, CCPR/C/44/D/269/1987 ................................................. 814 
Randolph Barrett and Clyde Sutcliffe v. Jamaica, 30 March 1992, CCPR/C/44/D/270/1988  
 and 271/1988 ................................................................... 252, 253, 255, 440, 682, 683, 775, 776 
Alrick Thomas v. Jamaica, 31 March 1992, CCPR/C/44/D/272/1988................................. 245, 246, 811 
N.A.J. v. Jamaica, 6 April 1992, CCPR/C/44/D/351/1989 .................................................. 127, 755, 756 
M.F. v. Jamaica, 17 July 1992, CCPR/C/45/D/335/1988............................................................ 754, 776 
R.W. v. Jamaica, 21 July 1992, CCPR/C/45/D/340/1988 .................................................................... 754 
 Table of Cases 
1160 
Clifton Wright v. Jamaica, 27 July 1992, CCPR/C/45/D/349/1989...... 246, 775, 776, 778, 784, 816, 825 
Parkanyi v. Hungary, 27 July 1992, CCPR/C/45/D/410/1990............................................................. 374 
C.F. v. Jamaica, 28 July 1992, CCPR/C/45/D/382/1989, 30 July 1992 ...................................... 254, 755 
Trevor Ellis v. Jamaica, 28 July 1992, CCPR/C/45/D/276/1988, 26 August 1992 ..................... 777, 948 
M.R. v. Jamaica, 28 July 1992, CCPR/C/45/D/405/1990 (* 31 July 1991) ...............................................  
K.C. v. Canada, 29 July 1992, CCPR/C/45/D/486/1992 ..............................................269, 270, 284, 770 
Glenmore Compass v. Jamaica, 19 October 1992, CCPR/C/49/D/352/1989 ...................................... 814 
Carlton Linton v. Jamaica, 22 October 1992, CCPR/C/46/D/255/1987...............109, 253, 685, 775, 776 
Leroy Simmonds v. Jamaica, 23 October 1992, CCPR/C/46/D/338/1988 ................................... 775, 776 
E.E. v. Jamaica, 23 October 1992, CCPR/C/46/D/337/1988............................................................... 756 
Balkissoon Soogrim v. Trinidad and Tobago, 8 April 1993, CCPR/C/47/D/362/1989 
 (* 10 August 1989)................................................................................................................. 686 
Victor Francis v. Jamaica, 24 March 1993, CCPR/C/49/D/320/1988................................. 250, 254, 797 
Trevor Collins v. Jamaica, 25 March 1993, CCPR/C/47/D/356/1989 (* 25 May 1989) .... 239, 244, 247, 
250, 756, 776, 811, 812 
Larrosa Bequio v. Uruguay, 29 March 1993, CCPR/OP/2, p. 118 and CCPR/C/18/D/88/1981.......... 343 
Leaford Smith v. Jamaica, 31 March 1993, CCPR/C/47/D/282/1988 ................................. 246, 684, 815 
N.P. v. Jamaica, 5 April 1993, CCPR/C/47/D/404/1990..................................................................... 756 
Bwalya v. Zambia, 14 July 1993, CCPR/C/48/D/314/1988 ................................................................. 438 
V.B. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 July 1993, CCPR/C/48/D/485/1991 (* 25 August 1992)................. 797 
Kindler v. Canada, 30 July 1993, CCPR/C/48/D/470/1991 .................. 233-235, 267, 282-283, 287-289, 
771, 797, 821-833, 824, 1007-1010, 1024-1025 
Glenmore Compass v. Jamaica, 19 October 1993, CCPR/C/49/D/375/1989 ...................................... 814 
Bahamonde v. Equitorial Guinea, 20 October 1993, CCPR/C/49/D/468/1991 ................................... 438 
R.M. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1993, CCPR/C/49/D/384/1989  
 (* 29 January 1990 (only 86).................................................................................. 756, 783, 816 
Chitat Ng v. Canada, 5 November 1993, CCPR/C/49/D/469/1991..................... 233-234, 267, 282- 283, 
287, 291-292, 668, 703, 797, 821-822, 1007-1010, 1024-1025 
Lenford Hamilton v. Jamaica, 21 March 1994, CCPR/C/50/D/333/1988.....250, 368, 372, 684, 775, 776 
O. Sara et al. v. Finland, 23 March 1994 (inadm.), CCPR/C/50/D/431/1990 .............122, 453, 455, 468, 
 640, 780, 799-801, 857, 860 
Mohammed Bashir El-Megreisi (submitted by his brother Youssef El-Megreisi) v. Libya,  
 23 March 1994, CCPR/ C/50/D/440/1990...................................................................... 293, 320 
Anthony Currie v. Jamaica, 29 March 1994, CCPR/C/50/D/377/1989 (* 13 November 1989) 246, 250, 
776, 884 
Lloyd Grant v. Jamaica, 31 March 1994, CCPR/C/50/D/353/1988 .................................... 246, 812, 814 
R.M. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 March 1994, CCPR/C/50/D/476/1991.....................756, 783, 809, 813 
Albert Berry v. Jamaica, 7 April 1994, CCPR/C/50/D/330/1988................................................ 240, 248 
Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 8 July 1994, CCPR/C/51/D/407/1990......................443, 685, 686, 755, 783 
George Winston Reid v. Jamaica, 8 July 1994, CCPR/C/51/D/355/1989............................................ 250 
Mojica v. Dominican Republic, 15 July 1994, CCPR/C/51/D/449/1991 ............................................. 116 
Peter Blaine v. Jamaica, 17 July 1997, CCPR/C/60/D/696/1996 (* 9 May 1996) .......217, 685, 762, 812 
Lynden Champagnie, Delroy Palmer and Oswald Chisholm v. Jamaica, 18 July 1994, 
CCPR/C/51/D/445/1991......................................................................................................... 372 
Theophilus Barry v. Trinidad and Tobago, 18 July 1994, CCPR/C/51/D/471/1992............................ 578 
Denzil Roberts v. Barbados, 19 July 1994, CCPR/C/51/D/504/1992 ...................682, 754, 901, 997, 998 
Peter Bradshaw v. Barbados, 19 July 1994 (inadm.), CCPR/C/53/D/489/1992................. 682, 754, 776, 
 901, 979, 997, 998 
Albert Womah Mukong v. Cameroon, 21 July 1994, CCPR/C/51/D/458/1991 ................... 291, 319, 373 
Länsman I: Ilmari Länsman v. Finland, 26 October 1994 (inadm.), CCPR/C/52/D/511/1992... 454, 488, 
489, 633, 641, 800-802, 981 
Coeriel and Aurik v. the Netherlands, 31 October 1994, CCPR/C/52/D/453/1991 ............................. 478 
Cox v. Canada, 31 October 1994, CCPR/C/52/D/539/1993........................................252, 267, 268, 283, 
 287, 288, 289, 668, 770-771, 822, 825, 827, 1007-1009 
 Table of Cases 
1161 
Darwinia Rosa Mónaco de Galliccho and her granddaughter Ximena Vicario v. Argentina,  
 3 April 1995, CCPR/C/OP/5, pp. 47-51 and CCPR/C/53/D/400/1990 ................................... 532 
Errol Simms v. Jamaica, 3 April 1995, CCPR/C/53/D/541/1993........................................................ 756 
Lloyd Rogers v. Jamaica, 4 April 1995, CCPR/C/53/D/494/1992 (* 14 July 1992)............................ 756 
Leroy Shalto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 4 April 1995, CCPR/C/53/D/447/1991 ................................... 249 
Lincoln Guerra and Brian Wallen v. Trinidad and Tobago, 4 April 1995, CCPR/C/53/D/575 and 
576/1994............................................................................ 755, 777, 778, 947, 1030, 1031, 1054 
Garfield and Andrew Peart v. Jamaica, 19 July 1995, CCPR/C/54/D/464/1991 and 482/1991......... 239, 
 443, 684, 814 
Holder v. Trinidad and Tobago, 19 July 1995, CCPR/C/54/D/515/1992 (* 16 December 1992) .............  
Michael Bullock v. Trinidad and Tobago, 19 July 1995, CCPR/C/54/D/553/1993 ............................. 990 
Clement Francis v. Jamaica, 25 July 1995, CCPR/C/54/D/606/1994 ................................. 250, 254, 762 
Lennon Stephens v. Jamaica, 18 October 1995, CCPR/C/55/D/373/1989, 25 October 1995  
 (* 15 September 1989 (only Rule 86) (Rule 86/91))..................31, 248, 249, 443, 689, 811, 812 
Bautista de Arellana v. Colombia, 27 October 1995, CCPR/C/55/D/563/1993................... 441, 607, 674 
Bernhard Lubuto v. Zambia, 31 October 1995, CCPR/C/55/D/390/1990 (1995)  
 (* 23 February 1990) .......................................................................................128, 237, 250, 948 
Dennie Chaplin v. Jamaica, 2 November 1995, CCPR/C/55/D/596/1994 (* 23 August 1994)........... 685 
Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, 15 March 1996, CCPR/C/56/D/594/1992  
 (* 16 December 1992 and 23 August 1993) .................................................................................  
Errol Johnson v. Jamaica, 22 March 1996, CCPR/C/56/D/588/1994 ..........................249, 252, 762, 817 
Peter Grant v. Jamaica, 22 March 1996, CCPR/C/56/D/597/1994..................................................... 684 
Tshishimbi v. Zaire, 25 March 1996, CCPR/C/53/D/542/1993 ................117, 314, 320, 437, 1023, 1054 
Laureano Atachahua (on behalf of his granddaughter Ana Rosario Celis Laureano) v. Peru,  
 25 March 1996, CCPR/C/56/D/540/1993....................................................................... 116, 320 
George Graham and Arthur Morrison v. Jamaica, 25 March 1996, CCPR/C/52/D/461/1991  
 (* 25 October 1992).........................................................................126, 127, 239, 246, 810, 813 
Daniel Pinto v. Trinidad and Tobago, 16 July 1996, CCPR/C/57/D/512/1992................................... 680 
 
[Category III] 
Clyde Neptune v. Trinidad and Tobago, 16 July 1996, CCPR/C/57/D/523/1992  
 ( * 11 December 1992) ................................................................................................... 370, 765 
Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 16 July 1996, CCPR/C/57/D/600/1994 (* 28 November 1994) ............. 254, 
442, 443, 686, 689, 755, 776, 783 
Rickly Burrell (submitted by Phillip Leach) v. Jamaica, 18 July 1996, CCPR/C/53/D/546/1993  
 (* 9 June 1993) ............................................................................................................... 247, 444 
Vaihere Bordes and John Temeharo v. France, 22 July 1996, CCPR/C/57/D/645/1995 .... 536, 860-861, 
Eustace Henry and Everald Douglas v. Jamaica, 25 July 1996, CCPR/C/57/D/571/1994  
 (* probably on 11 January 1994) ...........................................................249, 161, 368, 371, 1005 
Michael Adams v. Jamaica, 30 October 1996, CCPR/C/58/D/607/1994..................................... 762, 797 
Länsman II: Jouni E. Länsman et al. v. Finland, 30 October 1996, CCPR/C/58/D/671/1995................ 9, 
454-457, 495, 633, 802, 858, 859, 864, 1024 
Stewart v. Canada, 1 November 1996, CCPR/C/56/D/538/1993 ........................................ 298, 571-574, 
 576, 954, 957 
B.L. v. Australia, 8 November 1996 (inadm.), CCPR/C/58/D/659/1995/Rev.1................................... 571 
Irvine Reynolds v. Jamaica, 3 April 1997, CCPR/C/59/D/587/1994 (* 23 August 1994) ... 253, 776, 818 
Giosue Canepa v. Canada, 3 April 1997, CCPR/C/59/D/558/1993 .............576, 577, 800, 954, 955, 981 
Neville Lewis v. Jamaica, 17 July 1997, CCPR/C/60/D/708/1996 (* 3 July 1996) ............. 217, 690, 812 
Patrick Taylor v. Jamaica, 18 July 1997, CCPR/C/60/D/707/1996 (* 25 June 1996) ......................... 246 
Clifford McLawrence v. Jamaica, 18 July 1997, CCPR/C/60/D/702/1996...................239, 248, 249, 816 
A.R.J. v. Australia, 28 July 1997, CCPR/C/60/D/692/1996..........................................827, 828, 954, 955 
Francis Hopu and Tepoaitu Bessert v. France, 29 July 1997, CCPR/C/60/D/549/1993 ............. 477-481, 
483, 484, 500, 596, 681, 862 
 Table of Cases 
1162 
Robinson LaVende v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997, CCPR/C/61/D/554/19938  
 (* 5 October 1993)...........................................................................................244, 247, 252, 775 
Ramcharan Bickaroo v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 October 1997, CCPR/C/61/D/555/1993 .............. 119, 
 252, 686, 689 
Maurice Thomas v. Jamaica, 3 November 1997, CCPR/C/61/D/532/1993 (* 30 April 1993) .... 245, 247 
Byron Young v. Jamaica, 4 November 1997, CCPR/C/61/D/615/1995 (* 23 January 1995) ............. 813, 
 815, 816 
G.T. v. Australia, 4 November 1997, CCPR/C/61/D/706/1996 ............ 271, 291, 826, 827, 954, 956, 957 
Nathaniel Williams v. Jamaica, 4 November 1997, CCPR/C/61/D/609/1995 ..................................... 254 
Espinoza de Polay (on behalf of Polay Campos) v. Peru, 6 November 1997,  
 CCPR/C/61/D/577/1994 .................................................................................118, 349, 785, 848 
Anthony McLeod v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/734/1997.....................762, 814, 816, 817, 
 888, 1026 
Abdool Saleem Yasseen and Noel Thomas v. Republic of Guyana, 30 March 1998, 
CCPR/C/62/D/676/1996 (* 7 February 1996......... 239, 244, 246, 249, 374, 684, 796, 993, 1026 
Matthews v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 March 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/569/1993 .....123, 263, 373, 671, 795 
Deon McTaggart v. Jamaica, 31 March 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/749/1997 (* 11 April 1997) ........ 253, 814 
Desmond Taylor v. Jamaica, 2 April 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/705/1996 (* 17 June 1996)...... 246, 249, 762 
Steve Shaw v. Jamaica, 2 April 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/704/1996 (13 June 1996) ................. 246, 249, 762 
Tony Jones v. Jamaica, 6 April 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/585/1994 (* 23 Aug. 1994)..................... 247, 253, 
 369, 684, 762 
Victor Domukovsky, Zaza Tsiklauri, Petre Gelbakhiani and Irakli Dokvadze v. Georgia,  
 6 April 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/623/1995, 624/1995, 626/1995 and 627/1995  
 (* 2 March 1995 for Domukovsky; 10 March 1995 and 5 July 1996 for  
 Gelbakhiani and Dokvadze) .................................................... 219, 244, 252, 375, 680, 795, 949 
Fray Deidrick v. Jamaica, 9 April 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/619/1995 (* 31 February 1995).........................  
Ian Chung v. Jamaica, 9 April 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/591/1994 (* 5 September 1994)................ 443, 685 
Beresford Whyte v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/732/1997 (* 10 January 1997)................ 248, 
 369, 376, 813-816, 889 
Everton Morrison v. Jamaica, 27 July 1998, CCPR/C/62/D/635/1995 ........................249, 253, 369, 816 
Clive Smart v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 July 1998, CCPR/C/63/D/672/1995  
 (* 18 December 1995) ....................................................................248, 249, 764, 776, 813, 984 
Dole Chadee et al v. Trinidad and Tobago, 29 July 1998, CCPR/C/63/D/813/1998................... 816, 819 
Andrew Perkins v. Jamaica, 30 July 1998, CCPR/C/63/D/733/1997 (* 10 January 1997).................. 249 
Silbert Daley v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998, CCPR/C/63/D/750/1997........................240, 249, 443, 812, 888 
Anthony Finn v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998, CCPR/C/63/D/617/1995 (* 30 January 1995) .................... 248, 
 812, 814, 816, 817 
Junior Leslie v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998, CCPR/C/63/D/564/1993..............................370, 685, 796, 1034 
Hixford Morrison v. Jamaica, 31 July 1998, CCPR/C/63/D/611/1995 (* 9 January 1995  
 (Rule 86 only) and 15 February 1995).................................................................................... 815 
Irving Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, 20 October 1998, CCPR/C/64/D/594/1992.................... 680, 943 
Nicholas Henry v. Jamaica, 20 October 1998, CCPR/C/64/D/610/1995 (* 10 January 1995) ........... 369, 
371, 689 
 
[Category IV] 
Clive Johnson v. Jamaica, 20 October 1998, CCPR/C/64/D/592/1994 (* 5 September 1994)........... 237, 
244, 246, 762 
Barrington Campbell v. Jamaica, 20 October 1998, CCPR/C/64/D/618/1995 (* 3 April 1995) ......... 685 
McCordie Morrison v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998, CCPR/C/64/D/663/1995.............247, 371, 796, 797 
Leroy Morgan and Samuel Williams v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998, CCPR/C/64/D/720/1996  
 (* 2 September 1996) ............................................................................................................. 369 
Clarence Marshall v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998, CCPR/C/64/D/730/1996 (* 5 December 1996) .. 240, 
 244, 369, 377, 762, 816, 817, 949, 950 
 Table of Cases 
1163 
Conroy Levy v. Jamaica, 3 November 1998, CCPR/C/64/D/719/1996, 25 November 1998  
 (* 2 September 1996) ............................................................................................. 240, 369, 762 
Christopher Brown v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999, CCPR/C/65/D/775/1997 (* 13 November 1997  
 and 22 January 1999)............................................. 240, 244, 248, 249, 253, 369, 814, 816, 1035 
Desmond Amore v. Jamaica, 23 March 1999, CCPR/C/65/D/634/1995, 12 May 1999....................... 796 
Franklyn Gonzales v. Trinidad and Tobago, 23 March 1999, CCPR/C/65/D/673/1995,  
 30 April 1999 (* 12 January 1996) ...............................................................................................  
Trevor Bennett v. Jamaica, 25 March 1999, CCPR/C/65/D/590/1994 ................................................ 816 
Samuel Thomas v. Jamaica, 31 March 1999, CCPR/C/65/D/614/1995 (* 23 January 1995) ............. 249, 
 376, 762, 815, 816 
Christopher Bethel v. Trinidad and Tobago, 31 March 1999, CCPR/C/65/D/830/1998  
 (* 17 September 1998) .................................................................................... 738-739, 756, 778 
Errol Smith and Oval Stewart v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999, CCPR/C/65/D/668/1995............ 246, 247, 249, 
 370, 684, 762, 796 
Damian Thomas v. Jamaica, 8 April 1999, CCPR/C/65/D/800/1998, 1998........................................ 356 
Vicente Barzana Yutronic (on his own behalf and on behalf of his two sons) v. Chile,  
 23 July 1999 (inadm.), CCPR/C/66/D/740/1997 .................................................................... 441 
Anthony Leehong v. Jamaica, 13 July 1999, CCPR/C/66/D/613/1995 (* 10 January 1995) ....... 443, 685 
Linderholm v. Croatia, 23 July 1999 (inadm.), CCPR/C/66/D/744/1997............................................ 805 
Mohammed Ajaz and Amir Jamil v. Republic of Korea, 13 July 1999, CCPR/C/66/D/644/1995  
 (* 1 August 1995)........................................................................................................... 813, 815 
Ali Maleki v. Italy, 15 July 1999, CCPR/C/66/D/699/1996 ................................................................. 846 
Zephiniah Hamilton v. Jamaica, 23 July 1999, CCPR/C/66/D/616/1995 (* 31 January 1995  
 (Rule 86 only)) ................................................................................................248, 368, 372, 811 
Osbourne v. Jamaica, 15 March 2000, CCPR/C/68/D/759/1997 (* 23 June 1997)............ 123, 259, 260, 
 263, 670, 795 
Higginson v. Jamaica, 15 March 2000, CCPR/C/68/D/759/1997, ...............................260, 262, 670, 795 
Dias v. Angola, 20 March 2000, CCPR/C/68/D/711/1996 .......................................................... 438, 439 
Michael Freemantle v. Jamaica, 24 March 2000, CCPR/C/68/D/625/1995 (* 3 March 1995) .......... 253, 
 684, 685, 845 
Michael Robinson v. Jamaica, 29 March 2000, CCPR/C/68/D/731/1996 (* 10 December 1996)...... 111, 
 244, 253, 685 
J.G.A. Diergaardt (late Captain of the Rehoboth Baster Community) et al. v. Namibia, 25 July 2000, 
CCPR/C/ 69/D/760/1997.................................................................................470, 474, 475, 495 
Eversley Thompson v. St. Vincent & the Grenadines, 18 October 2000, CCPR/C/70/D/806/1998  
 (* 19 February 1998) .............................................................................................. 237, 994, 995 
Dante Piandiong, Jesus Morallos and Archie Bulan (deceased) (submitted by Alexander Padilla  
 and Ricardo III Sunga) v. the Philippines, 19 October 2000, CCPR/C/70/D/869/1999 ........ 111, 
 130, 208, 740, 795, 816, 899, 900, 902, 914, 918, 
 1015, 1016, 1031, 1032, 1054, 1055 
Chongwe v. Zambia, 25 October 2000, CCPR/C/70/D/821/1998........................................................ 438 
Apirana Mahuika et al. v. New Zeeland, 27 October 2000, CCPR/C/70/D/547/1993 ......... 494, 470, 494 
Samira Karker on behalf of her husband Salah Karker v. France, 26 October 2000,  
 CCPR/C/70/D/833/1998.................................................................................. 270-271, 799, 954 
Vakoumé and 28 other persons v. France, 31 October 2000 (inadm.),  
 CCPR/C/70/D/822/1998 ......................................................................................... 478-481, 801 
Simalae Toala et al. v. New Zealand, 2 November 2000, CCPR/C/70/D/675/1995 ............................ 768 
Mansaraj et al,.; Gborie et al. and Sesay et al. v. Sierra Leone, 16 July 2001. .................. 109, 111, 131, 
 900, 1031, 1032 
Hendrick Winata and So Lan Li v. Australia, 26 July 2001, CCPR/C/72/D/930/2000 ................ 575, 576 
Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 24 October 2001, CCPR/C/73/D/779/1997 ............ 456, 
 803, 860, 861 
Boodlal Sooklal v. Trinidad and Tobago, 25 October 2001, CCPR/C/73/D/928/2000....................... 123, 
 223, 263, 671 
 Table of Cases 
1164 
Devon Simpson v. Jamaica, 31 October 2001, CCPR/73/D/695/1996................................. 252, 370, 372 
Terrence Sahadeo (submitted by Margaret Paul on behalf of her brother) v. Republic of Guyana,  
 1 November 2001, CCPR/C/73/D/728/1996 (* 21 November 1996)...................... 249, 690, 817 
 
[Category V] 
Glenn Ashby v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2002, CCPR/C/74/D/580/1994 ...................... 110, 111, 
131, 680-681, 686, 778-779, 808, 900, 903, 
 989-990, 993-995, 1027-1032, 1059 
Jiménez Vaca v. Colombia, 25 March 2002, CCPR/C/74/D/859/1999.........................438, 439, 975, 976 
Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, 26 March 2002, CCPR/C/74/D/845/1998,  
 28 March 2002 and public admissibility decision of 2 November 1999 ........................ 109, 126, 
237-238, 739-741, 243-244, 746, 787, 886 
Higginson v. Jamaica, 28 March 2002, CCPR/C/74/D/792/1998 ................................260, 262, 670, 795 
R. S. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2 April 2002, CCPR/C/74/D/684/1996 .........................370, 371, 689, 741 
Boodoo v. Trinidad and Tobago, 2 April 2002, CCPR/C/74/D/721/1996 ........................................... 373 
Jayawardena v. Sri Lanka, 22 July 2002, CCPR/C/75/D/916/2000 .................................................... 442 
José Antonio Coronel et al. v. Colombia, 24 October 2002, CCPR/C/76/D/778/1997 ........................ 359 
Jarle Jonassen and members of the Riast/Hylling reindeer herding district v. Norway,  
 25 October 2002 (inadm.), CCPR/C/76/D/942/2000 ...................................................... 456, 862 
Oral Hendricks v. Guyana, 28 October 2002, CCPR/C/76/D/838/1998.............................................. 249 
C. v. Australia, 28 October 2002, CCPR/C/76/D/900/1999 .........................................302, 303, 888, 954 
Zheludkova v. Ukraine, 29 October 2002, CCPR/C/76/D/726/1996 ................................................... 370 
Xavier Evans v. Trinidad and Tobago, 21 March 2003, CCPR/C/77/D/908/2000 ...................... 238, 740 
Jaime Carpo et al. v. Philippines, 28 March 2003, CCPR/C/77/D/1077/2002 .................................... 238 
Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada, 28 March 2003 (inadm.), CCPR/C/77/D/743/1997 ................................. 801 
Igor Lyashkovich and Mariya Staselovich (submitted by the latter on behalf of her deceased son  
 and herself) v. Belarus, 3 April 2003, CCPR/C/77/D/887/1999, 24 April 2003.................... 113, 
 797, 1054, 1055 
Anton Bondarenko and Natalia Schedko (submitted by the latter on behalf of her deceased son  
 and herself) v. Belarus, 3 April 2003, CCPR/C/77/D/886/1999..................113, 797, 1054, 1055 
Sholam Weiss v. Austria, 3 April 2003, CCPR/C/77/D/1086/2002...................................... 267, 294-296, 
 597, 772, 802, 844, 878, 901, 954, 978, 1002, 1015, 1033, 1055 
J. Thevaraja Sarma (submitted by his father S. Jegatheeswara Sarma) v. Sri Lanka, 16 July 2003, 
 CCPR/C/78/D/950/2000......................................................................................... 116, 320, 321 
Roger Judge v. Canada, 5 August 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/829/1998..............................112, 234, 238, 256, 
 288-291 668, 703, 771, 825, 884, 955, 1009, 1010 
Omar Sharif Baban (also on behalf of his son Bawan Heman Baban) v. Australia, 6 August 2003, 
 CCPR/C/78/D/1014/2001............................................................................................... 271, 954 
Azer Garyverdy ogly Aliev v. Ukraine, 7 August 2003, CCPR/C/78/D/781/1997 ....................... 240, 245 
Floyd Howell v. Jamaica, 21 October 2003, CCPR/C/79/D/798/1998 ............................................... 109 
Ali Aqsar Bakhtiyari and Roqaiha Bakhtiyari (also on behalf of their five children) v. Australia,  
 29 October 2003, CCPR/C/79/D/1069/2002...................................................123, 133, 272, 356, 
771, 772, 954, 961, 1017, 1067 
Alfredo Baroy v. the Philippines, 31 October 2003 (inadm.), CCPR/C/79/D/1045/2002 .... 236, 355, 356 
Abduali Ismatovich Kurbanov (submitted by his mother Safarmo Kurbanova) v. Tajikistan,  
 6 November 2003, CCPR/C/79/D/1096/2002......................................................... 813, 816, 818 
Errol Pryce v. Jamaica, 15 March 2004, CCPR/C/80/D/793/1998 ............................................. 260, 262 
Hak-Chul Shin v. South Korea, 16 March 2004, CCPR/C/80/D/926/2000.................................. 566, 567 
Arsen Arutyunyan (submitted by his sister Karina) v. Uzbekistan, 29 March 2004, 
 CCPR/C/80/D/917/2000............................................................................................... 948, 1067 
Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 29 March 2004, CCPR/C/80/D/1051/2002 ..............131, 269, 285, 303, 304, 
668, 703, 808, 820, 825, 826, 827, 901 
 Table of Cases 
1165 
Collin Smartt (submitted by his mother Daphne Smartt) v. Republic of Guyana, 6 July 2004,  
 CCPR/C/81/D/867/1999......................................................................................................... 817 
Gaibullodzhon Ilyasovich Saidov (submitted by his wife Barno Saidova) v. Tajikistan, 8 July 2004, 
CCPR/C/81/D/964/2001....................................................................................... 246, 816, 1064 
Steven Romans v. Canada, 9 July 2004, CCPR/C/81/D/1040/2001 ............................................ 303, 800 
Lallman Mulai and Bharatraj Mulai (submitted by their sister Rookmin Mulai) v. Republic of  
 Guyana, 20 July 2004, CCPR/C/81/D/811/1998 ............................................................ 816, 825 
Ramil Rayos v. the Philippines, 27 July 2004, CCPR/C/81/D/1167/2003 ........................................... 239 
Bakhrom Khomidov (submitted by his mother Saodat Khomidova) v. Tajikistan, 29 July 2004, 
CCPR/C/81/D/1117/2002................................................................................372, 444, 817, 825 
Mr. Deolall (submitted by his wife) v. Guyana, 1 November 2004, CCPR/C/82/D/912/2000 ............. 741 
Jonny Rubin Byahuranga v. Denmark, 1 November 2004, CCPR/C/82/D/1222/2003................ 273, 830 
Pagdayawon Rolando v. the Philippines, 3 November 2004, CCPR/C/82/D/1110/2002 ............ 239, 530 
Länsman III: Jouni Länsman, Eino Länsman and the Muotkatunturi Herdsmen’s Committee v.  
 Finland, 17 March 2005, CCPR/C/83/D/1023/2001 .......................................177, 456, 457, 638 
Maryam Khalilova on behalf of her son Validzhon Alievich Khalilov v. Tajikistan, 30 March 2005, 
CCPR/C/83/D/973/2001......................................................................................................... 902 
Anthony Michael Fernando v. Sri Lanka, 31 March 2005, CCPR/C/83/D/1189/2003 11, 411-414, 1073-
1075 
Abdukarim Boimurodov on behalf of son Mustafakul Boimurodov v. Tajikistan, 20 October 2005, 
CCPR/C/85/D/1042/2001....................................................................................................... 948 
Lawrence Chan v. Guyana, 31 October 2005, CCPR/C/85/D/913/2000 ............................................. 741 
Nazira Sirageva on behalf of her son Danis Siragev v. Uzbekistan, 1 November 2005, 
CCPR/C/85/D/907/2000......................................................................................................... 948 
Hazerat Hussain and Sumintra Singh v. Guyana, 25 October 2005, CCPR/C/85/D/862/1999 ........... 741 
Davlatbibi Shukurova on behalf of her husband Dovud and his brother Sherali Nazriev v. Tajikistan, 
 16 March 2006, CCPR/C/86/D/1044/2002..................................................................... 902, 905 
Nadezhda Agabekova on behalf of her son Valery Agabekov v. Uzbekistan, 16 March 2006, 
CCPR/C/89/D/1071/2002....................................................................................................... 948 
Raymond Persaud and Rampersaud v. Guyana, 21 March 2006, CCPR/C/86/D/812/1998 ................ 741 
Louisa Bousroual (on behalf of her husband Salah Saker) v. Algeria, 30 March 2006, 
CCPR/C/86/D/992/2001......................................................................................................... 321 
Daljit Singh v. Canada, 30 March 2006 (inadm.), CCPR/C/86/D/1315/2004 ............................. 272, 823 
D. and E. and their two children v. Australia, 11 July 2006, CCPR/C/87/D/1050/2002 ............. 270, 798 
Dawood Khan v. Canada, 25 July 2006, CCPR/C/87/D/1302/2004.................................................... 828 
Dahanayake and 41 others v. Sri Lanka, 25 July 2006 (inadm.), CCPR/C/87/D/1331/2004............... 520 
Brun v. France, 18 October 2006 (inadm.), CCPR/C/88/D/1453/2006 ............................................... 865 
Larisa Tarasova on behalf of her son Alexander Kornetov v. Uzbekistan, 20 October 2006, 
CCPR/C/88/D/1057/2002....................................................................................................... 948 
Mohammed Alzery v. Sweden, 25 October 2006, CCPR/C/88/D/1416/2005 ................271, 784, 836, 901 
Jagjit Singh Bhullar v. Canada, 31 October 2006 (inadm.), CCPR/C/88/D/982/2001........................ 768 
Taghi Khadje v. the Netherlands, 31 October 2006 (inadm.), CCPR/C/88/D/1438/2005.................... 797 
Sultanova v. Uzbekistan, 30 March 2006, CCPR/C/86/D/915/2000.................................................... 905 
Walter Obodzinsky v. Canada, 19 March 2007, CCPR/C/89/D/1124/2002......................................... 571 
Afuson Njaru v. Cameroon, 19 March 2007, CCPR/C/89/D/1353/2005 ............................................. 442 
Humanitarian Law Center v. Serbia, 26 March 2007 (inadm.), CCPR/C/89/D/1355/2005................. 414 
Sid Ahmed Aber v. Algeria, 13 July 2007, CCPR/C/90/D/1439/2005 ................................................. 414 
Shevkkhie Tulyaganova v. Uzbekistan, 20 July 2007, CCPR/C/90/D/1041/2001 ................................ 902 
Matlyuba Khudayberganova on behalf of her son Iskandar Khudayberganov v. Uzbekistan, 
 24 July 2007, CCPR/C/90/D/1140/2002................................................................................. 948 
Roza Uteeva on behalf of her brother Azamat Uteev v. Uzbekistan, 26 October 2007, 
CCPR/C/91/D/1150/2003............................................................................133, 902, 1031, 1065 
 Table of Cases 
1166 
Blanca Lilia Londoño Soto, Oscar Alberto Teran Cano, Maria Hercilia Cano Bedoya, Lina Marcela 
Teran Londoño, and Lilia Andrea Teran Londoño v. Australia, 1 April 2008 (inadm.), 
CCPR/C/92/D/1429/2005....................................................................................................... 830 
Dissanayake, Mudiyanselage Sumanaweera Banda v. Sri Lanka, 22 July 2008,  
 CCPR/C/93/D/1373/ 2005.............................................................................................. 125, 706 
M.G. v. Germany, 23 July 2008, CCPR/C/93/D/1482/2006 ................................................................ 571 
Maksudov & Rakhidov; Tashbaev & Pirmatov v. Kyrgyzstan, 16 July 2008, CCPR/C/93/D/1461, 
 1462, 1476& 1477/2006 ......................................................................................................... 271 
 
HRC documents other than inadmissibility decisions and Views 
General Comments 
General Comment 6 (16) on Article 2 ICCPR (right to life), 30 April 1982, A/37/40 (1982),  
 Annex V (pp. 93-94).........................................................................239,287, 279, 318, 536, 862 
General Comment 8 (16) on the right to liberty and security of persons (Article 9), 28 July 1982, 
A/37/40 (1982) Annex V (pp. 95-96); CCPR/C/21/Rev.1, (pp. 7-8) ...................................... 248 
General Comment 12 (21) on Article 1 ICCPR (1984), HRI/GEN/1/Rev. 6, pp. 134-135, A/39/40 
(1984) Annex VI (pp. 142-143).............................................................................................. 470 
General Comment 13 (21) on Article 14, 13 April 1982, A/39/40 (1984) Annex VI (pp. 143-147) .... 279 
General Comment 15 (27) on the position of aliens, 22 July 1986, A/41/40 (1986) Annex VI  
 (pp. 117-119) .......................................................................................................................... 510 
General Comment 17 (35) on Article 24, 5 April 1989, A/44/40 (1989) Annex VI (pp. 173-175); 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1, (pp. 21-23)............................................................................................... 534 
General Comment 20 (44) on torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment  
 (Article 7), 3 April 1992, A/47/40 (1992), Annex VI (pp. 193-195) .......259, 282, 285, 291, 432 
General Comment 21 (44) on the right to humane treatment in detention (Article 10),  
 10 April 1992, A/47/40 (1992), Annex VI (pp. 195-198) ............................................... 372, 374 
General Comment 23 (50) on Article 27 (1994), A/49/40, Vol. I (1994) Annex V (pp. 107-110)...... 470, 
 474, 477, 488, 494, 495 
General Comment 24 (52) on reservations to the ICCPR or the Optional Protocols, 4 November 1994, 
A/50/40, Vol. I (1995) Annex V (pp. 119-125) 68, 198, 207, 398, 477, 491, 492, 
 689, 490, 533, 711, 724, 740-741, 887 
General Comment 29 (72) on states of emergency (Article 4), 4 July 2001 ....................... 207, 287, 374, 
 397,398 490, 510, 703, 704,705-708, 712, 714, 724, 1093 
General Comment 31 (80) on the nature of the general legal obligation imposed on States parties  
 to the Covenant (Article 2), 29 March 2004, A/59/40, Vol. I, Annex III (pp. 175-179) ........ 207, 
282, 303,432, 531, 587, 592, 637, 658, 669, 670, 677, 679-688, 734-735, 887, 899, 901, 902 
General Comment 32, Article 14, Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial,  
 23 August 2007, CCPR/C/GC/32 ................................................................................... 240, 279 
General Comment 33 (94), The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 5 November 2008, CCPR/C/GC/33... 196, 
 415, 884, 886, 901 
 
Published decisions to take provisional measures and transmit the case (as well as decisions to 
discontinue the case) 
Teti Izquierdo v. Uruguay, 24 October 1980 (Rule 91 decision), 73/1981, CCPR/C/OP/1  
 at 7 (1984) ...............................................................................................313, 346, 347, 441, 673 
O.E. v. S., 26 July 1978, 22/1977, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 6 (1984) ..... 111, 124, 127, 130, 267, 281, 339, 784, 
 821, 954, 955 
O.E. v. S., 27 October 1978 (disc.), 22/1977, CCPR/C/OP/1 at 35 (1984) ..................111, 124, 127, 130, 
267, 281, 339, 784, 821, 954, 955 
 
 Table of Cases 
1167 
Published admissibility decision 
Rawle Kennedy v. Trinidad and Tobago, admissibility decision of 2 November 1999, 
CCPR/C/76/D/845/1999 or A/55/40, vol. II, Annex XI.A............................................. 109, 126, 
237-238, 739-741, 243-244, 746, 787, 886 
 
Discontinued HRC cases (disc.) (unpublished) 
Lloyd Reece v. Jamaica, 247/1987, undated (disc.) (* 12 November 1987 (transmitted  
 27 November 1987), also March 1988, 2 November 1989 and 24 March 1992) ................... 107, 
 117- 118, 130, 802, 1034 
A.A.T. v. Hungary, 543/1993, 1994 (disc.) (* 2 June 1993)........... 119, 129-130, 268-269, 271, 825, 954 
H.M. v. Jamaica, 595/1994, 3 August 1995 (disc.) (* 8 Nov. 1994) ................................................... 132 
V. v. Spain, 495/1992, June 1995 (disc.) (* 22 May 1992) ...........................................133, 350, 357, 606 
P. L.-B. v. Canada, 556/1993, 17 April 1996 (disc.) (* denied) .................................................. 114, 304 
Rockliff Ross v. Guyana, 703/1996, 10 December 1997 (disc.) (* 4 June 1996) ........................ 120, 121, 
 132, 994, 1027 
F.M. v. Jamaica, 792/1996, undated (disc.) (* 4 December 1996) ............................................................  
J.P.A.F. v. Canada, 620/1995, 13 August 1998 (disc.) (*denied).........................132, 576, 577, 799, 800 
L. v. Canada, 621/1995, undated (disc.) (* denied) ..................................................................... 576, 577 
A.B. v. Canada, 622/1995, 1998 (disc.) (* denied) .......................................................132, 576, 577, 800 
E.O. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 636/1995, undated (disc.) (* 27 June 1995) ..............................................  
E.G. v. Canada, 738/1997, 17 November 1997 (disc.) (* 17 January 1997)............................... 122, 130, 
 267, 268, 799, 825, 826, 957 
A. et al. (6 persons) v. Angola, 810/1998, 1 August 2000 (disc.) (* 10 March 1998).......... 113, 130, 387 
J.C.A. v. Costa Rica, 725/1996, July 2000 (disc.) (* denied)............................................... 132, 800, 801 
W. v. New Zealand, 773/1997, 66th session (disc.) (* denied).............................................................. 527 
J. v. Canada, 685/1996, April 2003 (disc.) (* denied)...............................................................................  
E.P. v. Trinidad and Tobago, 636/1995, 29 July 2003 (disc.) (* 27 June 1995).................................. 132 
9 INTER-AMERICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (CIDH) 
Miskito report relating to Nicaragua, 16 May 1984, Case 7964 (resolution regarding friendly 
settlement) .............................................................................................................................. 495 
Yanomami v. Brazil, 5 March 1985, Case 7615, Res. 12/85 ................................................................ 495 
James Terry Roach and Jay Pinkerton v. US, 22 September 1987, Case 9647, Res. 3/87........... 236, 885 
Dr. A. de Jesus Pedraza Becerra v. Colombia, 25 September 1992, 10.581, Report No. 33/92.......... 441 
Cheryl Monica Joseph v. Canada, 6 October 1993, 11.092, Report 27/93.......................................... 770 
The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States (Haitian refugees case),  
 13 October 1993 (adm.), 10.675, Report 28/93 ................................................275-279, 284-285 
Gallardo Rodríguez v. Mexico, 15 October 1996, 11.430, Report 43/96............................. 545, 546, 852 
The Haitian Centre for Human Rights et al. v. United States (Haitian refugees case),  
 13 March 1997, 10.675, Report 51/96 ..................................................................... 278-281, 286 
Juan Chanay Pablo v. Guatemala, 13 March 1997 (Friendly Settlement), 11.212,  
 Report No. 19/97 ...........................................................................430, 609, 610, 620, 655, 1003 
La Tablada case (Juan Carlos Abella v. Argentina), 1 November 1997, 11.137,  
 Report 55/97........................................................................................................... 159, 365, 366 
Tomás Porfirio Rondin (‘Aguas Blancas’ case) v. Mexico, 18 February 1998, 11.520,  
 Report 49/97....................................................................................................410, 411, 531, 965 
Father Ricardo Rezende v. Brazil, 7 April 1998, 11.287, Report 24/98 .............................. 609, 620, 655 
Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 3 March 1998 (adm.), 11.762, Report 20/98 ..........560, 578, 580, 583, 
 609, 745-747, 975 
Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, 9 December 1998 (merits), 11.762, Report 91/98 ..560, 578, 580, 583, 
 609, 745-747, 975 
 Table of Cases 
1168 
Minors in detention v. Honduras, 10 March 1999 (merits), 11.491, Report 41/99 ..................... 359, 360, 
 379, 436, 447, 553, 655, 766, 962, 1068 
Victor Saldaňo v. Argentina, no case number, 11 March 1999, Report 38/99 (inadm.)....................... 403 
Newton Coutinho Mendes et al. v. Brazil, 13 April 1999 (merits), 11.405,  
 Report 59/99..................................................................................428, 606, 607, 617, 652, 1003 
Juan de la Cruz Núñez Santana et al. v. Peru, 13 April 1999, 10.815, 10.905, 10.981, 10.955, 11.042, 
11.136, Report. 55/99 ............................................................................................................. 322 
Coard et al. v. US, 29 September 1999, 10.951, Report 109/99 ...................................399, 401, 403, 734 
Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 27 September 1999 (adm.), 11.140, Report 99/99 .......459, 460, 474, 485, 
493, 885, 979, 980 
Ignacio Ellacuría et al. v. El Salvador, 22 December 1999, 10.488, Report 136/99 ........................... 322 
Mary and Carrie Dann v. US, 27 December 2002, 11.140, Report 75/02 .......................... 459, 460, 474, 
 485, 493, 885, 979, 980 
Polay Campos v. Peru, 10 March 2000 (inadm.), 11.048, Report Nº 32/00 ........................................ 848 
Baptiste v. Grenada, 13 April 2000, 11.743, Report 38/00 ............................................... 375, 756, 1037 
Shaka Sankofa aka Gary Graham v. US, 15 June 2000 (adm.), 11.193, Report 51/00 ........ 215-216, 236, 
598, 629, 813, 1004,  
Damion Thomas v. Jamaica, 15 June 2000 (adm.), 12.069, Report 54/00....................338, 339, 375, 675 
Leoncio Florian López et al. v. Peru, 3 October 2000 (adm.), 11.849, Report 65/00 .......................... 360 
Hugo Juárez Cruzat et al. v. Peru (Miguel Castro Castro Prison case), 5 March 2001 (adm.),  
 11.015, Report 43/01 ............................................................................................... 333-335, 845 
Jorge Odir Miranda Cortez et al. v. El Salvador, 7 March 2001 (adm.), 12.249,  
 Report 29/01....................................................................................528, 529, 654, 766, 964, 965 
Garza v. US, 4 April 2001 (adm.), 12.243, Report 52/01 ...........................165, 216, 217, 422, 908, 1005 
Damion Thomas v. Jamaica, 4 April 2001 (merits), 12.069, Report 50.01...................338, 339, 375, 675 
Lamey, Mykoo, Montique & Daley v. Jamaica, 4 April 2001, 11.826, Report 49/01 .......................... 237 
Franz Britton AKA Collie Wills v. Guyana, 10 October 2001, 12.264, Report 80/01.................. 315, 317 
Joseph Thomas v. Jamaica, 3 December 2001, 12.183, Report 127/01............................................... 247 
Manickavasagam Suresh v. Canada, 27 February 2002 (adm.), 11.661, Report 7/02 ................ 287, 829, 
1007, 1013, 1033 
Alladin Mohamed v. Trinidad and Tobago, 9 October 2002 (adm.), 12.401, Report 50/02................. 688 
Domingues v. US, 22 October 2002, 12.285, Report 62/02 ....................................................... 236, 1004 
Shaka Sankofa aka Gary Graham v. US, 29 December 2003, 11.193, Report 97/03.................. 216, 236, 
 600, 601, 632, 816, 1004, 1005 
Napoleon Beazley v. US, 29 December 2003, 12.412, Report 101/03 ................................................. 908 
Teodoro Cabrera García and Rodolfo Montiel Flores v. Mexico, 27 February 2004 (adm.),  
 735/01, Report 11/04 .............................................................................................. 609, 850, 977 
Jorge Alberto Rosal Paz v. Guatemala, 11 March 2004 (friendly settlement), 9618, Report 29/04 .... 315 
Mercedes Julia Huenteao Beroiza et al. v. Chile, 11 March 2004 (friendly settlement),  
 4617/02, Report 30/04 ............................................................................................ 461, 462, 492 
Maya Indigenous Communities of the Toledo District v. Belize, 12 October 2004, 12.053,  
 Report 40/04........................................................................................................... 460, 485, 498 
Toronto Markkey Patterson v. US, 7 March 2005, 12.439, Report 25/05............................................ 236 
Luis Rolando Cuscul Pivaral et al. v. Guatemala (persons living with HIV/AIDS), 7 March 2005 
(adm.), 642/03, Report 32/05.................................................................................................. 530 
Persons deprived of freedom at Urso Branco prison, Rondônia v. Brazil, 21 October 2006 (adm.), 
P394-02, Report 81/06....................................................163, 218, 337, 338, 376, 601 -603, 617, 
 643, 653, 662, 671, 672 
Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, 8 March 2007 (inadm.), 1-06, Report 11/07 ............................................... 178 
Prince Pinder v. Bahamas, 12.513, 12 October 2007, Report 79/07 ........................................... 261, 264 
 Table of Cases 
1169 
10 INTER-AMERICAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (IACHR) 
Provisional measures2 
19 Tradesmen/19 Merchants v. Colombia, Order of 3 September 2004 ...................................... 406, 851 
Adrián Meléndez-Quijano et al. (El Salvador, matter of), Orders of 12 May and  
 26 November 2007 ................................................................................................. 222, 406, 720 
Alemán-Lacayo v. Nicaragua, Orders of 2 and 6 February 1996......................................................... 852 
Álvarez et al. v. Colombia, Orders of 22 July 1997-30 May 2001................600, 637, 643, 647, 651, 893 
Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Orders of 30 June 1998-27 January 2009 .............408, 628, 758, 1046 
Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Order of 27 January 2009 (Provisional Measures and  
 Monitoring Compliance with Judgment) ..................................................................................... , 
 758, 1046 
Blake v. Guatemala, Orders of 16 August 1995-17 November 2004.............................98, 101, 320, 406, 
607, 624, 626, 635, 636, 645, 661, 745, 835, 883, 968, 982 
Boyce and Joseph v. Barbados, Order of 25 November 2004 .............................217, 218, 224, 226, 239, 
688, 796, 847, 892, 894, 1040, 1046 
Bustíos-Rojas v. Peru, Orders of 5 June 1990-17 January 1991 ...............................152, 408, 1040, 1041 
Caballero Delgado and Santana v. Colombia, Orders of 7 December 1994, 31 January 1997  
 (lifted), 16 April 1997 (reinstated)-6 February 2008 .......................320, 766, 852, 854, 973, 974 
Capital El Rodeo I & El Rodeo II Judicial Confinement Center v. Venezuela (Matter of), Order of  
 8 February 2008............................................. 337, 338, 377, 601, 602, 651, 711, 752, 753, 1094 
Cárcel de Urso Branco (Urso Branco Prison) v. Brazil, Orders of 18 June 2002-2 May 2008.. 163, 218, 
337, 338, 376, 601 -603, 617, 643, 653, 662, 671, 672 
Carlos Nieto Palma et al. v. Venezuela, Orders of 9 July 2004 and 3 July 2007 ......................... 406, 612 
Carpio-Nicolle v. Guatemala, Orders of 4 June 1995-8 July 2004.............................................. 850, 968 
Castañeda Gutman v. Mexico, Order of 25 November 2005 (denied)..........222, 359, 545, 567, 568, 583 
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Orders of 29 July 1997-14 August 2000 and 21 December 2005 .......... 349, 350, 
 360, 361, 544, 545, 689, 690, 974 
Children and Adolescents Deprived of Liberty in the "Complexo do Tatuapé" of FEBEM  
 (Brazil) (matter of; CASA Foundation), Orders of 17 November 2005-10 June 2008........... 152, 
337, 338, 359, 360, 376, 377, 567, 568, 599, 601, 652 
Chipoco v. Peru, Orders of 14 December 1992 (President) and 27 January 1993 .............................. 157, 
542, 543, 568, 799 
Chunimá v. Guatemala, Order of 15 July-1 August 1991.............................................422, 611, 848, 849 
Clemente-Teherán et al. v. Colombia, Orders of 23 March 1998-1 December 2003....427, 647, 665, 853 
Colotenango (Guatemala) (matter of), Orders of 22 June 1994-12 July 2007 (lifted) ........................ 408, 
600, 613, 628, 757, 758, 849, 931, 968 
Communities of the Jiguamiandó and of the Curbaradó v. Colombia, Orders of 6 March 2003- 
 15 March 2005.................................................................................410, 592, 643, 644, 653, 655 
Constitutional Court Case v. Peru, Orders of 7 April 2000-14 March 2001- ...................... 205, 560-561, 
627, 745, 746, 748, 891 
Digna Ochoa and Plácido et al. v. Mexico, Orders of 17 November 1999-28 August 2001 .............. 159, 
 628, 647, 846, 853, 854, 891, 986 
Eloisa Barrios et al. v. Venezuela, Order of 23 November 2004......................................................... 504 
                                                 
2 This refers to Orders granting or denying requests for provisional measures. The provisional 
measures by the Inter-American Court are presented in alphabetical, rather than chronological, 
order, because often they are maintained for a considerable period and regularly expanded. 
Consecutive Orders are listed by date of first Order; the last Order mentioned may not be the last 
Order in the matter, as many situations are ongoing. 
 Table of Cases 
1170 
García Prieto family et al. (El Salvador) (Gloria Giralt de García Prieto  
 et al.), Order of 26 September 2006......................................... 152, 160, 445, 446, 611, 973, 974 
García Uribe et al. v. Mexico (Matter of), Order of 2 February 2006 ................................................. 752 
Gallardo-Rodríguez v. Mexico, Orders of 20 December 2001-18 February 2002 and  
 11 July 2007 .................................................................................................... 546-549, 553, 852 
Guerrero Gallucci and Martínez Barrios v. Venezuela, Order of 29 November 2007 ................ 406, 612 
Giraldo-Cardona v. Colombia, Orders of 28 October 1996-3 December 2001.................. 408, 410, 444,  
600, 613, 617, 966 
Gómez-Paquiyauri brothers v. Peru, Order of 7 May 2004 ................................................ 218, 376, 379 
Gutiérrez Soler v. Colombia, Orders of 11 March 2005-27 November 2007 .............................. 406, 612 
Haitians and Dominican of Haitian origin in the Dominican Republic v. Dominican Republic,  
 Orders of 7 August 2000-26 May 2001, ........................................ 409, 410, 502-506, 512, 513, 
521, 524, 600, 607, 608, 628, 646-650, 834, 835, 892, 965, 983, 1001, 1002, 1040 
Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica (La Nacion), Orders of 6 April 2001-26 August 2002................... 580-582, 
584, 991 
Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Orders of 21 November 2000-14 March 2001 ....................560, 578, 580, 583, 
609, 745-747, 975 
James et al. v. Trinidad and Tobago, Orders of 27 May 1998-28 February 2005 .............................. 154, 
156-159, 217-219, 223-227, 256, 621, 622, 645, 
663, 689, 693, 742, 743, 749-752, 757, 779, 798, 849, 850, 854, 
894-896, 908, 920, 950, 951, 985, 990, 991, 1015, 1040-1045 
Kankuamo indigenous community v. Colombia, Order of 5 July 2005 .........................460, 461, 643, 653 
La Nacion, see Herrera-Ulloa ...................................................................................................................  
Liliana Ortega et al. v. Venezuela, Orders of 27 November 2002-1 March 2005.......753, 894, 896, 1047 
Liliana Ortega et al.; Luisiana Ríos et al.; Luis Uzcátegui; Marta Colomina and Liliana Velásquez  
 v. Venezuela, Order for provisional measures of 4 May 2004 .............................. 753, 894, 1047 
Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Orders of 2 July 1996 - 28 August 2001 (lifted).......................... 361, 378, 461, 
505, 524, 599-601, 751, 835 
Tyrone Dacosta Cadogan v. Barbados, Order of the President of 4 November 2008 ................. 752, 892 
Luis Uzcátegui v. Venezuela, Orders of 27 November 2002-4 May 2004 ......................... 753, 894, 1047 
Luisiana Rios et al. v. Venezuela, Orders of 27 November 2002-3 July 2007 .................... 222, 582, 583, 
720, 753, 851, 894 
Marta Colomina and Liliana Velásquez v. Venezuela, Orders 30 July 2003-4 May 2004.................. 753, 
894, 1047 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Orders of 6 September 2002  
 and 26 November 2007 (lifting) .....................................................458, 461-463, 484, 513, 1046 
Mendoza Prison inmates v. Argentina, Order of 9 October 2000-17 October 2008 ........... 337, 338, 349, 
359, 360, 377, 504, 592, 599, 601, 604, 605, 620, 622, 652, 653, 1005, 1047 
Mery Naranjo et al. v. Colombia, Order of 22 September 2006 .................................................. 152, 160 
Miguel Agustín pro Juárez human rights center et al. v. Mexico, Orders of 30 November 2001- 
 22 August 2007 .............................................................................................................. 853, 854 
Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Orders of 29 January 2008 and 30 January 2007 ........... 337, 583, 
601, 799, 851, 852 
Millacura Llaipén y otros v. Argentina, Order of 21 June 2006 .......................................................... 849 
Monagas Judicial Confinement Center (‘La Pica’) (Venezuela) (Matter of), Orders of  
  February 2006 and 3 July 2007.......................................................337, 338, 359, 360, 601, 652 
Paniagua-Morales et al. and Vásquez et al. v. Guatemala (Panel Blanca case), Orders of  
 10 February 1998-28 August 2001 ......................................................................... 408, 636, 964 
Peace Community of San José de Apartado v. Colombia, Orders of 9 October 2000- 
 6 February 2008 .......................................................205, 410, 423-425, 592, 598, 600, 611-617, 
 619, 620, 624, 625, 637, 643, 646, 648-651, 653, 697, 720, 732, 
850, 851, 891, 894, 969-971, 1040 
 Table of Cases 
1171 
Persons imprisoned in the "Dr. Sebastião Martins Silveira" Penitentiary in Araraquara São Paulo 
(Brazil) (Matter of the), Orders of 30 September 2006 and 10 June 2008 ......152, 160, 890, 906, 
1047, 1048, 1081 
Peruvian Prisons cases v. Peru, Resolution of the President, 14 December 1992,  
 Order of 27 January 1993 (denied) ......................................................................... 335, 844, 848 
Penitentiary Center of the Central Occidental Region (Uribana Prison) (Venezuela)  
 (Matter of the), Order of 2 February 2007 .............................................................. 337, 601, 652 
Plan de Sánchez Massacre v. Guatemala, Orders of 30 July 2004 and 8 September 2004.......... 492, 665 
Ramírez Hinostroza et al. (Peru) (Matter of), Order of 17 May 2007 ......................................... 406, 612 
Raxcacó Reyes et al. v. Guatemala, Order of 30 August 2004 ............................................... 35, 36, 149, 
227, 236, 251, 758, 1046-1048 
Reggiardo-Tolosa v. Argentina, Orders of 19 November 1993 and 19 January 1994 ................. 532, 534 
Sarayaku indigenous community (Matter of/Asunto de Pueblo Indígena de Sarayaku)  
 v. Ecuador, Orders of 6 July 2004 and 17 June 2005 .............. 218, 224, 460, 463, 646, 650, 653 
Serech and Saquic v. Guatemala, Orders of 28 June 1996 and 19 September 1997............................ 852 
Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador, Orders of 12 April and 28 June 1996.................................337, 544, 661, 835 
Urso Branco prison, see: Cárcel de Urso Branco .....................................................................................  
Velásquez Rodríguez, Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales, and Godínez Cruz Cases (Honduras), Letter 
President on behalf of witnesses Jiménez-Puerto and Custodio López, 6 November 1987,  
 Series E, Compendium 1 (1987-1996), pp. 3-4; Letter Secretariat on behalf of witness Ramón 
Custodio López, 18 December 1987, Series E, Compendium 1 (1987-1996), pp. 1-2; Order of 
15 January 1988, Series E, Compendium 1 (1987-1996), pp. 5-7; Order of 19 January 1988, 
Series E, Compendium 1 (1987-1996), pp. 9-11............................................................. 407, 434 
Vogt v. Guatemala, Orders of 27 June 1996 and 11 November 1997..................423, 671, 850, 906, 976,  
Yare I and Yare II Capital Region Penitentiary Center (Venezuela) (Matter of), Orders of  
 30 March 2006-8 February 2008 ............................................. 337, 359, 360, 601, 604, 643, 652 
 
Orders for compliance with judgments 
Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Compliance with Judgment, Order of 17 November 1999 .......... 361, 378, 461, 
 505, 524, 599-601, 751, 835 
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Compliance with judgment, Order of 22 September 2006..................... 349, 350, 
360, 361, 544, 545, 689, 690, 974 
Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, 17 June 2005........................458, 459, 485, 486, 531, 610 
Case of Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Order of 2 February 
2007 on supervision of compliance.................................................................................... 459, 758, 1048 
Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala and Raxcacó Reyes v. Guatemala (Order on supervision of 
compliance) and Order on the request to expand the provisional measures in Raxcacó Reyes  
 y otros, 9 May 2008................................................................................................... 35, 36, 149, 
227, 236, 251, 758, 1046-1048 
Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Order of 27 January 2009 (Provisional Measures and  
 Monitoring Compliance with Judgment) ...................................................................... 758, 1046 
 
IACHR Judgments 
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 26 June 1987 (Preliminary Objections) ......... xxxi, 148, 
433, 434, 443, 445, 627, 661, 764-766, 806, 807, 845, 890, 891, 924, 966 
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 28 July 1988 .................................................. xxxi, 148, 
433, 434, 443, 445, 627, 661, 764-766, 806, 807, 845, 890, 891, 924, 966 
Godínez Cruz Case v. Honduras, Judgment of 20 January 1989................................................ xxxi, 148 
433, 434, 627, 661, 765, 845, 891, 924, 966 
Fairén Garbi and Solís Corrales Case v. Honduras, Judgment of 19 March 1989 ................... xxxi, 407, 
 434, 627, 765, 891, 924, 966 
Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment of 2 July 1996 (Preliminary Objections) ......................98, 101, 320, 406, 
607, 624, 626, 635, 636, 645, 661, 745, 835, 883, 968, 982 
 Table of Cases 
1172 
Velásquez Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment of 21 July 1989 (Compensatory damages)......... xxxi, 148, 
, 433, 434, 443, 445, 627, 661, 764-766, 806, 807, 845, 890, 891, 924, 966 
Aloeboetoe et al. v. Suriname, Judgment of 10 September 1993 (Reparation) .............492, 661, 664, 665 
Caballero Delgado and Santana v. Colombia, Judgment of 21 January 1994  
 (Preliminary Objections) ......................................................... 320, 766, 852, 853, 892, 973, 974 
Neira Alegría et al. v. Peru, Judgment of 19 January 1995 ..........................................373, 377, 542, 799 
Caballero Delgado and Santana v. Colombia, Judgment of 8 December 1995...........320, 766, 852, 853, 
892, 973-974 
Garrido and Baigorria v. Argentina, 2 February 1996........................................................ 320, 444, 661 
Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of 31 January 1996 (Preliminary Objections) ............. 361, 378, 461, 
 505, 524, 599-601, 751, 835 
El Amparo v. Venezuela, Judgment of 14 September 1996 ................................................................. 661 
Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of 17 September 1997 ................................................. 361, 378, 461, 
505, 524, 599-601, 751, 835 
Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Interpretation of the Judgment of 17 September 1997................. 361, 378, 461, 
505, 524, 599-601, 751, 835 
Castillo Páez v. Peru, 3 November 1997............................................................................. 320, 399, 853 
Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador, Judgment of 12 November 1997........................................337, 544, 661, 835 
Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment of 24 January 1998 ......................................................98, 101, 320, 406, 
607, 624, 626, 635, 636, 645, 661, 745, 835, 883, 968, 982 
Paniagua Morales et al v. Guatemala, Judgment of 8 March 1998 .............................444, 661, 662, 835 
“Panel Blanca” case, see: Paniagua Morales et al v. Guatemala ............................................................  
‘White Van’ case, see: Paniagua Morales et al v. Guatemala...................................................................  
Benavides Ceballos v. Ecuador, Judgment of 19 June 1998................................................................ 665 
Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of 27 November 1998 (Reparations)........................... 361, 378, 461, 
505, 524, 599-601, 751, 835 
Suárez Rosero v. Ecuador, Judgment of 29 May 1999 (Interpretation of the Judgment on  
 Reparations and costs) .....................................................................................337, 564, 661, 835 
Castillo Petruzzi v. Peru, 30 May 1999............................................................................................... 399 
Loayza Tamayo v. Peru, Judgment of 3 June 1999 (Interpretation of the Judgment of Reparations) . 361, 
378, 461, 505, 524, 599-601, 751, 835 
Constitutional Court v. Peru, Judgment of 24 September 1999 (Competence) ................... 205, 560-561, 
627, 745, 746, 748, 891 
Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment of 24 September 1999 (Competence) .................560, 578, 580, 583, 
609, 745-747, 975 
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Judgment of 29 September 1999............................................................ 349, 350, 
360, 361, 544, 545, 689, 690, 974 
Blake v. Guatemala, Judgment of 1 October 1999 (Interpretation of the Judgment on Reparations) ... 98, 
101, 320, 406, 607, 624, 626, 635, 636, 645, 661, 745, 835, 883, 968, 982 
Street Children case (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment of 19 November 1999....... 462, 
505, 513, 524, 664, 665, 689, 690 
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Judgment of 29 January 2000 (Interpretation of the Judgment  
 on the Merits) ................................................................................................................ 349, 350, 
360, 361, 544, 545, 689, 690, 974 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 1 February 2000  
 (Preliminary Objections) ................................................................458, 461-463, 484, 513, 1046 
Figueredo Planchart v. Venezuela, 13 April 2000 .............................................................................. 545 
Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Judgment of 18 August 2000 ..........................287, 506, 524, 689, 690, 707 
Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment of 25 November 2000....................320, 444, 470, 661, 664, 
702, 806 
Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Judgment of 3 December 2000 (Reparations) ....................... 287, 506, 524, 
689, 690, 707 
Constitutional Court Case v. Peru, Judgment of 31 January 2001 ...................................... 205, 560-561, 
627, 745, 746, 748, 891 
 Table of Cases 
1173 
“The Last Temptation of Christ” (Olmedo Bustos et al.) v. Chile, 5 February 2001 ................... 583, 691 
Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment of 6 February 2001 .............................................560, 578, 580, 583, 
609, 745-747, 975 
Street Children case (Villagrán Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, Judgment of 26 May 2001  
 (Reparations) .................................................................................................................. 505, 513 
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Judgment of 31 May 2001 (Reparations)............................................... 349, 350, 
360, 361, 544, 545, 689, 690, 974 
Mayagna (Sumo) Awas Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Judgment of 31 August 2001 .... 458, 461-463, 
484, 513, 1046 
Constantine et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, 1 September 2001 (Preliminary objections) .............. 102, 217, 
226, 227, 229, 237, 238, 379, 645, 693-695, 
742, 743, 746-748, 753, 934, 1044, 1045 
Hilaire et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, 1 September 2001 (Preliminary objections)...................... 159, 217, 
226, 227, 229, 237, 238, 379, 642, 693-695, 
742, 743, 746, 753, 1016, 1044, 1045 
Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, 1 September 2001 (Preliminary objections) .......... 217, 226, 227, 
229, 237, 238, 379, 645, 691-693, 695, 742, 743, 745, 746, 753, 1044 
Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Judgment of 4 September 2001 (Interpretation of the Judgment  
 on the Merits) .................................................................................................560, 578, 580, 583, 
609, 745-747, 975 
Cesti Hurtado v. Peru, Judgment of 27 November 2001 (Interpretation of the Judgment  
 of Reparation).......................................................... 349, 350, 360, 361, 544, 545, 689, 690, 974 
Barrios Altos v. Peru, Judgment of 30 November 2001 (Reparations)........................................ 662, 686 
Durand and Ugarte v. Peru, Judgment of 3 December 2001 (Reparations) ........................................ 689 
Cantoral Benavides v. Peru, Judgment of 3 December 2001 (Reparations) ....................... 287, 506, 524, 
689, 690, 707 
Bámaca Velásquez v. Guatemala, Judgment of 22 February 2002 (Reparations)................ 159, 429, 513 
Hilaire, Constantine, Benjamin et al. v. Trinidad & Tobago, Judgment of 21 June 2002 .................. 217, 
225-227, 229, 236, 237, 377, 689-691, 753, 1044, 1045 
Cantos v. Argentina, Judgment of 28 November 2002 ...................................................................... 585 
Juan Humberto Sanchez v. Honduras, 7 July 2003 ............................................................................. 320 
Bulacio v. Argentina, Judgment of 18 September 2003....................................................................... 377 
Maritza Urrutia v. Guatemala, Judgment of 27 November 2003................................................ 287, 707 
Mercedes Julia Huenteao Beroiza et al. v. Chile, 11 March 2004....................................... 459, 460, 490 
Molina Thiessen v. Guatemala, 4 May 2004 ....................................................................................... 320 
Herrera-Ulloa v. Costa Rica, Judgment of 2 July 2004 (merits and reparation) (la Nación)....... 583, 992 
Case of 19 Merchants disappeared in 1987 (‘19 Tradesmen’) v. Colombia, 5 July 2004 ................... 320 
Gómez Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, 8 July 2004 ............................................................... 218, 376, 379 
“Instituto de Reeducación del Menor” v. Paraguay, 2 September 2004...................... 357, 376-379, 604 
Plan de Sánchez massacre v. Guatemala, 19 November 2004 (Reparations) ............................ 492, 605 
Serrano Cruz sisters v. El Salvador, 1 March 2005............................................................................. 320 
Caesar v. Trinidad and Tobago, 11 March 2005 (Merits, Reparations and Costs)..................... 262, 263, 
 746, 1016, 1036 
Moiwana Village v. Suriname, 15 June 2005....................................................................... 484, 485, 492 
Comunidad Indígena Yakye Axa v. Paraguay, 17 June 2005............................458, 459, 485, 531, 610 
Fermín Ramírez v. Guatemala, 20 June 2005...............................................................229, 230, 241, 243 
Yatama v. Nicaragua, 23 June 2005 .................................................................................................... 568 
Yean and Bosico children v. Dominican Republic, 8 September 2005 .........................506-507, 513-516, 
Raxcacó Reyes et al. v. Guatemala, Judgment of 15 September 2005................................. 227, 236, 251 
Comunidad Indígena Sawhoyamaxa v. Paraguay, Judgment of 29 March 2006................................. 485 
Ximenes-Lopes v. Brazil, Judgment of 4 July 2006 ............................................................................. 375 
Montero Arangunen et al. (Detention Center of Catia) v. Venezuela, Judgment of 5 July 2006 ......... 377 
Miguel Castro Castro Prison, Judgment of 25 November 2006.......................................................... 852 
 Table of Cases 
1174 
García-Prieto et al. v. El Salvador, Judgment of 20 November 2007 (Preliminary Objections,  
 Merits, Reparations, and Costs).............................................................................. 152, 160, 445 
Boyce et al. v. Barbados, Judgment of 20 November 2007 ......... 217, 218, 224, 226, 227, 239, 688, 796, 
847, 892, 894, 1040, 1046 
 
Advisory Opinions 
Restrictions to the death penalty, OC-3/83, 8 September 1983 ........................................................... 227 
Habeas Corpus in Emergency Situations (Articles 27(2) and 7(6) ACHR), OC-8/87,  
 30 January 1987...................................................................................................................... 399 
Judicial Guarantees in States of Emergency (Articles 27(2), 25 and 8 ACHR), OC-9/87,  
 6 October 1987 ....................................................................................................................... 401 
Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Article 46(1), 46(2) and 46(2)(b) ACHR),  
 OC-1190, 10 August 1990...................................................................................................... 774 
The Right to Information on Consular Assistance in the Framework of Guarantees of the Due  
 Process of law, OC-16/99, 1 October 1999 ............................................................................ 240 
The Juridical Condition and Human Rights of the Child, OC-17/02, 28 August 2002 ........................ 524 
The Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, OC-18, 17 September 2003..... 276, 
510 
11 AFRICAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN AND PEOPLE’S RIGHTS (ACHPR)3 
Jean Yaovi Degli (on behalf of Corporal N. Bikagni, Union Interafricaine des Droits de l’Homme, 
International Commission of Jurists) v. Togo, March 1995, 83/92, 88/93, 91/93, (2000) 
AHRLR 315 (ACHPR 1994).................................................................................. 172, 412, 597 
Achutan and another (on behalf of Banda and others) v. Malawi, October/November 1995,  
 64/92, 68/92, and 78/92, 8th Annual Activity Report, (2000) AHRLR 144 (ACHPR 1995)... 243 
Commission Nationale des Droits de l'Homme et des Libertés v. Chad, October 1995, 74/92,  
 (2000) AHRLR 66 (ACHPR 1995) ........................................................................................ 707 
Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Akamu and Others) v. Nigeria, 60/91, 1995,  
 8th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 180 (ACHPR 1995)..................... 214, 243, 247 
Constitutional Rights Project (in respect of Zamani Lekwot and 6 Others) v. Nigeria, 87/93,  
 October 1995, 8th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 183 (ACHPR 1995) ............. 214 
Free Legal Assistance group, Lawyers’ Committee for Human Rights, Union Interafricaine des Droits 
de l’Homme, Les Témoins de Jehovah v. Zaire (now Congo), decided at 18th ordinary session, 
Oct. 1995, 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 100/93, 9th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 74 
(ACHPR 1995) ....................................................................................................................... 516 
Organisation Mondiale Contre La Torture v. Rwanda, 20th ordinary session, October 1996, 27/89, 
46/91, 49/91, 99/93, (2000) AHRLR 282 (ACHPR 1996)...................................................... 513 
Rencontre Africaine pour la Defense des Droits de l'Homme v. Zambia (on behalf of 517 West 
Africans), 20th ordinary session, October 1997, 71/92, (2000) AHRLR,  
 321 (ACHPR 1996) ................................................................................................................ 511 
Fédération Internationale des Ligues des Droits de l’Homme v. Angola, 11 November 1997, 159/96, 
(2000) AHRLR 18, (ACHPR 1997) ....................................................................................... 514 
Media Rights Agenda and others v. Nigeria, 31 October 1998, 105/93, 128/94, 130/94 and 152/96, 
(2000) AHRLR 200 (ACHPR 1998) .............................................................................. 381, 707 
International Pen, Constitutional Rights Project and Interights on behalf of Ken Saro-wiwa Jr. and 
Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, 31 October 1998, 137/94, 139/94, 154/96 and 161/97, 
12th Annual Activity Report, AHRLR 212 (ACHPR 1998)....................214, 242, 379, 595, 779, 
 908, 919, 946 
                                                 
3  The decisions by the African Commission are often undated. 
 Table of Cases 
1175 
Constitutional Rights Project and Another v. Nigeria, 102/93, decided at the 24th ordinary session,  
 12th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 191 (ACHPR 1998)................................... 353 
Amnesty International et al. v. Sudan, November 1999, 48/90, 50/91, 52/91, 89/93,  
 (2000) AHRLR 297 (ACHPR 1999) ...................................................................... 243, 246, 247 
Amnesty International (on behalf of William Banda and John Chinula) v. Zambia, 212/98, 5 May 1999, 
12th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 325 (ACHPR 1999).......................... 276, 510, 
 515, 516, 519, 767 
Constitutional Rights Project v. Nigeria (I), 148/96, decided at the 26th ordinary session,  
 13th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR (ACHPR 1999) ................................. 246, 353 
Constitutional Rights Project and Another v. Nigeria, 150/96, decided at the 26th ordinary session,  
 13th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 235 (ACHPR 1999)................................... 353 
Civil Liberties Organisation v. Nigeria, 151/96, decided at the 26th ordinary session, November 1999, 
13th Annual Activity Report and (2000) AHRLR 243 (ACHPR 1999)......................... 214, 353, 
 402, 403, 910, 921, 946 
Africa Legal Aid (on behalf of Mr. Lamin Waa Juwara) v. Gambia, 11 May 2000 (inadm.), 209/97, 
(2000) AHRLR 119 (ACHPR 2000) .............................................................................. 323, 774 
Malawi African Association et al. v. Mauritania, 11 May 2000, 4/91, 61/91, 98/93, 164/97 à 196/97  
 and 210/98, (2000) AHRLR 194 (2000)..........................................240, 243, 246, 247, 381, 514 
Association pour la Défense des Droits de l’Homme et des Libertés v. Djibouti, 13th Annual  
 Activity Report (2000), 133/94 and (2000) AHRLR 80 (ACHPR 2000).................. 71, 172, 413 
Forum of Conscience v. Sierra Leone, October/November 2000, 223/98, (2000) AHRLR 293  
 (ACHPR 2000) ....................................................................................................................... 248 
Modise v. Botswana, 14th Annual Activity Report (2000), 97/93, AHRLR 30 (ACHPR 2000) ......... 514, 
519, 767 
Avocats sans Frontières (on behalf of Bwampamye) v. Burundi, October/November 2000, 231/99, 
(2000)AHRLR 48 (ACHPR 2000) ............ 214 Huri-Laws v. Nigeria, October/November 2000,  
 225/98, (2000) AHRLR 273 (ACHPR 2000) ......................................................................... 382 
Civil Liberties Organisation et al. v. Nigeria, 218/98, April/May 2001, (2001) AHRLR 75  
 (ACHPR 2001) ................................................................................214, 240, 245, 247, 351, 401 
Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for for Economic and Social Rights v. Nigeria, 
155/96, 27 October 2001, (2001) AHRLR 60 (ACHPR 2001) ...............166, 191, 433, 486, 497, 
 518, 647, 648, 908 
Ogoni case, see: Social and Economic Rights Action Center and Center for Economic and Social 
Rights v. Nigeria 155/96, 27 October 2001 ..................................................................................  
Legal Resource Foundation v. Zambia, April/May 2001, 211/98, (2001) AHRLR 84  
 (ACHPR 2001) ....................................................................................................................... 435 
Interights (on behalf of Jose Domingo Sikunda) v. Namibia, May 2002 (inadm.), 239/2001,  
 (2002) AHRLR 21 (ACHPR 2002) ................................................................................ 276, 288 
Congo v. Rwanda, Burundi and Uganda, 227/99, reference to case in 15th Annual Activity report 
(2001-2002), p. 13 .......................................................................................................... 168, 178 
Curtis Doebbler v. Sudan, May 2003, 236/2000, 16th Annual Activity Report ................................... 264 
Purohit and Moore v. The Gambia, May 2003, 241/2001, (2003) AHRLR 96 (ACHPR)................... 435 
Interights (on behalf of Jose Domingo Sikunda) v. Namibia, May 2002 (inadm.), 239/2001,  
 (2002) AHRLR 21 (ACHPR 2002) ................................................................................ 274, 286 
Liesbeth Zegveld and Mussie Ephrem v. Eritrea, November 2003, 250/2002, 17th Annual Activity 
Report..................................................................................................................... 394, 395, 402 
Samuel Kofi Woods, II and Kabineh M. Ja’neh v. Liberia, November 2003, 256/2002, 17th Annual 
Activity Report ............................................................................................................... 395, 551 
B. v. Kenya, November/December 2004 (inadm.), 283/2003, 2004 AHRLR 67 ................................. 171 
Interights (on behalf of Husaini et al.) v. Nigeria, April 2005, (2005) AHRLR 56 (ACHPR 2005) .. 214, 
 1002, 1036 
Open Society Justice Initiative (on behalf of Njawe Noumeni) v. Cameroon, May 2006,  
 (2006) AHRLR 75 (ACHPR 2006) ........................................................................................ 579 
 Table of Cases 
1176 
Zimbabwe Human Rights NGO Forum v. Zimbabwe, May 2006, (2006) AHRLR 128  
 (ACHPR 2006) ....................................................................................................................... 708 
12 EUROPEAN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS (ECOMHR) 
Application of the ECHR to the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. UK), 176/56, 2 June 1956 (adm.). 173, 175, 
 214, 215, 416, 418, 896, 946 
X. v. FRG, 297/57, 22 March 1958 (inadm.) ................................................173, 331, 352, 549, 550, 896 
Application of the ECHR to the Island of Cyprus (Greece v. UK), 176/56, 26 September 1958 173, 175, 
 214, 215, 416, 418, 896, 946 
X v. Sweden, 434/58, 30 June 1959...................................................................................................... 281 
X v. Belgium, 984/61, 29 May 1961 (inadm.) ...................................................................................... 281 
Mohamed Nazih-Al-Kuzbari v. FRG, 1802/63, 26 March 1963 (inadm.), Yearbook 4, pp. 462-484... 281 
X. and Y. v. Belgium, 1420/62, 1477/62 and 1478/62, 18 December 1963 (inadm.).................... 176, 896 
X. v. Austria and Yugoslavia, 2143/64, 30 June 1964 (inadm.) ........................................... 274, 281, 912 
Karl Heinz Wemhoff v. FRG, 2122/64, 1 April 1966................................................................... 550, 903 
X v. FRG, 3040/67, 7 April 1967 (inadm.) .......................................................................................... 281 
X. v. Federal Republic of Germany, 2396/65, 22 December 1967 (adm.) ................................... 272, 281 
First Greek case: Denmark, Norway, Sweden & the Netherlands v. Greece, 3321-3323/67 and  
 3344/67, 24 January 1968............................................................................................... 769, 909 
Second Greek case: Denmark, Norway, Sweden v. Greece, 4448/70, 5 October 1970............... 173, 176, 
 215, 416, 946 
X. v. FRG, 5207/71, 13 December 1971 (adm.)........................................................................... 908, 909 
Mohamed Kerkoub v. Belgium, 5012/71, 15 December 1971 (inadm.) ............................................... 272 
Tossum Dolani v. Belgium, 5399/72, 31 May 1972 (inadm.)............................................................... 274 
Ireland v. UK, 5310/71, 1 October 1972 (inadm.) ...............................................8, 21, 46, 47, 72, 73, 77, 
 195, 332, 334, 418, 596, 681, 682, 727, 745, 872 
Amekrane v. UK, 5961/72, 11 October 1973 (adm.).................................................................... 176, 283 
X. v. The Netherlands, 6225/73, 27 May 1974 (struck out) ................................................................. 272 
East African Asians v. UK, 4403/70, 4404/70 and 4405/70, 14 December 1973................................. 522 
Brückmann v. Federal Republic of Germany, 6242/73, 14 July 1976, D.R. 6 (1977), p. 57................ 363 
X. v. the Netherlands, 6225/73, 27 May 1974 (struck out) .................................................................. 272 
Becker v. Denmark, 7011/75, 3 October 1975 (inadm.)........................................273, 274, 283, 646, 769 
William Posnett Lynas v. Switzerland, 7317/75, 6 October 1976 (inadm.).......................... 179, 831, 909 
Ennslin, Baader and Raspe v. FRG, 7572/76, 7586/76 and 7587/76, 8 July 1978 (inadm.) ............... 178, 
 563, 699, 917 
M. Sands and R. Sands v. UK, 9338/81, 14 October 1981 (struck out)............................................85-87, 
 196, 197, 366, 367, 638, 1108 
Cemal Kemal Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, 10308/83, 3 May 1983 (adm.) ............... 281, 630, 
837-841 
France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden & The Netherlands v. Turkey, 9940/82, 9941/82, 9942/82,  
 9943/82 and 9944/82, 6 December 1983 (adm.)..................................................................... 840 
Cemal Kemal Altun v. Federal Republic of Germany, 7 March 1984 (struck out), 10308/83, D&R 36, 
April 1984, p. 236.......................................................................................................... 281, 630, 
837-841 
S. v. the Netherlands, 10633/83, 5 March 1984 (inadm.)................................................................... 1006 
Kirkwood v. UK, 10479/83, 12 March 1984 (inadm.).......................................................... 283, 294, 295 
A. Romano, J. Santos and C. Antunes, I. Do Carmo (S., R., A. and C.) v. Portugal, 9911/82 and 
9945/82, 15 March 1984 (inadm.) .................................................................................. 365, 630 
L. v. France, 10 December 1984, 10564/83, D. & R. 40, p. 262 ......................................................... 769 
H.I. Taspinar v. The Netherlands, 11026/84, 9 October 1985 (struck out).......................... 296, 297, 952 
S.I.G. v. the Netherlands, 11615/85, 10 October 1985 (inadm.) ........................................ 294, 911, 1006 
France, Norway, Denmark, Sweden & The Netherlands v. Turkey, 9940/82, 9941/82, 9942/82,  
 9943/82 and 9944/82, 7 December 1985 ................................................................................ 840 
 Table of Cases 
1177 
Patané v. Italy, 11488/85, 3 December 1986 (struck out; not reported) .............................................. 361 
Dhoest v. Belgium, 10448/83, 14 May 1987........................................................................................ 293 
B. v. France, 18020/91, 12 July 1991 (adm.)....................................................................................... 177 
Jens Soering v. UK, 14038/88, 10 November 1988 (adm.)......................... xxxi, 174, 177, 228-230, 233, 
 250, 251, 255, 272, 282, 284, 285, 291-293, 306, 748, 913, 1059 
Nadarrajah Vilvarajah, Vaithialingam Skandarajah, Saravamuthu Sivakumaran, Vathanan 
Navratnasingam and Vinnasithamby Rasalingam v. UK, 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 
13447/87 and 13448/87, 7 July 1989 (adm.).................................273, 282, 291, 828, 1058-1060 
Cruz Varas et al. v. Sweden, 15576/89, 7 June 1990 .............................xxi, 179, 182, 282, 508, 591,904, 
 909-912, 914-916, 918-921, 924-927, 929, 988, 992, 1012, 1049, 1056 
Mansi v. Sweden, 15658/89, 7 December 1990 (adm.)............179, 591, 909-911, 913, 1013, 1016, 1049 
Mansi v. Sweden, 15658/89, 9 March 1990 (friendly settlement) ....179, 591, 909-911, 1013, 1016, 1049 
A. v. France, 17262/90, 27 February 1991 (inadm.).................................................................... 769, 952 
B. v. France, 22 January 1987 (inadm.), 11722/85, D.& R. 51 ................................................. 769, 1048 
B., M. and 51 others v. Spain, 20347/92, 11 September 1992 ............................................. 526, 591, 643 
Vakalis v. Greece, 19796/92, 15 January 1993 (struck out)......................................................... 367, 633 
D. et al. v. Sweden, 22308/93, 8 September 1993 (struck out)............................................................. 297 
G. and E. v. Norway, 9278/81 and 9415/81, 3 October 1993 .............................................. 475, 479, 643 
Barir and Amuur v. France, 19776/92, 18 October 1993 (partly struck out, partly adm.)........... 380, 769 
R.M. v. UK, 22761/93, 14 April 1994 (inadm.) ................................................................................... 177 
J. Aylor-Davis v. France, 22742/93, 20 January 1994 (inadm.) .......................................................... 252 
I. Tanko v. Finland, 23634/94, 19 May 1994 (inadm.) ................................................................ 296, 297 
Sampson v. Cyprus, 19774/92, 9 May 1994 (inadm.) ...........................xxxi, 173, 175, 214-215, 896, 946 
Francine Nsona and Bata Nsona v. The Netherlands, 23366/94, 2 March 1995 ................................. 297 
Ahmed v. Austria, 25964/94, 2 March 1995 (adm.) ......................................................174, 272, 303, 373 
Chahal Family v. UK, 22414/93, 27 June 1995.............. 174, 273, 285, 400, 841, 871, 1058, 1059, 1061 
Ahmed v. Austria, 25964/94, 5 July 1995 .................................................................... 174, 272, 303, 373 
Nasri v. France, 19465/92, Judgment of 13 July 1995 ........................................................................ 299 
1ian v. Sweden, 26516/95, 14 September 1995 (inadm.) ..................................................................... 634 
Yeung Yuk Leung v. Portugal, 24464/94, 27 November 1995 (struck out).......................................... 770 
Tauira et al. v. France, 28204/95, 4 December 1995 (inadm.)............................................ 536, 537, 862 
H.L.R. v. France, 24573/94, 7 December 1995 ................................................................................... 449 
Hussain Mohamed Omar and Yonis Hassan Samanthar v. France, 29531/95, 25 January 1996  
 (struck out) ............................................................................................................................. 271 
A. Harron and J. Alayo v. Sweden, 28783/95, 7 March 1996 (adm.)................................................... 297 
A. Zapata Salazar and Family v. Sweden, 28987/95, 7 March 1996 (inadm.) ..................................... 351 
J.A. Paez v. Sweden, 29482/95, 18 April 1996 (adm.)................................................................. 415, 429 
Aaiza and Azam Choudry v. UK, 27949/95, 13 May 1996 (inadm.)............................................ 298, 303 
D. v. UK, 30240/96, 15 October 1996 .................................................................................. 297-299, 301 
Pietro Venezia v. Italy, 29966/96, 21 October 1996 (struck out)......................................................... 252 
Harron and Alayo v. Sweden, 28783/95, 3 December 1996 (struck out) ............................................. 299 
Kurt v. Turkey, 24276/94, 5 December 1996................................................................ 195, 321-323, 913 
Hüseyin Demir, Faik Kaplan, Sükrü Süsin v. Turkey, 21380/93, 21381/93 and 21383/93,  
 29 May 1997........................................................................................................................... 354 
B.B. v. France, 30930/96, 8 September 1997 (adm.), 9 March 1998 (Article 31 Report) and  
 7 September 1998 (struck out)................................................................................................ 300 
Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, 33977/96, 20 October 1997 (inadm.) ............................................................ 365, 630 
Cyprus v. Turkey, 25781/94, 4 June 1999.....................................................................322, 325, 380, 735 
13 EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS (ECTHR) 
Wemhoff v. Germany, 2122/64, 27 June 1968 ............................................................................. 550, 903 
Golder v. UK, 4451/70, 21 February 1975 .......................................................................................... 921 
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 5493/72, 7 December 1976 ................................................................ 586 
 Table of Cases 
1178 
Ireland v. United Kingdom, 5310/71, Judgment of 18 January 1978.................................. 330, 332, 416, 
 678, 682, 722, 750, 869 
Tyrer v. UK, 5856/72, Judgment of 25 April 1978 .......................................................250, 261, 262, 926 
Klass and others v. Germany, 5029/71, Judgment of 6 September 1978............................................. 915 
The Sunday Times v. United Kingdom, 6538/74, 29 March 1979........................................................ 586 
Le Compte, Van Leuven and De Meyere v. Belgium, 6878/75 and 7238/75, Judgment of  
 23 June 1981.................................................................................................................... xiii, 563 
Piersack v. Belgium, 8692/79, 1 October 1982.................................................................................... 563 
Sramek v. Austria, 8790/79, Judgment of 22 October 1984................................................................... xii 
Z. v. The Netherlands, 10400/83, 14 May 1984................................................................................... 769 
Bönisch v. Austria, 8658/79, Judgment of 6 May 1985 .............................................................. xxxi, 585 
X and Y v. the Netherlands, 8978/80, 26 March 1985 ......................................................... 447, 448, 591 
Belilos v. Switzerland, 10328/83, 29 April 1988 ................................................................................. 476 
Plattform ‘Artze für das Leben’ v. Austria, 10126/82, 21 June 1988................................................... 593 
Langborger v. Sweden, 11179/84, 27 January 1989 ............................................................................ 563 
Soering v. UK, 14038/88, Judgment of 7 July 1989 ................................... xxxi, 174, 177, 228-230, 233, 
250, 251, 255, 272, 282, 284, 285, 291-293, 306, 748, 913, 1059 
Powell and Rayner v. UK, 9310/81, 21 February 1990 ....................................................................... 593 
Cossey v. UK, 10843/84, Judgment of 27 September 1990 ................................................................. 929 
Case of Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, 15576/89, Judgment of 20 March 1991........... xxi, 179, 282,  
508, 591, 904, 909-912, 914-916, 918-921, 924-927, 929, 988, 992, 1012, 1049, 1056 
Clooth v. Belgium, 12718/87, 12 December 1991 ............................................................................... 662 
Vilvarajah and others v. the United Kingdom, 13163/87, 30 October 1991 ....................... 273, 282, 291, 
828, 1058-1060 
Beldjoudi v. France, 12083/86, Judgment of 26 February 1992.......................................................... 576 
Vijayanathan and Pusparajah v. France, 17550/90 and 17825/91, Judgment of 27 August 1992 ...... 177 
Herczegfalvy v. Austria, 10533/83, Judgment of 24 September 1992.................................................. 334 
Brannigan and McBride v. UK, 14553/89 ........................................................................................... 402 
Hurtado v. Switzerland, 17549/90, 28 January 1994 ...........................................351, 352, 362, 363, 380, 
441, 546, 547, 693, 694, 975 
Keegan v. Ireland, 16969/90, 26 May 1994 ........................................................................................ 593 
Otto-Preminger-Institut v. Austria, 13470/87, 20 September 1994 ..................................................... 586 
Hentrich v. France, 13616/88, 22 September 1994 ............................................................................. 661 
Loizidou v. Turkey, 15318/89, Judgment of 23 March 1995 (Grand Chamber)  
 (preliminary objections) ..........................................................................735, 745, 747, 748, 912 
McCann and Others v. UK, 18984/91, 27 September 1995................................................................. 598 
Amuur v. France, 19776/92, Judgment of 25 June 1996 ............................................................. 380, 769 
Akdivar and others v. Turkey, 21893/93, Judgment of 16 September 1996 (Grand Chamber) ........... 518, 
659, 913 
Stubbings v. UK, 22083/93 and 22095/93, 22 October 1996 ....................................................... 450, 593 
Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 22414/93, Judgment of 15 November 1996 (Grand Chamber)......... 177, 
273, 285, 400, 841, 871, 1058, 1059, 1061 
F. & B. Nsona v. The Netherlands, 23366/94, Judgment of 28 November 1996 ................................. 299 
Ahmed v. Austria, 25964/94, Judgment of 17 December 1996 .....................................174, 272, 303, 373 
Aksoy v. Turkey, 21987/93, Judgment of 18 December 1996 ...................................................... 400, 913 
Greenpeace Schweiz et al. v. Switzerland, 27644/95, 7 April 1997..................................................... 646 
D. v. UK, 30240/96, Judgment of 2 May 1997 ..................................................................... 297-299, 301 
Balmer-Schafroth et al. v. Switzerland, 22110/93, 27 August 1997 .................................................... 862 
Aydin v. Turkey, 23178/94, Judgment of 25 September 1997...................................................... 446, 448 
Raninen v. Finland, 20972/92, 16 December 1997 ............................................................................. 522 
Akdivar and others v. Turkey, 21893/93, 1 April 1998 (Pecuniary damages)...................... 518, 659, 913 
Selçuk and Asker v. Turkey, 23184/94 and 23185/94, 24 April 1998 .................................................. 521 
Kurt v. Turkey, 24276/94, Judgment of 25 May 1998 .................................................. 193, 321-323, 913 
Petra v. Romania, 27273/95, Judgment of 23 September 1998........................................................... 915 
 Table of Cases 
1179 
Assenov et al. v. Bulgaria, 24760/94, Judgment 28 October 1998..................................................... 1063 
Osman v. UK, 23452/94, 28 October 1998 (Grand Chamber) ...................................... 446-448, 590, 646 
Pélissier and Sassi v. France, 25444/94, 25 March 1999.................................................................... 241 
Messina v. Italy, 25498/94, 8 June 1999 (adm.) .................................................................................. 364 
Çakici v. Turkey, 23657/94, 8 July 1999 (Grand Chamber)................................................................. 323 
Selmouni v. France, 25803/94, 28 July 1999 (Grand Chamber).......................................................... 678 
Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, 52750/99, 18 January 2000 (adm.).............................362, 363, 380, 631 
S.C.C. v. Sweden, 46553/99, Decision of 15 February 2000 (inadm.) ......................................... 297, 298 
T.I. v. UK, 43844/98, Judgment of 7 March 2000 ............................................................................... 305 
Özgür Gündem v. Turkey, 23144/93, 16 March 2000.......................................................................... 593 
Mahmut Kaya v. Turkey, 22535/93, 28 March 2000...................................447, 448, 590, 596, 646, 1003 
Labita v. Italy, 26772/95, 6 April 2000 ....................................................................................... 325, 593 
Athanassoglou et al. v. Switzerland, 27644/95, 6 April 2000 (Grand Chamber) ................. 538, 539, 646 
Timurtas v. Turkey, 23531/94, 13 June 2000............................................................................... 323, 325 
Salman v. Turkey, 21986/93, Judgment of 27 June 2000 (Grand Chamber) ................................ 323, 869 
Tatete v. Switzerland, 41874/98, Judgment 6 July 2000.............................................................. 297, 952 
Jabari v. Turkey, 40035/98, Judgment of 11 July 2000................................................272, 591, 769, 952 
Cardoso and Johansen v. UK, 47061/99, Decision of 5 September 2000 (struck out) ........................ 299 
Labita v. Italy, 26772/95, Judgment of 6 April 2000 (Grand Chamber) ...................................... 325, 593 
Sevtap Veznedaroğlu v. Turkey, 32357/96, 11 April 2000................................................................... 833 
Kudla v. Poland, 30210/96, Judgment of 26 October 2000 ......................................................... 383, 522 
Bilgin v. Turkey, 23819/94, 16 November 2000 .................................................................................. 521 
Öcalan v. Turkey, 46221/99, Judgment of 14 December 2000 (First Section) (partly inadm.)... 171, 175, 
180, 181, 215, 228-231, 241, 244, 
245, 250, 251, 393,-396, 917, 946, 980 
Chapman v. UK, 27238/95, Judgment of 18 January 2001.................................................................. 929 
Dulaş v. Turkey, 25801/94, 30 January 2001....................................................................................... 521 
Bensaid v. UK, 44599/98, 6 February 2001......................................................................................... 300 
Conka et al. v. Belgium, 51564/99, Judgment of 13 March 2001 (partly adm.).................. 380, 508, 512, 
769, 911, 919, 920, 922, 926, 927, 929 
Keenan v. UK, 27229/95, Judgment of 3 April 2001................................................................... 363, 593 
Cyprus v. Turkey, 25781/94, 10 May 2001 (Grand Chamber) ......................................322, 325, 380, 735 
Z. et al. v. UK, 29392/95, 10 May 2001....................................................................................... 450, 593 
Nivette v. France, 44190/98, Judgment 3 July 2001 (inadm.) ............................................................. 296 
Avşar v. Turkey, 25657/94, Judgment of 10 July 2001 ........................................................................ 872 
Einhorn v. France, 71555/01, Judgment 16 October 2001 (inadm.).................................................... 296 
Al-Adsani v. UK, 35763/97, Judgment of 21 November 2001 (Grand Chamber) ................ 287, 707, 919 
Bankovic et al v. Belgium and 16 other States, 52207/99, 12 December 2001 (inadm.)  
 (Grand Chamber)............................................................................................................ 305, 735 
Conka and others v. Belgium, 51564/99, Judgment of 5 February 2002 ............................ 380, 508, 512, 
769, 911, 919, 920, 922, 926, 927, 929 
Stafford v. UK, 46295/99, 28 May 2002 (Grand Chamber) ......................................................... 929, 930 
Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 50963/99, 30 May 2002................................................................................... 402 
Weiss v. Austria, 74511/01, 13 June 2002 (struck out) ........................................................................ 294 
Orhan v. Turkey, 25656/94, 18 June 2002........................................................................................... 325 
Christine Goodwin v. UK, 28957/95, 11 July 2002 (Grand Chamber) ................................ 267, 928, 929 
Taskin v. Germany, 56132/00, 23 July 2002 (struck out) .................................................................... 299 
Williams v. Germany, 10763/02, 12 September 2002 (struck out)....................................................... 533 
Koughouli v. France, 50160/99, 26 September 2002 (inadm.) ............................................................ 995 
Mastromatteo v. Italy, 37703/97, 24 October 2002 ............................................................................. 450 
E. et al. v. the UK, 33218/96, 26 November 2002 ............................................................................... 450 
Jacobus Lorsé et al. v. The Netherlands, 52750/99, Judgment of 4 February 2003......362, 363, 380, 631 
Van der Ven v. The Netherlands, 50901/99, Judgment of 4 February 2003 (First Section) ......... 362, 380 
 Table of Cases 
1180 
Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, 46827/99 and 46951/99, Judgment of 6 February 2003  
 (First Section) ................................... xxi, 182, 716, 909, 911, 914, 931, 1012, 1059, 1070, 1099 
Öcalan v. Turkey, 46221/99, 12 March 2003 (First Section)...................................................... 171, 175, 
180, 181, 215, 228-231, 241, 244, 
245, 250, 251, 393, 396, 917, 946, 980 
Izquierdo Galbis v. Spain, 59724/00, 20 May 2003 (inadm.) .............................................................. 587 
Arcila Henao v. the Netherlands, 13669/03, 24 June 2003 (inadm.) ................................................... 398 
Lunguli v. Sweden, 33692/02, Judgment 1 July 2003 (struck out)....................................................... 272 
Shamayev and 12 others v. Georgia and Russia, 36378/02, Judgment 16 September 2003  
 (Second Section) (partly adm.) ........................................ 177, 181, 272, 316, 396, 629, 841, 929 
N. v. Finland, 38885/02, 23 September 2003 (adm.) ................................................................... 830, 831 
Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, 24668/03, Decision 23 September 2003 ...................772, 929, 930, 985, 986 
Scharsach and News Verlagsgesellschaft v. Austria, 39394/98, 13 November 2003 .......................... 586 
Nachova and Others v. Bulgaria, 43577/98 and 43579/98, 26 February 2004.................................... 325 
Hida v. Denmark, 38025/02, 19 February 2004 (inadm.) .................................................................... 300 
Haliti et al. v. Denmark, 14712/03, 19 February 2004 (inadm.) .......................................................... 300 
Muratovic v. Denmark, 14923/03, 19 February 2004 (inadm)............................................................. 300 
Assanidze v. Georgia, 71503/01, 8 April 2004 .................................................................................... 596 
Tahsin Acar v. Turkey, 26307/95, 8 April 2004................................................................................... 325 
Ndangoya v. Sweden, 17868/03, 22 June 2004 (inadm.) ..................................................................... 298 
Von Hannover v. Germany, 59320/00, 24 June 2004 .......................................................................... 593 
Salkic et. al. v. Sweden, 7702/04, Decision 29 June 2004 (inadm.) ..................................................... 298 
Ilaşcu et al. v. Moldova and Russia, 48787/99, 8 July 2004................................................ 367, 633, 735 
Hun v. Turkey, 5142/04, Decision of 2 September 2004 (adm.) .......................................................... 633 
Issa v. Turkey, 31821/96, 16 November 2004 ..................................................................... 197, 735, 736 
Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 46827/99 and 46951, 15 December 2004/4 February 2005 ....... xxi, 
179, 182, 195, 208, 508, 630, 698, 716, 748, 828, 842, 845, 
908, 909, 912-931, 934, 945, 952, 980, 988, 1012, 1022, 1054, 1056-1061, 1063, 1099, 1106 
Türkoğlu v. Turkey, 34506/97, 17 March 2005.................................................................................... 325 
Nevmerzhitsky v. Ukraine, 54825/00, 5 April 2005 ............................................................................. 334 
Shamayev et al. v. Georgia and Russia, 36378/02, 12 April 2005 (Grand Chamber) ................. 177, 181, 
272, 316, 396, 629, 841, 929 
Öcalan v. Turkey, 46221/99, Judgment of 12 May 2005 (Grand Chamber) ............................... 171, 175, 
180, 181, 215, 228-231, 241, 244, 
245, 250, 251, 393, 396, 917, 946, 980 
Akdeniz v. Turkey, 25165/94, 31 May 2005................................................................................. 325, 807 
Said v. the Netherlands, 2345/02, 5 July 2005..................................................................................... 828 
Moldovan et al. v. Romania (No. 2), 41138/98 and 64320/01, 12 July 2005 ....................... 519, 520, 714 
N. v. Finland, 38885/02, Judgment of 26 July 2005 ............................................................................ 828 
Taniş et al. v. Turkey, 65899/01, 2 August 2005 ......................................................................... 325, 326 
Özgen et autres c. Turquie, 38607/97, 20 September 2005 ................................................................. 325 
Kaldik v. Germany, 28526/05, 22 September 2005 (inadm.)............................................................... 300 
Mathew v. the Netherlands, 24919/03, 29 September 2005................................................................. 293 
Sarban v. Moldova, 3456/05, 4 October 2005 ..................................................................................... 354 
Nesibe Haran v. Turkey, 28299/95, 6 October 2005............................................................................ 325 
Gongadze v. Ukraine, 34056/02, 8 November 2005............................................................................ 326 
Tekin Yildiz v. Turkey, 22913/04, 10 November 2005 ......................................................... 367, 606, 848 
Hun v. Turkey, 5142/04, 10 November 2005....................................................................................... 632 
Taner Tanyeri et al. v. Turkey, 74308/01, 6 December 2005 (struck out) ........................................... 367 
Şeker v. Turkey, 52390/99, 21 February 2006 ..................................................................................... 325 
Evans v. UK, 6339/05, 7 March 2006 (Fourth section)........................................................................ 540 
Saddam Hussein v. Albania, UK et al., 23276/04, 14 March 2006 (inadm.) ...................... 181, 230, 268, 
304, 305, 736 
Uçar v. Turkey, 52392/99, 11 April 2006............................................................................................ 325 
 Table of Cases 
1181 
Istrate v. Moldova, 53773/00, 13 June 2006........................................................................................ 318 
Bazorkina v. Russia, 69481/01, 27 July 2006 ....................................................................... 324-325, 804 
Olaechea Cahuas v. Spain, 24668/03, Judgment of 10 August 2006 ...................772, 929, 930, 985, 986 
Isaak et al. v. Turkey, 44587/98, 28 September 2006 (adm.)............................................................... 736 
Salah Sheekh v. The Netherlands, 1948/04, 11 January 2007......................273, 303, 805, 830-832, 1053 
Al-Moayad v. Germany, 35865/03, 20 February 2007 (inadm.) .......................................................... 903 
Collins and Akaziebie v. Sweden, 23944/05, 8 March 2007 (inadm.) .................................................. 292 
Evans v. UK, 6339/05, 10 April 2007 (Grand Chamber) ..................................................................... 540 
Gebremedhin v. France, 25389/05, 26 April 2007 ...................................................................... 769, 773 
Behrami and Behrami v. France and Saramati v. France, 71412/01 and 78166/01,  
 2 May 2007..................................................................................................................... 736, 737 
Ciorap v. Moldova, 12066/02, 19 June 2007....................................................................................... 332 
Bitiyeva and X v. Russia, 57953/00 ..................................................................................................... 415 
Paladi v. Moldova, 39806/05, 10 July 2007 ................................................................................ 352, 930 
Sultani c. France, 45223/05, 20 September 2007 ........................................................................ 768, 769 
Dybeku v. Albania, 41153/06, 18 December 2007....................................................................... 362, 596 
Mostafa et autres c. Turquie, 16348/05, 15 January 2008 ................................................................... 953 
Saadi v. Italy, 37201/06, 28 February 2008 (Grand Chamber) ..............273, 299, 828-831, 833, 842, 871 
Shtukaturov v. Russia, 44009/05, 27 March 2008 ............................................................... 396, 596, 989 
Nnyanzi v. UK, 21878/06, 8 April 2008............................................................................................... 831 
N. v. UK, 26565/05, 27 May 2008 (Grand Chamber) ................................................................... 298-299 
Rodić et al. v. Bosnia and Herzegovina, 22893/05, 27 May 2008.................................... 365, 630, 631 
Kotsaftis v. Greece, 39780/06, 12 June 2008....................................................................................... 352 
Ryabikin v. Russia, 8320/04, 19 June 2008...................................................272, 805, 828, 829, 842, 953 
Pad et al. v. Turkey, 60167/00, 28 June 2007 (inadm.) ....................................................................... 735 
NA. v. UK, 25904/07, 17 July 2008 ..................................................................... 181, 2753 644, 829-831 
Prezec v. Croatia, 7508/05, 28 August 2008 (struck out).................................................................... 362 
Muminov v. Russia, 42502/06, 11 December 2008............................................................ 952, 953, 1050 
Paladi v. Moldova, 39806/05, 10 March 2009 (Grand Chamber)................................................ 352, 930 
 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) 
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, case IT-95-17/I-T, 10 December 1998, 38 ILM 317 (1999) .............. 287, 707 
Prosecutor v. Delacic and Others, case IT-96-21-T, 16 November 1998.................................... 287, 707 
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, cases IT-96-23-T and IT-96-23/1, 22 February 2001............................. 287, 707 
 
Bosnia Human Rights Chamber 
Borislav Herak v. Fed. BiH, 12 June 1998 ...........................................................214, 231, 232, 241, 946 
Sretko Damjanović v. Fed. BiH, 5 September 1997..............................................214, 231, 232, 241, 946 
Nail Rizvanović v. Fed.BiH, 13 November 1998 ......................................................................... 214, 946 
Ratko Grgić v. Republika Srpska, 5 August 1997........................................................................ 318, 786 
Josip, Božana and Tomislav Matanović v. Republika Srpska, 6 August 1997............................ 316, 322, 
 324, 325, 434, 447, 592, 786, 1024 
M.J. v. Srpska, 7 November 1997........................................................................................................ 519 
Medan et al. v. State and Fed. B&H, 7 November 1997...................................................................... 519 
Turčinović v. Fed. B&H, 11 March 1998 ............................................................................................ 519 
Kalinčević v. B&H and Fed. B&H, 11 March 1998 ............................................................................ 519 
Balić v. Srpska, 10 September 1998 (adm.)......................................................................................... 318 
Dyke Hasanaj et al. (11 adults and 27 children) v. B&H and Fed. B&H, 16 April 1999 (struck out). 528 
Milorad Marčeta v. The Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 3 April 1998 .......................... 550, 553 
Adnan Suljanović, Edita Čišić and Asim Lelić v. State BiH and Republika Srpska, 14 May 1998 
(inadm.) .......................................................................................................................... 568, 733 
S.K. v. Srpska, 14 May 1999................................................................................................................ 511 
Čavić v. B&H, 18 December 1998 (inadm.) ........................................................................................ 734 
 Table of Cases 
1182 
The Islamic Community in BiH (Banja Luka Mosques) v. The Republika Srpska,  
 11 June 1999........................................................................................................... 465, 468, 487 
Nada Blagojević v. Srpska, 11 June 1999............................................................................................ 519 
Mahmutović v. Republika Srpska, 8 October 1999 .............................................................. 466, 477, 493 
D.K. v. Republika Srpska, 2 November 1999 ............................................................................ 890, 1051 
Islamic Community in BiH v. Republika Srpska (Muslim Town Cemetery in Prnjavor),  
 11 January 2000........................................................................................ 466, 493-495, 643-644 
Municipal Council of the Municipality South-West Mostar v. the High Representative, 9 March 2000 
(inadm.) .................................................................................................................................. 734 
Novo Bencuz v. Republika Srpska, 8 February 2000 (inadm.) ............................................................. 550 
Ristić v. Srpska, 4 September 2000...................................................................................................... 511 
Islamic Community in BiH (former mosque sites in Zvornik) v. Republika Srpska,  
 9 November 2000 ........................................................................................................... 468, 489 
The Islamic Community in BiH (former Atik Mosque, Bijeljina) v. Republika Srpska,  
 6 December 2000.................................................................................................... 466, 487, 488 
Srpska Radikalna Stranka v. State BiH, 8 December 2000 (inadm.) ........................................... 568, 733 
Jasmin Šljivo v. Republika Srpska, 9 February 2001 (inadm.)............................................................. 550 
M.A. v. Federation BiH, 7 March 2001 (inadm.)................................................................................. 550 
Aziz Dautbegović and 51 Other Villagers from Duge v. Federation BiH, 2 July 2001................ 509, 641 
Drago Lukenda and Miroljub Bevanda v. Fed. BiH, 5 July 2001 (inadm.) ................................. 511, 644 
The Islamic Community in BiH (Jakeš Cemetery) v. Republika Srpska, 8 October 2001 .................... 466 
Boudellaa, Lakhdar, Nechle and Lahmar v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 11 October 2002 ..................... 279, 286, 
304, 605, 772, 890, 983, 994, 1002, 1051, 1052, 1069 
Ibrahim Makić v. Fed. BiH, 9 November 2001 (inadm.) ..................................................................... 550 
Aiša Tufekčić v. Fed. BiH, 6 December 2001 (adm.)........................................................................... 511 
Ivo Lozančić et al. v. Fed. BiH, 8 March 2002 (inadm.)...................................................................... 550 
Edin Garplija v. Fed. BiH, 9 April 2002 ............................................................................................. 550 
Mustafa Ait Idir v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 4 April 2003 (adm. & merits)...........................279, 286, 287, 304 
Belkasem Bensayah v. BiH and Fed. BiH, 4 April 2003...................................................................... 282 
Čengić v. BiH and Srpska, 5 September 2003 ............................................................................. 469, 480 
Islamic Community in BiH (Mrkonjić Grad) v. Republika Srpska, 22 December 2003....... 467, 673, 674 
 
Judicial Committee of the Privy Council (JCPC) 
Fisher v Minister of Public Safety and Immigration (No. 2) (Bahamas) 2 W.L.R. 349 (P.C.) (Lord 
Slynn of Hedley and Lord Hope of Craighead dissenting, p. 452 E-F) (5 October 1998)....... 996 
Pratt and Ivan Morgan v The Attorney General for Jamaica and another (Jamaica) [1993] UKPC 1  
 (2 November 1993)................................................................................................................. 683 
Darrin Roger Thomas and Haniff Hilaire v Cipriani Baptiste (Trinidad and Tobago) [1999] UKPC 13 
(17 March 1999)..............................................................................................988, 996, 997, 999 
Tangiora v Wellington District Legal Services Committee (New Zealand) [1999] UKPC 42  
 (4 October 1999) .................................................................................................................. 1000 
Briggs v Cipriani Baptiste (Commissioner of Prisons) and Others (Trinidad and Tobago) [1999] UKPC 
45 (28 October 1999).................................................................................................... 752, 1000 
Higgs v Minister of National Security [2000] 2 A.C. 228, pp. 245G-46C (14 December 1999) ......... 996 
Lewis, Patrick Taylor and Anthony McLeod, Christopher Brown, Desmond Taylor and Steve Shaw v 
The Attorney General of Jamaica and Another (Jamaica) [2000] UKPC 34  
 (12 September 2000) .............................................................................................................. 997 
 
Supreme Court of Canada 
United States v. Burns, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 283 (15 February 2001) ........................139, 145, 236, 283, 291, 
1009, 1010 
RJR-Macdonald Inc. v. Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311 (3 March 1994) .............. 1011 
 Table of Cases 
1183 
Ahani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 72  
 (11 January 2002) ........................................................................................................... 826, 998 
Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3  
 (11 January 2002) ......................................................................285, 825, 826, 1007, 1012, 1033 
 
Court of Appeal for Ontario 
Ahani v. Canada (A.G.) (2002), 58 O.R. (3d) 107 (8 February 2002) ......................... 633, 986-988, 992, 
999-1001, 1006, 1010-1013 
 
US Supreme Court 
Sale, Acting Commissioner, Immigration and Naturalization Service, et al. v. Haitian Center Council, 
INC, et al., 509 U.S. 155 ........................................................................................................ 284 
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998)........................................................................................... 92, 94 
Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).............................................................................................. 216 
Medellin v. Dretke, 544 U.S. 660 (2005)............................................................................................... 94 
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).................................................................................. 94 
Medellín v. Texas, US 552 U.S. _ (2008), 128 S. Ct. 1346.................................................................... 94 
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S._ (2008), 128 S. Ct. 2229..................................................................... 392 
 
Texas Courts of Criminal Appeals 
Saldaño v. State, 70 S.W. 3d 873 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (13 March 2002) ...................................... 217 
 
Other domestic courts 
House of Lords (UK) R (Al-Jedda) v. Secretary of State for Defence, 12 December 2007,  
 [2007] UKHL 58 .................................................................................................................... 737 
England and Wales Court of Appeal R (Al-Saadoon) v. Secretary of State for Defence [2009] EWCA 
Civ 7, appeal dismissed on 30 December 2008, motivated and published on  
 21 January 2009...................................................................................................................... 737 
Family Court (Australia) B and B v. Minister for Immigration & Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs 
[2003] FamCA 451, judgment of 19 June 2003...................................355, 961, 962, 1016, 1017 
Constitutional Court of Colombia, Sala de Revisión, T-1025/07, decided 3 December 2007, published 
22 January 2008...................................................................................................... 971, 972, 996 
South African Constitutional Court S v. Makwanyane and Mchunu, 1995 (2) SACR 1 (CC) ..... 220, 250 
South African Constitutional Court Mohamed and another v. President of Republic of South Africa 
 and others, 28 May 2001, CCT 17/01 (2001)......................................................................... 283 
Hoge Raad (Dutch Supreme Court) 30 maart 1990 RvdW 1990, 76, Nederlandse Jurisprudentie 1991, 
No. 249, 30 March 1990 (the Short case, also reported in English ILM 29 (1990),  
 pp. 1375 ff.). ................................................................................................................... 283, 871 
 
 
 
 
 

 1185 
  
  
 INDEX 
A 
Abstention 
see Negative obligations 
Acquis humanitaire...................................................................................................933, 934, 1105, 1110 
Action 
see Positive obligations 
Addressees of provisional measures .............................................................................210, 623, 654, 918 
Adequate time and facilities .........................................................................................239, 245, 256, 811 
Admissibility ................................................................................................... 759-787, 1099-1102, 1054 
Aggravation of dispute ................................14, 16, 25, 29, 30, 48, 89, 98, 100, 133, 199, 925, 930, 1084 
Aggravated breach............................................................ 914, 935, 1025, 1044, 1051, 1053, 1056, 1106 
Amnesty.................................................................................215, 219-221, 226, 239, 346, 373, 662, 670 
Amnesty International ....... 91, 94, 131, 135, 183, 220, 242, 245, 247, 258, 260, 269, 274, 304, 310, 316 
327, 330, 351, 388, 392, 402, 405, 409, 438, 442, 507, 512, 513, 517, 546, 
548, 675, 677, 767, 830, 832, 911, 1007, 1014, 1026, 1035, 1049, 
1060-1062, 1067, 1072, 1075, 1076 
Anticipation of judgment 
see Non-anticipation of judgment 
Arbitrary detention ........144, 342, 385, 411, 412, 506, 524, 541, 542, 543, 545, 547-553, 692, 710, 719, 
945, 959 
Arbitrary expulsion 
 see Mass expulsion 
Armed conflict..................................18, 28, 37, 38, 66, 69, 70, 87, 95, 99, 274, 315, 317, 397, 420, 423, 
431, 467, 625, 702, 849, 979, 991, 1075 
Assets, judicial seizure of .................................................................................................................... 584 
Assurances 
see Diplomatic assurances 
Assurances of non-repetition ...........52, 53, 368, 437, 656, 658, 660, 670, 678, 691, 693-695, 701, 1030, 
1096, 1097 
Atypical provisional measures.................................................... 200, 501, 523, 525, 553, 586, 963, 1087 
Audi alteram partem .................................................................................9, 191, 1018, 1079, 1086, 1108 
Audiatur et altera pars  
see Audi alteram partem 
Aut dedere aut iudicare ............................................................................................. 553-558, 1070-1073 
Authority to use provisional measures..............3, 5, 6, 103, 124, 188, 189, 199, 656, 699, 711, 790, 885, 
894, 896, 897, 1084, 1094, 1101 
Auxiliary rights.............................................................................................................392, 396, 397, 707 
B 
Balance of convenience ........................................ 58, 571, 633, 634, 654, 701, 781, 789, 856, 869, 1011 
Beneficiaries of provisional measures .................... 55, 172, 186, 210, 539, 621, 623, 624, 626, 628, 638 
642, 646, 648, 655, 695, 789, 852, 853, 968, 1097, 1098 
Border conflict.................................................................................... 7, 22, 26, 37, 48, 98, 99, 623, 1083 
Bosnia Human Rights Chamber............................................................ 53, 103, 182, 465, 501, 716, 1095 
Bottom-up approach .......................................................................................................................... 1096 
 Index 
1186 
Burden of proof .......... 41, 77, 80, 83, 85, 86, 96, 193, 319, 320, 323, 326, 442, 494, 597, 774, 804, 806, 
807, 815, 818, 819, 830, 843, 845, 863, 869, 873, 876, 877, 943, 1054, 1104 
C 
Capital punishment 
see Death penalty 
CEDAW ...............67, 69, 70, 103, 132-136, 138, 139, 141, 142, 153, 183, 188, 213, 214, 405, 431-433, 
443, 449, 514, 592, 595, 626, 718, 726, 805, 885, 919, 1022, 1076, 1094 
CEJIL ........... 158, 159, 207, 313, 314, 337, 357, 358, 360, 409, 419, 421, 427, 578, 581, 582, 585, 627, 
766, 849, 906, 958, 973, 991, 1070 
CERD .........30, 66, 103, 132-136, 188, 206, 213, 416, 469, 471, 482, 489-492, 499, 514, 517, 726, 759, 
770, 787, 789, 885, 896, 1094, 1101 
Cessation .......43, 52, 53, 550, 589, 656-660, 662, 666, 669, 679, 691, 693-695, 1050, 1096, 1097, 1098 
Children .................................................................. 96, 121, 131, 133, 152, 167, 259, 270, 271, 296-298, 
302, 320, 337, 338, 353-355, 357-360, 372, 376-378, 382, 408-419, 444, 447, 
462, 468, 474, 485, 503-507, 513-517, 521, 524, 526, 529-535, 540, 541, 546, 552, 
564, 568, 570, 575, 576, 587, 592, 599-602, 604, 607-609, 643, 652, 664, 665, 689, 690, 702, 
707, 714, 718, 726, 737, 769, 771, 798, 834, 840, 960-962, 1016, 1017, 1067, 1068, 1093 
Collective rights............................................................ 166, 210, 451, 455, 457, 459, 462, 464, 469-475, 
479-484, 486, 489, 497-499, 510, 512, 518, 530, 635-638, 
645, 650, 655, 674, 709-712, 725, 859, 860, 912, 1092 
Committee against Disappearances ..............................................................................135, 136, 786, 787 
Common core of provisional measures...........................................................705, 715, 1092, 1094, 1110 
Commutation of death sentence ................... 217, 219, 221, 222, 226, 237-239, 243, 248, 252, 254, 375, 
678-686, 688, 691-693, 721, 722, 749, 756, 777, 794, 816, 949, 1026, 1027, 1067, 1098 
Compétence de la compétence ............................................................................................... 72, 752, 932 
Compliance 
see Non-compliance 
Concept of provisional measures ............................................. 3, 5, 15, 78, 101, 104, 124, 192, 195, 199, 
200-202, 209, 210, 256, 293, 451, 499, 506, 521, 523, 531, 542, 
553, 559, 562, 564, 586, 587, 679, 695, 700, 705, 712, 718, 720, 
724, 729, 758, 855, 872, 934, 941, 944, 1081, 1082, 1084, 1086, 
1087, 1089, 1098, 1101, 1105 
Consent, of beneficiary with provisional measure ............................... 414, 446, 469, 480, 482, 483, 491, 
496, 497, 626, 634-642, 656, 695, 989 
Consent, of State.............. 60, 62, 68, 71, 98, 196, 744, 844, 845, 920, 944, 989, 1013, 1082, 1084, 1089 
Consular notification ........................................................................................................33, 54, 239, 240 
Consultation between the Parties ......................... 46, 50, 72, 84, 145-153, 202, 453, 455, 469, 472, 480, 
487, 491, 493-496, 624, 633-642, 695, 1035, 1055, 1081, 1097 
Convergence .................................3, 103, 191, 192, 195, 201, 497, 700, 716, 746, 927, 934, 1081, 1087, 
1088, 1099, 1105 
Core rights ......................... 497, 593, 622, 656, 694, 702, 719, 912, 913, 917, 925, 928, 933, 1096, 1105 
Corporal punishment ............. 103, 120, 121, 210, 257-263, 291, 329, 371, 375, 590, 666-668, 721, 722, 
793, 803, 875, 1092, 1094, 1103 
Cross-fertilization ..................................................................... 113, 192, 195, 200, 201, 499, 1087, 1088 
Cultural identity.....................................453, 459, 460, 463, 465, 481, 485, 486, 490, 493, 709, 710, 978 
Cultural survival ............ 121, 125, 434, 456, 462, 473, 479, 482-485, 487, 493, 495, 498-501, 509, 530, 
597, 655, 672, 674, 699, 705, 708-712, 725, 780-782, 804, 855-857, 859, 860, 
864-867, 871, 872, 874, 877, 979, 982, 1092, 1093, 1098, 1103 
D 
Dayton Peace Agreement .....................................................182-185, 206, 242, 325, 432, 465, 467, 497, 
501, 508, 518, 520, 623, 659, 712, 734, 756, 783, 785, 786, 890, 1022, 1051, 1069 
 Index 
1187 
Death penalty 
Death row phenomenon ..........................................................................................250-255, 292-294 
Exhaustion............................................................................................................................... 799-789 
Extradition............................................................................................................................... 287-290 
Follow-up by ICJ ........................................................................................................................91-94 
IACHR and reparation ............................................................................................................ 688-691 
ICJ ...................................................................................................................... 31-36, 89, 91-94, 100 
Promptness of intervention by HRC........................................................................................ 106-111 
Risk, assessment of ................................................................................................................ 808-816 
Risk, immediacy of ................................................................................................................. 792-795 
Death row .........76, 107, 120, 156, 163, 226-228, 233, 236, 250-256, 292, 293, 296, 306, 330, 353, 366, 
367, 369-371, 374, 382, 440-442, 449, 738, 741, 762, 774, 775, 783, 784, 791, 796, 809, 
824, 951, 1027, 1034 
Death threats................................. 104, 112, 162, 163, 178, 210, 253, 271, 316, 329, 345, 405-449, 457, 
460-462, 501, 510, 530, 531, 547, 553, 554, 557-559, 562, 590, 592-594, 598, 
605, 607, 610-614, 616, 617, 620, 621, 635, 642, 646, 655, 658, 661, 666, 
670, 672, 681, 692, 694, 699, 708, 714, 715, 717-719, 723-725, 732, 756-758, 
764, 765, 790, 799, 803, 804, 846, 848, 852, 870, 874, 946, 965-968, 
972, 1001, 1003, 1040, 1073, 1085, 1090, 1092, 1095-1097, 1101, 1103 
Deference to the executive......................................................................................................... 996, 1013 
Delegation of power to order provisional measures .....................9-11, 59, 106, 107, 124, 126, 137, 138, 
153, 154, 176, 177, 185, 189, 200, 1085 
Denunciation of treaty ............................................... 129, 145, 258, 356, 619, 738-748, 886, 1041, 1043 
Detention ................................................................ 329-383, 541, 599, 669, 678, 705, 842-845, 958-962 
Diplomatic assurances ...................... 21, 52-54, 75, 76, 81, 122, 233, 235, 251, 267, 268, 280, 283, 286, 
289, 290, 292, 304, 368, 391, 392, 437, 545, 605, 630, 656, 658, 660, 
662, 666, 668, 670, 678, 679, 691, 693-695, 701, 736, 783, 817, 822, 
823, 825, 826, 833, 836-842, 909, 948, 955, 956, 1007-1010, 1017, 
1028, 1030, 1052, 1056, 1060-1062, 1096-1098 
Diplomatic protection ........................................................................... 22, 38, 53, 55, 56, 100, 764, 1084 
Disappearance................................................111-115, 136, 144, 210, 309-329, 344, 345, 393, 397, 399, 
402, 405, 413, 439, 532, 534, 551, 598, 635, 664, 665, 678, 735, 766, 786, 804, 806, 
870, 875, 888, 945, 958, 966, 1023, 1038, 1054, 1071, 1103 
Discrimination .................................................... 30, 66-69, 133, 183, 232, 289, 433, 443, 465, 469, 471, 
475-476, 487, 489-490, 493, 497, 499-500, 501-521, 524, 540, 568, 573, 705-715, 
 725, 732, 739, 1092, 1093 
Disappeared persons 
see Disappearance 
Divergence.................................................................. 3, 103, 191, 192, 201, 716, 934, 1087, 1099, 1105 
Domestic violence ..................................................................................................70, 132, 135, 431, 433 
Drafting history of Rule 86 by the HRC .............................................................................................. 124 
Dualist system of implementation ................................................................................................. 92, 997 
E 
Early warning .............................................................................................................................. 489, 645 
Effet utile ...............................................691, 745, 746, 748, 918, 931, 932, 934, 1051, 1106, 1107, 1111 
Embryos......................................................................................................506, 524, 540, 541, 721, 1094 
Ensuring procedural rights 
see Purpose of provisional measures 
Environment, protection of the ........................................... 13, 20-21, 28, 36-38, 46, 56, 83-86, 99, 419, 
454, 455, 460, 469, 480, 486, 490, 494, 496-499, 516, 519, 529, 530, 537-539, 594, 597, 
 623, 640, 657, 676, 677, 709, 711, 713, 724, 780-782, 791, 801, 857, 860, 861, 
862-867, 869, 871-873, 876, 877, 1083, 1084 
 Index 
1188 
Equality ................................................................. 78, 105, 171, 191, 238, 241, 295, 326, 433, 454, 458, 
476, 477, 483, 509, 510, 568, 710, 788, 898, 927, 1024, 1101 
Equality of arms...............................19, 78, 98, 105, 245, 585, 684, 723, 811, 816, 867, 869, 1088, 1105 
Erga omnes obligations 
see Obligations erga omnes 
Eviction, forced ..................... 133, 182, 207, 210, 276, 449, 461, 486, 487, 501, 502, 508-511, 517-521, 
569, 713-715, 1092, 1093, 1095 
Evidence .................................................................................................................... 812-880, 1054-1062 
Preserving the........................................................................................................................... 19, 652 
Exhaustion of domestic remedies .................246, 274, 286, 295, 301, 327, 395, 454, 474, 480, 539, 634, 
644, 684, 685, 732, 739, 755, 756, 759, 761-764, 767, 770-774, 
777, 779-781, 788, 789, 797, 798, 825, 833, 857, 868, 949, 964, 
989, 1013, 1096, 1100, 1102 
Ex nunc .......................................................................................................................................... 62, 829 
Expression, freedom of.................. 104, 165, 342, 429, 434, 546-549, 552, 560, 564, 566, 568, 577-580, 
582-584, 587, 591, 598, 609, 610, 713, 715, 718, 992, 1038, 1095 
Extradition ....................................112, 116, 122, 130, 170, 173, 174, 177, 179, 206, 210, 228, 233, 235, 
250-252, 265-307, 327, 330, 354, 510, 537, 555-557, 573, 597, 605, 630, 668, 669, 
698, 699, 769-772, 792, 796, 797, 803, 805, 817, 820-825, 833, 837-842, 844, 863, 
869, 870, 875, 876, 897, 898, 900, 901, 910, 912-914, 921, 925, 929, 946, 951-955, 
977, 978, 980, 985, 999, 1002, 1007-1010, 1014, 1017, 1022, 1024-1026, 1033, 
1048, 1049, 1055-1063, 1070-1072, 1091, 1103 
Extraordinary rendition 
 see Rendition 
Extraterritorial obligations.............................................195, 279-280, 305, 329, 375, 397, 401-403, 436,  
733-737, 788, 1099, 1100 
F 
Fairness...........................................13, 229, 230, 239, 241, 256, 286, 633, 654, 695, 697, 722, 724, 783, 
808, 816, 826, 827, 983, 987, 998, 999, 1090, 1097 
Family life .............103, 268, 279, 290, 296, 467-479, 481, 482, 487, 493, 518, 533, 536, 538, 569, 571, 
572, 575, 576, 587, 641, 677, 698, 711, 715, 797, 824, 861, 912, 917, 953 
Financial measures, halting ......................................................................................................... 584, 585 
Flexibility of use of provisional measures .......................... 143, 148, 299, 586, 587, 619, 620, 622, 629, 
726, 897, 1086, 1093, 1111 
Follow-up on on-compliance 
by the HRC ......................................................................................................................... 1022-1034 
by CAT ........................................................................................................................................ 1035 
in Inter-American system.................................................................................................... 1036-1047 
in European system ............................................................................................................. 1048-1050 
under Dayton Peace Agreement ................................................................................................... 1051 
as part of treaty reporting procedures ........................................................................................... 1052 
by other authorities.............................................................................................................. 1064-1068 
by NGOs ............................................................................................................................. 1069-1075 
Forced confessions ...................................................................................................................... 239, 240 
Forum prorogatum .......................................................................................................................... 60, 71 
Fragmentation of international law .....................................................................193, 194, 745, 746, 1087 
Freedom from ex post facto laws ......................................................................................... 239, 241, 702 
G 
General principles of law.............................................. 77, 201, 881, 882, 912, 921, 923, 930, 988, 1088 
Genocide Convention ................7, 9, 10, 17, 29, 40, 44, 53, 58, 60, 63, 64, 66-68, 78, 88, 90, 91, 95, 97, 
748, 881 
 Index 
1189 
Gross human rights violations ............................................ 7, 29, 37, 151, 596, 623, 662, 767, 871, 1038 
H 
Habeas corpus............... 247, 293, 315, 317, 318, 327, 335, 337, 339, 347, 349, 350, 358, 385, 386, 392, 
397-400, 544, 545, 549, 669, 681, 764, 765, 766 
Halting corporal punishment 
see Purpose of provisional measures 
Halting executions 
see Purpose of provisional measures 
Harassment ...................................................... 210, 271, 405-450, 558-562, 611-619, 670, 671, 869-871 
Human Rights Watch...............78, 132, 141, 154, 159, 304, 310, 313, 324, 327, 402, 436, 543, 554-557, 
560, 799, 837, 957, 1062, 1070-1072, 1076 
Humanization ....................................................... 3, 36, 37, 100, 194, 716, 933, 1081, 1082, 1084, 1107 
Hunger strike ...........113, 178, 186, 329, 330, 332, 342, 343, 349, 353, 354, 362-366, 383, 604, 630-632 
635, 654, 719, 843, 846, 915, 918, 962, 1097 
I 
Identification of beneficiaries ....................................................................................... 609, 615, 642-655 
Immediacy of risk ..........................................................................6, 20, 74-76, 177, 294, 555, 698, 701, 
710, 732, 771, 791-802, 846, 847, 868, 
983, 1102, 1103, 1107 
Imminence of risk 
see Immediacy of risk 
Impact assessment .......................................................................... 84, 469, 494, 496, 498, 499, 530, 873 
Impartiality ..........................................................162, 177, 239, 241, 242, 395, 813, 814, 884, 885, 1000 
Impunity .......... 79, 132, 327, 427, 428, 434, 435, 444, 462, 548, 553, 557, 558, 610, 616, 617, 660-662, 
664, 671, 672, 708, 854, 969, 971, 1072 
Incorporation into domestic law ........................................................................................ 995, 996, 1000 
Incremental approach to specificity ............................................................................................. 598, 611 
Independence of the judiciary............................................................. 242, 413, 558, 559, 662, 718, 1095 
Indigenous communities ........................ 315, 426, 427, 459, 463, 483-485, 489, 490, 493, 496, 499, 873 
Indigenous culture .........103, 112, 115, 127, 144, 165, 451, 454, 457, 461, 468-471, 482, 490, 492, 497, 
499, 500, 626, 635, 638, 639, 654, 677, 700, 708, 710-712, 721, 725, 765, 792, 
799, 803, 863, 868, 871-873, 1092, 1094, 1097, 1111 
Individual complaints 
under African system ...................................................................................................... 165-167, 171 
under Bosnia Human Rights Chamber .................................................................................... 182-184 
under CAT/CEDAW/CERD ................................................................................................... 134-135 
under European Human Rights system ................................................................................... 170-172 
under Human Rights Committee ............................................................................................. 104-105 
under Inter-Americam Human Rights system ................................................................. 145-149, 548 
Inequality.............................................326, 723, 731, 792, 796, 803, 806, 808, 867, 882, 937, 943, 1105 
Inferences .....................................................................................................78, 323, 631, 805, 869, 1097 
Information, access to..................................................................................... 10, 120, 497, 538, 577-584 
Information on provisional measures, accessibility of .................................164, 190, 191, 200, 202, 219, 
1081, 1085-1087 
Internal displacement........................................... 165, 181, 273, 327, 422, 428, 434, 461, 501, 509, 510, 
529, 530, 619, 621, 694, 700, 713-715, 721, 725, 1040, 1093, 1096 
Interrogation method ............................................................................................330, 332, 383, 392, 678 
Intervening in detention situations 
see Purpose of provisional measures 
 Index 
1190 
Irreversible harm................. 15, 16, 20, 21, 46, 84, 85, 205, 208, 209, 211, 229, 238, 296, 300, 305, 394, 
463, 482, 498, 523, 525, 531, 540, 552-554, 557, 559, 562, 564, 567, 568, 573, 574, 576, 582, 
584, 586, 587, 657, 685, 698, 699, 701, 707, 709-713, 715, 718, 719, 722-724, 736, 
795, 831, 857, 900, 901, 907, 913, 922, 935, 1010, 1031, 1033, 1055, 1056, 1071, 
1081, 1090, 1095, 1107 
Ius cogens ..........................................37, 77, 207, 236, 275, 276, 285, 287, 510, 700, 702, 703, 705, 707 
Ius soli ......................................................................................................................................... 506, 514 
IVF .......................................................................................................................170, 506, 524, 540, 721 
J 
Journalist ..............................................214, 408, 418, 429, 430, 579, 580, 582, 609, 610, 637, 718, 903, 
966, 983, 992, 1041, 1095 
Jurisdiction .....................................................................................................59-72, 729-791, 1099-1101 
L 
Lack of proper care........................................................ 271, 272, 280, 292, 296-299, 301, 306, 367, 721 
Land rights..............................314, 451, 462, 465, 469, 471, 475, 490-493, 496, 499, 531, 710, 859, 978 
Legal aid .........................................................................244, 246, 625, 761, 764, 769, 773-776, 809-811 
Legal status of provisional measures ..................................... 87, 179, 188, 191, 197, 222, 266, 597, 693, 
729, 881, 882, 894, 898, 908, 909, 911, 934, 937, 943, 
945, 977, 1064, 1086, 1099, 1105, 1107, 1108 
Legitimacy....................... 193, 201, 401, 421, 494, 507, 611, 614, 654, 666, 695, 957, 1089, 1097, 1111 
Life imprisonment ............ 34, 94, 130, 170, 215, 252, 280, 292, 294, 295, 306, 307, 347, 680, 682, 683, 
844, 1009 
Life plan 
see Project of life 
Lifting provisional measures ....................................... 122, 139, 143, 150, 186, 408, 571, 580, 771, 797, 
803, 817, 821, 822, 836-841, 852-854, 867, 889, 955-957, 968, 974, 976, 982, 983 
M 
Margin of appreciation ....................................................................... 488, 541, 591, 622, 641, 694, 1096 
Marine environment, protection of ................................................. 8, 20-21, 28-29, 36, 39, 46, 59, 71-73 
Mass expulsion .................................... 133, 144, 207, 210, 274, 276, 378, 405, 409, 487, 501-518, 521, 
524, 531, 590, 591, 607, 608, 642, 646, 655, 700, 713-715, 721, 725, 767, 833-835, 965, 
1001, 1040, 1092, 1093, 1098 
Medical care ........... 170, 252, 297, 299, 329, 330, 333-335, 340-342, 344, 346, 348-351, 359, 363, 369, 
371, 372, 378, 382, 386, 392, 526, 530, 601, 611, 669, 670, 960, 962-964, 1074 
Minors ............. 94, 144, 235, 250, 256, 329, 330, 353, 355, 357-359, 376, 377, 378, 429, 434, 445, 531, 
532, 534, 535, 551, 576, 604, 652, 664, 707, 766, 806, 807, 960-962, 1004, 1068 
Monist system of implementation........................................................................................................ 997 
Motivation of provisional measures .............117, 125, 143, 161, 189, 190, 200, 202, 305, 580, 688, 691, 
699, 718, 867, 879, 995, 1040, 1081, 1085, 1086, 1090, 1105, 1110, 1111 
N 
Negative obligations .................................................................46, 49, 210, 376, 458, 486, 538, 589-593, 
609, 693-695, 700, 717, 721-724, 934, 944, 1096-1098, 1106 
NGO 
see Non-governmental organisation 
Non-anticipation of judgment ............................................................ 15, 16, 42, 191, 225, 360, 394, 544, 
721, 722, 732, 851, 878, 879, 1085 
Non-compliance 
consequences of .................................................................................................................. 1053-1063 
general................................................................................................................................. 1108-1110 
 Index 
1191 
official reasons given for....................................................................................................... 977-1018 
with provisional measures in re disappearance............................................................................... 959 
with provisional measures health in detention......................................................................... 959-962 
with provisional measures health care..................................................................................... 963-965 
with provisional measures halting executions ......................................................................... 946-950 
with provisional measures ICJ ......................................................................34-36, 54, 57-59, 90-101 
Non-derogable rights ............................. 207, 229, 236, 288, 358, 388, 390, 397-399, 489, 702-706, 708, 
714, 724, 917, 1092 
Non-governmental organisation................................... 119, 131, 132, 151, 154, 156, 158, 159, 166, 169, 
170, 172, 178, 181, 192, 194, 207, 216, 247, 327, 333, 337, 357, 
379, 388, 405, 411-413, 417, 427, 431, 434, 497, 554, 578, 595, 
600, 606, 624-627, 643, 647, 651, 653, 655, 703, 712, 766, 774, 798, 
805, 815, 830, 831, 875, 932, 944, 969, 975, 991, 995, 1018, 1021, 
1040, 1067, 1069-1073, 1075-1077, 1079, 1080, 1088, 1096, 
1104, 1107-1110 
Non-refoulement.................... 132, 134, 139, 144, 174, 181, 210, 230, 265-307, 310, 327, 367, 390-394, 
398, 401, 402, 428, 436, 501, 525, 553, 569, 573, 576, 634, 656, 669, 699, 705, 707, 
716, 721, 724, 737, 764, 768, 773, 779, 782, 796, 803, 804, 817, 819-821, 
831, 833, 836, 863, 870, 871, 874, 878, 901, 903, 904, 917, 925, 951, 953, 954, 
978, 1013, 1024, 1053, 1055, 1061, 1090, 1091, 1103 
Nuclear radiation ..........................................................................................................530, 535, 536, 539 
Nuclear tests .................................................... 20, 43, 47, 52, 79, 99, 535-537, 539, 707, 804, 860, 1083 
O 
Obligations erga omnes ...................................................................... 100, 285, 328, 513, 624, 714, 1084 
Ordre public ...............................................................................................................747, 750, 893, 1111 
Outer limits of provisional measures ............................................................................xx, 474, 729, 1087 
P 
Pardon of criminal conviction..................................... 219, 221, 226, 238, 239, 243, 252, 690, 949, 1015 
Personal integrity...................148, 154, 207, 210, 225, 310, 315, 320, 329, 338, 346, 350, 358-360, 372, 
375-378, 389-391, 393, 398, 402, 403, 406, 407, 409-411, 413, 415, 421, 424, 
425, 427, 428, 433, 438, 445, 459, 460, 462, 463, 482, 485, 500, 501, 503-505, 
509, 521, 523, 525, 535, 541, 542, 546, 553, 557, 559, 567, 576, 577, 582, 585, 
587, 592, 593, 596, 598-600, 602, 603, 609, 610, 612, 625, 643, 645, 648, 649, 
654, 656, 672, 690, 692, 700, 701, 709, 713, 716, 718, 720, 723-725, 729, 773, 
799, 834, 850, 851, 855-857, 868, 917, 924, 933-935, 944, 967, 973, 976, 1003, 
1017, 1038, 1046, 1079, 1091-1095, 1105, 1106, 1109, 1110 
Political rights........................................................................................171, 299, 434, 549, 565-567, 568 
Positive obligations..................46, 171, 313, 317, 319, 322, 372, 373, 376, 380, 383, 432-434, 436, 443, 
447-449, 458, 497, 520, 530, 531, 534, 558, 589-592, 659, 669, 698, 706, 
708, 724, 1096 
Precaution............................................................................................................................ 771, 864, 866 
Precautionary principle ...............20, 21, 73, 75, 83-86, 538, 657, 792, 858, 859, 861-867, 869-871, 873, 
876, 877 
Precedent ............................................................. 37, 58, 61, 66, 275, 394, 528, 540, 583, 596, 597, 608, 
714, 722, 780, 801, 926, 927, 952, 959, 970, 974, 1013, 1041, 1045, 1052, 1094 
Pre-empting use of provisional measures .....................................................788, 903, 97, 954, 955, 1100 
Pre-emption of outcome judicial process .................................. 42, 92, 224, 255, 657, 723, 981, 996, 998 
Prejudgment........................................ 3, 5, 12, 13, 20, 40, 41, 47, 49, 58, 61, 78-82, 150, 213, 222, 224, 
656, 683, 720, 722, 748, 848, 878, 1104 
Preventive principle ..................................................................................................78, 83, 863, 870, 877 
Project of life ........................................................................ 378, 505, 513, 524, 541, 548, 553, 717, 725 
 Index 
1192 
Promptness of intervention 
by African Commission ......................................................................................................... 167, 168 
by Bosnia Chamber ........................................................................................................................ 185 
by CAT and CEDAW ............................................................................................................. 135-138 
in European system ................................................................................................................. 173-178 
in general........................................................................................................................ 200, 254, 868 
by HRC ........................................................................................................... 103-119, 290, 326, 793 
by ICJ and ITLOS .........................................................................................................................9-12 
in Inter-American system........................................................................................................ 149-156 
Proprio motu ...........6, 12, 17, 18, 48, 50, 59, 77, 80, 90, 97, 99, 105, 120, 121, 139, 156-158, 168, 186, 
189, 174, 178, 200, 238, 261, 304, 311, 343, 344, 349, 356, 432, 451, 470, 545, 
567, 595, 626, 627, 636, 667, 668, 682, 683, 719, 739, 790, 805, 814, 816, 828, 
1047, 1057, 1085, 1101 
Prosecution of perpetrators ................... 241, 315, 338, 405, 416, 433, 434, 558, 598, 616-617, 658, 661, 
666, 670-672, 693, 1074, 1101 
Protecting against death threats and harassment 
see Purpose of provisional measures 
Psychological distress...................................................................................................353, 360, 362, 381 
Purpose of provisional measures 
Ensuring procedural rights .....................................................310, 346, 385, 386, 405-449, 767, 1038 
Halting corporal punishment ..................................................................... xx, 257-264, 666, 793, 803 
Halting executions.............................................................31, 130, 170, 213-256, 265, 287, 291, 292, 
396, 598, 629, 642, 658, 678, 691, 738, 779, 784, 
808, 817, 948, 951, 1018, 1026, 1062, 1081 
Halting expulsion/extradition .................................................................................................. 265-307 
Halting mass or arbitrary expulsion and forced eviction ......................................................... 501-521 
Intervening in dentention situations ............................................................................................... 170 
Locating disappeared persons ................................................................................................. 309-328 
Protecting against death threats and harassment.............................................. 209, 330, 385-403, 627 
Protecting (indigenous) cultural and religious rights............................................................... 451-500 
R 
Real risk..........132, 174, 206, 233, 235, 250, 251, 256, 267, 270, 272, 274, 281-287, 289, 291-293, 297, 
298, 302, 306, 537, 569, 575, 591, 597, 646, 653, 705, 716, 769, 792, 795, 798, 807, 817, 
820, 822-825, 827-829, 842, 863, 864, 867-871, 874-878, 913, 937, 941, 943, 980, 1015, 
1025, 1053, 1056, 1058-1063, 1079, 1091, 1099, 1103, 1104, 1107, 1109 
Recommendations in Orders denying provisional measures.................................................................. 49 
Refugees ........................129, 165, 181, 265, 272-279, 284, 304, 353, 428, 487, 511, 517, 526, 550, 591, 
643, 838, 916, 1056, 1068 
Rendition, extraordinary ........................................ 280, 302, 304-306, 310, 327, 329, 401, 402, 736, 737 
Reparation ......................................................................................... 51-54, 656-696, 699, 701, 715-726, 
975, 992, 1035, 1045, 1046, 1050, 1090-1092, 1096-1098, 1100, 1101, 1106 
Representation ......................................................................................................240, 243, 246, 256, 810 
Reservations ....................40, 62, 64, 67-69, 109, 196, 198, 207, 398, 476, 477, 489, 490, 687, 702, 703, 
711, 724, 731, 733, 738, 740, 742, 744, 746-748, 760, 787, 887, 1099, 1108 
Responses to provisional measures.......................................................................946, 951, 958, 963, 965 
Restitutio in integrum ...............................31, 32, 44, 52, 53, 92, 664, 670, 678, 689, 693, 698, 701, 752, 
892-894, 918, 924, 925, 932, 1044, 1050, 1090 
Restitution in kind 
see restitutio in integrum 
Right to counsel ............................................................................................239, 243, 256, 397, 770, 809 
 Index 
1193 
S 
Satisfaction ...................43, 53, 95, 133, 433, 446, 498, 509, 639, 660, 662-666, 672, 687, 693, 779, 957 
Scrutiny by adjudicators, level of .................................... 769, 804, 806, 809, 826, 876, 878, 1012, 1082 
Seguimiento ............................................................................................................751, 1022, 1036, 1052 
Self-determination .................................................................377, 464, 468-471, 490, 498, 638, 655, 711 
Sovereignty..........................................52, 84, 305, 401, 412, 513, 622, 694, 779, 944, 1084, 1096, 1111 
Specificity of provisional measures ................................. 46-48, 120, 353, 396, 400, 416, 458, 460, 530, 
589, 591, 594, 596, 598, 599, 611, 617, 619, 620, 622, 624, 651, 658, 694, 837, 
967, 976, 981, 992, 995, 1018, 1041, 1079, 1082, 1096, 1097, 1109 
Standard of proof ........... 63, 64, 78, 79, 321, 323, 326, 806, 807, 830, 841, 843, 869-871, 874-876, 956, 
1103, 1104 
Subsidiarity.................. 173, 193, 550, 604, 620, 622, 644, 694, 719, 745, 778, 779, 804, 817, 897, 1096 
Subsidiary means for the determination of international law..............................197, 201, 202, 931, 1089 
Subsidiary organs ................................................................................................................ 106, 107, 124 
Sui generis ................................................................................................183, 586, 716, 788, 1095, 1100 
Suspensive effect ............ 173, 301, 479, 512, 550, 731, 768-770, 772, 778-780, 782, 789, 797-800, 833, 
856, 896, 921, 1102 
Systemic integration .......................................................................................................... 194, 201, 1088 
T 
Timeliness of State reporting ............................................................................................................... 976 
Top-down approach........................................................................................................................... 1096 
Torture ................................ 37, 96, 174, 206, 207, 260, 263, 265-307, 374, 375, 380, 391-403, 447-558, 
575, 593, 620-622, 656, 798, 806-808, 815, 817-833, 836-842, 869-971, 901-904, 
909-912, 917, 918, 925, 928, 931, 933, 980, 1013, 1015, 1023, 1038, 1049, 1053, 
1056-1076, 1080, 1091-1094, 1096, 1098, 1099, 1109 
Transparency of information on provisional measures ............................3, 5, 6, 9, 60, 90, 103, 123-131, 
140-143, 158-164, 169, 178, 187, 189-191, 200, 476, 627, 644, 692, 793, 
861, 945, 1018, 1079, 1085-1087, 1108, 1110 
Treaty interpretation ................................................. 196, 876, 881, 902, 912, 916, 921, 933, 1089, 1105 
U 
Undue delay........................................................................ 240, 247, 249, 256, 317, 370, 398, 441, 1032 
Undue hardship................................................................................... 301, 550, 715, 716, 725, 726, 1093 
UNESCO............................................................................................................................. 465, 713, 863 
Urgency 
in general ....................................9, 12, 17, 39, 74, 116, 152, 175, 191, 222, 338, 505, 545, 547, 548, 
555, 558, 562, 582, 584, 605, 697, 717, 718, 720, 758, 760, 796, 832, 849, 
856, 874, 878, 976, 994 
Material .....................................................12, 20, 40, 45, 52, 74, 77-86, 116-118, 192, 729, 791, 821 
Temporal .......................................... 12, 44, 74-76, 192, 295, 705, 717, 729, 771, 785, 788, 791-801, 
821, 833, 868, 874, 875, 1102, 1103 
W 
Withdrawal from individual complaint system...........................................738, 739, 742, 847, 951, 1043 
Withdrawal of provisional measures 
see Lifting provisional measures 
Written judgment.......................................................................... 240, 249, 256, 679, 756, 765, 776, 777 
 
 
 
 

 1195 
 
  
  
 CURRICULUM VITAE 
Eva Rieter (1970) studied law at Maastricht University (Master of Dutch law, specialization 
international law, 1995). She went on to obtain an LL.M degree at the University of Virginia 
School of Law (LL.M. 1996, specializations human rights law and US law), where she also 
worked as a research assistant for Prof. R.B. Lillich and received the McClure Fellowship in 
human rights. She joined the Maastricht Centre for Human Rights in 1997. In 1999 she received a 
Max van der Stoel Human Rights award for her article ‘Interim Measures by the World Court to 
Suspend the Execution of an Individual: the Breard Case’, published in the Netherlands Quarterly 
of Human Rights. She has published a range of articles and is the co-author of a book on the 
proceedings before the European Court of Human Rights, the UN Human Rights Committee and 
the other three Geneva bodies (2002; revised edition 2008). She has taught public international 
law and human rights at Maastricht University School of Law and University College Maastricht. 
Currently she is assistant professor at Radboud University Nijmegen lecturing public international 
law and international human rights law. 

 1197 
  
 SCHOOL OF HUMAN RIGHTS 
 RESEARCH SERIES 
The School of Human Rights Research is a joint effort by human rights researchers in the 
Netherlands. Its central research theme is the nature and meaning of international standards in the 
field of human rights, their application and promotion in the national legal order, their interplay 
with national standards, and the international supervision of such application. The School of 
Human Rights Research Series only includes English titles that contribute to a better 
understanding of the different aspects of human rights. 
Editorial Board of the Series: 
Prof. dr. J.E. Goldschmidt (Utrecht University), Prof. dr. D.A. Hellema (Utrecht University), Prof. 
dr. W.J.M. van Genugten (Tilburg University), Prof. dr. M.T. Kamminga (Maastricht University), 
Prof. dr. P.A.M. Mevis (Erasmus University Rotterdam), Prof. dr. R.A. Lawson (Leiden 
University) and Dr. O.M. Ribbelink (Asser Institute). 
Published titles within the Series: 
1 Brigit C.A. Toebes, The Right to Health as a Human Right in International Law  
ISBN 90-5095-057-4 
2 Ineke Boerefijn, The Reporting Procedure under the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
Practice and Procedures of the Human Rights Committee 
ISBN 90-5095-074-4 
3 Kitty Arambulo, Strengthening the Supervision of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights. Theoretical and Procedural Aspects 
ISBN 90-5095-058-2 
4 Marlies Glasius, Foreign Policy on Human Rights. Its Influence on Indonesia under Soeharto 
ISBN 90-5095-089-2 
5 Cornelis D. de Jong, The Freedom of Thought, Conscience and Religion or Belief in the 
United Nations (1946-1992) 
ISBN 90-5095-137-6 
6 Heleen Bosma, Freedom of Expression in England and under the ECHR: in Search of a 
Common Ground. A Foundation for the Application of the Human Rights Act 1998 in English 
Law 
ISBN 90-5095-136-8 
7 Mielle Bulterman, Human Rights in the External Relations of the European Union  
ISBN 90-5095-164-3 
 School of Human Rights Research Series 
1198 
8 Esther M. van den Berg, The Influence of Domestic NGOs on Dutch Human Rights Policy. 
Case Studies on South Africa,Namibia, Indonesia and East Timor 
ISBN 90-5095-159-7 
9 Ian Seiderman, Hierarchy in International Law: the Human Rights Dimension 
ISBN 90-5095-165-1 
10 Anna Meijknecht, Towards International Personality: the Position of Minorities and 
Indigenous Peoples in International Law 
ISBN 90-5095-166-X 
11 Mohamed Eltayeb, A Human Rights Approach to Combating Religious Persecution. Cases 
from Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and Sudan 
ISBN 90-5095-170-8 
12 Machteld Boot, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, War Crimes: Nullum Crimen Sine Lege 
and the Subject Matter Jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court 
ISBN 90-5095-216-X 
13 Corinne Packer, Using Human Rights to Change Tradition. Traditional Practices Harmful to 
Women’s Reproductive Health in sub-Saharan Africa 
ISBN 90-5095-226-7 
14 Theo R.G. van Banning, The Human Right to Property 
ISBN 90-5095-203-8 
15 Yvonne M. Donders, Towards a Right to Cultural Identity? 
ISBN 90-5095-238-0 
16 Göran K. Sluiter, International Criminal Adjudication and the Collection of Evidence: 
Obligations of States 
ISBN 90-5095-227-5 
17 Nicola Jägers, Corporate Human Rights Obligations: in Search of Accountability 
ISBN 90-5095-240-2 
18 Magdalena Sepúlveda, The Nature of the Obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ISBN 90-5095-260-7 
19 Mitsue Inazumi, Universal Jurisdiction in Modern International Law: Expansion of National 
Jurisdiction for Prosecuting Serious Crimes under International Law 
ISBN 90-5095-366-2 
20 Anne-Marie L.M. de Brouwer, Supranational Criminal Prosecution of Sexual Violence: The 
ICC and the Practice of the ICTY and the ICTR 
ISBN 90-5095-533-9 
 School of Human Rights Research Series 
1199 
21 Jeroen Gutter, Thematic Procedures of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights and 
International Law: in Search of a Sense of Community 
ISBN 90-5095-557-6 
22 Hilde Reiding, The Netherlands and the Development of International Human Rights 
Instruments 
ISBN 978-90-5095-654-3 
23 Ingrid Westendorp, Women and Housing: Gender Makes a Difference 
ISBN 978-90-5095-669-7 
24 Quirine A.M. Eijkman, We Are Here to Serve You! Public Security, Police Reform and 
Human Rights Implementation in Costa Rica 
ISBN 978-90-5095-704-5 
25 Antoine Ch. Buyse, Post-conflict Housing Restitution. The European Human Rights 
Perspective with a case study on Bosnia and Herzegovina 
ISBN 978-90-5095-770-0 
26 Gentian Zyberi, The Humanitarian Face of the International Court of Justice. Its 
Contribution to Interpreting and Developing International Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Law Rules and Principles 
ISBN 978-90-5095-792-2 
27 Dragoş Cucereanu, Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression on the Internet 
ISBN 978-90-5095-842-4 
28 Ton Liefaard, Deprivation of Liberty of Children in Light of International Human Rights Law 
and Standards 
ISBN 978-90-5095-838-7 
29 Laura van Waas, Nationality Matters. Statelessness under International Law 
ISBN 978-90-5095-854-7 
30 Jeroen Denkers, The World Trade Organization and Import Bans in Response to Violations of 
Fundamental Labour Rights 
ISBN 978-90-5095-855-4 
31 Irene Hadiprayitno, The Dialectics of Development Practice and the Internationally Declared 
Right to Development, with Special Reference to Indonesia 
ISBN 978-90-5095-932-2 
32 Michał Gondek, The Reach of Human Rights in a Globalising World: Extraterritorial 
Application of Human Rights Treaties 
ISBN 978-90-5095-817-2 
33 Jeff Handmaker, Advocating for Accountability: Civic-State Interactions to Protect Refugees 
in South Africa 
ISBN 978-905095-910-0 
 School of Human Rights Research Series 
1200 
34 Anna Oehmichen, Hazard or Right? Terrorism and Anti-Terror Legislation: The Terrorised 
Legislator? A Comparison of Counter-Terror Legislation and Its Implications on Human 
Rights in the Legal Systems of the United Kingdom, Spain, Germany and France 
ISBN 978-90-5095-956-8 
35 Simon Walker, The Future of Human Rights Impact Assessments of Trade Agreements 
ISBN 978-90-5095-986-5 
36 Fleur van Leeuwen, Women’s Rights Are Human Rights: The Practice of the United Nations 
Human Rights Committee and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
ISBN 978-90-5095-980-3 
 
